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Caspar Hare June 2007 Published in the Journal of Philosophy CIV, no. 7, July 2007 – please cite that version.

Self-Bias, Time-Bias, and the Metaphysics of Self and Time

1: Self-Bias

It is common to have a slightly exaggerated sense of the significance of your own

joys and miseries, but grand self-importance is rare. Louis XIV was grandly self-

important. He believed that, when he consumed too much foie gras, France suffered

gastric pain. When he took satisfaction from the construction of a new fountain in the

grounds of Versailles, that feeling would settle over his natural kingdom – from the

frigid, poxy docks of Brest to the steaming, cholera-ridden slums of Marseilles. For

Louis, self-indulgence was a national mission.

When we have the state in mind, we are working for ourselves. The welfare

of the one creates the glory of the other. When the former is happy, lofty and

powerful, he who is the cause of it has glory too and consequently should

enjoy more than his subjects with regard to himself and to them everything in

life that is most pleasant.1

We, the undistinguished masses, are less fortunate than Louis. As one of the masses

I know that I have a set of unique qualities – a unique height, a unique weight, a unique

time and place of origin… and so forth – but these give me scarce grounds for thinking

that I occupy a special place in the larger scheme of things, that my pleasures and pains

are more significant than anybody else’s. I am not the physical embodiment of a national

Many thanks to Anthony Appiah, Paul Benacerraf, Karen Bennet, Akeel Bilgrami, Ned Hall, Simon Keller, Rae Langton, Gideon Rosen and in particular Mark Johnston for helping me to develop the ideas here. 1 Louis XIV, Mémoires for the Instruction of the Dauphin, Paul Sonnino trans. and ed., New York, 1970

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spirit. I have not been chosen by God as his special representative on Earth. I am hardly

stronger, faster, or more delicate than the next person. And there are seven billion next

people.

This means that, although I may be no less chronically attentive to my own comfort

than Louis was, my self-attention is internally problematic in a way that his was not.

Louis took his pleasures and pains to be especially important, so when he deliberated he

discovered a neat harmony between egocentric-hedonistic considerations (of the form:

‘overall, I will suffer less if I do __ rather than __’) and considerations of the greater

good (of the form: ‘overall, things will be better if I do __ rather than __’). When I

deliberate I discover no such harmony. I am continually faced with situations in which

these considerations conflict, situations in which I can make the world better at a cost to

my comfort, and myself more comfortable at a cost to the world.

That may seem a very obvious point. Of course people tend to be disproportionately

preoccupied with their own comfort. Of course to be so preoccupied is not to be

preoccupied with the greater good.

Can it be denied?

To get a grip on this question, let’s consider the position of a peacemaker, a person

whose desire for the kind of psychological harmony enjoyed by Louis leads her to be

resolutely committed to the view that, for the most part, concern for one’s own comfort

and concern for the greater good align. The peacemaker notes that although most of us

are not extreme egocentric-hedonists, caring only about our own pleasures and pains, we

are at least mild egocentric hedonists – all other things being equal, we prefer that pain

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befall others rather than ourselves, and pleasure befall ourselves rather than others. The

peacemaker then claims:

(Harmony) Whenever a mild egocentric-hedonist favors a scenario in which she

suffers less, she thereby favors a simply better maximal state of affairs.

I have used some quasi-technical terms here, and they need to be glossed. What is it to

for one thing to be ‘simply better’ than another? Let’s just say what it isn’t – not better in

some qualified or three-way relational sense of the word, not better for me, or better for

some purpose, or better in relation to a particular set of interests, but better period. What

is a ‘state of affairs’? Think of a state of affairs as a way for things to be. So the way

things in Yosemite National Park are is a state of affairs. The way things in the Russian

economy are is a state of affairs. What is a ‘maximal state of affairs’? Well, some states

of affairs can be parts of others – the way things in my laundry cupboard are is a part of

the way smelly things in the Boston area are. A maximal state of affairs is one that is not

a proper part of any state of affairs. It is a way for everything to be. Finally, what is it to

‘favor a scenario’? I mean the notion of ‘favoring’ to be understood quite broadly: one

way to favor a scenario or state of affairs is to bring it about, another is just to desire that

it obtain. So, according to (Harmony), it is not just that the actions of a mild egocentric-

hedonist bring about the good (when she brings about a situation in which she suffers

less, she brings about a better maximal state of affairs), it is also that the desires of a mild

egocentric hedonist align with the good (when she wants a situation in which she suffers

less to come about, she wants a better maximal state of affairs to come about.)

Is the peacemaker’s claim credible? Well, three seemingly insurmountable

obstacles stand in the way of my believing it.

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The Grounding Problem

First, if I am to believe it, I must take it to be true of me that when I enhance my

own comfort the expense of other people, I am making for a better overall state of affairs.

So I must adopt a picture of the world in which my comfort makes an especially weighty

contribution to the value simpliciter of a state of affairs. Call this the Grounding

Problem: my picture of who I am, and of how I fit into the world, must somehow give me

grounds for thinking that my pains and pleasures have an especially important place in

the larger scheme of things.

But how could this be? I am not the Sun-King. I am mundane in all measurable

respects. So perhaps my only hope is to believe that I am extraordinary in some

immeasurable respect, that I am metaphysically unique in some way that bears upon the

intrinsic value of my suffering. For example:

The Solitary Utility Monster

My physiology is not unusual in any measurable way – I wince when

punched, smile when pleased and frown when saddened, just like anyone

else. But there is one important, hidden difference between me and other

people: my experiences are, qualitatively, far more intense than theirs. If

their experiences are like water-colors by Turner, mine are like oil-

paintings by Francis Bacon. Drinking tea feels to me just the way that

taking morphine feels to them. A touch of indigestion feels to me just the

way that being disemboweled feels to them.

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If this bleak picture were accurate then perhaps I should be self-interested. For

surely, one could argue, what is intrinsically good or bad about pleasure or pain is its

phenomenal aspect. Hit your hand hard against your desk. What is bad about pain is that

feeling. Run your fingers gently across your scalp. What is good about pleasure is that

feeling. And there are more of those sorts of feelings associated with my experiences than

with anybody else’s.

But the picture is, of course, ridiculous. Serious philosophers do not believe that

they are metaphysically unique. At best they use the idea as a foil – the problem of the

‘problem of other minds’ is almost always taken to be the problem of how one can know

that other people’s mental states are just like one’s own, very rarely taken to be the

problem of whether other people’s mental states are just like one’s own. And to my

knowledge, no serious philosopher has ever even considered the view that I, Caspar Hare,

am metaphysically unique. It hasn’t even been in the ball-park!

So this doesn’t seem like a very promising strategy. If I am to solve the

Grounding Problem, I must do so without committing myself to a wildly implausible

metaphysical picture. And that appears impossible.

The Generalization Problem

Furthermore, if I am to argue, quite generally, that there is no conflict between

the considerations that move a mild egocentric-hedonist and considerations of the greater

good, it is not enough just to show that there is no conflict in my own case. I must show

that any mild egocentric-hedonist, in favoring scenarios in which she suffers less, is

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favoring better maximal states of affairs. And it is very difficult to see how this can be so.

Call this the Generalization Problem.

To see the difficulty, imagine a situation in which my interests are at odds with

someone else’s. For example:

Competing for a Scarce Resource

Jane and I are competing for a scarce resource. Jane will suffer less if she gets

it. I will suffer less if I get it.

In this situation there seem to be two possible ways for things to go:

Possibility (1) CJH gets the resource Jane misses out and is happy and is miserable Possibility (2) CJH misses out Jane gets the resource and is miserable and is happy

Being a mild egocentric-hedonist, I favor (1) over (2). Being a mild egocentric-hedonist,

Jane favors (2) over (1). But, if the notion of ‘better simpliciter’ is to remain coherent, it

can’t both be better simpliciter that the state of affairs represented by possibility (1)

obtain and better simpliciter that the state of affairs represented by possibility (2) obtain.

So surely in this case at least one of us, in favoring the state of affairs in which we suffer

less, is not favoring a simply better maximal state of affairs.2

2 This is the thought behind the famous argument against egoism in Moore’s Principia Ethica, section 59: ‘The only reason I can have for aiming at ‘my own good’ is that it is good absolutely that what I so call should belong to me – good absolutely that I should have something, which, if I have it, others cannot

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The Problem of Irreducibly Egocentric Preferences

The third problem arises from the fact that, for me, caring about CJH’s comfort

and caring about my comfort do not always amount to the same thing. Given that I am

broadly egocentric, and that I believe myself to be CJH, I want to promote my comfort

and the comfort of CJH. But, given that I am broadly egocentric, the moment I ceased to

believe that I was CJH, I would cease to care about him and continue to care about me.

There are imaginable situations in which this might happen:

After the Train-Crash

I wake up in hospital, achy and bewildered, unable to remember who or

where I am. I try to move, and find that my body is swathed in rigid plaster

and my head is locked in a brace. I call for help and receive no reply. But,

happily, some kind nurse has placed a television directly in front of me.

From it I learn that there has been a terrible train accident, that only two

survivors, CJH and Joe Bloggs, have been pried from the wreckage, and

that both have been taken to hospital and placed in full-body plaster casts,

from which they are watching this very program on television.

“Interesting!” I think, “I now have a vivid picture of what’s going on in this

hospital, and I know a lot about CJH and Joe Bloggs, although I still don’t

know which of them I am.” Next the television tells me that one of the two

have… What Egoism holds, therefore, is that each man’s happiness is the sole good – that a number of different things are each of them the only good thing there is – an absolute contradiction!’ Moore (1903).

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is scheduled to have an extremely long and painful operation in a few hours

time. “Interesting!” I think, “I hope that’s not me.”

My first concern in this situation, is for me, not CJH. If I were to discover that

CJH was to be the unfortunate subject of this operation, I would be neither happy nor

unhappy, because two importantly different possible scenarios would remain open,

scenarios that we can represent like this (with arrows to represent who I am):

Scenario (1): CJH suffers Joe Bloggs is comfortable

Scenario (2): CJH suffers Joe Bloggs is comfortable

I very much want the first scenario to obtain. I want to be Joe Bloggs, the person who

will not be suffering.

But surely this is a clear example of a person favoring a scenario in which he is

better off without thereby favoring a better maximal state of affairs. For, on the standard

account of the content of ‘self-involving’ propositional attitudes,3 when I hope, desire,

believe or discover that scenario (1) obtains, I do not hope, desire, believe or discover

that the world is a certain way. After the operation I already know everything relevant

about the way the world is, about the nature of the maximal state of affairs – I know who

will suffer, when they will suffer and how much they will suffer. My preference for (1)

3 Classic variants of which are in Castañeda, (1968), Lewis (1979) and Perry (1979).

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over (2) is not a preference that the world be one way rather than another, but rather a

preference that I be one way rather than another; it is, to use some jargon, an irreducibly

de se preference, a preference with no de dicto content.

In light of the Grounding, Generalization and Irreducibly Egocentric Preferences

problems, it appears that (Harmony) must be rejected and the peacemaker’s project must

be abandoned. The pressing question for ethicists to address is not whether the

considerations that move a mild egocentric hedonist misalign with considerations of the

greater good, but how we should respond when they do. And, sure enough, ethicists have

been responding to some form or other of this question for a very long time.

That may seem like a compelling argument, but it relies upon some substantive

and questionable assumptions about the metaphysics of the self. Perhaps the clearest way

to bring this out is by looking at an analogous argument, to the conclusion that we cannot

find harmony between considerations of the greater good and time-biased considerations.

2: Time-Bias

Some people care not only about what things happen, but also about when things

happen. One way to care about the when as well as the what is to care about how events

are ordered over the course of history – a history across which good and bad things are

evenly sprinkled, for example, might seem preferable to one with good things clumped at

one end, bad things clumped at the other.4 Another way is to care more about what

happens at some times than others – what happens on the first day of the year 2000, for

example, might seem to matter more than what happens on the three hundred and twenty

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sixth day of the year 1994. Another way is to care about when things happen relative to

the present moment. Call someone who cares about when things happen relative to the

present moment time-biased.

Of the many ways in which one might be time-biased, the two that have received

most attention from philosophers5 are hedonic bias toward the future (all things

considered, I prefer that pains be past rather than future, and pleasures be future rather

than past), and hedonic bias toward the near (all things considered, I prefer that pains be

in the distant future rather than the immediate future, and pleasures be in the immediate

future rather than the distant future). Everybody seems to some extent vulnerable to these

kinds of bias. Wouldn’t you prefer to be walking out of your dentist’s office, with the

pain in your tooth subsiding, than to be walking in, with the bulk of the pain still to

come? Wouldn’t you prefer the drill to be a week, rather than an hour away?

Let’s restrict our attention to pain. Someone who has these sorts of biases may

give them a role in her practical reasoning by taking considerations of the form ‘there is

less future pain in __ than __’ and ‘there is less near-future pain in __ than __’ to support

favoring one scenario over another. But obviously it would be hasty to take such

considerations to provide the last word in practical deliberation, because sometimes they

will misalign or conflict with considerations of the greater good. Sometimes, when you

desire, or make it the case that there is less future or near future pain, you do not desire,

or make it the case that things overall are better.

4For life-histories, Slote (1982), and Bigelow, Campbell and Pargetter (1990), have argued that the value of a life-history is not given by the sum or average of momentary well-being over the course of that life-history. The order in which good things happen matters. 5 Largely due to the discussion in Parfit (1984) Chapter 8.

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Why is this obvious? Once again it will be useful to consider a peacemaker, who

wants to claim that time-biased considerations are in harmony with considerations of the

greater good. The peacemaker is committed to:

(Harmony 2) Whenever a person favors a scenario in which there is less future, or near-

future pain, she thereby favors a simply better maximal state of affairs.

Can she really believe this? Three familiar obstacles stand in her way:

The Grounding Problem

First, she would have to adopt a metaphysical picture that gave her some grounds

for thinking that future pains are in themselves worse than past pains, near-future pains in

themselves worse than far-future pains. Her picture would need somehow to support the

idea that Joan of Arc’s suffering on the pyre matters less than mine at my next workout.

Here’s a picture that would work:

Divine Novocain

At the dawn of creation God faced a problem: He would not allow himself

physically to intervene in the course of history, for fear of compromising our

freedom, but he wished to protect us from the evil consequences of that

freedom. So he created Divine Novocain, a drug that dulls the qualitative

aspect of suffering without inducing any physical changes in the sufferer. In

the past he has administered this drug liberally, to all sufferers, pure and fallen,

but now (confronted with famine, war and disease on a scale that even he could

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not have anticipated) he finds his stocks to be running low. He will be forced to

ration. So he decides that he will administer none for a short while, and then

gradually build up the doses, though never to their pre-2005 level.

This would do the trick. But it is mad. On any sane view, Joan of Arc’s suffering is no

less intense and no less significant for being past.

The Generalization Problem

Second, it is not enough for our peacemaker to show that considerations of the

greater good align with time-biased considerations now, in 2007. She needs to show that

they always do. So she needs to deal with cases where time-bias leads us to have different

preferences at different times about the same states of affairs. Here’s an example of such

a case, where the preferences are generated by bias toward the future.6

Bad and Worse Operations

I must have an operation. It’s a safe operation, but it involves some nasty

stuff: some cutting, some scraping, some poking of optic fibers down blood

vessels… and so forth. On Monday doctors perform tests on me and declare

that, depending on the results of these tests, I will either endure the operation

under the influence of a local anesthetic (unpleasant, but not painful) on

6 Are there similar such cases where the preferences are generated by bias toward the near? This will depend upon the rate at which you discount for temporal distance. If you discount exponentially (for example, where i is the intensity of a future pain and t is the temporal distance, by taking its significance to you now to be given by i/2n.) then your preferences will not change over time. If you don’t then they will. See Parfit (1984) section 62 and elsewhere.

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Thursday, or endure the operation under the influence of no anesthetic at all

(terribly painful) on Tuesday. On Monday I hope to have the unpleasant

operation on Thursday. But on Wednesday evening I wake up, bewildered,

unable to remember if I have yet been operated upon, and, since I am biased

towards the future, I hope to have had the terribly painful operation on

Tuesday.

Here the possible world-histories seem to be:

Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday time Possibility (1):

mild pain! I await the results I wake up, bewildered

Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday time Possibility (2):

TERRIBLE PAIN! I await the results I wake up, bewildered

On Monday I prefer (1) to (2), while on Wednesday I prefer (2) to (1). But it can’t both

be better simpliciter that the maximal state of affairs represented by possibility (1) obtain,

and that the maximal state of affairs represented by possibility (2) obtain. So on at least

one of the two days considerations of the greater good do not align with future-biased

considerations. On at least one of the two days, in favoring a scenario in which there is

less future-pain, I am not favoring a better maximal state of affairs.

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The Problem of Irreducibly Egocentric Preferences

Third, the peacemaker must face cases where time-bias leads us to have

irreducibly egocentric preferences. Here is an example of such a case, where the

preference is generated by bias toward the near7:

Waiting For My Painful Operation

Early in my life, clever doctors find that I have a rare genetic condition that

will most likely cause me to contract cancer of the x (substitute whatever

organ you feel most anxious about for x) in late middle-age. Happily, they

can eliminate the risk by removing organ x from my body. Unhappily, the

necessary operation is agonizingly painful. Knowing all this, I schedule such

an operation for soon after April 8, 2022, my fiftieth birthday. I am always

perfectly sure that the operation will take place, that I will survive it, that it

will be successful, and that it will hurt like anything. Then, one night, I wake

up from a fretful dream and look at the date on my malfunctioning alarm

clock. It says ‘April 7 …2’. Is it April 7, 2012 or April 7 2022? For the

moment I just don’t know. But I do know what I want. Being biased toward

the near, I want it to be 2012.

In this case there are two possible scenarios I might be in (with arrows to represent what

the time is now):

7 Future-bias generates many similar preferences – e.g. when I wake up, knowing that I have a painful operation on a particular date, but not knowing whether it is in the past or future.

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April 7, 2012 April 7, 2022 time Scenario (1): I wake up PAIN!!! I wake up

April 7, 2012 April 7, 2022 time Scenario (2): I wake up PAIN!!! I wake up

But these two scenarios do not represent different ways for the world to be, different

maximal states of affairs. My ignorance in this case is, in the jargon, irreducibly de se – I

know everything relevant about the history of the world, but don’t know which person-

slice I am. So, in favoring (1) over (2), I am not favoring one maximal state of affairs

over another. So, in favoring the scenario in which there is less near-future pain, I am not

favoring a better maximal state of affairs.

As before, these three problems seem to be insurmountable, so it seems that the

peacemaker must give up, and concede that no plausible metaphysical picture grounds

general time-bias. Time-biased considerations do not always align with considerations of

the greater good.

3. Time-Bias and the Metaphysics of Time

The argument above is structurally just like the argument from Section 1, the

argument that egocentric considerations do not always align with considerations of the

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greater good. Is there anything wrong with it? Well, this time around we have at least

some reason to suspect that there might be something wrong with it, because its

conclusion is controversial. Certainly, many influential philosophers (including

Sidgwick8 and Rawls9) have had a low view of time-bias, arguing that it is petty,

unenlightened, or, in the extreme, irrational, but others (including Bentham10) have

thought it to be perfectly rational, and furthermore a bias toward what is better. It is better

that, for example, suffering be in the past rather than the future.

One way to accommodate this intuition would be to take issue with my

characterization of the sorts of states of affairs whose intrinsic value gives rise to

considerations of the greater good. I took them to be maximal states of affairs, but one

could perhaps take them to be proper parts of maximal states of affairs. In favoring better

futures I may, then, be favoring intrinsically better ‘states of affairs’ of the relevant kind.

(Lars Bergstrom once endorsed this view, arguing that, for consequentialists, ‘the future

is more important than the total state of the world.’11) Or, for a quite general solution to

problems of agent and time-bias, one could stipulate that the relevant ‘states of affairs’

are <World, Agent, Time> triples, the ‘centered worlds’ that figure prominently in recent

decision theory. It may be the case that (e.g.), in always favoring better futures, I am

always favoring better ‘states of affairs’ in this sense, because it may be that whenever

<w1, a1, t1> and <w2, a2, t2> are such that there is less suffering in w1 after t1 than in w2

after t2, then <w1, a1, t1> is simply better than <w2, a2, t2>.

8 See Sidgwick (1907), pp. 381, 382 9 See Rawls (1971), Section 45 10 … on one reading of Bentham (1789), Chapter IV. Bentham’s views are somewhat under-determined by the text. 11 Bergstrom (1966), p. 125

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But there is something fishy about this suggestion. For one thing, notice that there

is negligible difference between saying that the triple <w, a1, t1> is simply better than the

triple <w, a2, t2>, and saying that world w is better for, or in relation to, a1 at t1 than for, or

in relation to a2 at t2. For another thing, it mis-characterizes the nature of considerations

in question. Considerations of the greater good gain their force from the thought that

what matters is the way that everything is, not the way that everything is relative to a

time, place or person. But the triples <w, a1, t1> and <w, a2, t2> do not represent different

ways for everything to be.

Another, much better way to accommodate the intuition is to question whether

facts about what the time is now do not somehow enter into the way that everything is.

This involves making some substantive assumptions about the metaphysics of time.

Four-Dimensionalism

One vexed question in the metaphysics of time concerns the ontological status of

past, present and future entities (moments, events, objects). Does Julius Caesar exist?

Does the 90th President of the United States exist?

Call someone who believes that past and future entities (moments, events,

objects…etc.) exist an eternalist. Some eternalists are ersatz realists about the past and

future, they believe that present things are concrete, past and future things abstract.

Others believe that past, present and future things are equally real, equally concrete. ‘The

world consists of a four-dimensionally extended space-time manifold,’ these people say,

‘the past, present and future are ontologically on a par. Just as a thing is no less real for

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being to my left or right, so a thing is no less real for coming before or after me’. Call

such people block universe theorists.

Another vexed question concerns the status of tensed properties. What is it for

something to be past, present or future? Some block universe theorists think that there are

no monadic tensed properties, only relational tensed properties – the death of King

Harold is not monadically past, present or future, it is past relative to the death of Ann

Boleyn, future relative to the death of Jesus, and present relative to William’s invasion of

England. ‘All things are on a par with respect to tense’, these people say, ‘all things are

future relative to things that come before them, present relative to things with which they

coexist, and past relative to things that come after them. No moment has the privileged

status of being the present one.’ Call such people four-dimensionalists.12

Now, if we accept four-dimensionalism, then the Grounding, Generalization and

Egocentric Preferences problems really are insoluble. With respect to grounding, past

pains are just as real as future pains, so we have no real grounds for thinking them less

important simpliciter. With respect to generalization, in the Bad and Worse Operations

case, my preferences on Monday and Wednesday are indeed inconsistent. On Monday I

favor the one space-time manifold over the other, while on Wednesday I favor the other

over the one, so I cannot, on both days, be favoring better ways for everything to be.

With respect to irreducibly egocentric preferences, in the Waiting for my Painful

Operation case, my desire that pain be in the far future rather than the near-future does

12 This term has been used by several different philosophers in several different ways – sometimes to mean the block universe picture, sometimes (as here) to mean the block universe picture conjoined with the view that tensed properties are relational, sometimes to mean the block universe picture conjoined with the view that tensed properties are relational conjoined with perdurantism about persistence over time. So, for maximum precision, perhaps I should use a different term, but I find the one that suggests itself – ‘the uncentered block theory’ – unacceptably clunky.

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indeed have no de dicto content. I am not favoring one space time manifold over another,

so I am not favoring a better over a worse way for everything to be.

So if we accept four-dimensionalism then the argument goes through –

considerations of the greater good do not always align with time-biased considerations.

But what if we deny it? What if we insist that there are monadic tensed properties, that

tense is built into the way the world is?

Alternatives to Four-Dimensionalism

There are several ways to accommodate this basic thought. Advocates of hyper-

kenesis13 retain the block universe ontology, retain the idea that the world is a four-

dimensionally extended space time manifold, but say that one moment has the interesting

and unique property of being the present one. Which moment? Well, that changes as time

goes by (think of a spot-light moving remorselessly along the block). Others imagine that

the past exists but the future does not. The present is the outermost skin of a block that

expands as time goes by.14 Others imagine that the future exists but the past does not. The

present is the outermost skin of a block that contracts as time goes by15. Others imagine

that the future branches off in many directions while the past remains fixed. The present

is the first point at which multiple branches split off from the bare tree-trunk of the past.16

Presentists17, meanwhile, hold that only present objects, events, moments exist (along,

perhaps, with timeless things like gods and numbers). There are no past or future things. 13 See, for example, Schlesinger (1994) 14 This view may have origins in Aristotle. A contemporary version has been proposed by Tooley (1997) 15 Though many people have imagined this, I don’t know of anyone who has endorsed it. Surprising, perhaps, because it seems uniquely well qualified to explain why the future matters and the past does not. 16 A view developed in McCall (1994) 17 The first and most famous presentist was Saint Augustine. For more up-to-date expositions of the view, see Bigelow (1996) and Zimmerman (1998).

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The best we can say is that it used to be the case that they existed, or it will be the case

that they exist.

I think that presentism is by far the most coherent and philosophically defensible

of these theories, but for present purposes that is beside the point. The point is that each

of them is a theory about the nature and extent of all that there is, where ‘all’ is

understood in an unrestricted sense – a theory about what maximal states of affairs are

like. And, according to each of them, it is part of the nature of maximal states of affairs

that present things are different from past and future things. So, according to each of

them, the Generalization and Egocentric Preferences problems do not arise. With respect

to generalization: in the Bad and Worse Operations case the maximal states of affairs that

I discriminate between on Monday (one in which mild pain is in the far future and one in

which terrible pain is in the near future) are not the same as the maximal states of affairs

that I discriminate between on Wednesday (one in which terrible pain is in the past and

one in which mild pain is in the near future), so is quite possible that, on both days I am

favoring a simply better maximal state of affairs. With respect to irreducibly egocentric

preferences: in the Waiting for the Painful Operation case, the two scenarios that seem

open to me really do represent two different maximal states of affairs (in the one case a

maximal state of affairs in which pain is in the far future, in the other a maximal state of

affairs in which pain is in the near future), so it is quite possible that, in favoring one

scenario over another I am favoring a simply better maximal state of affairs.

So, if a dedicated peacemaker rejects four-dimensionalism, and accepts that there

are monadic tensed properties, she can solve the Generalization and Irreducibly

Egocentric Preferences problems by stipulating that, all other things being equal, states of

21

affairs in which pain will occur are worse than states of affairs in which pain has

occurred, and states of affairs in which pain will happen soon are worse than states of

affairs in which pain will happen a long time from now.

Would this solve the Grounding Problem? Would the metaphysics somehow

make it seem plausible that pain with the monadic property of being in the future is in

itself more significant than pain with the monadic property of being in the past? Well,

unless our peacemaker adopts the ‘shrinking block’ view, the metaphysics will not

explain why past pains matter less than future pains. But maybe no explanation is needed.

If the peacemaker has a strong (though perhaps defeasible) conviction that future pain is

intrinsically worse than past pain, the metaphysics does nothing to undermine her

conviction.

3: Self-Bias and the Metaphysics of the Self

We can make peace between considerations of the greater good and time-biased

considerations by adopting an appropriate metaphysical picture. Can we perform an

analogous trick for egocentric considerations? What sort of picture would allow us to say

that, when we favor scenarios in which we are better off, we favor simply better maximal

states of affairs? Well, at a minimum the picture would have to imply that, in the After

the Train Crash case, where I have an irreducibly egocentric preference, the two

possibilities represent different ways for the world to be. But since these ‘possibilities’

differ only with respect to which of the injured parties is me, the picture would have to

imply that this property, being me, somehow enters into states of affairs.

22

The analogy to four-dimensionalism and its denial should be clear. According to a

widely accepted view of the self, if ‘being me’ and ‘being other’ are properties at all, then

they are relational properties. CJH is me relative to CJH, other relative to Stalin. Stalin is

me relative to Stalin, other relative to Lenin. And everybody is, in the relevant sense, on a

par with respect to these properties – we are all me relative to ourselves, and other

relative to everybody else. But according to the rather unorthodox view we would have to

take, it would have to be the case that in any given maximal state of affairs, one and only

one person has the non-relational property of being me. There is a unique I at the center

(so to speak) of all that exists. After the Train Crash, I am comparing maximal states of

affairs in which the thing with the monadic property of being me is in pain, with maximal

states of affairs in which the thing with the monadic property of being me is free of pain.

Won’t this turn out to be just another theory of the kind we considered in Chapter

One, another theory that says I am metaphysically unique? Well, yes, but if it is to solve

the Generalization Problem then it needs to be considerably more subtle than those were.

Let’s say that I am CJH, and Jane and I are each contemplating a state of affairs in which

CJH suffers and Jane prospers. Our theory will need to explain why, although the state of

affairs I am considering is one in which the thing with the intrinsic property of being me

suffers, the state of affairs Jane is considering is not. And it will need to explain why,

when Jane says ‘I am going to prosper’, the proposition expressed by her sentence is true.

It may be helpful to see how a someone who believes in monadic tensed

properties (henceforth a monadic tenser18) deals with the analogous ‘problem’. Let’s say

that it is presently noon, and Joe at noon and Joe at 11am are both contemplating a

18 Such people are sometimes called serious tensers. But that seems prejudicial to me.

23

situation in which Joe at noon suffers, and Joe at 11am prospers. The monadic tenser

must explain why the state of affairs that Joe at 11am contemplates is one in which Joe

presently prospers, not one in which he prospered one hour ago. And she must explain

why, when Joe at 11am says ‘Joe is not suffering’, the proposition expressed by her

sentence is true.

Obviously this poses no real difficulties for the monadic tenser. If it is presently

noon, and Joe is suffering, and Joe at 11am was thinking about this, then the situation that

Joe at 11am was contemplating was one in which Joe wasn’t suffering.

The point is that the monadic tenser makes use of operators – it will be the case

that and it was the case that19, that enable her to make sense the states of affairs that past

and future people consider, and to make sense of past and future tensed utterances. If

Saint Augustine said ‘It is now 400 A.D.!’ the monadic tenser need not label his utterance

false. His utterance was true, because it was the case that (‘It is now 400 A.D.’ is true),

because it was the case that (it is now 400 A.D.).

And the operators enable monadic tensers to take the some of the counter-intuitive

sting out of their metaphysical commitments. For example, a presentist can say that,

although Anne Boleyn does not exist, she is not like Santa Claus – because it was the

case that (Ann Boleyn exists). Although my first grand-daughter does not exist, she is not

like the boogeyman – because it will be the case that (my first grand-daughter exists). In

general, for any thing that the four-dimensionalist believes to exist, the presentist can say

19 Monadic tensers typically also avail themselves of so-called ‘metric’ operators: for any n, the monadic tenser has operators in n seconds it will be the case that and n seconds ago it was the case that. But we won’t need these for the moment.

24

that either it exists, or it will exist, or it has existed. The present is special, then, but not

quite as special as it might at first have appeared.

The theory we are groping towards is going to need operators that, in a similar

kind of way, allow us to make sense of self-referential sentences uttered by other people,

and of the ‘possibilities’ that other people consider. Which operators we use will depend

on the details of the theory we adopt. I will outline a theory20, call it Egocentric

Presentism, which seems to me attractive and simple.

Egocentric Presentism – An Introduction

The best way to introduce this theory is with a story. Imagine that, in a fit of

Cartesian pique, I throw away all of my cherished beliefs about how the world is, and

about how I fit into it. I no longer accept that the earth is round, that there are material

objects, that I am CJH, or, for that matter, that I am anything at all. In this epistemically

emaciated state I retire to a secluded room and attempt to build up a world-view from the

raw materials of what is unquestionably given. A series of insights strike me.

Insight 1: There are some things: a painting of Saint George and the Dragon, a

telephone, a diary, a facial itch. Their nature remains obscure. Perhaps the

painting is not really a painting. Perhaps the telephone is a toy. Perhaps

the diary is a bundle of sense data. Perhaps the itch is imaginary. All that

20 I will not place the theory in any historical context here, but it picks up on themes from the work of a great many philosophers. It could, for example, be presented as the solution to a problem that troubled Wittgenstein, the problem of how to retain the basic Humean idea about self-knowledge (that the truth with which I am confronted, when I direct my attention towards my own experience, is not that I am in pain but that there is pain, not that I see red but that there is a sensation of red) without being forced to be a solipsist about other minds. See Wittgenstein (1922) §5.557 – §5.641 and Wittgenstein (1953) §402 – §420.

25

can be said for sure is that these things, whatever they are, reveal

themselves at this, the first stage of the Cartesian exercise. They are

present.21

Insight 2: The present things are perceptual objects of a sentient being, CJH. CJH

sees the telephone, painting and diary. CJH feels the itch.

Insight 3: There are many, many sentient beings other than CJH, but their perceptual

objects are not present. So as to talk about this interesting feature of CJH

in an economical way, let’s introduce some terms. Let ‘present

experiences’ be short-hand for ‘experiences whose objects are present.’

Let ‘I’ (in the nominative, ‘me’ in the accusative) be short-hand for the

definite description ‘the one with present experiences’.

Insight 4: Although I, CJH, am unique in having present experiences, I find that I

can imagine other sentient creatures being unique in this respect. I can

imagine, for example, that I am Michael Schumacher (that the one with

present experiences is Michael Schumacher). This involves imagining that

Michael Schumacher’s perceptual objects – heat, a smell of foam and

latex, the wail of a ten-cylinder engine – are present. It involves imagining

21 This is a term of art, and I introduce it guardedly. The advantages of using the word ‘present’ in this context are that it supports both monadic and relational readings, and that, by doing so, I emphasize the structural similarities between this view and the analogous views in the metaphysics of time.

26

hoardings buzzing past me, the one with present experiences, Michael

Schumacher, at two hundred miles per hour.

Insight 5: Such imaginings lead me to suspect that I am less unique than I may have

thought. Michael Schumacher’s experiences are not present, so things are

not as I imagined them to be, when I imagined being him. But he is

conscious, he has a point of view, and from his point of view things are as

I imagined them to be – the heat, the foamy smell, and the wail of the

engine are present. From Michael Schumacher’s point of view, Michael

Schumacher’s experiences are present.

But let’s be careful here. In saying that Michael Schumacher is conscious I am not taking

presence to be a relational property – saying that his experiences are present relative to

his point of view, while mine are present relative to my point of view. Presence is a

monadic property that my experiences have and his do not. The construction ‘from his

point of view’ is really an operator, the semantics for which might be given in the

following way.

Semantics for a Logic of Points of View

Say that a subject world (henceforth an S-world) is a world in which there are

functionally sentient creatures, the experiences of one and only one of which have the

monadic property of being present.

27

At any such world, a set of atomic propositions hold true. Think of these as

propositions having to do with the way things are, physically speaking, and propositions

having to do with where the property of being present is instantiated. So, for example, at

SHenryKissinger, a world physically identical to our own, but in which the experiences of

Henry Kissinger are present, the following atomic propositions hold true:

‘The sun orbits the moon’

‘There are over ten billion functionally sentient animals’

‘The person with present experiences was formerly Secretary of State’

‘CJH’s experiences are absent’

...etc.

Now, let a system of S-worlds be a set of physically identical S-worlds such that

for any functionally sentient creature in an S-world in the set, there is an S-world in the

set in which that very creature has present experiences. And say that for any system of S-

worlds there is a reflexive two-place access relation, the a-relation, defined over pairs of

S-worlds in the system.

Here, for the sake of having an example to work with, is one system of S-worlds:

28

Fig 3.1:

STom Some atomic propositions true at STom: ‘There are 3 functionally sentient animals’ ‘Tom’s experiences are present’

‘Harry feels queasy’

SDick SHarry Some atomic propositions true at SDick: Some atomic propositions true at SHarry: ‘There are 3 functionally sentient animals’ ‘There are 3 functionally sentient animals’ ‘Dick’s Experiences are present’ ‘Harry’s experiences are present’ ‘Harry feels queasy’ ‘Harry feels queasy’

(The ovals represent S-worlds. The arrows represent access relations between S-worlds:

S i S j means S i is a-related to S j.) So, in this system there are three S-worlds, STom,

SDick, and SHarry. They are all a-related to themselves, STom is a-related to SDick (though

not vice-versa), and SDick is a-related to SHarry, (though not vice-versa).

Now we give truth conditions for sentences containing quantified point of view

operators in the following way:

Definition 1: From some point of view, from every point of view

From some point of view (p) is true at SK iff for some SJ a-related to SK , p is true at SJ

From every point of view (p) is true at SK iff for every SJ a-related to SK , p is true at SJ

29

So, for example, in the above system the proposition ‘From some point of view (there are

present queasy experiences)’ is true at SDick, because SDick is a-related to SHarry and ‘there

are present queasy experiences’ is true at SHarry. But it is false at STom, because STom is not

a-related to SHarry, or to any other S-world at which ‘there are present queasy

experiences’ is true.

And we give truth conditions for sentences containing operators of the form from

H’s point of view with the following definition schema:

Definition 2: From H’s point of view of

For any functionally sentient being H, From H’s point of view (p) is true at SK iff

for some SJ a-related to SK, H has present experiences, and p is true at SJ

So in the above system, for example, ‘from Harry’s point of view (Harry’s experiences

are present and Harry is queasy’) is true at SDick.

Finally we stipulate that:

Definition 3: Consciousness

H is conscious is true at SK iff

From H’s point of view (H’s experiences are present) is true at SK

So in the above system, for example, ‘Harry is conscious’ is true at SDick but not at STom,

because SDick is a-related to a world in which Harry’s experiences are present, but STom is

30

not. But ‘from Dick’s point of view (Harry is conscious)’ is true at STom, because STom is

a-related to SDick.

Here’s a different system: Fig 3.2

STom Some atomic propositions true at STom: ‘There are 3 functionally sentient animals’ ‘Tom’s experiences are present’

‘Harry feels queasy’

SDick SHarry Some atomic propositions true at SDick: Some atomic propositions true at SHarry: ‘There are 3 functionally sentient animals’ ‘There are 3 functionally sentient animals’ ‘Dick’s experiences are present’ ‘Harry’s experiences are present’ ‘Harry feels queasy’ ‘Harry feels queasy’

In this system all pairs of S-worlds are a-related. Call this a maximally interrelated

system. So in this system ‘Harry is conscious’ is true at SDick. Indeed, at every S-world it

is true that every functionally sentient creature is conscious. There are no zombies in a

maximally interrelated system.

That’s the S-world semantics for a logic of points of view. It gives you, I hope, an

intuitive sense of how the operators from some point of view, from every point of view...

etc. work. As an egocentric presentist (pretend, for the moment, that I am one) I make use

31

of these operators but believe the semantics to be misleading in one important respect. I

believe that all that exists is an S-world, SME, in which the experiences of one and only

one person, the person I call ‘me’, are present. That’s it. What makes the S-world

semantics useful, though misleading, is that propositions containing the point of view

operators are true or false of this world as if it were part of a maximally-interrelated

system of physically identical S-worlds, and truth conditions for such propositions were

given by the rules above. So it is true, for example, that from Henry Kissinger’s point of

view (Henry Kissinger’s experiences are present), and that from Henry Kissinger’s point

of view (from Condoleezza Rice’s point of view (Henry Kissinger’s experiences are not

present)), and that every functionally sentient creature is conscious.

An egocentric presentist’s attitude towards the S-world semantics, then, is very

like a temporal presentist’s attitude toward the standard four-dimensionalist semantics for

tense logic. The temporal presentist says that only the present moment exists, that that is

all there is. But for the purposes of understanding how tensed operators (operators like it

was once the case that and it will always be the case that) work it may be useful to

imagine that other moments exist, because propositions containing such operators are true

or false of the present moment, as if it were part of a system of moments ordered by an

earlier-later relation and truth conditions for propositions containing the operators were

given by the rules of the four-dimensionalist semantics for tense logic.

It is also very like a modal fictionalist’s attitude to the possible worlds semantics

for modal logic.22 The modal fictionalist believes that propositions containing modal

operators (like it is possible that and it is necessary that) are true or false of the actual

22 See Rosen (1990) and onwards.

32

world as if it were part of a wider system of possible worlds ordered by an access

relation, and truth conditions for the operators were given by the possible worlds

semantics. But, says the fictionalist, we shouldn’t let this fool us into thinking that a

wider system really exists. Only the actual world exists.

Egocentric Presentism and Egoistic Considerations

If egocentric presentism is right then all that there is is an S-world. S-worlds are

maximal states of affairs. So, as an egocentric presentist, I can make peace between

considerations of the greater good and egocentric considerations by taking S-worlds in

which I (short-hand for ‘the one with present experiences’, remember) suffer to be worse

simpliciter than S-worlds in which I do not, and S-worlds in which I prosper to be better

simpliciter than S-worlds in which I do not.

The Problem of Irreducibly Egocentric Preferences now disappears. When I have

such a preference, in the After the Train Crash case, for example, the two ‘possibilities’

that seem open to me really do represent different ways for everything to be. My desire

that I not suffer amounts to a preference for the maximal state of affairs in which there is

no present suffering, a simply better maximal state of affairs.

What about the Generalization Problem? As an egocentric presentist I can make

sense of the idea that other people have reason to be self-interested, even when their self-

interest conflicts with my own. Recall the Competing for a Scarce Resource case, for

example. In this case there seemed to be two ways for things to go: Possibility (1): CJH gets the resource Jane misses out and there is present happiness and there is absent misery

33

Possibility (2): CJH misses out Jane gets the resource and there is present misery and there is absent happiness

Since the state of affairs represented by possibility (1) is intrinsically better than the state

of affairs represented by possibility (2), considerations of the greater good support my

favoring it, but how do such considerations bear on Jane? I might think about this

question in two different ways.

On the one hand, I might think that considerations of the greater good support

Jane favoring me getting the resource in just the way that they support me favoring me

getting the resource. If Jane takes the resource for herself then she brings about an

intrinsically worse state of affairs, and that counts against her doing so.

But there’s another, better way to think about it. When I treat another person as a

practical deliberator, and ask whether such-and-such considerations support her doing so-

and-so, I take her to be in a particular deliberative context, facing choices, options, and

alternatives. This involves taking the deliberative context to be present. But since Jane’s

experiences are not, have never been, and will never be present, she is not, has never

been, and will never be a practical deliberator in this sense, so I cannot think directly

about what considerations count. I must instead think indirectly, by, so-to-speak, thinking

within the scope of the from Jane’s point of view operator – by thinking about what from

Jane’s point of view (…is the case). When I do this I see that from Jane’s point of view (if

Jane gets the resource there will be present happiness and absent misery, if Jane misses

out there will be present misery and absent happiness), so from Jane’s point of view (it is

34

intrinsically better that Jane get the resource), so from Jane’s point of view

(consequentialist considerations support Jane favoring the scenario in which she gets the

resource). When I think about Jane as a practical deliberator, I see that considerations of

the greater good support her looking out for herself.

When a monadic tenser seeks to generalize time-bias he will feel a similar kind of

ambivalence. Imagine that, in the Bad and Worse Operations case, I decide to act on

Monday so as to ensure that I will have the nasty operation on Thursday, rather than the

exquisitely agonizing one on Tuesday. It is now Wednesday evening, and, being biased

toward the future, I am already regretting my decision, wishing that I had brought my

operation forward to Tuesday. What should I now think about whether considerations of

the greater good supported Monday’s decision?

On one hand I might think that they weighed against my decision. As things are

there will be nasty suffering tomorrow. If I had acted differently all suffering would be in

the past. So, in deferring the operation, I favored an intrinsically worse state of affairs

over an intrinsically better one.

But that is obviously the wrong way to think about it. Thinking in the right way

about the practical considerations that bore upon Monday’s decision involves thinking

about a deliberative context in which I face Monday’s options and alternatives, which

involves thinking about that deliberative context as present. But Monday’s deliberative

context is not present. For me to consider it so, I must think, so-to-speak, within the scope

of the it was the case that operator. I must think about how it was the case that (…things

are). But since it was the case that (if I choose to defer the operation there will be less

suffering in the future), it was the case that (considerations of the greater good support

35

my deferring the operation). When I think about the decision in the appropriate way, I see

that it was supported by considerations of the greater good.

Lastly, what about the Grounding Problem? Would the metaphysics support mild

egocentric-hedonism by providing grounds for thinking that, all other things being equal,

it is worse that suffering be mine than someone else’s? I think so. If you don’t see this

immediately, I urge you (really!) to perform this experiment:

Trial By Kettle

Today, many hundreds, if not thousands, of Russians will spill boiling water

on their hands. Pour boiling water on your own hand and compare your

present discomfort with the absent discomfort of the northern-most Russian

spiller. Which is worse?

Your immediate reaction:

‘This pain is dreadful, worse than any of those Russian pains.’

may be tempered by a sober, reflective thought:

‘My pain appears worse to me because I am more intimately acquainted with it. It

is present to me in a way that the northern-most Russian spiller’s pain is not. But he is

more intimately acquainted with his pain. It is present to him in a way that mine is not.

Since our situations are really symmetrical, I find, on reflection, that I have no grounds

for thinking that my pain is worse simpliciter than his pain.’

Well and good. But this humbling thought is not available to an egocentric

presentist. For an egocentric presentist, the situations are not symmetrical. It’s not that

36

my pain is present to me and his present to him. Mine is present and his is absent. That is

part of the way things are. So there is no reason to qualify or reassess my initial

judgment.

The thought experiment does not, of course, commit an egocentric presentist to

extreme egocentric-hedonism – the view that only present suffering has any significance

at all. It identifies one factor that makes pleasure better and suffering worse. This is quite

compatible with thinking that, in evaluating the significance of suffering, there are many

other relevant factors to consider – factors such as the intensity of the suffering, the

duration of the suffering, and the number of sufferers. It may be very tricky to give these

factors precise weight. Is it better that there be one hour of hand-scalding or four hours of

thumb-scalding? Is it better that there be one scalded hand or four scalded thumbs? 23 Is it

better that there be absent suffering from hand-scalding or present suffering from thumb-

scalding? But some cases are less tricky. It is better that there be four hangnails than one

crushed leg. It is better that there be present suffering from a hangnail than absent

suffering of leg-crushing. After all, when there is an absent suffering from leg-crushing,

and the victim is not a zombie, it is the case that from someone else’s point of view (there

is excruciating pain). And an egocentric presentist is free to take it that this matters, in

just the way that a monadic tenser is free to take it that it matters that it will be the case

that (there is excruciating pain). That is why empathy is instructive. For an egocentric

presentist, empathizing with an unfortunate involves imagining that I am the unfortunate,

that the unfortunate has present experiences. This involves viscerally imagining what

23 The trickiness runs very deep. Indeed, it may be that there is no satisfactory way of answering all such questions without appealing to an intransitive ‘better than’ relation. See Temkin (1996) and Norcross (1997).

37

from the unfortunate’s point of view (…is the case). And I care about the results of this

exercise because I care about what from another person’s point of view (...is the case).

So, for the mild egocentric-hedonist who adopts egocentric presentism, in some

cases (e.g. comparing a state of affairs in which I suffer a hangnail with one in which

someone else suffers a crushed leg) there will remain some conflict between egocentric-

hedonistic considerations and considerations of the greater good. But the residual conflict

will not trouble me. For an egocentric presentist, egocentric-hedonistic considerations are

not considerations of a special, distinctive kind, that count towards my favoring one state

of affairs over another even when I recognize that the other is better simpliciter than the

one. Once I have judged that it is better that there be a present hangnail than absent leg-

crushing, it isn’t as if there is some further consideration – ‘but the hangnail will be

mine!’ – that has independent force. I have already accounted for the presence of the

hangnail, the fact that it is mine, in my judgment about which state of affairs is better

simpliciter. So when egocentric-hedonistic considerations and considerations of the

greater good conflict the former just fall away.

Furthermore, when the trade-off between my interests and the interests of other

people is more evenly balanced, as an egocentric presentist I can indulge my mildly

egocentric preferences and attend to my own pleasures and pains while enjoying the

psychological harmony of Louis XIV – the serene confidence that comes with believing

that in doing what’s good for me I am doing what’s good full stop.

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