Setting the record straight

published 5 January 1994

Sinn Féin is publishing this record ofcommunications between itself and the Britishgovernment in order to set the record straight. Inpublic comments repeated many times Britishministers, including Prime Minister John Major,have said that they would not negotiate with Irishrepublicans. That representatives of the Britishgovernment have done so, and with approval at thehighest level of government, is clear from thisrecord. Communications and dialogue wereintensive from mid 1990 and as chronicled hereshould be read in the light of the false assertionsfrom British ministers. The facts as now presentedfor the first time speak for themselves and give thelie to the British governments claims.

INTRODUCTION

A line of communication has existed between SinnFéin and the British government for over 20 years.It has not been in constant use. It has been used inan intensive way during such periods as thebilateral truce of 1974-75 and the Long KeshHunger-Strikes of 1980 and 1981.

The British government reactivated it in the middleof 1990. This led to a period of protracted contactand dialogue between Sinn Féin and the Britishgovernment.

At all times Sinn Féin has endeavoured to avoidthe disclosure of this line of communication evenwhen such revelations would have been to ouradvantage or to the disadvantage of the British

government.

The British government has shown no suchintegrity. In the course of the recent protractedcontact and dialogue Sinn Féin made a number ofcomplaints to the British government about leaks tothe media. These leaks are documented both in theSinn Féin record and in the British governmentversion.

In the early part of 1993 the British governmentproposed a series of meetings with Sinn Féin,arguing that an intensive round of such meetingswould result in Irish republicans being convincedthat armed struggle was no longer necessary. Theyrequested a two to three week undeclaredsuspension of operations by the Irish RepublicanArmy to facilitate this. Sinn Féin sought and gainedsuch a commitment from the IRA. This wascommunicated to the British government on 10May 1993.

There was no positive response to this and aftersome time it became quite clear that the Britishgovernment was attempting to disguise its rejectionof the substantial response by the IRA to itsrequest.

Simultaneously the volume of leaks and rumoursabout talks between Sinn Féin and the Britishgovernment noticeably increased.

The leaks led to the breaking of the story on 8November 1993, by Belfast journalist, EamonMallie. There were immediate British governmentdenials.

One of these leaks was from DUP MP WillieMcCrea. According to Mr. McCrea he was given acopy of a British communiqué by a senior civilservant in the N10.

On BBC TV Breakfast Time on the 16 November,Mayhew, when asked about talks with Sinn Féin orthe IRA said: "There has been no negotiating withSinn Féin; no official, as I see, is alleged to havebeen talking to Sinn Féin on behalf of the Britishgovernment."

Also on BBC TV when asked if there had beencontact with Sinn Féin or the IRA by people whocould be regarded as emissaries orrepresentatives of the government Mayhewreplied, "No, there hasn't."

Afterwards to reporters he again said: "There havebeen no negotiations with Sinn Féin....

On the same day a spokesperson for John Major'soffice denied that it had been involved in"protracted contact and dialogue". Thespokesperson went on to reiterate that there hadbeen "no negotiation" with Sinn Féin or the IRA.

Three days later on 19 November speaking inDerry Mayhew reiterated that "Nobody has beenauthorised to talk or negotiate on behalf of theBritish government with Sinn Féin or any otherterrorist organisation."

The following day in the House of Commons JohnMajor asserted that he would not talk to Sinn Féin.Earlier he had declared that the prospects of talkswith Gerry Adams would "turn my stomach".

Willie McCrea gave his document to The Observeron 17 November 1993. They are reported to havesent it to the British government for comment onFriday, 26 November 1993. That same day, in anenigmatic statement, Ulster Unionist Party leader,Jim Molyneaux, advised the people of the North notto jump to conclusions when information came outover the weekend.

The matter came to a head on the evening ofSaturday, 27 November 1993. In a statement fromthe British government it admitted contact with SinnFéin. Patrick Mayhew claimed that this contact wasin response to a message from the IRA, sent byMartin McGuinness that the conflict was over.

In a follow-up statement on Sunday, 28 November1993, Mayhew announced his intention ofaddressing the British parliament on this issue onMonday, 29 November.

On the morning of Monday, 29 November, SinnFéin held a press conference. In a statement to themedia, Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams said:

"Over the past weeks many of you have askedSinn Féin to provide proof of the contact betweenus and representatives of the British government.Up to now we have declined to do so in an attemptto protect a line of communication which hasalways been dependant on confidentiality andwhich, we had hoped, could assist in the search fora viable peace process.

"At all times republicans have endeavoured toavoid the disclosure of this line of communication,even when such revelations would have been toour advantage or to the disadvantage of the Britishgovernment. Despite the fact that the BritishGovernment, have shown no real evidence thatthey are genuinely seeking a real settlement, weregard the contact as a potentially importantelement in the development of an effective peaceprocess. For this reason we endeavoured at alltimes to protect this contact believing that theobjective of peace was far more important than theshort-term political effects of disclosure.

"However, we also made it clear to the BritishGovernment that, if the contacts did becomepublic, we would not tell lies by denying theirexistence. The onus was on both sides to ensuretotal confidentiality. For some time now, and goingback at least over a three-year period, we havebeen concerned about leaks, whether initiated byelements of the British establishment or theunionists, and consequent speculation in the press.On each occasion that this happened we formallyprotested to the British government and expressedour concern.

"It is right that there is contact between the Britishgovernment and our party. It is clearly supported bythe majority of British and Irish people. For all ofthese reasons, Sinn Féin has sought to protect thisprocess. Mr. Major and Mr. Mayhew, however,have sought in recent times to abuse it. They haveacted in bad faith and Mayhew's statements areaimed at sowing dissension and confusion and

distracting attention from the real issues. For thisreason, I have called this morning's pressconference in order to place before you some ofthe documents, which have been exchangedbetween our party and the British government. I dothis reluctantly and only to correct the lies that arenow being told. It is still our intention to maintainand protect the line of contact.

"First of all, as I said yesterday, the contact wasmore than a conduit. It has been in existence overa period of two decades. To our certain knowledgeit has never been abused until now by those whopolitically controlled it on the British side and it hasnever, ever been abused by the republicans.

"The current phase of discussion has been on andoff for the last number of years. The Britishgovernment initiated the latest phase of contact.We welcomed it. In the course of this, outlines ofBritish government and Sinn Féin policies wereexchanged and discussed. This process was notan alternative to the discussions, which I wasconducting with John Hume. Indeed on a numberof occasions Martin McGuinness instructed hiscontact that the Hume-Adams discussions weredealing with the substantive issues and that theywere a serious effort to reach agreement on theprinciples, the dynamic and the process required tobring peace to Ireland. When John Hume and Ireached agreement, the British were informed ofthis. The IRA's positive attitude to this developmentwas also conveyed to them. There can be no doubtthat Mr. Major and his colleagues knew that theIrish Peace Initiative had the potential to move allof us towards a lasting peace. They have lied aboutthis also.

"I now want to deal with some of the detail of ourexchanges with the British. This included writtenposition papers. The British government suppliedSinn Féin with its position in a nine-paragraphdocument. We, in turn, supplied them with the SinnFéin position in an eleven-paragraph document.You have these before you.

"The British government also proposed that aBritish government delegation should meet with aSinn Féin delegation for a protracted and intenseround of discussions. Venues and timescales forthese meetings were discussed. We were told thatsuch an intense period of negotiation would resultin Irish republicans being convinced that armedstruggle would be no longer necessary. We were

asked to seek a short suspension of IRA operationsto facilitate these discussions.

"Given the importance of all of this, Sinn Féinsought and was given a commitment from theleadership of the Irish Republican Army, that itwould suspend operations for two weeks to enableus to explore the potential of the Britishgovernment's assertion.

"This was conveyed to the British government on10 May 1993.

"Although we were informed that the positiveresponse by republicans to the British proposalwas the subject of a series of high-level meetingsby British ministers and officials, including JohnMajor, there was no positive response by them andalthough the line was in regular use in this period itwas not used in any positive way. In fact, the Britishmoved away from their proposal and refused tofollow it through.

"We believe this was instanced, in part at least, byparty political difficulties which overtook the Toryparty leadership at this time, and other difficulties inthe House of Commons which lead them to dependon unionist votes at Westminster.

"The bad faith and double dealing involved in thisclearly presents serious difficulties for us. It wasclear to us from the early summer that the Britishgovernment had reneged on its proposal and theprevious indications that it may have been activelyseeking a way out of conflict. I want to stress alsoby this time that London was well advised that thediscussions between those involved in the IrishPeace Initiative had reached a point of significantprogress. They were also informed by us that thisprovided the best opportunityand framework forpeace if they had the political will to move forward.

"Despite all of this the documents we werereceiving continued to avoid the main issues. Theircontent was increasingly disingenuous and itbecame clear that the British were quite blatantlyabusing the line of communication for their ownnarrow, short-term interests. The communicationswere quite clearly being written with a view todisguise the British government's rejection of thesubstantial and generous response by the IRA tothe British request.

"Simultaneously the volume of leaks and rumours

increased quite noticeably.

"The British government was now trying to sowconfusion and division among republicans. Forexample, they now claim that the current phase ofcontact commenced in response to a commitmentthat the conflict was over.

"They were also actively engaged in trying tothwart the Irish Peace Initiative and to spoil thepotential which it presents. For example, theydenied knowledge of its contents. Their strategy bythis time was based upon lies and disinformation.Their objective was not peace but power. Thisremains their strategy up to and including today.Lies, lies and more lies.

"There will be more of this this afternoon.

"Patrick Mayhew is going to present a documentwhich he alleges was in response to acommunication from us. This is another lie. We didreceive such a document but it came on 5November, out of the blue, and incidentally, ninemonths after he alleges the contact was initiated. Itis also the only substantial policy document wehave received since the summer.

This claimed to be a response to a 2 Novembercommunication from Sinn Féin. We immediatelymade it clear that no such communication hadbeen sent by us. You have the British government's5 November communication before you.

"It represents the substance of John Major's publicpreconditions on talks with Sinn Féin as presentedin his Lord Mayors Banquet speech at London'sGuildhall. This unsolicited communication was atransparent manoeuvre to synchronise the Britishgovernment's public and private positions inadvance of this contact becoming public in aclimate of leaks and rumours.

"Sinn Féin acted at all times in good faith. Wesought to move towards peace, both through thisprivate contact with the British government andthrough my talks with the leader of the SDLP JohnHume. Republicans have demonstrated flexibilityand integrity throughout. The British Governmenthas demonstrated intransigence and duplicity.They have rejected these very real and tangibleopportunities for peace.

"In conclusion, I return to what is clearly the most

important development in twenty five years ofconflict - the issue which in reality is at the core ofthis controversy despite all the efforts at disguisingthat fact - the Irish Peace Initiative.

"It, I repeat, can deliver peace. John Major hasrejected peace. He cannot hide this behind lies,diversions and distractions forever.

"He will be held publicly accountable by the peopleof Ireland, Britain and by international opinion forhis denial of peace in Ireland.

"There is a need for honesty and a real peaceprocess. Sinn Féin remains committed to this.When the dust has settled on this disgracefulphase of British government duplicity, bad faith anddouble-dealing, all of us will have to endeavour tobuild such a process. I appeal to people of goodwill to demonstrate their support for the existingopportunity for peace."

On Monday, 29 November 1993, Patrick Mayhew,the British Minister with chief responsibility for theSix Counties, lodged in the Library and Vote officeat Westminster, what he claimed to be allmessages "received and dispatched" in the courseof the British government's protracted contact anddialogue with Irish republicans. His 'record'covered the period of 22 February 1993 -5November 1993. He claimed this to be the totalityof the period involved. He lied. The period involvedextended long before 22 February 1993.

He claimed these documents related tocommunications between the British governmentand the IRA leadership. The protracted contact anddialogue was, in fact, between the Britishgovernment and Sinn Féin, as the documentationwill show. At approximately 3.30pm on the sameday, Patrick Mayhew addressed the Britishparliament on the issue. Within an hour ofMayhew's speech, and solely on that basis, SinnFéin Ard Chomhairle member, Martin McGuinness,challenged the British minister's version of things.In a statement issued at approximately 5.00 pm,Mr. McGuinness said:

"Patrick Mayhew today read a text which he claimsto be a communication sent by me to the Britishgovernment in late February.

"I totally refute his claim. The text he read iscounterfeit. No such communication was ever sent.

It is a lie. Yet another lie to add to the many lies,which have emanated from Patrick Mayhew andJohn Major in recent times. My initial comparison ofthe version of the 19 March document read out byPatrick Mayhew today even indicates that they arenow counterfeiting their own documents to meettheir current needs.

"The British government has been telling lie afterlie after lie in recent times to disguise its rejectionof peace in Ireland.

"Sinn Féin will be returning to all of this in thecoming days."

Sinn Féin received a copy of the Britishgovernment's version of the record late in theevening of Monday, 29 November 1993 and beganan examination of this in the context of the SinnFéin files then available.

Confidentiality required that the files were kept insecure locations outside of Sinn Féin offices.Ironically Sinn Féin had properly tasked itself withkeeping confidential British government documentssafe from the possibility of discovery in the courseof raids on Sinn Féin offices by British forces. Indoing so, we hampered our ability to make aprompt and comprehensive response.

On 1 December 1993, Patrick Mayhew admittedthat his version of the exchanges was inaccurate. Itis clear that documents released by him weredoctored but in a further attempt to deceive, heattributed this to typographical errors. Theseincluded both British government and Sinn Féindocuments. He offered a number of corrections.These did not rectify all of the documents, whichhad been doctored. The issue of messages omittedfrom the British version was not addressed. He didnot address the issue of the bogus documentsfabricated by the British government whoseauthorship was attributed to Sinn Féin.

In due course, Sinn Féin issued an "Interim BriefingPaper" at a press conference in Belfast onThursday 2 December 1993. The briefing paperwas titled "A review of British Disinformation; Lies;Omissions and Fabrications."

At the launch of Sinn Féin's "Interim Briefing", partypresident Gerry Adams said: "As we informed yousome days ago, on Monday, 29 November 1993,Sinn Féin is scrutinising the British version of the

protracted contact and dialogue between our partyand the British government and the documentsprovided by Patrick Mayhew on Monday to theBritish parliament. We are providing you today withan interim report of our scrutiny.

"There are matters we will have to return toÚÚitremains our intention to place our account of thesematters on the public record and to thus set therecord straight."

He explained that the Sinn Féin record would belodged in the Linen hall Library, Belfast, and theNational Library, Dublin. (The full text of GerryAdams' statement is carried in this record).

Sinn Féin Ard Chomhairle member, MartinMcGuinness, provided an outline account of thehistory of this phase of the protracted dialogue andof the line of communication between Sinn Féinand the British government.

He began by saying that he "never thought therewould be a need for us to set the record straight aswe are doing today. Let me stress that we aredoing so reluctantly and because of the blatantabuse by the British government of the line ofcommunication between us and it." (The full text ofMartin McGuinness' statement is carried in thisrecord).

As stated at the press conference on Thursday, 2December, Sinn Féin is now "placing our accountof these matters on the public record" so as "to setthe record straight".

STATEMENT FROM SINN FÉINPRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS

2 December 1993

As we informed you some days ago Sinn Féin isscrutinising the British version of the protracteddialogue and contact between our party and theBritish government and the documents provided byPatrick Mayhew on Monday to the Britishparliament. We are providing you today with aninterim report of our scrutiny. There are matters wewill have to return to. For example, last nightÃsadmissions from Mayhew have not been properlyscrutinised by us. May I also once again demandan end to London and Dublin government

censorship. It remains our intention to place ouraccount of these matters on the public record andto thus set the record straight.

It is important that this is done because if this lineof communication is to have any value in the futureits integrity must be restored. The Britishgovernment has acted, and is acting in bad faithand has actively abused our contact with it in orderto sow dissension and confusion and to distractattention from the real issues. This can onlydevalue the peace process, which has beenseverely damaged by Major and MayhewÃsactions.

Martin McGuinness will give you an outline accountof the history of this phase of the protracteddialogue and of the line of communication betweenSinn Féin and the British government. RichardMcAuley will also provide you with a preliminaryreport of our scrutiny and an information documenton British Bogus, Omitted and Altered documents -BOA....snake in the grass!

We will also be releasing a number of documents,some from Sinn Féin and some from the Britishgovernment. In due course, and when we havecompleted our scrutiny and compiled a full accounton all these matters, we will be placing this on thepublic record in the Linen hall Library, Belfast, andin the National Library, Dublin.

I now want to make a number of important pointsregarding this affair. The behaviour of the Britishgovernment, the lies, omissions, falsification,forgeries, diversions and distractions are all proofof the British government's opposition to peace inour country which arises from its dogged refusal toconcede to the people of Ireland, all of us, our rightto determine our own future - our right to governourselves free of division and conflict.

This has to be seen also against the failure ofBritish rule in our country. But there are positiveaspects to this situation, for example, nogovernment on these islands can ever again claimthat there is any popular support for a policy ofexcluding Sinn Féin. The pompous, self-righteousrhetoric of British government officials and of JohnMajor that he will not talk to us, has been totallyexposed as cheap political manoeuvring. Peoplesupport inclusive dialogue. Even the British Houseof Commons supports dialogue with us despite allthe posturing of the past by all of the parties in that

establishment.

This recent phase of our history is one of the mostshameful in 25 years of conflict, or perhaps sincethe partition of this country. The Britishgovernment's attitude to nationalist Ireland,whether represented by Albert Reynolds or JohnHume or Sinn Féin has been despicable, deviousand damnable. The British government knows, andhas known for some long time now that the IrishPeace Initiative presents a real opportunity forpeace. John Hume has told them this privately andpublicly. We have told them this privately andpublicly. Public opinion, in both Ireland and Britain,with the exception of the unionists has told them italso.

I want to appeal to the unionists. Republicans arenot outraged by the conduct of British governmentministers. We expect nothing less. But we doexpect more from you. You and we, and the rest ofthe Irish people can build a common futuretogether. The main cause of the division betweenus is the British connection. You can have littleconfidence in British governments. Major andMayhew have lied to your leaders. They see IanPaisley and Molyneaux and John Hume and I andAlbert Reynolds and Dublin politicians as leadersof Irish opinion. You and we are seen by theLondon government for what we are, as people ofIreland. They will use you today and abuse youtomorrow and dump you the day after that. Youknow that. It is time we stopped being used by liarsand cheats who have no right to rule us.

Why is the British telling all these lies? What is thepurpose? Let us forget for a minute the convolutedand confusing detail of documents. Let us deal withthe main point. Nationalist Ireland wants peace.The British government does not. The Britishgovernment cannot admit this and it wishes todistract attention from it and to confuse and todivide us. They say that Irish republicans are readyto surrender. This is a lie. Our commitment tostruggle is firm and undaunted.

We do want to move towards a negotiatedsettlement. We want peace. We are prepared totake risks and have taken risks to achieve this andwe will continue to take risks because the objectiveof peace is so important to us.

Following protracted dialogue and contact betweenus and the British over a considerable period at the

beginning of this year, the British governmentproposed delegation meetings between Sinn Féinand its representatives. We will deal with the detailof this later. Suffice to say now that we negotiatedthe preliminary procedures for these discussions.In order to assist this process the IRA respondedpositively to a British request for a temporarysuspension of operations. The British then movedaway from this position. Fair enough. Such to-ingand fro-ing is not unusual. But to then try to use thegenerosity of the IRA in order to cover its ownfailure to engage meaningfully in a dialogue forpeace as it moved away from its own proposal istotally unacceptable. It damages the prospects forpeace.

It has always been clear to this generation of Irishrepublicans that the British government seeks todefeat us. It seeks not to bring about peace, not toend conflict, but merely to end the IRA's campaignas a means of subverting all Irish nationalistopinion.

When rumours about the dialogue between SinnFéin and the British government started againrecently, the British government moved to defendits position in a selfish and narrow way. When itbecame likely that some of these matters mightbecome public they then moved to counteract this.That is what the Guildhall speech was about. Thatis what the bogus messages of February 22, June1 and November 2 are about. That is what theforgeries are about. The British government darenot admit that it made a proposal, which met with aprincipled, flexible but positive response from bothSinn Féin and the IRA. And John Major threw thisback in our faces as he did with John Hume, as hehas done with the Dublin government. How this isdealt with is a matter for those concerned. How wedeal with our affairs is a matter for us. I am nowdemanding that John Major explains why he andhis cabinet walked away from their own proposaland condemned all of us to the violence, which hasoccurred since.

So, in conclusion, and I will return to this in myclosing remarks, there is a need for nationalistIreland and for progressive public opinion in Britainto see beyond the lies. It is time for the unionists tolikewise. But more importantly, we all need to movebeyond the lies and to consolidate the peaceprocess. What we have seen so far have beenskirmishes on the sidelines, but the high ground -that is, the opportunity for peace presented by the

Irish Peace Initiative - remains intact. Let us avoiddiversions about whether or not Sinn Féin will beinvolved in talks. We have been and we will beagain. This is not the main issue at this time.

The main issue, to paraphrase the words of JohnHume, is that the British government "hold the key"to peace in our country, and between the people ofBritain and Ireland. Major has refused to turn thiskey. When we have cleared away all of thesedistractions, then all of us, Dublin and London,republicans and nationalists, must strive - and mustseek the support of the unionist section of ourpeople - to build upon the peace process. ENDS

STATEMENT FROM SINN FÉINARD CHOMHAIRLE MEMBERMARTIN McGUINNESS

2 December 1993

Let me begin by saying that I never thought therewould be a need for us to set the record straight aswe are doing today. Let me stress that we aredoing so reluctantly and because of the blatantabuse by the British government of the line ofcommunication between us and it.

The Sinn Féin leadership has always accepted thateach side in this process will seek to gainadvantage over the other. This is part of the battlein which we are engaged. However, what hasoccurred this last year and which is now partially inthe public domain goes far beyond legitimatemanoeuvring. At no time, even under Thatcher, hasany government attempted to use and abusecommunication by fabrication and forgery in theway which the Major government has.

The history of my involvement with this line ofcommunication between Sinn Féin and the Britishgovernment must be seen against the backgroundof our initiatives on peace and against thebackground of the evolution and the developmentof party policy on this issue. Most of you will beaware that for the last five years, at least, Sinn Féinhas been involved in trying to build consensus inIreland around the need for a negotiated settlementof the conflict here. This was publicly outlined in aseries of discussion documents from "Scenario forPeace" through to "Towards a Lasting Peace". It

has dominated party Ard Fheiseanna and it hasbeen the central focus for us.

As part of our strategy, senior party members weregiven responsibility for engaging in private andpublic debate with different elements of opinionhere and abroad. I was given major responsibilityfor engaging in public debate with the Britishgovernment. I was accountable to a smallcommittee, chaired by party president, GerryAdams.

As many of you will recall the development of ourpolicy and the public articulation of it informedpublic debate during this time. Sinn Féin hasalways had a policy based on the need for dialogueand for as long as I can recall, we have been inregular contact with many elements of Irish andBritish opinion. As Sinn Féin engaged more andmore confidently in the peace debate thesecontacts became more intense. It was in thisclimate that the British government reactivated theline of communication and its current phase ofprotracted contact and dialogue with us. This line ofcontact was not an alternative to other dialoguethat we were engaged in. Nor indeed was it themost productive. At all times our objective wasaimed at building a process towards a lastingpeace. The most significant progress in this regardhas been made in the discussions between JohnHume and Gerry Adams. Throughout thesediscussions, and especially when significantprogress was made we pointed the Britishgovernment at this initiative and advised them thatit presented the best opportunity for peace.

The line of communication goes back over twodecades. I had no dealings with it before theHunger Strikes although I was aware of itsexistence. The line of communication was dormantfrom the breakdown of 74 - 75 truce until theHunger Strikes. The two Hunger Strikes were aperiod of frenzied contact between us and them.The contacts between us and the Britishgovernment at this time are not disputed.Incidentally, we were assured during this periodthat Margaret Thatcher had authorised the line ofcommunication with us and with the politicalprisoners in the H-Blocks and Armagh Prisons. TheBritish government representative was appointedby London not Stormont.

After the Hunger Strikes the line of communicationwas dormant until mid 1990. Even though the line

of communication was dormant the contactremained in touch with the British governmentrepresentative and occasionally with me. In mid-1990 the British government representativeintimated that he wished to open up the line ofcommunication once again. We thought that thiswas only an opening approach aimed at picking upon the bad situation between us since the HungerStrikes and we received some general andoccasional oral briefings on the British governmentposition during this time.

During this period also the British governmentrepresentative informed the contact that he wouldlike to meet me. Towards the end of 1990 hepassed word to Sinn Féin that he was due forretirement and he would like to meet me before heleft and to prepare the way for a new Britishgovernment representative. Gerry Adams and Idiscussed this invitation with others in the SinnFéin officer board and decided to go ahead with themeeting. I was instructed to proceed on a listeningbrief.

This meeting took place in October 1990. Thecontact was also in attendance. It was a low keymeeting lasting for three hours and discussed thegeneral political and the current state of Britishpolicy and Anglo-Irish relations. In keeping with mybrief, I said very little and was noncommittal on allaspects of republican policy.

The British government representative intimated tome that after his retirement a new representativewould be appointed and that there would be aneffort to reactivate the line of communication. I wasnoncommittal on this. I reported all this back to mycolleagues. While we felt a moral imperative toexplore any overtures from the British, because ofprevious experiences during the Hunger Strikesand the 72 and 74 bilateral truces, and given thatthere was no public evidence that the Britishgovernment position had changed, we weresceptical about their intentions. This stronglyinfluenced our attitude. However, we agreed if theBritish desired to activate the line ofcommunication that we were morally and tacticallyobliged not to reject their offer. We did notcommunicate this to the British. In January 1991the British government representative I met retired.

April 91: Contact informed us that the Britishgovernment, through the now retired Britishgovernment representative, had passed to him

information that the loyalist death squads wereabout to announce a cease fire for the inter-partytalks.

We were informed of this orally through the line ofcommunication and after this there was no contactuntil June 1991. Then we were informed that a newnamed representative had been appointed. He hadintroduced himself to the contact. He verified hisstatus by producing a letter signed by the thenBritish Secretary of State Peter Brooke. This letterwas read by the contact and kept by the Britishgovernment representative. His status was alsoverified by the previous British governmentrepresentative. We were informed that he wasappointed by London.

June to Christmas 91: During this period the newBritish government representative initiated a seriesof periodical meetings and occasional telephoneconversations with the contact. We were givendetailed briefings on British government policy. Themeetings took place both in the Six Counties and inLondon. The representative declared that it was hisobjective to ensure that republicans knew thethinking of his government. We presumed that hewas also engaged in building up a relationship withus and with the contact. We were assured thatJohn Major had authorised the line ofcommunication. Our private position was that in allof this that the British government's strategyremained one aimed at defeating the republicanstruggle. During this period we did not initiate anycontact and our response to all information was tonote it.

January to April 1992: Throughout 1992 the Britishgovernment representative became very active inbriefing us. The major part of these briefings wastaken up by reports of the progress, or lack or it,which was being made in the inter-party talks.Peter Brooke made a number of keynote speechesat this time and we were advised of these inadvance.

April to Christmas 1992: During this time, after theWestminster election Peter Brooke was replacedby Patrick Mayhew. We were informed that the lineof communication would continue as before andthat Patrick Mayhew was "fully on board".

We were being given consistent reports from theBritish government representative that theBrooke/Mayhew talks were going nowhere and that

the government's prediction was that they wouldend in failure.

We were also being told that there was frictionbetween the senior civil servants (in London andStormont) and Mayhew. In October, we wereprovided with a two-page document on theprogress of the talks under Sir Ninian Stephen.

Jan-Mar 1993: The British governmentrepresentative was in frequent contact, onoccasion on a daily basis. He was suggesting thatthere was a possibility of meetings taking placebetween British government representatives andSinn Féin representatives. We began to take hisproposal more seriously when he got intodiscussions about the logistics of carrying out sucha meeting.

At all times we stressed that there could be nopreconditions to such a meeting and that SinnFéin's electoral mandate was the basis for ourengagement. The British governmentrepresentative said there would be a need for theBritish prime minister to defend talks with us ifthese became public and this would be mostdifficult if the IRA campaign was continuing at ahigh level. He told us that the British governmentaccepted that the IRA activity would only be haltedas a result of negotiations. He said that the Britishgovernment believed that intensive meetings withSinn Féin would persuade republicans that armedstruggle was no longer necessary. He proposedthat if we got agreement of these meetings that theIRA should reduce its campaign or suspend it inorder to enhance this process.

In February Sinn Féin held its Ard Fheis. Therewere keynote speeches from Gerry Adams andmyself outlining party policy on the need for apeace process.

This triggered further intense responses from theBritish government. We were advised that wewould shortly be in a situation in which a definitearrangement would be made for such a meeting.Suggestions were made that meetings could takeplace in various venues. They offered to arrangean airplane to fly us to Scotland, Norway orDenmark.

I asked for information about the make-up of themeetings, eg numbers of delegates. I was informedthat the British were prepared to be flexible about

this. They suggested that three delegates,accompanied by three advisors, would besufficient.

They would also be similarly represented. I askedfor an indication of the seniority of the Britishrepresentatives. I was then given the names ofthose who would represent the British side. TheBritish government representative stressed that theBritish government believed that the end result ofthese talks would be that republicans would feelthat there would be no need to go back to armedstruggle.

He also stated that he believed two-weeksintensive daily meetings would suffice. I reportedthis to Gerry Adams. After a discussion with seniorcolleagues, the British request was passed to theIRA.

By this time, the British government had appointedtwo representatives. By the end of March we hadreached agreement in principle about themeetings. The Sinn Féin side applied itself to termsof reference and an outline of policy position. It wasduring this period that we received the British nine-paragraph document. We prepared an eleven-paragraph response to it. We also appointed asmall secretariat under my tutelage.

At this time Sinn Féin sought and was given acommitment by the IRA that it would create theconditions necessary to facilitate this round of talksand to enable us to explore the potential of theBritish government's assertion. This would haveinvolved a 14-day suspension of operations.

This was conveyed to the British government on 10May.

Although we were informed that the positiveresponse by republicans to the British proposalwas the subject of a series of high-level meetingsby British ministers and officials, including JohnMajor, there was no positive response by them. Iwas informed that this was discussed on Monday,17 May 1993, at a meeting, which included Major,Hurd, Mayhew, Chilcott, and Braithwaite. Themeeting was indecisive and was reconvened onTuesday, 18 May, and Kenneth Clarke wasinvolved in this. Clarke's advice was that theopening of public negotiations with us was "toorisky with the government under siege". Mayhewwas wobbling between "pushing for acceptance

and wanting a safer longer period of cessation".John Major compromised by instructing hissecretary to draw up a programme, which he wouldbe able to announce in parliament.......... "that hewas instructing the N10 to enter into dialogue withthe Republican Movement". Later we received awritten communication, which you have before you.This deals directly with the 10 May situation. Fromthis point, although the line was in regular use inthis period it was not used in any positive way. Infact, the British moved away from their proposaland refused to follow it through.

We believe that this was due to John Major'sdifficulties within his party and in the Britishparliament, and his need to secure an alliance withthe UUP.

During this time there were a number of leaks tothe media, which hinted at contact between us andthe British. s We made a number of formalcomplaints as we had done on previous occasionsand expressed concern at the risk to the process.

In fact we believe these leaks to have beeninspired from within the British military and politicalestablishment and that this led to the Britishgovernment being forced to give the UUP a limitedbriefing on its contacts with Sinn Féin.

July 1993: The Sinn Féin response to the Britishgovernment's nine paragraph document, whichhad been prepared in April for presentation by oursecretariat in advance of the proposed delegationmeetings, was lodged with the contact to bepassed to the British. This outlined the basis onwhich we were entering negotiations.

After this the exchanges we received became lessand less. They continued to avoid the main issueraised on 10 May. Their content was increasinglydisingenuous and it became clear that the Britishwere quite blatantly abusing the line ofcommunication for their own narrow, short-terminterests.

The communications were quite clearly beingwritten with a view to disguise the Britishgovernment's rejection of the substantial andcourageous response by the IRA to the Britishrequest. Simultaneously the volume of leaks andrumours increased quite noticeably. During thisperiod the Hume/Adams discussions were makingconsiderable progress and we conveyed this to the

British both verbally and in written messages.

November 1993: In early November we received aBritish government document, which purported tobe in response to a request from us. Weimmediately dispatched a repudiation of anyrequest from us. You know the rest.

I have outlined this chronology to you because theline of communication with the British governmenthas been abused by Major and Mayhew. Today weare setting the record straight. It is important thatthis is done because if this line of communication isto have any value in the future its integrity must berestored. The British government is acting in badfaith and is now actively abusing our contact withthem in order to sow dissension and confusion andto distract attention from the real issues. This canonly devalue the peace process.

Sinn Féin acted at all times in good faith. Wesought to move towards peace both through thisprivate contact with the British government andthrough our involvement in the Irish PeaceInitiative. Republicans have demonstrated flexibilityand integrity throughout. The British governmenthas demonstrated intransigence and duplicity.They have rejected very real and tangibleopportunities for peace. It is up to John Major toexplain why his government "walked away from itsown proposal and rejected the positive republicanresponse to this. ENDS

"SETTING THE RECORDSTRAIGHT"

All messages contained are written messagesunless clearly designated as oral or reports ofmeetings.

The British government chose to describe itsversion as being between the British governmentand the 'Provisional Movement'.

The protracted contact and dialogue was, in fact,between the British government and Sinn Féin.

A number of communications, which relate directlyto the line of communication have been withheldfrom this record as have a number of messagesrelating to the Irish Peace Initiative. These prove

conclusively that the British government was fullyaware of the detail of the Irish Peace Initiative at avery early stage. They are withheld at this timebecause of their sensitivity. They are dated 7January 1992, 29 January 1992, 26 October 1992,and 14 June 1993.

The line of communication with the Britishgovernment extends back over two decades.

It was in use during the 1974 - 1975 period ofbilateral truce.

It was again in use during the Hunger Strikes of1980 and 1981.

These phases of its use have not been a matter ofdispute.

The phase of its use between October 1990 -November 1993, however, is disputed by theBritish government.

For their own reasons they claim this phase beganon 22 February, 1993 and ended on 5 November1993. In support of their claim they mixed fact andfiction to produce their 29 November, 1993 version.

Accordingly their version opens with a bogusmessage purporting to come from Sinn Féin on 22February, 1993. Appropriately the hinge on which,it closes is an equally bogus message purporting tocome from Sinn Féin on 2 November, 1993.

British government attitudes varied greatly fromone period of this phase to the next.

During the first period the British governmentrepresentatives engaged in building up arelationship with the contact and with Sinn Féinbetween October 1990 and the autumn of 1992.The British government representative initiated aseries of periodical meetings, which took placeboth in the Six Counties and in London, andoccasional telephone conversations with thecontact. His objective, he declared, was to ensurethat republicans knew the thinking of hisgovernment.

The next period is characterised by an intenseexchange of contact and communicationssurrounding the "10 May" scenario and thesubsequent consideration of that.

The third period is characterised by the stringingout of the British government decision to walk awayfrom its own proposal as contained in the "10 May"message. The intensity of the first part of the yearis replaced by, in relative terms, a leaner crop ofcommunications.

The final period of this phase is characterised bythe British government moves to synchronise itsprivate and public positions in a climate of leaksand rumours - moves that ultimately culminated inthe publication of the British governmentsfabricated version on 29 November, 1993.

A record of communication betweenSinn Féin and the British governmentOctober 1990 - November 1993

October 1990: Meeting between Sinn Féin ArdChomhairle member Martin McGuinness andBritish government representative.

The British government representative initiated themeeting. He informed McGuinness of his imminentretirement and intimated that there would be aneffort to reactivate a long-standing line ofcommunication.

Martin McGuinness attended the meeting on alistening brief. Subsequently an advance copy ofPeter Brooke's Whitbread Speech "The BritishPresence" was forwarded to Sinn Féin. Brookemade this speech on November 9, 1990.

April 1991: Oral message from the Britishgovernment.

Sinn Féin was informed via the (now retired) Britishgovernment representative that the loyalist deathsquads were about to announce a ceasefire for theduration of the inter-party talks.

June 1991: British government appoints newrepresentative.

In June of 1991 the newly appointed Britishgovernment representative introduced himself tothe contact. He verified his status by producing aletter signed by the then British Secretary of StatePeter Brooke. This letter was read by the contactand retained by the British governmentrepresentative. The former British governmentrepresentative also verified his status. Sinn Féin

was informed that the appointment was made byLondon.

August and September 1991: Oral messagesfrom British government

Clarification was sought on two confusingmessages, which the NIO claimed to have receivedfrom people claiming to be in contact withrepublicans. They speculated about an extensionof the Irish Republican Army's traditionalsuspension of operations for three days atChristmas. Archbishop Robin Eames was, it wasclaimed, one of these people.

The matter was clarified.

October 1991: Oral message from the Britishgovernment

This gave Sinn Féin pre-notice of a speech byPeter Brooke in Enniskillen.

November 1991: Oral message from the Britishgovernment

It sought Sinn Féin advice on the usefulness ofsetting up, as a point of contact, the home of aretired civil servant in County Derry.

Sinn Féin responded orally saying we were moreinterested in the substance of communicationsthan the means. However, if the British governmenthad something solid to say Sinn Féin would belistening.

January 7. 1992: Written message from SinnFéin to the British government

This related to the developing Irish peace initiative.It is being withheld because of its sensitivity.

January 26, 1992: Oral message from theBritish government

This drew Sinn Féin's attention to comments madeby Peter Brooke in the course of an interview onRTE on 20 January, 1992.

It indicated that Brooke and Major were working ona speech. Sinn Féin was subsequently given apreview of the speech - a speech by John Major toScottish Conservative candidates delivered on 22February, 1992, in Glasgow.

January 29, 1992 : Sinn Féin received a writtenmessage from the British government on theIrish Peace Initiative.

This is being withheld at this time because of itssensitivity.

May 19, 1992: Oral message from the Britishgovernment

This urged Sinn Féin to be more proactive in usingthe line of communication.

Undated: Message from the British governmentto Sinn Féin

It is unclear from our files whether this documentwas received in Autumn 91 or Autumn 92.

Conclusion

6. As things stand, I do not recommend that weshould positively encourage the Provisionals todeclare a Christmas ceasefire. But we should beprepared to move very quickly if they decide to doso unilaterally, conceivably in the day or so beforeand after Christmas. I propose to review thesituation again some time in the week beginning 10December (given that the Taoiseach may saysomething on the subject to the Prime Minister atthe next month's Summit).

7.1 recommend the Secretary of State agree that: -

(i) we should prepare to respond very quickly to aceasefire at Christmas, but not seek to initiate one:

(ii) we should take forward detailed staff work onprison's issues suitable for the medium term;

(iii) I should keep the Chief Constable and GOCabreast of our thinking; and

(iv) we should keep the situation under closereview and report again after the Summit.

8. The Secretary of State may also wish at thisstage to note that, as last year, it may be necessaryto make quick - and potentially far-reaching -political decision in the immediate run-in toChristmas and we may need to set up machineryand a short-term contingency plan for this. I saythis because we cannot rule out a sequence which

goes something like: - PIRA calls a Christmasceasefire; we respond with some security de-escalatory measures; and Sinn Féin asks for adialogue with Government on political issues - thisdialogue to be linked to a continuing absence ofhostilities. Alternatively, some third party or partiesmay elicit a response from the Provisionals, withsimilar implications.

October 26. 1992: This document was sent toSinn Féin by the British government

1. Intensive shuttle diplomacy on the part of Sir NStephen. Atmosphere improves.

2. On 16 October SOSNI had a short meeting withthe Irish. Both Governments agreed that the bestchance of progress lay in the proposal that SirNinian Stephen should invite all the talk'sparticipants to submit to him privately theirindividual suggestions for Heads of Agreementacross all three Strands. It was a high risk strategy,but Sir Ninian appeared well aware of the extremedelicacy of the task and the importance of gettinghis synthesis right first time. There was a slightdanger that Sir Ninian's report would be based onthe lowest common denominator of the parties'submissions and thus not form the basis of aworkable blueprint; this was a risk, which wouldhave to be taken.

3. On the afternoon of 16 October there was ashort session of the Strand 2 committee. Sir Ninianformally asked the parties to submit to him, eitherorally or in writing, their ideas for Heads ofAgreement, their concept of the areas where theirproposals agreed with those of other delegations,and their views on any areas where they perceiveddisagreements to exist. Sir Ninian would thencorrelate the submissions with his own impressionsand formulate his report. He had nopreconceptions about the form the report wouldtake, and indeed he realised that there wasdisagreement between the participants as to thescope of the exercise; he saw the process as beinga dynamic one which would assume a morecoherent form during the course of the followingweek's consultations.

4. On timetable. Sir Ninian suggested that 19 and20 October be taken up with bilateral consultationswith the N1 political parties and that he should talkto the two Governments separately on 21 and 22October. On 23 October he would report progress

to the entire subcommittee either orally or onpaper. This, however, he stressed, was only anoutline, and changes could be made if people felt itdesirable. In addition, he encouraged thedelegations to talk to each other as much aspossible.

5. These proposals were accepted, albeit withsome reservation by the SDLP.

Outlook

6. The talks have thus entered an entirely newstage. Sir Ninian is now effectively in control of allthree Strands and the nature of his proposedshuttle diplomacy over the next week (and possiblyfor longer) means those events could begin todevelop very quickly. Information about who issaying what to whom will be at a premium.

7. In preparation for its meeting with Sir Ninian on21 October the HMG team is drawing up modelHeads of Agreement which it believes stand thewidest chance of being accepted by all concerned.These will be submitted for his use on a non-attributable basis, in an attempt to guide hisconsultations. The idea is to "ghost-write" SirNinian's report. The main elements are as follows:

Strand 1. Based closely on the Strand 1 sub-committee report of earlier in the year, with thechairmen of Assembly committees becomingheads of department, and with the Assembly beingthe sole legislative authority but having to submitdraft legislation to the separate "Panel" forratification.

Strand 2. This envisages co-operation betweenrespective departments in the North and the South,the establishment of cross-border executiveagencies by the respective legislatures North andSouth and remaining answerable to them, and thedelivery of some all-Ireland executive functions bythe body itself, subject to democratic approval andaccountability.

Strand 3. An IGC and Secretariat to deal with non-transferred matters affecting N1, with Panelmembers and committee chairmen from NIformally part of the IGC structure. On theconstitutional status of the Province, a statementthat NI is currently part of the UK is proposedtogether with a recognition that a substantialminority wish for a united Ireland, and have the

right to pursue that by peaceful and democraticmeans and without impediment. Replacement ofArticles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution by anaspiration to a united Ireland is also sought.

The paper, it is stressed, represents HMG'sjudgement of what it is possible to achieve, ratherthan its own sense of priorities in individual areas.

8. If an outline agreement something along theselines is possible there may be a chance of theparties reconvening to put flesh on the bones atsome point in the future after the 16 NovemberIGC. Events in the next couple of weeks couldmove rapidly and unpredictably.

Note: Reports up to this point on the Stormont talkshad been pessimistic in outlook. When theunfounded optimism contained in the 'NinianStephen' document subsided, Sinn Féin wasinformed that given the lack of progress in theStormont talks that the British and Irishgovernments were considering imposing asituation over the heads of the political parties.

October 26, 1992 : This preview of points for aspeech to be made by Patrick Mayhew inColeraine was sent to Sinn Féin. We alsoreceived a message.

1. Sinn Féin is not denied current involvement indemocratic institutions, but is subject to constraintsof law and political reality arising from itsrelationship with the campaign of violence.

2. As the previous Secretary of State envisaged inhis speech of 9 November 1990: "An Irishrepublicanism seen to have finally renouncedviolence would be able, like other parties, to seek arole in the peaceful political life of the community."

3. As to the Talks process, the agreed ground rulesof 26 March 1991 for the present and previousrounds of Talks sought to bring together the mainconstitutional political parties of the day. Thepresent round of Talks is scheduled to last until 16November 1992. The underlying analysis thatpolitical development should focus on three mainrelationships - within Northern Ireland, withinIreland, and between the two Governments - islikely to remain valid for the foreseeable future.

4. The British Government could not impose on theparticipants ground rules for any future phases of a

continuing Talks process. But its objectives wouldcontinue to include the involvement of all the mainpolitical parties of the day, which did not condoneviolence. The British Government has no desire toinhibit legitimate constitutional expression ofpolitical opinion or input to the political process.

5. The Talks process is based on the participationof each delegation as a free agent. It seeks toproduce an agreed accommodation, not animposed solution. The British Government doesnot work to any preconceived master plan.

6. Successive Governments have stressed thatany new structures for the government of NorthernIreland must be acceptable to both major traditions.A return to the old Stormont political system wouldnot meet this and other publicly stated criteria. TheBritish Government also recognises the need forany new North/South arrangement adequately tocater for and express both traditions.

7. In the event of a genuine and establishedcessation of violence, the whole range of policiesand activities undertaken in response to thatviolence would inevitably have to be looked atafresh.

October 26, 1992 : Report of meeting withBritish government representative

He pointed to earlier reports on the progress of theStormont talks. These consistently put the Britishgovernment view that they were not going tosucceed. While that opinion had not changed hepointed out that Ninian Stephen had improved thegeneral climate. He provided the 'Ninian Stephen'document as evidence of that.

He strongly advocated that we should be sendingSinn Féin addresses and keynote speechesthrough the line of communication as they hadbeen doing to us.

He said that he understood the dissatisfaction withthe means of communicating and that he had beenworking on this. He intimated the possibility ofmeetings but stressed that conditions would haveto be created to allow this. Such matters move veryslowly.

October 26, 1992 : Message from the Britishgovernment

The message shows that the British governmentwas aware of developments in the Irish peaceinitiative.

Sinn Féin is withholding this message from thisrecord because of its sensitivity.

December 4, 1992 : Sinn Féin response toreceipt of the 1-7 point document received onOctober 26 1992

Thanks for your recent document (the 1-7paragraphs) received on October 26, 1992.

The document is interesting but the presentmethod of communications is totally unsatisfactory.A more satisfactory means of discussion must befound if there is to be any hope of forwardmovement

NOTE: This message is omitted from the Britishgovernment version.

December 14, 1992 : Report of a meeting withBritish government representative

This returned to the subject of the method ofcommunicating. Sinn Féin would have to bepatient. The British government was not the onlyones being cautious. Meetings were possible butonly if suitable and acceptable conditions werecreated.

They had been working at these possibilities fortwo years now.

He inquired about the possibility of a unilateralcease-fire by the IRA. He was advised that this washighly improbable.

He inquired about the possibilities of the IRAeasing off in the context of a talkÃs situation andwas informed that advice on this would be sought.He supplied Sinn Féin with an advance copy ofPatrick Mayhew's Coleraine speech, which was tobe delivered on 16 December, 1992.

January 12, 1993 : Report of a meeting withBritish government representative

This began with an outline of the political risksbeing taken by the British government.

Republicans should be in no doubt that this

indicates their seriousness in the whole thing. Theconflict had been going on for too long. He said theBritish government was not serious in 1974/75 butthey were now.

There was a conviction by senior civil servants thattalks had to start. The politicians were slower butthey were moving to this position.

It could not be done without a major gesture fromrepublicans. They realised an IRA cease-fire was anon-starter. He voiced his view that a suspension -an easing off - would start the ball rolling in asignificant way. That republicans would beconvinced in that time that armed struggle was notnecessary any longer.

He was informed that advice would be sought onall of this.

February 20, 1993: Speech by Sinn Féin ArdChomhairle member Martin McGuinness toSinn Féin Ard Fheis.

The British government representative laterclaimed that it was this speech by MartinMcGuinness, which 'triggered' British governmentaction. This speech and the presidential addressby Gerry Adams were forwarded to the Britishgovernment.

"When British Secretary of State Peter Brookebegan the inter party talks process little did herealise that three years later this long running andboring saga would collapse in confusion andrecrimination as each of the participants blamedeveryone else for the failure.

Mr. Brooke must surely have expected that apartitionist agreement on the future government ofwhat the British call Northern Ireland would haveemerged.

Well, last year, after three years of discussionwhich proved lucrative for the participants andworthless to everyone else, the inter-party talksground to a predictable halt. Furthermore, eventhough it was to become a grave embarrassment tothe British, Sinn Féin was undemocraticallyexcluded from those discussions.

Democracy, British style, dictated that the AllianceParty, with less support than Sinn Féin, were there,the Democratic Unionists, who publicly advocate

the killing of republicans, were also there, as werethe Official Unionists whose track record includesthe exclusion and repression of the Nationalistcommunity since partition. The British governmentwas represented by Sir Patrick Mayhew. He hasrecently taken to describing his government's roleas a facilitator. How right he is. The Britishgovernment has indeed facilitated the persecutionof the nationalist people of the six counties sincepartition.

Meanwhile, scores of thousands of supporterswere excluded, chastised and penalised becausethey voted for the party of their choice. This factconveniently guaranteed the absence of anycriticisms of the British government's role in aconflict, which they created and have dismallyfailed to resolve in the decades since theypartitioned Ireland and divided the Irish people.

Instead the endless discussions yielded noimaginative solutions, which would end theinjustice of partition and bridge the divisionsbetween our people.

The rocks on which the talks foundered were ofcourse unionist suspicion that they were beinggently inched towards on all-Ireland settlement andSDLP reservations about agreeing a partitionistsettlement. Through it all Peter Brooke and PatrickMayhew behaved as though they were ditheringWimbledon umpires watching the ball fly over thenet but unable to decide who should win the point.The British of course are not referees in thisdispute and we repudiate any attempts to portraythem as neutral.

The British government's policy is crucial if there isto be a just settlement on this island. The otherparties to the debate can have but a limitedinfluence on the situation and it is essential if thereis to be any hope of peace that the Britishgovernment led the way by outlining its plan for afinal resolution of the problem. Britain cannot beallowed to abdicate its responsibility by standing bylike Pontius Pilate washing it? hands off a problemit created.

If they continue with their present policies there willbe no settlement, no peace. Britain must alsopublicly accept, as I believe they now privately do,that an essential ingredient in the search for asolution is the acceptance of the need for inclusivedialogue as a vehicle towards a final settlement.

Following Peter Brooke's earlier example PatrickMayhew has recently addressed us on this issue.Contradicting himself he says that Sinn Féin willnot be involved in talks until the IRA calls aceasefire yet implicit in everything else he says isan acceptance that Republicans must be part ofthe solution.

In the wake of the suspension of the Stormont talksthere is increasing acceptance that the Britishgovernment must now speak to Sinn Féin.Numerous editorials and one of the architects ofthe London/Dublin agreement have added theirvoices to those who now accept we must beinvolved. The concept of inclusive dialogue as theway forward is gathering momentum.

With the election of a new government in Dublinthere is to be a further attempt to resume the talk'sprocess. We are told these will initially take theform of bi-lateral meetings rather than round tablediscussions. This actually provides both the Britishand Dublin governments with an opportunity tobring Sinn Féin into a talk's process. If bothgovernments have the courage of their privateconvictions they should now finally meet with SinnFéin. For our part we recognise that such ascenario would place a great responsibility on us.

We would approach any serious talks acceptingthat we haven't got all the answers but we mostcertainly believe we have some of them.

The British government and others demanddramatic initiatives from us before we can beinvolved in talks. Whilst rejecting any pre-conditions on our participation we are quiteprepared to be open and flexible to seriousproposals, which can lead to a realistic agreement.

Years of struggle have not diminished thedetermination of the republican people to endBritish interference in Ireland. We are asdetermined as ever. No one can argue that ademocratic resolution would be a simple matter. Allinvolved in the conflict, all those who are affectedby it, would have to be prepared for a dramatic andimaginative initiative. Republicans are willing toengage in the search for a democratic settlementwith courage and flexibility.

We must all allow each other room to manoeuvre ifthere is to be any hope that the misery, injustice

and death of the past twenty-five years are to befinally ended.

We have, all of us, Irish and British, been hurt bythis conflict. We have all suffered and if we allshare responsibility for that, then surely, only whenwe are all included in a healing process whichhonestly and seriously seeks to remove the rootcauses of our troubles, will there be the slimmestchance of peace.

In recent weeks Patrick Mayhew agreed with DickSpring that the demand of unionists forconstitutional change would require anexamination of the root causes of the conflict. Thiscoming as it does from Mr. Mayhew was aninteresting and important admission.

Since the ending of the talks a new Governmenthad been formed in Dublin. Its stated policy is thatchange in the constitution can take place in thecontext of an overall agreement. Dublin should beunder no illusion about this issue. The nationalistcommunity in the six counties and I believe theoverwhelming majority of Irish people in this islandare bitterly opposed to any change which woulddilute the sovereign rights of the people of Irelandto nationhood.

Sinn Féin recognises the dismay and confusion,which exists within the unionist community. Manyfear that the British Government is looking for away out and they believe it's only a matter of timebefore this happens. This places a considerableonus on everyone including ourselves as Irishrepublicans to apply a new and radical thinking tothe predicament unionists find themselves in. Theplight of unionists is requiring particularconsideration to guarantee and protect theirinterests in any new arrangements, which will beneeded to resolve the conflict.

The British portray Republicans as the cause of theconflict. The British are dishonest. We are not thecause of this conflict we are the victims of it. Weare the product of decades of British tyranny andmisrule.

In his Coleraine speech Mr. Mayhew in theunderstatement of the year said, "You will not findme seeking to argue that Britain's role in this islandhas only ever been associated with what has beenuplifting. On the contrary, there is much in the longand often tragic history of Ireland for deep regret

and the British Government for its part shares inthat regret to the full".

Regret alone will not solve our problems. What isneeded is a plan to establish agreed democraticinstitutions to redress the damage done to Irelandand its people by successive British governments.Both Dublin and the SDLP should join with us inplacing this reality before the British Government.

Until this happens the struggle will continue untiljustice is done and freedom is ours.

NOTE: The British government version opens witha message, which it claims was sent by Sinn FéinArd Comhairle member Martin McGuinness.

The message begins: "The conflict is over but weneed your advice on how to bring it to a close...."

No such message was sent.

This was written by the British government. It isbogus.

February 24.1993: Report of a meeting withBritish government representative

He was very upbeat about the possibility ofdelegation meetings. He said that he and hiscolleagues had been working on this for two years.Major and Mayhew had discussed the republicanstruggle and the Christmas cessation on 14February. The Tory whips had regarded Mayhew'sColeraine speech as a bridge too far. Thepoliticians were moving. They were serious. Therepublicans will have to grasp the opportunity whileit exists. Events on the ground will bring anenormous influence to bear. The IRA needs toprovide the space to turn the possibility of meetingsinto a reality. A suspension is all that is beingrequired of them.

The British believed that two or three weeks werea sufficient period to convince republicans. Therewould be an intensive round of talks. Once startedpeople remain until decisions were arrived at.Reciprocation would be immediate; troopswithdrawn to barracks, checkpoints removed,security levels determined by loyalist threat.

Their side would probably be led, in such an event,by Quentin Thomas (Deputy Secretary to Chilcott).The republican side could include whomever they

wanted. Possibly three plus advisors.

Thomas might at the beginning say "Thanks for theceasefire" but do not be concerned with that. Heventured the opinion that Willie Ross the UnionistMP would be the next leader of the UUP.

February 26, 1993 British government messageto Sinn Féin

We understand and appreciate the seriousness ofwhat has been said. We wish to take it seriouslyand at face value. That will of course be influencedby events on the ground over the coming days andweeks. In view of the importance of the message itis not possible to give a substantive replyimmediately. It is however necessary that thisacknowledgement is given promptly. We areworking to reply further as swiftly as possible. Weunderstand the need for this.

February 26, 1993: Report of meeting withBritish government representative

The main points covered were;

1. The British government has agreed to talks withSinn Féin.

2. They need a 'no violence' understanding over2/3 weeks of private talks. No public declaration ofthis.

3. They believe they can convince Irish republicansin 2/3 weeks of talks that armed struggle is nolonger necessary.

4. If the talks are going well they could quicklymove from a private to a public situation.

5. Suggested venues: Sweden, Norway, Denmark,Scotland, and Isle of Man.

March 1, 1993: 0ral message from the Britishgovernment

Proposed meeting and venue for 23 March todiscuss logistics for delegation talks.

March 5.1993:0ral message from Sinn Féin tothe British government

We were pleased to receive this message andwelcome the possibility of a meeting. We would like

two representatives, Martin McGuinness and GerryKelly/ to have an exploratory meeting with you assoon as possible.

March 11, 1993: Message from the Britishgovernment to Sinn Féin

Wishing to take seriously what has developed/ wehave been preparing a considered and substantiveresponse.

But in the light of the continued violence of recentdays since the first response we are not yet able tosend a substantive response.

There must be some evidence of consistencybetween word and deed.

Given that background our ability to send asubstantive response will depend on events on theground.

March 19 1993: Nine paragraph document sent bythe British government to Sinn Féin

1. The importance of what has been said, the wishto take it seriously, and the influence of events onthe ground/ have been acknowledged. All of thoseinvolved share a responsibility to work to end theconflict. No one has a monopoly of suffering. Thereis a need for a healing process.

2. It is essential that there should be no deceptionon either side and also that no deception should,through any misunderstanding, be seen where it isnot intended. It is also essential that both sideshave a clear and realistic understanding of what itis possible to achieve, so that neither side can inthe future claim that it has been tricked.

3. The position of the British Government ondealing with those who espouse violence is clearlyunderstood. This is why the envisaged sequence ofevents is important. What is being sought at thisstage is advice. The position of the BritishGovernment is that any dialogue could only followa halt to violent activity. It is understood that in thefirst instance this would have to be unannounced.If violence had genuinely been brought to an end/whether or not that fact had been announced/ thenprogressive entry into dialogue could take place.

4. It must be understood/ though/ that once a haltto activity became public/ the British government

would have to acknowledge and defend its entryinto dialogue. It would do so by pointing out that itsagreement to exploratory dialogue about thepossibility of an inclusive process had been givenbecause - and only because - it had received aprivate assurance that organised violence hadbeen brought to an end.

5. The British government has made clear that:

- no political objective, which is advocated byconstitutional means alone, could properly beexcluded from discussion in the talkÃs process;

- the commitment to return as much responsibilityas possible to local politicians should be seenwithin a wider framework of stable relationships tobe worked out with all concerned;

- new political arrangements would be designed toensure that no legitimate group was excluded fromeligibility to share in the exercise of thisresponsibility;

- in the event of a genuine and established endingof violence/ the whole range of responses to itwould inevitably be looked at afresh.

6. The British Government has no desire to inhibitor impede legitimate constitutional expression ofany political opinion, or any such input to thepolitical process, and wants to see included in thisprocess all main parties, which have sufficientlyshown they genuinely do not espouse violence. Ithas no blueprint. It wants an agreedaccommodation, not an imposed settlement,arrived at through an inclusive process in which theparties are free agents.

7. The British Government does not have, and willnot adopt, any prior objective of "ending ofpartition". The British Government cannot enter atalks process, or expect others to do so, with thepurpose of achieving a predetermined outcome,whether the "ending of partition" or anything else. Ithas accepted that the eventual outcome of such aprocess could be a united Ireland, but this can onlybe on the basis of the consent of the people ofNorthern Ireland. Should this be the eventualoutcome of a peaceful democratic process, theBritish Government would bring democraticprocess, the British Government would bringforward legislation to implement the will of thepeople here. But unless the people of Northern

Ireland come to express such a view, the BritishGovernment will continue to uphold the union,seeking to ensure the good governance ofNorthern Ireland, in the interests of all its people,within the totality of relationships in these islands.

8. Evidence on the ground that any group hadceased violent activity would induce resultingreduction of security force activity. Were violence toend, the British Government's overall response interms of security force activity on the ground wouldstill have to take account of the overall threat. Thethreat posed by Republican and Loyalist groups,which remained active, would have to continue tobe countered.

9. It is important to establish whether this providesa basis for a way forward. The British Governmentwould answer specific questions or give furtherexplanation.

NOTE: The British government version issued onMon 29 November 1993 by Patrick Mayhew wasaltered in paragraph three to give the appearancethat the British government was responding to arequest for advice from Sinn Féin. The documentwas altered in a number of other places also.

The British government sought to rectify this onWed 1 December 1993 after Sinn Féin had pointedin a general way to amendments on the evening ofMonday 29 Nov.

Subsequent inquires by journalists provoked anadmission of this from the British government twodays later.

March 19, 1993 : 0ral message from the Britishgovernment received with above.

This process is fraught with difficulties for theBritish government, as must be obvious. They arenevertheless prepared to tackle these and acceptthe risks they entail.

But it must be recognised that all acts of violencehereafter could only enhance those difficulties andrisks, quite conceivably to the point when theprocess would be destroyed.

If that were to occur the British would consider thata potentially historic opportunity had beensquandered.

The paper gives our substantive advice inresponse to the initial message. As it makes clear,we wish to establish whether this provides a basisfor a way forward. We on our side are ready toanswer specific questions or give furtherexplanation.

You should also emphasise to your interlocutor theBritish government's acknowledgement mat allthose involved in the conflict share a responsibilityto work to end the conflict. We agree on me needfor a healing process. We wish to take a positiveview of these developments and hope that it willcontinue to be possible to do so.

March 23, 1993:Report of meeting with Britishgovernment representative

The British government representative said MartinMcGuinness' address to the Sinn Féin Ard Fheis1993 had been read and triggered governmentaction. Mayhew had tried marginalisation,defeating the IRA etc. That's gone. Colerainespeech was a significant move. Mayhew is nowdetermined. He wants Sinn Féin to play a part notbecause he likes Sinn Féin but because it cannotwork without them. Any settlement not involving allof the people North and South won't work. ANorth/South settlement that won't frightenunionists. The final solution is union. It is going tohappen anyway. The historical train - Europe -determines that. We are committed to Europe.Unionists will have to change. This island will be asone.

He outlined the situation of talks at the level ofdelegations. The politicians, he said, were moving.This opportunity must be grasped. Next week ifpossible. British government is sincere. Nocheating involved. He mentioned the Rees letter toWilson: "We set out to con them and we did." Thetwo weeks for talks proposed was repeated. Healleged that John Chilcott had instructed him toinform Sinn Féin that if this was agreed at sixo'clock that clearance for meetings at the level ofdelegations would be forthcoming by one minutepast six.

Confidentiality was of the utmost importance. OnlyMajor, Mayhew, Hurd and secretary to the cabinetknew of all this. The British side would probably beled by Quentin Thomas with John Chilcott down theline. This issue of location for meetings was raisedagain.

Statement from Sinn Féin President Gerry Adamsin relation to Warrington bomb

The British government version contained a 22March, 1993 message relating to the Warringtonbomb. Sinn Féin did not send this message. It isbogus.

However, after the Warrington bomb the Britishgovernment were referred to a statement from SinnFéin President Gerry Adams. The statement said:

"Republicans, not least because we have alsoburied our children, know the agony of the familiesof Jonathan Ball and Tim Parry. Children arealways innocent. None of the rest of us standsguiltless.

"Those who are now exploiting the understandableemotion and human reaction to the Warringtonexplosions know this. Yet they are manipulating thegenuine grief and deep sadness of peoplethroughout Ireland to channel public opinion in onedirection - against republicans.

"Republicans have nothing to fear from a genuinepeace movement. Sinn Féin has been engaged indeveloping a peace process for some time now. Iwelcome any positive approach to building peacebut I appeal to those who really wish to end theconflict to beware against letting themselves becynically used."

April 3, 1993: Message from Sinn Féin to theBritish government

We welcome the recent discussion and hope that itwill lead to a process, which will secure a lastingpeace. We are committed to this objective. Werecord our disappointment that only one of yourrepresentatives was in attendance. Despite this,the discussion was most useful and a report of it iscurrently under consideration. A response will beprepared without delay.

NOTE: This message is omitted from the Britishgovernment version.

April 24, 1993: Sinn Féin President GerryAdams and SDLP Party Leader, John Hume.issued the first of three joint statements by thetwo party leaders in the course of 1993.

The statement said:

A meeting between us held on Saturday/10 April, inour capacities as party leaders of the SDLP andSinn Féin has given rise to media coverage, someof which was ill informed or purely speculative.

We are not acting as intermediaries. As leaders ofour respective parties, we accept that the mostpressing issue facing the people of Ireland andBritain today is the question of lasting peace andhow it can best be achieved.

Everyone has a solemn duty to change the politicalclimate away from conflict and towards a processof national reconciliation, which sees the peacefulaccommodation of the differences between thepeople of Britain and Ireland and the Irish peoplethemselves.

In striving for that end, we accept that an internalsettlement is not a solution because it obviouslydoes not deal with all the relationships at the heartof the problem.

We accept that the Irish people as a whole have aright to national self- determination. This is a viewshared by a majority of the people of this islandthough not by all its people.

The exercise of self-determination is a matter foragreement between the people of Ireland. It is thesearch for that agreement and the means ofachieving it on which we will be concentrating.

We are mindful that not all the people of Irelandshare that view or agree on how to give meaningfulexpression to it. Indeed, we cannot disguise thedifferent views held by our own parties.

As leaders of our respective parties, we have toldeach other that we see the task of reachingagreement on a peaceful and democratic accordfor all on this island as our primary challenge.

We both recognise that such a new agreement isonly achievable and viable if it can earn and enjoythe allegiance of the different traditions on thisisland, by accommodating diversity and providingfor national reconciliation.

We are reporting our discussion of these mattersback to our respective parties. They have fullyendorsed the continuation of this process of

dialogue.

We will be picking up on where the talks betweenour parties ended in 1988 and reviewing thecurrent political situation.

At that time we engaged in a political dialogueaimed at investigating the possibility of developingan overall political strategy to establish justice andpeace in Ireland."

A copy of this statement was forwarded to theBritish government.

April 24. 1993: Message from the Britishgovernment to Sinn Féin in response to SinnFéin message of April 3, 1993

Please speak of the basis of the following:

We are pleased at this positive response. Ourleading board member is away till Monday 26 April,but in his absence we request to see Mr. Brown onMonday in London so that Mr. Ferguson canconvey the "Yes" position to our Board on Tuesday27 April. We need to be assured that our 'nine-paragrapher' has been accepted as our position(for any future discussion) and most important thatMr. Campbell/Campbell confirms (privately orotherwise as they wish) that the "not a single shareposition" will be in operation. Ideas on timingswould be appreciated.

NOTE: This message is omitted from the Britishgovernment version.

April 26, 1993: Report of meeting with Britishgovernment representative

Two British government representatives attended.They confirmed their commitment to the delegationmeetings, notwithstanding events on the ground atthat time.

They were told that Sinn Féin would be providing apolicy outline which would be the basis for itsentering into dialogue at that level. The Britishgovernment was asked to come forward with thelogistics for the meetings as soon as possible.

May 4, 1993: 0ral message from Sinn Féin to theBritish government

Some time has passed since we both agreed to

proceed to delegation meetings. Why the delay inyour response on how we are to proceed to thenext stage? Are you still serious about this? Arethere problems?

NOTE: This message is omitted from the Britishgovernment version.

May 5, 1993: Message sent by the Britishgovernment to Sinn Féin

Events on the ground are crucial, as we haveconsistently made clear. We cannot conceivablydisregard them. We gave advice in good faithtaking what we were told at face value. It is difficultto reconcile that with recent events.

2. Nonetheless we confirm that we stand by the 9-paragraph document, which we prepared as thatadvice.

3. We have not received the necessary privateassurance that organised violence has beenbrought to an end. We hope that we do so soonand that violence is genuinely brought to an endas, without that, further progress cannot be made.

NOTE: The version of this published by the Britishgovernment contains two important alterations.

In the first paragraph; "We gave advice in goodfaith...." is amended to "We gave in good faith theadvice which was sought."

In the second paragraph; "which we prepared asthat advice." is amended to "...which we preparedin response to that request for advice."

Both alterations seek to support the alterationsmade by the British government to its own March19 nine-paragraph document. It was subsequentlyforced to rectify this. However the Britishgovernments December 1, 1993 statement doesnot address the above amendments.

May 6, 1993: British government message inresponse to Sinn Féin's May 4

Yes the order of events was the main problem. Wewill be back tomorrow with a more detailedexplanation of exactly what we mean.

May 7, 1993: British government message inresponse to Sinn Féin's May 4

We confirm that we stand by the 9-paragraphdocument.

The Secretary of State will, as you know, be awayuntil next week. This gives the opportunity for youto consider any other questions, which you maywish to put to us or to seek further explanation.

We confirm that the ordering of events is important.The 9-paragraph note made clear in paragraphs 3and 4 that any dialogue could only follow a halt toviolent activity and receipt of a private assurancethat organised violence had been brought to anend.

May 10 1993: Message from Sinn Féin to theBritish government

The following message was given to the Britishgovernment representative. He was also briefedthat the IRA had agreed to a two-week suspension,that Sinn Féin had prepared a response to theBritish government nine-paragraph outline of policyand that the Sinn Féin document was the party'sbasis for entry into dialogue. This would bepresented to the British at the first meeting of theproposed joint secretariat.

We welcome the face-to-face exchange with yourrepresentative. Given the seriousness of thisproject we trust that this represents only thebeginning of such meetings. We are concernedthat the movement to further meetings has beendelayed by your side.

It is important that we are frank with each other.Our seriousness in addressing this project shouldnot be in any doubt. But it is greatly tempered bycaution, occasioned by the far from satisfactoryexperiences in 1972,1975 and during the hungerstrikes 1980/81. It would be wrong to minimise orunderestimate the problems which theseexperiences have given rise to.

Having said that, we are responding directly to yourrequest for advice, recognising fully the sensitivityof any position, from you or us, which is committedto paper at this stage. Our response has beencouched accordingly but it is clear that we areprepared to make the crucial move if a genuinepeace process is set in place.

You say you require a private assurance in order to

defend publicly your entry into dialogue with us. Wehave proceeded to this stage/without assurance.

We wish now to proceed without delay to thedelegation meetings'. In order to facilitate this stepwe sought and received a commitment, which willpermit you to proceed so that we can both explorethe potential for developing a real peace process.This depends upon agreement between us aboutthe next stage and particularly about the seniorityof your representatives. It is important that youunderstand how important a gesture this is andhow/even though it will be of a short duration itunderlines the sincerity of those involved and theirfaith in us. We wish to stress that we will be not beparty to any dealings, which could undermine thisfaith. To do so will serve only to damage our peaceproject and the overall quest for peace.

Democratic reasons clearly determine that SinnFéin's right to represent its electorate and topromote its analysis should be accepted and actedupon. This is the basis upon which we enter intodialogue.

We need to agree agendas and formats formeetings etc. We have appointed a smallsecretariat to assist in this task. We would like youto nominate someone to liaise with M.McG' on this.

We also have a number of questions. They are todo with the mechanics of the sequence outlined byyou. They are;

Who will represent you? We need to know whenthe BG will be politically represented in this processand by whom?

We need clarification of phrase 'progressive entryinto dialogue'?

When will this start?

Where is the proposed venue?

It would be more practical and quicker/ if thesedetails could be agreed directly with M. McG'. If thisis not possible we ask that you proceed throughusual channel as soon as possible."

Sinn Féin's basis for entering intodialogue

This document is the basis on which Sinn Féin wasentering into dialogue. The British government hadits position. Sinn Féin had its position.

Sinn Féin lodged this document with the contact tobe put on the agenda of the first meeting of the jointSinn Féin/British government secretariat asproposed by Sinn Féin in its May 10 message.

APRIL 1993

1. We welcome this contact and hope it can helpcreate a healing process, which removes both thecauses and the consequences of conflict.Everyone shares the responsibility to work to bringabout a real and lasting peace in Ireland.Republicans are not reluctant to face up to ourresponsibility in this but the British Governmentclearly has the power and the major responsibilityto initiate the necessary process.

2. Our longstanding position has been one ofwillingness to enter into dialogue with a view toresolving the conflict. In all of this we do not seekto impose pre-conditions nor should preconditionsbe imposed on us. This is not a position, which wecould easily recommend let alone successfullydefend.

Dialogue and negotiations are necessary andinevitable if this conflict is to be resolved on ademocratic basis. Pre-conditions representobstacles to peace.

Moreover/ after more than two decades of conflictand political impasse/ we hold as self-evident theview that democratic/ political and practicalimperatives clearly require the open involvementand inclusion of all political views if a democraticresolution is to be sought and achieved.Democratic reasons clearly determine that SinnFéin's right to represent its electorate and topromote its analysis should be accepted and actedupon. This is the basis upon which we enter intodialogue.

3. The route to peace in Ireland is to be found in therestoration to the Irish people of our right tonational self-determination - in the free exercise ofthis right without impediment of any kind.

4. British sovereignty over the six-counties, as withall of Ireland before partition, is the inherent cause

of political instability and conflict. This must beaddressed within the democratic context of theexercise of the right to national self-determination ifthe cause of instability and conflict is to beremoved.

5. We seek to assist the establishment of, and tosupport, a process, which, with due regard for thereal difficulties involved, culminates in the exerciseof that right and the end of your jurisdiction.

6. We believe that the wish of the majority of theIrish people is for Irish unity. We believe that anadherence to democratic principles makes Irishunity inevitable. The emerging political andeconomic imperatives both within Ireland andwithin the broader context of greater Europeanpolitical union support the logic of Irish unity. It isour view therefore that the British Governmentshould play a crucial and constructive role inpersuading the unionist community to reach anaccommodation with the rest of the Irish people.

7. Your disavowal of any prior objective iscontradicted by your commitment to uphold theunionist veto. The consequence of upholding theveto is, in effect, to set as your objective themaintenance of partition and the six-county statelet. And consequently, the maintenance of theprimary source of the conflict.

Since its creation 72 years ago, the six-countystatelet has been in constant crisis. Its survival hasalways been dependant on the existence andexercise of repressive legislation, coercion anddiscrimination. Its existence lies at the heart of thepresent conflict and divisions, both in Ireland, andbetween Britain and Ireland.

8. We recognise that the concerns and perceivedconcerns of the unionist population about theirposition in an Irish national democracy must beaddressed and resolved in the form of the greatestreassurance possible, including legislation for allmeasures agreed in the course of a process ofnegotiations. This process of national reconciliationmust secure thepolitical, religious and democraticrights of the northern unionist population.

That is not only the democratic norm but also apractical necessity if we are to advance the causeof peace in Ireland and find a way out of thepresent impasse.

9. The most urgent issue facing the people ofIreland and Britain is the need for a genuine peaceprocess which sets equality, justice and politicalstability as its objectives and, has as its means,dialogue and all-embracing negotiations in thecontext of democratic principles. In attempting toprogress towards that position, we are prepared tobe as reasonable and flexible as possible.

In this context, we are willing to seriously considerany proposal, which genuinely aims to set such aprocess in train, and to take the accompanyingpolitical risks involved.

10. We accept, of course, that it is essential thatboth sides have a clear and realistic understandingof what it is possible to achieve. But we are sureyou will agree that what is realistic is dependentupon the existing conditions at any given point andthe political will to move the situation on. If theessential political will exists then the construction,at this time, of a peace process is clearly feasible.

11. We found our preliminary meeting with yourrepresentative valuable. We believe that thereexists a basis for progress, which can bedeveloped into a genuine realistic and democraticpeace process. The potentially historic opportunity,which this represents for the cause of peace inIreland, should not be lost. We have outlined ourposition. You have outlined yours. It is now time tomove on. You should arrange for us to do so asspeedily as possible.

NOTE: In the British government version the firstline of paragraph 11 is deleted, i.e. "We found ourpreliminary meeting with your representativevaluable."

May 11, 1993: Oral message from Sinn Féin tothe British government

We are reliably informed that an English reporter inUSA has picked up a story about talks between youand us. Maybe working for Sunday Times. We aretold he was briefed by your people inWashington??

Note: This message is omitted from the Britishgovernment version.

May 13 1993: Message from the Britishgovernment to Sinn Féin responding to acomplaint about leaks to the media

I was very concerned to hear about the alarmingpress story you told me. I've checked on this withthe Bank's press department who said, "Oh that oldstory from Washington? It's all gibberish. We'dheard it was going to be in last Sunday's papers,but we think that the editors must have realisedthat it didn't make sense". Please reassure yourfriends that this is the last thing that we would do orwant. We believe that somebody visitingWashington from Stormont who was not privy tothe loan business was shooting his mouth off and ajournalist embellished it out of all proportion. Ifasked, our press people will deny it.

Note: This message is omitted from the Britishgovernment version.

May 15. 1993: Report of a meeting with Britishgovernment representatives

They said that it had been a hell of a battle withMayhew who wanted to revert to his morecomfortable position, i.e. These bad boys mustobey our rules and then we would consider whataction we'll take.

The Number 10 people said that historically theycouldn't defend it if the May 10 position is not fullyexplored.

In the end the May 10 position was accepted and anew draft British paper had been formulated. Thiswas to be put to Major at a special meeting onTuesday 18 May in Downing Street. They were notprepared to hand over the draft.

May 25.1993: Report of a meeting with Britishgovernment representative

There were no developments from 4:30pm 18thMay 1993. (British government representative)returned from his walking holiday and contacted(the contact) at 11:00 am Monday 24th May to saythat he was absolutely disgusted at what hadhappened and would it be possible to speak to (thecontact) on Wednesday at (location deleted). (Thecontact) was anxious to avoid the constantstretching of the position by (British governmentrepresentative) and (the contact) said she wasgoing to travel to (location deleted) immediately,which she did and met (British governmentrepresentative) at the usual hotel.

(The contact) felt very detached and (Britishgovernment representative) gave his explanationas follows. 1 That the initiative of 11th May hadbeen very well received by Chilcott and plans wereimmediately put in place to get approval from JohnMajor. Mr. Mayhew had reservations pointing outthat he couldn't risk any announcements in the runup to the local government elections. He stated thathe was worried about an upsurge in support for theDUP at the expense of the UUP. It was pointed outto him that in reality it was unlikely that there wouldbe enough time anyway for any formal discussions.The timetable agenda was agreed by Chilcott andMayhew. That is cessation followed within 1-7 daysby logistics followed by delegates meeting. It wasthe intention to put this to Major on Monday 17thMay. Present at the meeting were Major, Hurd,Mayhew, Chilcott, Braithwaite and two other nameswhich appeared to be secretaries or similar. Themeeting was rushed and indecisive with Majorasking questions on which he should have beenmore fully briefed, e.g. 1 What guarantees we havethat this cessation can be held or will hold? 2 Weneed more evidence that what they say, theymean. Douglas Hurd had to leave for a meeting ofForeign Secretaries on the Bosnian peace plan. Onthe whole the meeting was most unsatisfactoryfrom an Irish point of view. John Major adjournedthe meeting to the following day Tuesday 18th andcalled in Kenneth Clarke who was in buoyant,bombastic mood and advised John Major that theproposition was much too risky at the present timewith the government under siege and if theRepublicans were sincere about their intentionsthen the Prime Minister should hasten slowly toadopt such a radical departure from their previouspublicly successful anti-terrorist line. Mayhew waswobbling between pushing for acceptance andwanting a safer longer period of cessation. JohnMajor compromised by instructing his secretariesto draw up a programme which he would be able toannounce in Parliament having previously i.e. 24hours before, informed Dr. Eames, Cahal Daly andthe heads of the main political parties that he wasinstructing the Northern Ireland Office to enter intodialogue with the Republican Movement. Major'splan involved a longer cessation, followed byprivate logistics, (The two British governmentrepresentatives), followed by his agreed statementat Westminster followed by dialogue. (The contact)spent approximately 1.5 hours in London listeningto (British government representative) and (theBritish government representativeÃs) last remarkwas that he would like it known that everything that

he had said to (Sinn Féin representatives) was thetruth exactly as he had been instructed by Chilcottwith specific reference to his famous one minutepast six offer (see page 28).

June 3, 1993: Message from the Britishgovernment to Sinn Féin in response to May 10

The Government was working out a response,which, because it was radical, needed carefulcrafting. This meant deliberate (but not artificiallyslow) work at the highest levels. One of thereasons why it was necessary to proceed socarefully was the recognition that any responsemust remove existing doubts, misconceptions andsuspicions.

Before that process could be completed renewedviolence on a serious scale took place - with theinevitable consequence that that process itself hadto be halted. Since then there have of course beenchanges in the Government. It would be possiblefor further considerations of this to be resumedafter the Whitsun recess. The outcome will, asalways, be affected by events on the ground. Thisis not a threat, merely a statement of reality."

NOTE: 1. This message is omitted from the Britishgovernment version.

2. Sinn Féin received two messagessimultaneously in the first week of June.

(a) June 3 message from the British government toSinn Féin.

(b) a letter from the British governmentrepresentative.

3. The British government version contained aJune 1 message. It purports to come from the'Provisional Leadership' and talks of "the offer of atotal cessation". It is bogus.

June 3, 1993: letter from the British governmentrepresentative to Sinn Féin received in the firstweek of June

Grateful if you would convey the following to (SinnFéin representatives) which is personal from me:

"There is depression and anger here at our failureto respond to your brave and straightforward offer.None feel it more than I do for obvious reasons. I

appreciate - as do all those most closely involved -the position this puts you in. It also contrasts withall that you have heard earlier. You have my wordthat all that was conveyed was done so honestlyand accurately at the time. There would have beenno quotation from 1975 if the intention was to copythat bad example and I for one would not be partyto it.

The present position is that the local Chairman hadaccepted your offer, but such a vital economicissue had to go to the Board. We had miscalculatedin assuming that the National Chairman wouldsimply give it the nod of approval. Recenteconomic events have made him nervous of boldsteps and your unfortunate headline events of Aprilhave made acceptance of your offer much morerisky for him. You and I may think this should notmatter, but the fact is that it does and it is that whichis holding things up - if you like, humancharacteristics rather than anything more sinister.

We all hope that you and your colleagues can bearwith the situation - you are certainly being asked fora lot, but there is will on both sides to complete theloan and we must succeed. We have our strugglesand pressures from individuals as perhaps you do.

There is a proposal worked out (the NationalChairman's own and new idea of 18 May) whichdelayed us and was then in turn put on one sideafter the events of 19 May. I know that you feel forour Bank "the time is never right", but this time itwill be. I cannot tell you when - our wheels turn fartoo slowly, but that is the way of the Bank, not anynotion of stringing the other side along. If delaywere a ploy it is certainly taking up our attentionjust as much as yours!

I can only ask for patience for all our sakes. You willcarry out your own financial policy and it would beimpertinent for me to suggest anything otherwise(as well as being counter-productive); but ineconomic terms headline stuff knocks us backbecause the National Chairman is then wary ofproceeding and it gives support to those who areagainst such a step.

I hope you will not mind me ending with a newmeaning to Tiochfaidh ar la."

(This document was initialed by the author. Theinitials have been deleted by Sinn Féin.)

June 10, 1993: Oral message from Sinn Féin to theBritish government.

We are concerned at the protracted delay by yourside. It is now a month since you received our May10 position. You will also be aware of progress inpeace initiatives here. We wish to reiterate oursupport for this and to confirm our positive attitudeto recent developments. We would welcome anindication of your attitude to this.

NOTE: This message is omitted from the Britishgovernment version.

June 14, 1993: The British governmentrepresentative forwarded a text designated"SECRET" to Sinn Féin.

The "SECRET" text shows conclusively that theBritish government was fully aware of the detail ofthe Irish peace initiative at this point.

This "SECRET" text is withheld because of itssensitivity.

July 4, 1993 : Sinn Féin message to the Britishgovernment

We can only presume from the failure by your sideto follow up on your proposal and our May 10response that you do not wish to proceed or thatyou underestimate the importance, seriousnessand significance of May 10.

We also note the lack of any response by your sideto the Irish peace initiative.

NOTE: This message is omitted from the Britishgovernment version

July 11, 1993 : Sinn Féin message to the Britishgovernment complaining about leaks to themedia

We are most displeased at what we read in thepopular press. It seems obvious to ourselves thatsome of [your] colleagues are leaking what we hadcome to regard as a confidence between ourselvesand [you]. The [RUC] are clearly well informed ofwhatever the situations was and even more clearlyare briefing people like [a journalist is named]. Asusual we have kept our word and there hasn't beenany deviation from our established position ofsaying nothing. We view the latest breach with

extreme disquiet and furthermore we seek anexplanation as to what is happening and why [yourside] are encouraging the position to develop.

July 17 1993 : British government messagesent to Sinn Féin

The importance, seriousness and significance ofyour message of 10 May was fully understood.

As you know, consideration was being given to afar-reaching response. It would have replied to thequestions posed and was intended to removeremaining doubts, misconceptions and suspicions.There was no ulterior motive in any delay, and youwould have had the response as soon as it wascleared. But this response needed to be carefullyand deliberately written to avoid misunderstandingor suspicion about bad faith. You shouldunderstand this, as it took you some time torespond to the nine-paragraph note, presumablyfor the same reasons.

Events on the ground shortly after the Elections of19 May, however, made it impossible to proceedwith this response. Events on the ground arecrucial, as we have consistently made clear. Wecannot conceivably disregard them. Although itwas absolutely clear from the attacks, which tookplace in March that events on the ground could haltprogress, these attacks following the Mayelections, went ahead. This has happened severaltimes now with an inevitable result.

This said, the position of the nine-paragraph notestands and progress is still possible. Does theending of conflict remain your objective, and isthere a way forward?

There is one very important point, which needs tobe answered to remove possiblemisunderstandings. Recent pronouncements,including the Bodenstown speech, seem to implythat unless your analysis of the way forward isaccepted within a set time, the halt in violence willonly be temporary. This is not acceptable.

The reasons for not talking about a permanentcessation are understood, but the peace processcannot be conditional on the acceptance of anyparticular or single analysis. The views of othersinvolved must also be recognised as valid, thoughyou will of course want to promote you own views.Paragraph 7 of the 9 paragraph note sets out our

position.

Can you confirm that you envisage a peaceprocess which is aimed at an inclusive politicalprocess and that a lasting end to violence does notdepend on your analysis being endorsed as theonly way forward?

If you can, we remind you that this process ofdialogue leading to an inclusive political processcan only start after we have received the necessaryassurance that organised violence had beenbrought to an end. In the meantime progress has tobe subject to events on the ground.

August 14 1993: Sinn Féin message to theBritish Government in response to its messageof July 17

We are concerned at the inflexibility of your mostrecent communication. It does not reflect, in tone orcontent, the pre 10th May position. This coupledwith recent political statements must raise aserious question over your commitment to a realpeace process.

Sinn Féin is committed to securing peace and anend to conflict. In our view this requires a genuinepeace process which sets equality, justice andpolitical stability as its objectives and has as itsmeans dialogue and all embracing negotiations inthe context of democratic principles.

In attempting to progress towards that situation weare prepared to be as reasonable and flexible aspossible.

There is a way forward for all who have the politicalwill to grasp it. Our will to do so should not be inany doubt.

We are perplexed by your latest communication. Inthis you require a private unilateral assurance thatorganised violence has been brought to an end.The purpose of a dialogue about peace is to bringall organised violence by all parties to the conflict toan end. This is implicitly recognised in the contacts,which have been made in the past several years.Without any such assurance we were prepared toproceed to the point of a face-to-face meeting. Wewelcomed this development.

In the course of that exchange you asserted thebelief that a two week suspension to accommodate

talks would result in republicans being persuadedthat there is no further need for armed struggle.

Because of our commitment to a lasting settlementand despite all of the difficulties involved we soughtand received a commitment to facilitate that step sothat we could both explore the potential for a realpeace process. We acknowledge this positiveresponse to our request as a sign of theseriousness of those involved.

The commitment was convey to you by theintermediaries. You failed to grasp that opportunity.This failure has frustrated any furtherdevelopments.

Your latest written communication states that the"importance, seriousness and significance" of thismessage "was fully understood". The logic of thatshould have been to move forward on the outlinedbasis. Regrettably that did not happen. Instead youdid not respond to this development.

We believe that this may be for expedient, internaland domestic party political reasons. If we are tomove forward such narrow considerations must beset to one side. We are not interested in playinggames.

In addition, much time prior to this was devoted byus to the drafting of an 11-paragraph response toyour 9-paragraph document. This has been lodgedwith the intermediaries for some time now. It wasour intention to put this on the agenda when thejoint secretariat, proposed by us, met to agreeprocedures. Because of your failure to respond thisdid not happen.

The manner in which we have handled this projectis a clear demonstration of our seriousness andcommitment to bringing about a peace process.The way in which you have handled it hasdamaged the project and may have increased thedifficulties.

Your failure to respond, coupled with recentstatements by your Prime Minister and other seniorministers shows no flexibility or imagination.

As for events on the ground. The greatest numberof fatalities for some time now in the conflict hasresulted from the actions of loyalist groups actingboth on their own agenda and as surrogates forBritish intelligence. South African guns supplied by

British agent Brian Nelson with the full knowledgeof the British authorities are being used for attackson the nationalist population, members of SinnFéin and their families.

This is the reality of events on the ground, whichwe seek to change, so let us be serious. There is aconflict. The issue is its resolution.

The absence of such a peace process condemnsus all to ongoing conflict and tragedy.

Note: In the British government version thefollowing sentence was omitted from paragraph 5,line three after "end." "The purpose of a dialogueabout peace is to bring all organised violence by allparties to the conflict to an end."

This was subsequently corrected by the Britishgovernment on Wednesday

December 1,1993. August 30, 1993 : Messagefrom Sinn Féin to the British Government

We reiterate our concern at the continuing leaksfrom your side. The Sunday Times story of 22ndAugust 1993 was but the latest in a recent serieswhich include a previous Sunday Times article andseveral informed references in public statementsby a number of Unionist spokesmen. We are alsoconvinced and concerned that the recent CookReport is connected to the above revelations.

September 1, 1993 : British governmentmessage in response to Sinn Féin message ofAugust 14, 1993

MESSAGE IN RESPONSE TO NOTE OF 14AUGUST 1993

1. The importance of clear mutual understandinghas already been recognised. Minds do not seemto be meeting at the moment. This needs to beovercome.

2. The note you sent on 14 August did not deal witha crucial point. It did not confirm that you envisagea peace process which is aimed at an inclusivepolitical process and that a lasting end to violencedoes not depend on your analysis being endorsedas the only way forward.

3. On a further point in it, the Government side hasnot asserted a belief that a two weeks suspension

would have the result described in paragraph 6. Onthe contrary, it has been their consistent positionthat violence must be brought to an end before anyprocess could begin.

4. Equally it is accepted that your side genuinelyand reasonably believed it had made a serious andsignificant offer. If it is the case that your sidebelieves it has been met with indifference, orworse, then it shows that both sides must strive tobe more clear with each other.

5. The important thing, without raking over everypoint of detail, is to establish whether there is aclearly understood way forward which could beagreed and adopted, without sacrifice of essentialprinciples on either side, in pursuit of the objectivesof securing peace, stability and reconciliation.

6. Two points are of importance:

i. since it is not possible to hold discussions underthe threat of violence, there must be an end toviolent activity before the process could begin;

ii. the objectives of an inclusive process would bethe pursuit of peace, stability and reconciliation onthe widest possible basis. Beyond that, there wouldbe no attempt to impose prior restrictions on theagenda. On the contrary it is assumed that eachparticipant would enter such a process on the basisof their separately stated political analysis andobjectives. The Government's position is wellunderstood publicly. The 9-paragraph note wasentirely consistent with that position.

7. Against that background, can you confirm thatyou want a peace process which is aimed at aninclusive political process and that a lasting end toviolence does not depend on your analysis beingendorsed as the only way forward?

8. If you can confirm this, then we remind you thatthis process of dialogue leading to an inclusivepolitical process can only start after the receipt ofthe necessary assurance that organised violencehad been brought to an end. In the meantimeprogress has to be subject to events on the ground.

September 3, 1993 : British governmentmessage sent to Sinn Féin in response to acomplaint of August 30, 1993 concerning leaksto the media

MESSAGE IN RESPONSE TO NOTE OF YOURNOTE OF 30 AUGUST

Recent media reports and speculation do not resultfrom authorised briefing. Nor do they serve theinterests of anybody seeking to bring theseexchanges to a successful conclusion. As bothsides recognise, that depends on maintainingmaximum confidentiality. Recent reports arecertainly not being inspired/ let alone orchestrated,by the Government side to which they are mostunwelcome. Accordingly, the Government side willcontinue to respect the confidentiality of theseexchanges. It remains committed as before to thenine-paragraph note.

September 6, 1993: Oral message from theBritish government.

This stated that Major was now a force forprogress. It stressed that the May 10 situation hasgot to be got back on the rails and suggested thatSinn Féin should comment in as major a way aspossible on the PLO/Rabin deal; that Sinn Féinshould be saying 'If they can come to anagreement in Israel, why not here? We arestanding at the altar why won't you come and joinus'.

It also said that a full frontal publicity offensive fromSinn Féin is expected, pointing out that variouscontingencies and defensive positions are alreadyin place.

NOTE: This is omitted from the British governmentversion.

September 10, 1993: Sinn Féin response toBritish government message of September 1,1993

RESPONSE TO 1 SEPTEMBERCOMMUNICATION

In our communication of August 14 we outlined ourdoubts about your commitment to the developmentof a real peace process. Your message of 1September 1993 does little to remove thesedoubts.

From the beginning of this process we had assuredyou of our preparedness to be as reasonable andflexible as possible. Our commitment to the searchfor a genuine peace process was evidenced by the

fact that we positively conveyed the very specificrequest from your representative for a two-weeksuspension of military activity on the part of the IRAto the IRA leadership. You informed us that thediscussions, which would follow on from such asuspension, would result in republicans beingconvinced that armed struggle was no longernecessary.

The positive response to this request by theleadership of the Irish Republican Army underlinedthe willingness on the republican side to facilitatemovement towards a real peace process.

The rejection of this substantial gesture by you hasnot only prevented further movement, but hasdamaged the project and increased the difficultiesinvolved. This, and your present attempts to denythis aspect of the contact between us, can only beregarded with the utmost scepticism and mustraise serious questions about your motives in all ofthis.

As we have already pointed out we found ourpreliminary meeting valuable. Despite ourreservations, and the difficulties since, we stillbelieve that there exists a basis for progress, whichcan be developed into a genuine, realistic, anddemocratic peace process. This, however, requiresa degree of political will to move forward which has,up to now, been singularly lacking on your part.

Sinn Féin is engaged in a serious attempt throughour contact with you and with others to developsuch a process. Our party president Gerry Adamsis currently discussing with SDLP leader JohnHume this possibility. We have publicly called for anew and imaginative initiative by the Dublin andLondon Governments, based on democraticprinciples, to break the present deadlock.

Our commitment to any genuine peace processwhich sets equality, justice and political stability asits objective is a matter of public record. Sinn Féinhas, like every other party to this conflict, its ownparticular political analysis. But the future shape ofIrish society is a matter for the Irish people todecide democratically, without impediment of anykind, through dialogue and all embracingnegotiations. Sinn Féin remains committed to sucha real peace process

NOTE: This message is omitted from the Britishgovernment version.

September 25. 1993: Sinn Féin President GerryAdams and SDLP Party Leader John Humeissued the second of three joint statements bythe two party leaders in the course of 1993.

The statement said:

"Our discussions, aimed at the creation of a peaceprocess which would involve all parties, have madeconsiderable progress.

We agreed to forward a report on the positionreached to date to Dublin for consideration.

We recognise that the broad principles involved willbe for wider consideration between the twogovernments.

Accordingly, we have suspended detaileddiscussions for the time being in order to facilitatethis.

We are convinced from our discussions that aprocess can be designed to lead to agreementamong the divided people of this island, which willprovide a solid basis for peace.

Such a process would obviously also be designedto ensure that any new agreement that mightemerge respects the diversity of our differenttraditions and earns their allegiance andagreement."

A copy of this statement was forwarded to theBritish government.

September 28. 1993: Sinn Féin message toBritish Government seeking response to SinnFéin's message of September 10 1993

We are still awaiting your response to ourcommunication of September 10.

Developments since then particularly theHume/Adams statement have moved the situationforward. It deserves a more positive response thanthat given by Patrick Mayhew yesterday

NOTE: This message is omitted from the Britishgovernment version.

November 5 1993: British government messageto Sinn Féin

The British government claimed it had sent thismessage as a response to a written message sentby Sinn Féin on November 2, 1993. The November2 message is contained in the British governmentversion of these exchanges.

Sinn Féin did not send this message. It is bogus. Itwas written by the British government.

Sinn Féin received this message and the bogusNovember 2 message purporting to come fromSinn Féin simultaneously on the evening ofNovember 5,1993.

Sinn Féin believes that this 'Substantive Response'is the "new draft British paper" referred to on May15 1993 (see page 34) and which was discussedby the British ministers on May 17 and May 18 (seepage 35) and referred to in their message of July17 (see page 37).

SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE

1. Your message of 2 November is taken as beingof the greatest importance and significance. Theanswer to the specific question you raise is given inparagraph 4 below.

2. We hold to what was said jointly and in public bythe Prime Minister and the Taoiseach in Brusselson 29 October. A copy of the Statement is annexed.There can be no departure from what is said thereand in particular its statement that there could beno secret agreements or understandings betweenGovernments and organisations supportingviolence as a price for is cessation and its call onthem to renounce for good the use of, or supportfor/ violence. There can also be no departure fromthe constitutional guarantee that Northern Ireland'sstatus as part of the United Kingdom will notchange without the consent of a majority of itspeople.

3. It is the public and consistent position of theBritish Government that any dialogue could onlyfollow a permanent end to violent activity.

4. You ask about the sequence of events in theevent of a total end to hostilities. If, as you haveoffered, you were to give us an unequivocalassurance that violence has indeed been broughtto a permanent end, and that accordingly Sinn Féin

is now committed to political progress by peacefuland democratic means alone, we will make clearpublicly our commitment to enter exploratorydialogue with you. Our public statement will makeclear that, provided your private assurance ispromptly confirmed publicly after our publicstatement and that events on the ground are fullyconsistent with this, a first meeting for exploratorydialogue will take place within a week ofParliament's return in January.

5. Exploratory dialogue will have the followingpurposes:

(i) to explore the basis upon which Sinn Féin wouldcome to be admitted to an inclusive political talksprocess to which the British Government iscommitted but without anticipating the negotiationswithin that process;

(ii) to exchange views on how Sinn Féin would beable over a period to play the same part as thecurrent constitutional parties in the public life ofNorthern Ireland;

(iii) to examine the practical consequences of theending of violence.

6. The attached Annex summarises the sequenceof events and provides answers to the proceduralquestions concerning exploratory dialogue, whichhave been raised.

7. If, in advance of our public statement, any publicstatement were made on your behalf whichappears to us inconsistent with this basis forproceeding it would not be possible for us then toproceed.

8. If we received the necessary assurance, whichyou have offered, that violence has been brought toan end, we shall assume that you are assenting tothe basis for proceeding explained in this note andits attachment.

PROCEDURAL ANNEX

November 8, 1993: Sinn Féin message toBritish government repudiating the November2, 1993 message. This was despatched by SinnFéin on November 8, 1993

After a discussion between Gerry Adams andMartin McGuinness the following message was

sent at 11am Wednesday 10th November 1993.

I have been instructed to send this message.

We were informed on Friday November 5th of acommunication received by you on November 2.This communication was issued without ourauthority or knowledge and solely on the initiativeof Mr. Brown.

As you are aware it is our belief that theHume/Adams process provides the basis forpeace. The IRA has also publicly indicated apositive attitude.

This provides a unique opportunity which should begrasped.

8th November 1993.

NOTE: This message is omitted from the Britishgovernment version. It was sent in the belief (asdescribed above) that the British government hadreceived a message and before the contact hadsatisfied Sinn Féin that no message whatsoeverhad been sent by the contact.