Seeing From Above - The Geopolitics of Satellite Vision and North Korea

7/31/2019 Seeing From Above - The Geopolitics of Satellite Vision and North Korea

1/29www.giga-hamburg.de/workingpapers

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GIGA Research Unit:

GIGA Institute of Asian Studies___________________________

Seeing from Above:

The Geopolitics of Satellite Vision and North Korea

David Shim

No 201 August 2012


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201/2012 GIGAWorkingPapers

GIGAWP201/2012

SeeingfromAbove:TheGeopoliticsofSatelliteVisionandNorthKorea

AbstractSatelliteimageryplaysanimportantroleincontemporarygeopolitics.Arguablythemost

wellknownexampleisColinPowells(in)famouspresentationtotheUNSecurityCouncil

inFebruary2003,duringwhichheusedsatellitepicturestolegitimatetheinvasionofIraq.

Satellitephotographsdrawonatechnoscientificdiscoursethatenablesthemtofunction

asundistorted

records

impartially

documenting

space

and

place.

As

aresult,

they

assume

adefiningauthoritytospeakthetruthwhichisprobablyenhancedwithregardto(al

legedly)unknownandmysterioussiteslikeNorthKorea.Sincesatellitesaredeployedto

revealwhat shouldbe invisible, theirability todetectandexpose,orsee fromabove,

impliesaparticularpower.However,satellitephotographsarenotnecessarilyobjectivere

flectionsofageographicalsurfacebut, likeallvisualrepresentations,underliewhatwill

becalledalogicofinclusionandexclusionthatmakesthemdeeplypolitical.TakingNorth

Koreaasanexample,thearticlearguesfortheneedtodevelopasensitizedunderstanding

concerningthe

use

and

function

of

satellite

images

as

they

often

come

to

have

internation

alpoliticalimplications.Referringtothelinkagesbetweenseeing,knowingandacting,the

article examines the roleof remote sensingasawayofknowingand inquiresas to the

immediacyofimagesandtheensuingimperativetorespondtothem.

Keywords:NorthKorea,visuality,criticalgeopolitics,satelliteimagery

Dr.des.DavidShimisapostdoctoralresearchfellowattheGIGAInstituteofAsianStudies.Hisresearchinter

ests include critical approaches to IR and the relationshipbetweenvisuality andworld

politics.HeisamemberofResearchProgramme4:Power,NormsandGovernanceinIn

ternationalRelations.

Contact:

Website:


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GIGAWorkingPapers WP201/2012

SeeingfromAbove:TheGeopoliticsofSatelliteVisionandNorthKorea

DavidShim

ArticleOutline1 Introduction

2 Visuality,KnowledgeandGeopolitics

3 TheAuthorityofSatelliteVision

4 TheGeopoliticsofSatelliteVision

5 NorthKorea:TerraIncognitaandPracticesofLooking

6 TheSpatialImaginary

7 BelievingisSeeing

8 Conclusion

Bibliography

1 IntroductionIn the contemporary geopolitical order, there are seemingly few states like North Korea.

Continuouslymademeaningfulandproblematizedintermsofthepoliticalandtheinterna

tional,almosteveryaspect,areaoractionofthissocalledpariahorroguestateissaidto

have inherentpoliticaldimensionsand international repercussions:be it the countrysdo

mestichuman rightssituation, itsprecariouseveryday lifeor its foreignpolicyofcoercion

andnuclearbrinkmanship,nomatterwhatNorthKorea saysanddoes, itaffects the stateandstabilityofregionalandglobalpolitics.WhileNorthKoreaisinthissenseunquestiona

blyaninternationalsubject,articulationsofsecrecyplayacrucialroleindescriptionsofthe


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DavidShim:TheGeopoliticsofSatelliteVisionandNorthKorea 5

WP201/2012 GIGAWorkingPapers

spacesandspatialitiesof thecountry.NorthKorea isoftenreferred toas themost isolated

place in theworld,andparticular imaginationsor, toput itdifferently,certain imaginative

geographiesincludingthatofaterraincognita(Solarz1999),ablackhole(Demick2010)

oralandofnosmiles(VanHoutryve2009)prevailintheportrayalofthecountryininternationalrelations.

CitingNorthKoreasambiguousandreclusivenature,governmentofficials,scholarsand

journalists fromother countries still struggle tounderstandNorthKoreas stateof affairs.

Thecountryappearstobeaperfectexampleofthequintessentialotherofmodernglobaliza

tion, somethingwhichdefies closer scrutinybecause it isunmapped, shrouded in secrecy

andsecludedfromtherestoftheworld.Interestingly,thisassessmentisnotnew.Asearlyas

the1970s,thethendirectoroftheCentralIntelligenceAgency(CIA),RobertGates,wholater

servedasUSsecretaryofdefensefrom2006to2011,describedNorthKoreaasablackhole

and the toughest intelligence target in theworld (cited inFrench2005:xiii).Oneof the

most recent examples of such statements was theblunt acknowledgment madeby Kurt

Campbell,AssistantSecretaryofState,EastAsianandPacificAffairs,before theUSSenate

Armed Services Committee in September 2010. Responding to questions from the Senate

panelconcerningthesecuritysituationontheKoreanpeninsula,Campbellstated,

In fundamentalways,NorthKorea is stillablackbox.Wehave someglimpsesand

someintelligenceandthelike,butthetruthisoftentimesinretrospectsomeofthatin

telligencehasproven tobewrong. Itsavery,veryhard target,probably thehardest

targetwefaceintheglobalarena.(citedinStewart2010)

Ofcentral importance to thesecharacterizations is theclaimofmissing information.What

appearstobecertain,bothforthen(Gates)andnow(Campbell),isthatNorthKorearemains

unknownorisunknowabletotheoutsideworld.However,equallyworthyofmentioninthis

regard is the significanceofcertainpractices for securingknowledgeabout thecountry in

ordertocompensateforthispaucityofinformation:visualrepresentationsthatis,satellite

images.Inparticular,theimplicationsofwhatweseevisionandhowwe(aremadeto)see

visualityaregivenanalyticalpriorityinthepaper.

Inthisvein,thearticlepursuesseveralgoals:First,itshowshowsatelliteimagesfunction

aspowerfulspatialimaginarieswhichmediateaparticularnotionaboutaparticularterritory

(seeDodgeandPerkins2009).Thisproductivefunctionispossiblebecauseseeingisviewed

asanauthoritativewayofknowing.Second,byinvertingthecommonplaceseeingisbeliev

ingtowhatcanbetermedbelievingisseeing,thearticleprovidesexamplesthatquestion

theauthoritativerelationshipbetweenseeing,knowingandacting.Whilethetruthfulnessor

accuracyofsatellite imagesisnotchallenged,thearticleassertsthat it isessentialtorecog

nizethatsuchpicturesarenotselfevident:theyalonedonottelluswhattheymean,what

therightconclusionsareorwhathastobedone.Third,itintendstoadvancecriticalstudies ingeopoliticsbyempiricallydiscussingacasethat isarguablyneglected in thisfieldof


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study:NorthKorea,ormoreprecisely,theuseofvisualspatialrepresentationsofNorthKo

rea.Forinstance,onestrongthreadincriticalgeopoliticsisthefocusontopicsrelatedtothe

USWaronTerror(seeforexampleAmoore2007;Anderson2010;Dodds2007)orthewar

in Iraq (see for exampleGregory 2010;Hyndman 2007; Tuathail 2003). Critical engagementswith the subjectofNorthKoreaarevirtuallynonexistent.Finally, thisarticlepoints

outapeculiarfeatureofremotesensingthatismoreoftenthannotoverlooked:satelliteim

agesareartificialandauthoritativeatthesametime.Because itindicatesthedifferenttruth

terrainsonwhichothermodesofthevisualplay(forexample,documentaryphotography),

thehybridcharacterofsatelliteimageryhighlightstheneedtodevelopacarefulunderstand

ingconcerningitsuseandfunction.

Thepaperbeginsbyexplicatingtherolethatsatelliteimageryisassignedwithincurrent

geopoliticalpractices.Tothisend,ithighlightstheepistemologicalstatusofremotesensing

as such ways of (remote) seeing are embedded within technological and scientific logics.

However,itisalsodemonstratesthatsatelliteimages,likeallvisualrepresentations,aresub

jecttowhatwillbecalledalogicofinclusionandexclusion(cf.Mirzoeff1999):somethings

(aremade to) liewithin thesatellites frameofvision,whileothers remainoutof itsview.

This logicmakes satellite imagespoliticalandopen toappropriation.Thepaperdiscusses

examplesrelatedtoNorthKoreaandconcludeswiththeimplicationsofitsfindingsforthe

broaderstudyofvisualityincriticalgeopolitics.

2 Visuality,KnowledgeandGeopoliticsRemotesensinghasabroadrangeofapplicationsinglobalpolitics.Itisused,forinstance,in

armedconflicts,warsandhumanitarianemergencies,aswellas for internationalsanctions

and drug prevention and environmental preservation efforts (see for example Baker,

OConnell,andWilliamson2001;BakerandWilliamson2006;DodgeandPerkins2009).The

academic analysis concerning the use of satellite imagery varies accordingly. Fields that

studyitinclude(critical)geopolitics,(critical)securitystudies,strategicstudies,conflictstud

ies,environmentalstudiesandhumanitarianstudies.Satellitepicturesaredeeplyembeddedingovernmental, intelligence andmilitary factfindingmissions anddecisionmakingpro

cesses.Oftentheyrepresentthemainsourceofinformationusedin,forinstance,theevalua

tionofweapons(ofmassdestruction)programsandofproliferationactivitiesonthepartof

states likeNorthKoreaand Iran (seeHerman1996).Satellitephotographsarebelieved to

reveal the stageofdevelopmentofnuclear reactorsandmissilebasesand tohelpmonitor

andtracksuspiciouscargovesselsininternationalwaters.TheUSledProliferationSecurity

Initiative,whichseekstocreateaglobalnetworktomonitor,controlandpreventtheship

pingofweaponsofmassdestruction,isoneexampleofthis.Anumberofincidentsdemonstratethatsatelliteimageryhasconsistentlyandrepeatedly

playedanimportantroleininternationalpolitics.Perhapsthemostwellknownincident in


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recentyearswastheinvasionofIraqbyUSledforcesinMarch2003, inwhichsatellite im

ageryinfamouslypresentedbythenUSsecretaryofstateColinPowellattheUNSecurity

CouncilclaimingtoprovetheexistenceofIraqiweaponsofmassdestructionplayedapiv

otalroleinthejustificationforstartingthewar.OtherexamplesincludetheconflictinBosniain1995,duringUSambassadortotheUnitedNationsMadeleineAlbrightusedsatellitepho

tographsinherpresentationtotheUNSecurityCounciltocallattentiontoatrocitiescommit

tedagainstBosnianMuslimsandtoprovideevidenceaboutthelocationofsuspectedmass

gravesnearSrebrenica,1and theairraidundertakenbyIsraelifighterjets in2007againsta

SyrianfacilitythatJerusalemconsideredtobeanuclearreactorunderconstruction.

The involvement of the UN Security Council is indicative of the overall dynamics to

whichimagesrelateandareapartof,assatellitepictureshavebeencentralreferentsinmat

ters related to international peace and security. Against thisbackdrop, images appear to

speaksecurityandfunctionasinstantaneouscommunicativeacts(Hansen2011;Williams

2003).Inotherwords,imagesarenotillustrativeand,therefore,secondarytoknowledge,but

knowledgeintheirownright.Inthisvein,theyareanintegralpartofgeopoliticaldynamics.

Thisnotonlymakesthemlegitimatesubjectsofcriticalanalysisbutalsohighlightstheneed

forcarefulengagementwiththeissuesandimplicationsofvisualrepresentations.

Moreover, theepisodesdescribedabovealsoaptlysummarizewhat isatstake inthese

practicesoflooking.Theyillustratetheimmediacyoftheimages,theensuingimperativeto

respond to them,and the reality thatknowledge reliesonvision.Remote sensingenables

politicalactorstoknowwhat(theybelieve)anotherisuptoandtoactuponwhattheyseeor,and this isalso important toconsider,what theyhavebeenallowed toseebyothers.2The

caseofsatellite imagery isaprimeexampleof the linksbetweenvisuality,knowledgeand

geopoliticsinthatitrevealshowgeopoliticalpracticesaretiedtothiswayof(remote)seeing:

regardedasprovidingcompellingevidence,thesepicturesallowgovernmentstomakelegit

imatestatements,drawconclusionsandtakepoliticalaction.

3 TheAuthorityofSatelliteVisionTraditionally,remotesensinghasbeentheexclusivedomainofthestate.Asaresult,satellite

imageshavetypicallybeenalignedwithofficialformsofknowledge(Parks2005).However,

duetoseveraldevelopmentsinthisdomaintheprivatizationofthesatelliteindustry,legis

lativeamendmentsandtechnologicalinnovationssatelliteimageshaveincreasinglycome

1 Thephotographs led thecouncil toadoptResolution1010,whichdemanded thatBosnianSerbsrespect the

rightsofBosnianMuslimsandwarnedtheBosnianSerbmilitarythattheywouldbeheldaccountableforvio

lationsofinternationalhumanitarianlaw(FloriniandDehqanzada2001:437).2 For instance, the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which uses satellite imagery, among other

things,foritsassessmentofsuspectednuclearprograms,isoftenprovidedwith(particular)imagesbyother

states,includingtheUnitedStates.


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tobeusedbynonstateactorsincludingcivilsocietygroups,nongovernmentalorganizations,

journalists,scholars,aidworkersandartists.Thegrowinginterestinandutilizationofcom

mercialsatelliteimageryhaspromptedsometoarguethatithasreshapedthewaysinwhich

theseactorscomprehendspaceandplace(forexample,DodgeandPerkins2009;AdayandLivingston2009;Parks2009).Further,thesimplicitywithwhichthesekindsofimagescanbe

viewed,usedanddisseminatedhasempowereddifferentsocialgroups tochallengesover

eignpowersthroughthedisclosureofclandestinesitesundermilitaryorstatecontrol.Per

hapsmoreimportanttonotethanthefactthatstatesfacenewchallengesfromcommercialor

privatesatelliteapplicationsisthatthevisual isreconfiguringthegeopoliticalterrain itself:

remotesensingenablesdifferentgroupstoconstitutethemselvesaspoliticalactors(seeHan

sen2011;seealsoAdayandLivingston2009;Litfin2001,2002;Rosenau2002).Examplesare

providedbyadvocacynetworkssuchastheInstituteforScienceandInternationalSecurity

(ISIS)andhumanrightsorganizationslikeAmnestyInternationalthatregularlyusesatellite

imagestocallattentiontoparticularissuesandtopressgovernmentstotakeaction.Forin

stance,humanrightsactivistssuchastheUSCommitteeforHumanRightsinNorthKorea

(Hawk2003;2012)repeatedlyrefertooverheadimageryofNorthKoreanprisoncampsinan

attempttogettheUSgovernmentandinternationalorganizationstoputNorthKoreanhu

manrightsatthetopoftheirpoliticalagendas.TheregularreferencesmadebytheUSState

DepartmentsannualreportonNorthKoreanhumanrightstotheaccountsandimageryof

nongovernmentalorganizations,refugeesand themediashowshowvariousactorspartici

pateinandbecomepartofgovernmentaldiscourse(forexample,USDOS2010).However,regardlessofwhethersatelliteimagery isusedbygovernmentornongovern

mentactors,whatisimportanttonoteisthatitsfunctionremainsthesame:givingauthority

tocertainstatements,conclusionsandactions.Thiskindofuse ispossiblebecausesatellite

imagesdrawonatechnoscientificdiscoursethatendowsthemwithwhatDavidCampbell

(2007:20)callsanauraofunsurpassedobjectivity.Theprecisionofhighresolutionpan

chromaticandmultispectralimagesistheresultofelectroopticalprocessesandinnovations

thatallowsatellitepicturestolooklikemimeticreflectionsofgeographicalsurfaces.Sophis

ticated technologyand its scientificapplication sustain theperception that remotesensingimagesimpartiallydocumentplaces,spacesandsites.Seeminglystrippedofsubjectiveinter

ference,satelliteimagesrevealtraitssimilartothegenreofdocumentaryphotography:like

the latter, theyclaim tooffer transparent insights intomajorprocesses in theworldand to

providetheirviewerswithunmediatedaccesstothetruth.Furthermore,becausegeostation

arysatellitesarecapableofrecordingimagesatanytimeandfromanywhere,theyinaway

analogous to theallseeingeyeofprovidencearebelieved to transcendnaturalobstacles

andelementalboundaries.Similarly toWalterBenjaminsnotionofphotographyasa tech

nologyoftheopticalunconscious,satellitecamerasexpandhumanobservationbeyondits

naturalscopeandextend therangeofvisiblespace (cf.Edwards2006;SchwartzandRyan

2003).Therefore, satellites seem tobe capable of autonomousvision as they continuously


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orbitandscantheearth(Marmor2008).Asaresulttheyprovidetheobserverwithaprivi

legedvisualangle,onewhichnotonlypurportstoofferasynopticviewofagivenlandscape

orterritorybutalsogivestheimpressionofinherenttransparencyandcontrollabilityandof

dominanceoverwhatisbeingobserved.Inthisregard,DodgeandPerkins(2009:498,italicsinoriginal)assertthatsatelliteimagesappeartoseemoreoftheworld,oratleasttheview

ersperceivetheyareseeingmuchmore[]afullerviewofspace;sothatyouthinkyoucan

seethingsyouwouldrecognizewiththenakedeye.

Whatisimportanttonoteisthatsatellitesmakevisiblewhatpeoplecannotnormallysee.

Becausetheyareabletorevealhidden,unknownorsecretsites,whichwouldotherwisere

main invisible and inaccessible to us, their ability to see from above implies a particular

power(PerkinsandDodge2009),apowerthatcanbeassociatedwiththeestablishmentofa

particular imaginativegeography,a specificnotionof spaceandplace.Asopticaldevices,

satellitesnotonlydefine thevisualappearanceandcognitionofspecificsites, through, for

instance,thepracticeofmapping,butalsocreateimaginationsofspatialorder.Forexample,

someauthorshavearguedthatthecameraofthesatellitehascreatedanewwayoflooking,

throughtheadoptionofaperspectiveseenfromouterspace,whichhasnotonlyestablished

theiconoftheblueplanetbutalsohelpedtoconstructtheearthasaunitarybiosphereanda

coherentecologicalsystem(Siemer2007;Sachs1994;seealsoCosgrove1994;2001).

4 TheGeopoliticsofSatelliteVisionThedefiningauthorityofsatelliteimagesisrelatedtotheirpoliticalcharacter.Eventhough

theyareunderstood toprovide theobserver,asstatedabove,withafullerviewofspace

(DodgeandPerkins2009:498,italicsinoriginal),leadingtotheassumptionthatviewersare

seeingmuchmore,onecannotobscurethefactthattheseimagesarepartialrepresentations

ofspace.Nocameraperspectivecancaptureascene in itsentirety,becauseanyattemptto

representrealityinvolvesselectionsandreductions.Imagesare,therefore,necessarilysynec

dochicrepresentations.Theymakeareferenceto thewhole throughapartialaccount.The

partialcharacterofsatelliteimagespointstothemostpowerfulmechanismofthevisual:thelogicofinclusionandexclusion.Again,whiletheaccuracyofsuchimagesisnotchallenged

here, it is important tonote that (satellite) imagingrestsuponanunderstandingofwhat is

entitledtorepresentationandwhatisnot,oruponaninterpretiveresponsetowhatdeserves

tolieinsideandoutsideasatellitesframeofvisibility.Bythismeans,imagescanhelptoerect

hierarchies,createboundariesandsustaindifferenceswhichseparate,forinstance,aknown

fromanunknown,adomesticfromaforeign,orasimpleherefromathere.

Theselectivityofsatelliteimaginggivescausetoaskwhyspecificphotographsorvisual

motifs,andnotothers,arerepeatedlypresentedanddisseminated.Forinstance,eventhoughintelligenceagenciesfromboththeUnitedStatesandSouthKoreapossessoverheadimagery

ofNorthKoreasforcedlaborcamps,noimageofthemhaseverbeenofficiallyreleased.Cit


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ingsecurityreasons,theUSgovernmenthasobjectedtothepublicationofsuchpicturesbe

cause itallegedlydoesnotwant todisclose the reconnaissance capabilitiesof its satellites

(Brooke2003).Theinternationalpubliconlylearnedabouttheexistenceoftheseprisoncom

poundsafter,inDecember2002,aseriesofsatellitephotographsappearedintheFarEasternEconomicReview,whichhadobtainedthepicturesfromacommercialproviderofspaceimag

ing (Larkin2002).While reportsand testimoniesbyNorthKorean refugeeswereavailable

previously, they,as theFarEasternEconomicReviewnoted,suffered fromakey failing:no

foreignershaveeverseen theNorthKoreancamps (Larkin2002:15).TheDecember2002

publicationwasthefirsttimethatphotographsoftheNorthKoreanlaborcampsweremade

public.3Further imagesweremadeavailableinOctober2003and,morerecently, inApril

2012(Hawk2012)whenthenongovernmentalUSCommitteeforHumanRightsinNorth

Koreareleasedareportthatprovidedvisualevidenceoftheexistenceofthesecamps(Hawk

2003). What is striking is the fact that since the 1990s highresolution satellite pictures of

NorthKoreasnuclearandmissilesiteshavefrequentlybeenreleasedandreferredtobyUS

administrations, thereby contradicting the claim that accurate reconnaissance imagery

shouldnotbeshowntothepublicforsecurityreasons.

ConcerningthequestionofwhysatelliteimagesofNorthKoreasnuclearandmissilefa

cilitiesarereadilyreleasedbygovernmentsbutthoseofthecountrysnotoriousprisoncom

plexesarenot,wemustaskwhethersuch imagesareameanstoaparticularendthat is,

whethertheyservecertainpoliticalpurposes.For,asLisaParks(2001)argues,satellitepho

tographsassumeimportanceonlywhentheyhaverelevanceincurrentinternationalaffairs.Thus,the(comparative)invisibilityofthesecampsisnosurprisegiventhedominanceofone

geopolitical issue intheNortheastAsiansecuritydiscoursesince themid1990s:NorthKo

reasnuclearandmissileprogram.4Parks(2001:597)statesthatthesatellitesgazeistrained

onparticularplaces forparticular reasons [that] [] canbemobilizedas representing the

ultimateauthorityofthestate[]orasacompletelyabstractanduncertainpointofview.

Sowhatshouldbeconsideredacharacteristicfeatureofsatelliteimagesisthattheycanei

therbeutilizedascompellingsourcesbyvariousactorsorbeseenassignifyingnothingbuta

viewfromouterspace.However,therearealsootheraspectsofsatelliteimagerythatrevealitsinclusionaryand

exclusionarylogics.Theybringtolightthefactthatremotesensingisnotaninnocentmode

ofrepresentationbutisratheropentopoliticalappropriationandmanipulation.Whilesatel

3 Thephotographsweresodetailedthataformerguardhadnotroublepinpointinghisplaceofwork.Henot

ed,thisisdefinitelyit[]Ifinishedmyshiftat2a.m.ThenIdrovemytruckalongthisroadtotherailway

stationyouseethere,andfollowedtheroadtotheChineseborder(Larkin2002:15).4 However,severaldevelopmentsinrecentyearshavepointedtoincreasingpoliticalcommitmentsandinterna

tionalattentionregardingthe(humanrights)situationinNorthKorea.Theseincludetheenactmentofspecifichuman rightsrelated laws, theappointmentof specialemissariesand thegrowing condemnationofNorth

Koreashumanrightsviolationsbynationalgovernmentsandinternationalbodies.


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liteimagesarecommonlyassumedtobevisualevidence,theyarefarfrombeingselfevident

anddonotspeakforthemselves.RevealinginthisregardweretheremarksmadebyColin

PowellwhenhepresentedsatelliteimagesofIraqtotheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilin

ordertomakethecaseforamilitaryinvasion:LetmesayawordaboutsatelliteimagesbeforeIshowacouple.ThephotosthatIam

abouttoshowyouaresometimeshardfortheaveragepersontointerpret,hardforme.

Thepainstakingworkofphotoanalysistakesexpertswithyearsandyearsofexperi

ence,poringforhoursandhoursover light tables.Butas Ishowyou these images,I

willtrytocaptureandexplainwhattheymean,whattheyindicatetoourimageryspe

cialists.(Powell2003)

WhilethewarinIraqillustrateshowsatelliteimagescanbeusedformanipulativepurposes,

italsoshowsthatsuchstrategiesofdeceptionareenabledpreciselyasaresultoftheimagesopacityandambiguitythatis,becausepictureslackanyinherentmeaning.Tounderstand

howsuch images function, it isuseful tooutlinehow satellitevision ismanufacturedand

mediatedandhowitinteractswithtextandlanguageinthecreationofmeaning.

The impression that satellitephotographsare transparentmediatorsobscures thecom

plextechnicalprocessesthataccompanytheirproduction.Beforetheycanbepresentedand

viewedinameaningfulway,satelliteimagesarecomputerprocessedinordertocorrectdis

tortionsandtogivethemtheirpropervisualappearance(DodgeandPerkins2009;Campbell

2007;Parks2001;2005).Oftentheyarecompiledoutofparcelsofshotsfromdifferenttimes;thiscreatesagenuineviewofagivensurface,freefromcloudcover.Thus,satelliteimages

originatefromaparticulardayandfromaparticulartime.Thesyntheticimagingprocessis

duetothevastamountsofdatainvolved.Thesearetransmittedthroughtheelectrooptical

sensors of satellites to terrestrial stations, where they are converted into a visual form of

analysis (Marmor 2008: 318).However,muchofwhat satellites capture is rarelyanalyzed

andismoreoftenthannotarchived.Satellitedatabecomesrealaphotographonlyafterit

issorted,arrangedandcirculated(cf.Campbell2007).Perhapsbecauseofthis,satellite im

ages,morethananyotherphotographicrepresentation,demand(professional)interpretation

(Parks2005).

Indeed,theanalysisofsatelliteimagesappearstobeamatterofexpertknowledge,asa

distinctbodyofwork and institutions suggests (for example,Conway and TheMaryland

SpaceGrantConsortium1997;Philipson1997;Campbell1996;Baker2001;Lillesand,Kiefer

and Chipman 2008). A common example of this is providedby satellite weather photo

graphs,whichhave tobe interpretedbymeteorologists so thata layaudience canunder

stand them properly. Important stakeholders in the production and dissemination of this

expertknowledge areprofessional associations and international imagery training centers

suchas the InternationalSociety forPhotogrammetryandRemoteSensingor the InternationalInstituteforAerospaceSurveyandEarthSciences.Theexaminationofsatellitephoto


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graphsforthepurposeofdetectingspecificobjectsandevaluatingtheirsignificanceisbased

onanumberof(visual)methodologicalcategories.Thesecomprise,forinstance,thelocation,

size,shape,color,textureandpatternofdepictedobjects(Baker2001:537).AttheNational

PhotographicInterpretationCenter,whichisrunbytheUSgovernment,overonethousandimageryanalystsand specialistsworkonphotographs todecodeandmake senseof them

(Campbell2007:22).

Variousaccompanyingexplanationsandcaptions,aswellasothergraphicandtechnical

tools,notonlyensurethatsatelliteimagesareaccessibletoawideraudiencebutalsomake

thesepicturescomprehensibleinaparticularway,whichinturnnarrowsthepossibilitiesfor

howtheycanbeunderstood.TheprocessingofsatelliteimagesembedstheminwhatParks

(2001:592)callsabroadereconomyoftelevisualsigns.Thisembeddednessreferstothe

signifyingfunctionofthecaptions,narrationsandarrowsthatarealwaysattachedtothese

photographs.Sincesatelliteimagesdonotinherentlyindicatehowtheyshouldberead,the

interweavingofsuchphotographs intoa largercontextofothersignstells theviewerhow

theyhavetobe interpreted.Similarlytoavisualmanualorasetofvisual instructions,the

accompanying marks direct the viewer to see what the presenter wishes to make visible,

therebyreducingthenumberofpossiblemeanings.

5 NorthKorea:TerraIncognitaandPracticesofLookingAsindicatedabove,referencestosecrecypervadevariouspartiesapproachestoNorthKo

rea.Oftendescribedasanenigma(Halliday1981)oramystery(Scalapino1997),North

Koreaiswidelybelievedtobeasecretofitsownkind.Itremainsunseenandishiddenfrom

view.Sincesatellitesaredeployedtorevealwhatshouldbeinvisible,detectingandexposing

thehiddenor,inotherwords,seeing(fromabove)impliesaparticularpower(Perkinsand

Dodge2009).Anumberofexamplesshowthatsatelliteimageryplaysadecisiveroleinex

posingNorthKoreassecret(s)(seeforexampleBrown2009,DailyTelegraph2010;KimT.H.

2010;Ramstad2009,Yang2008;Yoo2010).Whatshouldalsobeconsideredisthatsuchimag

esmayholdagreaterauthoritytospeakabout(allegedly)unknownplacesandmysterioussitesbecausetheyliketheeyeofprovidencehelpustoseeand,therefore,toknowwhatis

reallygoingon.

From the statusof itsnuclearormissiledevelopments, to itsweaponsproliferationor

overseastradeactivities,toitsfoodsecurityorhumanrightssituation,satelliteimagestellus

whatishappeninginandaroundKorea.Forinstance,theUNsWorldFoodProgrammeand

itsFoodandAgricultureOrganizationhaveregularlyassessedNorthKoreascropandfood

supplybystudyingsatellitephotosofitsfields(forexample,FAOandWFP2004).Satellite

imagery isalso important inestimatingNorthKoreasvegetationandcropgrowingconditions.Basedon theestimates theyderive from thesesources, theseUNagenciesappeal to

internationaldonorsforfoodaid.Satellitepictureswerealsousedbyinternationalreliefor


13/29



ganizationstoassesstheextentofthedamagecausedbyatrainexplosioninRyongchonin

April2004,andtoevaluatethescaleofdestructionresultingfromsupertyphoonBilis,which

hitNorthKorea inJuly2006.Remotesensing imageshavealsobeenused toassessNorth

Koreas alleged involvement in the statesponsored production and global distribution ofillegalnarcotics(seeSovacool2009).

6 TheSpatialImaginaryPeoplecometoknowtheworldand itsspacesandplaces throughvisual imagery.Un

known locations are made familiar through visual representation (cf. Schwartz and Ryan

2003).Satellite imagesareoneof theways inwhichpeopleapproachandengagewith the

worldthatis,howtheyimaginetheplacesandsitesoftheworld.Becausetheyareameansofmapping,watching,orderingandrepresentingtheworld,satelliteimagesareapervasive

formofgeographicalknowledge;theymaketheworldknowable.Assuchtheycontributeto

shapingparticularspatialimaginaries.

Intermsofvisualcomposition,almostallsatelliteimagesrevealsimilarrepresentational

patterns,astheyprovideaverticalandplanarviewfromabovetheearthssurface.Exhibit

ingfeaturesoflandscapephotographyandlandscapepainting,satelliteimagestendtocap

turebroadterritorialspaceswithinasingleframeandconveyanenhancedsenseofpictorial

realism,overtnaturalismandcolorfuldiversity(DodgeandPerkins2009:498).Likethegen

reoflandscapephotography,satelliteimagerypermitsviewerstocontrol,orderandscalea

territory intoneatlyarrangedportions (Clarke1997:55,61).Asaresult, thesatellite image

appearsasanaturalmapofanareaonewhichclaimstorepresentthetruthonthediscur

siveauthorityofcartographyandgeography.

With regard toNorthKorea,one satellite image,ormoreprecisely,onevisualmotif is

widelyandfrequentlyused(seeFigure1).ItshowstheKoreanpeninsulaatnight;mostof

thebright spots are located in the south,while thenorthernpart is almostentirely in the

dark.OtherversionsofthepictureincludetheJapaneseislandsandpartsofNortheastChina

andRussia,allofwhichareilluminated(seeforexampleGlobalSecurity.org2006).Themotifgainedprominencewhen theUSDepartmentofDefense included thesatellitephoto in its

standardbriefingsonNorthKoreaunderthetenureofDonaldRumsfeld(GlobalSecurity.org

2006).Thesamepictureorsimilarversionsofithavebeenreferredtoorreproducedinaca

demicpublications(forexample,KimS.2002;KnausandLee2011;Harris2007)andmedia

outletssuchastheNewYorkTimes(Zeller2006),theBritishDailyMail(2006),theWashington

Post(Klein2011)andSouthKoreas largestnewspaperChosunIlbo(2010).Someeconomists

haveevenusedthisimagetoestablishacausallinkbetweentheluminositythatisthevisibil

ity of nighttime light and economic growth (see for example Henderson, Storeygard andWeil2009;seealsoChenandNordhaus2011).However,theacademicuseofthisphotoisnot


14/29



the only example that exposes the nexusbetween certain kinds of visualities and certain

kindsofknowledges.

Figure1: SatellitePhotoShowingtheKoreanPeninsulabyNight,UsedDuringaNewsBriefingbytheUSDepartmentofDefenseon11October2006

Source:GlobalSecurity.org2006.

Inordertoascertainwhatthisvisualmotifisbelievedtosignifyand,therefore,howNorth

Korea is imagined, it ishelpfultoexaminethestatements thathavebeenprovokedbythis

way

of

seeing.

During

a

news

briefing

at

the

US

Department

of

Defense

in

December

2002,

Rumsfeldstated,

IfyoulookatapicturefromtheskyoftheKoreanPeninsulaatnight,SouthKoreaisfilled with lights and energy and vitality and abooming economy; North Korea isdark.Itisatragedywhatsbeingdoneinthatcountry.AndthesuggestionthatitisaresultofrhetoricfromoutsideIthinkismissesthepoint.Wehaveaverystrangesituationinthatcountry.(USDoD2002)

Duringanothernewsbriefing,shortlyafterNorthKoreahadconducteditsfirstnucleartest

inOctober2006,Rumsfeldreferredonceagaintothisimage:

Exceptformywifeandfamily,thatismyfavoritephoto.Itsaysitall.TheresthesouthoftheDemilitarizedZone,thesamepeopleasnorth,sameresourcesnorthandsouth,


15/29



andthebigdifferenceisinthesouthitsafreepoliticalsystemandafreeeconomicsystem [] thatdotof light isPyongyang.And thepeople thereare starvingand theirgrowthisstunted.Anditsashame.Itsatragedy.(USDoD2006)

One

of

the

latest

examples

of

the

use

of

this

image

is

the

book

Nothing

to

Envy:

Ordinary

Lives

inNorthKoreabyLosAngelesTimesjournalistBarbaraDemick(2010),whowasawardedthe

2010BBCSamuelJohnsonPrizeforNonFictionforthiswork.Sheintroducesherbookwith

aversionofthissatellitepicture,stating,

IfyoulookatsatellitephotographsoftheFarEastbynight,youllseealargesplotch

curiouslylackinginlight.ThisareaofdarknessistheDemocraticPeoplesRepublicof

Korea.Next to thismysteriousblackhole,SouthKorea,Japan,andnowChina fairly

gleamwithprosperity. [] In themiddleof itall [there is]anexpanseofblackness

nearlyaslargeasEngland.Itisbafflinghowanationof23millionpeoplecanappear

asvacantastheoceans.NorthKoreaissimplyablank[]acountrythathasfallenout

ofthedevelopedworld.(ibid.:34)

Itisimportanttonotethatthetruthfulnessofthesatelliteimageorthevalidityoftheread

ingsofitisnotquestionedhere;nonetheless,thepictureisusedtoestablishaparticularspa

tial imaginary.ThesiteNorthKorea isparticularlymarked in termsofabsence,deficiency

andscarcity.Itispicturedaccordingtowhatitdoesnothave:light,prosperity,freedom,food

andhope.Itlacksvisibility,vitalityandprosperity.Thepictorialcontrastbetweenbrightand

darkandblackandwhiteunderpinsreadingsthatforegrounddifference,distanceandoth

ernessoverwhatcanbecalledaffinity,familiarityandsameness.NorthKoreaisliterallyim

aginedasablackhole,animagethatformanyisanallegoryforitsuniqueroleinthecurrent

geopolitical order. It is an isolated,backward and mysterious place, which its people can

onlyrunawayfrom;itisasitethatmustbeabandonedbecauseitisoutsideofthemodern

world,evenoutsideoftime,incapableofchangeandentrappedinaneternalpast.Fromthis

representation,itbecomesclearwhatNorthKoreaisnot:homeaspecialplaceofbelonging

thatcomprises theexperiences,emotions,valuesandsocial relationships thatmakeup the

veryessenceofahumanbeing(cf.Gregoryetal.2009:339).

Alsonoteworthyisthefactthatcertainconstructed(in)visibilitiesestablishtheconditionsaccording towhichmeaningful statements and conclusions aboutplaces, spaces and sites

canbemade:thatwhatcan(not)beseendetermineswhatcan(not)beknownandsaidabout

alocality.Anothercrucialpointisthatthesubjectofthephotoisunderstoodtospeakinse

curityanddifference(forexample,asRumsfeldstates,Itsaysitall).Itdoesnotcommuni

cateanycartographicknowledge,whichisoneofthemostessentialassetsofremotesensing,

but isratherimplicated inaparticular imaginativegeography:NorthKoreaastheplaceof

thegreatunknowninworldpolitics,aplacebeyondtherealmofcomprehensionthatisnei

therpartofourworldnorpartofourtime.TherepeateduseandcirculationofthisvisualmotifNorthKoreaindarknessinaca

demia,politics andmediademonstrate itsoverarchingpopularity asan iconicgeography.


16/29



Thatistosay,thephotossubjectfunctionsasanimaginativesignifierratherthanasacarto

graphic referent. This form of visuality is also hegemonic as it marginalizes alternative

modesofrepresentationanddetermineswhoseandwhatkindsofperspectivesaremeaning

ful. For instance, the constructed visibility of this photograph would take on a differentmeaningwhen interpretedaccordingtoanenvironmentaldiscoursethatproblematizesnot

the lackof lightbut,on thecontrary, itsexcessiveapplicationand thedamage itcauses to

naturalecosystemsandphysicalhealth(lightpollution).Also,satelliteimagestakenofthe

Koreanpeninsuladuringthedaywouldnotservethespecificpurposeofspeakinginsecurity

andemphasizingdifference,asthenighttimepicturesdo,becausetheycouldnotdisplaythe

necessaryvisibleormetaphoricaldisparitiesbetweenNorthKoreaanditsneighbors.Inthis

vein,itisnotsurprisingthatdaytimeimagesoftheKoreanpeninsulaarealmostnonexistent

while nighttime pictures are prevalent and widely used, as the abovecited cases demon

strate. The selective practices regarding what and what not to picture/show highlight the

political implications of satellite images logic of inclusion and exclusion. These practices

disguise thefact thatknowledgeofcomplexpoliticalsituationsbecomessimplified,partial

andreductiveasaresultofwhatisincludedandexcludedintheimagesframes.

7 BelievingisSeeingSatellitesurveillanceofNorthKoreabeganintheearly1980s,whentheUSspysatelliteKH11

tookpicturesofa facility inYongbyonbelieved tobeanuclear reactor.Thehistoryof the

observation of North Korea through satellite vision provides many examples of how the

sameimagescanbeusedtoeitherbuttressorrefuteparticularclaimsregardingthecountrys

militarybuildup.Thisisnottoarguethatremotesensingiscompletelyinaccurateorfalse,

butratherthatitsdata,duetotheopaqueandambiguousnatureoftheimages,isproneto

divergent interpretations. In thisvein, the following section challenges thenexusbetween

seeing andknowing, andhence its repercussions for taking action,byproblematizing the

possibilityofknowingwhatisreallygoingonsimplybylookingatimages.Whiletheun

certaintyof(satellite)imagescontradictsthecommonplacenotionthatthecameraneverlies,itisimportanttopointouttheroleoftheseimagesinshapingtheunderstandingofcertain

eventsanddevelopmentsrelatedtoNorthKorea.Becausesuchpicturescometohavegeopo

liticalimplicationstheyareinvokedtolegitimizeparticulardecisionsandactions,suchas

inspections,warningsandsanctionsthebriefexampleswillmakethecasefortheneedto

developasensitizedunderstandingregardingthepurposeanduseofsuchimages.

Inthelate1990s,USintelligenceagenciesspottedwhattheybelievedtobealarge,secret

underground complex near Kumchangri, in North Pyongan Province that supposedly

formedthebackboneoftheregimeseffortstodevelopnuclearweapons.Theevidenceconsisted of several photographs that hadbeen taken from a reconnaissance satellite, one of

whichalongwiththeinformationthatNorthKoreahadreviveditsnuclearprogramwas


17/29



leaked to theNewYorkTimes inAugust1998byaseniorgovernmentanalyst from theDe

fenseIntelligenceAgency(Sanger1998;KimY.H.2005).

The US government stated that the images depicted construction activities at the site,

with thousands of workers excavating a huge area underground. The type of excavationprompted theClintonadministration to infer thatNorthKorea intended tocircumvent the

socalledAgreedFrameworkonthefreezingofNorthKoreasnuclearprogrambyrecreating

the facilitiesof theYongbyonnuclearcomplex,which,meanwhile,hadbeenunder intense

scrutinyfromtheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency.AlthoughNorthKoreahadnotvio

latedtheagreementbecausetherewasnoevidencethatithadbegunrebuildingthesein

stallations thepicturescausedagreatstirwithinboth theUSgovernmentandCongress,

whoseapprovalofthefinancingfortheagreementwascrucial.TheClintonadministration

warnedNorthKoreaabouttheconsequencesofbreachingthebilateralagreement,demand

edthecessationofallconstructionactivitiesandaskedtobegrantedaccesstothesuspicious

undergroundfacility.DuringapressconferencewithhisSouthKoreancounterpartinSeoul

inJanuary1999,thensecretaryofdefenseWilliamCohenstated,

Webelievethatthereissufficientevidenceforustobesuspiciousofthatsite,andthose

suspicionsmustbeaddressedinordertosatisfyourselvesthattheagreement[Agreed

Framework]isbeingcompliedwith.(USDoD1999)

WhiletheSouthKoreangovernmentdownplayed the findingssoas tonotjeopardize its

socalled Sunshine Policy, which emphasized dialogue and cooperation with the NorthKoreanleadershiptheincident,andthedemandforonsiteinspections,emergedasmajor

pointsof contentionbetween theUnitedStatesandNorthKoreaduring thisperiod.After

monthsofdiplomatic negotiations,NorthKorea eventually agreed to allow aUS team to

inspect theundergroundsite inKumchangri inreturn foraidconcessions (Sanger1999).It

wasthefirsttimethatPyongyanghadallowedinspectionsbeyondthoseatitsnuclearcom

plexinYongbyon.

During twovisits to thesuspicioussite in1999and2000,however, investigators found

nothingbutemptytunnels,aresultthatwasembarrassingtoboththeUSgovernmentand

intelligenceauthorities(Shenon1999;Risen2000).GivingcredittoNorthKoreaforitscoop

eration,Washingtonofficiallyconfirmedthatnopreparationsfortheconstructionofanun

derground nuclear reactor something that the images were stronglybelieved to have

shown couldbedetected. Itwas later revealed that theNorthKorean leadership,when

theylearnedthataUSsatellitewasscanningthesite,hadmusteredthousandsofsoldiersto

simulateahugeconstructionprojectinprogress(KimY.H.2005).

Acoupleofyearslater,anotherseriesofsatellitepicturesbecamethesubjectofanemerg

ingdebateintheUnitedStatesoverwhetherornottoconstructanewnationalmissilede

fensesystemagainstsocalledroguestatessuchasNorthKoreaandIraq.Theimageswereprovidedbyacommercialspace imagingcompanyandwerepublishedinJanuary2000on


18/29



thewebsiteoftheUSpolicythinktankFederationofAmericanScientists(FAS)aswellasin

theNewYorkTimes(Broad2000).TheyshowedalaunchfacilityfromwhichNorthKoreahad,

inAugust1998,sentoffwhatwasclaimedbyPyongyangtobeasmallsatellitebutwasin

ternationallycondemnedasadisguisedattemptto testan intermediaterangeballisticmissile.5

While forsome imageryanalyststhepicturessimplyshowedaprimitivecomplexwith

dirt roads and no visible housing or fuelstorage facilities, government officials from the

UnitedStatesandSouthKoreawarnedofunderestimatingPyongyangsmissilecapabilities

(Anselmo2000;AFP2000;Zakaria2000).TheFAS,whichhadpurchased the images,con

cludedinastatement,itisquiteevidentthatthisfacilitywasnotintendedtosupport,and

inmanyrespectsisincapableofsupporting,theextensivetestprogramthatwouldbeneed

edtofullydevelopareliablemissilesystem(FAS2000).Itthereforequestionedtheneedfor

aUSmissiledefensesystemandnoted,itisfittinglyparadoxicalthattensofbillionsofdol

larsshouldhavebeenspent,andarangeofnationalpoliciesreoriented,onaccountofthis

distressinglymodestandunderwhelmingmissiletestfacility(FAS2000).

Inanindicationofhowprivatewaysof(remote)seeingchallengetheobservantvisionof

sovereignstates,theUSDepartmentofDefensewascompelledtorespondasfollows:

Itisourjudgmentfromapanoplyofintelligencesourcesandmethodsthatgofarbe

yond thisrather limitedcapability that theFederationofAmericanScientistshasput

onitswebsitethatthereisagenuinethreatandariskfromthepotentialmissilepro

gramofNorthKorea.Webelievethisisarealdangerthatwearedealingwith.[]we

recognizethatthis[facility]isntatthatkindofleveloftechnology[thatofUSequip

ment].But,nevertheless,webelievetherearerisksandtherearethreats.Wedontbe

lievewevebeenexaggeratingthethreat,andperhapstheFASmightbeunderplaying

itabit.(USDoD2000)

WhilethethensecretaryofdefenseWilliamCohenwascertainthatNorthKoreawouldbe

abletodeveloplongrangemissilesby2005,thusjustifyingtheerectionofamissileshield,it

shouldbenotedthateventhoughtheimages,andothersources,seemedtogivecompel

lingevidenceNorthKoreahasstillnotsucceededindoingso.Inarecentreassessmentof

NorthKoreasmissilecapabilitiespreparedbyUSsecretaryofdefenseRobertGates,theUS

governmentstatedthatthecountrywouldbecapableoflaunchingintercontinentalmissiles

by2015.InviewoftheUSmissiledefensepolicy(anditsgeopoliticalrepercussionson,for

instance,USChineserelationsandthebalanceofpowerinEastAsia),whichwaspredomi

nantlydrivenbythepredictionthatNorthKoreawouldpossesslongrangemissiletechnol

5 Sincethislaunch,NorthKoreasmissile/rocketprogram,alongwithitsnuclearambitions,hasbecomeamajor

concernintermsofinternationalpeaceandsecurity.Whilethe1998launchwasformanyanattempt(albeitafailedone)totestanintercontinentalmissile,theUSgovernmentlaterpubliclyacknowledgedthatNorthKo

reahadindeedattemptedtolaunchasatellite(USDoD1998).


19/29



ogyby2005,itisnecessarytopayattentiontothepoliticallogicsthroughwhichimagesare

madetowork.

FiveyearsaftertheFASpublishedtheimagesdiscussedabove,inMay2005,satelliteim

agerywascentraltoUSadministrationclaims thatNorthKoreamightbepreparing foranundergroundnucleartest.AsNorthKoreahaddeclareditselfanuclearpowerthreemonths

earlier, thepictures,which were said to show workers excavating tunnels andbuilding a

reviewstand,presumablyforhighrankingofficialstoattendatest(SangerandBroad2005),

fuelledconcerns that tensions in theregionwouldescalate further.Althoughthe imagesdid

notprovideanyconclusiveevidence, theyweresufficient toalarm theBushadministration,

whichsubsequentlybriefedtheJapanese,SouthKoreanandChinesegovernments.Thisdevel

opmentledUSandJapaneseofficialstoissuestrongwarningstoNorthKoreaandtothreaten

theimpositionofUNsanctionsifthecountryconductedanucleartest(Sanger2005).

WhileNorthKoreadidnottestanatomicdeviceuntilOctober2006ayearandahalfaf

terWashingtonhadstridentlywarnedofanimminenttestthis2005episode,alongwiththe

abovementioned examples, points to a rangeof epistemological problems with regard to

satellite imagery:Whatdoesasatellite image tellusabout the intentionsofagivenactor?

Howcantheambitionsofanactorbeknownbylookingatimages?Whatcanmeaningfully

beconcludedbywhatwe(wantto)seeandhowwe(aremadeto)see?Howcanweensure

thecorrectinterpretationofsatelliteimageswhentheylackanyinherentmeaning?Whatis

a proper interpretation? Who decides when and whether these media are compelling

sourcesornothingbutanartificialviewfromouterspace?Andhowcanweharmonizeandalignwhatsatellitesmakevisibleonthegroundwithestimationsaboutwhattheobserved

partywantstheobservertoseeandbelieve?Foreventhoughsatellitesarecreditedwithhav

ing superiorcapabilities (theallseeingeye), it shouldbekept inmind that theydonot

necessarily reveal what is seemingly meant tobe concealed. Clandestine activities on the

groundmaybepartofadeceptivestrategyonthepartoftheobservedtofooltheobservers

andmakethembelievethatsomethingsuspiciousisgoingon.Satelliteimagesdonottell

uswhetherparticulardevelopmentsonthegroundareindicativeofgenuinelycovertactivi

tiesorwhethertheyaremerelyashowstagedforthewatchfuleyesinthesky.

8 ConclusionImagesserveparticularpurposes.Because theyareselective inwhat they include (andex

clude)within their frameofvisibility, imagesand thepracticeof imagingarebothdeeply

political. Satellite images are no exception. As seemingly realistic representations of the

world, satellitephotographs are effective toolsofpersuasion.However, references to, and

relianceupon,themneedtoberegardedcautiouslybecausetheyareopentospecificuses:either aspowerful spatial imaginaries conveying aparticular truth about a territoryor as

subjectsforparticularappropriationsthathavegeopoliticalimplications.


20/29



Because they are simultaneously artificial and authoritative, remotesensing images re

vealaninterestingparadox.Thefactthatsatelliteimages,asaresultoftechnicalprocedures,

areheavilyprocesseddoesnotdiminishtheirstatusasobjectivereferentsofthetruth.They

continue tobedeemed transparentandauthentic.The implicationsof thisparadoxcanbeillustratedbycomparingremotesensingwithanothermodeofthevisualwhich,likeremote

sensing,isalsoelevatedtoanalmostsacredlevelofobjectivity:photography.Thegenresof

newsphotographyanddocumentaryphotography inparticulardrawon similarclaims to

accuracy, neutrality and science and technology to underpin their supposed truthfulness.

Giventhatsatelliteimagesoftenfunctionasnewstheyarenotillustrativetonewsitcould

beaskedwhatwouldhappentotheauthorityandcredibilityofacommonnewsphotograph

ifitsubsequentlyturnedoutthatithadbeenmassivelyphotoshopped?Howwoulditsclaim

totruthbeaffectedifitcametolightthat,likethesatelliteimage,itwasprocessedandhad

beencomposedofdifferentparcelsofinformationstemmingfromdifferenttimesinor

dertobepresentableandviewableinameaningfulway?

KarenLitfin(2002:67)remindsusthateventhoughconsensusonwhatasatellitephoto

graphdepictscanbereached,thepicturedoesnottelluswhat itssupposedmeaning isor

whathastobedoneaboutit.Further,theabovementionedepistemologicalproblemsofre

motesensingremainunaddressed.Theambiguityofsatelliteimageryhighlightstheneedto

takeintoconsiderationthepoliticalcontextwithinwhichitoperatesandismademeaning

ful.Inthisregard,itshouldberememberedthat(satellite)visioncanbeaffectedbyprecon

ceptions(believingisseeing):whatpeopleseedependsonwhattheybelieveor,putbluntly,whattheywanttobelieve.Itisthusimportanttonotethatwhatwe(wantto)knowde

pendsonwhatwe (want to)seeandviceversa.Thisalsodemonstrates the inevitabilityof

interpretationinthearticulationofdanger(Campbell1998).

Thequestionsoutlinedabovepointtothenecessityofdevelopingacarefulandsensitive

understanding regarding the uses and functions of remotesensing data. However, these

questionsalsoapplytoothermodesofoverheadimaging:aerialphotographyand,perhaps

more importantlydue to the increasingdeploymentofsocalledunmannedaerialvehicles

aroundtheglobe,droneimagery.Utilizedtorebutasmanyargumentsastheycansubstantiate,visualimagesarenotnecessarilyabletoservetheenlighteningfunctionthatmanyreadi

lyattributetothem.ThecaseofNorthKoreaprovidesdiverseexamplesofthis,rangingfrom

theambiguityregarding thenumberofatomicbombsandstorage installations fornuclear

warheadstotheuncertainpresenceofnuclearwastesites,proliferationactivities,andmissile

andnucleartests.

Whatisalsonoteworthyisthatamomentofrevelation,forexample,theemptytunnels

andtheundergroundsysteminNorthKorea,doesnotendthequest(oftheUnitedStates)to

uncover (NorthKoreaspresumed) clandestineactivities.Rather, itactually intensifies this

impulse, true to themotto that these things that is,whatever theactor inquestion isas

sumed tobehidingmustbesomewhereelse instead.This, in turn,makes thesearch for


21/29



thempracticallyendless.Inotherwords,thereisnoactualneedtofindtheseobjects,asitis

sufficient todemonstrate thataparty iscapableofsecrecy (cf.Bratich2006).Asimilar logic

prevailedwithregardtothe(failed)searchforIraqsweaponsofmassdestruction.

Further implicationsforthebroaderstudyofvisuality incriticalgeopoliticsarisewhenimagesarenotconsideredasdirectreflectionsoftheworldbutasinterpretationsandsenti

mentsthereof.Whenapictureisbasedfirstandforemostonanunderstandingofwhichis

suesorplacesareentitledtorepresentation,thenitisnotobjectivedocumentationbutrather

theresultofasubjectivedecision,aninterpretiveresponsetohowcertaincircumstancesare

imaginedand framedby the imagemaker.Similarly to thewritingofacommentaryoran

opinionpieceinordertopursueaparticularpurposebypromotingordefendingaparticular

position, a picture can likewisebe viewed as a statement ofbelief, a statement of intent

and/orasastatementofdefense.Acceptingthatpicturescanservecertainpurposeshascon

sequencesnotonlyfortheevaluationofethicalandpoliticalresponsesbutalsoforthevery

possibilityofhavingtheminthefirstplace.Whenheorsheisawarethatanimagecouldbe

astatementofopinion that followsaspecificgoal, theviewer isable tochallengepopular

imaginationsof,forinstance,whatconstitutesaspecialplaceofbelongingthataffecthisor

herensuingresponse.Itfollowsthatitbecomespossibletothinkandactdifferently,which,

intheend,couldstimulatetheformulationofdifferent(policy)options:inthecaseofNorth

Koreathisismeantinthesensethatitspeoplecouldbeseentobelikeotherpeopleinother

countriesandthattheirhomelandwouldnotbethegreatunknownotherinworldpolitics,

whichwould legitimizecooperationandengagement regarding the countrys containmentandisolation.

Accordingly,viewersofsatelliteimagesneedtobefullyawarethatthesepicturesarenot

only prone tomanipulationbuthave also alreadybeendoctored.AsCampbell (2007: 23)

aptlyconcludes,weneedtoreadthem[satelliteimages]criticallylikeanyphotograph,ex

ploring theirproduction, interpretationandcirculation in termsof thepoliticalwork these

supposedlyobjectiveregimesorvisionsupport.


22/29



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Seeing From Above - The Geopolitics of Satellite Vision and North Korea

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