SEMNAR & HARTMAN, LLP Babak Semnar (SBN 224890)

NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS SETTLEMENT 3:15-cv-2410 BAS NLS

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SEMNAR & HARTMAN, LLP Babak Semnar (SBN 224890) [email protected] Jared M. Hartman, Esq. (SBN) 254860 [email protected] 400 S. Melrose Dr., Suite 209 Vista, California 92081 Telephone: (619)500-4187 Fax: (888) 819-8230 Attorneys for Plaintiffs MARY CAPPS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA MARY CAPPS, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. LAW OFFICES OF PETER W. SINGER AND MCT GROUP, INC., Defendants.

Case No. 3:15-cv-2410 BAS NLS NOTICE OF MOTION AND PLAINTIFF’S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR ORDER (1) CONDITIONALLY CERTIFYING SETTLEMENT CLASS; (2) PROVISIONALLY APPOINTING CLASS COUNSEL AND CLASS REPRESENTATIVES; (3) PRELIMINARILY APPROVING SETTLEMENT; (4) APPROVING NOTICE TO CLASS; AND (5) SETTING HEARING FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT AND AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS Hearing Date: November 21, 2016 Courtroom: 4B Judge: Cynthia Bashant Magistrate Judge: Nita L. Stormes Complaint Filed: October 26, 2015 Trial Date: None set NO ORAL ARGUMENT UNLESS REQUESTED BY THE COURT

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, on the date indicated above, in Courtroom

4B the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, located

at 333 West Broadway, San Diego, CA 92101, Plaintiff will, and hereby does,

Case 3:15-cv-02410-BAS-NLS Document 26 Filed 10/17/16 of 2

NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS SETTLEMENT 3:15-cv-2410 BAS NLS

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apply to this Honorable Court for an order (i) conditionally certifying the proposed

Settlement Class for settlement purposes only, (ii) appointing Plaintiff as Class

Representative and appointing her counsel as Class Counsel, (iii) granting

preliminary approval of the Parties’ proposed class action settlement, (iv)

approving the form and content of the notice to the members of the Settlement

Class, (v) scheduling a Final Hearing for approval of the Settlement and award of

attorneys’ fees and costs, and (vi) providing such other and further relief as the

Court deems reasonable and just.

This motion is made following the multiple conferences of counsel

throughout the arms-length settlement negotiations process since case initiation.

This motion will be based on this notice of motion, the memorandum of

points and authorities served and filed herewith, the declaration of Babak Semnar

and Jared Hartman in support thereof, the records and file herein, and on such

other evidence as may be presented at the hearing of the motion.

DATED: October 17, 2016

SEMNAR & HARTMAN LLP

By: /s/ Jared M. Hartman Jared M. Hartman, Esq.

Attorneys for Plaintiff MARY CAPPS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated

Case 3:15-cv-02410-BAS-NLS Document 26 Filed 10/17/16 of 2

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS SETTLEMENT

3:15-cv-2410 BAS NLS

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SEMNAR & HARTMAN, LLP Babak Semnar (SBN 224890) [email protected] Jared M. Hartman, Esq. (SBN) 254860 [email protected] 400 S. Melrose Dr., Suite 209 Vista, California 92081 Telephone: (619)500-4187 Fax: (888) 819-8230 Attorneys for Plaintiffs, MARY CAPPS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated



Case No. 3:15-cv-2410 BAS NLS MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ORDER (1) CONDITIONALLY CERTIFYING SETTLEMENT CLASS; (2) PROVISIONALLY APPOINTING CLASS COUNSEL AND CLASS REPRESENTATIVES; (3) PRELIMINARILY APPROVING SETTLEMENT; (4) APPROVING NOTICE TO CLASS; AND (5) SETTING HEARING FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT AND AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS Hearing Date: November 21, 2016 Courtroom: 4B Judge: Cynthia Bashant Magistrate Judge: Nita L. Stormes Complaint Filed: October 26, 2015 Trial Date: None set NO ORAL ARGUMENT UNLESS REQUESTED BY THE COURT

Case 3:15-cv-02410-BAS-NLS Document 26-1 Filed 10/17/16 Page 1 of 28

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 1

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF CLAIMS ................. 2

III. SUMMARY OF SETTLEMENT TERMS ......................................................... 3

A. The Settlement Class ............................................................................. 3

B. Benefits to the Class .............................................................................. 4

C. The Settlement’s Release Provisions .................................................... 5

D. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs .................................................................... 5

E. Administration and Notice .................................................................... 5

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS ........................................................................................... 6

A. Plaintiff’s allegations are based upon alleged violations of 15 U.S.C. 1692g(a) by Defendant Law Offices of Peter Singer including language within its standard debt collection letters that allegedly overshadow and weaken the consumers’ rights pursuant to Section 1692g(a). ............................................................... 6

B. Class Certification is Appropriate. ........................................................ 8

1. The Proposed Settlement Class Meets the Requirements of Rule 23(a). .............................................................................. 9

a. The Numerosity Requirement Is Satisfied. ...................... 9

b. The Commonality Requirement Is Satisfied. ................... 9

c. The Typicality Requirement Is Satisfied........................ 10

d. The Adequacy of Representation Requirement Is Satisfied. ......................................................................... 11

2. Rule 23(b)(3)'s Requirements Are Satisfied. ............................ 12

a. Common Questions Predominate Over Any Questions Affecting Only Individual Class Members. ........................................................................ 13

b. A Class Action Is the Superior Means to Adjudicate Plaintiff’s Claims. ........................................ 14

C. The Proposed Settlement Satisfies the Criteria for Preliminary Approval. ............................................................................................. 15


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1. The Proposed Settlement Resulted from Arm’s Length, Informed Negotiations by Experienced Counsel. ..................... 16

2. The Proposed Settlement Falls Within the Range of Possible Approval. .................................................................... 17

3. The Proposed Settlement treats all Class Members fairly. ....... 19

D. The Proposed Plan for Class Notice Is Appropriate. .......................... 20

V. PROPOSED SCHEDULE FOR REMAINING PROCEDURES ...................... 21

VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 21


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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Alberto v. GMRI, Inc., 252 F.R.D. 652 (E.D. Cal. 2008) ........................................ 16

Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) ........................ 11, 13, 14, 15

Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2001) .................................................. 10

Ballard v. Equifax Check Svcs., 186 F.R.D. 589 (E.D.Cal. 1999) .......................... 14

Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905-06 (9th Cir. 1975) ...................................... 14

Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, 155 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 1998) ....... 10

Carter v. Anderson Merchandisers, LP, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55581 at *27 (C.D. Cal. May 11, 2010) ............................................................................................... 17

Churchill Village, L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 2004) ................... 20

County of Los Angeles. v. Jordan, 459 U.S. 810 (1982) ........................................... 9

Day v. Check Brokerage Corp., 240 F.R.D. 414 (N.D. Ill. 2007) ........................... 13

Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 285 F.R.D. 492 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ................. 12, 13

Evon v. Law Offices of Sidney Mickell, 688 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2012) .................... 9

Fuller v. Becker & Poliakoff, 197 F.R.D. 697 (M.D. Fla. 2000) .............................. 9

Gonzales v. Arrow Fin. Servs. LLC, 233 F.R.D. 577 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2006) 13, 14

Hale v. AFNI, Inc., 264 F.R.D. 402 (N.D. Ill. Oct 23, 2009) .................................. 13

Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998) ............................... passim

Harris v. D. Scott Carruthers & Assoc., 270 F.R.D. 446 ........................................ 13

Hodges v. Akeena Solar, Inc., 274 F.R.D. 259 (N.D. Cal. 2011) .............................. 9

Hunt v. Imperial Merchant Services, Inc., 560 F.3d 1137(9th Cir. 2009) ................ 6

In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2011) ............ 16

In re Risk Mgmt. Alternatives, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 493 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2002) .... 12, 14

In re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2007.) ............. 17

In re Wireless Facilities, Inc., 253 F.R.D. 630 (S.D.Cal. 2008) ............................. 16

Jackson v. Nat'l Action Fin. Servs., Inc., 227 F.R.D. 284 (N.D. Ill. 2005) ............. 13


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Jacobson v. Healthcare Financial Services, Inc., 516 F.3d 85 (2d. Cir. 2008) ........ 7

Jandek v. Hearst Corp., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15783, at *5 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 1. 1999) ..................................................................................................................... 11

Jordan v. County of Los Angeles, 669 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1982) ............................. 9

Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589 (7th Cir. 1998) .......................................................... 8

Longo v. Law Offices of Gerald E. Moore & Associates, P.C., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19624, at *5 (N.D. Ill. March 30, 2006) .................................................. 11

Macaraz v. Transworld Syst., 193 F.R.D. 46 (Dist. Conn. 2000) ......................... 8, 9

Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338 (7th Cir. 1997) .................................. 19

Monterrubio v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 291 F.R.D. 443 (E.D. Cal. 2013) ............... 16

Nat'l Rural Telcoms. Coop. v. Directv, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25375, *13 (C.D. Cal. 2004) ............................................................................................. 13, 16

Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Com., 688 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1982) ............... 17

Randle v. GC Servs., L.P., 181 F.R.D. 602 (N.D. Ill. 1998) ................................... 11

Rodriguez v. West Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2009) .............................. 19

Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law School, 2 F.Supp.2d 1324 (W.D. Wash. 1998) ........ 10

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) ....................................................... 18

Staton v. Boeing, 327 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2003) ..................................................... 8, 9

Swanson v. Southern Oregon Credit Services, 869 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1988) ........ 7

Talbott v. GC Services, 191 F.R.D. 99 (W.D. Va. 2000) ........................................ 10

Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370 (9th Cir. 1993) ............................ 21

United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673 (1971) ............................................. 18

Voris v. Resurgent Capital Services, L.P., 494 F. Supp. 2d 1156 (S.D. Cal. June 26, 2007) ....................................................................................................................... 8

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) ........................................... 9

Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) .................... 20

Statutes

15 U.S.C. §§1692, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), ............... passim

15 U.S.C. 1692g ...................................................................................................... 7,8

15 U.S.C. 1692g(a) ........................................................................................... 6, 7, 8


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15 U.S.C. 1692k ....................................................................................................... 18

15 U.S.C. 1692k(a) ................................................................................................... 8

15 U.S.C. 1692k(b) .................................................................................................... 8

Cal. Civil Code 1788, The Rosenthal Act ..................................................... 2, 10, 18

Cal. Civ. Code §1788.17 ......................................................................................... 18

Cal. Civ. Code §1788.2(c) ....................................................................................... 18

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 ................................................................................................. 6, 14

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) ...................................................................................... 9, 10, 12

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) ............................................................................................. 9

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) ........................................................................................... 10

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) ................................................................................................ 12

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) ............................................................................... 12, 13, 20

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B) ...................................................................................... 20

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) .......................................................................................... 15, 20

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(B) ...................................................................................... 20

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) ....................................................................... 8

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) ...................................................................... 8

Manual for Complex Litigation, § 21.61(4th ed. 2004) .......................................... 15

Herbert Newberg & Alan Conte, Newberg on Class Actions, §3.5 at 233-234 (4th ed. 2002) ................................................................................................................. 9


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I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Mary Capps (“Plaintiff”) brought this putative class action against

Defendants the Law Offices of Peter Singer and MCT Group, Inc. (collectively

“Defendants”), on behalf of herself and a proposed class of California residents

who received a letter from the Law Offices of Peter Singer on behalf of MCT

Group, Inc. which allegedly attempted to collect a debt during the period of

October 26, 2014 to the date of the settlement agreement. Defendants deny any

liability or wrong doing resulted from any actions they engaged in during this

period related to the collection of any debt, but nevertheless, wish to avoid the

further expense and inconvenience of protracted litigation. After meaningful

discovery and extensive arm’s length negotiations through their experienced

counsel, the parties have reached a proposed settlement.

Plaintiff now brings this motion seeking conditional certification of a

settlement class (the “Class”) and for the Court’s preliminary approval of the

parties’ proposed statewide class action settlement (the “Proposed Settlement”).

The settlement is an excellent result for the proposed Class since the terms of the

Proposed Settlement provide the Class the maximum statutory damages available

to it based on the net worth of the Law Offices of Peter Singer. The settlement will

result in a payment to participating Class members on terms that Plaintiff and

Settlement Class Counsel believe to be fair, reasonable and adequate.

Given the uncertainties associated with continuing litigation and the

immediate value of the settlement to the class, Plaintiff respectfully requests that

the Court (1) conditionally certify the settlement class; (2) provisionally appoint

class counsel and class representative; (3) preliminarily approve the settlement; (4)

approve notice to class; and (5) set the hearing for final approval of class

settlement and for attorneys’ fees and costs award.


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II.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF CLAIMS

On October 26, 2015, Plaintiff Mary Capps filed this lawsuit against the

Law Offices of Peter Singer and MCT Group, Inc. in this Court. (Dkt. 1.) The

complaint alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”),

15 U.S.C. §§1692 et seq. and its California counterpart, the Rosenthal Act, Cal.

Civil Code 1788 et seq on behalf of all persons who were California residents and

were sent a letter by the Law Offices of Peter W. Singer on behalf of MCT Group,

Inc. which contained the following language: If you do not dispute the above balance due, then within seven days of your receipt of this letter, either pay my client the entire balance due or phone them to work out arrangements for payment. If you do neither of these things, my office will be entitled to file a lawsuit against you for the collection of this debt when the seven days is over. I urge you to contact my client directly at 800-622-2242.

Unless you notify this office within 30 days after receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt, or any portion thereof, this office will assume this debt is valid. If you notify this office in writing within 30 days after receiving this notice that this debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, this office will obtain verification of the debt or obtain a copy of a judgment against you. This office will mail you a copy of such verification or judgment. If you request it of this office in writing within the 30 day period after receiving this notice, this office will provide you with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor.

(Dkt. 1.)

On January 15, 2016, both Defendants jointly filed an Answer denying any

liability. (Dkt. 9.) On January 19, 2016, the parties were ordered to participate in

an early neutral evaluation conference on February 17, 2016. (Dkt. 10.) On

February 17, 2016, the attorneys for all parties participated in the early neutral

evaluation with the Honorable Nita Stormes in an initial attempt to resolve the

matter. (Dkt. 12.) When the settlement discussions reached an impasse over the


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issue of vicarious liability, a further early neutral evaluation was scheduled for

March 4, 2016 to give the parties the opportunity to brief the issue prior to

engaging in further settlement discussions. (Dkt. 12.) The further early neutral

evaluation on March 4, 2016 similarly ended without a settlement and Class

Counsel propounded discovery on Defendants. (Declaration of Babak Semnar

(“Semnar Decl.”), ¶¶ 3-4.)

Defendants cooperated fully with counsel for the class during their

investigation while continuing to vigorously deny any wrongdoing. To date, no

class has been certified and no court has made a finding of any wrongdoing on the

part of Defendants or that Defendants otherwise acted improperly or in violation of

any federal, state or local law, rule or regulation, with respect to the issues

presented in this litigation. Nevertheless, wishing to avoid further expense and

inconvenience of protracted litigation, concurrent with their litigation efforts,

Plaintiff’s counsel and counsel for the Law Offices of Peter Singer continued to

engage in extensive, good faith, arm’s length negotiations concerning the

possibility of settlement of the action, including numerous emails and telephone

conversations. (Semnar Decl.¶ 5.) Ultimately, a global settlement agreement was

reached and executed on 10-17-16. (Semnar Decl.¶ 7, and Exhibit 1 thereto.)

III.

SUMMARY OF SETTLEMENT TERMS

A. The Settlement Class

The proposed settlement provides for conditional certification of a

settlement class defined as all consumers with addresses within the State of

California who were sent a letter by the Law Offices of Peter W. Singer on behalf

of MCT Group, Inc. in an attempt to collect a debt which, according to the nature

of the creditor or the debt, or the records of the creditor or the Defendants, was

incurred for personal, family or household purposes. Each Class member was sent

such a letter between October 26, 2014, and the date of final execution of the


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Settlement Agreement, and such letter contained the following language or

language substantially similar: If you do not dispute the above balance due, then within seven days of your receipt of this letter, either pay my client the entire balance due or phone them to work out arrangements for payment. If you do neither of these things, my office will be entitled to file a lawsuit against you for the collection of this debt when the seven days is over. I urge you to contact my client directly at 800-622-2242.


(Semnar Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. 1.)

Excluded from the Class are: (a) any consumer whose letter was sent to an

attorney or debt counselor; (b) any consumer who was mailed a letter that was

returned as undeliverable; and (c) any consumer who filed for bankruptcy after

receiving the letter but did not disclose the claim as an asset. (Id.) As of the date of

the executed settlement agreement, the Class consisted of 174 individuals. (Id.)

B. Benefits to the Class

The settlement provides that Defendants will fund a Settlement Fund in the

amount of $11,606.16. (Semnar Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. 1.) This amount is the maximum

statutory damages available to the Class based on the Law Offices of Peter

Singer’s net worth. Issues regarding vicarious liability provided hurdles to any

further additional recovery based on MCT’s net worth. Defendants have agreed

that all Class members who have not opted out of the class within 60 days of the

initial mailing of Class Notice will be sent a check for $66.70, their pro rata


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distribution of the $11,606.16 Settlement Fund, without having to make a

claim. (Id.) Defendants will make payment of the Settlement Funds after the time

to appeal the Final Approval Order has passed. (Id.)

C. The Settlement’s Release Provisions

In exchange for the above benefits, Class members who do not opt out shall

release claims against the Defendants consisting of all known and unknown claims

of any nature whatsoever, known or unknown, which either the Plaintiff or any

Class member has, or may have had, against the Defendants, whether or not

apparent or yet to be discovered, or which may hereafter develop, for any acts or

omissions flowing from the conduct alleged in the Complaint and related to or

arising from the Class Action under federal, state or local law, rule or regulation.

(Semnar Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. 1.)

D. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

After the settlement amount had been negotiated between the Parties, the

Parties negotiated and stipulated to Class Counsel receiving an award of attorneys'

fees and costs in the amount of $39,000.00. (Semnar Decl. ¶¶ 7-8, Ex. 1.) Class

counsel will make its application for approval of the fees and costs concurrently

with the submission of the Motion for Final Approval of the Class Settlement. (Id.)

E. Administration and Notice

The settlement provides for a robust settlement notice that explains in plain

language that nature of the terms of the settlement, the Class member’s right to

receive their proportional share of the Settlement Fund, their right to request

exclusion, their right to comment upon or object to the settlement, their right to

appear in person or by counsel at the final approval and fairness hearing and be

heard regarding approval of the Settlement, and their right to object to Class

Counsel's request for attorneys' fees and costs. (Semnar Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. 1.) The

parties have agreed that First Class, Inc. will administer the Proposed Settlement,


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and that Defendants will bear the costs associated with such notice1. (Id.)

Within ten (10) business days following the filing of the Order Granting

Conditional Class Certification and Preliminary Approval of the Class Settlement

Preliminary Approval, Defendants shall provide the Class Administrator with a list

of putative class members. (Id.) The Class Administrator shall promptly send each

Class member by First Class U.S. mail a Notice as approved by the Court. (Id.) All

costs of notice and claims administration will be paid by Defendants. (Id.) A copy

of the proposed Notice is attached to the Declaration of Semnar as Exhibit 2.

All checks not cashed within one hundred eighty (180) days of issuance

shall be allocated as cy pres to the Voluntary Legal Services Program of Northern

California, 501 12th Street, Sacramento, CA 95814. Voluntary Legal Services

Program of Northern California provides services to low income clients with legal

problems associated with the collection of debts. Any Class member may request

the Settlement Administrator re-issue a settlement check at any time for good

cause (as determined in the reasonable discretion of the Settlement Administrator)

before that Settlement Class Member’s payment is paid to Voluntary Legal

Services.

IV.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff’s allegations are based upon alleged violations of 15 U.S.C.

1692g(a) by Defendant Law Offices of Peter Singer including language

within its standard debt collection letters that allegedly overshadow and

weaken the consumers’ rights pursuant to Section 1692g(a).

While Defendants deny any liability arising from Plaintiff’s allegations, it

would be helpful for Plaintiff’s claims to be put into context in order for the Court

to sufficiently review the factors pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 below. 1 The Ninth Circuit has held that, in class actions involving alleged FDCPA violations, the court may properly shift the cost of providing class notice to the defendant. Hunt v. Imperial Merchant Services, Inc., 560 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 2009).


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Plaintiff’s claims are based upon Defendant Law Offices Peter Singer

having sent debt collection letters to consumers within the State of California,

while acting as an agent on behalf of Defendant MCT Group, Inc. that stated If you do not dispute the above balance due, then within seven days of your receipt of this letter, either pay my client the entire balance due or phone them to work out arrangements for payment.

Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) of the FDCPA, all consumers who fall

within the protections of the FDCPA have thirty days from a collector’s initial

collection notice to either lodge a dispute or request validation. This 30-day period

is a hard and fast rule, and cannot be overshadowed, contradicted, or limited in any

way.

“Overshadowing occurs when a debt collector sends a consumer the

statutorily required notice regarding validation under section 1692g, but includes

other language that contradicts the information in the statutorily required notice to

such an extent that it would make ‘the least sophisticated consumer uncertain as to

her rights.’" Jacobson v. Healthcare Financial Services, Inc., 516 F.3d 85, 90 (2d.

Cir. 2008).

In Swanson v. Southern Oregon Credit Services, 869 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th

Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit specifically ruled that violations of 1692g for

overshadowing claims are to be viewed from the perspective of the “least

sophisticated debtor” standard. The Ninth Circuit therefore held, as a matter of

law, that the debt collection letter subject of that case violated 1692g because

directly above the mandatory 1692g(a) notice in standard typeface the letter stated

in bold all caps typeface, IF THIS ACCOUNT IS PAID WITHIN THE NEXT 10 DAYS IT WILL NOT BE RECORDED IN OUR MASTER FILE AS AN UNPAID COLLECTION ITEM. A GOOD CREDIT RATING IS YOUR MOVST VALUABLE ASSET.

Id. at 1225-1226.


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Following the “least sophisticated debtor” standard, Judge Miller of the

Southern District of California in Voris v. Resurgent Capital Services, L.P., 494 F.

Supp. 2d 1156, 1170 (S.D. Cal. June 26, 2007) applied this rule as follows: “[T]he

rationale for imposing liability for validation notices containing contradictory or

overshadowing language, even when the notices actually contain the advisements

required by § 1692g(a), is to avoid debtor confusion regarding their rights under

the FDCPA.” Judge Miller denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s

overshadowing claims when the debt collection letter was contained within an

envelope that claimed “you are pre-approved. See conditions inside.”, and in

doing so ruled that the 1692g notices were overshadowed in violation of Section

1692g. Id. at 1169-1172.

Plaintiff alleges that the conflicting timeline provided in Defendant Law

Offices of Peter Singer’s letters effectively overshadows and weakens consumers’

rights to a 30-day dispute period as provided above.

B. Class Certification is Appropriate.

This Court has not yet certified this case as a class action. For settlement

purposes, Plaintiff requests that the Court conditionally certify the Class defined in

the Settlement Agreement. “The court reviews the propriety of class certification

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) and (b). In a settlement context, the

court must pay 'undiluted, even heightened, attention' to class certification

requirements because the court will not have the opportunity to adjust the class

based on information revealed at trial.” Staton v. Boeing, 327 F.3d 938, 952–53

(9th Cir. 2003); Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998).

Courts have found that FDCPA cases arising from form debt collection

letters are ideally suited for class action treatment. Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589

(7th Cir. 1998). To be sure, Congress specifically recognized the propriety of class

actions under the FDCPA by providing special damage provisions and criterion in

15 U.S.C. ¶¶ 1692k(a), (b). See also, Macaraz v. Transworld Syst., 193 F.R.D. 46


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(Dist. Conn. 2000); Fuller v. Becker & Poliakoff, 197 F.R.D. 697 (M.D. Fla.

2000). The Ninth Circuit has specifically recognized that certifying class actions

in FDCPA matters helps to “serve a ‘deterrent’ component to other debt collectors

who are engaging, or consider engaging in this type of debt collection tactic.”

Evon v. Law Offices of Sidney Mickell, 688 F.3d 1015. 1031 (9th Cir. 2012).

1. The Proposed Settlement Class Meets the Requirements of Rule

23(a).

“Rule 23(a) establishes four prerequisites for class action litigation, which

are: (a) numerosity, (b) commonality, (c) typicality, and (d) adequacy of

representation.” Staton, 327 F.3d at 953 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)). Each of

these prerequisites is satisfied here.

a. The Numerosity Requirement Is Satisfied.

Rule 23(a)’s first requirement, numerosity, is satisfied where “the class is so

numerous that joinder of all members is impractical.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).

Joinder is generally presumed to be impractical when the class is comprised of 40

or more members. Jordan v. County of Los Angeles, 669 F.2d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir.

1982), vacated on other grounds, County of Los Angeles. v. Jordan, 459 U.S. 810

(1982); Herbert Newberg & Alan Conte, Newberg on Class Actions, §3.5 at 233-

234 (4th ed. 2002). The numerosity requirement is satisfied because the Settlement

Class consists of 174 people. (Semnar Decl. ¶¶5-7.)

b. The Commonality Requirement Is Satisfied.

The question of commonality is to be construed permissively. Hodges v.

Akeena Solar, Inc., 274 F.R.D. 259, 266 (N.D. Cal. 2011). Commonality may be

demonstrated when the claims of all class members “depend upon a common

contention” and “even a single common question will do.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.

Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551, 2556 (2011) (quotation omitted); see also Hanlon v.

Chrysler Corp., supra, 150 F.3d at 1019 (“[t]he existence of shared legal issues

with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts


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coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class.”).

The commonality requirement is satisfied here because all Class members

received similar letters from the Defendants. (Semnar Decl. ¶¶6-7, Ex. 1.) This

gives rise to common claims as well as common questions of law and fact,

including: (1) whether the Defendants efforts to collect a debt violated the FDCPA;

(2) and whether the Defendants efforts to collect a debt violated the Rosenthal Act.

These common issues satisfy Rule 23(a)(2)’s requirements.

c. The Typicality Requirement Is Satisfied.

As with commonality, the Ninth Circuit interprets the typicality requirement

liberally: representative claims are typical if they are reasonably co-extensive with

those of absent class members; they need not be substantially identical. Hanlon,

150 F.3d at 1020. The Ninth Circuit has stated: A plaintiff’s claim is typical if it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members and his or her claims are based on the same legal theory. The typicality requirement may be satisfied even if there are factual distinctions between the claims of the named plaintiffs and those of other class members. Thus, similarity of legal theory may control even in the face of differences of fact.

Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 869 (9th Cir. 2001).

The typicality requirement is thus simply stated: as goes the claim of the

named plaintiff, so go the claims of the class. Broussard v. Meineke Discount

Muffler Shops, 155 F.3d 331, 340 (4th Cir. 1998). And, “When it is alleged that

the same unlawful conduct was directed at or affected both the named plaintiff and

the class sought to be represented, the typicality requirement is usually satisfied,

irrespective of varying fact patterns which underlie individual claims.” Smith v.

Univ. of Wash. Law School, 2 F.Supp.2d 1324, 1342 (W.D. Wash. 1998). In

Talbott v. GC Services, 191 F.R.D. 99, 104 (W.D. Va. 2000), typicality was found

as follows, “Typicality is, by definition, inherent in [the plaintiff’s] class, i.e., each

class member was subjected to the same FDCPA violation as [the plaintiff] when


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they were sent the dunning letter.”

Here, Plaintiff’s claims actually are substantially identical to, and certainly

are co-extensive with, the claims of absent Class members because they were all

subject to the same collection practices and their claims are based on the same

legal theories arising from the same collection letters. (Semnar Decl. ¶¶ 2, 6-7, Ex.

1.)

d. The Adequacy of Representation Requirement Is Satisfied.

The adequacy requirement “serves to uncover conflicts of interest between

named parties and the class they seek to represent.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v.

Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997). To satisfy the adequacy requirement, a Class

Representative must establish that: (i) the representative plaintiff and her counsel

do not have any conflicts of interest with other class members, and (ii) the

representative plaintiff and her counsel will prosecute the action vigorously on

behalf of the class. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020. "As long as a class representative's

interests do not conflict with those of the proposed class, she need only have a

marginal familiarity with the facts of her case and need not understand the larger

legal theories upon which her case is based." Randle v. GC Servs., L.P., 181 F.R.D.

602, 604 (N.D. Ill. 1998). As such, the class representative need only be

conscientious and have a basic understanding of the litigation. Longo v. Law

Offices of Gerald E. Moore & Associates, P.C., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19624, at

*5 (N.D. Ill. March 30, 2006).

Even if the class representative has been educated about the FDCPA

violations from her attorneys, that will not deprive her of being an adequate class

representative. Jandek v. Hearst Corp., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15783, at *5 (N.D.

Ill., Oct. 1. 1999) ("[A]lthough [plaintiff] learned most of what she knows from her

attorneys, that is neither surprising nor offensive in the context of a FDCPA case.

This law imposes technical requirements on debt collectors, something laypersons

cannot expected to know about or understand, absent information provided by an


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attorney."). Further, in FDCPA actions, “named plaintiffs are not required to ‘have

expert knowledge of all the details of the case, … and a great deal of reliance on

the expertise of counsel is to be expected.’” In re Risk Mgmt. Alternatives, Inc.,

208 F.R.D. 493, 505 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2002).

Plaintiff is a motivated and qualified class representative who does have a

basic understanding of the claims filed in her Complaint. Plaintiff was sent a letter

by Defendants subjecting her to a professional collector’s efforts to collect a debt.

(Docket 1; Semnar Decl. ¶ 2.) There are no conflicts of interest between the class

representative and other Class members; Plaintiff only wants to maximize the

recovery for the class. (Id.) Plaintiff has no personal or business relationships with

her counsel except as her representation in this action. Plaintiff also has engaged

highly qualified and experienced counsel. Plaintiff’s counsel, Jared Hartman and

Babak Semnar of the Semnar & Hartman, LLP law firm, are experienced with

class action and other complex litigation. (Semnar Decl. ¶9; Declaration of Jared

Hartman, ¶ 2.) Examples of their class and mass cases and qualifications are

detailed in their attached declarations. Accordingly, adequacy is satisfied and

Semnar & Hartman, LLP should be appointed class counsel.

2. Rule 23(b)(3)'s Requirements Are Satisfied.

Upon satisfying Rule 23(a) requirements, Plaintiff also must demonstrate

that certification is appropriate under one of the three subdivisions of Rule 23(b).

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). In this case, Plaintiff seeks to certify the proposed

settlement class under Rule 23(b)(3). “To qualify for certification under Rule

23(b)(3), a class must satisfy two conditions in addition to the Rule 23(a)

prerequisites: common questions must ‘predominate over any questions affecting

only individual members,’ and class resolution must be ‘superior to other available

methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.’” Ellis v. Costco

Wholesale Corp., 285 F.R.D. 492, 537 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

23(b)(3)). The proposed settlement class meets all of the prerequisites for Rule


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23(b)(3) certification.

a. Common Questions Predominate Over Any Questions

Affecting Only Individual Class Members.

The focus of the predominance requirement is whether the proposed class is

sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation. Amchem, 521 U.S.

at 623. Predominance exists “[w]hen common questions present a significant

aspect of the case and they can be resolved for all members of the class in a single

adjudication.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022. With respect to FDCPA letter violations,

courts have found the predominance question to be easily satisfied. See, e.g., Hale

v. AFNI, Inc., 264 F.R.D. 402, 407 (N.D. Ill. Oct 23, 2009) ("Rule 23(b)(3)'s

predominance requirement is typically satisfied where the central, common issue is

whether the defendant's form letter violates the FDCPA."); Day v. Check

Brokerage Corp., 240 F.R.D. 414, 418-19 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (finding that

predominance was satisfied where class members received "very similar" letters,

and the common legal issue was whether those letters violated the FDCPA);

Jackson v. Nat'l Action Fin. Servs., Inc., 227 F.R.D. 284, 290 (N.D. Ill. 2005)

(same); Harris v. D. Scott Carruthers & Assoc., 270 F.R.D. 446, at 453 (Neb. July

13, 2010) (“the Court finds the common issues of whether each letter sent to the

classes violate the FDCPA and/or the NCPA predominate over the individual

claims for monetary relief.”).

In Gonzales v. Arrow Fin. Servs. LLC, 233 F.R.D. 577, 582 (S.D. Cal. Feb.

6, 2006), in granting plaintiff’s motion for class certification pertaining to alleged

FDCPA letter violations, Judge Houston of the Southern District agreed with the

plaintiff that “the only individual issue is the identification of consumers who

received the letter,” and therefore ruled, “The Court finds common questions of

law and fact predominate.”

In this case common questions resulting from Defendants conduct in seeking

to collect a debt from the Class, present a dominant aspect of the case that can be


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resolved for all Class members in a single adjudication. Like in Gonzales, supra,

“the only individual issue is the identification of consumers who received the

letter,” which is easily addressed by Defendants merely scrubbing their own

accounts to determine which letters were sent during the applicable class period

and which letters were not returned as undeliverable.

Furthermore, because the “predominance” factor concerns liability, any

variation in damages is plainly insufficient to defeat class certification. Blackie v.

Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905-06 (9th Cir. 1975). Thus, the proposed Settlement

Class should be certified.

b. A Class Action Is the Superior Means to Adjudicate Plaintiff’s

Claims.

The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the superior requirement was added

to Rule 23 “to cover cases ‘in which a class action would achieve economies of

time, effort, and expense, and promote … uniformity of decision as to persons

similarly situation, without sacrificing procedural fairness.’” Amchem, 521 U.S. at

615 (quoting Rule 23 advisory committee notes). It has been stated that suits

brought under the FDCPA “regularly satisfy the superiority requirement of Rule

23.” In re Risk Mgmt. Alternatives, Inc., supra, 208 F.R.D. at 507.

In Gonzales, supra, 233 F.R.D. at 582, Judge Houston cited with approval,

and followed, Judge Frank’s opinion from the Eastern District of California in

Ballard v. Equifax Check Svcs., 186 F.R.D. 589, 600 (E.D.Cal. 1999). Judge Frank

in Ballard found the class action to be superior because “individual consumers are

most likely unaware of their rights under the FDCPA. Class action certifications to

enforce compliance with consumer protection laws are ‘desirable and should be

encouraged’. [citations omitted] [T]he size of any individual damages claims under

the FDCPA are usually so small that there is little incentive to sue individually.”

The certification of this suit as a class action is superior to any other method

available to fairly, adequately, and efficiently resolve the claims of the members of


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the Class. The alternative to a class-wide proceeding is for the 174 Class members

to proceed through individual litigation against Defendants—an unrealistic and

impractical solution that would “not only unnecessarily burden the judiciary, but

would prove uneconomic for potential plaintiffs.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1023.

Moreover, because Plaintiff seeks certification for settlement, the Court need not

consider issues of manageability relating to trial. See, Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620

(“Confronted with a request for settlement-only class certification, a district court

need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management

problems, for the proposal is that there be no trial.”)

C. The Proposed Settlement Satisfies the Criteria for Preliminary

Approval.

A class action may not be dismissed, compromised or settled without the

Court’s approval. Fed. Ru. Civ. P. 23(e). Proper review and approval of a class

action settlement requires three steps: (1) preliminary approval of the proposed

settlement after submission of a written motion; (2) dissemination of mailed and/or

published notice of the settlement to all class members; and (3) a formal fairness

hearing, or final settlement approval hearing, at which class members may be

heard regarding the settlement, and at which evidence and argument concerning

the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of the settlement is presented. Manual

for Complex Litigation (4th ed. 2004), § 21.61. The decision to approve or reject a

proposed settlement is committed to the sound discretion of the court. Hanlon v.

Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d at 1027.

To make a fairness determination, the district court must balance a number

of factors, including: “(1) the strength of the plaintiff's case; (2) the risk, expense,

complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining

class action status throughout the trial; (4) the amount offered in settlement; (5) the

extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceeding; (6) the experience

and views of counsel; (7) the presence of a government participant; and (8) the


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reaction of class members to the proposed settlement.” Id. at 1026. Where, as here,

a settlement has been reached prior to formal class certification, “a higher standard

of fairness” applies due to “[t]he dangers of collusion between class counsel and

the defendant, as well as the need for additional protections when the settlement is

not negotiated by a court designated class representative[.]” Id.; In re Bluetooth

Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 2011).

Given that some of these “fairness” factors cannot be fully assessed until the

Court conducts the final approval hearing, a full fairness analysis is not necessary

for preliminary approval. See Alberto v. GMRI, Inc., 252 F.R.D. 652, 665 (E.D.

Cal. 2008). Rather, preliminary approval of a settlement, and notice to the

proposed class is appropriate, if the proposed settlement (1) appears to be the

product of arm's length, non-collusive negotiations; (2) contemplates fair fee

awards; (3) was a result of sufficient discovery or investigation; and (4) integrates

the adequacy of the experience and views of counsel to the litigation. Monterrubio

v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 291 F.R.D. 443, 453-54 (E.D. Cal. 2013). The Proposed

Settlement satisfies these criteria.

1. The Proposed Settlement Resulted from Arm’s Length, Informed

Negotiations by Experienced Counsel.

Courts afford a presumption of fairness and reasonableness to a settlement

agreement where that agreement was the product of non-collusive, arms' length

negotiations conducted by capable and experienced counsel. In re Wireless

Facilities, Inc., 253 F.R.D. 630, 634 (S.D.Cal. 2008) citing Nat'l Rural Telcoms.

Coop. v. Directv, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25375, *13 (C.D. Cal. 2004). That

presumption should apply here.

The Proposed Settlement was reached following arm’s-length negotiations.

The parties participated in two early neutral evaluations discussing settlement with

the Honorable Nita Stormes. While neither of those discussions resulted in

settlement, the parties continued negotiations for several months before finally


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reaching an agreement. (Semnar Decl.¶¶3-7.) Moreover, the settlement reached

affords the Class members the maximum amount in statutory damages they could

have recovered based on the net worth of the Law Offices of Peter Singer in the

event that had prevailed on the causes of action asserted. (Id.)

Furthermore, where counsel are well qualified to represented the proposed

class in a settlement based on their extensive class action experience and

familiarity with the strengths and weakness of an action, courts find this factor to

support a finding of fairness. Carter v. Anderson Merchandisers, LP, 2010 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 55581 at *27 (C.D. Cal. May 11, 2010) (Counsel’s opinion is

accorded considerable weight.”)

Plaintiff’s counsel were also informed. Through their discovery efforts

described above, independent investigation, and analysis, Plaintiff’s counsel

developed a thorough understanding of the collection efforts engaged in by the

Defendants. While discovery is not complete, Plaintiff’s counsel has completed

sufficient discovery to conclude that the Proposed Settlement is in the best interest

of the Class. (Semnar Decl. ¶¶3-7.)

2. The Proposed Settlement Falls Within the Range of Possible

Approval.

To determine whether a settlement “falls within the range of possible

approval,” a court must focus on “substantive fairness and adequacy,” and

“consider plaintiffs' expected recovery balanced against the value of the settlement

offer.” In re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1080 (N.D. Cal.

2007.) In so doing, courts must bear in mind that “the very essence of a settlement

is compromise, a yielding of absolutes and an abandoning of highest hopes.”

Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Com., 688 F.2d 615, 624 (9th Cir. 1982).

“Naturally, the agreement reached normally embodies a compromise; in exchange

for the saving of cost and elimination of risk, the parties each give up something

they might have won had they proceeded with litigation.” United States v. Armour


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& Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82 (1971).

The monetary value of the Proposed Settlement to Class represents a fair

compromise given the litigation risks and uncertainties presented by continued

litigation. Were Plaintiff to prevail on all of her claims and damage theories, the

maximum damages the Class would recover is one percent of the net worth of the

Law Offices of Peter Singer on the FDCPA claim and one percent of the net worth

of the Law Offices of Peter Singer on the Rosenthal Act claims. (15 U.S.C. 1692k

and Cal. Civ. Code §1788.17.) This is the amount afforded under the terms of the

settlement agreement. (Semnar Decl. ¶7, Ex. 1.) While Plaintiff has asserted the

legal theory of vicarious liability, in this context it is uncertain and vehemently

contested if this theory would allow the Class to recover from MCT Group any

additional sum based on their own net worth.

If this litigation were to proceed, Defendants would continue to assert legal

and factual grounds to defend against this action. Both Defendants would contest

that the letter violated either the FDCPA or Rosenthal Act in any way or that the

least sophisticated consumer could be confused by the validation notice provided.

Defendants would also contest Plaintiff’s ability satisfy Article III’s concreteness

requirements especially in light of the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Spokeo,

Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). The Law Offices of Peter Singer would

continue to assert it cannot be held liable under the Rosenthal Act because an

attorney is specifically excluded from the Rosenthal Act’s definition of “debt

collector.” (Cal. Civ. Code 1788.2(c).) Also, as mentioned above, MCT Group

would vehemently contest that the theory of vicarious liability applies or if it did,

that the class was entitled to any additional damages from MCT Group other than

those for which the Law Offices of Peter Singer were liable for.

Plaintiff would face the risk of dismissal upon a dispositive motion, denial of

class certification, and loss at trial. Were a class not certified, it is unlikely that

many Settlement Class members would maintain an individual action. Therefore,


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absent settlement, Plaintiff’s counsel acknowledges that there would be a

continued vigorous challenge to both class certification and the merits of Plaintiff’s

claims. While Plaintiff’s counsel remains confident that Plaintiff would certify a

litigation class and prevail on the class claims, continued litigation would be

costly, time consuming, and uncertain. Plaintiff still would have to prevail at class

certification, establish class-wide liability, and then prove up various issues

regarding damages. Continued litigation will increase the already significant costs

incurred on a matter where the maximum statutory recovery is relatively small and

already attained by this settlement.

These considerations weigh in favor of settlement. See Rodriguez v. West

Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 966 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Settlement avoids the

complexity, delay, risk and expense of continuing with the litigation and will

produce a prompt, certain, and substantial recovery for the Plaintiff class.”).

Given these costs and risks of litigation, the Proposed Settlement represents

an excellent outcome for the Class and falls well within the range of

reasonableness.

3. The Proposed Settlement treats all Class Members fairly.

While the amount of the settlement fund in favor of the putative class may

not be large in consideration with other class action settlements that this Court may

see, it has been said: The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problems that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone’s … labor.

Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997). Furthermore, the

Ninth Circuit has stated, “Where damages suffered by each putative class member

are not large, this factor weighs in favor of certifying a class action.” Zinser v.

Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1190, opinion amended on denial of


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reh’g, 273 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2001).

Nevertheless, under the Proposed Settlement, all Class members are treated

exactly the same. Each class member will receive an equal pro rata share of the

Settlement Fund and any unclaimed amounts of monies will be donated to an

appropriate cy pres award.

D. The Proposed Plan for Class Notice Is Appropriate.

Pursuant to Rule 23(e), the court must “direct notice in a reasonable manner

to all class members who would be bound by a proposed settlement.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 23(e)(1)(B). The notice provided to members of a class certified under Rule

23(b)(3) must be the “best notice practicable under the circumstances” and must

“concisely and clearly state in plain, easily understood language” the nature of the

action, the class definition, a general statement of the class claims and issues, that a

class member may enter an appearance through counsel if desired, the right and

manner of exclusion or objection, and the binding effect of class judgment. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).

The proposed Class Notice attached as Exhibit 1 to the Settlement

Agreement satisfies this standard. The Class Notice :(1) defines the class; (2)

describes the method for objecting to and opting out of the settlement and the

deadlines for taking action; (3) describes the essential terms of the proposed

settlement; (4) discloses the amounts that will be requested as attorney’s fees,

costs; (5) states the time and place of the Fairness Hearing; (6) explains the

procedures for allocating and distributing settlement funds; and (7) displays the

address and phone number of class counsel and how to make inquiries. This is

more than adequate. Churchill Village, L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th

Cir. 2004) (notice is satisfactory “if it generally describes the terms of the

settlement in sufficient detail to alert those with adverse viewpoints to investigate

and to come forward and be heard.”) (citations omitted)).

Under the proposed settlement, the Class Notice will be sent by U.S. Mail.


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(Semnar Decl. ¶7, Ex. 1 - Agreement § 8.) Class members will have 60 days from

the date the Class Notice is sent to request exclusion or object to the Settlement.

This gives Class members sufficient time to consider their options and make a fully

informed decision. See, e.g., Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1375

(9th Cir. 1993) (approving notice sent 31 days before the deadline for objections

and 45 days before the hearing).

V.

PROPOSED SCHEDULE FOR REMAINING PROCEDURES

The chart below summarizes the proposed schedule for the notice and

settlement approval process.

Event Date

Deadline for submission of objections or

exclusion requests to Settlement

Administrator

60 days after class notice is sent

Deadline for plaintiffs to file motion for

final approval

35 days prior to fairness hearing or

10 court days if unopposed

Deadline for plaintiffs to file Settlement

Administrator declaration identifying

class members who submitted exclusion

requests

10 days prior to fairness hearing

Deadline to file responses to objections

to final approval or fee

3 court days prior to fairness hearing

Fairness hearing

VI.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court issue an

order (1) conditionally certifying the class for settlement purposes; (2)


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provisionally appointing Semnar & Hartman, LLP as class counsel and Plaintiff

Mary Capps as class representative; (3) preliminarily approving the settlement; (4)

approving the notice to class; and (5) setting the hearing for final approval of class

settlement and for attorneys’ fees and costs award.

DATED: October 17, 2016

SEMNAR & HARTMAN LLP

By: /s/ Jared M. Hartman Jared M. Hartman, Esq.

Attorneys for Plaintiff MARY CAPPS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated


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DECLARATION OF BABAK SEMNAR IN SUPPORT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS SETTLEMENT


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Case No. 3:15-cv-2410 BAS NLS DECLARATION OF BABAK SEMNAR IN SUPPORT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS SETTLEMENT Hearing Date: November 21, 2016 Courtroom: 4B Judge: Cynthia Bashant Magistrate Judge: Nita L. Stormes Complaint Filed: October 26, 2015 Trial Date: None set NO ORAL ARGUMENT UNLESS REQUESTED BY THE COURT

I, Babak Semnar, declare:

1. I am a member in good standing of the California State Bar, and a

partner in the law firm of Semnar & Hartman LLP, which represented Plaintiff and

the Class in this action. I submit this declaration in support of Plaintiff’s Motion

for Preliminary Approval of the Settlement Agreement. I am one of the two

primary attorneys at Semnar & Hartman LLP on this case, and have been involved

in every aspect of it from inception to the present. Except where stated otherwise, I


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have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein, and could and would

competently testify thereto if called to do so.

2. Our firm initiated this lawsuit as a result of our review of a letter

received by Plaintiff from the Law Offices of Peter Singer, sent as an agent acting

on behalf of MCT Group, Inc., seeking to collect a debt. Plaintiff only desires to

maximize recovery for the class. Plaintiff has no relationship with our firm other

than as her attorney in this action.

3. After the parties responded to the Complaint filed by our office, we

participated in two early neutral evaluation conferences with the Honorable Nita

Stormes and counselors for the Law Offices of Peter Singer and MCT Group, Inc.

to attempt to resolve the matter, but no settlement resulted.

4. We then propounded written discovery to Defendants the Law Offices

of Peter Singer and MCT Group, Inc. to which both parties responded. Through

discovery, we developed an understanding of the Law Offices of Peter Singer’s

and MCT, Groups collection practices.

5. Concurrent with litigation efforts, I and counsel for the Law Offices of

Peter Singer, engaged in extensive, good faith, arm’s length negotiations

concerning the possible settlement of the Action, including numerous emails, and

telephone conversations. These communications thoroughly analyzed the relevant

law, facts, and the litigation risks all sides face.

6. Through discovery and negotiations, I have learned that the class

consists of 174 people who received substantially similar form letters from the

Law Offices of Peter Singer on behalf of MCT Group, Inc. as what was received

by Plaintiff Mary Capps.

7. The parties were able to reach a global settlement on 10-17-16. The

settlement affords the class members the maximum amount in statutory damages

they could possibly recover based on the net worth of the Law Offices of Peter


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Singer. I believe this settlement is in the best interest of the class. Attached hereto

as Exhibit 1, is a true and correct copy of the settlement agreement.

8. After the parties negotiated the initial terms of the settlement, the

parties than negotiated and stipulated to Class Counsel receiving an award of

attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $39,000. This negotiation was separate

from the negotiation of the class settlement terms and remained adversarial, non-

collusive, and at arm’s length. Class counsel will make its application for approval

of the fees and costs concurrently with the submission of the Motion for Final

Approval of the Class Settlement consistent with the terms of the settlement

agreement should it please the Court.

9. I have been counsel of record in, and actively worked on, the

following matters filed as proposed class actions concerning various consumer

rights violations, including, but not limited to, the areas of Federal Fair Debt

Collection Practices Act, California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,

Fair Debt Buyer Practices Act, Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, California

Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act, and Telephone Consumer Protection

Act:

a. Miran, Dara v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., Southern District of

California Case No. 16-CV-00692-AJB-JMA;

b. Casanova, Diego v. LVNV Funding, LLC and J.C. Christensen &

Associates, Inc., Central District of California Case No. 5:16-cv-

00918-GW-DTB;

c. Scally, Kendall v. Ditech Financial, LLC, Southern District of

California Case No. 3:16-cv-01992-WQH-WVG;

d. Stuppiello, Matthew v. Southwest Credit Systems, L.P., Southern

District of California Case No. 3:16-cv-01811-H-JMA;

e. Salehi, Mohammad v. Bluestem Brands, Inc., Southern District of

California Case No. 3:16-cv-00924-DMS-BGS;


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f. Parwani, Nargis and Abdolrasoul, Pouya v. Midland Credit

Management, Inc., Southern District of California Case No. 3:16-cv-

00691-JAH-JLB;

g. Barajas, Eduardo v. Roundpoint Mortgage Servicing Corporation,

Southern District of California Case No. 3:14-CV-01626-DMS-RBB;

h. Blankenship, Clay v. Clark County Collection Service, LLC, Central

District of California Case No. 5:14-cv-02147-JGB-DTB;

i. Nazaroff, Emily v. Nelson & Kennard, Southern District of California

Case No. 3:14-CV-02262-MMA-RBB;

j. Shackelford, Kristie and Shackelford, Joel v. Ascension Law Group,

PC, Pamela Tsao, and Cloud Portfolio Recovery, Inc., Central District

of California Case No. 8:14-cv-02022-AG-DFM;

k. Wolcott, Candida v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corporation, Central

District of California Case No. 5:14-cv-00780;

l. Stewart, Melissa v. The Wisdom Companies, LLC, Central District of

California Case No. 2:15-cv-01078;

m. Charkchyan, Manuel v. EZ Capital, Inc., Central District of California

Case No. 2:14-cv-03564-ODW-AS;

n. Youssofi, Rabi v. Allied Interstate LLC, Southern District of California

Case No. 3:15-cv-02197-GPC-JLB;

o. Youssofi, Rabi v. Simple Payments Corporation, Southern District of

California Case No. 3:16-cv-00828-BAS-WVG;

p. Aghdasi, Ehsan v. Claims Resource Services, Inc., Northern District

of California Case No. 5:16-cv-02156-HRL

10. As will become clear in the future in connection with the eventual

Motion for Final Approval and Motion for Approval of Attorneys’ Fees, the

amount of hourly attorneys’ fees my firm will inevitably incur in this matter is

likely to exceed the agreed-upon flat sum of $39,000.00, because my hourly rate is


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$425.00 per hour and my partner, Jared M. Hartman’s, hourly rate is $349.00 per

hour.

11. As such, the instant settlement agreement awarding Plaintiff’s

attorneys a flat sum that will inevitably be less than the amount that we would

otherwise incur on an hourly basis should be seen as reasonable.

12. My requested hourly rate of $425.00 per hour was found as reasonable

by the Southern District of California in the case of Gutierrez v. Herbert P. Sears

Co, Inc., et al., 3:15-cv-332 DMS (NLS), Dckt. #52.

13. I further believe my requested hourly rate of $425.00 per hour is

reasonable based upon my training and experience as a litigator, flowing from the

following factors:

a. I have completed a total of 32 trials to date to verdict, 25 of which

were jury trials.

b. I attended the Gerry Spence Trial Lawyers College in 2005, whereby I

was in Wyoming for three (3) week for the Trial Lawyers College

with 50 other attorneys from around the Country, working on our

Trial skills approximately ten (10) to twelve (12) hours a day. There I

was not only trained on various skills and insight, but I also had the

opportunity to see how other, more experienced attorneys approached

the same or similar situations.

c. After graduating from the Gerry Spence Trial Lawyers College in

2005, I attended the Graduate program, which is a full week—again in

Wyoming—whereby I obtained advanced training in learning,

understanding, and ultimately presenting the story of the client to a

Judge or Jury.

d. Since 2005, I have also been actively involved in the Trial Lawyers

College list-serve, whereby thousands of legal issues—including anti-

SLAPP related issues—have been raised and resolved. As part of my


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membership, I have had the benefit of passively and actively being

involved in such a continuous education. I have also been part of the

San Diego Consumer Attorney's list-serve for approximately five (5)

years [although not currently a member] whereby the same issues as

those in this case, have readily been analyzed.

e. I have been counsel in and litigated a substantial number of civil

litigation cases in the area of consumer law—including, but not

limited to, the areas of Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,

California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Fair Debt

Buyer Practices Act, Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, California

Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act, and Telephone Consumer

Protection Act.

f. I have also filed and litigated a substantial number of civil litigation

cases in the areas of negligence, intentional infliction of emotional

distress, fraud, and misrepresentation.

g. I have litigated cases in various Federal Courts, including U.S.

District Courts for the Southern District, Central District, and

Northern District.

h. I have also filed an appeal in the Court of Appeals of the State of

California, Second Appellate District Division One, whereby I was

the Trial Attorney, preserved the appropriate objections at trial,

briefed the issues in our appellate briefs, and presented the oral

argument to successfully result that allowed for a complete reversal.

i. In 2013, I attended a two day “boot camp” that focused exclusively on

the area of Consumer Law and Debt Collection Harassment.

j. In November 2014, I attended a three-day National Association of

Consumer Advocates conference in Tampa, Florida, whereby a

substantial portion of the conference focused on credit reporting, debt


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harassment, and debt collection practices, similar to the allegations

alleged by Plaintiff in the instant case.

k. In March 2015, I attended a two-day Fair Debt Collection Practice

conference by the National Consumers Law Center in Washington,

D.C., whereby the sole focus on the conference was debt harassment

and debt collection issues, such as those issues alleged by Plaintiff in

the instant case.

l. In May 2015, I attended a two-day conference hosted by the National

Association of Consumer Advocates on the Fair Credit Reporting Act,

whereby the sole focus of the conference was credit reporting

procedures and rules, and how they are violated, similar to the

allegations brought by Plaintiff in the instant case.

14. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of the

proposed notice to class members.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of

America and the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct according

to the best of my knowledge.

Executed on this 17th day of October, 2016, in Vista, California.

/s/ Babak Semnar

Babak Semnar, Esq. Counsel for Plaintiff


EXHIBIT 1

FULLY EXECUTED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT


10-17-16


10-7-16


JC2

Pencil

JC2

Typewritten Text

10/7/16

EXHIBIT 2

PROPOSED NOTICE TO CLASS MEMBERS


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARY CAPPS, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. LAW OFFICES OF PETER W. SINGER AND MCT GROUP, INC., Defendants.

Case No. 3:15-cv-2410 BAS NLS NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF CLASS ACTION PROPOSED SETTLEMENT AND HEARING DATE FOR COURT APPROVAL

PLEASE READ THIS NOTICE CAREFULLY, AS IT MAY AFFECT YOUR RIGHTS.

THIS IS NOT A LAWSUIT AGAINST YOU. A COURT AUTHORIZED THIS NOTICE

THIS IS NOT A SOLICITATION FROM A LAWYER.

The Court in charge of this lawsuit still has to decide whether to approve the settlement. Payments will only be made if the settlement is approved.

WHAT THIS LAWSUIT IS ABOUT Plaintiff, Mary Capps, brought this class action against Defendants, the Law Offices of Peter W. Singer and MCT Group, Inc. (“Settlement Defendants”) to recover damages for alleged violations of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. §1692, et seq. and the Rosenthal Act (“Rosenthal”), Cal. Civ. Code §1788 et seq.

Settlement Defendants deny any wrongdoing in this case. However, the parties have negotiated a proposed settlement.

THE CLASS You have received this notice because, according to the records of the Settlement Defendants, you appear to be a member of the Class. There are 174 Class Members. The Settlement Class is defined as all consumers with addresses within the State of California who were sent a letter by the Law Offices of Peter W. Singer on behalf of MCT Group, Inc.in an attempt to collect a debt which, according to the nature of the creditor or the debt, or the records of the creditor or the Defendants, was incurred for personal, family or household purposes and such letter was sent between October 26, 2014, and the date of final execution of the Settlement Agreement on October 17, 2016, and such letter contained the following language or language substantially similar:

If you do not dispute the above balance due, then within seven days of your receipt of this letter, either pay my client the entire balance due or phone them to work out arrangements for payment. If you do neither of these things, my office will be entitled to file a lawsuit against you for the collection of this debt when the seven days is over. I urge you to contact my client directly at 800-622-2242.


Excluded from the Class are: (a) any consumer whose letter was sent to an attorney or debt counselor; (b) any consumer who was mailed a letter that was returned as undeliverable; and (c) any consumer who filed for bankruptcy after receiving the letter but did not disclose the claim as an asset.

THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT The attorney for the Class believes that this settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and in the best interests of the class members. The terms of the settlement are:


Relief to the Class. Each Class Member who does not opt-out or exclude himself or herself from the settlement shall receive a check in the sum of $66.70 ("Settlement Check") approximately sixty days from the date of Final Approval by the Court. To the extent that there are any funds from un-cashed or expired Settlement Checks, an amount equal to the amount of such checks will be paid over as a cy pres award to the Voluntary Legal Services Program who provides assistance to consumers with legal problems associated with the collection of debts.

Release. If the terms of this Class Settlement are approved by the Court, and you do not opt out, you release Defendants the Law Offices of Peter W. Singer and MCT Group, Inc. as well as their past and present parents, affiliates, subsidiaries, successors, assignees, and its present and former directors, officers, employees or agents, attorneys and insurers, from the claims made in this lawsuit.

Litigation Expense. Subject to Court approval, Settlement Defendants shall pay Class Counsel reasonable attorney's fees and costs in the negotiated and stipulated amount of $39,000. Settlement Defendants shall also pay all costs associated with class administration.

YOUR RIGHTS & HOW TO CLAIM YOUR SHARE How To Claim Your Share of the Class Fund: If you wish to claim your share of the class fund, do nothing. If you do not opt out by the deadline provided below, you will receive a check in the amount of $66.70.

How to Be Excluded From the Class: If you do not want to participate in this Settlement, or you want to keep the right to sue or continue to sue Defendants on your own, then you must take steps to get out of the Settlement. This is called “excluding yourself” from or “opting out” of the Class, and therefore from the Settlement. To exclude yourself, you must notify First Class, Inc., 5410 W. Roosevelt Rd, Ste 222, Chicago IL 60644-1490 in writing stating that you wish to be excluded from the Class, and also mail a copy to class counsel as identified below, both of which must be postmarked and mailed no later than ________, 2016, specifically stating you want to be excluded from the class settlement. Be sure to include your name, address, telephone number, your signature, and a statement that you wish to be excluded from the Class. You cannot exclude yourself on the phone or by email. If you ask to be excluded, you will not get any Settlement compensation, and you cannot object to the Settlement. You also will not be legally bound by anything that happens in the Lawsuit.

Right to Object to the Terms of Settlement. If you do not request to be excluded from the class and the settlement, you can object to the settlement. If you want to object, you must put your objection in writing, state why you are objecting, include your full name, address and telephone number, and also include the name of the case and the case number which appears at the beginning of this Notice. Then mail by First Class U.S. Mail your written objection to First Class, Inc., 5410 W. Roosevelt Rd, Ste 222, Chicago IL 60644-1490 and to class counsel at the address below. The objection must be postmarked and mailed no later than _______, 2016.

FURTHER COURT PROCEEDINGS A Final Fairness Hearing will be held before the Honorable Cynthia Bashant on _____, 2016, at ______ __.m. in the, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, Courtroom 4B, Suite 4145, 221 West Broadway, San Diego, CA 92101. At the hearing, the Court will decide whether the proposed settlement is reasonable, adequate and fair. If the Court approves it, the settlement will be completed and the distributions paid as stated above. Class members who have filed an objection should appear at the hearing to explain their position. You need not appear in order to receive your share of the class funds.

CORRECT ADDRESS If this Notice was forwarded to you by the Postal Service, or if it was otherwise sent to you at an address that is not current, you should send a letter immediately to the Settlement Administrator: First Class, Inc., 5410 W. Roosevelt Rd, Ste 222, Chicago IL 60644-1490

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION If you would like more information about this notice or this litigation, you may write class counsel at Semnar & Hartman, LLP, 400 S. Melrose Dr., Suite 209 Vista, CA 92801 or call (951) 293-4187, or the claims administrator at First Class, Inc., 5410 W. Roosevelt Rd, Ste 222, Chicago, IL 60644-1490. You may also contact counsel for the Law Offices of Peter Singer at Klinedinst, PC, 801 K Street, Suite 2100, Sacramento, CA 95814. The pleadings and all other records of this litigation may be examined and copied any time during regular office hours in the office of the Clerk at the above listed address. Please do not call the Judge or Clerk of the Court. They will not be able to give you advice about this case.


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DECLARATION OF JARED HARTMAN IN SUPPORT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS SETTLEMENT


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Case No. 3:15-cv-2410 BAS NLS DECLARATION OF JARED HARTMAN IN SUPPORT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ORDER (1) CONDITIONALLY CERTIFYING SETTLEMENT CLASS; (2) PROVISIONALLY APPOINTING CLASS COUNSEL AND CLASS REPRESENTATIVES; (3) PRELIMINARILY APPROVING SETTLEMENT; (4) APPROVING NOTICE TO CLASS; AND (5) SETTING HEARING FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT AND AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS Hearing Date: November 21, 2016 Courtroom: 4B Judge: Cynthia Bashant Magistrate Judge: Nita L. Stormes Complaint Filed: October 26, 2015 Trial Date: None set NO ORAL ARGUMENT UNLESS REQUESTED BY THE COURT

I, Jared Hartman, declare:

1. I am a member in good standing of the California State Bar, and a

partner in the law firm of Semnar & Hartman LLP, which represented Plaintiff and


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the Class in this action. I submit this declaration in support of Plaintiff’s Motion

for Preliminary Approval of the Settlement Agreement. I am one of the two

primary attorneys at Semnar & Hartman LLP on this case, and have been involved

in every aspect of it from inception to the present. Except where stated otherwise, I

have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein, and could and would

competently testify thereto if called to do so.

2. I have been counsel of record in, and actively worked on, the

following matters filed as proposed class actions concerning various consumer

rights violations, including, but not limited to, the areas of Federal Fair Debt

Collection Practices Act, California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,

Fair Debt Buyer Practices Act, Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, California

Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act, and Telephone Consumer Protection

Act:

a. Miran, Dara v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., Southern District of

California Case No. 16-CV-00692-AJB-JMA;

b. Casanova, Diego v. LVNV Funding, LLC and J.C. Christensen &

Associates, Inc., Central District of California Case No. 5:16-cv-

00918-GW-DTB;

c. Scally, Kendall v. Ditech Financial, LLC, Southern District of

California Case No. 3:16-cv-01992-WQH-WVG;

d. Stuppiello, Matthew v. Southwest Credit Systems, L.P., Southern

District of California Case No. 3:16-cv-01811-H-JMA;

e. Salehi, Mohammad v. Bluestem Brands, Inc., Southern District of

California Case No. 3:16-cv-00924-DMS-BGS;

f. Parwani, Nargis and Abdolrasoul, Pouya v. Midland Credit

Management, Inc., Southern District of California Case No. 3:16-cv-

00691-JAH-JLB;


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g. Barajas, Eduardo v. Roundpoint Mortgage Servicing Corporation,

Southern District of California Case No. 3:14-CV-01626-DMS-RBB;

h. Blankenship, Clay v. Clark County Collection Service, LLC, Central

District of California Case No. 5:14-cv-02147-JGB-DTB;

i. Nazaroff, Emily v. Nelson & Kennard, Southern District of California

Case No. 3:14-CV-02262-MMA-RBB;

j. Shackelford, Kristie and Shackelford, Joel v. Ascension Law Group,

PC, Pamela Tsao, and Cloud Portfolio Recovery, Inc., Central District

of California Case No. 8:14-cv-02022-AG-DFM;

k. Wolcott, Candida v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corporation, Central

District of California Case No. 5:14-cv-00780;

l. Stewart, Melissa v. The Wisdom Companies, LLC, Central District of

California Case No. 2:15-cv-01078;

m. Charkchyan, Manuel v. EZ Capital, Inc., Central District of California

Case No. 2:14-cv-03564-ODW-AS;

n. Youssofi, Rabi v. Allied Interstate LLC, Southern District of California

Case No. 3:15-cv-02197-GPC-JLB;

o. Youssofi, Rabi v. Simple Payments Corporation, Southern District of

California Case No. 3:16-cv-00828-BAS-WVG;

p. Aghdasi, Ehsan v. Claims Resource Services, Inc., Northern District

of California Case No. 5:16-cv-02156-HRL

3. The settlement in the instant matter involves Defendants agreeing to

pay a flat sum of $39,000.00 to compensate my firm for attorneys’ fees and costs

incurred in prosecuting this matter.

4. As will become clear in the future in connection with the eventual

Motion for Final Approval and Motion for Approval of Attorneys’ Fees, the

amount of hourly attorneys’ fees my firm will inevitably incur in this matter is


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likely to exceed the agreed-upon flat sum of $39,000.00, because my hourly rate is

$349.00 per hour and my partner, Babak Semnar’s, hourly rate is $425.00 per hour.

5. As such, the instant settlement agreement awarding us a flat sum that

will inevitably be less than the amount that we would otherwise incur on an hourly

basis should be seen as reasonable.

6. My requested hourly rate of $349.00 per hour has been found as

reasonable by the Southern District of California in the case of Gutierrez, Anna v.

Herbert P. Sears Co, Inc., et al., 3:15-cv-332 DMS (NLS), Dckt. #52; by the

Northern District of California in the case of Klein, Charles v. Law Offices of D.

Scott Carruthers, et al., 3:15-cv-00490-CRB, Dckt. #27; and also by the Central

District of California in the case of Baeza, Noemi v. Assisted Credit Services, Inc.,

et al., 8:15-cv-01451-ODW-JCG, Dckt. #42.

7. I further believe my requested hourly rate of $349.00 per hour are

reasonable based upon my training and experience as a litigator, flowing from the

following factors:

a. I have completed a total of 32 jury trials to date to verdict.

b. I received my Juris Doctorate from the Cleveland State University,

Cleveland-Marshall College of Law in May 2006.

c. I received my Ll.M. from the University of San Diego School of Law

May 2007.

d. I have filed and litigated a substantial number of civil litigation cases

in the area of consumer law since approximately March of 2013—

including, but not limited to, the areas of Federal Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act, California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices

Act, Fair Debt Buyer Practices Act, Federal Fair Credit Reporting

Act, California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act, and

Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

e. I have also filed and litigated a substantial number of civil litigation


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cases in the areas of negligence, intentional infliction of emotional

distress, fraud, and misrepresentation.

f. In 2013, I attended a two day “boot camp” that focused exclusively on

the area of Consumer Law and Debt Collection Harassment.

g. In November 2014 and November 2015, I attended a four-day

National Association of Consumer Advocates conference in Tampa,

Florida and San Antonio, Texas, respectively, whereby a substantial

portion of the conference focused on credit reporting violations, debt

collection harassment, and debt collection practices, similar to the

allegations alleged by Plaintiff in the instant case.

h. In March 2015, I attended a two-day Fair Debt Collection Practices

Act conference by the National Consumers Law Center in

Washington, D.C., whereby the sole focus on the conference was debt

harassment and debt collection issues, such as those issues alleged by

Plaintiff in the instant case.

i. In May 2015, I attended a two-day conference hosted by the National

Association of Consumer Advocates on the Fair Credit Reporting Act,

whereby the sole focus of the conference was credit reporting

procedures and rules, and how they are violated, similar to the

allegations brought by Plaintiff in the instant case.

j. In November 2015, I attended a four-day conference hosted by the

National Association of Consumer Advocates on various aspects of

debt collection harassment, credit reporting violations, and debt

collection practices, similar to the allegations brought by Plaintiff in

this case.

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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of

America and the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct according

to the best of my knowledge.

Executed on this 17th day of October, 2016, in Vista, California.

/s/ Jared M. Hartman

Jared M. Hartman, Esq. Counsel for Plaintiff


PROOF OF SERVICE

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PROOF OF SERVICE

Capps v. Law Offices of Peter W. Singer, et al.

Case No.: 3:15-cv-02410

I am employed in the County of San Diego, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and am not a party to the within action; my business address is 400 South Melrose Drive, Suite 209, Vista, California 92081. On the date provided below, I served the foregoing document described below on the interested parties in this action by placing same in a sealed envelope. NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS CERTIFICATION; DECLARATION OF COUNSEL SEMNAR AND EXHIBITS; DECLARATION OF COUNSEL HARTMAN; PROPOSED ORDER was served on: June D. Coleman Kronick, Moskovitz, Tiedemann & Girard 400 Capitol Mall 27th Floor Sacramento, CA 95814 Attorneys for Defendant MCT GROUP, INC.

Lindsey Nicole Heaton Klinedinst PC 801 K Street Suite 2100 Sacramento, CA 95814 Attorneys for Defendant Law Offices of Peter W. Singer

(BY MAIL) – I caused such envelope(s) with postage thereon fully prepaid to be placed in

the United States mail in Vista, California.

I am “readily familiar” with the firm’s practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice, it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on the same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Vista, California, in the ordinary course of business. I am fully aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if the postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after the date of deposit for mailing an affidavit.

(BY FACSIMILE) – I caused the above described document(s) to be transmitted to the

offices of the interested parties at the facsimile number(s) indicated above and the activity report(s) generated by facsimile number (888) 819-8230 indicating on all pages that they were transmitted.

(BY PERSONAL SERVICE) – I caused such envelope(s) to be delivered by hand to the

office(s) of the addressee(s).

(STATE) – I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

(FEDERAL) – I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court

at whose direction the service was made. Via Electronic Service: The above-described documents will be delivered electronically through the court’s ECF/PACER electronic filing system, as stipulated by all parties to constitute personal service.

Dated: 10-17-16 /s/ Jared M. Hartman Jared M. Hartman, Esq.


SEMNAR & HARTMAN, LLP Babak Semnar (SBN 224890)

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Transcript of SEMNAR & HARTMAN, LLP Babak Semnar (SBN 224890)