Security and Displacement in Iraq Security and Sarah ... · PDF filesence, militants consider...

Contrary to all expec-tations, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 did not immediately trigger massiverefugee ºows. The anxious aid workers massed on the border packed up andleft, heading to more urgent crises. In February 2006 the bombing of the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra dispelled that calm. The destruction of the Shiiteshrine precipitated an eruption of sectarian violence throughout the country.Since then, millions of Iraqis have ºed their homes, and displacement has be-come a central strategy in the civil war. Similar to the ethnic cleansing inBosnia, militant groups have engineered these colossal population movementsto consolidate their power and expand their territorial claims. Despite the evi-dence from past refugee crises, responses to the Iraqi crisis have thus far ig-nored the grave security threat it poses at home and in neighboring states.Understanding the potential for massive and protracted displacement crises todestabilize international security is essential if policymakers hope to preventthe manipulation and militarization of the displaced Iraqis.

In March 2008 the International Organization for Migration estimated that2.4 million Iraqi refugees had ºed the country, primarily to Jordan and Syria,and 2.7 million more remained displaced within Iraq.1 Initially, the displacedIraqis received a sympathetic reception in their new locations.2 With no solu-tions in sight, however, the host governments, both within and outside Iraq,

Sarah Kenyon Lischer is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wake Forest University.

The author would like to thank Brian Haggerty, Chaim Kaufmann, Steven Van Evera, the partici-pants of the Lone Star National Security Forum, and the anonymous reviewers for their helpfulcomments. For their generous support, she is grateful to the Tobin Project and the Wake ForestUniversity Archie Fund.

1. International Organization for Migration, “IOM Emergency Needs Assessments, Post-February2006 Displacement in Iraq,” March 15, 2008.2. I use the term “displaced” to refer to both refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees deªnes a refugee as “[any per-son who,] . . . owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nation-ality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of hisnationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection ofthat country.” The United Nations “Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement” deªne IDPs as“persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to ºee or to leave their homes orplaces of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armedconºict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-madedisasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.”

Security and Displacement in Iraq

Security andDisplacement in Iraq

Sarah Kenyon Lischer

Responding to the ForcedMigration Crisis

International Security, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Fall 2008), pp. 95–119© 2008 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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have begun to fear the risks posed by the crisis. With their welcome worn thin,displaced Iraqis have encountered increased resentment and restrictions ontheir activities.

In such desperate circumstances, the refugees and internally displaced per-sons (IDPs) have become susceptible to political manipulation by extremists.In Iraq, militant groups, such as that of Muqtada al-Sadr, have already capital-ized on this opportunity, offering shelter and protection to the traumatized ex-iles. Aid workers report that militant groups have increased their recruitingin IDP settlements, in some cases exchanging humanitarian aid for new re-cruits.3 Kristèle Younès of Refugees International explains that individual refu-gees and IDPs do not inherently pose a security threat, but that under suchwretched conditions, their “loyalties can be bought.”4 Human Rights Watch(United Kingdom) Director Tom Porteous warns, “Unless this crisis is ad-dressed, we may well look back in 10 years’ time and see the seeds of the nextgeneration of terrorists.”5

Even if the displaced Iraqis do not join militant groups, their mere presencewill continue to exacerbate political tensions. Extremist leaders have alreadyused the displacement to further their agenda of sectarian cleansing. In es-sence, militants consider the displaced Iraqis as pawns and bargaining chips intheir conºict with the Iraqi government and U.S. forces. The sheer magnitudeof the displacement crisis has further discredited the government of PrimeMinister Nouri al-Maliki by conªrming its inability to maintain law and order.As a concentrated and vulnerable group, the displaced make easy targetsfor attackers. Although they ºed their homes to escape conºict, the displacedmay ªnd their new accommodations even more dangerous. Such attacks couldprovoke a spiral of further displacement and sectarian violence.

Refugee ºows also increase the risk that conºict will spread across interna-tional borders. In some cases, the militarization of refugees can lead to inter-national war and regional destabilization.6 The governments of Jordan and

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3. Various nongovernmental organization representatives, interviews by author, Washington,D.C., September 20–25, 2007.4. Kristèle Younès, Refugees International, interview by author, Washington, D.C., September 25,2007.5. Quoted in Ruth Gidley, “Where Will Iraq—and Its Refugees—Go Next?” Reuters Alertnet blog,June 22, 2007, http://www.alertnet.org/db/blogs/1264/2007/05/22-162514-1.htm.6. Examples include the 1990 attack against Rwanda led by Rwandan Tutsi refugees in Uganda,the 1996 Rwandan invasion of Zaire to eliminate the security threat posed by the Rwandan Hutumilitants who had taken shelter among the refugees, and the inºux of 10 million refugees into In-dia, which prompted the Indian invasion of East Pakistan in 1971.

Syria fear that Iraq’s refugee crisis will facilitate the operations of al-Qaida-afªliated groups and lead to a rise in Islamic militancy. Iraqi militant groups,both Shiite and Sunni, have established ofªces in exile, which could provide astaging ground for future militant activity against secular Middle East govern-ments and perhaps Western states.

The history of the Palestinians demonstrates the dangers of protractedrefugee crises. The United Nations currently recognizes nearly 4 millionPalestinian refugees, some of them the grandchildren of refugees who ºedIsrael in 1948. Over the decades, the impoverished refugees coalesced into ahighly organized and militant state-in-exile. Considering its past, Jordan, witha population of only 5.7 million (more than half of whom are Palestinian refu-gees), views the Iraqi refugees as an existential threat.

Four policies are necessary to prevent the wide-scale militarization of dis-placed Iraqis. First, international donors must provide a massive infusion ofhumanitarian aid. Second, host states and the Iraqi government should resistthe temptation to build camps to house the displaced. Third, despite thedifªculties caused by the refugees’ presence, the displaced should not be senthome against their will. Any voluntary refugee repatriation needs to ensurethat returnees can claim their property or receive adequate compensation fortheir losses. Finally, Western states, and especially the United States, need toexpand and expedite the resettlement process, especially for vulnerable Iraqissuch as those who were once U.S. employees.

In many refugee crises, states offer humanitarian aid as a way of avoidingpolitical commitments while appearing to “do something.” In the case of Iraq,however, humanitarian assistance actually plays an essential role in mitigatingpotential security threats posed by the crisis. Refugees and IDPs are mainlyconcerned about food, shelter, health care, and education. Thus, in the shortterm, meeting these basic needs will dilute the inºuence of militant groupsand pacify anxious host states.

As the crisis drags on, hosts are considering housing the displaced in campsor even forcibly expelling them. Camps would isolate and impoverish the ref-ugees and IDPs, making them easy targets for attack and susceptible to mili-tary recruitment. Their forced return to Iraq, or expulsion from the hostingarea within Iraq, would greatly multiply deaths from malnutrition and dis-ease, and would likely trigger further sectarian violence.

The long-term solution to the displacement crisis is political stability in Iraqthat facilitates a peaceful return home. Most of the Iraqi refugees and IDPs ac-knowledge, however, that if they do return, it will be in the distant future. Se-

Security and Displacement in Iraq 97

curity gains following the U.S. military surge in Baghdad encouraged thereturn of around 60,000 Iraqi refugees in late 2007. Although this representedonly a tiny percentage of the total refugee population, the Iraqi governmenthailed this movement as proof of its growing stability. Yet a mismanaged andpremature return process represents perhaps the greatest threat to Baghdad’snewly acquired calm. The Iraqi government has not offered a comprehensiveplan to settle property disputes, protect returnees to minority areas, and pro-vide essential services. Such an unorganized return process will likely fuel re-sentment and has already led to further displacement. At worst, higher levelsof returnees could reignite the sectarian violence that drove these Iraqis fromtheir homes in the ªrst place.

Continued instability in Iraq is likely to impede any quick resolution of thedisplacement crisis. Indeed, ongoing violence continues to force Iraqis fromtheir homes. These people, rejected within Iraq and barred from neighboringstates, literally will have nowhere to go. If millions of Iraqis remain impover-ished and unable to return to their homes, eventually the displacement crisiswill destabilize not only Iraq but the entire region.

The remainder of this article is structured in three main sections. The ªrstsection lays out the conditions that are conducive to refugee manipulation andmilitarization. It then characterizes the wider security implications of displace-ment crises. The second section applies that general framework to the Iraq cri-sis, clarifying how manipulation and militarization have undermined securitywithin Iraq and across the region. The third section presents recommendationsfor mitigating, and in some cases preventing, these security threats.

Refugees and the Spread of Conºict

Like the Iraqis, millions of people around the world have ºed their homesto escape violence and persecution. In 2006 the United Nations High Commis-sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported a global total of 9.8 million refugeesand 12.8 million internally displaced persons.7 Contrary to their expecta-tions of sanctuary, many refugees and IDPs continue to experience securitythreats in their new locations. In some cases, forced displacement functions as


7. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “2006 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced, and Stateless Persons” (Geneva: UNHCR, July 2007),http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/4676a71d4.pdf. Figures do not include Palestinianrefugees served by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.

a strategy of war. Political and militant groups may use the crisis to their ad-vantage by manipulating the refugees and IDPs using strategies such as incit-ing fear among them and treating them as demographic bargaining chips.

Although both refugees and IDPs are vulnerable to manipulation andmilitarization, refugee crises pose a greater risk to the spread of conºict acrossborders. In some instances, manipulation leads to the militarization of the ref-ugee population. For insurgent groups, a displaced (and concentrated) popu-lation provides international legitimacy, a shield against attack, a pool ofrecruits, and valuable sources of food and medicine. In essence, refugee campscan function as rear bases for rebels who attack across the border. The refugee-sending state may pursue the refugees across the border, subjecting them tomilitary attack.8 As the cross-border attacks escalate, the risk of internationalwar grows. The refugees may also instigate conºict within the receiving stateby upsetting a fragile ethnic balance or by undermining the government.Eventually, regionwide destabilization may result as more states are drawninto the conºict.9

manipulation of refugees

The conventional view of displacement crises emphasizes their humanitariancharacteristics. The revised U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency FieldManual indicates a change in traditional attitudes toward displacement, how-ever. The manual warns, “An insurgency often creates many groups of inter-nally displaced persons and refugees on short notice. . . . Nongovernmentalorganizations and other civilian agencies normally furnish this support to in-ternally displaced persons and refugees. However, conditions may preventthese agencies from providing these services quickly. Furthermore, in [coun-terinsurgency] operations, internally displaced person and refugee securitymay take on heightened military importance. Traumatized and dislocated per-sons may become vulnerable to insurgent threats and recruitment.”10 The dis-placed populations most vulnerable to manipulation have often ºed targetedviolence; that is to say, they are victims of persecution. There are two mainways that militant leaders can manipulate a displaced population for strategic


8. The term “sending state” refers to the country from which the refugees ºed; “receiving state”describes the country that hosts the refugees.9. See Sarah Kenyon Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas ofHumanitarian Aid (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005), chap. 1.10. U.S. Army and Marine Corps, The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), chap. 8, par. 8-41.

ends. The ªrst is by forcibly moving people to gain territory or resources. Thesecond is by encouraging a security dilemma mentality among the displacedpopulation.11

In the ªrst type of manipulation, the refugees and IDPs play a mostly pas-sive role. Essentially, militant groups force people to ºee their homes as part ofa larger strategy. This demographic engineering often takes the form of ethniccleansing. Militants decide to homogenize the territory under their control as away of securing their position. Using violence or threats of violence, militantsexpel the “undesirable” group from the territory. Usually, the expulsion is fol-lowed by an inºux of members of the “desirable” group. That inºow may bevoluntary or coerced. The shared experience of persecution often strengthensthe bonds among the forcibly displaced and may increase their receptivity tomilitant propaganda.

As their fears grow, refugees and IDPs realize they cannot return home untilthey are protected from their persecutors. In such a situation, leaders may ex-aggerate or distort the nature of the violence that caused the displacement.This strategy is particularly effective among refugees who are isolated incamps. By convincing the refugees that they must defend themselves againstfurther threats, their leaders can encourage political, and even military, activityamong the displaced. Without alternative sources of information, the refugeesbelieve that they are acting in self-defense, when in reality opponents viewtheir behavior as threatening. Over time, a leadership emerges that unites therefugees behind a highly organized program of political and military actionand may even form a state-in-exile.12

militarization of refugees

The militarization of a refugee population occurs when combatants inªltratethe refugees’ camp, often forming a de facto state-in-exile. Refugees may vol-untarily support the militants, or they may be coerced into doing so.Militarization is more likely to occur the longer the crisis continues becausestate-in-exile groups gain strength over time. The longer it takes to isolate anddisarm the militants, the more time the group has to organize and grow. In ex-ile, the militants improve their security situation vis-à-vis the sending state.They often have greater freedom to raise funds and develop alliances. Time in


11. See Stephen John Stedman and Fred Tanner, eds., Refugee Manipulation: War, Politics, and theAbuse of Human Suffering (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), chaps. 1, 6.12. On state-in-exile refugee groups, see Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries, pp. 24–28.

exile gives leaders the opportunity to expand their popular support. As a crisisdrags on, discouraged refugees may begin to believe that the only escape froman interminable situation is through violence.

The effects of the militarization of refugees include the spread of political vi-olence across borders, clashes between the refugees and the receiving state,and conºict between the receiving and sending states. Cross-border violencetakes the form of attacks between the sending state and the refugees, includingbombing and shelling of camps, hot-pursuit raids across the border, and insur-gent attacks launched from a refugee camp. Such violence threatens the territo-rial integrity of the receiving state and may lead to international war.

Conºict between the refugees and the receiving state is likely if the receivingstate views the refugees as a security threat or if the receiving state is alliedwith the sending state. Ethnic or factional violence that erupts among refugeescan spread conºict to the receiving state. This often occurs when refugeegroups include members of different ethnic groups or competing political par-ties. Such violence threatens the stability of the receiving state, which may al-ready have only a tenuous hold on political order. A related type of violenceoccurs when the refugees create an unstable ethnic balance in the receivingstate that encourages a previously oppressed minority to confront the state.13

At the highest level of militarization, refugee crises can serve as catalystsfor interstate war or unilateral intervention. In some instances, internationalwar occurs when refugees use exile to launch an invasion of their home state.Interstate war becomes more likely if the receiving state supports the militaryactivity. Another type of international war occurs when the receiving state per-ceives the refugees as a threat, regardless of their political or military activity.The receiving state may attack the sending state as a way to expel the refu-gees. The sending state may also launch preemptive war against the receivingstate if it views the refugee crisis as a grave enough threat.

Unlike refugee crises, the militarization of IDPs primarily affects the stabil-ity of their own state, with secondary effects on neighboring states. During acivil war, different regions of the state experience varying levels of violenceand resulting vulnerability to destabilization.14 An inºux of IDPs may upsetethnic balances within a region and incite conºict. There is also the possibility


13. On refugee ºows and the increased risk of civil war, see Idean Salehyan and Kristian SkredeGleditsch, “Refugee Flows and the Spread of Civil War,” International Organization, Vol. 60, No. 2(Spring 2006), pp. 335–366.14. See Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2006).

that militants will move with the IDPs and engage in violence in their new lo-cations. This may draw a previously peaceful region into the civil war. Byspreading and exacerbating violence, the militarization of IDPs indirectly af-fects the security of border states.

Strategies of Displacement in Iraq

The magnitude and nature of the Iraqi displacement crisis increase the risks ofmanipulation and militarization of the refugees and IDPs. As yet, large-scalesectarian violence has not spread to the displaced population. Although mili-tant groups have established a presence in Jordan and Syria, both receivingstates have threatened harsh measures against any perceived security threats.Thus, there is still time to avert the high levels of militarization that haveafºicted many other displaced populations.

persecution and ºight

As of March 2008, the International Organization for Migration estimated that2.4 million Iraqis had crossed international borders, including around 500,000into Jordan and 1.2–1.4 million into Syria. Other refugee-receiving states in-clude Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, and Turkey. More than 80 percent of the refugeesoriginated from Baghdad, with half identifying themselves as Sunni andaround 25 percent as Shiite. Within Iraq, 2.7 million people are classiªed asIDPs, 1 million of whom ºed after the bombing of the al-Askari Mosque inFebruary 2006. The majority of displaced Iraqis, of all sects and religions, citepersecution as the impetus for their ºight.15

The March 2008 statistics include the displacement that occurred during theregime of Saddam Hussein. Before 2003 there were two main refugee move-ments out of Iraq. These occurred in the 1980s, prior to and following the Iran-Iraq War, and after the 1991 Gulf War. At the time of the 2003 U.S. invasion,between 1 and 2 million Iraqis lived outside Iraq, including 300,000 who hadobtained refugee status. Most receiving states did not recognize the Iraqis asrefugees, with the exception of Iran (which hosted 200,000 refugees). Between2003 and 2006, more than 300,000 Iraqis returned home, mainly from Iran.16


15. International Organization for Migration, “IOM Emergency Needs Assessments, Post-February 2006 Displacement in Iraq.”16. U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, World Refugee Survey, 2002 (Washington, D.C.:U.S. Committee for Refugees, 2002), pp. 170–173; and United Nations High Commissioner for Ref-ugees, “Statistics on Displaced Iraqis around the World,” September 2007, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl?SUBSITES&id?470387fc2.

As of 2003, there were still about 1 million Iraqis who had been internallydisplaced during the regime of Saddam Hussein. The 800,000 Kurdish IDPspresent in the northern governorates of Dohuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah re-sulted primarily from Saddam’s Arabization program and Anfal campaignin the late 1980s and early 1990s. Arabization involved the deportation ofhundreds of thousands of Kurds from the oil-rich regions in northern Iraq toso-called collective settlements. During the genocidal Anfal campaign, thegovernment killed 150,000–200,000 Kurds and displaced many times thatnumber. Other IDPs in the north left their homes to escape Kurdish inªghtingamong competing political parties. Persecution of the Shiite displaced 100,000Iraqis from the southeastern marshlands. Since 2006, an additional 200,000IDPs have arrived in the Northern Provinces.17

In addition to the sheer numbers of displaced people, the characteristics ofthe population create further signiªcant problems. Particularly damaging toIraqi society has been the massive ºight of the professional class since the 2003invasion. At the beginning of the crisis, the ªrst people to leave Iraq were thosewith sufªcient resources to survive abroad. Targeted threats against profes-sionals also induced this “brain drain.” The Iraqi Medical Association reportsthat 50 percent of doctors have left Iraq. An Oxfam/NCCI (NGO CoordinationCommittee in Iraq) study states that at least 40 percent of Iraq’s professionalstaff has left the country since 2003. More than 230 university professors havebeen assassinated, and 3,000 have ºed the country since 2003. In 2007, deans ofthree major universities in Baghdad reported that teacher populations hadfallen by 80 percent.18

Nearly all recently displaced Iraqis, both Sunni and Shiite, cite various


17. Figures for total IDPs before 2003 vary from 600,000 to 1.1 million. David Romano, “WhoseHouse Is This Anyway? IDP and Refugee Return in Post-Saddam Iraq,” Journal of Refugee Studies,Vol. 18, No. 4 (December 2005), p. 433; U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, WorldRefugee Survey, 2002, pp. 170–173; Jane Chanaa, “Iraq,” Forced Migration Online: Research Guide,July 2003, http://www.forcedmigration.org/guides/fmo015 (last updated November 2007);United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Statistics on Displaced Iraqis aroundthe World”; and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, “Iraq, Population Figures and Pro-ªle,” statistics as of 2007, http://www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/(httpEnvelopes)/FE5FB119916249D5802570B8005A748A?OpenDocument (accessed July 21, 2008).18. Elizabeth Ferris and Matthew Hall, “Update on Humanitarian Issues and Politics in Iraq,” Re-port of the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement (Washington, D.C., and Bern:Brookings Institution and Universität Bern, July 6, 2007), p. 5 n. 25; Elizabeth Ferris, “Security, Dis-placement, and Iraq: A Deadly Combination,” Report of the Brookings-Bern Project on InternalDisplacement (Washington, D.C., and Bern: Brookings Institution and Universität Bern, August27, 2007), p. 9; NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq and Oxfam, “Rising to the HumanitarianChallenge in Iraq,” Brieªng Paper, No. 105 (July 2007), p. 15; and International Medical Corps,“Iraqis on the Move: Sectarian Displacement in Baghdad” (Santa Monica, Calif.: InternationalMedical Corps, January 29, 2007), p. 7.

forms of persecution as the impetus for their ºight.19 These experiences of per-secution include murder, torture, or abduction of a family member; personallytargeted threats, such as gunmen at the door, warnings from neighbors, threat-ening letters, phone calls, and text messages (for example, one letter warned:“We give you 48 hours to leave this area. . . . Remember 48 hours only from thetime you receive this paper—and then death.”20); threatening grafªti, such as,“No Shiite after today,” scrawled in predominantly Sunni neighborhoods;rumors of impending violence (which are seen as a more reliable source of in-formation than the media); generalized fear of attack by the majority group ina mixed area; and violence against community leaders. As one Iraqi waiting atthe Syrian border lamented, “There isn’t an Iraqi here who wants to enterand hasn’t lost a brother or father, or received a threat.”21 Such experiences fos-ter the belief among the refugees that they will never return home.

In a stereotypical crisis, refugees live in tattered tents in remote, inhospita-ble terrain, surviving on meager humanitarian aid. Unlike most displacedgroups, the majority of Iraqis have ºed cities and have congregated in urbancenters, rather than camps. Jordan and Syria have not established camps forthe Iraqis, in part because neither state has granted them refugee status.Within Iraq, less than 1 percent of IDPs live in camps.22 Most live crowded inwith family or friends or in abandoned buildings and public spaces. This pat-tern could change as refugee and IDP ºows increase and host areas exceedcapacity.

manipulation by militants

The displacement crisis is both an effect and a cause of Iraq’s violence. Whensectarian violence produces displacement, the resulting sectarian polarizationcan lead to further violence and displacement. As Ashraf al-Khalidi and VictorTanner argue, “The violence gives the radical groups their raison d’être. The


19. Walter Kälin, “A Tragedy of Increasing Proportions: Internal Displacement in Iraq,” Forced Mi-gration Review, Special Issue, June 2007, p. 14. For examples of persecution, see Ashraf al-Khalidiand Victor Tanner, “Sectarian Violence: Radical Groups Drive Internal Displacement in Iraq,”Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement (Washington, D.C., and Bern: Brookings Institu-tion and Universität Bern, October 18, 2006), p. 27; and Nir Rosen, “No Going Back: Little Relief inSight for Millions of Displaced Iraqis,” Boston Review, Vol. 32, No. 5 (September/October 2007),pp. 19–26.20. Ashraf al-Khalidi and Victor Tanner, “The Remorseless Rise of Violence and Displacement inIraq,” Refugees, No. 146 (April 2007), p. 9.21. Quoted in Rosen, “No Going Back,” p. 20.22. Kälin, “A Tragedy of Increasing Proportions,” p. 15. See also International Organization forMigration in Iraq, General Library, updates on the IDP situation, http://www.iom-iraq.net/library.html#IDP_mid07_review.

displaced are pawns they use to further their agendas—which are strikinglysimilar. They seek to consolidate ‘their’ territory by expelling the ‘others.’ Theytry to keep some of ‘their’ people in the territory of the ‘other’ so as to main-tain a claim on the local resources.”23 In Baghdad, formerly mixed neighbor-hoods have become unmixed as militants on all sides mount organizedcampaigns to segment the city into closed neighborhoods based on sectarianafªliation.

In carrying out this demographic engineering, the militant groups employstrategies that discourage future return. For many refugees and IDPs, the trau-matic effects of violent displacement, as well as the loss of property, eliminatethe hope of return. The International Medical Corps warns that “the enmitysurrounding the current violence [in Baghdad] is serving to cement these [pop-ulation] movements.”24 In turn, that hardening of sectarian-based populationpatterns further strengthens the position of radical groups.

Increasingly, Iraqi refugees and IDPs are arriving destitute in their newlocations. In insecure areas the property market has collapsed, leaving the dis-placed unable to sell their homes. Conversely, in safer areas prices have sky-rocketed, putting housing out of reach for many Iraqis. In some instances,sectarian organizations have given properties abandoned by a family of onesect to newly arriving families of another sect.25 As in the Balkans, these hous-ing patterns create a domino effect that will immensely complicate refugees’and IDPs’ return and assignment of property rights. In Bosnia many refugeesattempted to return home after the war, only to ªnd families of a different eth-nic group occupying their house. Those squatter families in turn refused toleave, claiming that their homes had since been occupied.

In theory, the Iraqi Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of Displacementand Migration are responsible for displacement issues. In reality, few IDPs re-ceive any government assistance. The government has continually down-played the magnitude of the crisis to hide its failure to cope. As Nir Rosenstates, “Iraqi authorities are in denial about the extent of the violence and dis-placement, preferring to view the problem as small scale and temporary. Theyare reluctant to initiate a process that could enshrine the displacement, poten-tially encouraging internally displaced persons to view their new homes aspermanent.”26


23. Al-Khalidi and Tanner, “The Remorseless Rise of Violence and Displacement in Iraq,” p. 8.24. International Medical Corps, “Iraqis on the Move,” p. 18.25. Ibid., p. 9.26. Rosen, “No Going Back,” p. 25.

The IDP crisis has exacerbated persistent food shortages in the most heavilyaffected areas. For food rations, most Iraqis rely on the Public DistributionSystem, one of the few government programs from Saddam’s era that has re-mained functional. Under the strain of massive population movements, thesystem has rapidly deteriorated. Fewer than 50 percent of IDPs are able to col-lect their rations. To access the Public Distribution System, an IDP must regis-ter in his or her new location and show proof of displacement. Provincialgovernments have used such impossible bureaucratic hurdles as a way to dis-courage further IDP inºows.27

Many local governments and residents have begun to resent the drain on al-ready meager social services caused by the IDP presence. The Britishnongovernmental organization (NGO) Ockenden International reports that “inthe three governorates where Ockenden works, IDPs (new and old) represent61% of the population, while returning refugees represent 16% and the hostcommunity 23%.”28 As this crisis drags on, citizens will increasingly view theIraqi government as incompetent and irrelevant.

The government’s failure to address the displacement crisis has created anopportunity for militant groups to increase their inºuence by distributing as-sistance. For example, Muqtada al-Sadr has opened storefront ofªces acrossIraq (including nine in Bagdad).29 Following the pattern set by Hezbollah inLebanon and Hamas in Gaza, the Sadrists offer social services and humanitar-ian aid to Shiite residents, as well as protection by militia members. The al-Sadr ofªces have distributed aid to IDPs in the squalid camps set up by theIraqi Red Crescent Society (IRCS).30 This strategy will undoubtedly win thegratitude of many desperate residents, but also further undermine the Iraqigovernment. The expanded role of the militant groups will also likely drawmore IDPs into the ranks of the militants. Already, anecdotal evidence pointsto a rise in both voluntary and involuntary recruitment among displacedpopulations.31


27. José Riera and Andrew Harper, “Iraq: The Search for Solutions,” Forced Migration Review, Spe-cial Issue, June 2007, p. 10; Elizabeth Ferris, interview by author, Washington, D.C., September 21,2007; and Kälin, “A Tragedy of Increasing Proportions,” p. 14.28. Ockenden International works in the governorates of Kerbala, Missan, and Wassit. OlivierBeucher, “Vital Role of Legal Assistance for Displaced Iraqis,” Forced Migration Review, Special Is-sue, June 2007, p. 49.29. Alissa J. Rubin, “Cleric Switches Tactics to Meet Changes in Iraq,” New York Times, July 19,2007; and IRIN, “Ministering Militias,” Reuters AlertNet, February 14, 2007.30. International Organization for Migration in Iraq, “IDP Tent Camp Assessment Report, Iraq,”October 2007.31. Various nongovernmental organization representatives, interviews by author.

militarization at home and abroad

As discussed earlier, the risks of refugee militarization include the spread ofpolitical violence across borders, clashes between the refugees and the receiv-ing state, and conºict between the receiving and sending states. Under ex-treme circumstances, militarization can lead to international war and regionaldestabilization. Militarization becomes more likely over time, as refugees losehope and militant groups coalesce in exile.

Thus far, large-scale sectarian conºict has not emerged among the refugees.Many refugees state that they ºed the violence and do not want to replicate itin exile. Some refugees report that sectarian threats have followed them acrossnational borders. For example, one refugee recounted that in 2006 he receiveda call on his cell phone saying, “We killed your brother, and you’re next. Nomatter what country you go to, we will ªnd you.” Other examples includethreatening text messages sent from Iraq to refugees in Jordan and Syria.32

The governments of both Jordan and Syria have made clear that they will re-spond harshly to any militant action among the refugees. Elizabeth Ferris com-ments that “the reactions to the Iraqi refugees are deeply conditioned by theregion’s experience with Palestinian refugees over the past 59 years.”33 Re-ceiving states, especially Jordan and Syria, fear that “unable to return home,running out of savings, carrying with them sectarian grudges and many withmilitary experience, Iraqi refugees may yet destabilize much of the region.”34

In addition, hosts worry that the huge economic burden imposed by the crisiswill cause violence between locals and refugees.

Militant leaders present a greater threat to political order than do ordinaryIraqi refugees. Radical groups, both Shiite and Sunni, have established ofªcesin exile, which could provide a staging ground for future militant activity.Field research by the Brookings Institution found that “in the past one to twoyears . . . people linked at a lower level to both Sunni and Shi’a radical and in-surgent groups have begun coming to Syria, some as refugees. . . . What is un-clear, however, is the extent to which these people remain part of theirorganizations once in Syria. Active members of the radical groups—again,both Sunni and Shi’a—come to Syria to procure goods and especially to con-tact non-Iraqi insurgents headed for Iraq.”35

In Jordan, the demographic shift caused by the Iraqi inºux exacerbates exist-


32. Al-Khalidi and Tanner, “The Remorseless Rise of Violence and Displacement in Iraq,” p. 12.33. Ferris, “Security, Displacement, and Iraq,” p. 10.34. Rosen, “No Going Back.”35. Ashraf al-Khalidi, Sophia Hoffmann, and Victor Tanner, “Iraqi Refugees in the Syrian Arab Re-

ing domestic tensions involving Palestinians, who make up more than half ofthe Jordanian population. Ferris warns that “the potential for unrest or evencivil war in Jordan is not insigniªcant if the presence of Iraqis becomes pro-tracted or if the Iraqis in any way challenge the sovereignty or territorial integ-rity of the state.”36 Because Jordan is not a signatory to the 1951 UnitedNations Refugee Convention, it is not obliged to follow the convention’s man-dates. Given that the government considers the Iraqis illegal aliens rather thanrefugees, the Iraqis continually face the threat of deportation. In February 2008Jordan introduced visa restrictions that require Iraqis to apply for a visa inIraq, rather than at the Jordanian border crossing. In addition, border ofªcialsregularly refuse entry to men between eighteen and thirty-ªve years old andalso reportedly turned back many Shiite would-be refugees. Sixty-eight per-cent of the refugees in Jordan are Sunni.37

Initially, Syria offered a warmer welcome to Iraqis than did Jordan.Although Syria is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, the gov-ernment opened its borders to the Iraqis and allowed them access to state-provided social programs. In response to the growing economic and socialstresses, however, Syria closed its previously porous border in late 2007. TheSyrian government began issuing one-month visas (which are renewable fortwo additional months). Iraqis are required to reenter Iraq and obtain a newvisa if they want to remain in Syria.38 These restrictions have worsened the sit-uation for Iraqis in Syria and will undoubtedly increase the IDP populationwithin Iraq.

The crippling costs inºicted by the refugee crisis have undermined theSyrian economy, which, in turn, has heightened local resentment of Iraqis anddissatisfaction with the government. As Syria’s deputy foreign minister as-serts, “There has been a sharp increase in the cost of living. . . . The prices offoodstuffs and basic goods have gone up by 30%, property prices by 40%, andrentals by 150%.”39 Crime rates have also skyrocketed. Once in Syria, many


public: A Field-Based Snapshot,” Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement (Washington,D.C., and Bern: Brookings Institution and Universität Bern, June 2007), p. 34, pp. 16, 40.36. Ferris, “Security, Displacement, and Iraq,” p. 14.37. Statistics as of May 2007. Kristin Dalen and Jon Pedersen, “Iraqis in Jordan: Their Number andCharacteristics” (Oslo: Fafo, November 15, 2007), p. 34; and United Nations High Commissionerfor Refugees, “Iraq Situation Report—March 2008,” http://unhcr.org.38. Amnesty International, “Iraq: Rhetoric and Reality: The Iraq Refugee Crisis,” Report MDE/14/011/2008, June 2008, p. 9.39. Faisal al-Miqdad, “Iraqi Refugees in Syria,” Forced Migration Review, Special Issue, June 2007,p. 19.

refugees survive on hawala money transfers from relatives in Iraq. In addition,the refugees still have the right to their food rations in Iraq. Sometimes familymembers have been able to collect the rations and pay drivers to ship them toSyria.40

A potential contributor to violence is the geographical concentration ofthe refugee populations. In both Jordan and Syria, refugees have duplicatedIraqi neighborhoods in exile. These neighborhoods offer Iraqi food, shops,money transfers, and other services that cater to the refugees. For example, inone Damascus suburb, Iraqis have nicknamed neighborhoods after theirhometowns.41 In Jordan, refugees have congregated in the Zarqa neighbor-hood, commonly known as “a hotbed of radicalism.”42 Thus far, these neigh-borhoods have avoided sectarian violence. This could easily change shouldradical groups strengthen their hold among exile groups.

Like external refugee movements, massive internal displacement couldencourage violence in previously stable areas within Iraq. Naturally, victimsof persecution ºee to areas that seem safer and more stable. The northerngovernorates of Dohuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah, for example, have remainedrelatively peaceful thus far. Because of that stability, those Kurdish-run gov-ernorates host around 200,000 IDPs from the south. This rapidly growing Arabpopulation disrupts the agenda of the Kurds, who aim to establish an autono-mous Kurdish region and reverse Saddam Hussein’s Arabization policy.Rather than reaching a safe haven, the IDPs ªnd themselves unwelcome, un-employed, and desperate for basic necessities. Resentful and overwhelmedprovincial governments have threatened to close their borders to additionalIDPs, creating a desperate mass of people with nowhere to go.

humanitarian dilemmas

In Iraq, humanitarian NGO personnel face unprecedented security threats,which have greatly hindered efforts to assist the displaced population. Theseorganizations, which have worked successfully and openly in most of theworld’s most brutal conºict zones, ªnd themselves unable to operate in Iraq.In most crises, humanitarian NGOs emblazon their logos prominently and en-gage in public fundraising campaigns. In Iraq, by contrast, “aid workers work-ing for or in partnership with international NGOs do not advertise where the


40. Al-Khalidi, Hoffmann, and Tanner, “Iraqi Refugees in the Syrian Arab Republic,” p. 37.41. Ibid., p. 25.42. Ferris, “Security, Displacement, and Iraq,” p. 13.

aid is being brought from or who their partners are, nor do they communicateinformation on their programs or interventions.”43 Since the U.S. invasion,ninety-four Iraqi and international aid workers have been killed.44

The danger to NGO and UN employees is so great that virtually no interna-tional staff remain in Iraq. A few organizations have a presence in the centralsouth regions and in the north, but even there, international staff make onlyshort visits to check on their local staff. Most NGOs work out of Jordan andKuwait and attempt to manage their operations remotely. In late 2007 UNHCRhad one international staff person in the north and one in Baghdad. InFebruary 2008 the organization increased its international staff in Baghdad toªve.45

Within the country, the Iraqi Red Crescent Society is the only group with atruly national presence and a relatively neutral orientation. This has notspared the organization from violence, however. Militants have repeatedly at-tacked IRCS aid convoys and facilities and kidnapped staff from its Baghdadofªces.46 As the sectarian conºict continues, some observers claim that theIRCS favors Shiite areas over Sunni ones. Many aid organizations are con-cerned about its neutrality and willingness to cooperate with other agencies.47

Even from the relative safety of Jordan and Syria, aid agencies face numer-ous hindrances to their operations. Because of their lack of legal status inJordan, many refugees stay hidden for fear of deportation. Aid workers reportthat some Iraqis literally will not venture into the streets. Obviously this com-plicates attempts to deliver humanitarian assistance. In Jordan, aid organiza-tions must balance their mandates to provide humanitarian assistance with theneed to avoid triggering a mass deportation.48

Syria, too, has been wary of international NGOs and UN agencies. The gov-ernment requires NGOs to operate under the Syrian Red Crescent, which in es-


43. Marion Couldrey and Tim Morris, eds., “Delivering Is Never Remote: NGOs’ Vital Role,”Forced Migration Review, Special Issue, June 2007, p. 28.44. Figure as of September 2007. NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq homepage, http://www.ncciraq.org/.45. Wendy Young, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, interview by author, Wash-ington, D.C., September 25, 2007; and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Iraq Sit-uation Update—March 2008.”46. Jamal Al-Karboli, “The Iraqi Red Crescent,” Forced Migration Review, Special Issue, June 2007,p. 49.47. In sharp contrast to virtually all other humanitarian organizations, the Iraqi Red Crescent hashired a lobbying ªrm in Washington, D.C., to press for greater funding. Various nongovernmentalorganization representatives, interviews by author.48. Ibid.

sence means under government control. The government has mandated thatUNHCR can assist only Iraqis who have registered with UNHCR. Registrationprovides refugees temporary protections and gives them the right to assistancefrom the Syrian Red Crescent. It also offers a possibility for third-country reset-tlement. Relatively few Iraqis, however, are registered with UNHCR. As ofApril 2007, there were only 77,000 registered refugees (out of a total popula-tion of 1.2 million). By May 2008, increased funding allowed UNHCR to regis-ter a total of 194,273 refugees in Syria. Part of the explanation for the shortfallis that UNHCR has limited resources to process registrations, and many Iraqisare suspicious of the process.49

Despite the difªcult operating conditions, humanitarian organizations havebeen trying to coordinate their efforts to meet the needs of the displaced. Onesuch effort is the NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq, based in Amman,which represents around 300 local and international NGOs.50 Many interna-tional organizations have found it expedient to partner with local NGOs,which can operate more easily and unobtrusively. Of all the groups, localmosques and religious ofªces experience the fewest security problems whencarrying out humanitarian activities.51

Preventing the Spread of Violence

The longer that millions of Iraqis remain unable to return to their homes, themore likely that the displaced population will become involved in political vi-olence. In past conºicts, such as Afghanistan in the 1980s and Rwanda in themid-1990s, peacemakers mistakenly took a wait-and-see attitude and avoidedaddressing the refugee crises in those countries until a peace settlementhad been reached. During their many years in exile, Afghan mujahideen orga-nized the refugees into a state-in-exile, successfully launching an insurgencyfrom their bases in Pakistan. Following the Rwandan genocide, Hutu militantsestablished a state-in-exile among the Hutu refugees in Zaire. Rather than dis-sipating over time, the state-in-exile strengthened, eventually precipitating aninternational war between Zaire and Rwanda.


49. Al-Khalidi, Hoffmann, and Tanner, “Iraqi Refugees in the Syrian Arab Republic,” p. 29; andUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Syria, “UNHCR Syria Update—May 2008,”http://www.un.org.sy/publications/UNHCR%20Syria%20Update%20May%202008.pdf.50. NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq homepage, http://www.ncciraq.org/.51. Greg Hansen, “Iraqis Defend Humanitarianism,” Forced Migration Review, Special Issue, June2007, p. 31.

The lessons from past crises emphasize the need to pay attention to the dis-placement issue while the situation is still ºuid. The Migration InformationSource warns that “internal displacement [in Iraq] is taking on a more perma-nent and increasingly desperate character.”52 The quick stabilization of violentareas of Iraq will prevent further population movements, and may even facili-tate return. For example, in the wake of the U.S. military surge, some IDPsquickly returned to Ramadi in Anbar Province.53 The factor of time in contrib-uting to refugee-related violence means that a speedy response is essential todefusing a potentially disastrous situation.

massive humanitarian aid

In the immediate term, international donors should meet the basic needs of thedisplaced Iraqis. Field interviews by Refugees International predicted that“failure to address humanitarian needs would have dramatic impacts on secu-rity inside Iraq and reinforce the control armed groups now have over the en-claves they claim as their own.”54 These needs include clean water, sanitation,medical care, and adequate food and shelter. Another urgent problem is thelack of education for displaced children. To prevent resentment by local resi-dents, assistance should beneªt both the local and displaced populations.55 Asa ªrst step, meeting basic needs will have an immediate impact in stabilizingthe crisis.

Donor states, and especially the United States, should channel funding intwo directions—bilateral aid to affected states and contributions to interna-tional organizations. Many wealthy states, especially in Europe, express reluc-tance to assist in what they perceive as a bailout of the George W. Bushadministration. To counter that sentiment, the United States needs to jumpstartthe process with a large commitment in hopes that reluctant Europeans willfollow suit.


52. Andrew Harper, “Where to Now? Decreasing Options for Displaced Iraqis,” Migration Infor-mation Source (Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute, September 27, 2007), http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id?644.53. Peter Apps, “Iraq Humanitarian Crisis Grows Despite U.S. Surge,” September 19, 2007, http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-29620520070919.54. Kristèle Younès and Nir Rosen, “Uprooted and Unstable: Meeting Urgent HumanitarianNeeds in Iraq” (Washington, D.C.: Refugees International, April 2008), p. 21.55. Some observers claim that recipient states have misused donations meant to help the Iraqis.Nicholas Seeley, “In Jordan, Aid for Iraqi Refugees Is Often Redirected,” Christian Science Monitor,July 2, 2008.

America’s hostile relationship with Syria obviously precludes the possibilityof U.S. bilateral aid. A possible solution is for the United States to donategenerously to Jordan and other refugee-hosting states, while encouragingEuropean Union support for Syria. The Syrian government has been using therefugee issue as a bargaining chip, as evidenced by its initial refusal to supplyvisas to U.S. Department of Homeland Security ofªcials to process resettle-ment cases. At the same time, the refugees threaten to crush the Syrian econ-omy and exacerbate domestic political tensions. Bearing that in mind, it seemsreasonable for donors to request greater independence for humanitarian orga-nizations as a condition for funding.

Unlike Jordan and Syria, the Iraqi government, with a large budget surplus,has the ªnancial resources to address the displacement crisis. The central gov-ernment lacks the capability to disburse this money, however. Before commit-ting additional funding, the United States should ensure that the governmenthas used its current funds in an efªcient and unbiased manner. Thus, it is es-sential to help the Iraqi government strengthen the institutions responsible foraddressing displacement and reconstruction issues.

In addition to bilateral aid, donors should fully fund the appeals made byUN agencies, such as UNHCR, the United Nations Children’s Fund, and theWorld Food Programme. The massive outºow of refugees after February 2006caught the aid community by surprise. Most UN agencies had, at best, a mini-mal presence in neighboring states, but they have since responded to the crisisby signiªcantly expanding their operations. Donor states were even moresluggish in responding to urgent appeals for funding. Virtually every aspect ofthe humanitarian response remains woefully underfunded. For example,Jordan and Syria have agreed to allow Iraqi children to enroll in school, but in-adequate facilities mean that only a small fraction of refugee children actuallyattend. UN agencies hope to build more schools for both refugee and localchildren, but they require additional funding to do so. Another program is theUNHCR initiative, which has issued 4,000 ATM cards to vulnerable Iraqiwomen heads of household. This project will require $1.5 million per month tocontinue. The United States, in particular, has a responsibility to increase itsshare of contributions from the usual 25 to 30 percent. Despite its resentmentof U.S. policy in Iraq, the European Union should also enlarge its role in hu-manitarian aid and reconstruction.56


56. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Iraq Situation Update—March 2008.”

no camps

Unlike most refugees, Iraqi refugees are not housed in UN-run camps, buthave established themselves informally in urban areas. Some provincial au-thorities have suggested building camps for internally displaced Iraqis on theoutskirts of overwhelmed cities. Other observers have suggested containingpotential refugees in camps, or “catch basins,” on the Iraqi side of the borderas a way to prevent the spread of conºict.57 Currently less than 1 percent ofIraqi IDPs live in camps. The existing IDP camps consist of overcrowded tentswith no potable water, electricity, sanitation facilities, or medical care.58

Establishing camps would be a disaster from both humanitarian and secu-rity perspectives. Ferris explains, “Iraqis resist living in camps because of thelack of privacy, close family ties, and perhaps also because of the historic asso-ciation of camps with long-standing Palestinian camps in the region.”59 Hu-manitarian and advocacy groups active in Iraq concur regarding the negativeaspects of camps.

The location of camps would likely be in inhospitable terrain lacking sanita-tion infrastructure. Residents of catch basins at remote and arid border cross-ings would suffer intolerable conditions. Camp residents would be unable topursue any attempts at self-sufªciency, thus depending solely on humanitar-ian assistance. The costs of maintaining the camps would dwarf the fundingrequired to maintain the displaced in their current locations.

Camps would pose a heightened security risk, as the residents would be-come easy targets for attack. Desperate residents might also become morelikely to engage in political violence, especially because the camps would un-doubtedly be divided along sectarian lines. In a camp for IDPs in Najaf, theInternational Organization for Migration reported that “unemployment, over-crowding, and lack of privacy are causing signiªcant tension among thecamp’s inhabitants.”60 Past refugee crises have demonstrated the many dif-ªculties in providing protection for refugee and IDP camps. Considering theinability of the Iraqi government and U.S. military to protect and assist the dis-


57. Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover froman Iraqi Civil War,” Saban Center for Middle East Policy Analysis Paper, No. 11 (Washington, D.C.:Brookings Institution, January 2007), pp. 44–47.58. On border camps, see Ferris, “Security, Displacement, and Iraq,” pp. 7–8; International Organi-zation for Migration in Iraq, “IDP Tent Camp Assessment Report, Iraq”; and various nongovern-mental organization representatives, interviews by author.59. Ferris, “Security Displacement and Iraq,” p. 7.60. International Organization for Migration in Iraq, “IDP Tent Camp Assessment Report.”

placed population, camp residents are particularly susceptible to manipulationand militarization.

no forced return

In most refugee crises, the ideal outcome is peaceful repatriation. The sameholds true for Iraq. In the near future, however, large-scale return is not a via-ble option. Thus, aid agencies recommend focusing on stabilizing the humani-tarian situation and alleviating the pressures on the host states. Under morestable humanitarian conditions, political actors can address possible repatria-tion scenarios.

The clashing interests of regional actors complicate any plans for return.Citing the economic, political, and security risks posed by the refugees, Jordanand Syria demand that they return home as soon as possible. The Iraqi govern-ment has expressed conºicting attitudes toward return. On one hand, the Iraqigovernment is wary of mass repatriation because it is completely unpreparedto accommodate returnees. Yet the ongoing crisis indicates government weak-ness and instability. Thus, the Iraqi government ofªcially promotes repatria-tion, and even encouraged the Syrian government to enact more stringent visarequirements for Iraqis, at the same time that it lacked the resources to managea peaceful and voluntary return. In June 2008 the government of Nouri al-Maliki pledged $195 million for repatriation, a step lauded by AmbassadorJames Foley, the senior U.S. coordinator for Iraqi refugee issues, as “commend-able” but “only the tip of the iceberg.”61

Although the overall displacement numbers have steadily increased, statis-tics for voluntary return improved in late 2007. In some areas, such as Anbargovernorate, refugees and IDPs returned home as security improved. Iraq’sMinistry of Displacement and Migration reported an increase in the number ofIDP families returning to their former homes during 2007, with more than3,200 families registered as returnees between January and October.62 TheInternational Organization for Migration stated in March 2008 that 78,000 dis-placed Iraqis had returned to their original homes, although many found themdestroyed. Of these returnees, only 17 percent were refugees and the remain-


61. Reuters, “U.S. Says Iraq Should Promote Refugees’ Return,” Reuters AlertNet, June 3, 2008,http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N03271447.htm.62. International Organization for Migration, “Tension in the North Poses Additional Burden onInternally Displaced,” IOM Press Brieªng, November 2, 2007, http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pbnAF/cache/offonce?entryId?15750.

der were IDPs.63 In 2008, aid agencies noted a drop in the numbers of returns.A UNHCR survey found that 70 percent of the refugees who returned fromSyria had become internally displaced within Iraq.64

The Iraqi government has not developed a mechanism to adjudicate prop-erty disputes, one of the most crucial aspects of a managed return.65 To facili-tate return, local and national authorities must enact appropriate protectionsfor private property. At the very least, the Iraqi government should emphasizeits support for existing laws that protect property titles. The Brookings Institu-tion recommends that “the Iraqi authorities should secure, back up, and pro-tect all registered data on property title and transactions. It may be worthconsidering temporarily suspending legal transfers of property rights in areasexperiencing severe sectarian conºict.”66

The postwar response to ethnic cleansing in Bosnia offers one example of re-turn and restitution policies. Following the 1995 peace agreement, the UnitedNations administration established laws that entitled anyone who was wrong-fully displaced to return and reclaim their property. During the war, the UNSecurity Council passed repeated resolutions conªrming the temporary natureof the displacement. By 2004, around 200,000 abandoned homes had been re-claimed by the families who had left during the war. Owners were permittedto stay in their former homes or resell them.67

In response to the continuing sectarian violence, some policymakers and an-alysts have advocated partitioning Iraq along sectarian lines.68 In theory, sucha separation would reduce violence by providing security and stability foreach group. Most partition proposals have ignored the pivotal role of the dis-placement crisis. Virtually all humanitarian organizations oppose the idea ofpartition, given that it inevitably involves further forced displacement.69 Suchan undertaking would doom many refugees to permanent exile, including the


63. International Crisis Group, “Failed Responsibility: Iraqi Refugees in Syria, Jordan, and Leba-non,” Middle East Report No. 77, July 10, 2008, p. 7.64. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Iraq Situation Update—March 2008”; andYounès and Rosen, “Uprooted and Unstable,” p. 14.65. In 2004 the Coalition Provisional Authority established a mechanism for adjudicating propertyrights violations that occurred under the Baathist period.66. Rhodri C. Williams, “Applying the Lessons of Bosnia in Iraq: Whatever the Solution, PropertyRights Should Be Secured” (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, January 8, 2008), p. 5.67. Ibid., pp. 2–3.68. Peter W. Galbraith, “Partition Is the Only Way, Iraq,” International Herald Tribune, October 22,2007; and Reidar Visser, “Historical Myths of a Divided Iraq,” Survival, Vol. 50, No. 2 (April/May2008), pp. 95–105.69. Various nongovernmental organization representatives, interviews by author.

roughly 1.3 million members of ethnic and religious minority groups. Evenmore important, partition would divide many families, because a majority ofIraqis have both Shiite and Sunni relatives. The Iraqi government estimatesthat 2 million of Iraq’s 6.5 million marriages are between Arab Shiites andArab Sunnis.70 Such refugees and IDPs who returned would, in fact, be return-ing to a new location, due to ofªcially ratiªed sectarian divisions. As in Bosnia,repatriation would signify a return to one’s country, but not one’s home. Con-sidering those dangers, observers fear that partition would create a resentfuldisplaced population, determined to exact justice and retribution for theirlosses.

enlarge and accelerate the resettlement process

As the magnitude of the Iraq displacement crisis has grown, so too has atten-tion to refugee resettlement policies. Despite the refugees’ increasing numbers,the United States, along with most European countries, have offered resettle-ment to only a handful of displaced Iraqis.71 Between 2003 and 2006, theUnited Sates admitted 770 Iraqi refugees.72 In response to political pressure,the Bush administration agreed to admit 7,000 Iraqis in ªscal year 2007. Dur-ing that period, however, only 1,608 Iraqi refugees arrived in the United Statesfor resettlement.73 During the ªrst seven months of FY 2008, the UnitedStates admitted 4,742 Iraqi refugees, casting doubt on whether the resettlementprogram would reach its stated goal of 12,000 for FY 2008.74 Insufªcient fund-ing and a cumbersome bureaucracy have drastically delayed U.S. processingof Iraqi refugees.

Although resettlement does not provide a solution for the vast majority ofdisplaced Iraqis, it offers haven to a subset of particularly vulnerable groups.Iraqis who worked for the U.S. forces (e.g., as drivers and interpreters) faceprobable murder if they return to Iraq. The U.S. Congress has established the


70. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR’s Eligibility Guidelines for As-sessing the International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers” (Geneva: UNHCR, August2007), p. 55.71. Sweden provides the exception, having admitted 18,000 Iraqi asylum seekers between 2003and 2007. In 2008, however, Sweden introduced more restrictive asylum and resettlement policies.72. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Statistics on Displaced Iraqis around theWorld”; and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Iraq Situation Update—March2008.”73. Ofªce of the Spokesman, “Fact Sheet: United States Humanitarian Assistance for DisplacedIraqis” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, November 9, 2007), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/nov/94849.htm.74. Reuters, “U.S. Says Iraq Should Promote Refugees’ Return.”

Special Immigrant Visa program to resettle Iraqis who were U.S. employees inIraq. Other vulnerable groups include victims of torture, members of minoritygroups, and medical cases. An expanded resettlement program also stands asa symbol of U.S. concern for displaced Iraqis. Such a public and generous com-mitment could encourage reluctant European states to follow suit.

Conclusion

The Iraq displacement crisis is not a stable situation. Every day, the media re-port new statistics about population movements in the region. Those details,though important, do not alter the larger political and security risks posed bythe crisis. The refugees in Syria will continue to devastate the Syrian economyand create political tensions regardless of whether their numbers increase ordecrease, even by hundreds of thousands. Militants will continue to recruitamong the internally displaced as long as the IDPs’ living conditions remainintolerable. Concerns about the manipulation and militarization of the dis-placed population are unlikely to abate in the near future. Even if the Iraqigovernment manages to impose political order, the negative effects of violenceand sectarian cleansing will persevere. The demographic changes created bythe crisis mean that many of the displaced will never return to their actualhomes. In addition, the government will ªnd it difªcult to entice the profes-sional class to return.

Considering the improbability of any rapid resolution to the displacementcrisis, concerns have arisen over the prospect of increased refugee ºows andabout the sustainability of the situation in Jordan and Syria. It is unlikely, how-ever, that the ºow of refugees will increase signiªcantly, because both Jordanand Syria have essentially closed their borders. Border restrictions will onlytighten as the crisis continues.

Even without an inºux of more refugees, the situation is not sustainableover the long term. As noted by Gil Loescher and James Milner, “Long-termrefugee populations are a critical element in ongoing conºict and instability,obstruct peace processes, and undermine attempts at economic develop-ment.”75 There are two scenarios if the Iraqi refugee crisis becomes protracted.The ªrst is that receiving states will force the refugees back into Iraq, prob-ably by means of police or military action. Forced return, or “refoulement,” vi-


75. Gil Loescher and James Milner, Protracted Refugee Situations: Domestic and International SecurityImplications, Adelphi Paper, No. 375 (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 8.

olates international law, but the international community would have littleleverage to prevent this. Massive refoulement would greatly exacerbate theIDP problem.

Second, as is already evident, the refugees’ living conditions are deteriorat-ing further over time. As their savings run out, the refugees are turning in des-peration to crime, prostitution, and child labor.76 If this continues, increasingnumbers of refugees will become slum dwellers living on the fringes of society.Tensions between local residents and refugees could erupt in violence, threat-ening political order.

The ºuidity of the crisis can help avert the dangers of manipulation andmilitarization. There is still time to mitigate many of the security threats posedby the crisis. A rapid infusion of humanitarian assistance will weaken the mili-tants’ inºuence among the IDPs. High levels of aid will also defuse some of thehost states’ resentment by repairing their social and economic infrastructure.Before warehousing the refugees in camps, donors and hosts should seek ur-ban solutions to the housing crisis. Camps, even if initially conceived of as atemporary measure, will increase security threats and discourage efforts to re-solve the crisis. The ideal solution to this crisis is a rapid and peaceful repatria-tion. The longer millions of Iraqis remain displaced, the less likely the chancesare that they will ever return home.


76. International Crisis Group, “Failed Responsibility,” p. 25.

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