SE~T A Review of the FBI's Actions With ' Raised By ... IG Report.pdfAllegations Raised By Contract...
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, , S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General SE~T A Review of the FBI' s Actions Connection With ' Allegations Raised By Contract Linguist Sibel Edmo nds Office of the Inspector General Office of Oversight and Review July 2004
Transcript of SE~T A Review of the FBI's Actions With ' Raised By ... IG Report.pdfAllegations Raised By Contract...
, ,
S. Department of JusticeOffice of the Inspector General
SE~T
A Review of the FBI' s Actions Connection With 'Allegations Raised By Contract Linguist Sibel Edmonds
Office of the Inspector GeneralOffice of Oversight and Review
July 2004
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a. Organization (U).......................................................,....... 6b, . Types of Linguists (U) """"""""""""""""""""""""""'" 7Co Linguist Responsibilities and Procedures (U).....................
2, FBI Headquarters Security Clearances (U)............................. a; SF-86 (U)......,.".....,.,...............................,................,..... 12 b. Personal 8ecurity Interview (U)....................................... 12 ic. Pre-employment Polygraph (U) ........................................ 13 d. Risk Assessment (U) ....................................................... 13 e. 8ecuri Briefin and Forms U)...................................... 14
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INTRODUCTION (U),.........,..............
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BACKGROUND (U).,..,..... ............,........,.,...".............,...,...............".,..... 3A. Edmonds (U)...,..,.,.,..........,........,..,....,...,.."...........,..""""""""""" 31. Biographical Information (U).. ...... .
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A. Arrival of EdmondsJ (S) .............
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L.......,............,............,......,.... 213. Response by Edmonds ' Supervisors (U)..................................4. Edmonds Documents Additional Complaints on aFebruary 8 Memorandum Writte'n' on Her Home Computer(0) ...
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E. . Follow-up by Edmonds ' Supervisors (U) ........................................ 28
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Q, Polygraph (S) ....................................... 30
H. Additional Complaints by Edmonds (U).........................................
I. FBI's Decision to Stop Using Edmonds ' Services (0) """"""""""" 34
J, Events After Edmonds ' Services Were Terminated (U).................... 36
K. Additional Allegations by Edmonds (U)........................ ..............,... 38
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J. Documents Allegedly Taken from Edmonds ' Workspace (U)...........
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VI. FBI' S INVESTIGATION OF EDMONDS' ALLEGATIONS (U) .................... 64
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0, FBrs Response to Edmonds ' First Written Complaint-January 22 2002 Memoranda (U) ............................................... 70
E, FBI's Response to Edmonds ' Subsequent Written Complaintthe February 8 2002 , Memorandum (X) .......................................
F. FBI's Security Investigation (U) ..........................................,..........
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VII. EDMONDS' CLAIM OF RETALIATION (U) ............................................. 81
VIII. OTHER ALLEGATION8 MADE BY EDMONDS (U) ................................. 83A, Work "81ow Down (U)...............,..,....,............,.,..,.....,................... 83B. ................ 86
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D, Additional Allegations (0)".............................................................. 1. Other Travel-Related Allegations (U)..... .......,.....,....................
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:er ReCei~t of Gifts by Supervisors (U!...."."...."si::::: ~~4. Unaut or zed DIsclosure of Information to Congress (U) ........ 95
IX. OIG RECOMMENDATlON8 (U) ............................................................. 96
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INTRODUCTION (U~
This report describes the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG)investigation of allegations raised by Sibel Edmonds , a former contract linguistfor the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Edmonds worked for the FBIfrom 8eptember 20. 2001. until March 22. 2002.f
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On March 22 , 2002 , the FBI stopped using Edmonds ' translation servicesand on March 26 terminated her contract. (U)
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II. OIG INVESTIGATION (U)
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During the course of our investigation , the OIG interviewed more than 50individuals, including FBI employees , cont.ractors, and Department of Justice(DOJ) officials. The OIG interviewed Edmonds on three separate occasions inApril , June , and November of 2002, On January 28 2004 , the OIG wrote toEdmonds ' attorney offering to meet with Edmonds again if she had additionalrelevant information to provide to the 010. Her attorney said that Edmondsdid not believe she had anything additional to provide the GIG , and theattorney did not request an additional meeting. In addition , we obtained andreviewed thousands of pages of FBI documents relating to Edmondsallegations , including e-mails , notes, and other records. We also sought fromanother federal government agency outside the DOJ expert assistance withtranslations and other matters. (U)
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. The FBI conducted a classification review of t.his report and classified the report at thesecret level. The paragraphs of the report that the FBI has classified as secret are marked. (U)
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In this section of the report, we rovide brief bio a hical andback round information on Edmonds n .n tC"" ( S )
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Before joining the FBI , Edmonds handled retail sales for her husband'camera business. Edmonds also worked as a volunteer at the AlexandriaVirginia courthouse as a court-appointed special advocate for children and forthe Rostropovich foundation , a non-profit organization that delivers medicalsupplies and food to a children s hospital in St. PetersQurg, Russia. Edmondsalso served as a corporate officer (8ecretary) for her husband' s networkcomputer consulting business. (U)
I According to various media accounts , Edmor.ds has made additional allegations relatingto the September 11 terrorist attacks and to the allegedly inappropriate reaction by other FBIlinguists to those attacks. Edmonds never raised those allegations to the OIG , and we have notinvestigated them in this review, Rather, we undeFstand that staff from the NatioI.lalCommission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States have interviewed Edmonds regardingthese claims. (V)
In addition , our investigation did not review allegations regarding unauthorized disclosureof information to the media. We did not address Edmonds ' allegation , contained in a lawsuitshe filed against the FBI , that her Privacy Act rights were violated by FBI disclosures about hernor do we address the FBI's claim that Edmonds inIDroperlv disclosed classified information
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Pursuant to instructions in the offer letter, Edmonds completed onJune 4 , 1998 , an SF-86 Questionnaire for National Security Positions - thestandard form used by the federal government to collect information forbackground investigations of persons applying for positions that require asecurity clearance. As part of the background investigation , Edmonds waspolygraphed on December 4 , 1998. The FBI also conducted a Personal8ecurity Interview (PSI) of Edmonds on December 16 , 1998. Her security filedoes not reflect any activity on her backgreund investigation during 1999. Itappears that through a series of oversights and lack of follow through, the FBIdid not take action on her background investigation during this time periodand therefore Edmonds did not begin work as a contract linguist during thistime period. (0)
In February 2000, the FBI asked Edmonds to submit ano . In :bIA fil2001 th Lnrequestingnthat------.---
I( S )e up a e , an as e n ce to complete the background investigation, . The FBI cor;lducted supplemental PSIs of Edmonds on May 1 2001 , and July 19 2001. On September 13 2001 , fouryears after she first submitted her application
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the FBI"granted Edmonds a Secret" clearance. No job interview was conducted other than the PSIs,
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2 The various linguist positions in the FBI are described more fully in the next section ofthis report. In brief, a CM can provide summary translations of oral and writtencommunications , and analysis of those translations, for internal dissemination. In addition tothose services, CLs also can act as interpreters in FBI interviews, review material produced byother linguists , produce written communications for internal and court dissemination, andtestify as expert witnesses in federal court. A CL can perform the same duties as a LanguageSpecialist (LS), which is the term for a linguist who is a permanent employee of the FBI. (V)
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a. Organization (Ut
In the early 1980s , the FBI began hiring linguists for translationinterpretation , and other language services necessary for the FBrs work.Before that, the FBI used Special Agents to perform such services. The numberof linguists hired by the FBI has grown from a mere handful in 1983 to over
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Through its Foreign Language Program (FLP), the FBI seeks tq ensurethat the language needs of its field offices and Headquarters units are met.The FLP and the personnel who perform language services for the FBI aredirected by the Language Services' Section (LSS). LSS personnel handleapproximately 60 languages covering 95 percent of the world's population,
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SE~TSince March 2002 the LSS has been placed within the Office of InternationalOperations at FBI Headquarters) which is under the jurisdiction of the FBI'sDirector for Law Enforcement 8ervices. Immediately before the March 2002reorganization, LS8 was part of the Investigative Services Division.3 A copy ofthe FBrs current organizational chart is attached as Appendix
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During the early part of 2002 , the time relevant to this review) LSS wascomposed of three units. The Language Training and Assessment Unit (LTAU)was responsible for developing and conducting language assessments of FBIapplicants and personnel. The LTAU also provided foreign language andcultural training to FBI personnel. The Translation and Deployment Unit(TDU) managed national translation and interpreting resources in support ofthe FBI's investigative and administrative priorities, The TDU ensured thatlinguists were assigned to field offices requesting their services or that arequesting office s work was sent to available linguists. , The LanguageAdministration and Acquisition Unit (LAAU) handled the administrativefunctions of the FLP. The LAAU also was responsible for hiring linguists andfor researching) acquiring, a~d integrating language-related technologies. Anorganizational chart for the Language Services Section , dated November 132001 , is attached a~ Appendix B. (U)
b. Types of Linguists (U)
The FBI uses three types of linguists. First, the FBI has permanentemployees known as Language Specialists. Language Specialists (LS) providetranslations of written or oral communications and analyze those translations.They also can act as interpreters in FBI interviews, review material producedby other linguists, produce written communications for internal and courtdissemination , and testify as expert witnesses in federal court. (U)
In addition ) the FBI uses contract employees as linguists. The ContractLinguist Program (CLP)) which is administered by the LAAU, enables the FBI toacquire linguist resources without adding permanent employees, It also givesthe FBI the opportunity to recruit permanent LS from linguists woo alreadyhave been evaluated through the CLP.
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3 Before that, LSS had been placed , at various times , in the Laboratory Division and theCriminal Investigative Division, (V)
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CMs. Linguists ) designation as CL or CM depends upon their performance onlanguage tests administered by the LSS.4 (U)
According to the LS OperationalnManuat..G!.-.~....nm..." ? \-.I perform translation duties mIlar to tnose at Language Specialists." CLs \
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provide translations of written or oral communications and analyze thosetranslations. They also act as interpreters in FBI interviews , review materialproduced by other linguists, produce written communications for internal andcourt dissemination , and testify as expert witnesses in federal court.
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The FBI created the additional position of "Contract Language Monitor" .(CM) in response to a critical need for linguists and the inability to find asufficient number of linguists who qualify for LS or CL positions. A CM canprovide summary translations of oral. communications and analysis of thosetranslations. and written comml1nir.~tinn~ for intf'.rn::ll r1i~~PTnin~ti
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In order to obtain a security clearance , FBI applicants must fill out anSF -86 form Questionnaire for National Security Positions.
The SF -86 is thestandard form used by federal government agencies to collect information forbackground investigations and reinvestigations of persons applying for, orincumbents in , national security positions. ll The form consists of nine pagesof questions addressing the following areas: identifying informationcitizenship, residences , education , employ.ment history, marital status/history,relatives and associates , military his~ory, foreign travel and activities , a limitedmedical inquiry, police record , use of illegal drugs and drug activity, financialrecord , civil court actions , and associations with anti-United Statesorganizations. (U)
b. Personal Security Interview (U)
In addition to filling out the SF-86 form , an individual whose backgroundis being investigated by the FBI must undergo a Personnel Security Interview(P8I) . 12 According to the instructions on the SF - , the interview is an
II According to the SF - , the group of people requiring background investigations fordetermining eligibility for a security clearance include military personnel ' and applicants orincumbents in national security positions , either employed by the Government or working forGovernment contractors , licensees, certificate holders , and grantees. SF-86, (V)
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According to the MIOG and an FBI All Field Office ElectronicCommunication (EC) dated October 11 2002 , areas to be covered in thebackground investigation include personal and business credit issues , denialsand dismissals from emploYment, business circumstances that could lead toconflict-of- interest allegations , membership or involvement in organizationsthat are discriminatory and organizations that advocate activities against theinterest of the United 8tates , and concealment of any activity that could beused to compromise the applicant or have an adverse affect on their character.MIOG Part 2 Section 17- 6. (U)
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The Language Services Section conducts the background investigationand the pre-employment polygraph to ensure that the candidate is suitable foremployment. The applicant's file is then passed to the Initial Clearance andAccess Unit (ICAU) in the Personnel Security Section with1n the FBrs Security
Division. 13 ICAU' s function is to determine if the applicant will be granted asecurity clearance, (U)
The adjudicators within ICAU may request that a risk assessment beperformed. A risk assessment is meant to address any security concerns thatsurface during the applicant' s background investigation includin those that
licanfs vulnerabili to coercion.
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that as of Marc 2 , ns assessments are camp ete or approximately 95 percent of applicants for contract linguist positions.
e. Security Briefing and Forms (U)
If ICAU determines that a potential contractor should be granted asecurity clearance , a 8ecurity Officer gives that person a security briefing. Thepurpose of the briefing is to inform individuals that they may not disclosesensitive or classified information obtained while working for the FBI , and toinform the individuals of the consequences for unauthorized disclosure. (U)
At the briefing, new contractors sign a Security Acknowledgement Formin which they acknowledge that they understand the information provided inthe briefing and agree to adhere to instructions printed on the form forhandling classified information. They also sign a Classified Information
13 Before the creation of the Security Division in December 2001, the duties were
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15 Throughout this report, individuals are identified using the title they held at the time of the event or action under examination. (V)
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has beenbriefed about security responsibilities ) and will not improperly divulgeclassified information. The agreement also sets forth the potentialpunishments for improperly divulging classified information. Until the form issigned, .the individual does not have clearance and cannot have access tonational security information. (U)
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and travel warnings, They also pass clearances to other organizations, TheSecurity Officer also provides security briefings and covers leads for (S)background investigations.
Security Officers also conduct investigations of reported and suspectedsecurity violations. The types of violations they investigate include using homecomputers to process classified information ' processing Top Secret informationon the internal FBI Secret network, unauthorized access to FBI files) andsharing computer passwords. (U)
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In the next section) we describe each of Edmonds) allegations andthe evidence .to support or refute them.
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On March 8, Edmonds took the polygraph examination. The polygraphquestions related to whether she had disclosed classified information tounauthorized persons, and whether she \vas maintaining classified informationoutside FBI office space. She denied disclosing classified information tounauthorized persons , and denied maintaining classified information outsideFBI space. The polygrapher concluded that she was not deceptive in her.answers.
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41 Edmonds said that a Spanish language linguist was at an adjoining work station at the. time of this conversation. The Spanish language linguist told the GIG that she could not recall
this conversation , and she noted that all the linguists wear headphones while they work. (U)
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J. Documents Allegedly Taken from Edmonds ' Workspace (U)
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VI. FBI'S INVESTIGATION OF EDMONDS' ALLEGATIONS
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January 22, 2002, Memoranda (U)
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At the time of these events , the FBI had no protocol for the receipt andinvestigation of derogatory information about an employee or contractor. May 2002 , in response to the Hanssen case , the FBI created a new
47 As demonstrated by the eSPiOnage of former F ~ Ap'f'nt RO :rt Hanssen :f' FBI ml1st
I ta:. :1US1Y allegations suggesting security breach. (S) , . ven if the evidence is not clear-cut. The Hanssen case emonstrates at an
In 1V1 ual reporting a security-related concern about another employee may not have the wholestory, but may provide sufficient information to focus attention on a person deserving offurther scrutiny, See the GIG's report entitled "A Review of the FBI's Performance in Deterring,Dectecting, and Investigating the Espionage Activities of Robert Philp Hanssen " August 2003,at 148-60.
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E. FBI's Response to Edmonds ' Subsequent Written Complaint, theFebruary 8 2002 , Memorandum (B):
The OIG also found problems with the manner in which the FBI handledEdmonds ' February 8 memorandum. These problems had significantimplications for the investigation the FBI conducted. (U)
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VII. EDMONDS' CLAIM OF RETALIATION (U)
On April 2 , the FBI sent a letter to Edmondsterminating her contract as of March 26. Edmonds has claimed that hertermination was in retaliation for her raising allegations of misconduct to theFBI. IS1
Edmonds does not qualify for "Whistleblower" status under the FBIWhistleblower regulations because she was a contractor, not an FBI employee.See 28 Code of Federal Regulations ~ 27. 1(a). However, in examining thequestion of whether the FBI retaliated against Edmonds because of herallegations of misconduct, we used the principles of these regulations whenanalyzing whether a complainant can demonstrate improper retaliation. (U)
. Pursuant to these regulations, the FBI cannot take a personnel actionagainst an employee in retaliation for any "protected disclosure" the employeehas made. 28 C. R. Section 27.2. For a disclosure to be "protected" underthe regulations, it must be made to the OIG , DOJ OPR , FBI OPR, the AttorneyGeneral, the Director of the FBI , the Deputy Director of the FBI, or the highestranking official in any FBI field office, 28 C. R. 27. 1 (a) In addition , theemployee making the disclosure must reasonably believe the disclosureevidences a violation of law, rule
, .
or regulation; or mismanagement, a grosswaste of funds , an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger topublic health or safety. 28 C. R. 27. 1 (a). The complainant has the burden ofshowing by a preponderance of the evidence that her protected disclosure wasa contributing factor in the decision to take the personnel action. Once thatshowing is made , the burden shifts to the agency to show by clear andconvincing evidence that it would have taken the personnel action against thecomplainant in the absence of the protected. disclosure. . at ~ 27. 5(e)(2). (VI
Edmonds ' allegations wo~ld clearly qualify as protected disclosures underthe FBI Whistleblower regulations.. Thus , the key issue would be whether herdisclosures were a "contributing factor" in the termination of her services.Under the Whistle blower regulations, the FBI would have to prove by clear andconvincing evidence that it would have taken the same action absent herdisclosures. (0)
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In sum , while Edmonds does not fall within the protection of the FBI'Whistleblower regulations , we believe that the FBI significantly mishandled thismatter. The FBI should not discourage employees or contractors from raisinggood- faith allegations of misconduct or mismanagement. By terminatingEdmonds ' services, in large part because of her allegations of misconduct, tl?-eFBI' s actions also may have the effect of discouraging others from raisingconcerns.51 (U)
VIII. OTHER ALLEGATIONS MADE BY EDMONDS U
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51 In response to a draft of this report , the FBI expressed disagreement with thisconclusion, A copy of the FBI's response to the GIG is attached as Appendix D, (V)
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phase I also includes an English Composition test, which includes bothmultiple-choice questions and an essay, and is graded on a scale of
5"1 In
order to pass the English Composition portion of Phase I , a CL must obtain ascore of at least 2+ and a CM candidate must achieve a score of at least 2.According to the FBI's MAGP, only linguists who pass "' Phase In of the FBI's
language test battery will be scheduled for "Phase II. See MAap Part 1Section 22- 1.7. (U)
Phase II consists of Foreign Language Speaking and English LanguageSpeaking tests. According to Margaret Gulotta , Chief of the FBI's LanguageServices Section , Phase II is administered over the telephone by a "highly-educated native speaker." It is also graded on a 0-5 scale. (U)
54 Possible scores include "pluses " but not minuses~, 0, 1 , 1+ , and
5). A score of 1 + is described as "Elementary Proficiency, Plus," a score of 2 is described asLimited Working Proficiency," and a score of 3 is described as "General Professional
Proficiency, " (U)
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rn.J1JnP. ?OOO :::mrl . Julv 200? t e FBI administered over 4 300
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According to Gulotta, however did not have the authority to grantthis waiver. Only the Unit Chief of LtAUmay grant such a waiver. MAOP Part
, Section 22- 1.7(4). Gulotta also told t~e OIG in July 20?2 th~FBI did
not have any other CMs who had been"hm~d "based on waivers. L-J statedthat she believed she had the authority to grant the waiver because In pastemergency situations contractors had been allowed to work with no orincomplete testing, or had received waivers from ,a Program Manager. (U)
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55 In Septeniber 2002 , the request was broadened to i?clude CMs. (U)
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Edmonds II;lade other allegations that the GIG investigated and did notsubstantiate, We discuss those briefly below. (0)
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2. Improper Receipt of Gifts by Supervisors (U)
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The GIG was unable to determine the specific value of the watches , butthey do not appear to be expensive watches. We found that the same brand ofwatches was advertised on the Internet for $4.90 per set. In addition , ajewelertold the OIG that the watches do not contain a karat mark, indicating that theydo not contain any gold. The jeweler said ~hat he had seen similar watches forsale by street vendors in Washington , D.C, He estimated that the watchescould be worth anywhere from $20 to $100. (U)
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SE~The FBI MAOP provides that a supervisor may not accept a' gift from
subordinate employee who receives )ess pay than the supervisor. A supervisor-may accept from subordinates voluntary gifts of a nominal value made on aspecial occasion such as marriage , illness , or retirement. A supervisor mayalso accept gifts worth less than $10 on "on an occasional basis, including anyoccasion on which gifts are traditionally given or exchanged" such as holidays.MAOP 1- 13. 1. This provision of the MAOP is the same as the DOJ regulationprohibiting gifts from subordinates to suuervisors. 5 CFR 2635.302 & 3041
11 IS\
3. I I (S)
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Unauthorized Disclosure of Information to Congress (U)
The OIG also received an allegation from the FBI of a possibleunauthorized disclosure of classified information to a congressional staffer.
The OIG found that on June 17 2002 , Edward Shubert, the Section Chief ofthe Personnel 8ecurity 8ection in the 8ecurity Division , conducted a briefingregarding Edmonds ' allegations for congressional staff members. Because oneof the congressIOnal staff members present lacked the appropriate secunty
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IX. OIG RECOMMENDATIONS (U)
In light of the issues that we examined in this case , we are providing eightsystemic recommendations to the FBI in an attempt to help it improve itsforeign language translation program. (U)
: .
1. The FBI should consider having an employee from theLanguage Services Section or a case agent from the rel~vantsquad interview contract linguists before they are hired by theFBI. The FBI's hiring process for contract linguists includes bothlanguage testing and a full background investigation. Although thebackground investigation includes a Personal Security Interviewdesigned to obtain information relevant to the security clearancecontract linguists are not inte:rviewed before being hired byemployees from the Language Services Section or any operationalagents. As a result, the supervisors of contract linguists orcontract monitors never have an opportunity to meet with thelinguist and explore any issues relating to their qualificationsbackground or foreign contacts prior to the linguists starting work.While we recognize that these linguists are used on a contract basisonly, we believe the FBI shouled consider including an interview
during the hiring process for contract linguists and contractmonitors. Such an interview could include the applicant's futuresupervisor or a case agent from a relevant operational squad. (U),
57 This briefing recently has become the subjeCt of congressional complaints regarding
retroactive classification of infonnation by the DO.J. (U)
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5, The FBI should establish a uniform policy with regard to workassignment sheets for linguists. In the Language ServicesSection , work assignment sheets that should contain thesignatures of the translator, reviewer, and editor who worked on aparticular translation are destroyed after the infoI"II1:ation is enteredinto a database. We also were told that the practice with respect tothe signatures on these forms is not uniform. For example , someindividuals only put a checkmark by their name when theycomplete the assignment, while others simply forward the sheetwithout marking it in any way. We recommend that the FBIestablish and enforce a uniform policy requiring signatures on workassignment sheets, and that it maintain those sheets for areasonable period of time so that issues relating to a particulartranslation can be addressed adequately. (U).
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8. The FBI should reinforce ethics rules regarding gifts tosupervisors. We found that the practice of giving small gifts tolanguage squad supervisors was widespread , and was not limited tospecial occasions such as marriage , illness or retirement. believe the FBI should reiterate the ethics rules regarding gifts andspecifJ.cally instruct language squad supervisors and linguists tostop the practice of supervisors accepting ,gifts from linguists. . (U)
CONCLUSION (U)
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Edmonds also alleged that the FBI retaliated against her by terminatingher services as a contract linguist. We concluded that Edmonds ' allegationswere at least a contributing factor in why the FBI terminated her services. recognize that the FBI Whistle blower regulations do not apply to Edmondsbecause she was a contractor rather than an FBI employee. We also recognize
--"
tl1~t her ~riP" :: ;n:pnt ol1pa tions of misconduct may have been(S) frustta:tm and ~hat not all of her allegations were true.
However, many 0 er egations ad a basis in fact, and the way the FBIresponded to her allegations contributed to her persistent claims. Moreoverwe believe the FBI should not discourage employees OF-- contractors from raisinggood -faith allegations of misconduct or mismanagement and the FBI'termination of Edmonds ' services may discourage others from raising suchconcerns.
With regard to Edmonds ' other allegations of misconduct , most were notsupported by the evidence we reviewed. However, she did raise a valid concernabout unnecessary travel for certain linguists. (V)
Finally, our review also found problems in the oversight of FBI contractlinguists. The FBI needs to more carefully oversee and monitor their work.Towards this end, we made several recommendations regarding the FBI's hiringand oversight of contract linguists. We believe that the FBI should carefullyconsider these recommendations , which we believe could help improve theoperation of the FBI's language translation program. (U)
100
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. APPENDICES
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Appendix B
FBI LANGUAGE SERVICES SECTION
lANGUAGE SPEC1AI.IST PROGRAM
~ SPEC~~=NGUIST I
lANGUAGe SERVICESTRANSLJlTI()N CENTER
SupeMsoty Translalol'
DEPLOYMENT PROGRAM
TRANSlATION STAFF
CONTRACT UNG ISTS
Re~
fIIT3/DT
SECTION CHIEF
BOAS. WORK ORDERS.CERTIFICATIONS & RENEWALS
Secretary
APPliED UNC".usTS
l WK;~~=N~
CllNVOrCE \IOUCHERPROCESSiNG: OVERTIME
REQUESTS: ADoIIN SUPPORT
PROGAAN ~PORT I
ESOuRcE ENHANCEMENT& STRATEGIC PlANNINGPROGAAM MANAGER
Cl RECRUTMENT& BACKGROUND PROCESSING
FOREIGN LANGUAGERESOURCE CENTER
ASSESSME , R:.5EARCHAND TEST AOMINISTRATION
PROGAANProg...m Man..;,er
TEST ADMiNISTRATION
LANGUAGE AUTOMATIONSUPPORT & OUTREACH
For Internal FBI Foreign Language Personnel Usage Only :"- No Outside Dissemination Permitted
ASSESSIAEfIT ANO RESEARCHFOREIGN l..'/;GUAGE TESTING
SPECIALIST
TEST. ADMINISTASSIST
~TlON
III
ndix C
(S )
..-.. ,-..--- .".....--
s. Department of JusticeAppendix D
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington . D. C. 20535-0001
June 30 , 2004
Honorable Glenn A~ Fine
Inspector GeneralDepartment of JusticeRoom 4322 Main950 Pennsylvania Avenue , NorthwestWashington , D.C. 20530
Dear Mr. Fine:
This letter is in response to your draft report on Sibel Edmonds. First, I disagreewith your conclusion that Edmonds, a private contractor, was retaliated against for her makingaJlegations of misconduct or mismanagement. Edmonds was tenninated from the FBI becauseshe committed security violations and was a disruption to her office. Second, the FBI thoroughlyinvestigated this matter and determined that retaliation was not the basis of her termination.Your report makes reference to her " increasingly vociferous complaints," and found " insufficient
'idence " to substantiate multiple additional allegations made by Edmonds. Under the totality ofthe facts and circumstances, the FBI was justified to terminate her contract and did not retaliateagainst her.
The Director has testified before Congress, and has communicated to allemployees in the FBI , that he will not folerate retaliation.
information.Please feel free to contact me at (202) 324-2901 should you require additional
Sincerely yours
.s- "?,VI
('
aA~Steven C. McCrawAssistant DirectorInspection Division
