Separation and Delagation of Powers Cases

7/31/2019 Separation and Delagation of Powers Cases

1/23

In Re: Manzano

Facts: RTC Judge Manzano was designated as a memberof the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justicepursuant to EO 856 as amended by EO 326 by thenGovernor. Rodolfo Farinas. He sent a letter to theSC stating that before he accepts theappointment, he would like to request for theissuance of a Resolution (1) authorizing him toaccept his appointment and assume and dischargethe powers and duties attached to it (2) that hismembership to the said Committee is notviolative of the Independence of theJudiciary or may be considered as anabandonment of his position in the RTC (3)to consider that his membership in thecommittee is a part of the primary functionof an Executive Judge. However, one x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e E O s , i t w a s r e v e a l e d t h a t a m o n g t h e f u n c t i on s o f t h e C o m m i t t e e i s t o r e v i e wcomplaints against any apprehending officerxx who may be found to have committedabuses in the discharge of his duties and referthe same to proper authority for the appropriateaction. Another function ist o r e c o m m e n d t h e r e v i s i o n o f a n yl a w o r r e g u l a t i o n w h i c h i s b e l i e v e d p r e j

ud ic ia l to th e pr op er administration of criminal justice.Issue: Whether or not the acceptance of Judge Manzanoof his appointment in the Committee will violate thedoctrine of separation of powers Held: It is evident from the stated functions of theCommittee that it performs func ti ons that are administrative in nature which are defined as those involving the regulation

and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals fore their own welfare and thepromulgation of rules and regulations tobetter carry out the policy of the legislature xxx.Under Art.8, Sec12 of the Constitution, themembers of the xxx courts xxx shall not bedesignated to any agency performing quasi-

judi ci al or admini st ra ti ve func tions. While the doctrine of separation of powers is xxx

not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, xxx it cannot just ify a member of th e judi ciary

being requi red to assume posi tion xxxwhich are non- j udicia ry in character xx if heis expected to be confined to the task of

adjudication. Xxx He is not a subordinate of anexecutive or legislative official. This does not mean that the RTS judgesshould adopt an at titude of monasticinsensibility. An RTC judge should renderassistance to said Committees xxx but only when itmay be reasonably incidental to thefulfillment of their judicial duties. Hence,the request was denied.

Angara vs. Electoral Commission

Facts: (1)That in the elections of September 17,1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, andthe respondents, Pedro Ynsua, MiguelCastillo and Dionisio Mayor, werecandidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for thefirst district of the Province of Tayabas;( 2 ) T h a t o n O c t o b e r 7 , 19 3 5 , t h e p r o v i n c i a l b o a r d o f c a n v a s s e r s , proclaimed thepetitioner as member-elect of the National

Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes;(3 )Tha t on November 15 , 1935 , t hepe t i t i one r took h i s oa th o f o ff i ce ;( 4 ) T h a t o n D e c e m b e r 3 ,1 9 3 5 , t h e N a t i o n a l A s s em b l y i n s e s s i o n assembled,passed the followingresolution:"[No.8]" R E S O L U T I O N C O NF I R M A N D O L A S A C T A S D E A QU E L L O S D I P U T A D O S CONTRAQUIENES NO SE HA PRESENTADO PROTESTA."Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion

de los Diputados contra quienes nosehubiere presentado debidamente una protestaantes de la adopcion delap r e s e n t e r e s o l u c i o n s e a n ,c o m o p o r l a p r e s e n t e , s o n ap r o b a d a s y confirmadas."Adoptada, 3 dediciembre, 1935."(5)T h a t o n D e c e m b e r 8 , 1 93 5 , t h e h e r e i n r e s p o n d e n t

P e d r o Ynsua, fi led before the


2/23

Electoral Commission a "Motionof Protest" against the electionof the herein petitioner, Jose A.Angara,beingt h e o n l y p r o t e s t f i le d a f t e r t h e p a s s a g e o f R e s o l u t i o n N o . 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-things,that said respondent be declaredelected member of the NationalAssembly for the firs t district of Tayabas, or that the election of saidposition be nullified; ( 6 ) T h a t o n D e c e m b e r 9 , 19 3 5 , t h e E l e c t o r a l C o m m is s i o n a d o p t e d a resolution,paragraph 6 of which provides:" 6 . L a C o m i s i o n

n o c o n s i d e r a r a n i n g u n ap r o t e s t a q u e n o s e h a y apresentado en o antes de este dia."(7 )Tha t on December 20 , 1935 ,the he re in pe t i t i one r, Jose A .

Ang ara , one o f t h e r e s p o n d e n t s i nt h e a f o r e s a i d p r o t e s t , f i l e d b e f o r e t h e E l ec t o r a l Commiss ion a "Motionto Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) thatResolution No. 8 of the National Assemblywas adopted in the legitimate exercise of

i t scons t i tu t ional prerogat ive to prescr ibe the pe r iod dur ing which p ro te s t sa g a i n s t t h e e l e c t i o n o f i t s m e m b er s s h o u l d b e p r e s e n t e d ; ( b ) t h a t th e aforesaid resolution has for its object,and is the accepted formula for, thelimitation of said period; and (c) that the protestin question was filed out of the prescribedperiod;(8 )Tha t on December 27 , 1935 ,the he re in r e sponden t , Pedro

Ynsua , f i l ed an "Answer to theMot ion o f Di smissa l " a l l eg ing tha tthe re i s no l ega l o r cons t i tu t iona l p rov i s ion ba r r ing the presen ta t ion o f a p ro te s t aga ins t t heelection of a member of the National Assembly,after confirmation;(9 )Tha t on December 31 , 1935 ,the he re in pe t i t i one r, Jose A .

Ang ara , f i l ed a "Reply" to the aforesaid"Answer to the Motion of Dismissal";

Issues: 1. H a s t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t j u r i s di c t i o n o v e r t h e E l e c t o r a l C o m mi s s i o n a n d t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e ro f the con t roversy upon the fo regoing related facts, and in theaffirmative, 2. Has the said ElectoralCommission acted without or inexcess of its jurisdiction inassuming to take cognizance of the protest filedagainst the electionof the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the

National Assembly?

HELD: ( a )Tha t t he gove rnmen t e s t ab l i shed bythe Cons t i t u t i on fo l l ows fundamen ta l l yt he theory of separation of powers into thelegislative, the executive and the judicial.( b )Tha t t he sy s t em o f checks andba l ances and t he ove r l app ingof fu nc t io ns a nd dut ies of ten makesdifficult the delimitation of the powers granted.

( c ) T h a t i n c a s e s o f c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n t h e s e v e r a ld e p a r t m e n t s a n da m o n g t h e a g e n c i e s thereof, the

judici ar y, wi th the Supreme Court as thefinal arbiter, is the onl y constitutionalmechanism devised finally to resolve the conflictand allocate constitutional boundaries.( d ) T h a t j u d i c i a l s u p r e m a c y i s b u tt h e p o w e r o f j u d i c i a l r e v i e w i na c t u a l a n d a p p r o p r i a t e cases and

controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of thegovernment transcends the Constitution, which isthe source of all authority.( e ) T h a t t h e E l e c t o r a l C o m m i s s i o ni s a n i n d e p e n d e n t c o n s t i t u t i o n a lc r e a t i o n w i t hs p e c i f i c p o we r s a nd f u n ct i o ns t o e x e cut e and pe r fo rm, c lo se r fo rpu rposes o f c l a s s i f i c a t i on t o t he


3/23

legislative than to any of the other two departmentsof the government.( f ) T h a t t h e E l e c t o r a l C o m m i s s i o n i st h e s o l e j u d g e o f a l l c o n t e s t sr e l a t i n g t o t h e e l e c t i o n , returns andqualifications of members of the NationalAssembly.( g ) T h a t u n d e r t h e o r g a n i c l a wp r e v a i l i n g b e f o r e t h e p r e s e n tC o n s t i t u t i o n w e n t i n t o e f f e c t , e a c hhouse o f t he l eg i s l a tu r e wasre spec t i ve ly t he so l e j udge o f t heelections, returns, and qualifications of theirelective members.( h ) T h a t t h e p r e s e n t C o n s t i t u t i o nh a s t r a n s f e r r e d a l l t h e p o w e r sp r e v i o u s l y e x e r c i s e d b y t h el eg i s l a tu r e w i th r e spec t t o con t e s t sr e l a t i ng t o t he e l ec t i on , r e tu rns and

qu al i f ic at io ns o f i ts members, to the ElectoralCommission.( i ) T h a t s u c h t r a n s f e r o f p o w e r f r o mt h e l e g i s l a t u r e t o t h e E l e c t o r a lC o m m i s s i o n w a s f u l l , clear and complete,and carried with it ex necesitate rei the impliedpower inter alia to prescribe the rules andregulations as to the time and manner of filingprotests.( j ) T h a t t h e a v o w e d p u r p o s e

i n c r e a t i n g t h e E l e c t o r a l

C o m m i s s i o n w a s t o h a v e a n independent constitutional organ pass uponall contests relating to the election, returnsandq u a l i f i c a t i o n s o f m e m b e r s o f t h eN a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y , d e v o i d o f p a r t i

s a n i n f l u en c e o r cons ide rat ion , whichobject would be frustrated if the NationalAssembly were t o ret ain the power to prescriberules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests.( k )Tha t s ec t i on 4 o f a r t i c l e VI

o f t he Cons t i t u t i on r epea l ed no t on lysection 18 of the Jones Law making eachhouse of the Philippine Legislature respectively thesole judge of theelections,ret urn s and qua l i f ica t io ns of i tse l ec t i ve member s , bu ta l so s ec t i on 478 o f Ac tNo. 3387empowering each house to prescribe byresolution the time and manner of filing contests

against the el ection of i ts memb ers, the timeand manner of notifying the adverse party,and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and tofix the costs and expenses of contest

( l ) T h a t c o n f i r m a t i o n b y t h eN a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y o f t h e e l e c t i o no f a n y m e m b e r , i r r e s p e c t i v e o f whe the r h i s e l ec t i on i s con t e s t ed o r no t ,i s no t e s sen t i a l be fo re such member-e l ec t m ay discharge the duties and enjoythe privileges of a member of the NationalAssembly.(m)That confirmation by the NationalAssembly of the election of any memberagainst whom no protest had been filed prior tsaid confirmation, does not and cannot deprivethe Electoral Commission of its incidenta lpower to prescribe the time within whichprotes t against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed. We holdtherefore, that the Electoral Commission wasacting within the legitimate exercise of itsconstitutional prerogative in assuming totake cognizance of the protest filed by therespondent Pedro Ynsua against theelection of the herein petitioner Jose A.Angara, and that the resolution of theNational Assembly of December 3, 1935can not in any manner toll the time forfiling protests against the election, returnand qualifications of members of theNational Assembly, nor prevent the filing of aprotest within such time as the rules of theElectoral Commission might prescribe.

Ratio: Upon principle, reason and authority, we areclearly of the opinion that upon the admittedfacts of the present case, t his court has

jurisdiction over the ElectoralCommission and the subject matterof the present controversy for thepurpose of determining thecharacter, scope and extent of theconstitutional grant to the ElectoralCommission as "the sole judge of allcontests relating to the election,returns and qualifications of themembers of the National Assembly."


4/23

Were we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system which may in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework? The separation of powers is a fundamental

principle in our system of government. Itobtains not through express provision but byactual division in our Constitution.Each department of the government hasexclusive cognizance of matters within its

jurisdiction, and is supreme within its ownsphere. But it does not follow from the fact thatthe three powers are to be kept separate anddistinct that the Constitution intended them tobe absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for

an elaborate system of checks and balances tosecure coordination in the workings of thevarious departments of the government.The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government . Who is to determine the nature, scopeand extent of such powers? The Constitutionitself has provided for the instrumentality of the

judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutionalboundaries, it does not assert any superiority

over the other departments; it does not inreality nullify or invalidate an act of thelegislature,but only asserts the solemn andsacred obligation assigned to itby the Constitution to determineconflicting claims of authority underthe Constitution and to establish forthe parties in an actual controversythe rights which that instrumentsecures and guarantees to them .

The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional

mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.That judicial supremacy is but the power of

judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution,which is the source of all authority.That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government.That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC vsPOEAFacts: Facts:Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/VEastern Polaris when he was killed in an accidentin Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow suedfor damages under Executive Order No. 797 andMemorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. Thepetitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued thatthe complaint was cognizable not by the POEA butby the Social Security System and should have beenfiled against the State Insurance Fund. The POEAnevertheless assumed jurisdiction and afterconsidering the position papers of the parties ruledin favor of the complainant. The decision ischallenged by the petitioner on the principal groundthat the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case asthe husband was not an overseas worker. Issue: Whether or not POEA has jurisdiction Held: The Philippine Overseas EmploymentAdministration was created under ExecutiveOrder No. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982,to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced theNational Seamen Board created earlier underArticle 20 of the Labor Code in1974. Under Section4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested


5/23

with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over allcases, including money claims, involvingemployee-employer relations arising out of or byvirtue of any law or contract involving Filipinocontract workers, including seamen."

The award of P180,000.00 for death benefitsand P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made bythe POEA pursuant to its Memorandum CircularNo. 2, which became effective on February 1, 1984.This circular prescribed a standard contract tobe adopted by both foreign and domestic shippingcompanies in the hiring of Filipino seamenfor overseas employment.

But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative

power. It contends that no authority had beengiven the POEA to promulgate the said regulation;and even with such authorization, the regulationrepresents an exercise of legislative discretionwhich, under the principle, is not subject todelegation.

Memorandum Circular No. 2 is an administrativeregulation. The model contract prescribed therebyhas been applied in a significant number of thecases without challenge by the employer. Thepower of the POEA (and before it the NationalSeamen Board) in requiring the model contract isnot unlimited as there is a sufficient standardguiding the delegate in the exercise of the saidauthority. That standard is discoverable inthe executive order itself which, in creating thePhilippine Overseas Employment Administration,mandated it to protect the rights of overseasFilipino workers to "fair and equitable employmentpractices.

"The petition is dismissed, with costs against thepetitioner.

Casibang vs Aquino FACTS:Responden t Remig io P. Yu wasp roc l a imed on November 9 , 1971 a s t hee l e ct e d Ma yo r o f Rosales, Pangasinan in the

1971 local elections. Herein petitioner filed onNovember 24, 1971 a protest against the election of the former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of As the proceedingscontinued, the 1973 Constitution was ratified. Yumoved to dismiss the election protest of petitioneron the ground that the trial court had lost

jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivityof the 1973 Constitution by reason of which Section 9 of Article XVII [TransitoryProvisio ns] and Section 2 of Article XI a political question has intervened in the case.Respondent Yu contended that "...the provisions inthe 1935 Constitution relative to all localgovernments have been superseded by the1973Constitution. Therefore, all local governmentshould adhere to our parliamentary formof government. This is clear in the NewConstitution under its Article XI." He further

submitted that local elective officials have no morefour-year term of office. They are only in office atthe pleasure of the appointing power embodied inthe New Constitution, and under Section 9 of Article XVII. CFI ruled in favor of Yu.

ISSUE:WON the protest case is a political question

HELD: No po l i t i c a l ques t i on has

eve r been i n t e rwoven in to t h i s c a se .Nor i s th ere any ac t o f the incumbentPresident or the Legislative Department to beindirectly reviewed or interfered with if therespondent Judge decides the electionprotest. The term "political question"connotes what it means in ordinary parlance,namely, a question of policy. It refers to thosequestions which under the Constitution, are tobe decided by the people in their sovereigncapacity; or in regard to which full discretionary

authority has been delegat ed t o t he l egislat iveor executive branch of the government. It isconcerned with issues dependent upon thewisdom, not legality, of a particular measure" Theonly issue in the electoral protest case dismissed byrespondent Judge on the ground of politicalquestion is who between protestant herein petitioner and protestee hereinrespondent Yu was the duly elected mayorof Rosales, Pangasinan, and legally entitled to enjoythe rights, privileges and emoluments appurtenant


6/23

thereto and to discharge the functi ons, dut ies andobligations of the position. If the protestee'selection is upheld by the respondent Judge,then he continues in office; otherwise, it isthe protestant, herein petitioner. That is theonly consequence of a resolution of the issuetherein involved a purely justiciable question orcontroversy as it implies a given right, legallydemandable and enforceable, an act or ommissionviolative of said right, and a remedy, grant ed orsanctioned by law, for said breach of right.Any judgment to be made on that issue will notin any way collide or interfere with the mandate of Section 9 of Article XVII. Neither does Section 2 of Article XI stigmatize the issue in that electoralprotest case with a political color. For simply, thatsection allocated unto the National Assembly thepower to enact a local government code.

TAADA vs.CUENCO FACTS: Petitioners Lorenzo Taada and DiosdadoMacapagal sought to oust respondentsenators MarianoJ. Cuenco and Francisco A.Delgado as members of the same ElectoralTribunal, alleging that the Committee on Rules forthe Senate, and the Senate itself, in nominating thenchoosing the respondents, respectively, had actedabsolutely without power or color of authority andin clear violation of Article VI, Section 11 of

the Constitution (1935): Section 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunalwhich shall be the sole judge of all contests relatingto the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shallbe composed of nine Members, three of whom shallbe Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be

Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be

chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest numbers of votes therein. The senior Justice in each

Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

Respondents allege that: (a) the Court is withoutpower, authority of jurisdiction to direct or controlthe action of the Senate in choosing the membersof the Electoral Tribunal; and (b) that the petition

states no cause of action, because "petitionerTaada has exhausted his right to nominate after henominated himself and refused to nominate two(2) more Senators."

ISSUE:1.Are the allegations by there sponden t s co r r ec t ?

2 . I s t h i s c a se a mere po l i t i c a lques t i on?

RULING: We cannot agree with the conclusiondrawn by respondents from the foregoing facts. Thiscase is not an action against the Senate and it doesnot seek to compel the latter, either directly orindirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform theirduties as members of said House. Although theConstitution provides that the Senate shall choosesix (6) Senators to be members of the SenateElectoral Tribunal, the latter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate. Secondly, although theSenate has, under the Constitution, the exclusivepower to choose the Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental lawhas prescribed the manner in which the authorityshall be exercised. Under the Constitution, "thelegislative power" is vested exclusively in the

Congress of the Philippines. Yet, it does not detractfrom the power of the courts to pass upon theconstitutionality of acts of Congress. And, since

judicial power includes the authority to inquire intothe legality of statutes enacted by the two Housesof Congress, and approved by the Executive, therecan be no reason why the validity of an act of oneof said Houses, like that of any other branch of theGovernment, may not be determined in the properactions. The Court is also called upon to decide

whether the election of Senators Cuencoand Delgado, by the Senate, as members of theSenate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination bySenator Primicias a member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in theSenate on behalf of its Committee on Rules,contravenes the constitutional mandate that saidmembers of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall bechosen "upon nomination ..of the party having the


7/23

second largest number of votes" in the Senate, andhence, is null and void. This is not a politicalquestion. The Senate is not clothed with "fulldiscretionary authority" in the choice of membersof the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of itspower thereon is subject to constitutional limitationswhich are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It

is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicialdepartment to pass upon the validity theproceedings in connection therewith. Whether anelection of public officers has been in accordancewith law is for the judiciary. Moreover, where thelegislative department has by statute prescribedelection procedure in a given situation, the judiciarymay determine whether a particular election hasbeen in conformity with such statute,and, particularly, whether such statute has beenapplied in a way to deny or transgress on theconstitutional or statutory rights. "The court doesnot only have jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, toconsider and determine the principal issue raised bythe parties herein.

Pablito Sanidad vs COMELEC

On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No.991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (barangays)to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, itsreplacement, the powers of such replacement,the period of its existence, the length of theperiod for the exercise by the President of hispresent powers. Twenty days after, thePresident issued another related decree, PDNo. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991,

by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229providing for the manner of voting and canvassof votes in barangays applicable tothe national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16,1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealedinter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the samedate of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No.1033, stating the questions to he submitted tothe people in the referendum-plebisciteon October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its

whereas clauses that thepeoplescontinued opposition to the conveningof the interim National Assembly evinces theirdesire to have such body abolished andreplaced thru a constitutional amendment,providing for a new interim legislative body,which will be submitted directly to the peoplein the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed aProhibition with Preliminary Injunction seekingto enjoin the Commission on Elections fromholding and conducting the ReferendumPlebiscite on October 16; to declare withoutforce and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991and 1033, insofar as they proposeamendments to the Constitution, as well asPresidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as itdirects the Commission on Elections tosupervise, control, hold, and conduct theReferendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the1935 and 1973 Constitutions there isno grant to the incumbent President toexercise the constituent power to proposeamendments to the new Constitution. As aconsequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on

October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.The Soc-Gen contended thatthe question is political in nature hence thecourt cannot take cognizance of it.ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validlypropose amendments to the Constitution.HELD: The amending process both asto proposal and ratification raises a judicialquestion. This is especially true in cases wherethe power of the Presidency to initiate the

amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised bythe legislature, is seriously doubted. Under theterms of the 1973 Constitution, the power topropose amendments tothe Constitution resides in theinterimNational Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). Afterthat period, and the regular National Assembly


8/23

in its active session, the power to proposeamendments becomes ipso facto theprerogative of the regular National Assembly(Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI,1973 Constitution). The normal course has notbeen followed. Rather than calling theinterim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbentPresident undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposedamendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 tothe people in a Referendum-Plebiscite onOctober 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of theprocedure for amendments, written in lambentwords in the very Constitution sought to beamended, raises a contestable issue. Theimplementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991,1031, and 1033, which commonly purport tohave the force and effect of legislation areassailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validityof said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one,within the competence of this Court to passupon. Section 2 (2) Article X of thenew Constitution provides: All cases involvingthe constitutionality of a treaty,executive agreement, or law shall be heard

and decided by the Supreme Court en bancand no treaty, executive agreement, or lawmay be declared unconstitutional without theconcurrence of at least ten Members. . . .. TheSupreme Court has the last word inthe construction not only of treaties andstatutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like allother powers organized in the Constitution, isin form a delegated and hence a limited power,

so that the Supreme Court is vested with thatauthority to determine whether that power hasbeen discharged within its limits.This petition is however dismissed. ThePresident can propose amendments tothe Constitution and he was able to presentthose proposals to the people in sufficienttime.

DELEGATION OF POWERS

Antonio Araneta vs Judge Rafael Dinglasan FACTS: Araneta is being chargedunder violation of EO 62 which regulates rentalsfor houses and lots for residential buildings.Dinglasan is the judge hearing the case.

Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasanand the Fiscal from proceeding with the case.He averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671. 3 othercases were consolidated with this one. L-3055which is an appeal by Ma. Guerrero, a shoeexporter, against EO 192 which controlsexports in the Philippines; he is seeking tohave permit. L-3054 is filed by Rodriguez toprohibit the treasury from disbursing funds[from 49 - 50] pursuant to EO 225. L -3056 isfiled by Barredo is attacking EO 226 w/c isappropriating funds to hold the nationalelections. CA 671 is otherwise known as AN

ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTALEMERGENCY AS

A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THEPHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THEPRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND

REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act. All thepetitioners aver that CA 671 ceased to haveany force and effect hence all EOs passedpursuant to it had likewise ceased.

Issue: WoN the assailed EOs are invalid as it wasissued using Act. 671

A. WoN Act 671 is only valid for a limited timeB. When did Act.671 become ineffective?

Ruling: Petitions granted. (EOs are invalid as theywere issued after Act. 671 had already becomeineffective)

Reasoning:A. Act 671 is only valid for a limited

time.

Emergency Powers only becomes justifieddelegation of powers only if it is temporary


9/23

Temporary or else its not an emergency.

Thus, it is presumed Act 671 wasapproved with a limitation in mind.

The assertion that a new law is needed torepeal Act 671 does not make sense eitheras the repeal may not be approved by thePresident and the Congress may notoverride the veto.

Also, this would create the anomaly thatwould make it easier for Congress todelegate their powers than to take it backas delegation of power occurred by simplemajority and a recall would need 2/3votes.

Sec 4 is silent regarding the repeal ofauthority in the face of express provision forthe repeal of the rules and regulationsissued in pursuance of it is a clearmanifestation that the NA believed therewas no necessity to provide for the former.

If Executive continues to exerciselegislative powers, Congress and thePresident could (as Araneta s case)mutually nullify each other s actions.

Language of Act 671 itself restricts the lifeof the emergency powers of the Presidentto the time Legislature was prevented fromholding sessions due to enemy action orother causes brought on by the way

Sec 3: Requirement that President reporton his issuance once Congress hasconvened.

Intent behind Act 671 also evident inQuezons autobiography

He was the one who called NA to a specialsession to enact Act 671

He stated that it was only for a limitedperiod, and a new law is needed to keep italive.

B. Act 671 became inoperative whenCongress met in regular session on May 25,

1946 (assailed EOs were issued withoutauthority of the law).

Quezon s biography

call for special session to enact Act 671came about when it became evident thatthe country was completely helplessagainst air attacks and it was most unlikelythe Phil. Legislature would hold its nextregular session.

Thus NA delegated its powers/abdicatedits powers to the President only when itwas clear the NA would be unable to meet.

The enactment of Act 671, which isdestructive of the foundation of democraticinstitutions, could only have been made incircumstances where there is a completedisruption and dislocation of the normalprocesses of government.

Notes: Court did not decide on which department

is authorized to inquire whether thecontingency on which the law is predicatedstill exists.

In this case, the Court merely applied thelaw.

On the contention that Pres. has theexclusive authority to say the war has notended, not legal principle can be found tosupport this. PRESI DENT S AUTHORITY(IN THIS CASE)IS PURELYSTATUTORY, NOT DERIVEDFROMCONSTI

Even in times of extreme peril, thelegislation is preserved for Congress.Actually, it is in times of peril that thevarious branches of government are (morethan normal) called to act.

Votes: 4 concur with ponente


10/23

RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OFMINDORO [39 PHIL 660; NO. 14078; 7 MAR 1919]

Facts: The provincial board of Mindoro

adopted resolution No. 25 wherein non-

Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes)

will be directed to take up their

habitation on sites on unoccupied public

lands. It is resolved that under section

2077 of the Administrative Code, 800

hectares of public land in the sitio of

Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a

site for the permanent settlement of

Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further,

Mangyans may only solicit homesteads

on thisreservation providing that said

homestead applications are previously

recommended by the provincial

governor.

In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of

the Revised Administrative Code, all the

Mangyans in the townships of Naujan

and Pola and the Mangyans east of the

Baco River including those in the districts

of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan,

were ordered to take up their habitation

on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also,

that any Mangyan who shall refuse to

comply with this order shall upon

conviction be imprisoned not exceed in

sixty days, in accordance with section

2759 of the revised Administrative Code.

Said resolution of the provincial board of

Mindoro were claimed as necessary

measures for the protection of the

Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the

protection of public forests in which they

roam, and to introduce civilized customs

among them.

It appeared that Rubi and those living in

his rancheria have not fixed their

dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao

and are liable to be punished.

It is alleged that the Manguianes are

being illegally deprived of their liberty by

the provincial officials of that

province. Rubi and his companions are

said to be held on

the reservation established at Tigbao,

Mindoro, against their will, and one

Dabalos is said to be held under the

custody of the provincial sheriff in the

prison at Calapan for having run away

form the reservation.

Issue: Whether or Not Section 2145 of

the Administrative Code deprive a person

of his liberty pf abode. Thus, WON

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code

of 1917 is constitutional.

Held: The Court held that section 2145

of the Administrative Code does not

deprive a person of his liberty of abode

and does not deny to him the equal

protection of the laws, and that

confinement inreservations in accordance
http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/02/rubi-vs-provincial-board-of-mindoro-39_06.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/02/rubi-vs-provincial-board-of-mindoro-39_06.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/02/rubi-vs-provincial-board-of-mindoro-39_06.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/02/rubi-vs-provincial-board-of-mindoro-39_06.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/02/rubi-vs-provincial-board-of-mindoro-39_06.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/02/rubi-vs-provincial-board-of-mindoro-39_06.html


11/23

with said section does not constitute

slavery and involuntary servitude. The

Court is further of the opinion that

section 2145 of the Administrative Code

is a legitimate exertion of the police

power. Section 2145 of the

Administrative Code of 1917 is

constitutional.

Assigned as reasons for the action: (1)

attempts for the advancement of the

non-Christian people of the province;

and (2) the only successfully method for

educating the Manguianes was to oblige

them to live in a permanent settlement.

The Solicitor-General adds the following;

(3) The protection of the Manguianes;

(4) the protection of the public forests in

which they roam; (5) the necessity of

introducing civilized customs among the

Manguianes.

One cannot hold that the liberty of the

citizen is unduly interfered without when

the degree of civilization of the

Manguianes is considered. They are

restrained for their own good and the

general good of the Philippines.

Liberty regulated by law": Implied in theterm is restraint by law for the good of

the individual and for the greater good of

the peace and order of society and the

general well-being. No man can

do exactly as he pleases.

None of the rights of the citizen can be

taken away except by due process of

law.

Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully

imprisoned or restrained of their

liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore,

not issue.

COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DEFILIPINAS vs. THE BOARD OF PUBLICUTILITY COMMISSIONERS (1916) G.R. L-11216 Facts: COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE

FILIPINAS is a foreign corporation organizedunder the laws of Spain and engaged inbusiness in the Philippine Islands as a commoncarrier of passengers and merchandise bywater: On June 7, 1915, the Board of PublicUtility Commissioners issued and caused to beserved an order to show cause why theyshould not be required to present detailedannual reports respecting its finances and

operations respecting the vessels owned andoperated by it, in the form and containing thematters indicated by the model attached tothe petition. They are ordered to present annually on orbefore March first of each year a detailedreport of finances and operations of suchvessels as are operated by it as a commoncarrier within the Philippine Islands, in theform and containing the matters indicated inthe model of annual report whichaccompanied the order to show cause herein. COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DEFILIPINAS denied the authority of the boardto require the report asked for on the groundthat the provision of Act No. 2307 relied on bysaid board as authority for such requirementwas, if construed as conferring such power,
http://whitereflection87.wordpress.com/2011/10/30/compania-general-de-tabacos-de-filipinas-vs-the-board-of-public-utility-commissioners-1916-g-r-l-11216/http://whitereflection87.wordpress.com/2011/10/30/compania-general-de-tabacos-de-filipinas-vs-the-board-of-public-utility-commissioners-1916-g-r-l-11216/http://whitereflection87.wordpress.com/2011/10/30/compania-general-de-tabacos-de-filipinas-vs-the-board-of-public-utility-commissioners-1916-g-r-l-11216/http://whitereflection87.wordpress.com/2011/10/30/compania-general-de-tabacos-de-filipinas-vs-the-board-of-public-utility-commissioners-1916-g-r-l-11216/http://whitereflection87.wordpress.com/2011/10/30/compania-general-de-tabacos-de-filipinas-vs-the-board-of-public-utility-commissioners-1916-g-r-l-11216/http://whitereflection87.wordpress.com/2011/10/30/compania-general-de-tabacos-de-filipinas-vs-the-board-of-public-utility-commissioners-1916-g-r-l-11216/http://whitereflection87.wordpress.com/2011/10/30/compania-general-de-tabacos-de-filipinas-vs-the-board-of-public-utility-commissioners-1916-g-r-l-11216/http://whitereflection87.wordpress.com/2011/10/30/compania-general-de-tabacos-de-filipinas-vs-the-board-of-public-utility-commissioners-1916-g-r-l-11216/http://whitereflection87.wordpress.com/2011/10/30/compania-general-de-tabacos-de-filipinas-vs-the-board-of-public-utility-commissioners-1916-g-r-l-11216/


12/23

invalid as constituting an unlawful attempt onthe part of the Legislature to delegatelegislative power to the board. It iscumbersome and unnecessarily prolix and thatthe preparation of the same would entail animmense amount of clerical work. ISSUE:Whether or not it is constitutional torequire COMPANIA GENERAL DETABACOS DE FILIPINAS to pass a detailedreport to the Board of Public UtilityCommissioners of the Philippine Islands? Whether the power to require the detailedreport is strictly legislative, or administrative,or merely relates to the execution of the law?RULING: The order appealed from is setaside and the cause is returned to the Boardof Public Utility Commissioners withinstructions to dismiss the proceeding. The section of Act No. 2307 under which theBoard of Public Utility Commissioners reliesfor its authority, so far as pertinent to thecase at hand, reads as follows: Sec. 16. The Board shall have power, afterhearing, upon notice, by order in writing, to

require every public utility as hereindefined: (e) To furnish annually a detailedreport of finances and operations, in suchform and containing such matters as the Boardmay from time to time by order prescribe. The statute which authorizes a Board of Public Utility Commissioners to requiredetailed reports from public utilities, leavingthe nature of the report, the contents

thereof, the general lines which it shallfollow, the principle upon which it shallproceed, indeed, all other matterswhatsoever, to the exclusive discretion of theboard, is not expressing its own will or thewill of the State with respect to the publicutilities to which it refers. Such a provision does not declare, or set out,or indicate what information the State

requires, what is valuable to it, what it needsin order to impose correct and just taxation,supervision or control, or the facts which theState must have in order to deal justly andequitably with such public utilities and torequire them to deal justly and equitably withthe State. The Legislature seems simply tohave authorized the Board of Public UtilityCommissioners to require what informationthe board wants. It would seem that theLegislature, by the provision in question,delegated to the Board of Public UtilityCommissioners all of its powers over a givensubject-matter in a manner almost absolute,and without laying down a rule or evenmaking a suggestion by which that power is tobe directed, guided or applied. The true distinction is between the delegationof power to make the law, which necessarilyinvolves a discretion as to what shall be, andconferring authority or discretion as to itsexecution, to be exercised under and inpursuance of the law. The first cannot bedone; to the latter no valid objection can bemade.

The Supreme Court held that there was nodelegation of legislative power, it said: The Congress may not delegate its purely legislativepowers to a commission, but, having laid down thegeneral rules of action under which a commissionshall proceed, it may require of that commission theapplication of such rules to particular situations andthe investigation of facts, with a view to makingorders in a particular matter within the rules laid

down by the Congress. In section 20 (of the Commerce Act), Congresshas authorized the commission to requireannual reports. The act itself prescribes in detailwhat those reports shall contain . In other words,Congress has laid down general rules for theguidance of the Commission, leaving toit merely the carrying out of details in theexercise of the power so conferred. This, we


13/23

think, is not a delegation of legislativeauthority. In the case at bar the provision complained of does not law down the general rules of action under which the commission shallproceed. nor does it itself prescribe in detailwhat those reports shall contain. Practicallyeverything is left to the judgment anddiscretion of the Board of Public UtilityCommissioners, which is unrestrained as towhen it shall act, why it shall act, how it shallact, to what extent it shall act, or what itshall act upon. The Legislature, by the provision in question,has abdicated its powers and functions infavor of the Board of Public UtilityCommissioners with respect to the matterstherein referred to, and that such Act is inviolation of the Act of Congress of July 1,1902. The Legislature, by the provisionreferred to, has not asked for the informationwhich the State wants but has authorized andboard to obtain the information which theboard wants.

Rodriguez vs Gella

FACTS: Rodriguez et al seek toinvalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546 issuedin 1952, the first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential publicworks, and the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provincesand cities visited by typhoons, floods,droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action andother calamities. These EOs were pursuant toCommonwealth act 671. Note that priorto Araneta vsDinglasan , Congress passed House Bill 727intending to revoke CA 671 but the same wasvetoed by the President due to theKorean War and his perception that war is stillsubsisting as a fact.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EOs are valid. HELD: As similarly decided inthe Araneta case, the EOs issued in pursuantto CA 671 shall be rendered ineffective.The president did not invoke anyactual emergencies or calamities emanatingfrom the last world war for which CA 671 hasbeen intended. Without such invocation, theveto of the president cannot be of merit forthe emergency he feared cannot be attributedto the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed the repealing bill theintent of Congress must be given due weight.For it would be absurd to contend otherwise.For while Congress might delegate its powerby a simple majority, it might not be able torecall them except by two-third vote. In otherwords, it would be easier for Congress todelegate its powers than to take them back.This is not right and is not, and ought not tobe the law. Act No. 671 may be likened to anordinary contract of agency, whereby theconsent of the agent is necessary only inthe sense that he cannot be compelled toaccept the trust, in the same way that theprincipal cannot be forced to keep the relation

in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neithercan it be suggested that the agency createdunder the Act is coupled with interest.

People vs Vera

FACTS: Cu Unjieng was convicted by thetrial court in Manila. He filed forreconsideration which was elevated to the SCand the SC remanded the appeal to the lower

court for a new trial . While awaiting new trial,he appealed for probation alleging that the heis innocent of the crime he was convicted of.Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed theappeal to the Insular Probation Office. TheIPO denied the application. However, Judge

Vera upon another request by petitionerallowed the petition to be set for hearing. TheCity Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera
http://www.uberdigests.info/2011/11/antonio-araneta-vs-judge-rafael-dinglasan/http://www.uberdigests.info/2011/11/antonio-araneta-vs-judge-rafael-dinglasan/http://www.uberdigests.info/2011/11/antonio-araneta-vs-judge-rafael-dinglasan/http://www.uberdigests.info/2011/11/antonio-araneta-vs-judge-rafael-dinglasan/http://www.uberdigests.info/2011/11/antonio-araneta-vs-judge-rafael-dinglasan/http://www.uberdigests.info/2011/11/antonio-araneta-vs-judge-rafael-dinglasan/


14/23

has no power to place Cu Unjieng underprobation because it is in violation of Sec. 11

Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards thepower to provide a system of probation toconvicted person. Nowhere in the law is statedthat the law is applicable to a city like Manilabecause it is only indicated therein thatonly provinces are covered. And even if Manilais covered by the law it is unconstitutionalbecause Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitutionprovides equal protection of laws. The said lawprovides absolute discretion to provincialboards and this also constitutes unduedelegation of power. Further, the saidprobation law may be an encroachment of thepower of the executive toprovide pardon because providing probation, ineffect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.ISSUE: Whether or not there is unduedelegation of power.HELD: The act of granting probation is not thesame as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in away an imposition of penalty. There is unduedelegation of power because there is no setstandard provided by Congress on how

provincial boards must act in carrying out asystem of probation. The provincial boards aregiven absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the nondelegability of power. Further, it is a violationof equity so protected by the constitution. Thechallenged section of Act No. 4221 in section11 which reads as follows: This Actshall apply only in those provinces inwhich the respective provincial boards

have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lowerthan those now provided for provincialfiscals. Said probation officer shall beappointed by the Secretary of Justice andshall be subject to the direction of theProbation Office. This only means that onlyprovinces that can provide appropriation fora probation officer may have a system

of probation within their locality. This wouldmean to say that convicts in provinces whereno probation officer is instituted may not availof their right to probation.

Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA, 166 SCRA 533

(1988)

FACTS:

Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship, waskilled in an accident in Tokyo, Japan. Thewidow filed a complaint fordamages againstthe Eastern Shipping Lines with the POEA,based on Memorandum Circular No. 2 issuedby the latter which stipulated death benefitsand burial expenses for the family of anoverseas worker. Eastern ShippingLinesquestioned the validity of thememorandum circular. Nevertheless, the POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.

ISSUE:

W/N the issuance of Memorandum Circular No.2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers

HELD:

SC held that there was valid delegation of powers.

In questioning the validity of the memorandumcircular, Eastern Shipping Lines contended that

POEA was given no authority to promulgatethe regulation, and even with suchauthorization, the regulation represents anexercise of legislative discretion which, underthe principle, is not subject to delegation.

It is true that legislative discretion as to thesubstantive contents of the law cannot bedelegated. What can be delegated is the


15/23

discretion to determine how the law may beenforced, not what the law shall be. Theascertainment of the latter subject is aprerogative of the legislature. This prerogativecannot be abdicated or surrendered by thelegislature to the delegate.

There are two accepted tests to determinewhether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness testand the sufficient standard test. Under the firsttest, the law must be complete in all its termsand conditions when it leaves the legislaturesuch that when it reaches the delegate theonly thing he will have to do is to enforce it.Under the sufficient standard test, there mustbe adequate guidelines or stations in the law tomap out the boundaries of the delegatesauthority and prevent the delegation fromrunning riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a totaltransference of legislative authority to thedelegate, who is not allowed to step into theshoes of the legislature and exercise a poweressentially legislative.

Xxx The delegation of legislative power hasbecome the rule and its non-delegation theexception.

The reason is the increasing complexity of thetask of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriadproblems demanding its attention. The growthof society has ramified its activities and created

peculiar and sophisticated problems that thelegislature cannot be expected to reasonablycomprehend. Specialization even in legislationhas become necessary. Too many of theproblems attendant upon present-dayundertakings, the legislature may not have thecompetence to provide the required direct andefficacious, not to say, specific solutions. Thesesolutions may, however, be expected from its

delegates, who are supposed to be experts inthe particular fields.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularlyapplicable to administrative bodies. With theproliferation of specialized activities and theirattendant peculiar problems, the nationallegislature has found it more and morenecessary to entrust to administrative agenciesthe authority to issue rules to carry out thegeneral provisions of the statute. This is calledthe power of subordinate legislation.

With this power, administrative bodies mayimplement the broad policies laid down instatute by filling in the det ails which theCongress may not have the opportunity orcompetence to provide. Memorandum CircularNo. 2 is one such administrative regulation.

Solicitor General vs. Metropolitan ManilaAuthority

Facts:

On July 13, 1990 the Court held in the case ofMetropolitan Traffic Command, West TrafficDistrict vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, that theconfiscation of the license plates of motorvehicles for traffic violations was not amongthe sanctions that could be imposed by theMetro Manila Commission under PD 1605 andwas permitted only under the conditions laiddown by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehiclesobstructing the public streets. Even theconfiscation of drivers licenses for trafficviolations was not directly prescribed orallowed by the decree. After no motion forreconsideration of the decision was filed the judgment became final and executor.

Withstanding the Gonong decision stillviolations of the said decision transpired,wherein there were several persons who sent


16/23

complaint letters to the Court regarding theconfiscation of drivers licenses and removal oflicense plate numbers.

On May 24, 1990 the MMA issued OrdinanceNo. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself todetach license plate/tow and impound

attended/unattended/abandoned motorvehicles illegally parked or obstructing theflow of traffic in Metro Manila.

On July 2, 1991, the Court issued a resolutionregarding the matter which stated that theOrdinance No. 11, Section 2 appears to be inconflict with the decision of the Court, and thatthe Court has received several complaintsagainst the enforcement of such ordinance.

Issue:W/N Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1991 andOrdinance No. 7, Series of 1998 are valid in theexercise of such delegated power to localgovernment acting only as agents of thenational legislature?

Held:

No, the Court rendered judgment: 1) declaring

Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the MMAand Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998, of theMunicipality of Mandaluyong, Null and Void;and 2) enjoining all law-enforcementauthorities in Metropolitan Manila fromremoving the license plates of motor vehicles(except when authorized under LOI43) andconfiscating drivers licenses for trafficviolations within the said area.

To test the validity of said acts the principlesgoverning municipal corporations wasapplied, according to Elliot for a municipalordinance to be valid the following requisitesshould be complied: 1) must not contravenethe Constitution or any statute; 2) must not beunfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial ordiscriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but mayregulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable;

and 6) must be general and consistent withpublic policy.

In the Gonong decision it was shown that themeasures under consideration did not pass thefirst criterion because it did not conform toexisting law. PD 1605 does not allow either the

removal of license plates or the confiscation ofdrivers licenses for traffic violationscommitted in Metropolitan Manila. There isnothing in the decree authorizing the MMA toimpose such sanctions. Thus Local politicalsubdivisions are able to legislate only by virtueof a valid delegation of legislative power fromthe national legislature (except only that thepower to create their own sources of revenueand to levy taxes is conferred by theConstitution itself). They are mere agentsvested with what is called the power ofsubordinate legislation. As delegates of theCongress, the local government unit cannotcontravene but must obey at all times the willof the principal. In the case at bar theenactments in question, which are merely localin origin, cannot prevail against the decree,which has the force and effect of a statute.

OSMEA vs. ORBOS220 SCRA 703 GR No. 99886, March 31, 1993

" To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation of thepower to tax, there must be a standard whichimplies that the legislature determines matter of principle and lays down fundamental policy."

FACTS: Senator John Osmea assails theconstitutionality of paragraph 1c of PD 1956, asamended by EO 137, empowering the EnergyRegulatory Board (ERB) to approve the increase of fuel prices or impose additional amounts onpetroleum products which proceeds shall accrue tothe Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) establishedfor the reimbursement to ailing oil companies in theevent of sudden price increases. The petitioner aversthat the collection on oil products establishments isan undue and invalid delegation of legislative power


17/23

to tax. Further, the petitioner points out that since a'special fund' consists of monies collected throughthe taxing power of a State, such amounts belong tothe State, although the use thereof is limited to thespecial purpose/objective for which it was created.It thus appears that the challenge posed by thepetitioner is premised primarily on the view that thepowers granted to the ERB under P.D. 1956, asamended, partake of the nature of the taxationpower of the State.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegationof legislative power to the Energy Regulatory Board(ERB) of the exercise of the power of taxation

HELD: None. It seems clear that while the fundscollected may be referred to as taxes, they areexacted in the exercise of the police power of the

State. Moreover, that the OPSF as a special fund isplain from the special treatment given it by E.O.137. It is segregated from the general fund; andwhile it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trustliability account," the fund nonetheless remainssubject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. TheCourt is satisfied that these measures comply withthe constitutional description of a "specialfund." With regard to the alleged unduedelegation of legislative power, the Court finds thatthe provision conferring the authority upon the ERB

to impose additional amounts on petroleumproducts provides a sufficient standard by which theauthority must be exercised. In addition to thegeneral policy of the law to protect the localconsumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domesticpump rates, P.D. 1956 expressly authorizes the ERBto impose additional amounts to augment theresources of the Fund.

Title: United States v. Ang Tang HoGR 17122 February 27, 1922

Johns, J.

Facts: At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating thedistribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the

Governor-General, with the consent of the Councilof State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation

for this purpose," the material provisions of whichare as follows: Section 1. The Governor-General ishereby authorized, whenever, for any cause,conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary risein the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and

promulgate, with the consent of the Counci lof State, temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purpose of this ActAng Tang Howas charge, was tried, and then found guilty inviolation of such act. Ang Tang Ho appealed to thiscourt questioning the validity of the said Act.

Issue : Whether or not the Governor-General can fixthe price of rice and make it a crime to sell it at ahigher price.

Held: No, the Governor-General cannot fix the price nor make it a crime to sell it in a higher price. By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and theConstitution of the United States all powers arevested in the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of the

Executive to execute the law; and of the Judiciary toconstrue the law. The Legislature has no authorityto execute or construe the law, the Executive has noauthority to make or construe the law, and the

Judiciary has no power to make or execute the law.

Subject to the Constitution only, the power of eachbranch is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for the Judiciary only to say when any Act of the

Legislature is or is not constitutional. Assuming,without deciding, that the Legislature itself has the

power to fix the price at which rice is to be sold,can it delegate that power to another, and, if so,was that power legally delegated by Act No.2868?

In other words, does the Act delegate legislative power to the Governor-General? By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in the

Legislature, and the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to theGovernor-General, or anyone else. The Legislaturecannot delegate the legislative power to enact anylaw. If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and withinitself, and it does nothing more than to authorize theGovernor-General to make rules and regulations tocarry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the Act withinitself does not define crime, and is not a law, and


18/23

some legislative act remains to be done to make it alaw or a crime, the doing of which is vested in theGovernor-General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.

PEOPLE VS. MACEREN

FACTS: The respondents were charged withviolating Fisheries

Administrative Order No. 84-1 which penalizeselectro fishing in fresh

water fisheries. This was promulgated by theSecretary of Agriculture

and Natural Resources and the Commissionerof Fisheries under the old

Fisheries Law and the law creating theFisheries Commission. The

municipal court quashed the complaint andheld that the law does not

clearly prohibit electro fishing, hence theexecutive and judicial

departments cannot consider the same. Onappeal, the CFI affirmed the

dismissal. Hence, this appeal to the SC.

HELD: This Court held that the Fisheries Lawdoes not prohibit boats not subject to licensefrom fishing within three kilometers of theshoreline of islands and reservations over

which jurisdiction is exercised by naval andmilitary authorities of the United States, withoutpermission from the Secretary of Agricultureand Natural Resources upon recommendationof the military and naval authorities concerned.

As the said law does not penalize the actmentioned in section 28 of the administrativeorder, the promulgation of that provision by theSecretary "is equivalent to legislating on thematter, a power which has not been and

cannot be delegated to him, it being expresslyreserved" to the lawmaking body. "Such an actconstitutes not only an excess of the regulatorypower conferred upon the Secretary but alsoan exercise of a legislative power which hedoes not have, and therefore" the saidprovision "is null and void and without effect".Hence, the charge against Santos wasdismiss.

A penal statute is strictly construed. While anadministrative agency has the right to makeranks and regulations to carry into effect a lawalready enacted, that power should not beconfused with the power to enact a criminalstatute. An administrative agency can haveonly the administrative or policing powersexpressly or by necessary implicationconferred upon it. (Glustrom vs. State, 206 Ga.

734, 58 Second 2d 534; See 2 Am. Jr. 2nd129-130).

Where the legislature has delegated toexecutive or administrative officers and boardsauthority to promulgate rules to carry out anexpress legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which havethe effect of extending, or which conflict withthe authority granting statute, do not representa valid precise of the rule-making power but

constitute an attempt by an administrative bodyto legislate (State vs. Miles, Wash. 2nd 322,105 Pac. 2nd 51).

In a prosecution for a violation of anadministrative order, it must clearly appear thatthe order is one which falls within the scope of the authority conferred upon the administrativebody, and the order will be scrutinized withspecial care. (State vs. Miles supra ).

The Miles case involved a statute whichauthorized the State Game Commission "toadopt, promulgate, amend and/or repeal, andenforce reasonable rules and regulationsgoverning and/or prohibiting the taking of thevarious classes of game.

Under that statute, the Game Commissionpromulgated a rule that "it shall be unlawful tooffer, pay or receive any reward, prize or compensation for the hunting, pursuing, taking,


19/23

killing or displaying of any game animal, gamebird or game fish or any part thereof."

Beryl S. Miles, the owner of a sporting goodsstore, regularly offered a ten-down cash prizeto the person displaying the largest deer in hisstore during the open for hunting such gameanimals. For that act, he was charged with aviolation of the rule Promulgated by the StateGame Commission.

It was held that there was no statute penalizingthe display of game. What the statutepenalized was the taking of game. If thelawmaking body desired to prohibit the displayof game, it could have readily said so. It wasnot lawful for the administrative board toextend or modify the statute. Hence, theindictment against Miles was quashed. The

Miles case is similar to this case.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision of June 9, 1970 is set aside for lack of appellate

jurisdiction and the order of dismissal renderedby the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna inCriminal Case No. 5429 is affirmed. Costs de oficio .

SO ORDERED.

Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate CourtGR No. L-74457, March 20, 1987

FACTS: In 1980 President Marcos amendedExecutive Order No. 626-A which orders thatno carabao and carabeef shall be transportedfrom one province to another; suchviolation shall besub j ec t t o con f i s ca t i on and fo r f e i t u r e b

y t he gove rnmen t , t o be d i s t r i bu t ed t o cha r i t ab l e in s t i t u t i ons and o the r s imi l a r in s t i t u t i ons a s t he Cha i rman o f t he Na t iona l Mea t In spec t i onCommiss ion maysee f i t f o r t he ca r abee f and t o de se rv ingfarmers through dispersal as the Directorof Animal Industry may see fit in the case of the carabaos.On Ja nu ar y 13 , 19 84 , Pe ti t i one r s 6 ca rabaos we re con f i s ca t ed by t hepolice stationcommander of Barotac

Nuevo, Iloilo for having been transportedfrom Masbate to Iloilo in violation of EO626-A. He issued a writ for replevin ,challenging the constitutionality of said EO.The trial court sustained the confiscation of theanimals and declined to rule on the validity of thelaw on the ground that it lacked authority to do so.Its decision was affirmed by the IAC. Hence, thispetition for review filed by Petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not police power is properlyenforced

HELD: NO. The protection of the generalwelfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and isrestrained by due process. The police power issimply defined asthe p o w e r i n h e r e n t i n t h e S t a t e t o r e

g u l a t e l i b e r t y a n d p r o p e r t y f o r t h ep r o m o t i o n o f t h e general welfare. As long asthe activity or the property has some relevance tothe public welfare, its regulation under thepolice power is not only proper butnecessary. In the case at bar, E.O.626-A hasthe same lawful subject as the o riginalexecutive order (E.O. 626 as cited in Toribiocase) but NOT the same lawful method. Thereasonable connection between the means employedand the purpose sought to be achieved b y the

questioned measure is missing. Thechal lenged measure is an invalid exercise of thepolice power because the method employed toconserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary tothe purpose of the law and, worse, is undulyoppressive.

Tablarin vs. Gutierrez GR 78164, 31 July 1987 En Banc, Feliciano (J): 13 concur

FACTS: Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco,Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, and Evangelina S. Labaosought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988.However, they either did not take or did notsuccessfully take the National Medical

Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Boardof Medical Education and administered by the
http://xyckriz.blogspot.com/2010/11/tablarin-vs-gutierrez.htmlhttp://xyckriz.blogspot.com/2010/11/tablarin-vs-gutierrez.htmlhttp://xyckriz.blogspot.com/2010/11/tablarin-vs-gutierrez.html


20/23

Center for Educational Measurement (CEM).On 5 March 1987, Tablarin, et. al., in behalf of applicants for admission into the MedicalColleges who have not taken up or successfully hurdled the NMAT, filed with theRegional Trial Court (RTC), National CapitalJudicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory

Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) andPreliminary Injunction, to enjoin the Secretaryof Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcingSection 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2382, asamended, and MECS Order 52 (series of 1985), dated 23 August 1985 [whichestablished a uniform admission test (NMAT)as an additional requirement for issuance of acertificate of eligibility for admission intomedical schools of the Philippines, beginningwith the school year 1986-1987] and fromrequiring the taking and passing of the NMATas a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding withaccepting applications for taking the NMAT andfrom administering the NMAT as scheduled on

26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearingon the petition for issuance of preliminaryinjunction, the trial court denied said petition on20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted andadministered as previously scheduled.Tablarin, et. al. accordingly filed a Special Civil

Action for Certiorari with the Supreme Court toset aside the Order of the RTC judge denyingthe petition for issuance of a writ of preliminaryinjunction.

ISSUES1. Are Sec. 5 (a) and (f), together withMECS Order No. 52, and undue delegationof legislative power?RATIO 2:The general principle of non-delegation of legislative power must be applied withcircumspection in respect of statutes that deal with subjects that are complex and technical.

- Citing the decision in Pangasinan TransportCo., Inc. v. The Public Service Commissionpenned by Justice Laurel, the Court held thatthere was a constantly growing tendencytowards the delegation of legislative power dueto the growing

complexities of modern society, and that therewas an accompanying trend of acceptance bythe courts.- Citing Justice Fernando in Eduv. Ericta, the Court also held that the standardsset for subordinate legislation may be explicitor implied. In the case of an implied standard, itcan be deduced from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the case of the Medical Act, the standards are set by the Acts objectives, considering Sec. 5 (a) andSec. 7 of the same Act, and taking into

consideration the body of the Act itself.

OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO., INC.(COACO) vs Drilon

FACTS : Petitioner and the union of its rank andfile employees, Cebu Oxygen, Acetylene andCentral Visayas Employees Association(COAVEA) entered into a collective bargainingagreement(CBA) covering the years 1986 to

1988.1)For the first year which will bepaid on January 14, 1986 P200 toeach coveredemployee.2)For the secondyear which will be paid on January 16,1987-P 200 to each coveredemployee.3)3)For the third year which will be paid onJanuary 16, 1988 P300 to eachcovered employee. On December 14, 1987, Republic Act No. 6640was passed increasing the minimumwage, in sum, Section 8 of the

implementing rules prohibits theemployer from crediting anniversarywage inc reases nego t i a t ed under a co l l ec t ive ba rga in ing ag reemen t aga inst such wage increases mandated byRepublic Act No. 6640.On February 22, 1988,a Labor and Employment Development Officer,pursuant to Inspection Authority No. 058-88,commenced a routine inspection of petitioner'sestablishment. Upon completion of theinspection on March 10, 1988, and based on


21/23

payrolls and other records, he found thatpetitioner committed violations of the law asfollows:

1. Under payment of Basic Wageper R.A. No. 6640 covering theperiod of two(2) monthsrepresenting 208 employees whoare not receiving wagesaboveP100/day prior to theeffectivity of R.A. No. 6640 in theaggregate amount of EIGHTYTHREE THOUSAND AND TWOHUNDRED PESOS(P83,200.00);and

2 . U n d e r p a y m e n t o f 1 3 t hm o n t h p a y f o r t h e y e a r 1 98 7 , r e p r e s e n t i n g 2 0 8 employees who are not receiving

wages above P 100/day prior tothe effectivityof R.A. No. 6640 inthe aggregate amount of FORTYEIGHT THOUSAND ANDFORTYEIGHT PESOS (P48,048.00).

ISSUE : The principal issue raised in thispetition is whether or not an ImplementingOrder of the Secretary of Labor andEmployment (DOLE) can provide for aprohibition not contemplated by the law it

seeks to implement.

HELD : As to the issue of the validity of Section 8 of the rules implementingRepublic Act No.6640,which p roh ib i t s t he employer f rom c red i t ing the ann ive r sa ry wage increases provided incollective bargainingagreements, it is a fundamental rule thatimplementing rules cannot add or detract

from the provisions of law it is designedto implement. The provisions of Republic

Act No. 6640, do no t proh ibit thecrediting of CBA anniversary wageincreases for purposes of compliancewith Republic Act No. 6640. Theimplementing rules cannot provide for such a prohibition not contemplated bythe law. Administrative regulations

adopted under legislative authority by aparticular department must be inharmony with the provisions of the law,and should be for the sole purpose of carryinginto effect its general provisions. The law itself cannot be expanded by such regulations. Anadministrative agency cannot amend an act of

Congress.

Thus petitioner's contention that thesalary increases granted by it pursuant tothe existing CBA including anniversarywage increases should be considered indetermining compliance with the wageincrease mandated by Republic Act No.6640, is correct. However, the amountthat should only be credited to petitioner is thewage increase for 1987 under the CBA when

the law took effect. The wage increase for 1986 had already accrued in favor of theemployees even before the said law wasenacted. WHEREFORE, the petition is herebyGRANTED. Section 8 of the rulesimplementing Republic6640, is herebydeclared null and void in so far asit excludes the anniversarywage increases negotiated under collective bargaining agreements frombeing credited to the wage increase

provided for under Republic Act No. 6440. Thisdecision is immediately executory.

Enrique Garcia vs Executive Secretary FACTS: On 27 November 1990, Cory issuedEO 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law onall articles imported into the Philippines, anadditional duty of 5% ad valorem. Thisadditional duty was imposed across the boardon all imported articles, including crude oil and

other oil products imported into the Philippines.In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional dutyto 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passedreinstating the previous 5% duty except thatcrude oil and other oil products continued to betaxed at 9%. Garcia, a representative fromBataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 areunconstitutional for they violate Sec 24 of Art 6of the Constitution which provides: " Allappropriation, revenue or tariff bills, billsauthorizing increase of the public debt, bills of


22/23

local application, and private bills shalloriginate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may proposeor concur with amendments." He contends thatsince the Constitution vests the authority toenact revenue bills in Congress, the Presidentmay not assume such power of issuingExecutive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which arein the nature of revenue-generating measures.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 areconstitutional.

HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of theConstitution, the enactment of appropriation,revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislativerather than the Executive Department. It doesnot follow, however, that therefore Executive

Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they maybe characterized as revenue measures, areprohibited to the President, that they must beenacted instead by the Congress of thePhilippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of theConstitution provides as follows: "(2) TheCongress may, by law, authorize the Presidentto fix within specified limits, and subject to suchlimitations and restrictions as it may impose,tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnageand wharfage dues, and other duties or

imposts within the framework of the nationaldevelopment program of the Government."There is thus explicit constitutional permissionto Congress to authorize the President "subjectto such limitations and restrictions as[Congress] may impose" to fix "within specificlimits" "tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . ."

Emmanuel Pelaez v. The Auditor GeneralGR L-23825 December 24, 1965Concepcion, J.

Facts : During the period from September 4 toOctober 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines,

purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued ExecutiveOrders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to129; creatingthirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in themargin. Soon after the date last mentioned, or on

November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, asVice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer,instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as hisrepresentatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation

of said executive orders and/or any disbursement bysaid municipalities. Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by

Republic Act No.2370 and constitutes an unduedelegation of legislative power. Respondent maintains the contrary view and avers that the

present action is premature and that not all proper parties referring to the officials of the new political subdivisions in question have beenimpleaded. Subsequently, the mayors of severalmunicipalities adversely affected by theaforementioned executive orders because thelatter have taken away from the former the barrioscomposing the new political subdivisions intervened in the case.

Issue: Whether or not there is the law is valid.

Held: No, the law is unconstitutional due to invalid delegation of powers. Although Congress maydelegate to another branch of the Government the

power to fill in the details in the execution,enforcement or administration of a law, it isessential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be completein itself it must set forth therein the policy to beexecuted, carried out or implemented bythedelegate2 and (b) fix a standard the limits

of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conformin the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which isthe essence of every law; and, without theaforementioned standard, there would be no meansto determine, with reasonable certainty, whether thedelegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his


23/23

authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate uponhimself the power, not only to make the law, but,also and this is worse to unmake it, byadopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thusnullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and,

consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.

Separation and Delagation of Powers Cases

Documents

Transcript of Separation and Delagation of Powers Cases