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Security Reflections of 2012 and Predictions for 2013 January 22, 2013 Start Time: 9 AM US Pacific, Noon US Eastern, 5 pm London 1

Transcript of Security Reflections of 2012 and Predictions for 2013 › › resource › ...(decoy) •Preferred...

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Security Reflections of 2012 and Predictions for 2013

January 22, 2013 Start Time: 9 AM US Pacific,

Noon US Eastern, 5 pm London

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Generously sponsored by:

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Welcome Conference Moderator

Phillip H. Griffin

Raleigh, USA Chapter

ISSA Web Conference

Committee

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Agenda Speakers

• Michael Versace Global Research Director, Worldwide Risk, Big Data Industry Lead, IDC Financial Insights

• Wayne Proctor Director, Information Security & Risk Management, United Parcel Service

•Darien Kindlund Senior Staff Scientist, FireEye, Inc.

Open Panel with Audience Q&A Closing Remarks

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2012/2013 Infosec Trends

*The slide deck is not available for this presentation – please view the On-Demand

recording posted on the ISSA website.

Michael Versace

Global Research Director, Worldwide Risk,

Big Data Industry Lead, IDC Financial Insights

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2012/2013 Infosec Trends

Wayne Proctor

Director, Information Security & IT Risk Management

United Parcel Service

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Agenda

• Security intelligence & behavioral analysis

• Advanced malware protection

• Attacks targeting a specific individual

• Technologies for mobile device protection

• DDoS attack intensity & complexity

• Cyber security program information sharing

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Security Intelligence & Behavioral Analysis

• SIEM systems implemented mainly for compliance

purposes are not providing significant value

• Security Intelligence leverages SIEM at its core but includes key value-added features – Input feeds from many new sources

– Alignment with business rules

– Integration with Big Data

– Behavioral Analysis

• Behavioral Analysis is the future of InfoSec monitoring – Why try to define what to look for?

– Alert when something is not acting within a normal range

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Advanced Malware Protection

• Traditional AV is only effective against known threats

– Signature based tools [...] are only effective against 30-50 percent of current security threats – IDC, early 2012

• Advanced malware protection features may include: – Finding advanced malware

– Stopping advanced malware infection

– Analyzing advanced malware forensically

– Removal and/or quarantine of advanced malware

• Stopping the advanced malware infection is key as it is close to impossible to stop all company employees from clicking links and opening attachments

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Attacks Targeting a Specific Individual

• Social Networking sites have made it possible to focus

attacks on specific targets

• Enough personal information can be found in minutes to get a normal person to click a link

• An advanced people search for “DBA” in a current job title on LinkedIn replies with over 29,000 results

• An advanced people search for “CEO” in a current job title on LinkedIn replies with over 500,000 results

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Technologies for Mobile Device Protection

• Simple MDM and container approaches for mobile

security have limited corporate innovation

• We need all of the security that we expect on laptops

• Concerns are encountered when the use of personal devices are considered

• Future solutions should run as a cloud service

• Goal of future mobile protection systems should offer industry standard levels of security with minimal impacts to the user experience

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DDoS Attack Intensity & Complexity

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• DDoS Attacks have increased over 2000% over the last three years (source: Akamai)

• A sustained attack of 1 Gigabit per second was considered large prior to mid-2012

• Attackers are now using a small number of owned large servers with large bandwidth pipes

• Sustained attacks of 60 gigabit per second with spikes over 100 gigabits are common

• These next-gen attacks originate from only one group and only against large financials today but will expand

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Cyber Security Program Info Sharing

• Former Defense secretary Leon Panetta warned in Oct 2012 of a “Cyber Pearl Harbor” threat that could “be just as destructive as terrorist attacks of 9/11”

• The FBI sees Cyber Security surpassing Terrorism as their primary focus

• Cyber Security Act of 2012 was voted down in the senate by a 52-46 vote (60 needed to pass) in September of 2012

• A Cyber Security Executive Order (EO) may be issued in the next several weeks – establishing a “voluntary” program for critical infrastructure companies

• Companies are concerned that liability can’t be waived without legislation

• The EO would direct federal agencies to "incorporate cybersecurity standards as part of the regulatory requirements they impose on the industries they regulate”

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Question and Answer

Wayne Proctor

Director, Information Security & IT Risk Management

United Parcel Service

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2012/2013 Infosec Trends

Darien Kindlund

Senior Staff Scientist

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Spectrum of Frequent Advanced Attacks

For 2012/2013

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Mass Website Compromises

• Exploit toolkits

• Zero-day exploits (rare)

• Sophisticated crimeware

Watering Hole Attacks

• Compromised site specific to industry vertical

• Zero-day exploits more common

• Frequently nation-state driven

Weaponized Email Attachments

• Common file formats

• Legit work product presented (decoy)

• Preferred by nation-states

Malicious URLs in Email (Spearphish)

• Exploits specific to target environment

• Only exploit if visited from target network(s)

• Use existing trust relationships

1000+ Victims

(Easiest to Detect) ~1-2 Victims

(Hardest to Detect)

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Watering Hole Attacks

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Mass Website Compromises

• Exploit toolkits

• 0-day exploits (rare)

• Sophisticated crimeware

Watering Hole Attacks

• Compromised site specific to industry vertical

• Zero-day exploits more common

• Frequently nation-state driven

Weaponized Email Attachments

• Common file formats

• Legit work product presented (decoy)

• Preferred by nation states

Malicious URLs in Email (Spearphish)

• Exploits specific to target environment

• Only exploit if visited from target network(s)

• Use existing trust relationships

1000+ Victims

(Easiest to Detect) ~1-2 Victims

(Hardest to Detect)

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1) Offense: ▲Watering Hole Methods

• Growing in popularity among nation-state threat actors

• Useful when precise targeting intel is unknown

• Compromise web site likely visited by target

• Start campaign when target is distracted (e.g. holidays)

• Once victim compromised, cleanup site

• Or, leave exploit for opportunistic attacks

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Ex: Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)

• On Dec 21st, 2012, FireEye detected attacks from cfr.org to 4 major customers – Victims: large scale ISP, large US financial, US media outlet,

& local government

– Only worked from US, JP, KO, and CN systems

– Exploit triggers only one time (cookie tracking)

– First reported IE 8 zero-day exploit (CVE-2012-4792)

– Obfuscated JS + Heapspray via Flash + IE 8 exploit

– Fetches xsainfo.jpg as XOR encoded backdoor

– Loads backdoor as “shiape.exe”

– Callbacks to dynamic DNS C2 provider as normal HTTP POST traffic

– More at: http://blog.fireeye.com

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1) Offense: ▲Watering Hole Methods

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Sept 2012 Capstone Turbine Space Foundation Reporters Without

Borders

Oct 2012 (Earlier

Campaigns End)

Dec 2012 CFR

Taiwan Travel Dissident Uygur

CFR is not the first…nor the last…

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1) Offense: ▲Watering Hole Methods

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Email Attacks

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Mass Website Compromises

• Exploit toolkits

• 0-day exploits (rare)

• Sophisticated crimeware

Watering Hole Attacks

• Compromised site specific to industry vertical

• 0-day exploits more common

• Frequently nation state driven

Weaponized Email Attachments

• Common file formats

• Legit work product presented (decoy)

• Preferred by nation-states

Malicious URLs in Email (Spearphish)

• Exploits specific to target environment

• Only exploit if visited from target network(s)

• Use existing trust relationships

1000+ Victims

(Easiest to Detect) ~1-2 Victims

(Hardest to Detect)

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2) Offense: ▲Email Attacks During Holidays

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Mal

icio

us

Att

ach

men

t

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2) Offense: ▲Email Attacks During Holidays D

aily

Co

un

ts

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Typical Defensive Lifecycle

Collection

Detection

Incident Response

Remediation

Threat Intelligence

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Threat Intelligence Improvements

Collection

Detection

Incident Response

Remediation

Threat Intelligence

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3) Defense: ▲Localized Threat Intelligence

• Picking defensive technologies that provide max intel – Tolerance for false positives (FPs) is exceptionally low

– Not enough to state something is malicious by fiat

– Must provide more evidence as to why the alert is valid

– Includes IOCs, PCAPs, historical data, copies of malware, copies of dropped files, and memory dumps of processes

• Analyzing attack trends specific to the organization

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• How did the attack work?

• Vulnerabilities used?

• Applications targeted?

• Was it likely APT?

• Decoy content used?

• What was the motive?

• Financial gain?

• IP theft?

• Who was targeted? When?

• Common trend?

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3) Defense: ▲Localized Threat Intelligence

• Up-leveling attack trends from past incidents – Identifying common tools, techniques, procedures (TTPs) used by

threat actors, over time

– Focusing defenses on identifying common TTPs

• The point: Instead of trying to cover all defenses, focus first on identifying known tactics used by threat actors – The attackers are human and (generally) lazy in nature

– Most operate like a “business”; employing the least sophisticated methods that accomplish the mission

– If sending a weaponized resume (PDF) to your HR dept. (because their Acrobat isn’t updated) achieves a foothold, then why bother using a more complicated attack?

– Once attack succeeds, expect new waves of attacks using same tactics

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3) Defense: ▲Localized Threat Intelligence

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Nation State

Military Group #1

TTP 1 Contractor #1

TTP 2 TTP3

Contractor #2

TTP 4 TTP 5

Intel Group #2

Contractor #3

TTP 6

Goal: Identifying TTP patterns specific to your industry

Target: Energy Sector

• Spring/Summer: TTP2

• Fall: TTP1

• Winter: TTP3

Target: Finance Sector

• Spring/Summer: TTP4

• Fall/Winter : TTP5

Target: Legal

• Always:

TTP6

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3) Defense: ▲Localized Threat Intelligence

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Nation State

Military Group #1

TTP 1 Contractor #1

TTP 2 TTP3

Contractor #2

TTP 4 TTP 5

Intel Group #2

Contractor #3

TTP 6

Target: Energy Sector

• Spring/Summer: TTP2

• Fall: TTP1

• Winter: TTP3

Target: Finance Sector

• Spring/Summer: TTP4

• Fall/Winter: TTP5

Target: Legal

• Always:

TTP6

• Don’t focus on attribution (doesn’t help/matter)

• Instead, focus on TTP trends (does matter)

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Incident Response Improvements

Collection

Detection

Incident Response

Remediation

Threat Intelligence

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4) Defense: ▲IR Creativity

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Att

ac

k R

ate

Breach Successful

IR Starts

How do you measure

successful incident

response engagements?

Why did this

happen?

Time

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4) Defense: ▲IR Creativity

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Att

ac

k R

ate

Time

Breach Successful

IR Starts Cleanup

Fails

Cleanup

Succeeds

Look For This

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Summary: 2012/2013 Trends

Offense

▲Watering Hole Methods

▲Email Attacks During Holidays

Defense

▲Localized Threat Intelligence

▲IR Creativity

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5 Criteria for Advanced Threat Protection

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1. Dynamic, signature-less engine to detect & block zero-

day and targeted inbound attacks (as used by

Hacktivists, APT and crimeware actors, and nation-

states)

2. Real-time protection to stop data exfiltration

3. Integrated, cross-protocol Web & email inbound infection

and outbound callback protection

4. Accurate, no tuning, and very low false positive rate

5. Global malware intelligence for sharing threat indicators

to block zero-day malware & latest callback channels

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Integrated Solution to Stop Advanced Targeted Attacks

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• Integrated solution to combat advanced malware across multiple vectors, like Web and email

• Exploit, callback, and payload analysis to address all stages of attack lifecycle

• Malware forensics complements real-time protections with deep malware intelligence

• Systems share real-time malware intelligence locally and globally

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Question and Answer

Darien Kindlund

Senior Staff Scientist

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Open Panel with Audience Q&A

•Michael Versace Global Research Director, Worldwide Risk, Big Data Industry Lead, IDC Financial Insights

•Wayne Proctor Director, Information Security & Risk Management, United Parcel Service

•Darien Kindlund Senior Staff Scientist, FireEye, Inc.

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Closing Remarks

Online Meetings Made Easy

Thank you to Citrix for donating this Webcast service

Thank you to our Sponsor

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CPE Credit •Within 24 hours of the conclusion of this webcast, you

will receive a link via email to a post Web Conference quiz.

•After the successful completion of the quiz you will be given an opportunity to PRINT a certificate of attendance to use for the submission of CPE credits.

•On-Demand Viewers Quiz Link:

http://www.surveygizmo.com/s3/1139768/ISSA-Web-Conference-Security-Reflections-for-2012-and-Predictions-for-2013-January-22-2013

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