Arthur Archie Tiu SENIRES

10722688

“On Kuhn’s Incommensurability of Meaning”

Abstract: this paper is focused on Thomas Kuhn’s problem on incommensurability with regards to scientific terminologies and their meaning. For years Thomas Kuhn’s Thesis has become a threat to the scientific community by showing that scientific knowledge is not cumulative as it seems. It will show the two sides taken by some philosophers and the problem that arises from Thomas Kuhn’s Incommensurability thesis. The author’s paper will concentrate more on the Incommensurability of meaning. The theses on incommensurability of meaning have raised problems in scientific communities because it claims that scientific paradigms do not totally understand each other and cannot have an intellectual debate. The author shall attempt to reason that there is no incommensurability of meaning between scientific paradigms.

I. Introduction

When Thomas Kuhn first published his book, The structure of

scientific revolution in 1970 he explained how science and the scientific

community builds its paradigms and how their knowledge are affected

by a shift in paradigm known as a paradigm shift. Initially, Kuhn has,

more or less, 21 notions of paradigms in his book The structure of

scientific revolution (Kuhn, 1970). But generally it can be viewed as a

whole world view in which scientists and their colleagues work on as a

kind of puzzle. To better illustrate this, think of the world as a big jigsaw

puzzle and the scientists who study the world are puzzle solvers, trying

to construct the puzzle piece by piece. Every now and then scientists

would solve a problem about the world, a piece of the puzzle has been

discovered, but in some instances there would be those pieces that

would not fit, these pieces are called anomalies. Anomalies are

scientific problems that arise when something else happens in the

experiments that are not in the working paradigm of the scientist, an

unforeseen event. Anomalies tend to build up on the scientific

community and eventually, a scientific revolution would occur. In this

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“revolution” Scientists would have different theories about the world,

they would have separate world views and this is what Kuhn calls a

paradigm. A paradigm shift is the event wherein the scientists would

have a change of world view. Now, within these events, Kuhn thought

that two different paradigms would be incommensurable therefore

seeing and proving the scientific knowledge as non-cumulative. There

are three kinds of incommensurability [the incommensurability of

standards, values, and meaning] but here I shall focus on the

Incommensurability of meaning.

Thomas Kuhn presented the incommensurability problem as

being part of the problem in natural languages. He thought that a

communication breakdown may occur in between paradigms but this

breakdown is not absolute. He thought that terminology in different

paradigms had different meaning leading in this breakdown of

communication between two paradigms. With this breakdown, no two

paradigms are able to have an intellectual debate over a certain

problem.

“In the transition from one theory to the next words change their meanings or conditions of applicability in subtle ways. Though most of the same signs are used before and after a revolution” Kuhn( 1970, p. 162)

Theories, as Kuhn thought and is evident even today, have an

effect on our understanding of a certain word ie: mass, gravity, energy.

These terminologies had changed their meaning throughout time and

scientist coming from different paradigms tend to speak of different

concepts and idea when, for example, the term gravity for Newton may

mean the force that attracts us to the center of the earth while for

Einstein gravity means a cylindrical bend in space time in which

everything falls into. With this kind of a problem arising, two scientists

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talking about one term but having different theories, the problem of

incommensurability of meaning arises. With this, Kuhn further thought

that any further communication between these scientists is lost. A

breakdown is inevitable as only partial communication is achieved when

this happens any debate between two paradigms would become

unintelligible. Kuhn Likened this to that of his gestalt shift (Duck-rabbit

image). One views it as a duck, and the other as a rabbit. Another point

raised Kuhn is that there is no neutral language between two

paradigms. Making any attempt to translate and/ or interpret scientific

meaning in two paradigms hard if not impossible because for Kuhn, The

theoretical framework of the paradigm will have a direct effect on the

meaning in a scientific community.

For Kuhn, scientific terms are genuinely untranslatable between

paradigms. This is because scientific terms, when learning about them,

are clustered with other scientific terms within the paradigm. This

relation of terms in a scientific paradigm makes it impossible to learn

them separately from other terms. Kuhn writes:

“In learning Newtonian mechanics, the terms 'mass' and 'force' must be acquired together, and Newton's Second Law must play a role in their acquisition. One cannot, that is, learn 'mass' and 'force' independently and then empirically discover that force equals mass times acceleration. Nor can one first learn 'mass' (or 'force') and then use it to define 'force' (or 'mass') with the aid of the Second Law. Instead, all three must be learned together, parts of a whole new (but not a wholly new) way of doing mechanics.” -Kuhn (1983,pp. 676-677)

Kuhn insisted that there was no common language between

scientific theories. That there no point by point comparison can be

made between two scientific terms.

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“I had intended only to insist that there was no common language within which both could be fully expressed and which could therefore be used in a point-by-point comparison between them.” Kuhn (1976, p. 189)

Here we can clearly see that Kuhn involves language in his

problem of incommensurability and translation, that we could not fully

translate one meaning from past paradigm to present paradigm.

I shall show in this paper that the incommensurability problem in

meaning is can be solved by simple semantical and empirical facts,

that our reference to the world using language and words prevents

incommensurability in meaning from happening in the scientific

community and in between scientific paradigms and I shall attempt to

defend Davidson from the argument of Kuhn that translation and

Interpretation are different.

II. Arguments against Kuhn by Davidson

Donald Davidson goes against Kuhn’s idea that we cannot

translate meaning between paradigms, though he does not directly

attack incommensurability. For him, if we are able to translate a

language into our own, there would be an overlap in the conceptual

scheme. Davidson developed his Idea on conceptual scheme, much

like a paradigm on language. It is the concept that language organizes

our thought and experience. For Davidson however, he rejects the very

idea conceptual scheme. For the empiricists like Quine and Kuhn,

Analytic statement’s truth values are affirmed via their empirical

content and meaning. For Quine, who gave up on the analytic

synthetic distinction, the only thing left for them to compare their

languages would be the empirical world which is based on our

experiences.

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Davidson argues that to be able to know if there really was a

change in meaning, one would have to establish that there is a neutral

point of view. If there really is a common point of view, then translation

would be possible. If there is some untranslatable meaning, we could

only know this from a neutral point of view and we could not establish

that there is an untranslatable language if there is no neutral point of

view.

“The dominant metaphor of conceptual relativism, that of differing points of view, seems to betray an underlying paradox. Different points of view make sense, but only if there is a common coordinate system on which to plot them.”- Davidson (1974, p. 6)

Yet Quine and Kuhn still believed that there are different

viewpoints or different conceptual schemes thus organizing the world

differently for each conceptual scheme. For them, all meanings contain

theories depending on which conceptual scheme you would come from

which leads to semantic relativism thus having a dualism of conceptual

scheme and empirical content. This dualism is what Davidson called as

the third dogma of empiricism.

“If we give up the dualism, we abandon the conception of meaning that goes with it, but we do not have to abandon the idea of empirical content: we can hold, if we want, that all sentences have empirical content. Empirical content is in turn explained by reference to the facts, the world, experience, sensation, the totality of sensory stimuli, or something similar.”- Davidson (1974, p.11)

Davidson proposes that we should abandon the idea of

conceptual dualism which would leave us only with the empirical

content of the sentence which has reference to the real world and

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experience. Different schemes, just like a paradigm, would have

different meanings to the terms they would use. Davidson then

proceeds to argue that a certain thing or activity can be called a

language if it has some correlation to experience of the world and it is

this experience that makes it interpretable. This interpretability is what

makes us understand the world and makes things translatable because

people have similar experiences to the world and that given enough

time, we would be able to understand, interpret, and translate one

language into ours. He further says that the Idea of complete

untranslatability is unintelligible. For him, if we can at least interpret

some of the language or theories in a scheme, then we can also

interpret and translate the rest of meaning and language of that

scheme. This is what makes intelligible disagreements possible

between two schemes because if we can interpret and translate the

language of two different schemes, then there is in fact a shared

conceptual scheme.

In translating languages, we would sometimes need to assume

the principle of charity, as Davidson writes:

“Charity is forced on us; whether we like it or not, if we want

to understand others, we must count them right in most matters.

If we can produce a theory that reconciles charity and the formal

conditions for a theory, we have done all that could be done to

ensure communication. Nothing more is possible, and nothing more is needed.”- Davidson (1974, p. 19)

We have to assume that what the native speaker, in our

case a scientist from another paradigm, is true or the expression

of their sentences as true. Once we learn more about their native

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language, we would then know the truth value of those

sentences and words. This principle was used by Davidson by

which interpretation and communication could take place.

Kuhn responded to this by saying that Davidson has mixed

translation and interpretation. Kuhn writes:

“My claim is that interpretation, a process about which I shall be having more to say, is not the same as translation, at least not as translation has been conceived in much recent philosophy.”- Kuhn (1982, p. 672)

For Kuhn, translation is not the same as interpretation because

translation is done by someone who knows two or more languages

while in interpretation, the interpreter only knows one language and

will start interpreting another language just to be able to understand it.

Translation, for Kuhn is not always possible, as he tries to show in his

phlogiston theory and the gavagai example he writes:

“The interpreter may not, for reasons previously explained, merely introduce the term 'gavagai' into his or her own language, say English. That would be to alter English and the result would not be translation. But the interpeter can attempt to describe in English the referents of the term 'gavagai'”- Kuhn (1983, p. 673)

“In learning to recognize gavagais, the interpreter may have learned to recognize distinguishing features unknown to English speakers and for which English supplies no descriptive terminology. Perhaps, that is, the natives structure the animal world differently from the way English speakers do, using different discriminations in doing so. Under those circumstances, 'gavagai' remains an irreducibly native term, not translatable into English. Though English speakers may learn to use the term, they speak the native language when they do so. Those are the circumstances for which I would reserve the term 'incommensurability'.” – Kuhn (1982, p. 673)

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People use different criterions coming from different paradigms

to refer and describe scientific objects. Different languages means

different world views as language has an influence in the structure of

empirical facts according to Kuhn.

“For where language is different, the world is different, language is private, and communication ceases until one party acquires the language of the other.” – Kuhn (1982, p. 52)

Furthermore, Kuhn believed that groups of people who have or

use the same language come from the same culture therefore they

have similar observation and situations. Different language structures

then meant that people have different world views and how they would

structure the world to be. Their observations on the world have created

for them, their language structure. People coming from the same

culture would know what the term applies to and its limits to the

application of the term, and I have to agree with Kuhn on this one

since it is evident in our lives when we talk to other people coming

from the same community. The same would then go for scientific

communities, according to Kuhn; scientific communities have already a

fixed language structure which is based on their discoveries and

observations, if the scientific community would need to adapt a new

term because of an anomaly, this would also mean that their whole

structure of the world would have changed which would also include

the language used. If this happens, there would already be a change in

the scientific laws that govern the scientific communities, there would

be a change in understanding and formulation, interrelated terms

would then become incommensurable since scientists would differ in

their understanding of the terms used in the scientific community.

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III. On Neutral Languages and Paradigms

It is however to my belief that Kuhn maybe mistaken about his

view on the incommensurability of meaning and also his view that

Davidson has mixed translatability and interpretation. To start, I

believe that there is a neutral language and point of view in which we

could translate terms within paradigms.

We somehow share a common viewpoint of the world with other

people. This common viewpoint about the world is what makes us

understand other languages so clearly when we study them and the

same goes for the scientific world. Two different paradigms may seem

to have different descriptions about masses, gravity, etc. But yet we

would still be able to understand their point by studying their way or

their paradigm. It can be compared to the use of our language here in

the Philippines that though we have different dialects and some words

like langgam , for bisaya it means bird and Filipino it means ant, we

are still able to understand where one is coming from and we can have

an understanding of the different terms even if they have the same

word expression. If it is true that we could have no neutral language

and that no intelligible debate can come from two paradigms due to

the incommensurability of meaning, how is it that we are able to

understand past scientific terms and Ideas and we can compare and

debate about them when put side by side with present theories. We

are able to compare and understand theories because we are able to

translate them into our own language. But we must note that

translating involves interpreting or interpreting involves translation

and once we are able to translate and interpret one language or

meaning, then we are able to understand the meaning the other is

trying to show to us.

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As I have mentioned, translation and interpretation go side by

side, this is how it works. When we try to understand a meaning or

language we usually study how the other speak, when I use the term

“other” I mean another language or scientist from another paradigm,

we use semantics, or the study of words and what they stand for to be

able to learn and understand what they mean when they utter a

meaning or a sentence. This understanding involves two processes,

translation and interpretation. It is the same as understanding a

foreign language. First we try to translate them. By translating we

substitute whatever words they have for a meaning and exchange it

with ours. After our translation or translating a meaning or sentence,

we try to interpret them by means of understanding what they have

said. For example, I utter to an American “ May kotse na itim doon sa

gilid”. By means of translation, assuming that this American studied

Filipino, will try to substituting words in their language, ie: Kotse = car,

Itim = Black. As soon as he is finished replacing and substituting the

words in this sentence, he has fully translated the sentence but it

would appear much like this “ there car that is black in that corner”

and as soon as he tries to interpret this sentence to be able to

understand it, he transforms and fixes this into a language he

understands, that “there is a black car in the corner”. We can see here

that when we translate, we simply do not translate nor interpret as if

they were apart, as Kuhn thought, but we use both to be able to

understand what the other wants us to see or hear. However, it may

seem here that Interpretation can stand on its own without the use of

translations. Even if we use the same language and understood what

the utterer or the other had said, we would already have heard that

language as already being translated once we understand what he or

she has said. What is left for us is to only interpret their meaning and

what they are trying to say or convey to us. The same may go for

scientific terminology between two distinct paradigms, Paradigms may

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have different conceptual schemes and theories that they associate

with what they mean in their terminology but though they may have

different theories and terms, we are still able to understand what they

mean, for example, when they say Newtonian gravity and Einsteinian

Gravity. We are able to understand both because we are able to

translate them and interpret them in such a way that we can have a

meaningful debate over these issues. But how do we know that our

translations are correct?

When we translate Ideas or sentences, we actually refer to

experience and things that our sensory functions detect; we base our

words on experience and intellectual logic. Words have a reference to

our world such as when we say car or table, it also has the same effect

for scientific terms such as gravity and mass. Though theories and

scientific description may have its differences when they say gravity,

take note that we usually refer to one thing when we say gravity, that

is that gravity is the thing the pulls us towards the center or that thing

that makes us drop when we jump. There is some base or neutral

language outside the everyday scientific terms. This “neutral

language” helps us understand what is meant by mass between two

completely different paradigms. Ordinary language, though they may

seem theory laden, are not so theory laden as we originally thought,

but I do not mean that all terms we use are not theory laden. When we

use ordinary language such as Filipino or English our English, we often

forget about the scientific terms and some people don’t even mention

terms like mass or gravity. Perhaps ordinary language is our neutral

language to begin with. Our Ordinary language, or the everyday

language we use, helps us understand terms coming from two different

paradigms though it may involve translation and interpretation.

Translating a scientific term from another paradigm using our own

language is not impossible, when we study scientific history we see

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that we are able to understand their theories, we even recreate some

of their experiment to help us understand why they would think of a

certain theory and to learn how they could have arrived at their

solution. If we are able to learn this thing in our classrooms it is

because it was already translated and interpreted to us by our

teachers and this translation and interpretation makes meaningful

debates over paradigms intellectual. So how is this seen in a scientific

setting?

I do partially agree with Kuhn that we do learn scientific terms in

cluster with other terms associated with a certain paradigm or theory,

but I don’t think that all scientific terms are clustered with other terms

or we learn them by clusters. But even if we learn them in cluster with

other scientific terms, we are still able to understand them. This is

because even if we learn them in clusters with other scientific terms, if

we study a scientific term using ordinary language, we can learn their

meaning apart from what we already know when we cluster them with

other terms. For example: the idea of a phlogiston, there are scientific

terms associated with this that are not in use nor compatible with the

theory of oxygen, but scientists from the oxygen paradigm are still

able to understand them because they are able to describe and study

the clusters associated with the phlogiston theory. If there are,

however, terms that cannot be understood, given that a problem like

this would arise, we could simply translate the scientific term to one

that the other scientific paradigm could understand, a term that is

similar, if not closely related to that scientific term.

Two theories coming from different paradigms may be different

but they are still very much translatable and interpretable. Seeing as

we can still understand the formulas coming from two different

paradigms, this is because in reality we really understand what they

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meant. We study what they meant when they say mass and we can

still very much distinguish it from the thing we call mass today. Though

descriptions and theories change our very description of the term

“mass”, both Newtonian and Einsteinian, are still understandable and

commensurable. This is because there is such a thing as a neutral

language and we employ this neutral language when we try to

describe our everyday experiences. Learning the language used from

one paradigm to describe a theory and translating them into the

language we use now, we can make a point by point comparison of

different theories.

When we try to describe thing or define them we usually think of

words that has a relation to our real world experiences. We can even

learn from the scientists from another paradigm themselves, based on

their lecture notes, formulas, or the real person assuming that they are

still alive, to learn what they mean by this and that. It is because we do

understand what they meant, for example, when they say gravity. We

are able to distinguish the differences made by these people that is

another reason why we say “Einstenian”, “Newtonian”, or

“Copernican”. Even if a scientific revolution occurs, and it does,

scientists do not just forget what they had learned from the previous

paradigm but retain it in their memories, or if memory is not reliable

enough we may learn from their notes. There is no point in trying to

say that two paradigms are incommensurable even if they utter the

same words but have different meaning. Meanings are not

incommensurable, it just takes time and effort to understand and learn

what the previous paradigm meant.

Even in our present discussion and debates in the scientific

community, when we utter the term mass or gravity, we are able to

distinguish what is meant by one scientist to the other by identifying

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what paradigm they are talking about simply by using these “word

markers” such as Einstenian, or Newtonian. These markers are used in

our ordinary language, though they are rarely used and thus might be

easily forgotten or it may seem invisible in our language. Markers are

similar to proper names and they give us a general idea of what is

being talked about or debated upon when uttering a word or term that

may have different meaning. By using such markers scientists are able

to describe what is meant by the other paradigm when they utter a

term. Just like us, they are able to understand concepts and terms or

what the other paradigm meant by this or that.

Furthermore, Kuhn viewed that language changes as the world

changes. This cannot be completely true. When a paradigm shift

occurs and our world changes, scientific terms may change but our

ordinary language do not and as I have stated above, this ordinary

language may be used as a neutral language for the commensurability

of two scientific terms and theories. How? When one speaks of a

theory one tells us that he meant this and this when speaking about a

theory. This theory and terms can still be broken down into much

simpler definitions that could make both sides understand what is

meant by the other. For example, I can describe an object without

giving it a name such as: “ A thing that has 4 wheels and an engine

usually ranging from...” and this thing which I can describe without

giving it a name will start to form an image of what is meant by the

other. When the one being spoken to has an image of what is being

described, s/he is able to identify and have a general idea of what is

being talked about. Terms are simply like names, and names are just

there to help us identify what is being described to us. We can always

change the terms to help us identify what is meant by this and that

and this is the reason why we use this name “markers”. Instead of

Identifying it like this A=C, A=B, where A is the name or term and C, B

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is the meaning and definition of a term, we Identify what is meant by

EA= C, NA=B. So applying this in real life, we apply to mass the term

“Newtonian” gravity and “Einstenian” gravity.

When I say ordinary language, I do not mean that there is a

third language. What I mean here is the language that we use in our

everyday lives for us to be able to describe terms. Though I do have to

admit that some terms may need the help of other scientific term to

describe what they mean but even if this is the case, we could still very

much define, translate, and interpret them for us to be able to

understand and grasp the concepts associated with them.

IV. Incommensurability of meaning: The Unobservables

Just like observable objects, unobservables ie; electrons, atoms,

etc. Can be defined and described to us. We are able to understand

what they mean by atom or by electron. We are able to grasp their

concepts by simple mathematical formulas and/or illustrations of what

they mean when they utter a term that is unobservable by the human

eye. This has always been a daunting task in the history of science,

making ordinary people understand what is meant by a theory and

making them believe that such things exists in nature.

Theories, for the most part, help us understand scientific terms

and references that are unobservable and undetectable to the human

senses. Theories illustrate how and why such would react in a certain

way and gives a clear image via illustrations and mathematics of how a

certain phenomenon happens. But we have to accept the fact that

there is always a chance that scientists will fail in trying to get a

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certain theory of an unobservable correct. But even if this is the case,

we cannot help but try to learn in our educational system what is

meant by an atom or a molecule. Just like our school systems,

scientists have notes, guide books, and other equipments to make

them understand what they are talking about. These tools can also be

of help when other paradigms emerge, scientists coming from two

completely different paradigms are able to discuss their findings and

make a good intellectual argument about their theories. Meanings of

unobservables can still be understood by another paradigm via notes

and illustrations. The same way we understand how an atom would

look like or how Bohr and other atomists differ in their theories.

Comparing notes and using ordinary language to describe the

unobservable can make us understand what the other scientist meant.

For example; the theory on phlogiston and oxygen: Before oxygen was

discovered phlogiston theory about how fire affects a certain material

was a widely accepted scientific fact, but there were too many

anomalies associated with the phlogiston theory, when oxygen was

discovered as a result of the anomalies arising from phlogiston, the

phlogiston theory was discarded as the oxygen paradigm was being

adopted by the scientific masses. Even if these unobservable theories

came from different paradigms, we are still able to understand what

they meant when they said phlogiston and what is meant by oxygen, if

this is the case scientists coming from the oxygen paradigm would still

be able to understand the phlogiston theory. Each word in their theory

can still be described and understood via the interpretation of

illustrations, when I say illustration I mean to say drawings or other

artistic means to show a model of the unobservable, of what oxygen

would look like and how it would fit on a theory. This would make both

paradigms be able to understand each other and this would make it

possible for both paradigms to have an intellectual debate.

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Mathematical laws, however, are much harder to interpret and

translate. For example, the mathematical law on gravity would differ

from paradigm to paradigm. These mathematical laws are impossible

to translate but they are not totally incommensurable. Einstenian

theory about energy “e=mc2 ” cannot be translated to another

equation for the understanding of another paradigm, however we can

still understand what he meant by his equation such as e means

energy by learning and understanding his notes about energy. By

doing so, defining and interpreting each part of the equation using

ordinary language makes both sides understand what is meant by the

formula. This makes it understandable and commensurable between

two paradigms and thus making it possible for scientists to have a

debate and argument without any misconceptions and

misunderstandings.

V. Conclusion

It is to my belief that Kuhn might have thought that scientists

could not have any intellectual debate because of incommensurability.

For one thing by using simple description of words which refer to the

real world, we can understand by way of translation and interpretation

what the other meant who comes from another paradigm. Though

scientific terms may change from one paradigm to another there would

still be a neutral point of view and a neutral language in which we

would be able to translate and interpret scientific terms.

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