SESSION IV PART 1SESSION IV PART 1Panel Discussion of SMSPanel Discussion of SMS

Joint Meeting of the FSF 61st Annual International Air Safety Seminar IASS, IFA 38th International Conference, and IATA

Panel Discussion of SMS

“The Moderator”

David Mawdsley

Panel Discussion of SMS

“The Implementers”

Peter Simpson, Cathay Pacific

Robert Dodd, Qantas

Jacqueline Booth-Bourdeau, Transport Canada Civil Aviation

Gerhard Gruber, Vienna Airport

Are You Ready?

• Providers are Providers are responsible for responsible for establishing an SMSestablishing an SMS

• States are responsible States are responsible for the acceptance for the acceptance and oversight of and oversight of providers’ SMSproviders’ SMS

2009 A Time for SMS Implementation

and Integration

SMS Panel Member SMS Panel Member PerspectivesPerspectives

“Our SMS Message” The Panel Support Papers

FSF International Advisory Committee SMS Position Paper – David Mawdsley, Superstructure Group

Safety Management Systems – Simplifying the Business – Peter Simpson, Cathay Pacific Airways

Using an Integrated Causal Model to Better Manage Airline Risk – Robert Dodd, Qantas Airways

Assessing Compliance in An SMS Environment: A Systems Approach to Oversight – Jacqueline Booth-Bourdeau, Transport Canada Civil Aviation

Airport Safety Management Systems – Gerhard Gruber, Vienna AP

SMS Implementation in an Expanding MROs – Mark Hayman, Director (Engineering), Hong Kong Aircraft Engineering Company

Safety Management Safety Management Systems Systems

Simplifying the BusinessSimplifying the Business

Peter Simpson, Manager Air Peter Simpson, Manager Air SafetySafety

SMS - StBSMS - StB

• Even the ‘experts’ are casting SMS in a negative light – costly, time consuming, difficult, complex.

• SMS has become the buzzword of the 2000s, replacing TQM and the quality frenzy of the 1990s.

• A Safety Management System is simply a system for managing safety. Managing safety is about managing risk.

• SMS is not new, airlines have always managed safety and risk, but it wasn’t called SMS until 1990s

• Most airlines (inc those with IOSA) have an SMS or at least the basic components

SMS - StBSMS - StB

• Having an SMS does not make an airline safe, but an airline cannot be safe without an SMS.

• The challenge is to make the SMS effective• Effective safety management requires a good safety

culture• Back to basics – identify risk, asses risk, manage risk• An integrated system is not a single system or a single

department

Rob Kella - Chief Risk Officer

The Simplicity of Aviation Safety Management Putting Practical Ideas Into Practice - Airline Risk Management

Bringing Risk and Assurance Together

Evolution of the Qantas Safety Management SystemRobert Dodd

Evolution of the Qantas SMS

AQD

Safety ReportsOccurrences & Hazards

InvestigationsFindingsCausesActions

AuditsFindingsCausesActions

Action Tracking

FOQA• Data focus• Investigation• Quality Audits

2.1 Occurrence Risk Index

2.2 Findings Risk Index3.1 Safety System Assessment

3.2 Overdue Action Close Out

4.1 Occurrence Investigation

4.2 Safety Meetings

1.1 High Risk Occurrences

1.2 High Risk Findings

1.3 Damage Costs

• Measure Safety Performance• Feedback process• SMS Elements

• Assess System•Integrated SMS•Managerial Accountability

Operational EnvironmentEg Flight Deck

Threats Errors Risk States

Organisational Factors

Local F

actorsP

ersonal Com

petence Task E

nvironment

Health/F

atigue/AO

D S

kills/Recency T

ime pressure

Lighting/N

oise

Ris

k M

anag

emen

t Pro

cess

Risk Controls

LeadershipCulture/ Communication

Planning/ Objectives

Process Management

Technical Controls

Procedures/ Checks

Training/ Assessment

People Management

Ana

lyse

& E

valu

ate M

onitor & R

eview

Risk Identification

Response/ Action

Operational EnvironmentEg Flight Deck

Threats Errors Risk States

Operational EnvironmentEg Flight Deck

Threats Errors Risk States

Risk Outcome

Operational EnvironmentEg Flight Deck

Threats Errors Risk States

Operational EnvironmentEg Flight Deck

Threats Errors Risk States

Organisational Factors

Local F

actorsP

ersonal Com

petence Task E

nvironment

Health/F

atigue/AO

D S

kills/Recency T

ime pressure

Lighting/N

oise

Ris

k M

anag

emen

t Pro

cess

Risk Controls

LeadershipCulture/ Communication

Planning/ Objectives

Process Management

Technical Controls

Procedures/ Checks

Training/ Assessment

People Management

Ana

lyse

& E

valu

ate M

onitor & R

eview

Risk Identification

Response/ Action

Operational EnvironmentEg Flight Deck

Threats Errors Risk States

Operational EnvironmentEg Flight Deck

Threats Errors Risk States

Operational EnvironmentEg Flight Deck

Threats Errors Risk States

Operational EnvironmentEg Flight Deck

Threats Errors Risk States

Risk Outcome

•Multiple source•Enterprise Risk•Causal Framework

Threats Errors UAS Outcomes

•Risk Estimation based on TEM model

• Risk Driven• Engineered• Accountable

Board SESC

Qantas Airlines Safety Committee

Management Safety Review Committee (Flight Operations)

Type Committees (Each Fleet)

Group Safety

Common Information

Source (AQD)

Transport Canada’s System Level Approach to Regulatory Oversight

Transport Canada’s System Level Approach to Regulatory Oversight

Jacqueline Booth-Bourdeau Transport Canada Civil Aviation

SMS in the Canadian Context

• SMS and the Canadian Aviation Regulations• SMS Implementation process• SMS Challenges: Industry and the Regulator• Drivers of change: A new approach to

oversight

Transport Canada’s Assessment Methodology

• Audit versus Assessment: What’s the difference?• Transport Canada’s assessment methodology

– Expectations– Questions– Scoring Criteria

• Benefits of the assessment approach

Airport

Safety Management Systems

Gerhard GruberManager Airport OperationsVienna International Airport

Airport Safety Management Systems

As of 24th November 2005 a certified aerodrome shall have in operation a Safety Management System

Airport Safety Management Systems

• Rapid air transport growth– Number of aerodromes– Expansion of aerodromes

• Increasing aerodrome privatization trend• Increasing adoption of

– BOT (Build, Operate and Transfer)– BOO (Built, Operate and Own)

for the development of new and the expansion of existing aerodromes

• Global interest on aviation safety

The reasons behind:

Airport Safety Management Systems

• To have a safety policy and organization

• To ensure staff safety awareness

• To verify externally provided goods and services

• To have effective monitoring systems

• To detect changes which could affect safety

• To detect deviations from standards

• To respond to changes in requirements

• To comply with State regulations

Responsibilities of the Aerodrome Operator:

SMS in a Maintenance & Repair Organisation

SMS Implementation in an Expanding MRO

SMS for Air Traffic Management

A

EUROCONTROL Perspective of

SMS Implementation

A Road to Global SMS Integration

SMS Panel DiscussionSMS Panel Discussion

Questions Please!Questions Please!- From Audience to Panel- From Audience to Panel

SMS Panel