SHADOW BANKING FINAL.pptx

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    Seminar on

    MANAGEMENT OF BANKING AND

    FINANCIAL SERVICES

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    TODAYS AGENDA

    17/7/2013

    1

    SHADOW BANKS:Introduction to it.

    2 SHADOW BANKS:

    Prime cause for 2007 crisis.

    3 SHADOW BANKING:The Chinese scenario.

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    Shadow bank vs. Normal

    bank

    Access No access to central bank funds

    Safety

    No Safety nets from FDIC((FederalDeposit Insurance Corporation)

    Trading Banks do not take deposits instead

    rely on asset backed C.P and CDOs

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    SHADOW BANKING

    SYSTEM:

    VOLUME:

    Year Size of SBS (FSB)

    2007 - $25 Trillion2011 - $24 Trillion

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    Five steps of shadow banking

    1. Make loans.2. Make securities.

    3. Sell securities.

    4. Set up (SPVs)5. Trade (CDOs)

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    Mortgaged Backed Securities -MBS

    Secured by a mortgage(asset)

    Lent to home buyers.

    Default of the loan leads to surrenderof the asset.

    Given by small regional banks.

    Middlemen's job

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    Collateralized debt obligations - CDO

    Backed by a pool of bonds, loans.An investment-grade security,

    Do not specialize in one type of debt

    Often mortgage loans

    Different types of debt are often referred to

    as 'tranches' or 'slices

    PRIME

    NON PRIME

    SUBPRIME

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    Commercial PapersCPs

    A short-term investment vehicle

    With a maturity (90 and 180 days.)

    Issued by a bank and Companies.

    Used for short-term financing needs.

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    Shadow BankersAsset management

    firms

    Bank holding

    companies Banks, investment

    Banks, traditional

    Hedge funds Insurance

    companies

    Private equity firms

    Securitizing firms

    Sovereign wealth

    funds

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    3 Stage destruction and

    turmoil

    C.PS

    CDOS

    MBSS

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    IN THE 70S

    In 1970 banks were just doing Vanillabanking.

    Corporate went for C.Ps (started by Coke andGE)

    Banks had protection form FDIC (FederalDeposit Insurance Corporation)

    C.Ps :1. Short term

    2. Risky (comparatively)

    3. Not protected

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    THE STARTCITIGROUP

    Known for products with heavy risk

    hate to lose investors wanted a safe play:-(only high rated quality assets).

    Need was to create a new place ofinvestment vehicle.

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    NICK SOSSIDISPARTIDGE HICKS

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    Android of Citi called the ALPHA

    (The 1st so called shadow bank ever)

    Not banks, early forms of SPV.

    FUNCTIONS

    1. Trade in only high rated bonds(strictly)2. Raise the money though Short term C.Ps.

    3. Chances of failing = ZERO

    Umbilical cord with citi ( Back stop

    facility) 17/7/2013

    C.PS High ratedbonds

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    GET SET GO!!!

    IKB Deutshe Industrial bank Formed a new android called the

    RHINELAND.

    Similar to alpha but much more risky

    (next shadow product)

    New rules of Umbilical cord

    High risk Better fee Constantdemand 17/7/2013

    C.PS CDOS

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    GORDIAN KNOT

    Introduction of SIGMA. (yet another shadowproduct)

    IOSS maturing @ longer years (reducerisk of payment)

    Same as Alpha but didnt have theumbilical cord!

    Medium term notes (MTN)..LONGERMATURITY.

    The thing was growing @ million

    dollar pace.

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    Analysts team of Moddy quit to form aSIV.

    Moddy was analyzing the sigmas that

    time. Patenting a financial innovation:

    difficult

    Sigma clones spread like forest fire. $3 Trillion of IOUs were soldfor

    highhy risky and subprime CDO.

    Shadow banking @ its height!17/7/2013

    Thieves steal to gain!

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    Banks become BLACK!

    Banks wanted higher returns.

    To grow faster, take high risk

    Banks set up shadow institutions.

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    MorganStanley Cheyne

    Barclaysbank AVENDIS

    And many more likethis

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    Unlike sigma they were taking huge

    risks

    Paradoxthese were sold to hate tolose investors

    Investors never knew the CDOs (bad)

    behind the IOUs. Japanese weren't ready so the their

    scapegoat were The liquidity flushed

    MIDDILE EAST NATIONS. The giant CDOs were managed by

    the HEDGE FUND.

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    The turmoil begins

    The shadow bankers wrongassumptions:

    The housing prices will always sore-

    NO

    The default loans will not effect the giant CDOs

    NO

    Buying the rating companies will always ensure

    constant demand for shadow products

    THAT DIG THEIR GARVE.

    The turmoil began..slowly

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    The stage 1, the loans turned bad.

    The MBS lost all its market value.

    The stage 11, the CDO s lost all itsvalue and no inflow of cash. Therewere millions of unsold CDOs (likerotten onions)

    The stage 111, the C.Ps

    Matured and the lack of liquidityMade them sell more CDOs for

    Loss and the Shadow institutions

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    MBSS

    CDOS

    C.PS

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    Sizeable informal financial sector.

    Financial intermediaries not registered

    Include informal lenders, kerbside capitalists, back-

    alley bankers.

    Wealth management products offered by

    regulated banks and trusts.

    Provide credit outside traditional, and more highlyregulated, banking model.

    In violation of Chinese law.

    Careless local governments .

    THE BROAD OUTLOOK

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    1. The local governments borrowing behavior.

    2. Structure of banking industry.

    3. Underdevelopment of the corporate bond

    market.

    4. IPO regulatory frame work.

    5. Negative real deposit rates, due to high

    inflation.

    Reasons for emergence of shadow banking.

    Part 1: THE CreditKulaks.

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    According to Xiao Gang, The Chairman of, The Bank of

    China.

    Area of wealth management products is especially

    concerning.

    Estimates

    20% of total bank assets.

    33% increase since 2010.

    Yields reaching 70%!

    Scale of shadow banking

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    Not really.

    It is well diversified and serves a legitimate consumer

    base.

    Have much lower leverage than the banks or other

    Corporate China.

    Losses often absorbed by the entrepreneurs

    themselves.

    They help those in financial repression.

    Is this form of shadow banking really bad?

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    Wealth management products.An alternative to a bog-standard bank deposit.Peoples Bank of China, deposit interest rates 3.5%WMP 5% to Above 8%(www.euromoney.com)

    WMPs to be over 20,000,

    Total value of WMPs to be 12.14 trillion RMD by 2012.Characterized this shadow banking sector as a potentialsource of systemic financial risk, whose model isfundamentally a Ponzi scheme.

    The shadow banking. Part ll

    WMP

    BY BANKSBY

    TRUSTS

    http://www.euromoney.com/http://www.euromoney.com/
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    http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user3303/imageroot/2013/06-2/chinawealth.gif
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    Comparable to CDOs.

    The Global Financial Crises.

    The nature of Chinese economy.-export oriented.

    -Low cost of labour and HUKOU.

    -Interest in infrastructure.

    The Economic stimulus.

    How it started?

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    Fuelling of Speculative housing bubble.

    Inefficient State owned enterprises.

    Sunk investments into LGFVs.

    Post Reducing stimulus.

    The rise of WMVs.

    Impact of Economic Stimulus.

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    17/7/2013

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    AN HUMBLE OFFERING AT HIS DIVINE LOTUS FEET

    SAIRAM