Session 7: Capital Structure C15.0008 Corporate Finance Topics.
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Transcript of Session 7: Capital Structure C15.0008 Corporate Finance Topics.
Financial Distress Costs
• Direct costs– Lawyers, accountants, consultants fees– Forced asset sales
• Indirect costs– Wasted time and energy– Deterioration of reputation and customer,
supplier, and employee relationships
• Total ~10-20% of firm value
Agency Conflicts
• Bondholders vs. stockholders (managers)– Occur when debt is risky– Stockholders control the firm
• Management vs. stockholders– Occur when corporate governance system
does not work perfectly– Managers can misuse the firms assets
Stockholder Incentives
• Take risk, i.e., undertake high risk (possibly negative NPV) projects
• Under-invest, i.e., reject positive NPV projects that require equity investment
• Pay dividends, i.e., distribute wealth to shareholders
Agency Costs
Since the market is smart, bondholders anticipate future actions and demand protection up front• Bond covenants (restrict the actions of managers and may reduce value)• Higher promised payments• These are all costs to the firm
Valuation Implications
VL = VU + PV(tax shield) - PV(financial distress costs) - PV(agency costs)Financial distress and agency costs (bondholder vs. stockholder) increase as the amount of debt increases.Optimal capital structure trades off the tax benefits of debt with financial distress and agency costs.
Agency conflict demonstrated
• Firm with 30 million debt to be repaid in 1 year, liquidated after a year
• Assets to pay off 35 million after 1 year (for certain). Risk free rate = 10%
• Asset value = 31.81, Debt value = 27.27. Hence equity value = 4.54
Risky negative NPV project
• NPV of project = -2 million
• Project changes the distribution of cash-flows. Cash-flows could either be 100 million or 10 million after 1 year
• New PV of firm = 31.81 – 2 = 29.81 million
Equity Pay-off
• H = 0.72
• B = 6.56
• Equity value = 14.96 : It increased, even though firm value decreased!
S
65
0
Finding the Optimal Capital Structure
• Comparison with other firms
• Maximize firm value– WACC approach
V = UCFt/(1+rWACC)t
– APV approachVL = VU + PV(tax shield) - PV(financial distress costs)
– Binomial approach
The WACC Approach
V = UCFt/(1+rWACC)t
UCF = EBIT(1-T) + depreciation – capex – nwc• Calculate WACC at various debt levels
– rB from debt rating via interest coverage and leverage ratios
– rS from Prop. IIrS = r0 + (1- TC)(B/S)(r0 - rB)
– WACC = (B/(S+B)) rB(1-T)+(S/(S+B)) rS
• Adjust expected cash flows for financial distress costs
Interest Coverage, Ratings and Spreads
Interest Coverage> < Rating Spread
0.20 D 14.00%0.2 0.65 C 12.70%0.65 0.80 CC 11.50%0.8 1.25 CCC 10.00%1.25 1.50 B- 8.00%1.5 1.75 B 6.50%1.75 2.00 B+ 4.75%
2 2.50 BB 3.50%2.5 3.00 BBB 2.25%3 4.25 A- 2.00%
4.25 5.50 A 1.80%5.5 6.50 A+ 1.50%6.5 8.50 AA 1.00%8.50 AAA 0.75%
Large manufacturing companies
Source: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/
Issues with the WACC Approach
• How big is the cash flow adjustment?
• You get a tax shield on interest expenses only
as long as you are making a profit and are
paying taxes.
• Financial distress costs and tax shields have
option like pay-offs.
The APV Approach
VL = VU + PV(tax shield) - PV(financial distress costs)
• PV(tax shield) = t [TC(interest expense)t] / (1+ rB)t
– The expected tax rate decreases as debt increases
• PV(financial distress costs) =
Prob * PV(financial distress costs | financial distress)
– The probability increases as the debt rating declines
– Cost are usually estimated as a percentage of pre-distress firm
value (~10-20%)
• Financial distress costs and tax shields have option like payoffs
Ratings and Default Risk
Rating Default RiskAAA 0.01%AA 0.28%A+ 0.40%A 0.53%A- 1.41%BBB 2.30%BB 12.20%B+ 19.28%B 26.36%B- 32.50%CCC 46.61%CC 52.50%C 60%D 75%
Source: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/
Rating ProbAAA 0.03%AA 0.55%A 0.78%BBB 9.33%BB 20.03%B 38.19%CCC 54.88%
Source: Altman, 1971-2002
Time Series of Default Rates
0.00%
2.00%
4.00%
6.00%
8.00%
10.00%
12.00%
14.00%
Year
Def
ault
Rat
e
% of high yield bonds defaulting in a given year
The Binomial Approach
Firm:• Single remaining cash flow in 1 year EBIT $10 million or $2 million (prob. 50%) no salvage value• Corporate tax rate: T=40%• Unlevered required return: r0=10%• In the event of bankruptcy
– Financial distress costs are 15% of VU
– Pay taxes, financial distress costs, residual goes to bondholders
The Unlevered Firm
VU = S
Liquidating dividend is only cash flow
Value via DCF
[0.5(6)+0.5(1.2)]/1.1=3.27
EBIT(1-T)=10(1-0.4)=6
EBIT(1-T)=2(1-0.4)=1.2
The Levered Firm
• $2 million amount of (risky) 1-year debt
• Promised interest rate = 56.65% (rf=2%)
• Promised payment (at maturity) 2(1+56.65%)=3.13
– Solvent for high EBITPayment to bondholders: 3.13
– Bankrupt for low EBITPayment to bondholders:EBIT-taxes-financial distress costs = EBIT-(EBIT-int.exp.)T-0.15VU = 2-[2-2(56.65%)]0.4-0.15(3.27) = 1.16
Debt Value
H=0.41, B*=-0.656, B=2 (trading at par!!)
B
3.13
1.16
Replicate using the unlevered firm (rf=2%)
3.27
6
1.2
Equity Value
H=0.69, B*=0.814, S=1.45 rS=14.49%
S
(EBIT-56.65%(B))(1-T)-B=3.32
0
Replicate using the unlevered firm (rf=2%)
3.27
6
1.2
Firm Value
VU = S = 3.27
VL = S + B = 1.45 + 2 =3.45
VL = VU + PV(tax shield) - PV(f.d. costs) ?
The tax shield is risk-less (even though the debt is risky):
PV(tax shield) = [56.65%(2)(0.4)/1.02]
= 0.444
Financial Distress Costs
H = -0.102, B* = -0.602, FD = 0.267
VL = VU + PV(tax shield) - PV(f.d. costs) = 3.27 + 0.444 - 0.267 = 3.45
FD
0
0.491
Replicate using the unlevered firm (rf=2%)
3.27
6
1.2