Secure Cell Relay Routing Protocol for Sensor Networks

Xiaojiang Du, Fengiing Lin

Department of Computer Science

North Dakota State University

24th IEEE International Performance, Computing, and Communications Conference24th IEEE International Performance, Computing, and Communications Conference(IPCCC), 2005(IPCCC), 2005

Chien-Ku Lai

Outline

Introduction System Assumptions and Attacks on

Routing The Secure Cell Relay Routing

Protocol Performance Evaluation Conclusions

Introduction- Sensor Networks

Application areas Military surveillance Environmental monitoring Target tracking

Routing protocols for sensor networks Direct Diffusion TTDD Mesh Energy-Aware Delay-Constrained routing

Introduction- Sensor Networks (cont.)

The main research focus has been on making sensor networks feasible and useful

Less emphasis was placed on security

Introduction- Security

Security is important and even critical for many sensor network applications Military Homeland security

Introduction- Recent Researches

Most of the existing sensor network routing protocols Do not consider security issues during th

e design of the protocols

Introduction- Challenges

Hardware limitation Processing capability Storage Bandwidth Energy

Introduction- About this paper

Secure Cell Relay (SCR) routing protocol is resistant to several attacks on sensor

networks is also an energy efficient routing protocol

System Assumptions and Attacks on Routing

1. Network Model

2. System Assumptions

3. Attacks on Routing

Network Model

Cell

a: side length

R: transmission range

a = R / 2 2

System Assumptions

Each sensor is static and aware of its own location

Base stations are trusted computing base

Attacks on Routing

Manipulating routing information Selective forwarding Sybil sinkhole Wormhole Hello flooding (unidirectional) attacks

Attacks on Routing- Sybil sinkhole

AB

C

DH

Sink

Normal sensor

Compromised sensor

Attacks on Routing- Wormhole

3

44

2

5

35

5

5

24

3

11

11

Normal sensor

Compromised sensor

Attacks on Routing- Hello flooding (unidirectional) attacks

Can’t reach

Normal sensor

A powerful devicee.g. laptop

The Secure Cell Relay Routing Protocol

1. Initial Deployment of Sensor Networks

2. The Secure Data Dissemination Scheme

3. Defense against Sensor Network Attacks

Initial Deployment of Sensor Networks

KG

a globally shared key is stored in each sensor node and the ba

se station before sensor deployment All the sensor nodes and the base stati

on are synchronized before deployment

Initial Deployment of Sensor Networks

B A

Check the time-stamp

< pre-set value : valid> pre-set value : discard

{node-ID, time-stamp} KG

B 0Hello

Initial Deployment of Sensor Networks

B A

Challenge

{node-ID, time-stamp, nonce N0} KG

A 1 5

Initial Deployment of Sensor Networks

B A

{node-ID, time-stamp, KAB, KB, N0+1} KG

Ack

B 2 6

Routing Cells

The Secure Data Dissemination Scheme

S

R1

R4

R2

R5R3

{RTS}KS

td = a(t)/ E + tr

{CTS}KS

The Secure Data Dissemination Scheme

S

R1

R4

R2

R5R3

packet-ID + {Data}KSR1

Defense against Sensor Network Attacks

Against The Sybil Attack

Against The Wormhole and Sinkhole Attacks

Against The Selective Forwarding Attack

Against The Hello Flood Attack

Against The Sybil Attack

Authentication is used to ensure one node cannot pretend to be other nodes

Thus, the Sybil attack can not work

Against The Wormhole and Sinkhole Attacks – Examples

A powerful adversary (like a laptop) has a real, high quality route to the base station

However the neighbor sensors will not use the adv

ertised route they will only route the packets via the ro

uting cells

Against The Wormhole and Sinkhole Attacks

Against The Wormhole and Sinkhole Attacks – Examples (cont.)

An adversary broadcasts to its neighbors about an artificial link to the base station

This attack does not work for the same reason as above

Against The Selective Forwarding Attack – Solution

If one node serves as the relay node for more than M times (where M is a system parameter) neighbor nodes will send an alarm to the

base station and neighbor nodes

Against The Selective Forwarding Attack – Solution (cont.)

If one node serves as the relay node for more than M times the upstream node (the sender) will send

the packet to another node in the cell encrypted with the corresponding shared secr

et key

Against The Hello Flood Attack

Since sensor nodes use the three-way handshake protocol

The hello flood attack does not work

Performance Evaluation

Performance Evaluation- Parameters

Simulator: QualNet Compared with SP and Mesh MAC protocol: 802.11 DCF Base stations: 4 Sensor Nodes: 300 Simulation area: 300m x 300m Transmission range: 60m

Performance Evaluation

SCR routing protocol has high delivery ratio and low energy consumption (close to single path routing)

Conclusions

1. Security

2. Energy Efficiency

Conclusions- Security

The nature of SCR routing (cell relay via routing cells) makes it resistant to Spoofed routing information Selective forwarding Sinkhole Wormhole attacks

Conclusions- Security (cont.)

The three-way handshake can defense against Sybil attack Hello flooding attack

Conclusions- Energy Efficiency

In SCR routing only an active node with more remaining

energy (than other nodes) in the routing cells forwards packet

Question?

Thank you.Thank you.