Serbian Kosovo

7/29/2019 Serbian Kosovo

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THE SERBIAN MINISTRY

FOR KOSOVO AND METOHIA


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KOSOVO

THE CROWN OF SERBIAN HISTORY

Some nations have their founding father figure,others are based on a mix of cultures or an imageof grandeur, but the Serbs identify themselves witha small piece of land a sacred land symbolizingtheir spirituality and sacrifice.

Te southern province of Kosovo and Metohija(Land of churches) represents the birthplace of the Serbian nation, the roots of the royal familytree, the site of many glorious battles and timelessshrines, the matrix of values the Serbs cherish andlive by, their Jerusalem and Alamo rolled into one.

Crowns can fall, riches may vanish and mostborders are subject to change, but no hearth can bedeemed lost as long as the fire is kept alive. Serbiahas finally restored its statehood after eighty yearsof ideological confusion and now stands prouderthan ever of its unique heritage.

Te new democratic leaders have shown laudablerestraint and cooperation with the internationalcommunity in the face of the tragic situation in

postwar Kosovo and are now ready to propose anall-round compromise solution for the future statusof the troubled province, in full compliance withinternational law and balancing the interests of all the parties involved to the fairest.


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RISE AND GLORY

OF THE SERBIAN MEDIEVAL STATE

At the time the Serbs populated Kosovo,around the 10th century, the territory waslargely deserted. Te fertile plain surroundedby protective mountains became the center ofthe prosperous Serbian Kingdom that stretched

over most of the Balkans.

Over the next four centuries, the Serbs aris-tocracy formed a great number of castled citiesall over Kosovo, which served as centers of im-portant political and diplomatic decision-mak-ing. Czar Duan (1331-1355) moved the royalresidence to the city of Prizren and the SerbianOrthodox Church established its Patriarchatein Pe (1331).

Marriages to European royal families mem-

bers, support to Christian crusades, an impor-tant trade balance, a developed mining indus-try and impressive wine-making capabilities,including 20 km long vinoduct from VelikaHoa to Prizren, put the Serbian society of themiddle ages on the line of social, economic andcultural developments in western Europe.

Its rulers were also keen on artistic and re-ligious endowments. Over 1,500 monumentsof Serbian culture identified in Kosovo are theliving legacy of the Serbian historical presence

in the region.

Many of them are part of world heritage, suchas the Patriarchate of Pe (1331), the Monas-tery of Graanica (1320) or the Holy Virginof Ljevi (1307) and the Monastery of Deani(1334), both included on UNESCOs list.

Tese temples, inspired by Byzantine archi-tecture and built by the best western architects,feature frescoes of impressive beauty, showingscenes from the Gospel as well as portraits ofSerbian rulers.

Tey have been sheltering for eight centuriesnow the relics of canonized monarchs and lead-ers of the national church and have providedspiritual support to the nation in times of bothprosperity and occupation.

ogether with many other monasteries anda dense network of small parish churches scat-tered all over Kosovo, these shrines representthe basis on which the Serbs formed and con-solidated their national consciousness and builtup their national and cultural identity.


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THE MEANING OF KOSOVO

FOR THE SERBS

After the fall of the Serbian medieval kingdom(12th-15th centuries) in which it held a centralpart, Kosovo remained a citadel of spiritualityand a symbol of Serbian national identity andresistance during the long periods of foreign oc-

cupation.

It is enshrined in Serbian collective memory asa quasi-mythological place, whose popular his-tory set the bases of Serbian national characterarchetypes in the middle ages and perpetuatedthem into modern times through epic poetryand the charts of the rulers.

Te major themes that shaped the cult ofKosovo were loyalty to the family and to thenation, the necessity of struggle against tyranny,the ideal of heroic self-sacrifice, the futility of

betrayal and the assuredness of resurrection.

urbulent historical events only exacerbatedthis devotion, especially in the 19th and 20thcentury.

In the dramatic 1804 and 1812 uprisings,

Serbian masses called upon the spirit of Kosovo,which their leaders, founding members of thecurrent royal dynasty, included in their coat ofarms.

In the first half of the 19th century, Kosovobecame a favorite theme for Serbias romanticpoets, playwrights and painters inspired by the

wars of liberation and the nations cultural re-vival.

During World War I, Serbia became the dar-

ling of both English and French public, whichinterpreted its determination to fight and securefreedom as an expression of the Kosovo spirit.

In communist Yugoslavia, celebrations relatedto Kosovo were forbidden, but strongman itoskillfully usurped the matrix of the Kosovo leg-acy in order to hype up some of the World WarII battles he himself participated in.

In modern times, Slobodan Miloevi cameto power in the late 1980s by pledging to help

the suffering of the Kosovo Serbs. At that time and then only he had the support of theentire population.

In 1999, Serbia was bombed as it unanimous-ly refused to accept an agreement it consideredas paving the way for the secession of Kosovo.

Even today, the Serbs categorically refuse torenounce on Kosovo, both as a territory and asa set of values. Tis is a rare common stand ofthe Government, the National Assembly, the

royalty, the Church and the general public.


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FIVE CENTURIES

OF TURKISH OCCUPATION

Te demographic balance of Kosovo started tochange after the landmark 1389, the Battle ofKosovo Polje. A few decades later, Kosovo andthe rest of Serbia fell under Ottoman (urkish)rule.

Tis oppressive feudal system brought a darkage of destruction of Serbian society, architec-ture and cultural achievements, which led Ser-bia to lag far behind the rest of Europe duringits Renaissance and Enlightenment periods.

Serbian resistance and solidarity with Chris-tian Europe was punished by severe reprisals,

which triggered waves of northward migrations,most notably in 1690 and 1739, following ma-

jor defeats of Austro-Hungarians, with whom

the Serbs had sided up against the urks.

As the Ottomans settled in Serbian townsof Kosovo and the Serbs were forced to move,

Albanians from todays northern Albania beganto settle in the region and to accept Islam inexchange of social favors.

Tis trend continued in the 18th and the 19thcenturies, bringing out significant numbers ofethnic Albanians on Kosovos demographicmap for the first time in history and antago-

nizing Serbs-Albanians relations on both socialand religious levels, with very little room forcompromise.

Serbia finally regained its independence at the1878 Berlin Congress. It liberated Kosovo fromurkish yoke in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13and reintegrated it into the Kingdom of Serbiathrough the 1913 Bucharest reaty, which was

unanimously supported by the ambassadorsand royal representatives of Russia, France,Germany, Austro-Hungary, Italy and the UK atthe ensuing London Conference.

As part of Serbia, Kosovo was offi cially in-corporated, in 1919, in the Kingdom of Serbs,Croats and Slovenians later called Yugoslavia.


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LIBERATION FROM THE TURKS AND

MODERN ALBANIAN UPRISINGS

However, the return under Serbian controlafter five centuries of Ottoman occupation hasbeen interpreted by Albanian and Albanophilehistorians as the beginning of the Serbian oc-cupation of Kosovo, thus legitimizing their

non-cooperation and uprisings against theSerbs throughout the 20th century.

Regardless of who ruled over Kosovo -- urks,Yugoslavs, Italians, Germans, Communists,Miloevi or the UN and whatever their rela-tions to the ruler were, Kosovo Albanians havealways fought for secession from Serbia and an-nexation to neighboring Albania. Tis is there-fore not a new phenomenon, as commonlyperceived today.

Albanians have sided up offi cially, but notwholeheartedly, with the fascism of Mussolini,with the Stalinism of irana, with the inter-nationalism of ito, with the human rightsrhetoric of the UN, always hoping that the bigpowers they are playing up to will grant themindependence. More than often, they were pre-pared to resort to extreme violence in order tofulfill these goals.

In World War I, they joined the Austro-Ger-mans and Bulgarians. In World War II, they

supported fascistic Italy and later formed spe-cial SS units. Both wars triggered new waves ofSerbs migrations out of Kosovo.

In itos Yugoslavia, the communist regimeonly reinforced this trend. In trying to mini-mize the strength of the Republic of Serbia,the biggest in the Yugoslav Federation, Serbianrefugees were prohibited to return in the prov-

ince while Kosovo Albanians were given ex-traordinary prerogatives after the constitutionalchanges of 1974, which granted high autono-my and rights of veto to the Kosovo ProvincialGovernment.

Billions of dollars were invested in the prov-ince, which accounted for up to 45% of thetotal internal aid. Major social and urbanisticdevelopments were achieved: the province be-came fully bilingual and there were V and ra-dio stations, newspapers, schools and university

studies available in Albanian language.

Te Obili power plant was constructed in1962, the police turned multiethnic in 1966,the Institute of Albanology and the Albanian

Academy of Sciences were formed in the 1970sand Kosovo Albanians were granted the higheststate positions.

Tis, however, didnt stop Albanian aspira-tions for secession, as manifested by generallack of their integration in the Yugoslav system

and a series of violent demonstrations callingfor a Republic status for Kosovo, with a per-spective of secession.

After itos death, radical Albanian requestsof seceding from Serbia mounted, encouragedby their demographic growth and supported bytheir affl uent and solidary diaspora and theirnotorious organized crime network.

Numerous incidents from that period, suchas the widespread Albanian demonstrations of

1981 and desperate protests of Kosovo Serbs at-tracted much international media attention.


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INTERETHNIC RADICALIZATION

AND FOREIGN INTERVENTION

Kosovo became a synonym for trouble evenbefore the breakup of Yugoslavia, and manyanalysts predicted that the problematic Serbianprovince would be the catalyst of the disintegra-tion of the entire country.

Compromise was once again off the agenda.Faced with an open campaign for secession ofKosovo in the 1980s, the Serbian Governmentheaded by Slobodan Milosevic sharply abolishedthe autonomy of the province in 1989, invol-untarily triggering the creation of the Kosovo

Albanian parallel system, which was based onthe boycott of cooperation and dialogue withthe Serbs and on the establishment of parallel,pro-Albanian underground institutions.

Te absence of dialogue inevitably led to the

radicalization of the situation. On July 2nd1990, the Albanians-dominated Assembly ofKosovo proclaimed the Republic of Kosovo,

which led to the introduction of the state ofemergency, widespread harassment and insti-tutional discrimination of dissident ethnic Al-banians.

Te second part of the 1990s was marked bythe appearance of the armed Albanian guerillagroup calling itself KLA (Kosovo Liberation

Army), which staged numerous attacks on se-

curity forces and civilian targets in 1996-1998,aimed at inciting a foreign intervention.

Belgrade reacted with an effective policecrackdown, first praised as war on terror by the

White House - while it was still listing KLA as aterrorist organization - and later condemned asoverwhelming use of force, when the separat-

istic guerillas were suddenly renamed partnersof US interests.

Te clashes between KLA and Serb securityforces led to substantial collateral damage andinitial displacement of thousands of Kosovo Al-banian civilians from the areas of conflict.

At the Rambouillet negotiations, NAO ac-cused Milosevic of ethnic cleansing and threat-ened to stage a military intervention againstSerbia. Belgrade strongly disputed this interpre-

tation, claiming it was only fighting separatistson Serbian territory.

A few weeks later, despite the lack of approvalof the UN Security Council, NAO launcheda massive 78-day bombing campaign againstSerbia, which resulted in all-out war on theground, exodus of hundreds of thousands ofethnic Albanians, significant material damageand loss of life.

On 10 June 1999, a peace-deal was signed,

ensuring the retreat of Yugoslav army and Ser-bian police forces and the establishment of atemporary UN-NAO protectorate in Kosovo.


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Eight years later, the consequences of that in-tervention are rather controversial.

While they have achieved a certain success ininstitution-building and restoring normal living

conditions for the ethnic Albanian community,UN administrators and NAO KFOR troopshave blatantly failed to challenge the other sideof the problem a wide-spread campaign ofviolence against the Kosovo Serbs and othernon-Albanians.

Albanian revenge attacks, as they were apol-ogetically called in the first weeks of the post-

war period, became the syndrome of systematiceradication of Serbian presence and culture inKosovo.

Faced with deadly violence, discriminationand lack of freedom of movement, KosovoSerbs and other non-Albanians either fled theprovince or relocated to isolated enclaves andghettos, living in the worst conditions in the

whole of 21st century Europe.

In the seven years of UN administration, intimes of internationally guaranteed peace anddespite the presence of dozens of thousandsof NAO troops, over 2000 Serbs and other

non-Albanians have been killed or remain un-accounted for and 226,000 of them have beenforced out of Kosovo.

Tousands of homes have been destroyed;over 80 graveyards and 156 Christian Ortho-dox churches, many of them the jewels of me-dieval architecture, were desecrated, mined orburned to the ground.

All symbols and monuments of Serbian cul-ture have been removed, while many govern-

ment-sponsored materials grossly falsifying thehistory of Kosovo appeared, trying to wipe outall traces of Serbian presence in the province.

Te remaining 120,000 Kosovo Serbs liveconfined in rural enclaves and ghettos withrestricted freedom of movement, facing dailyintimidation and harassment, limited access tohealth care, lack of employment opportunities

and a blockade of Serbs media outlets.

Tey survive thanks to the help coming fromBelgrade and to the security provided by NAOsoldiers, who maintain checkpoints around themost vulnerable enclaves and provide militaryescort to school children, priests and bus pas-sengers.

But even this proved not to be enough: beat-ing, stoning, shooting, bomb, landmine androcket attacks - cynically described as isolated

incidents- continue on a daily basis. Te pro-claimed goal of multiethnic coexistence seemsvery far away.

All this is to be added to the problems thatKosovo faces as a society in general: the ex-tremely diffi cult economic situation (skyrock-eting unemployment, enormous deficit, wide-spread corruption and ever too frequent electricpower cuts), its trademark organized crime(drugs trade, sex traffi cking, cigarette smug-gling) and notorious paramilitary structures (

violence exporting to Macedonia or southernSerbia and turning against the UN administra-tion or other local targets, including even latepresident Ibrahim Rugova and various Hagueribunal witnesses).

A poor and biased privatization processdid not take into account the property rightsowned by the Kosovo Serb workers or by thestate of Serbia, and the expropriation of illegallyoccupied property is discouragingly slow.

THE FAILURE OF UN PEACEKEEPING


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Public condemnation of the living conditionsof non-Albanians is virtually non-existent and aculture of impunity reigns: so far only a handfulamong thousands of ethnic-motivated crimeshave been processed, thus further endangering

prospects for a multiethnic environment.

In such a situation, it is almost understand-able that the return of the displaced Serbs andnon-Albanians to Kosovo has been practicallynon-existent: in six years only 5-6% or some12,000 people returned to their homes, mostlyon individual incentive.

In January 2007, there were less than one hun-dred (!) Serbs living in the six biggest cities ofKosovo combined, excluding the north part of

Kosovska Mitrovica.On the political plan, the Kosovo Albanian

leadership continually refuses any contact withBelgrade, despite democratic changes and suc-cessful EU-oriented reforms in Serbia.

Tey were encouraged in this kind of thinkingby the UN administration which on numerousoccasions breached UNSC Resolution 1244 bytransferring more competency than agreed tothe provisional authorities.

Tis transfer of responsibilities failed to im-prove the situation, however, as the Albaniancommunity had only one thing on their agenda the urgency of talks on the final status ofKosovo. Ironically, they keep claiming thatall problems would be solved only posteriori,when Kosovo becomes independent.

Te international community tried to movethings from a standstill in December 2003 whenit came up with the policy of standards before

status, which called for the fulfilling of a seriesof eight key human rights standards before anytalks on the future status could begin.

In the meantime, the situation on the groundturned from bad to worse. Te wide-scale anti-Serb violence of 17-20 March 2004 brand-ed ethnic cleansing by the NAO AdmiralGregory Johnson and orchestrated, planned

violence by international observers was theworst outbreak of violence since July 1999.

Yet, instead of pursuing with more firmnessthan ever the proclaimed policy of establishingdemocratic standards, the opposite happened:the standards were downsized, with the sarcas-tic argument that there could be no progress

without starting the negotiations on the statusof Kosovo.

Ironically, this was exactly what the Kosovo

Albanian politicians wanted and what the Alba-nian extremists aimed at when launching theiroperations.

Te standards BEFORE status policy wasburied in the rubble of the March 2004 vio-lence, cynically replaced by the motto stan-dards AND status.

Negotiations on the future status of Kosovobegan in Vienna in February 2006.


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Despite early attempts by some lobby groupsto close down the debate on Kosovo before ithas even begun by suggesting there was onlyone possible option (independence), a thor-ough and well argued debate based on past

conflict-management experience has led to theunderstanding that negotiations on the statusof Kosovo must meet a certain number of pre-requisites in order to be successful.

One-sided solutions, international precedentsand artificial deadlines must be excluded, the fi-nal agreement should be based on compromiseand not imposed, and the final word should

stay with the UNSC, which was the warrant ofthe peace-brokering in the first place.

Based on these conditions, proclaiming theindependence of Kosovo would indeed bea risky, unilaterally-imposed and ultimately

wrong solution.

Not only would it endanger international lawby creating a second Albanian state from scratchand critically hurting democratic Serbia, but it

would also create a dangerous precedent that

could have severe repercussions in dozens ofsimilar hotspots around the world Kurdistan,Palestine, Western Sahara, Kashmir, Xinjiang,

ibet, aiwan, Northern Cyprus, the BasqueProvince, Chechnya, Abkhasia, South Ossetia,Dagestan, Nagorno-Karabagh, ransdniestria,Northern Ireland, Western Macedonia, Repub-lika Srpska, Quebec, amil Eelam, Hawai

Attempts to describe Kosovo as a cancer thatSerbia should amputate, to suggest that Serbia

will go faster into the EU without Kosovo, tospeculate that progressive Serbs do not careabout Kosovo or to estimate that organizedcrime and human rights abuses will disappearas soon as Kosovo becomes independent havenot worked, nor have the emotional spin-ar-guments implying that Albanians must getindependence simply because they want it verymuch, because they have a moral (sic) right to

it or because they would explode in violence iftheir desires were not satisfied urgently.

Still, despite all these bluffs and notwithstand-ing Belgrades continuously restrained role andconstructive proposals, the negotiations process

was clearly biased, superficial and unsubstantial,while a vicious sticks and carrots policy set upby some lobby circles continued to be appliedagainst Serbia, not the least through constantproposals of conditional, delayed or super-vised independence as the magic solution for

Kosovo.

Luckily however, this idea, initially presentedas a fait-accompli and even grossly hailed ascompromise, quickly became downplayed asonly one of the options on the table, and notthe most rational one indeed.

Te controversial proposal of UN-envoy Mar-tti Ahtisaari calling for supervised indepen-dence for Kosovo was not even put to vote atthe UN Security Council, as Russia, China and

several other council members were clearly re-luctant about it, rejecting a priori not less thanfive such resolution drafts.

THE FAILURE OF STATUS

NEGOTIATIONS


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As Washington became desperate to presentKosovo as one of its rare successful interven-tion stories and tried by all means to impose itsindependence, Moscow was firmly determinednot to allow this imposition to become a breach

of international law, while Brussels, for its part,spent more time managing its internal cohesionthan creatively thinking about how to get outof the impasse.

Summer 2007 is therefore the time for a newbeginning in Kosovo. Any continuation on thebasis of the previous assumptions could causeserious trouble in Kosovo and elsewhere in the

world.

aking away 15% of a sovereign, democratic,

multi-ethnic European countrys territory withthe intent of satisfying the independence aspi-rations of one of its minorities sounds danger-ous and problematic indeed.

Bypassing international law, especially nowthat the issue has mobilized the attention ofelite world analysts, would deal a deadly blowto international stability and to the credibilityof the United Nations.

Persisting in finding ways to impose a pro-

Albanian solution rather than engaging all sidesin a fair, deep, compromise-driven debate isdefinitely not an example of serious conflictmanagement.

It is time now to look at realistic alternatives,the painful ones which imply the recognition ofones own mistakes and a necessary sacrifice ofself-interests.

As opposed to Washington and Pritina, Ser-bia has gone the furthest on this line, acknowl-

edging its past mistakes and proposing a realis-tic solution which complies with internationallaw and takes into best account the interests ofall sides.

Under the offi cial Serbian proposal, KosovoAlbanians would keep all the power they al-ready have and get even more, only in exchangeof giving up on breaking Kosovo away fromSerbia.

Tey would enjoy full legislative, executive

and judicial capacity, including even a limitedexternal representation in particular full ac-cess to the international financial institutions -but most importantly, they would benefit fromnormalized relations with Belgrade.

Serbia, as the natural leader in the region,has many positive things to offer to Kosovo,including a strong push in its macroeconomicrevival, a large job market and common marketof goods, continuous coverage of the provincesexternal debt, an integrated energy, electricity

and infrastructure network, access to its healthand education systems, a common fight againstorganized crime and a joint contribution to re-gional stability and European integration.

All these things could only be realized ina compromising solution of autonomy, and byno means in case of an imposed independence,

which would never be signed by Serb offi cialsand which would certainly result in the closingof borders, regional destabilization and a per-manent threat of renewed conflict.


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Considering all this, an internationally su-pervised, maximum autonomy for Kosovoinside Serbia appears as the most reasonable,compromising and long-term solution.

Ignored in the beginning of the negotiationsprocess, this proposal should now become the

basis for a historical conflict resolution betweenSerbs and Albanians.

It represents a fair balance between a stan-dard autonomy for the province, unacceptablefor the Albanian aspirations, and the indepen-dence of Kosovo, unoffi cially promised to themby some international players but unacceptablein any form for international law, for the Serbsand for the Serbian state.

It responds to the realistic demands of Kosovo

Albanians for self-governing, but it also protectsthe interests of non-Albanians, of Serbia and ofthe principles of non-violability of borders.

More than anything, it is a win-win situationfor everyone: the Kosovo Albanians will finallyget the means to manage their future and so

will the Kosovo Serbs; Serbia will not have itsborders changed and its historical and religiouscradle amputated; Macedonia and Bosnia willreceive guarantees that the changes of bordersin the Balkans are no longer tolerated; the EU

will obtain regional stability and take fully incharge its European perspective; the UnitedStates would be able to disengage its troops

without losing its diplomatic leverage in bothPristina and Belgrade; Russia, China, India andmany other countries in the world would ap-preciate not having to deal with a dangerous

precedent; the UN will have the basis of inter-national law system respected.

Past mistakes should be acknowledged and re-versed, not perpetuated.

Only arguments should be used as arguments.

Artificial deadlines, lobbying efforts and un-der-the-table promises should not preclude last-ing solutions.

Pressure should be applied on creating thosesolutions, rather than imposing one sides inter-ests over another.

Forcing a result on which neither the sides onthe ground nor the great powers agree has obvi-ously not passed.

It is time now to get back to fair negotiations,to respect international law, to be constructive,patient, sound and consistent.

For the first time in the history of Kosovo, itis time for a successful compromise.

THE NEED FOR A TRUE

COMPROMISE

Printed by Te Serbian Ministryfor Kosovo and Metohia

Serbian Kosovo

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