3 Mobile Security Best Practices for LA Investment Advisors (SlideShare)
Security Best Practices for Mobile Development
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Transcript of Security Best Practices for Mobile Development
Security Best Practices for Mobile DevelopmentMobile SDK Entity Framework and SmartStore
Tom Gersic, Salesforce.comDirector, Mobile Services Delivery@tomgersic
Safe HarborSafe harbor statement under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: This presentation may contain forward-looking statements that involve risks, uncertainties, and assumptions. If any such uncertainties materialize or if any of the assumptions proves incorrect, the results of salesforce.com, inc. could differ materially from the results expressed or implied by the forward-looking statements we make. All statements other than statements of historical fact could be deemed forward-looking, including any projections of product or service availability, subscriber growth, earnings, revenues, or other financial items and any statements regarding strategies or plans of management for future operations, statements of belief, any statements concerning new, planned, or upgraded services or technology developments and customer contracts or use of our services. The risks and uncertainties referred to above include – but are not limited to – risks associated with developing and delivering new functionality for our service, new products and services, our new business model, our past operating losses, possible fluctuations in our operating results and rate of growth, interruptions or delays in our Web hosting, breach of our security measures, the outcome of any litigation, risks associated with completed and any possible mergers and acquisitions, the immature market in which we operate, our relatively limited operating history, our ability to expand, retain, and motivate our employees and manage our growth, new releases of our service and successful customer deployment, our limited history reselling non-salesforce.com products, and utilization and selling to larger enterprise customers. Further information on potential factors that could affect the financial results of salesforce.com, inc. is included in our annual report on Form 10-K for the most recent fiscal year and in our quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the most recent fiscal quarter. These documents and others containing important disclosures are available on the SEC Filings section of the Investor Information section of our Web site. Any unreleased services or features referenced in this or other presentations, press releases or public statements are not currently available and may not be delivered on time or at all. Customers who purchase our services should make the purchase decisions based upon features that are currently available. Salesforce.com, inc. assumes no obligation and does not intend to update these forward-looking statements.
Tom GersicDirector, Mobile Services Delivery@tomgersic
Agenda• Fundamental Principles• What iOS and Android Share• iOS Specific Characteristics• Android Specific Characteristics• Salesforce Mobile Offerings
Who thinks the data on their phone is secure?
Fundamental Security Principles
Vulnerability
Threat
Consequence
Mitigation
Separation of Concerns – Principle of Least Privilege
Security Stack
Real life examples
Libtiff Image Exploit / Jailbreak• iPhone 1 – patched in 1.1.2• Tiff buffer overflow• No DEP/ASLR – nothing to
prevent executing code on the heap• Gained root access from viewing an
image on the web
ASLR (PIE) and DEP
iOS 7 Lock Screen Bypass
Fingerprint Hacking
“Bluebox Uncovers Android Master Key -- 2013”
Concatenated SMS Exploit – Charlie Miller
Concatenated SMS Exploit• Takes 519 SMS messages – all but 1 is invisible• Send message -1 of X to underflow the array buffer• Can’t be stopped by the user• Used to write an entire binary executable to the heap, and run
it, taking over the phone.
NFC Exploit
But most of the time…
Data Security – Hardware EncryptionRequires PIN/Passcode on both iOS and AndroidOn iOS, apps opt-inSupported on
▪ iPhone 3GS w/ iOS v4+ (AES 256 bit)▪ Android Honeycomb+ (AES 128 bit)
• Some manufacturers increase to AES 256 bit (Samsung SAFE)
SD Card encryption on Android is manufacturer specific.
Is Facebook.app Secure?
App Security
Layers of Defense
Application Signing
Application Sandboxing
iOS Sandbox• All apps (Apple’s and App Store) run as “mobile” user.• Sandboxing is bolted on -- handled via XNU Sandbox
“Seatbelt” kernel extension.• Applications run in separate subdirectories of
/private/var/mobile/Applications• Any app in this directory is loaded with “container”
(sandboxed) profile.
Android Sandbox• Uses underlying Linux security model• Every app runs as a separate user• Apps signed by the same developer can run as the same user, if
desired (not the default, though)• Every app runs in its own instance of the Android Runtime (Dalvik
Virtual Machine)• Like iOS, every app has its own directory structure• SD Card, though, is generally public – accessible to all apps and
unencrypted unless manufacturer has added encryption (Samsung SAFE)
Background Processing• iOS 6:
• Audio Streaming (Spotify, Pandora)• GPS / Navigation• VOIP• Newsstand app content downloading• Hardware integrations (bluetooth, other external accessories)
• iOS 7• 10 3 minute window after app closes to finish any task.• Background Fetch• Remote Notifications• Background Transfer Service
iOS 7 Backgrounding
Background Processes / App Interaction
Types of Android Components
▪ Activities▪ Intent▪ Service▪ Content Provider▪ Broadcast Receiver
Public / Private Components
But what about custom keyboards?
Keyboard Security Risks
Except Passwords?
https://github.com/tomgersic/AndroidKeyLogger
Permissions
Mitigation
Static Analysis Tools
Application Encryption• Encrypt your data yourself using PIN / Passcode• CoreData/SQLCipher
▪ NSIncrementalStore▪ Good Dynamics
• FMDB/SQLCipher▪ Salesforce Smartstore
Jailbreak Detection• Sandbox integrity check: fork() should fail• Check for jailbreak files:
▪ /Applications/Cydia.app▪ /Library/MobileSubstrate/MobileSubstrate.dylib▪ /var/cache/apt▪ /bin/sh▪ /bin/bash
In-App Encryption
SmartStore Stack
Enable ASLR in Your App• ASLR: Address Space Layout Randomization
Stack Canaries• AKA Stack Smashing Protection• Protect against buffer overflows• Places random known value (canary) before local variables• Use Apple LLVM – won’t work with LLVM GCC
Hide Data from App Snapshot Images
Who STILL thinks the data on their phone is secure?
Tom Gersic
Director, Mobile Services Delivery@tomgersic
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@tomgersic