Secure Pork Supply Board Update

Credit where credit is due! • Thanks to Dr. Jim Roth

and Dr. Pam Zaabel – Center for Food

Security And Public Health @ Iowa State University

• and the SPS Planning Committee

Secure Pork Supply Plan • Center for Food Security and Public Health @

Iowa State CVM has received USDA funding to develop the plan.– Coordinating with the Center for Animal Health &

Food Safety @ University of Minnesota who also has USDA funding

– Will cover movement of swine between production sites and processing plants

3

Secure pork supply (Patrick's Interpretation )

• SPS is basically a “club”• The benefits that “club” members get the

opportunity to move pigs sooner than “non-club” members in an outbreak.– This is because members agree to implement:

• a valid pre-harvest traceability program• standardized bio security practices• disease surveillance the level to achieve a defined

status

4

Secure Pork Supply • Built on the experiences of

– Secure Egg Supply• Move eggs in the event of HPAI• Plan has resulted in MOU’s between IA, MN, NE and CO

– Secure Milk Supply• Move milk in the event of FMD

– Secure Turkey Supply• Move turkey’s to harvest in the event of HPAI

5

Secure Pork Supply Planning Committee

• First meeting October 11-12, 2011• Working Groups formed:

– Biosecurity (pre and post outbreak)– Surveillance (pre and post outbreak)– Compartmentalization/Monitored Premises– Data Collection, Management, and Sharing– Risk Assessments– Communications– Plan for response to an FAD Outbreak Tomorrow

Secure Pork Supply• First draft (completed May 2013) covers:

– Biosecurity– Pre-harvest traceability– Outbreak tomorrow plan– Data and information sharing agreements

• Producers• State Vets• National animal health laboratory network• Packers and Processors

7

Secure Pork Supply• Parts still under development

– Data management, risk assessments and disease surveillance are longer-term projects and will be incorporated in future drafts as they become available.

8

Secure Pork Supply • Groups provided the draft for review:

– State and Federal Animal Health Authorities– USDA FSIS – State Pork Producers Associations / Councils– Checkoff’s Swine Health Committee– AMI / NAMA – AASV’s FAD and Swine Health Committees – Packers and Processors

9

Secure Pork Supply • Next steps

– Continue to bird-dog the process• Review & Incorporate Comments • Focusing on getting the disease surveillance section

completed – Engage industry leadership on compliance and

verification issues • Program needs to be credible and workable• Need to consider how the industry can verify

compliance

10

Secure Pork Supply • …is a game of “connect the dots”

– Many of the “practices” already occur • Needs to be documented and verified

– Data & information already exists • Sits in multiple private and government databases

– A “common denominator” is necessary to link everything together

• Standard Premises Identification Number

11

Data Collection, Management & Sharing

12

Producers

13

Valid Pre-harvest Traceability• Identify all premises with the standard PIN

– Industry is solidly behind PIN’s

• Implement the Swine ID Standards and maintain records in electronic format– Associates PIN’s with movements

• Use Electronic Certificates of Veterinary Inspection or electronic IMR’s– Associate PIN’s with source and destination

• Allow access to movement data by animal health officials

14

Disease Surveillance • Maintain animal inventories by premises in an

electronic format • Submit surveillance data and samples in

accordance with SPS Surveillance Plan

• Include validated PIN on all diagnostic laboratory submission forms

16

Validated PIN’s

17

Official PIN Tags• Sow Packer Requirement

– Condition of sale by January 1st 2015 by various companies

– Must be a USDA Approved Official PIN Tag

• http://www.aphis.usda.gov/traceability/downloads/swine_device_listing.pdf

– Industry support for this @ Pork Forum

18

Official PIN Tags • Only 2 companies currently have USDA approval

to manufacture and are selling official PIN Tags – Destron Fearing– Allflex

• Available in multiple colors– Some packers prefer pink

20

Official PIN Tags• The PIN on the Official Tag is the USDA allocated

Standardized Premises Identification Number (PIN) and not the State allocated Location Identifier (LID) – When ordering the manufacturer will ask for the PIN

so they can validate it to the address of the site

21

Official PIN Tags• According to the Swine ID Program Standards the

PIN on the Tag should be the PIN of the breeding farm she was on prior to entering harvest channels– Works for systems that are not parity segregated

• Parity segregated systems– Work with the State Vet to determine what PIN make

the most sense – Producer records maintain the traceability

22

Official PIN Tags

• One (or one set) and your done– Once identified with one PIN tag or a set of official

tags with same PIN and production number then that is it. Producers do not need to put in a new one if the animal moves to another production site BUT they do need to record that movement in case of a traceback.

23

Official PIN Tags

24

Disease Surveillance • Allow veterinary diagnostic labs to pass through

the PIN’s associated with subsets of diagnostic samples to the NHALN for the express purposes of surveillance for foreign animal (and program diseases)

• Allow Packers/ Processors to pass through the PIN’s associated with diagnostic samples for the express purposes of surveillance for foreign animal (and program diseases).

25

Disease Surveillance • Allow access by state and federal animal health

officials to the geospatial information stored in the National and State Premises Repositories for the express purposes of emergency preparedness and surveillance for foreign animal (and program diseases).

26

Recommendations (Not Required)• Annual Employee FAD Awareness• Separate PIN’s for epidemiological separate

premises more than ¼ mile apart.• Provide annual premises updates to SAHO• Develop Swine Health Production Plans for routine

interstate movements of feeder pigs(9 CFR 71.19)– A word on the Code

27

Sow / Boar Surveillance

Market Hog Surveillance

Veterinary Diagnostic Labs

What the State Vet can determine:1. Site is a part of Secure Pork? 2. Valid traceability system up and running? 3. Standardized biosecurity in place? 4. Achieved a negative disease status?

PIN# -123456A: Sow Farm

PIN#-1234567B: Wean to Finish

PIN#-765432A: Pork Packer

PackerReceived Pigs from SPS sites:

AA13579 on XX / XX /2012BB24688 on XX / XX /2012ETC…..

PIN#-AA13579: Wean to Finish

PIN#-BB24688: Wean to Finish

PIN#-1234567C: Swine Finisher

Permitted Movements

E2E Proof-of-Concept Demonstration

StatePremises and Plant

Data

Producer Census and Movement

Data

Testing Data

Premises and Plants (SCS)Premises and Plants (SCS) Producer (3rd Party S/W)Producer (3rd Party S/W) Testing Results (Diag. Lab)Testing Results (Diag. Lab)

Show premises disease status and support the decision on

whether or not to move animals.

Show the day-to-day usefulness for monitoring

facility disease status.

This message funded by America’s Pork Checkoff Program.This message funded by America’s Pork Checkoff Program.

Thank You!

Secure Pork: Disease Awareness, Preparedness, Response and Recovery

Dr. Patrick WebbDirector, Swine Health Programs

Secure Pork Supply Plan

A Continuity of Business Plan for the Swine Industry in the Face of a Foreign

Animal Disease

James A. Roth, DVM, PhD, DACVM

Center for Food Security and Public Health

College of Veterinary Medicine

Iowa State University

US Animal Agriculture is Highly Vulnerable to Foreign Animal Diseases

• US production animals have no immunity to FADs

• Export markets will be lost• Prices will drop dramatically• Emergency vaccine stocks are far below what

would be required to address a livestock dense state or multi-state outbreak

• The size, structure, efficiency, and extensive movement inherent in the U.S. livestock industries will present unprecedented challenges in the event of a FAD outbreak

USDA APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan

USDA FAD PReP FMD Response Plan

38

Common Components of Secure Food Supply Business Continuity Plans

– Voluntary pre-outbreak preparedness components– Biosecurity, surveillance, epidemiology

questionnaires, movement permits – Risk assessments (completed and in process)– Plans must be based on current capabilities and will

evolve with science, risk assessments and new capabilities

– Guidelines only: Final decisions made by responsible officials during outbreak

– Outreach and training pre and post outbreak

Secure Egg Supply (HPAI); Secure Turkey Supply (HPAI); Secure Milk Supply (FMD);Secure Pork Supply (FMD, CSF, ASF, SVD)

SPS Partners

• SPS Planning Committee– Federal and State officials– Representatives of all phases of the

swine industry– NPB, NPPC, AASV– Academia

• Iowa State University• University of Minnesota

FADs included in SPS plan

• Foot and mouth disease– Swine, cattle, sheep, goats, deer

• Classical swine fever• African swine fever• Swine vesicular disease

PIADC

Foot and Mouth Disease : 7 days post infection

Disease Transmission(FMD, CSF, ASF, SVD)

• Not zoonotic

• Direct contact and oral exposure are the most important routes of infection for swine (Pigs are relatively resistant to airborne infection by all 4 FADs)

• Indirect contact (fomites) also can play a lesser role for transmission

• Pigs exhale large concentrations of FMDV, cattle are highly susceptible to aerosolized virus

Secure Pork Supply Planning Committee

• First meeting October 11-12, 2011• Working Groups formed:

– Biosecurity (pre and post outbreak)– Surveillance (pre and post outbreak)– Compartmentalization/Monitored Premises– Data Collection, Management, and Sharing– Risk Assessments– Communications– Plan for response to an FAD Outbreak

Tomorrow

Getting On the Same Page

44

North American Animal Agriculture Industry is Unique

• The size, structure, efficiency, and extensive movement inherent in the U.S. and North American livestock industries will present unprecedented challenges in the event of a FAD outbreak

• Strategies for the response to, and management of, a FAD outbreak will change as the outbreak progresses and will depend upon the magnitude, location and other characteristics of the outbreak.

Phases and Types of FMD Response

http://www.cfsph.iastate.edu/pdf/phases-and-types-of-an-fmd-outbreak

Phases of FMD Response

FMD Detection in the United States:FMD Detection in the United States: Types of an FMD OutbreakTypes of an FMD Outbreak

Type 6: Catastrophic North American

Response Shifts from Emphasis on Stamping-Out to Emphasis on Alternate Strategies (duration of FMD response)

Size of FMD Outbreak (in terms of

animals, premises,

and jurisdictions

affected)

Six Types of FMD OutbreaksSix Types of FMD Outbreaks

4848

Differentiating between Types of FMD Outbreaks

Geographic Size of

Outbreak

Animal Movement

Number of

Premises

Size of Premises

Vaccine Assumptions

Appropriate Strategies Minimum Time Required to Achieve FMD Free Status*

Type 1-Focal FMD outbreak

One state or small region

No extensive animal movement

Small number

Relatively small

Not applicable Stamping-out

3 months after the last case

Type 2-Moderate regional FMD outbreak

Few focal areas in one region

No extensive animal movement out of the Control Area

Small to moderate number

Small to medium

Sufficient vaccine is available to vaccinate designated animals

Stamping-outVaccinate-to-killVaccinate-to-slaughterDiscontinue vaccination after the last case

3 months after the last case and slaughter of all vaccinated animals, or 6 months after last case or last vaccination if all vaccinated animals are not slaughtered

Type 3-Large regional FMD outbreak

Multiple areas in a region

No extensive animal movement outside of the region

Moderate number

Medium to large


Vaccinate-to-liveVaccinate-to-slaughterDiscontinue vaccination after the last case

12 months after the last evidence of FMD infection and the last FMD vaccine was administered

Type 4-Widespread or national FMD outbreak

Widespread areas of infection

Extensive animal movement

Moderate to large number

Medium to large


Vaccinate-to-liveVaccinate-to-slaughterContinue vaccination after the last case

FMD Free with Vaccination: 18 months after the last case

Type 5-Catastrophic FMD outbreak

Widespread areas of infection


Large number

Large Sufficient vaccine is NOT available to vaccinate designated animals

Endemic FMD control programVaccinate-to-liveContinue vaccination after the last case

FMD Free with Vaccination: 2 years after the last outbreak

Type 6-North American FMD outbreak

Widespread infection in Mexico / Canada/ US


Large number

Large Sufficient vaccine is NOT available to vaccinate designated animals

Endemic FMD control programVaccinate-to-liveContinue vaccination after the last case

FMD Free with Vaccination: 2 years after the last outbreak

FMD Outbreak in Iowa—Large Control AreaFMD Outbreak in Iowa—Large Control Area

Number of Swine Affected: Number of Swine Affected: 19,883,988 19,883,988 Number of Bovines Affected: Number of Bovines Affected: 2,366,5352,366,535

Number of Operations Affected: Number of Operations Affected: 110,727 110,727

Number of Swine Affected: Number of Swine Affected: 19,883,988 19,883,988 Number of Bovines Affected: Number of Bovines Affected: 2,366,5352,366,535

Number of Operations Affected: Number of Operations Affected: 110,727 110,727

Source: NASS, 2007

5050

Type 5 – Catastrophic FMD Outbreak

Widespread areas of infection are detected involving a large portion of the United States. Sufficient vaccine and resources are not available to quickly vaccinate all designated susceptible animals in the affected regions. The number of vaccinated animals is too great to consider a vaccinate-to-kill or vaccinate-to-slaughter (only) policy. It becomes apparent that FMD is widespread, and will not be eradicated within a year. Declare FMD to be an endemic disease and implement a program for long term eradication and control, including vaccinate-to-live

Outbreak Tomorrow

52

Controlled Movement of Swine in an FMD Outbreak

– At the beginning of an outbreak• No new movements initiated from the FMD

control area• 625,000 pigs on the road each day

– Some will have come from the control area– ~400,000 to 500,000 hogs and sows slaughtered

daily

– Restarting movement• Depends on the type of outbreak

Controlled Swine Movement To and Through a Packing Facility

• Swine may be infected with FMD virus before showing any clinical signs or testing positive by PCR

• It is not possible to prove freedom from FMD infection in a herd, or in an individual animal. It is only possible to establish that there is lack of evidence of infection

• Therefore, all pork from a processing facility that has received swine from the FMD Control Area will be considered to potentially contain the FMD virus


• FMD is not a public health or food safety problem

• Animals which pass ante-mortem and post-mortem inspection by USDA FSIS are safe for human consumption, even if they may be in the pre-clinical stage of FMD infection

• Regulations regarding feeding garbage to swine must be strictly enforced.


• At the beginning of an FMD outbreak (Phase 1)– Packing plants should continue to process all swine in

the plant and in transit to the plant which cannot be turned back or euthanized while in transit

• During a large FMD outbreak (Phase 2, Type 3 or greater)– Market ready hogs and sows, from herds in the Control

Area with no evidence of infection should be sent to slaughter as quickly as possible


• Processing of swine should continue, even if it is known that FMD infected animals have been in the plant

– Federal and State Officials (Incident Command Post) would need to agree to this

– Packing facility owners/managers would also need to agree to this


• Modern packing facilities process thousands of swine daily. At any point in time, there may be thousands of live animals in lairage awaiting slaughter.

• If any animals are incubating the virus, and the

processing of swine is stopped, the virus will rapidly multiply in the swine in lairage.

• The thousands of animals that are in transit to

slaughter facilities will not be able to be unloaded if the processing of swine at the plant is not continued.


• Processing of all healthy animals in the slaughter facility and in transit to the facility is the fastest way to dispose of those animals and presents the lowest risk of spreading FMD infection

• It also reduces the need for carcass disposal and preserves high quality protein for human consumption


• Finished products from any processing plants that received swine from the Control Area must be considered to potentially contain FMD virus

• Processed product should be quarantined and placed in

cold storage until a decision is reached by Incident Command on allowable uses for the product

• If the outbreak is quickly controlled by stamping out, the product should be destroyed

• If it becomes apparent that the outbreak is extensive, the product should be released for domestic sale


• Packing plant employees, service personnel, and truck drivers must observe proper biosecurity protocols to avoid transmitting the FMD virus when they leave the plant

• All potential fomites leaving the plant must be cleaned and disinfected

• This will be difficult to implement on an emergency basis

• Ideally, an emergency plan for implementing biosecurity will be in place before an outbreak

• Biosecurity measures will be needed whether the plant receiving FMD infected animals continues or halts processing of healthy animals

Problems to Address

• Will the pork consuming public accept the product?

• Will Packers be willing to continue to process animals from an FMD control area in a large outbreak?– Will the economics make sense for the Packers?

• Cold storage facilities for excess pork in the first months of an outbreak?

• Disposition of herds that have recovered from infection?

Data Collection, Management & Sharing

64

Producers

65

Valid Pre-harvest Traceability• Identify all premises with the standard PIN

– Industry is solidly behind PIN’s

• Implement the Swine ID Standards and maintain records in electronic format– Associates PIN’s with movements

• Use Electronic Certificates of Veterinary Inspection or electronic IMR’s– Associate PIN’s with source and destination

• Allow access to movement data by animal health officials

66

Disease Surveillance • Maintain animal inventories by premises in an

electronic format • Submit surveillance data and samples in

accordance with SPS Surveillance Plan

• Include validated PIN on all diagnostic laboratory submission forms

68

Validated PIN’s

69

Disease Surveillance • Allow veterinary diagnostic labs to pass through

the PIN’s associated with subsets of diagnostic samples to the NHALN for the express purposes of surveillance for foreign animal (and program diseases)

• Allow Packers/ Processors to pass through the PIN’s associated with diagnostic samples for the express purposes of surveillance for foreign animal (and program diseases).

70

Disease Surveillance • Allow access by state and federal animal health

officials to the geospatial information stored in the National and State Premises Repositories for the express purposes of emergency preparedness and surveillance for foreign animal (and program diseases).

71

Recommendations (Not Required)• Annual Employee FAD Awareness• Separate PIN’s for epidemiological separate

premises more than ¼ mile apart.• Provide annual premises updates to SAHO• Develop Swine Health Production Plans for routine

interstate movements of feeder pigs(9 CFR 71.19)– A word on the Code

72

National Animal Health Laboratory Network

73

Data Collection• Request premises identification numbers (PIN) on

all swine diagnostic specimens submitted as a part of the surveillance component of the SPS plan

• Use either separate forms or have an area on current form to indicate the samples submitted are for the surveillance component of the SPS plan

74

Process Surveillance Submissions• Receive surveillance samples with accompanying

producer information submitted for SPS plan • Scan validated PIN’s into the LIMS and associate

with the accession/case• Pass through PINs with diagnostic samples for

surveillance for FADs (and program diseases)• Conduct routine testing on samples and report

out results to producers / veterinarians

75

Data Sharing• Coordinate transfer of FAD surveillance results

with PINs into SPS information reporting system prior to and during an outbreak

• Follow current NAHLN protocols for reporting FAD testing data related to the SPS plan including reporting to state and federal animal health officials

76

Recommendations (Not Required)• Add a statement to the diagnostic submission

form reminding producers of what participation means

– “I agree to the steps outlined in the document titled secure pork supply step for producers participation”

77

Packers and Processors

78

Pre-harvest traceability• Develop ability to capture and associate PINs of

sending premises with normal business information

• Develop a mechanism to record information regarding conveyances for each group / lot

• Develop a mechanism to share the following information associated w/ each group / lot– Sending premises, conveyance identification, group lot

number or animal identification, date of shipment, number of head

79

Biosecurity• Develop plan with USDA for implementation and

verification plant biosecurity standards in the Packer / Processor FAD strategy document

80

Disease Surveillance• Develop and test a mechanism to associate PINs

with diagnostic samples collected at the plant• Develop protocols to deliver diagnostic samples

to laboratories using common shipping methods or plant employees

• Pass through PINs associated with diagnostic samples for the express purpose of surveillance for FADs (and program diseases) prior, during and after an outbreak

81

Recommendations (Not Required)• Implement awareness training for employees• Develop and implement plans for reporting

suspect FADs• Develop policies for plant operations in the

control area based on the Packer / Processor FADs Strategy Document

• Categorized products into trade categories as outlined in the Packer / Processor FADs Strategy Document

82

State Animal Health Officials

83

Pre-harvest traceability• Issue separate PINs for epidemiologically

separate premises separated by more than a quarter-mile

• Accept electronic formats of CVI’s and interstate movement reports that include validated PINs for sending and receiving premises participating in an SPS plan

84

Disease surveillance• Access geospatial information stored in the

State/National premises repository for the express purposes of emergency preparedness and surveillance for foreign animal (and program) diseases

85

Communication• Communicate with NAHLN labs concerning FAD

testing results using current reporting channels for samples submitted through the SPS plan

• Communicate with SAHO’s in surrounding states concerning compliance with SPS plans– Premises information, approved biosecurity audits,

test results for samples submitted under the surveillance component of the SPS plan

86

Communication• Communicate with other SAHO’s and the incident

command any adverse findings, noncompliance with SPS standards or protocols, results of site evaluations and regulatory actions taken

87

Animal Movement• Allow swine already in transit to cross state

borders according to the controlled movement component of the SPS plan at the beginning of an FAD outbreak

• Allow swine across state borders according to the controlled movement component of the SPS plan when movement is restarted after beginning of an outbreak

88

Recommendations (Not Required)• Work with producers to develop swine

production health plans for routine interstate swine movements of feeder pigs with no change of ownership as established by 9 CFR 71.19

89

Biosecurity

90

Biosecurity Lines On Production Sites• Lines are imaginary or real barriers to reduce risk

of pathogen exposure to pigs– Perimeter Buffer Area (PBA)

• Outer control boundary set up around the perimeter of the site to limit access of the outside world to close contact with animal buildings

– Interior Clean-Dirty Line (ICD)• Established to isolate pigs on the clean side of the

production site from sources of infection on the dirty side of the production site

Biosecurity Lines on Production Sites• Criteria for each line addresses risk mitigation

measures for swine, people and fomites

• Producers would work with herd veterinarians to establish lines and protocols.

92

Factors Considered in Setting up Production Site Biosecurity Lines• Restricting Entry into the PBA

– Access control• Ingress / egress

– People • Routing, designated parking

– Animals• Animal disposal, feral swine prevention, other livestock

– Fomites• Area for cleaning and disinfection, feed routing

94

Factors Considered in Setting up Production Site Biosecurity Lines• Crossing the ICD line

– People• Biosecurity protocols

– Animals• Prevention of non-swine animal exposure

– Fomites• Biosecurity protocols for delivery of equipment & feed

etc.

96

Factors Considered in Setting up Production Site Biosecurity Lines• Crossing the ICD line

– Load out’s• Portable chutes, common load outs, animal flow etc.

– Carcass removal• Movement of carcasses and people

– Weather

97

Biosecurity Protocols• Broken into Level I & Level II

– Level I is the default for day-to-day practice– Level II is a heightened protocol for after an FAD event

• Producers can choose to operate in level II on a day-to-day basis which would shorten the time for transition and verification in the event of an FAD

99

Visitor Biosecurity• Two levels and each

addresses:– Limiting visitors– Requiring sign in– Following biosecurity

protocols– Cleaning of equipment

100

Employee Biosecurity• Two levels and each

addresses:– General employee

guidelines– Employee entry – Employee movement

between sites– Facility entry

101

Production Site Biosecurity• Two levels and each

addresses:– Access deterrents– Buildings– Pest & wildlife control– Crossing the ICD line

for operating procedures

– Carcass removal– Loose pigs

102

Loadout Biosecurity• Two levels and each

addresses:– Drivers

– Each load-out area

– Load-out procedures

103

Surveillance

104

Vet-D-Lab

Cull Sows

Mkt. Hogs

1st Pt. Conc.

Sentinel Vets

DTR Test

Waste Feeders

FADD Inv.

SHN

Nat’l Surveillance Program – Streams

PIN Tag Pilot

What is next?

Iowa E2E Project

Communications

109

Communications • Cross Species FMD Communications Team

– Developed messaging for FMD outbreaks to reassure the consumer about the safety of pork, beef and milk.

– Currently studying consumer perceptions regarding vaccine

– Working on an educational strategy to raise retailer awareness (ounce of prevention)

– http://www.fmdinfo.org/

110

http://www.fmdinfo.org/

http://www.fmdinfo.org/

Monitored Premises & Compartmentalization

111

Setting a High Bar

112

Risk Assessment

113

What is an acceptable risk?

114

SPS Enrolment /Compliance / Verification

• We will be addressing the issue this year

• Goal is to develop a workable, credible and affordable solution

– Could develop it as a part of PQA plus

115

Putting it all together!

116

What the State Vet can determine:1. Site is a part of Secure Pork? 2. Valid traceability system up and running? 3. Standardized biosecurity in place? 4. Achieved a negative disease status?

PIN# -123456A: Sow Farm

PIN#-1234567B: Wean to Finish

PIN#-765432A: Pork Packer

PackerReceived Pigs from SPS sites:

AA13579 on XX / XX /2012BB24688 on XX / XX /2012ETC…..

PIN#-AA13579: Wean to Finish

PIN#-BB24688: Wean to Finish

PIN#-1234567C: Swine Finisher

Permitted Movements

Secure Pork Supply Board Update

Documents

Transcript of Secure Pork Supply Board Update