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South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC)

25 March 2007

MALHUZINE (MOZAMBIQUE) EXPLOSION SITE‘QUICK LOOK’ TECHNICAL SUMMARY AND CONCEPTS FOR FURTHER SUPPORT

INTRODUCTION1

There was a tragic and undesirable explosive event within the Mozambique Ministry of Defence (MOD) ammunition storage facility at Malhuzine2 on Thursday 22 March 2007. The initial explosion was recorded at 1600 hours, with subsequent explosions and fires continuing over the next 15 hours until 1100 hours on Friday 23 March 2007. The loss of life and injury was significant with over 104 fatalities and 400+ injuries estimated to date.3 The physical results of this explosive event impacted on the township of Malhuzine and the immediate settlements, causing significant damage to civilian property, (damage levels dependent on distance from Malhuzine ammunition depot). The event also caused mass panic among local residents with many fleeing from the area to avoid injury. Further explosions from the site cannot yet be discounted. UNDP immediately offered technical support to the Government of Mozambique in alleviating the impact of this incident.4 This ‘Quick Look’ Technical Summary contains the findings from an assessment visit (24 - 27 March 2007) and suggests proposals for further donor engagement. There are four generic areas that require technical support and assistance, although significant capability has already been deployed to respond to two of these Task Areas:

Task Area 1: Support to the post-incident Awareness and Risk Education programme within the Malhuzine area. UNICEF, with operational support from Handicap International and Save the Children has the operational lead in this area and an effective localised mine and UXO risk education (MRE) campaign is underway. No further support from UNDP is necessary in this Task Area.

Task Area 2: Continued EOD response to UXO discovered in the area outside the Malhuzine ammunition depot. HALO Trust (Mozambique), with financial support from the Governments of Belgium and Ireland, responded very quickly to this threat. A joint coordination cell (JCC) has been established with the Mozambique Armed Forces (FADM), and 11 EOD Teams were operational as at 270800B Mar 07. UNDP held a coordination meeting on 25 Mar 07, at which the following responsibilities were agreed to respond to this task area:

1 All photographs courtesy of HALO Trust (Mozambique) (Primarily) and UNDP Mozambique.2 Centre Point: Latitude 31051’33.49” South, Longitude 32035’ 02.42” East. 3 Source: IRIN (OCHA) Website.4 A request for initial technical assistance from SEESAC was received by Resident Representative UNDP Serbia from the Resident Representative UNDP Mozambique, through BCPR Geneva. As a result Head SEESAC deployed immediately, under UNDP BCPR SURGE capacity, to provide technical assistance.

Internacionalnih Brigada 56, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia Tel. (381 11) 344 6353 Fax. (381 11) 344 6356


ACTIVITY ORGANIZATIONS REMARKS

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)

FADM

Logistic support to HALO EOD Teams for recovery of ‘safe to move’ ammunition.

Establishment of JCC in National Army HQ and Ammunition Collection Point (ACP) near task area.

HALO Trust

11 x EOD Teams deployed for Conventional Munition Disposal (CMD) Operations.

Technical support to JCC and ACP. Operational coordination of EOD and EOR activities.

HALO should continue to have this key operational coordination role on the ground until the area is safe.

Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance (EOR)

Handicap International 5 x EOR Teams to locate and mark UXO.

CCM EOR support (as appropriate) during MRE operations. Coordination with local civilian authorities.

Mine and UXO Risk Education (MRE)

CCMHISave the Children

See Task Area 2

UNDP/SEESAC have already supplied HALO Trust with the ‘EOD Frontline’ software package to assist in the mapping and control of the EOD clearance operation.

Task Area 3: The planning, management and implementation of the EOD clearance of the Malhuzine ammunition depot explosion site.

Task Area 4: SALW (Conventional Ammunition) stockpile management support to the Ministry of Defence to reduce the risks of re-occurrence at other ammunition storage sites within Mozambique.

CAUSE OF THE EXPLOSION

There are many possible causes of undesirable explosions in ammunition depots, but these can usually be attributed under the following generic areas: 1) deterioration of the physical or chemical condition of the ammunition and explosives; 2) unsafe storage practices and infrastructure; 3) unsafe handling and transport practices; 4) external environmental effects; or 5) deliberate sabotage.

Regrettably, the dramatic consequences of an ammunition explosion often make the key witnesses to the event its first victims. Therefore any subsequent investigation tends to concentrate on the practices and regulations in force at the time, as key witnesses are not available. In this case no witnesses to events within the ammunition depot at the time were identified.

Due to the fact that a degree of technical knowledge is required for an effective investigation, the investigating authority is also usually the authority responsible for the ammunition management and storage in the first place. This complicates impartiality, independence of investigation and leads to a reluctance to allocate responsibility. At a meeting with the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence it was indicated that the accident would be an investigated by an ‘independent’ commission with MOD members, although no further details of the composition of this commission were made available. SEESAC requests that this technical evaluation be forwarded to the Commission if it is deemed appropriate by the Ministry of Defence and UNDP.



Limited evidence was made available to support a comprehensive technical investigation into the cause of the explosion, as the MOD would not permit access to the explosion site despite numerous official requests. Therefore the following matrix summarises the possible causes together with the evidence available. Final attribution of the cause of the explosion must inevitably be based on the ‘balance of probability’ for each possible cause. (SEESAC has allocated a ‘balance of probability’ based on a No - Low - Medium - High - Definite Scale.



POSSIBLE CAUSE EVIDENCE BALANCE OF PROBABILITY REMARKS

Deterioration of the Physical or Chemical Condition of the Ammunition or Explosives.(Autocatalytic decomposition of propellant leading to spontaneous ignition.)

High ambient temperatures and wide diurnal cycling accelerating decomposition and stabiliser depletion.

Types of ammunition (mortar) stored in depot are known to be susceptible to this phenomenon.

No propellant test capability, or records available, in the FADM to identify ‘at risk’ propellant.

High

External environmental effects. (Fire)

An external vegetation fire spreading into the facility cannot be discounted.

There are no witnesses to suggest that this happened though, therefore the probability of this is assessed as Low to Medium.

Low - Medium .

External environmental effects. (Heat)(Ignition of White Phosphorous (WP) due to ambient high temperatures).

The high ambient temperatures could cause White Phosphorous ammunition to spontaneously combust if stored under inappropriate conditions.

FADM is known to have WP ammunition, and although the presence of WP in the depot has not been confirmed to SEESAC, it is still a medium to high probability of cause.

Medium to High

Unsafe storage practices.

There is previous evidence of very unsafe storage practices in Mozambique, but in this particular case they are unlikely to have caused this particular accident.

Low

An Ammunition Technical Assessment to assess safety within the MOD/FADM ammunition stockpile this urgently needed to assess the chances of a repeat event. (See Later).

Unsafe storage infrastructure.

The external safety distance to civilian habitation was approximately 200m at the nearest point.

Map analysis suggests that in the past there were adequate danger areas, but civilian housing has since encroached into the danger area. This is due to a lack of control of building in the area.

Low

The inadequate safety distances were not a cause of the explosion, but have had a major effect on the effects.The MINIMUM danger area for even small quantities of ammunition should be greater then 400m.

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POSSIBLE CAUSE EVIDENCE BALANCE OF PROBABILITY REMARKS

Unsafe handling and transport practices.

This is possible, but unlikely. No ammunition processing or transport operations were taking place, and therefore it is unlikely that any ammunition handling was taking place.

Any witnesses are likely to be fatalities if this were the cause anyway.

Low

Sabotage or Arson No evidence of sabotage or arson was identified. The facility was guarded and no unusual incidents

to suggest sabotage of arson were reported.NO



If this analysis is supported by the result of the official investigation, then this will have an impact on the safe storage of ammunition at other ammunition storage areas within Mozambique, and the wider region. This was not an isolated incident, and there is now a trend developing of undesirable ammunition depot explosions within Mozambique;

DATE LOCATION DEATHS INJURIES CAUSE (?) REMARKS1986 Malhuzine 1 13 100 Not Known

30 Oct 02 Beira 1 6 50+ Electrical Storm (?)

Still requires EOD Clearance.5

130 houses destroyed. 3,655 Tonnes Involved. 500 Tonnes recovered.

23 Nov 06 Beira 1A 5 0Fatalities due to UXO within 150 metres of ESA due to the Oct 02 explosion.

Jan 07 Malhuzine 2 0 3 Not Known

22 Mar 07 Malhuzine 3 104+ 400+ Not Known

TOTALS 118+ 553+

IMPACT AND EFFECTS OF THE EXPLOSION

It is an unfortunate fact that ammunition and explosive storage can never be 100% safe in terms of the ‘absence of risk’, and the best that can be achieved is ‘tolerable risk’. This can only be achieved by a wide range of technical responses that are outside the scope of this report. It is appropriate, however, to highlight that in terms of national stockpiles the hazard is the physical presence of the ammunition and explosives, whereas the risk is primarily dependent on the physical and chemical condition of the ammunition and explosives; the training and education of the personnel responsible for the storage and surveillance of the stockpiles; the handling, repair, maintenance and disposal systems in place; and the storage infrastructure and environment.

The concept of tolerable risk can only be achieved if the ammunition management systems and storage infrastructure are to appropriate standards or in accordance with ‘best practices’. There is no doubt that the ‘national standards’ applicable within the MOD/FADM are not in accordance with international ‘standards’ and best practices.6

To illustrate this, the following matrix contains the Explosive Licence Limits for UN Hazard Division 1.1 (High Explosives) that would have been applicable to the facility should international ‘best practices’ for ammunition storage have been applied:

5 See UNDP Mozambique Report, Technical Assessment and EOD Clearance Recommendations for the Beira Ammunition Storage Site, 30 November 2006. This is a comprehensive report, in which EOD clearance methodology is clearly identified. The information is also applicable to the Malhuzine Ammunition Depot Explosion, and therefore will not be repeated in detail here.6 NATO Allied Ammunition Storage and Transportation Publications 1 and 2 (AASTP 1 and 2) - Safety Principles for the Storage and Transport of Military Ammunition and Explosives.European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR) (http://www.unece.org/trans/danger/publi/adr/intro.htm).United Nations Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods Model Regulations (Eleventh revised edition). Details of how to obtain this publication can be found at (http://www.unece.org/trans/danger/publi/unrec/pubdet.htm).RMDS/G 05.40 - Ammunition Storage. (www.seesac.org).

7Internacionalnih Brigada 56, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia Tel. (381 11) 344 6353 Fax. (381 11) 344 6356

http://www.seesac.org/

http://www.unece.org/trans/danger/publi/unrec/pubdet.htm

http://www.unece.org/trans/danger/publi/adr/intro.htm


EXPOSED SITE

DISTANCE FROM PRIMARY EXPLOSIVE

SITE (PES)(m)

QUANTITY DISTANCE

(QD) REFERENCE

EXPLOSIVE LIMITS

(kg)REMARKS

Road 1 (PTR)7 Approx 200 m D13 (>400) NILHouse 1 (IBD)8 Approx 200 m D13 (>400) NIL

Therefore NO high explosives could have been licensed for storage and processing at the Maputo site if international ‘best practices’ had been applied. In the technical opinion of SEESAC, the lack of explosive safety standards was a major contributory factor to the impact and effects of the explosion. SEESAC therefore very strongly recommends that Mozambique develop and implement National Explosives Safety Legislation that approaches international ‘best practices’ as a matter of urgency.

Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Density

Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) has been projected out to a maximum range of 10,000 metres, although UXO contamination density is only really significant in density out to approximately 2,000 metres. Although a danger area radius outside the technical area of the ammunition depot is still being surface cleared by a response EOD capability from HALO Trust, there will inevitably be a requirement for a sustainable EOD response capability as, based on previous global experience of these sorts of incidents, additional ammunition items will inevitably discovered in the future. A few large ammunition items (240mm BM 24 Rockets) were discovered out to a 10 km radius, and these are also being cleared as part of a response EOD capability.

Clearance within the external danger zone has already commenced and is within indigenous capability of the Joint Coordination Centre established to deal with the incident, (with the support of international mine and UXO clearance NGOs).9

Regrettably the evacuation of the civilian population from a recommended 2 km radius around the explosion site is not a practical option for a number of reasons;

The lack of an immediate evacuation policy during the explosions means that it would be difficult to impose one now;

The lack of immediate resources to shelter, feed, provide medical support and sustain a significant number of people during the period of the EOD clearance;

The family home is been used as a ‘contact place’ for those who fled during the explosions; and

The local population would be highly reluctant to leave their homes at this stage, fearing the looting of their homes. It is doubtful whether an evacuation policy could be effectively enforced and maintained.

Non-evacuation of the civilian population means obvious risks as:

The conduct of the EOD clearance operation in such close proximity to the civilian population will be complicated as effective cordon distances may be difficult to impose. (Conversely, the presence of the civilian population will greatly assist in the location of UXO!).

7 Public Traffic Route.8 Inhabited Building Distance.9 HALO Trust (EOD), CCM (EOR) and HI (EOR).

8Internacionalnih Brigada 56, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia Tel. (381 11) 344 6353 Fax. (381 11) 344 6356


The presence of UXO presents an ongoing threat to life until cleared.

There may yet be further explosions from the ammunition depot.

The Government of Mozambique has been warned of these risks, and the international community is taking the following action to reduce the risks to as close to a ‘tolerable’ level as possible:

The instigation of a localised MRE campaign;

The deployment of an Ammunition Control Point (ACP) in the area, manned by EOD specialists from HALO Trust to provide immediate technical advice;

The use of MCC personnel to ensure close liaison with local community leaders and communities. This supports both the MRE campaign and the location of UXO.

Area Clearance Requirements

The following matrix estimates the EOD clearance efforts and future requirements:

ITEMEXTERNAL UXO CONTAMINATION

AMMUNITION DEPOT AREAHABITATED AREA IMMEDIATE

UNHABITATED AREA10

Explosive Contaminated Areas11 2,640 Ha 500 Ha 96 Ha

Area Cleared as at 26 Mar 07. 500 Ha (Estimate)

500 Ha 0

EOD Clearance Balance 2,140 Ha (Estimate)

500 Ha 96 Ha

Situation within the Malhuzine Ammunition Storage Site

The Malhuzine Ammunition Storage Site consists of an area of approximately 1200m x 800m (96 Ha). The site consists of a bunker complex, surrounded by a double wire fence within a larger forest area of approximately 500 Ha. The nearest civilian habitation is less than 200m from the ammunition depot boundary, which means that no high explosive ammunition (UN Hazard Division 1.1) should ever have been stored there if international best practices were being applied. The site could be safely licenced in the future to store low explosive ammunition of Hazard Division 1.4 in the future, but the devastation caused by the explosions would suggest that this is a non-cost effective option. The land should be cleared of

10 The Ammunition Depot is in the middle of a 600 Ha Forest, which will also require a separate Battle Area Clearance (BAC) type operation. This has not yet commenced, and there are no plans to do so as part of the immediate EOD response.11 UXO have been located out to a 10 km radius from the explosion site, which means that an area of 314 km 2 (pi.r2) could possibly be subject to minor UXO contamination. Certainly an area of 12.6 km2 is subject to medium contamination (a radius of 2 km from the explosion site).


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UXO and utilised for other use. It should not be considered as a credible and safe ammunition storage area with immediate effect.

PROPOSED AREAS OF FUTHER INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Task Area 1: Awareness and Risk Education

In addition to the initial response coordinated by UNICEF, the following factors will require addressing in the future:

The Ministry of Defence will, to a major degree, have lost the trust and support of the civilian community of Malhuzine as a result of the impact of the explosion on the local community. This trust and support needs to be rebuilt, particularly as it is inevitable that Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) work will be necessary within the ammunition depot and surrounding area to destroy UXO. The community needs to be attuned to the fact that further small explosions will be necessary for safety reasons at the site during the next few months. This needs to be explained to them from an operational safety perspective, and they will need full explanations as to why it is necessary in order to reduce ‘fear’ levels whenever an explosion from the site is heard.

It would be very beneficial if the MOD could be persuaded to formally engage and co-operate with UNICEF and a local NGO for the development and implementation of appropriate ongoing risk education and awareness campaigns, as this would be a very positive first step towards rebuilding community trust and support. Consideration should be given to the employment of a local civilian Communications/Awareness Officer within the MOD/FMAD to manage this component of the EOD clearance operation.

Task Area 2: UXO Clearance of Local Area

HALO Trust has indicated that they have the capability and funding to support response EOD operations in the area outside the ammunition depot for four weeks. Yet it is inevitable that further support outside this time limitation will be necessary, and it is therefore strongly recommended that HALO maintain their lead operational and coordination roles, and be provided with further donor support until the FADM have developed a credible EOD response capability.

There is an uninhabited and forested area of 600 Ha surrounding the ammunition depot. This is still a ‘restricted area’ by the FADM and is not been cleared as part of the initial EOD response. Future clearance of this area is well within the planning and operational capability of the National Mine Action Authority (IND), (with international NGO support). It is therefore recommended that consideration for the transfer of clearance authority for this area be transferred to the IND, where it can be included in the national mine action plan. It is effectively Battle Area Clearance (BAC) anyway. However, EOD clearance will need to be closely coordinated with Task Area 3, as many factors will determine the EOD clearance order of both areas (the Forest and the Depot).

Task Area 3: EOD Clearance of Malhuzine Ammunition Depot


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The future EOD clearance of the explosion site should be in accordance with international best practice if support from the international donor community is to be obtained by the MOD/FMAD or an NGO partner. A level of ‘tolerable risk’ during EOD operations must be achieved in accordance with ISO Safety Guide 51, IMAS 12 and SEE RMDS/G 05.55.13 A formal risk assessment for the EOD Clearance operation should be developed in accordance with the above ‘best practices’. This is a more complex task than BAC, and it may require a different approach to that normally used in mine and UXO clearance.

Future EOD clearance operations should be based on the ‘philosophy’ and ‘principles’ of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), which may need to be formally developed and adopted by the MOD/FMAD. These need to be supported by specific ‘Standing Operating Procedures’ (SOP) for the site clearance operation.14 Philosophy and principles are essential for the planning and management of all EOD operations and should be formally established by the MOD/FMAD as a matter of priority.

Strategic direction as to the future land use of the ammunition depot must also be established by the MOD/FMAD, as it should not be used for ammunition storage again. This is very important, as future land use should determine the level of clearance required. IMAS 09.10 states that:

Land shall be accepted as 'cleared' when the demining organisation has ensured the removal and/or destruction of all mine and UXO hazards from the specified area to the specified depth.

The specified area to be cleared shall be determined by a technical survey or from other reliable information which establishes the extent of the mine and UXO hazard area.

Note: The priorities for clearance shall be determined by the impact on the individual community balanced against national infrastructure priorities.

The specified depth of clearance shall be determined by a technical survey, or from other reliable information, which establishes the depth of the mine and UXO hazards and an assessment of the intended land use. In the absence of reliable information on the depth of the local UXO and mine hazard, a default depth for clearance shall be established by the national mine action authority. It should be based on the technical threat from mines and UXO in the country and should also take into consideration the future use to which the land is to be put.

Note: For buried mines and UXO this depth should normally not be less than 130mm below the original surface level; this figure is based on the effective detection depth of the majority of metal detectors. It may be refined by the national mine action authority dependent on the type of metal detector that they currently use based on the results of the International Pilot Project for Technology Co-operation Final Report on the Evaluation of Commercial Off The Shelf Metal Detectors (EUR 19719 EN) (available from the EU JRC Ispra).

Therefore the detailed clearance requirements of the Malhuzine explosion site need to be strategically developed based on; 1) the threat; and 2) future land use. It is very likely that ‘surface clearance’ may be appropriate for the majority of the land within the depot, whereas sub-surface clearance would be appropriate for the ‘crater’ areas of the individual storage site15 explosions. Once the clearance depth requirements have been formally established then the appropriate technical equipment requirements can also be established.

The following matrix estimates the situation regarding the ammunition stocks at Malhuzine:16

12 www.mineactionstandards.org. In particular IMAS 09.10 and 09.30.13 www.seesac.org. In particular RMDS/G 05.55.14 SEESAC can advise further on these should it be required.15 In this case a ‘storage site’ being defined as an individual Explosive Storehouse (ESH) or Exposed Stack.16 To follow once access to the depot and FADM records has been obtained.


11

http://www.seesac.org/index.php?content=&page=crse&section=3

http://www.mineactionstandards.org/


ITEM 17 QUANTITY TONNES (AUW)18 REMARKS

Start State Statistics 850.0Ammunition natures include; 1) 240mm MLRS; 2) 57mm AA; 3) 23mm Cannon; 4) 82mm Mortar; 5) 152mm HE Shell.

Stocks Lost (Explosion)Stocks Recovered (Scrap)Stocks Recovered (To Storage)Stocks Destroyed (Open Burning)Stocks Destroyed (Open Detonation)UXO Destroyed Estimate of UXO cleared outside the Maluzine Site.

BALANCES

In terms of planning and implementing a safe, efficient and effective EOD clearance within the Ammunition Depot area SEESAC proposes that the following technical support and equipment from the international community would be appropriate in this case:

SERIAL RECOMMENDATION REMARKSCAPACITY DEVELOPMENT (FADM)

1.1 Assistance in the development of ‘Principles and Philosophy’ for EOD Operations.

Deployment of Technical Advisor (EOD and Ammunition Technical qualified).

1.2Development of EOD Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) in accordance with international ‘best practices’.

ISO Guide 51 IMAS RMDS/G 05.55 NATO STANAG 2143 NATO STANAG 2389

1.3

Assistance in the development of a formal risk assessment methodology for future EOD clearance operations. (Using Malhuzine as an example model).

TA (EOD and CA)

EOD CLEARANCE OPERATIONS

2.1 Commercial EOD Clearance Contract INGO capacity exists in Mozambique (HALO,

Armor Group, HI and RONCO). All are technically capable, and could be expected to bid.

2.2 Technical advice on ‘alternative’ clearance techniques for Malhuzine.

Vegetation clearance. (Controlled burns). Identification and marking techniques. Logistic destruction planning.

Significant quantities of un-fuzed ammunition will inevitably be recovered that will require logistic destruction. Open detonation is an obvious solution, but there will be sensitive local political issues relating to noise pollution that will constrain the development of a destruction programme, and only small quantities could be destroyed in the immediate area anyway due to lack of effective danger areas. Recovered un-fuzed ammunition will have to be stored in the open within the ammunition depot until a destruction programme can be developed. A plan for the safe disposal of this ammunition, and the identification of a suitable demolition ground and transportation requirements requires development.

A minor logistic challenge will be the disposal of metal scrap recovered from the ammunition that detonated or deflagrated during the initial explosions, destroyed infrastructure and damaged

17 The full matrix has been included to illustrate the future requirements for an EOD Clearance Operation.18 AUW = All Up Weight


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vehicles. A system should be established to confirm that the scrap is Free From Explosive (FFE). The commercial value of the scrap could be used to ‘subsidise’ the operational EOD clearance costs if an effective scrap disposal system can be implemented in partnership with a commercial scrap processor.

Task Area 4: SALW (Conventional Ammunition) Stockpile Management Support to the MOD/FADM19

SERIAL RECOMMENDATION REMARKSCAPACITY DEVELOPMENT (FADM)

1.1 Development of ammunition management system within the MOD/FADM.

Deployment of Chief Technical Advisor (Ammunition) for a 6 - 12 month period.

1.2 Development of ammunition management SOPs. Necessary as an immediate risk reduction operation.

1.3Production of an Ammunition Technical Assessment (ATA) of ammunition storage safety and future requirements.

Urgent requirement to establish risks of reoccurrence.

Conducted by CTA (Ammunition)

1.4 Development of National Explosive Safety Legislation. CTA (Ammunition) to advise.

AMMUNITION STORAGE INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS2.1 Urgent initial infrastructure improvements. Grass cutting to reduce risks of external fire.

2.2 Development of one ammunition depot as a ‘model’ depot.

Use for training and advocacy for better standards.

Test, develop and demonstrate capability for improvements to the remaining sites.

Final SEESAC Comments

The MOD/FMAD is requested to take note of the contents and proposals contained within this ‘Quick Look’ Technical Summary, and formally indicate to UNDP Mozambique the components that they would be interested in pursuing in terms of technical support and assistance from the international donor community. UNDP Mozambique, with BCPR assistance, can then develop formal project proposals for consideration by the international community and initiate the appropriate project implementation mechanisms.

Support for the immediate EOD response capability provided by HALO Trust should continue to be routed through the normal channels used by HALO Trust in Mozambique.

19 UNDP Mozambique has been provided with a draft Project Document for this specific Task Area.


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Adrian WilkinsonHead SEESAC

Office: +381 11 344 6353Mobile: +381 63 217 350Fax: +381 11 344 6356 E Mail: [email protected]: www.seesac.org


14

http://www.seesac.org/

mailto:[email protected]


ANNEX A - INSTABILITY OF EXPLOSIVES

If, as seems likely, that autocatalytic decomposition of propellant leading to spontaneous ignition or self-ignition of white phosphorous ammunition was the major contributing factor, then this has implications for the safety of the remainder of the Mozambique MOD ammunition stockpile.

It is generally accepted that long-term stability of high explosive fillings is not considered to be a problem that could compromise the safety of stored ammunition. However, it is still necessary to carry out routine inspection to monitor the general state of ammunition for signs of exudation of the filling, corrosion etc for high explosive filled ammunition (detonating items). This aspect of long-term storage can have safety implications when ammunition is transported and certainly if it is ever used in proof activities, training or on operations.

Propellants, however, are a different case in terms of stability and safety in storage. In the Mozambique ammunition stockpiles the majority of propellants are either Single Base containing only nitrocellulose as the energetic component or Double Base containing both nitrocellulose and nitro-glycerine as energetic components. It is unlikely that they have any Triple Base propellants. Even if the propellant is kept in ideal storage conditions these components will begin to decompose over time to form oxides of nitrogen, mainly dinitrogen tetroxide. If these oxides of nitrogen are not removed from the propellant as they are formed they will catalyse further decomposition. This is an example of autocatalytic decomposition since the impurity being formed accelerates the chemistry creating more of the same impurity which, therefore, causes further decomposition and so on.

One factor that can increase the rate of chemical reaction is temperature. Thus any increase above 20oC will have an adverse effect on the storage life of propellant. It has been noted that for surface magazines, the temperature may reach over 45oC in the region. In itself this is a significant problem in ideal storage conditions, however, if the propellant is one that already has a low stabiliser content this high temperature will be a major problem, particularly for that ammunition that has been stored in the open and subjected to significant diurnal cycling.

This autocatalytic decomposition of propellants is a serious safety issue, as it is known to lead to spontaneous ignition (see below). To prevent this occurrence, chemical additives are introduced into the propellant formulation and are known as stabilisers. They do not stop the slow decomposition of the nitrocellulose and nitro-glycerine but rather prevent the accelerated chemical decomposition by removing the oxides of nitrogen, which would cause it to happen. Thus, the stabiliser reacts chemically with these oxides removing them from the system. Of course, to do this, the stabiliser will slowly be consumed.

Thus, the reduction in stabiliser content will lead to a point where it becomes insufficient to guarantee safety and this should be a measure of the storage life of that propellant. Both chemical analysis and instrumental methods can be employed to measure the stabiliser content, the latter being a more recent advance in propellant analysis.

Two chemicals are used routinely as stabilisers, one is diphenylamine (DPA) used in Single Base propellants from the early years to the present time. Chemically it behaves as a base reacting with the initial decomposition products of nitrocellulose, initially to form nitrosodiphenylamine, which is then converted into various nitro-derivatives of diphenylamine. This stabiliser is too basic to be used if nitro-glycerine is present and therefore is not used in Double Base propellants. Instead the stabiliser of choice is diphenyldiethylurea also known as carbamite or ethyl centralite. This acts as a weak base reacting with the decomposition products again to form nitro- and nitroso-derivatives.


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The overall chemistry of the action of stabilisers is extremely complex but the end result is to keep the propellant chemically stable.

Evidence of propellant instability

The fact that autocatalytic decomposition of propellant may cause spontaneous ignition is mentioned in virtually all texts on ammunition or explosives. However, there is still little hard evidence given as to the likelihood or even examples of this actually occurring. Data is available to show that over 30 ammunition accidents could be attributed (with a high degree of probability) to spontaneous propellant ignition. Care must be taken, however, as there may well be a self-prophesy syndrome in that the instability of nitrocellulose has been known since its discovery and it may be that this is a convenient reason why an ammunition depot has exploded. However, there appears to be sufficient evidence from some cases that this certainly was the cause, as analytical evidence exists to show that the propellant was in a state of serious stabiliser depletion. In other cases the propellant was known to be old or not kept under proper surveillance.

All of this demonstrates that great care must be taken in the surveillance of stored propellant to avoid possible magazine accidents. This is compelling evidence that depletion of stabiliser indeed causes spontaneous ignition of propellant and causes magazine accidents. In one recorded case the DPA stabiliser content was only 0.04 - 0.13%.

Assessment of propellant stability

It would therefore seem logical that the most important measure of safety from the point of view of chemical stability is the stabiliser content of the propellant. During the lifetime of the propellant the stabiliser content will slowly decrease. The diphenylamine usually begins as 1.2% by weight of the Single Base propellant formulation and centralite usually as 2% by weight of the Double Base propellant formulation. In NATO, sentencing of propellant for disposal in storage is based on remaining stabiliser. Once the stabiliser content falls to 50% of the original quantity then the propellant will be destroyed.

Measurement of stabiliser content

Chemical methods of analysing for stabiliser content of propellants are relatively slow requiring a day to carry out the test. Thus, the total number that can be done will be completely dependent on the number of apparatus available and the size of laboratory in which to house them. The apparatus will usually consist of laboratory glassware to carry out reflux and distillations. This is inefficient and usually cannot keep pace with the surveillance of propellant requirements.

The most efficient method to increase the analysis of stabiliser content is to move to a physical method. The easiest of these is High Performance Liquid Chromatography (HPLC) in which a sample of the stabiliser is passed through a micro-bore column eluted by a solvent and the time taken by different materials to pass through the column separates them at the exit. A detector can then measure quantitatively the amount of stabiliser in that sample.

To obtain the sample, a known weight of propellant under test has the stabiliser extracted by solvent in an ultrasonic bath. The time for the HPLC to carry out an analysis is approximately 10 minutes and the sampling of the prepared solutions can be carried out by an auto-sampler, thus, the throughput is 6 samples per hour. The ultrasonic bath will easily keep pace with the HPLC. It is estimated that one HPLC system would be capable of analysing 10,000 samples in a year.


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The equipment would need to be housed in a clean, secure room with a floor area of approximately 20 - 25 m2. It would not require the support normally needed for a full chemical laboratory, as the only operations would be accurately weighing samples and accurately measuring volumes of solvents. A sudden loss of power would be an inconvenience but would not seriously jeopardise the analytical technique.

Assessment of Retest Periods

For propellant surveillance there is also another issue and that is to assess the duration between retests. This is not simple since the rate of stabiliser depletion depends on many factors, some of which are impossible to quantify. For example, two identical propellant samples, which have undergone different storage histories are analysed for stabiliser content and the percentage remaining is 0.8% in both cases. In 5 years time it may be found on retest that one has now 0.7% remaining whereas the other has 0.5%. The only way to assess the likely future event is to use accelerated ageing.

Accelerated ageing is achieved by carrying out tests at elevated temperature and this is can be done by several methods used in different countries. There are apparently simple tests such as the Abel Heat Test, which requires that samples of between 1g and 2g are heated at temperatures in the range 60-85oC (depending on the specific source of the test and which propellant is being tested). The results are obtained in a matter of minutes, typically no longer than 15 minutes. Sentencing for retest is then obtained from tables, for example, if the time for the test is over 10 minutes then retest in 3 years. The time is the number of minutes from the start of the test until a colouration is seen on a standard test paper. This may seem simple, however, to obtain reliable results requires a high degree of skill at carrying out this particular test.

Other tests that can be carried out in a chemical laboratory include the Bergmann-Junk Test, the Woolwich Test, the Silvered Vessel Test, the Colour Test and many more. As an example, the Vieille Test is a very lengthy procedure. In this test the sample is heated at 110 oC for 8 hours or until a standard tint is seen on a litmus test paper. The sample is then left overnight on a tray in the open. This is repeated day by day until it takes only one hour until the standard tint is seen. At this point all the times from each day are added and the total time recorded used to assess the period before retest from standard tables. This test, therefore, can take weeks before a result is obtained. If at any time during the elevated temperature phase of the test there is a loss of heating such that the temperature falls more than a few degrees for a short time then the whole test becomes invalid. This could happen after a long period as the test duration is so long and thus much time would be wasted in the test programme.

Since rapid tests such as the Abel Heat Test require specific skills to obtain accurate results and the Vieille Test takes a significant length of time then other tests should be considered. Perhaps the Bergmann-Junk Test would be a suitable test for Mozambique to adopt as its main test methodology as it is easily within the capabilities of chemical analysts and can be carried out in one day. In this test the sample is heated at 132oC for 5 hours for Single Base propellants or at 115oC for 8 or 16 hours for Double Base propellants. The gases evolved are absorbed into a hydrogen peroxide solution and then the acidity is titrated against a standard sodium hydroxide solution. Practically, this is a reasonably simple test to perform. Most of the other tests take weeks at elevated temperature to obtain results. At this time a cost estimate cannot be given but would probably require EURO 125,000 to equip a laboratory to carry out this test.


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Additional Considerations

It is imperative that the results of any propellant analytical laboratory are acted upon. There is little point in identifying propellant that may be in a hazardous condition if action is not taken to destroy it. As noted above, any propellant that is below a certain stabiliser content is marked for destruction and isolated from the other ammunition. However, this isolation may not be sufficient to prevent propagation of an accident if it spontaneously ignited. Even more relevant is the fact that at this time there does not appear to be any destruction programme and this propellant is not being retested. There must be a chain of command put in place that can ensure the destruction of the failed propellant.

Therefore, it will also necessary to create an effective system for the destruction of ammunition. This is a complex issue, which will require a much more complex technical assessment due to the number of variables involved. UNDP BCPR could initiate such an independent assessment if requested.

Consideration should therefore be given as a priority to the provision of financial support to upgrade the analytical capabilities of the Mozambique Ministry of Defence. A budgetary figure would be EURO 125,000, which includes an element for project management.

The proposed solution will provide results at a rate needed to give complete surveillance within a few years is to use a physical method of analysis for stabiliser content (HPLC) and a more rapid chemical method for accelerated ageing (Bergmann-Junk Test).


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Appendix A(Normative)References

The following documents form part of the provisions of this advisory report:

a) SEE RMDS/G 05.55 - EOD Clearance of Ammunition Depot Explosions.

b) NATO AASPT 1 and 2 - Safety Principles for the Storage and Transport of Ammunition and Explosives;

c) ISO Guide 51, Safety aspects - Guidelines for their inclusions in standards;

d) ISO/IEC Guide 2, Standardization and related activities - General vocabulary;

e) ISO Standards Handbook, Quantities and units;

f) OHSAS 18001:1999, Occupational health and safety management systems - Specification;

g) OHSAS 18002:2000, Occupational health and safety management systems - Guidelines for the implementation of OHSAS 18001;

h) ILO R164 - Occupational safety and health recommendation 1981; and

i) ILO C155 - Occupational safety and health convention 1981.


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