The End of the Philippine-Mindanao Conflict?

The Philippines Mindanao conflict with Moro insurgents has been going on since 1969, and there has yet to be a permanent peace settlement. Recently the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front have come to an agreement that could replace the existing autonomous region in the area, but first the measure must be approved by the Filipino Congress. Furthermore, if the measure is passed there is no guarantee of a permanent peace. And with other Moro Insurgent groups such as the Moro National Liberation Front, the Abu Sayyaf group, and other MILF breakaway groups such as the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, the potential for a permanent peace in the region is becoming increasingly more unlikely. Therefore, an autonomous region for the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in Mindanao will not permanently resolve the Philippine-Mindanao conflict.

Senior Thesis byChristopher J. Porter

Department of Political Science

& Criminal JusticeSouthern Utah University

Cedar City, UTcjporter1991@gmail.com

The Philippine-Mindanao conflict with Moro insurgents has been ongoing since 1969, and there

has yet to be a permanent peace settlement. Recently the Government of the Philippines and the

Moro Islamic Liberation Front have come to an agreement could establish an autonomous region

to replace and expand the existing Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, but first the

measure must be approved by the Filipino Congress. Furthermore, if the measure is passed there

is no guarantee of a permanent peace. And with other Moro Insurgent groups such as the Moro

National Liberation Front, the Abu Sayyaf group, and other MILF breakaway groups such as the

Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, or BIFF, the potential for a permanent peace in the

region is becoming increasingly more unlikely. Therefore, an autonomous region for the Moro

Islamic Liberation Front in Mindanao will not permanently resolve the Philippines Mindanao

conflict.

The Philippines has been a nation dominated by colonialism since the Spanish first

arrived in 1521 up until Filipino independence in 1946.1 But even before the Filipino Colonial

Era there has been tremendous influence from outside cultures, regions, and religions. Perhaps

the most notable of these influences is the arrival of Islam in Mindanao in the 13th and 14th

centuries.2 After the arrival of Islam a sultanate was established in 1450 on the Filipino island of

Sulu. The man who established this sultanate is known as Sharif ul-Hashim, also known as Sayid

Abu Bakar. After the establishment of the Sulu Sultanate Abu Bakar began to pattern a

government in the area after the Arab Caliphate and in turn established the original Sulu code of

1 Zaide, The Philippines: A Unique Nation, (Quezon City: All Nations Publishing Co. Inc., 2008), 80-81.2 The origins of Islam in the Philippines is still debated by scholars today. Perhaps the most accepted

argument is that Islam was brought to the Philippines by Muslim traders from Malaysia and Indonesia. For more information see: Koerner, Brendan. "How Islam Got to the Philippines." Slate. January 28, 2005. http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2005/01/how_islam_got_to_the_philippines.html (accessed February 18, 2015).

law.3 Over the next century the most notable Sultanates would be established in Sulu,

Maguindanao, and Buayan. These Sultanates would enter into treaties with other regions in

Southeast Asia and are now referred to as the Sulu zone.4 “The political structures under the

leadership of the three major groups existed independently with one another. There were times,

however, when they united against their common enemy. For example, immediately before and

during Spanish colonialism the reign of Sultan Kudarat joined forces with the sultanates of

Maguindanao, Sulu, Buayan and, even Ternate and Moluccas in present-day Indonesia to thwart

the European invaders.”5 It wasn’t until this time when the Muslims in Southern Mindanao began

to be referred to as Moros. The term was introduced when the Spanish believed that the Muslims

of Mindanao were the Moors of Northern Africa.6

Since the colonization of the Philippines by the Spanish the Moro people have been

fighting against Spanish, American, Japanese, and Filipino rule.7 With the goal that one day they

will be independent once again. “From 1576 under the reign of Governor General Francisco

Sande, Spanish colonial forces tried to reduce the sultanates into vassalage but failed. In

retaliation, the sultanates of Sulu, Maguindanao, and Buayan with their allies in East Asia,

jointly or independently launched military offensives. They succeeded not only in thwarting

colonial designs to subjugate them but also in limiting the Christianization process in

northeastern and western Mindanao. However, the sultanates failed to recover areas in Luzon

and the Visayas that used to be under their control and influence.”8 During the Spanish Colonial

3 Halili, Maria Christine N., Philippine History, (Manila: Rex Bookstore Inc., 2004), 52.4 Abreu, Lualhati M. "Colonialism and Resistance: A Historical Perspective." In The Moro Reader: History

and Contemporary Struggles of the Bansamoro People, ed. Bobby M. Tuazon (Quezon City: CenPEG Books, 2008), 19.

5 Ibid.6 Banlaoi, Rommel C., Al-Harakatul al-Islamiyyah: Essays on the Abu Sayyaf Group, (Quezon City:

Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research, 2012), 24.7 Ibid.8 Abreu, Colonialism and Resistance, 20.

Era in the Philippines the Moros launched a series of orchestrated attacks against the Spanish

colonizers in the Visayas.9 Although these attacks did impede the Spanish, they ultimately had

relatively little effect on the Spanish colonizers.10

The next three centuries would show constant rebellion and insurrection against the

Spanish colonizers. Consistent attempts by the Spaniards to subdue the Moro people in the

southern Philippines would never prove to be successful. The Philippine Revolution in 1896

forced the Spanish to pull troops from the sultanate areas in the Bangsamoro region and reassign

them to areas in Luzon.11 This victory for the Moro people was short lived. The American

invasion in 1898 once again led to the Moro people being under the thumb of another great

power.12 But still rebellion and insurrection raged on through the Japanese occupation in World

War II. Then on July 4, 1946 the Treaty of Manila was signed, which granted the Philippines its

long awaited independence from foreign rule.13 But even with the struggle for Filipino

independence complete, the struggle for the Moro people, and their desire for self-government

and independence would continue.

The insurgence of Islamic groups in the southern Philippines has been common place

since Filipino Independence in 1946. Since then numerous Islamic fundamentalist groups have

emerged. “The decade of the sixties and seventies saw the emergence of the two major Muslim

9 Ongsotto, Rebecca Ramilo, and Reena R. Ongsotto. Philippine History: Module Based Learning, (Manila: Rex Bookstore Inc., 2002), 12.

10 The purpose of this information is to show that the Bangsmoro people have a history of fighting against any rule other than self-governance. And although this particular instance took place in the Visayas, Filipino Muslims are often referred to as Moros all over the Philippines. Furthermore, this historical perspective begins to show that autonomy is not the answer, and only through complete independence for the Moro people will the in the Bangsmoro region of Mindanao cease.

11Abreu, Colonialism and Resistance, 22.12 Ibid.13 The Treaty of Manila was ratified by the U.S. Senate later that year making it official. For more

information see: Philippines, and United States. Treaty of General Relations and Protocol with the Republic of the Philippines: Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Treaty of General Relations and Protocol Between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946).

armed movements, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) founded in 1969 and the Moro

Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 1977. These decades marked the resurgence of militant

nationalism in the Philippines led by university students and intellectuals, including many of the

Muslim leaders who would figure prominently in the founding of both the MNLF and the

MILF.”14 Other Moro insurgent groups are the Abu Sayyaf Group, and BIFF (Bangsamoro

Islamic Freedom Fighters)15. Furthermore, this discussion will focus primarily on MILF

(including its splinter groups, and separate factions), with a secondary focus on MNLF, the Abu

Sayyaf group, and their respective splinter groups.

In order to form a proper discussion regarding the Philippine-Mindanao conflict attention

must be paid to the roots and the formation of the Islamic groups in the Philippines. Philippine

scholars agree that the formation of these groups can be traced back to a singular event that acted

as a catalyst in the emergence of these groups. This event is known as the Jabidah Massacre. The

infamous event took place on March 18, 1968 when several Filipino Muslims, who were

members of the Filipino Army, were killed by their officers in the act of mutiny after they had

demanded pay which had not yet been afforded them.16 This event led to the inciting of rebellion

and civil unrest among the Moro people.17 After these events Islamic Fundamentalist groups

began to appear, one of the first was the Moro National Liberation Front. Although the group

was founded in 1969, it did not begin to gain notoriety until the early 70’s and its purpose was to

14 Rivera, Temario C. "The Struggle of the Muslim People in the Southern Philippines: Independence or Autonomy?" In The Moro Reader: History and Contemporary Struggles of the Bangsamoro People, ed. Bobby M. Tuazon, (Quezon City: CenPEG Books, 2008), 40.

15 BIFF or the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters is a MILF splinter group.16 This event is contested by many, noting that the account isn’t clearly documented. For more

information regarding the event and its history see: Leifer, Selected Works on Southeast Asia, 674-678.17 Abreu, Lualhati M., and Bobby M. Tuazon. "40 Years of Revolutionary Struggles." In The Moro Reader:

History and Contemporary Struggles of the Bangsamoro People, ed. Bobby M. Tuazon, (Quezon City: CenPEG Publication, 2008), 133.

gain independence from the Government of the Philippines through the process of waging war.18

And since then the group has been engaged in constant peace talks with the government of the

Philippines with no end in sight. Although the group accepted the governments offer of

autonomy for a small part of Mindanao, there are large parts of MNLF that are not fully satisfied.

Even though there may be a peace in place between MNLF and the Government of the

Philippines at the current time, the group still maintains its desire for independence. According to

the MNLF group’s Facebook page they wish to establish a Federation of four states, Mindanao

(including Palawan), Sulu, Bangsamoro, and Compostela.19 Although this goal appears to be an

impossibility the group still presents problems for the Government of the Philippines, and

perhaps they are even holding out hope that other Moro Islamic groups can gain independence,

and succeed where they did not.

One of these groups is the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. MILF was formed in 197720

when it split from MNLF, but did not officially declare itself as separate from MNLF until

1986.21 The split of the MNLF into the MILF and the MNLF is an ideological one. The MILF

faction wished to put more emphasis on Islam, thus explaining the fact that many of its leaders

are religious clerics, whereas MNLF and its leaders appeared to be more secular. Peace talks

between the Filipino government and MILF have been on and off over the last few decades, with

ceasefires and military crackdowns a constant.22 All this amidst a tumult of noise for an Islamic

State in the southern Philippines. Although the Moro Islamic Liberation Front’s ultimate goal is

to create an Islamic State in Mindanao some say that the group may be willing to settle for a

18 See: "Guide to the Philippines conflict." BBC News, December 18, 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7887521.stm#Moro Islamic Liberation Front (accessed February 23, 2015).

19 For more information regarding the group’s plans on social media see: Moro National Liberation Front, Planned Political Subdivisions of Mindanao, April 7, 2014. https://www.facebook.com/notes/moro-national-liberation-front-mnlf/planned-political-subdivisions-of-mindanao/627914147264550 (accessed March 5, 2015).

20 See: “Guide to the Philippines Conflict,” BBC News.21 Abreu and Tuazon, 40 Years of Revolutionary Struggles, 136.22 See “Guide to the Philippines Conflict,” BBC News.

certain degree of autonomy.23 And with the recent peace talks that may appear to become a

reality. According to the Bangkok Post over the next couple years MILF will begin to

decommission forces as the Filipino military reduces its presence in the area (with the Filipino

government promising MILF an autonomous region).24 But recent events speak against the

success of this agreement. Earlier this year Philippine Special Forces conducted an operation to

capture two targets from militant controlled territory. Amidst this operation the Philippine

Special Forces were engaged in a firefight with the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters25, and

a unit from MILF. This single event creates an enormous amount of difficulty for President

Bengino Acquino III. His term ends next year and he is seeking to make this peace deal his

legacy item.26 Furthermore, we see that even if the resolution MILF has come to with the

Government of the Philippines endures, the potential for a permanent peace is limited, especially

given the influence of other groups in the area.

Another important group which needs mention is the Abu Sayyaf group. The group

emerged sometime in the early 1990’s.27 Abu Sayyaf is generally considered to be the most

violent and radical of the three groups previously mentioned. They are responsible for numerous

terrorist activities in the Philippines. The leader of the Abu Sayyaf group, Isnilon Hapilon,

recently pledged allegiance to ISIS/Daish (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) over the summer of

23 Ibid.24 For more information on the report see: "Philippine peace breakthrough," Bangkok Post. January 25,

2014, http://www.bangkokpost.com/print/391473/ (accessed February 18, 2015).25 Also known as BIFF, the group separated from MILF in 2008 over the argument of autonomy over

independence. The group refuses to accept autonomy, and insists on independence, while MILF is willing to accept autonomy. For more information see: Philippine Daily Inquirer, "Is BIFF the MILF's 'BFF'?" Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 1, 2015, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/669597/is-biff-the-milfs-bff (accessed March 2, 2015).

26 See: "The Philippines Commits to Southern Offensive Despite Peace Effort," Stratfor Global Intelligence, March 6, 2015. https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/philippines-commits-southern-offensive-despite-peace-effort (accessed March 6, 2015).

27 Banlaoi, Essays on the Abu Sayyaf Group, 16.

2014.28 As long as this terror group stands in the way it seem it is impossible for a permanent

peace to be achieved in the Philippine-Mindanao conflict.

Relations between the Moro people, MILF, MNLF, the Abu Sayyaf group, and the

Government of the Philippines have been contentious over the past half century. There have been

many attempts at peace, but to no avail. The most recent of these is a peace negotiated in the

begging part of last year. As part of the agreement the Moro Islamic Liberation Front or MILF,

has agreed to decommission their forces in exchange for Muslim autonomy in parts of

Mindanao, to be achieved sometime in 2016. This agreement would also require the Philippine

military to withdraw forces in the areas to be granted autonomy. But in order for this measure to

hold water it must first be approved by the Filipino Congress.29 Moreover, the Filipino people are

strongly opposed to the measure. This has led to the belief that the Philippine Congress is not

likely to pass the bill.30 “Public and congressional support for the BBL has crumbled in the

aftermath of a clash between Philippine National Police Special Action Force (SAF) commandos

and Moro rebels in Mamasapano, Maguindanao province, that left 44 policemen, 17 MILF

fighters and three civilians dead on Jan. 25.”31 With events such as this one happening regularly

the Filipino people are not likely to change their mind about the bill. Furthermore, an additional

problem to the success of such a bill is that even if the Bangsamoro bill endures congressional

scrutiny and is signed into law, the country still has significant tensions with other Islamic

groups vying for independence that will require their attention. The possibility of a permanent

28 Katie Zavadski, "ISIS Now Has a Network of Military Affiliates in 11 Countries Around the World," New York Media LLC, November 23, 2014. http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/11/isis-now-has-military-allies-in-11-countries.html (accessed March 6, 2015).

29 ”Philippine peace breakthrough,” Bangkok Post.30 The bill that would grant an Islamic Autonomous Region in the Bangsamoro is known as the

Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL).31 See: DJ Yap, Leila B. Salaverria, and Nikko Dizon, "44% vs BBL: Gov’t needs Plan B," Philippine Daily

Inquirer, March 20, 2015. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/680155/44-vs-bbl-govt-needs-plan-b (accessed March 23, 2015).

peace here just between MILF and the Philippine government is becoming increasingly more

unlikely. The current bill is set to expand the territory of the already autonomous Muslim region

in the area. Thus expanding the scope of the existing ARMM, or the Autonomous Region in

Muslim Mindanao.32 The bill is also set to lay out the powers of the Bansamoro region in regards

to the central Government of the Philippines, how revenue will be generated and shared,

territory, and the rights of the people living under Moro rule, how the plan is to be transitioned to

and implemented, and the process of normalization.33

In order to fully understand why the agreement will fail we must first examine its

contents. Stated in the Bangsamoro Basic Law, presented to the Congress of the Philippines on

September 11, 2014 is the purpose of the law: “The purpose of this Basic Law is to establish a

political entity, provide for its basic structure of government in recognition of the justness and

legitimacy of the cause of the Bangsamoro people and their aspiration to chart their political

future through a democratic process that will secure their identity and posterity and allow for

meaningful self-governance.”34 The purpose of the Basic Law is vague, at least on paper. The

real purpose of the law is to allow for Muslim autonomy in an area of the Philippines which has

traditionally been Muslim, at least since the Sulu Sultanate was established by Abu Bakr in 1450.

But this point is ambiguously addressed in the Purpose, Section 3 of the bill when it state that a

purpose of the bill is to “secure their identity…”35 In Article 10 of bill, starting in Section 1, the

32 For more information about the proposed Bangsamoro region and its predecessor see: “The Envisioned Territory of the Bangsamoro,” Money Politics, March 14, 2014, http://moneypolitics.pcij.org/2014/03/the-envisioned-territory-of-the-bangsamoro/ (accessed March 23, 2015).

33 For full details regarding the aspects of the proposed plan see: Government of the Philippines, "2012 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro," Government of the Philippines Website, 2012, http://pcdspo.gov.ph/downloads/2012/10/20121007-GPH-MILF-Framework-Agreement.pdf (accessed March 23, 2015). The Framework agreement is based in the beginnings of the peace process that ultimately led up to the agreement made in January of 2014.

34 See: "House Bill 4994," Republic of the Philippines House of Representatives, (Quezon City, September 11, 2014).

35 Ibid.

Shari’ah Justice System is finally addressed. Article 10 Section 1 of the bill states: “36The justice

system in the Bangsamoro shall consist of Shari’ah law which shall have supremacy and

application over Muslims only.” Perhaps this part of the bill, the part that everyone has been

concerned over, the application of Shari’ah law to non-Muslims, is moot. At least for now. Many

non-Muslim Filipinos are skeptical about this. How can a group which has strived for decades to

create an Islamic State in the Philippines settle for an autonomous region that will not have

complete power to enforce Shari’ah law on all the living within its borders? This is the reason

MILF broke away from MNLF in the first place. MILF believed that MNLF was not Islamic

enough.

Therefore, in the recent past we have seen breakaway groups emerge from within MILF,

now claiming that MILF lacks the same components that MILF claimed the MNLF was lacking.

Groups such as the BIFF, or the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, are one of these groups.

They strongly denounce the MILFs acceptances of autonomy. And because of such have broken

away and have had their own clash with the Government of the Philippines and the Filipino

Army.37 These events have also led to speculation that the BIFF is fighting in behalf of MILF

and that there has been correspondence between the two groups, and that ties do indeed exist.

Perhaps there are part of the MILF that are hoping for a failure to reach a peace, and that is why

groups like BIFF still have rebel camps in MILF territory.38

The Government of the Philippines has been dealing with the problems of Moro

Insurgency since its inception. Presidents from the 3rd Philippine Republic up to the Presidency

of current Chief of State Benigno Aquino III39. Each President has tried to deal with the problem,

36 Ibid.37 For more information see: “Is BIFF the MILF’s ‘BFF’?” Philippine Daily Inquirer.38 Ibid.39 In the Philippines he is also commonly known as Noynoy.

and each President has failed. But with current President Benigno Aquino III term coming to a

close he seeks to make a peace with MILF a legacy item of his as President. Some view him as

willing to do anything to make a deal. But this bill up before the Philippine congress may hurt

his popularity more than help it. President Aquino recently spoke accepting responsibility for the

death of 44 Special Action Force members who were involved in a raid near MILF territory. He

said, “As President and Commander-in-Chief, I am carrying the responsibility for any

consequence, any success, pain, or tragedy, we can enjoy the pursuit of lasting peace and

security.”40 This event is a considerable setback for President Aquino in obtaining a lasting peace

with Islamic militants. But perhaps an even bigger setback is the opinion of the Filipino people

and congress in regards to this singular event. This event has enjoyed widespread publicity in the

Philippines. And with opinion polls regarding the Bangsamoro Basic Law already down the

likelihood of passing the law is decreasing, especially with each passing day that there is more

violence in the area. Considering all of this President Aquino has a huge mountain to climb if

this bill is to become law.

In order to fully comprehend why this current peace deal doomed to failure we must first

understand the history of other peace deals Moro insurgent groups have had with the Philippine

Government, and why those have failed. First it is important to look at the 1976 Tripoli

Agreement. The agreement would later establish autonomy for 13 cities and 9 provinces in

Mindanao and Sulu.41 But originally the Moro National Liberation Front wanted to establish a

separate sovereign state, not just an autonomous region. Many members of the group were

40 For the full article on President Aquino’s speech see: Camille Diola, “Aquino accepts responsibility for 44 fallen SAF men,” Philippine Daily Star, February 6, 2015, http://www.philstar.com:8080/headlines/2015/02/06/1420896/aquino-accepts-responsibility-44-fallen-saf-men (accessed March 24, 2015).

41 For more information see: “Conflict and Peace in Mindanao: (MNLF)," Conciliation Resources, June 2009, http://www.c-r.org/sites/default/files/Summary_MNLF.pdf (accessed March 24, 2015). For the entire peace agreement see: "The Tripoli Agreement, December 23, 1976," Government of the Philippines, December 23, 1976, http://www.gov.ph/1976/12/23/the-tripoli-agreement-december-23-1976/ (accessed March 24, 2015).

unsatisfied with the agreement and broke away into other factions. One being the Moro Islamic

Liberation Front, which also broke away for religious reasons. The next major event occurred in

1987 with the Jeddah Accord. The agreement sought to create a commission on a proposal to

grant autonomy for Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Palawan.42 At the same time talks

were occurring in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia a people’s revolt was underway back in the Philippines.

The constitution was scrapped and a new one was written. In the new constitution a clause was

written including the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao.43 Following these event

tensions resumed. In 1996 a Final Peace Agreement, based on the Tripoli Agreement, was signed

when the MNLF accepted the option of autonomy.44 And although this peace agreement

continues on today there is still a struggle between MNLF and the Government of the Republic

of the Philippines. Although MNLF operate largely within the Autonomous Region of Muslim

Mindanao, they still maintain their desire for independence and expansion into other provinces

and Palawan.

The Abu Sayyaf group in the southern Philippines is similar to the Middle-East’s ISIS.

Although the Abu Sayyaf group is not as large as ISIS, and does not maintain the amount of

resources as ISIS, it is still a significant threat to any peace attempts in the southern Philippines.

Up to the current date there has been no peace negotiations with the Abu Sayyaf group, and they

are often considered the most radical and violent of the Islamic Fundamentalist groups in the

southern Philippines.

The group of focus in regards to the current peace talks is the Moro Islamic Liberation

Front, or MILF. The peace process with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and

42 See: “Jeddah Accord,” United Nations Peacemaker, 2014. http://peacemaker.un.org/philippines-jeddahaccord87 (accessed March 24, 2015).

43 “Conflict and Peace in Mindanao: (MNLF),” Conciliation Resources.44 Ibid.

MILF began just as the peace process was finishing with MNLF in 1996 during the Ramos

Administration.45 After the Final Peace Agreement was made with MNLF in forming the

Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao or ARMM, MILF emerged as “the main standard

bearer of Moro aspirations…its struggle is principally a nationalist and territorial one, although

religion has certainly served as a rallying call and focal point of resistance to the central

government….”46 From the negotiations beginning with the Ramos Administration up until the

time before present day negotiations, nothing has appeared to be very successful. But in 1997

things appeared to be taking a turn for the better. On July 18, 1997, during the Presidency of

Fidel V. Ramos, the Government of the Philippines and MILF signed an agreement that would

end hostilities between the group and the Government. Then in 1998 and agreement was signed

that laid out the general framework of a possible peace. Following these events on October 25,

1999 peace talks once again began between MILF and the Government of the Philippines in

Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao, which is located within the territory of the Autonomous Region in

Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).47 “The goals of the talks were to return the MILF to mainstream

society, attain lasting peace in Mindanao through a meaningful autonomy program, and a

consolidation of peace efforts.”48 These peace talks would continue for many weeks in different

locations throughout Mindanao, while at the same time tensions between the Government and

MILF were on the rise. MILF forces had begun to conduct operations in Talayan, Maguindanao

and succeeded in taking city hall. Then only a few weeks late in April of 2000, the Abu Sayyaf

45 See: Soliman M. Santos, Jr, Delays in the Peace Negotiations between the Philippine Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, (Washington D.C.: East-West Center, January 2005), 6.

46 Ibid. For more information and the full excerpt see: Tan, Andrew. "The Indigenous Roots of Conflict in Southeast Asia: The Case of Mindanao." In After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in South East Asia, eds. Kumar Ramakrishna, and See Sang Tan, (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2003) 112.

47 For a timeline of peace negotiations see: “Timeline: GRP-MILF peace negotiations,” Philippine Daily Star, January 26, 2014, http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2014/01/26/1283079/timeline-grp-milf-peace-negotiations (accessed March 25, 2015).

48 See: Catherine Denni R. Jayme, "The Challenge For Peace in Mindanao: Counterinsurgency Policies of the Estrada and Arroyo Governments for the Southern Philippines," (Maxwell Review, n.d.), 108.

group kidnapped 30 hostages, and then took 150 more. While at the same time the military was

striking back against both MILF and the Abu Sayyaf Group. This led to a declaration of war by

then President Joseph Estrada against MILF in the southern part of the country.49 Months passed

and the hostilities continued. The peace negotiations began again, but to no avail. Soon President

Estrada was ousted by political protestors and the Presidency was vacated.50 Leaving the nation

in a state of disorder. Soon after President Estrada left office, his Vice President Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo took office, and the peace process once again had to begin over again.

In 2001 the Government of the Philippines and MILF began conducting peace talks once

again. And on June 22, 2001 the two groups signed a peace agreement.51 The agreement laid out

a definition of terms, such as what was to be considered hostile acts, and prohibited acts. The

agreement also laid out a plan for a cessation of hostilities as well as laying out a date for the

recurrence of future peace talks.52 However, the agreements broke down once again. Over the

next several years from 2003-2008 several events would take place. The Government launched a

military campaign in 2003 against MILF headquarters, and later that year MILF founder Hashim

Salamat passed away, with Al Haj Murad Ebrahim stepping up to fill the void.53 Then in 2008 it

seemed that a peace would finally be reached. On the 5th of August 2008 in Kuala Lumpur,

Malaysia a peace agreement was to be signed. The agreement laid out concepts and principles,

territorial claims, claims to resources, and governance. And it seemed that perhaps the dispute

between MILF and the Government of the Philippines would finally be settled. But then the

Supreme Court of the Philippines stepped in and blocked the measure from being signed. The

49 Ibid, 108-109.50 See: Hannon, Jessica. “Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,” (Great Neck Publishing, 2006).51 See: “Timeline: GRP-MILF peace negotiations,” The Philippine Daily Star.52 For the full agreement see: MILF, and Government of the Philippines, "Implementing Guidelines on the

Security Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001," United States Institute of Peace, August 7, 2001. http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/implement_guide_08072001.pdf (accessed March 25, 2015).

53 See: “Timeline: GRP-MILF peace negotiations,” The Philippine Daily Star.

court put a stay on the signing until the document was reviewed.54 Then on October 14, 2008 the

Supreme Court of the Philippines ruled the agreement between MILF and the Government of the

Philippines unconstitutional.55

In 2011, at the beginning of the administration of current Philippine President Benigno

Aquino III, peace talks once again resumed. With the newly elected President, Benigno Aquino

II taking office he had only six years to prove himself. When he ran for office he promised to

combat corruption, but when all was said and done he chose to make a peace deal with MILF his

legacy item. Later in 2011 President Aquino met for the first time with MILF chairman Al Haj

Murad Ebrahim. The two met in Japan, with President Aquino hoping to show the sincerity of

the Filipino government, as well as hoping to speed up peace negotiations.56 Moreover, after

another year of meetings talks and agreements something substantive was finally produced. On

October 15, 2012 the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic

Liberation Front produced a framework agreement, one that would set the stage for the current

agreement, the Bangsamoro Basic Law.57 And after over 1,661 skirmishes between the

Government and MILF since 2002, zero skirmishes took place in 2012.58 Then on January 25,

2014 “The Annex on Normalization and the Addendum on Bangsamoro Waters, the final

annexes of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro,” was signed.59

54 See: Santosh Digal, "Supreme Court blocks peace deal between MILF and government," Asia News, August 4, 2008, http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Supreme-Court-blocks-peace-deal-between-MILF-and-government-12927.html (accessed March 25, 2015).

55 For more information on the Courts ruling see: Carlo Lorenzo and Mark Meruenas, "Supreme Court rules domain agreement ‘unconstitutional’," GMA News Online, October 14, 2008, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/126956/news/nation/supreme-court-rules-domain-agreement-unconstitutional (accessed March 25, 2015).

56 See: “Timeline: GRP-MILF peace negotiations,” The Philippine Daily Star.57 Ibid.

58 See: Marvic Leonen, “Zero GPH-MILF armed clashes since January 2012,” June 20, 2012, http://www.opapp.gov.ph/milf/news/zero-gph-milf-armed-clashes-january-2012-leonen (accessed March 26, 2015). For more information also see: Sun Star, “Gov't, MILF record zero encounter in 2012,” January 1, 2013, http://www.sunstar.com.ph/breaking-news/2013/01/01/govt-milf-record-zero-encounter-2012-260862 (accessed March 26, 2015).

59 See: “Timeline: GRP-MILF peace negotiations,” The Philippine Daily Star.

The signing of the agreement between MILF and the Government of the Philippines has

created a whole new wave of concerns for those involved as well as for the Filipino people. On

January 28th of this year Al Jazeera reported on a statement made by President Aquino,

“President Benigno Aquino III called on Wednesday for continued support for the pact with the

Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), but added he also expected MILF to help authorities

identify the rebels who killed the elite police commandos. ‘If the peace process were derailed,

how many more graves would we have to dig?’ Aquino asked in a national television address.

The Muslim autonomy deal signed last 2014 stands to be one of the legacies of Aquino, whose

six-year term ends next year.”60 President Aquino is afraid that if the Bangsamoro Basic Law

isn’t debated and passed into law soon things will only get worse.61 But the truth of the matter is

that President Aquino is too idealistic. From his speeches and his press releases and from his

actions it can be deciphered that he may indeed believe that a peace deal here, with MILF, will

permanently solve the Philippine-Mindanao conflict. That is simply dead wrong. The President

talks as if this law (BBL) is the only thing that will bring peace to the region. When in reality the

law only just replaces an existing region (ARMM) and expands it slightly.

There are many who are willing to compromise for peace regarding this matter, thus the

result is an autonomous region in a part of southern Mindanao. But there are some who will

settle for nothing less than sovereignty. We’ve seen this before. When this conflict began in the

60’s the MNLF insisted on creating an independent sovereign Islamic state. But as time

progressed they began to see the benefits of settling for autonomy. When members of MNLF

caught wind of this they broke away and formed MILF. Therefore, while MNLF was settling for

60 For the full article see: “Philippine president seeks to save peace pact,” Al Jazeera, January 28, 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/01/philippine-president-fire-police-deaths-150128183540948.html (accessed March 26, 2015).

61 Ibid.

autonomy in southern Mindanao (ARMM), MILF continued to press for independence. Overtime

even MILF began to realize that their goal of independence was a long shot. Furthermore, when

parts of MILF began to realize that the group was considering settling for autonomy, another

splinter group was formed, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF). And thus the

cycle continues. And with groups like the Abu Sayyaf Group wreaking havoc in the country,

having pledged loyalty to ISIS, a sure, permanent peace appears to be impossible to obtain.

Amidst all this tumult of opinion and for the passage, or defeat of the Bangsamoro Basic

Law, the International community has thrown their hat in the ring. According to the Manila

Times about 78 international organizations have lobbied to congress for the passage of the

Bangsamoro Basic Law. Here is an excerpt of their appeal from the Manila Times: “We, the

undersigned organizations condemn this recent violence62 in Mamapasano town, Maguindanao

province, Philippines. We call for a timely, transparent and thorough investigation and

prosecution. At the same time, while the investigation and quest for justice is ongoing, we urge

the Philippine Congress to complete their deliberation and adopt the Bangsamoro Basic Law.”63

Moreover, there is enormous pressure being exerted from the international community on the

Congress of the Philippines to pass this law. On the other side there is some pressure being

exerted on the Congress from the voters to vote down the law. According to a poll taken in early

March of this year 44% of Filipinos disapprove of the measure while 21% approve and 36%

undecided. The strongest opposition coming from within Mindanao itself at 62% disapproval.

Furthermore, every region in the Philippines from Luzon to the Visayas and Mindanao oppose

62 The event being referred to is also mentioned earlier where 44 police officers were killed in a clash with MILF fighters. For more information see: “44% vs BBL: Gov’t needs Plan B,” Philippine Daily Inquirer.

63 “International community appeals Philippine Congress to honor peace agreement with MILF,” Manila Times, March 19, 2015, http://www.manilatimes.net/breaking_news/international-community-appeals-philippine-congress-to-honor-peace-agreement-with-milf/ (accessed March 26, 2015).

the measure.64 So the members of the Congress of the Republic of the Philippines have a choice

to make. Are they to cave to the pressures of the international groups, or to the pressures of the

people they represent? Right now it appears as though they are leaning toward the people.

A report released in February from the Asian Journal suggests that when MILF was

negotiating with President Acquino and his branch of the government that they were under the

impression “that he had the power to influence Congress and the Supreme Court over the fate of

the proposed BBL.”65 According to the statements made by the MILF chairman Al Haj Murad

Ebrahim he may not have understood how things really work in Quezon City. Apparently

Ebrahim was under the impression that the President had power to bind members of Congress

and the Supreme Court to his will, a tremendous oversight on his part. Resulting in the MILF

imploring the Congress of the Philippines to not change anything in the already proposed

Bangsamoro Basic Law already signed by the MILF and those who negotiated on behalf of the

government.66 “Senate’s President Pro-Tempore Ralph Recto, on the other hand, vowed that they

would not be blackmailed into signing the BBL without changes. ‘It has to undergo revision and

improvements. But amending the bill shouldn’t be equated with mangling with it,’ he said. ‘The

bill must be cured of its perceived constitutional defects,’ he added. ‘Let it be fixed here. It must

pass the constitutional litmus test here. It’s better for the legislature to make it constitutionally-

compliant than for the Supreme Court strike it down later.’”67 President Pro-Tempore Ralph

Recto brought up an important point. If the law passes the Philippine House of Representative

and the Philippine Senate, there is still the issue of it getting through the Supreme Court who will

64 See: Andreo Calonzo, and GMA News, “44% of Pinoys oppose passage of BBL —Pulse Asia,” GMA News Online, March 19, 2015, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/455097/news/nation/44-of-pinoys-oppose-passage-of-bbl-pulse-asia (accessed March 26, 2015).

65 For the full article regarding MILF’s statements see: Rocelle Tangi, "MILF urges lawmakers to pass BBL ‘with no changes’," Asian Journal, February 18, 2015, http://asianjournal.com/news/milf-urges-lawmakers-to-pass-bbl-with-no-changes/ (accessed March 27, 2015).

66 Ibid.67 Ibid.

have to rule on its constitutionality. In 2008 the Supreme Court ruled on a similar law, which

would have granted autonomy for MILF in the Bangsamoro area, the result being it was

unconstitutional. There is a fear running through the supporters of the law in the Congress that

the Supreme Court may strike this law down if there aren’t changes to the law, and even then

they cannot be say for certain if it will be ruled constitutional.

It is amazing to see the amount of ineptitude, among those who insist that this law is the

pathway to a permanent peace in Mindanao, in regards to the BBL. Those who believe this law

will grant a permanent peace in the region have clearly not studied out the issue, the people, and

the history in regards to the issue and the Moro people. Even the President of the Philippines

believes that only this will grant a peace in the region. Perhaps he is trying to secure his legacy,

but nevertheless this is a folly. Although the passage of this law may be a stepping stone to a

decreasing violence in the area, it is in no way a permanent peace.

The Philippine-Mindanao conflict is perhaps one of the most complex and on-going

conflicts in the world today. With the Government of the Philippines fighting against several

different Islamic groups whom are vying for independence there is no one group to negotiate

with. Thus we see the chaos that has ensued.

The Moro people have been fighting for independence from governmental entities for

hundreds of years. Ever since Islam was introduced in the area over 500 years ago they’ve

sought to practice their religion without governmental interference or oversight. Since the

colonization of the Philippine by the Spanish the Moro people have been fighting against all

types of government hoping for independence and sovereignty. Moreover, since the

establishment of the Republic of the Philippines they have continued to fight for independence.

But it wasn’t until the late 1960’s that it became increasingly more serious. With the events

leading up to and including the Jebidah Massacre the Moro people have grown more organized.

They began to form groups such as the Moro National Liberation Front that sought to fight

against the Government of the Philippines in hopes for independence. But when many Moro’s

began to see the MNLF failing them they split off and formed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

Therefore, while the MNLF settled for autonomy MILF continued the struggle for independence.

Later more groups began to spring up, such as the Abu Sayyaf Group, this group was much more

violent than its predecessors, and has since sworn its allegiance to ISIS/Daish (Islamic State of

Iraq and Syria). As time went on MILF began to see the wisdom of doing what MNLF did, that

is settling for autonomy. As a result another group formed, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom

Fighter, vowing to do what its predecessors had failed to do, gain independence.

Since the signing, by MILF and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, of a

new peace agreement, entitled the Bangsamoro Basic Law, discussion has begun of whether or

not this would finally end the conflict in the southern Philippines. The answer is a resounding no.

History tells us that autonomy will not grant a permanent peace in the area. Currently the

Bangsamoro Basic Law is up for debate and vote in the Philippine Congress, and with public

opinion against it, it appears the law may indeed fail. And even if it passes it must hold up to

scrutiny by the Supreme Court of the Philippines. Subsequently, if the law passes all these

checks it may grant autonomy, among other benefits, to MILF and Moro’s in the Bangsamoro

area of Mindanao, but there will still be groups who will not be satisfied with autonomy alone. If

the bill becomes law violence and discord will continue to be sown in this conflict ridden area of

the Philippines, and perhaps only independence and sovereignty will grant the long awaited

peace that so many are searching for.

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