SEC. 12 CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

HO WAI PANG v. PEOPLEFACTS:Infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation or the so-called Miranda Rights render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during such investigation.13 Hongkong Nationals arrived at NAIA as tourists. At the arrival area, the group leader Wong Kwok Kwa (Sonny Wong) presented baggage declaration form to Gilda Cinco, Customs Examiner. Cinco examined the baggages of all 13. However, while the second bag was examined, she noticed chocolate boxes which are of the same size as the ones found o the first baggage. Suspicious, she took out 4 and opened one of them.What she saw inside was a white crystalline substance contained in a white transparent plastic. Cinco then called attention of Duty Collector and Customs Appraiser who advised her to call the NARCOM.The tourists were placed in Intensive Counting Unit (ICU). The result of such substance yielded positive for shabu. The 13 tourists were brought to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further questioning.The confiscated stuff were turned over to the Forensic Chemist who weighed and examined them.Findings show that its total weight is 31.1126 kilograms and that the representative samples were positive for shabu.Out of the 13 tourists, the NBI found evidence for violation of R.A. No. 6425 only as against petitioner and his five co-accused.

HELD:Petition lacks merit.Sec. 12 Art III of the Consti PROHIBITS as evidence only confessions and admissions of the accused as against himself.

CONTENTION: he was not assisted by a competent and independent lawyer during the custodial investigation.He claimed that he was not duly informed of his rights to remain silent and to have competent counsel of his choice.

SC:Section 12of Article III of the Constitution, we must not, however, lose sight of the fact that what said constitutional provision prohibits as evidence are only confessions and admissions of the accused as against himself.

In Aquino v. Paiste, the Court categorically ruled that the infractions of the so-called MIRANDA RIGHTS render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation. The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and [are] not otherwise excluded by law or rules, [are] not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation.

In the case at bench, the petitioner did NOT make any confession or admission during the custodial investigation. Moreover, no statement was taken from petitioner during his detention and subsequently used in evidence against himNOTE: As the Court held inPeople v. Buluran,[a]ny allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their conviction.Petitioners conviction in the present case was on the strength of his having been caughtinflagrante delicto transporting shabuinto the country and not on the basis of any confession or admission.Petitioner was not denied rights to confrontation.ANOTHER CONTENTION: Alleged violation of the right of confrontation. In refutation, the OSG countered that petitioner was given the opportunity to confront his accusers and/or the witnesses of the prosecution when his counsel cross-examined themAccdg to the SC, As borne out by the records, petitioner did not register any objection to the presentation of the prosecutions evidence particularly on the testimony of Cinco despite the absence of an interpreter. CONSPIRACY OF ACCUSED WAS ESTABLISHED.RULING: Guilty of RA 6425. Petition denied.GAMBOA v CRUZFACTS:On 19 July 1979, at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning, he was arrested for vagrancy, without a warrant of arrest, by Patrolman Arturo Palencia. Thereafter, petitioner was brought to Precinct 2, Manila, where he was booked for vagrancy and then detained therein together with several others. During the lineup of five (5) detainees, including petitioner, complainant Erlinda B. Bernal pointed to petitioner and said, "that one is a companion." After the Identification, the other detainees were brought back to their cell but petitioner was ordered to stay on. While the complainant was being interrogated by the police investigator, petitioner was told to sit down in front of her.Then an info for robbery was filed against the petitioner. On 13 August 1980, petitioner filed said Motion predicated on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice to, and in the absence of, his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process.HELD:The Court found no merit in the contention of petitioner. The rights to counsel and to due process of law are indeed two (2) of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, whether it be the 1973 or 1987 Constitution. In a democratic society, like ours, every person is entitled to the full enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense.NOTE: Police line-up was no part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was NOT entitled at such stage, to counsel.Powell case: It has been firmly established that a person's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendmentright to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him.HOWEVER, in our Consti: , the right to counsel attaches at the start of investigation against a respondent and, therefore, even before adversary judicial proceedings against the accused have begun.On due process there was no violationRULING: PETITION DENIED.

PEOPLE v. MACAMFACTS:Appeal from the decision of the RTC finding Danilo and Ernesto Roque guilty BRD of the crime of Robbery w/ Homicide.Upon being arraigned, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. However, after the prosecution had presented evidence, assisted by their clients, changed plea of not guilty to guilty. Upon their arrest, the appellants contended that they were brought by the security guards and then and there they were mauled.HELD: It appears that the security guards at the factory of the father of accused Eduardo Macam detained appellants. They were later brought to the Quezon City Police Headquarters for investigation. Since they refused to admit their participation in the commission of the crime, appellants were then brought to the Quezon City General Hospital and were made to line-up together with several policemen in civilian clothes. Salvacion Enrera, Benito Macam and Nilo Alcantara, who were confined at the hospital for injuries sustained during the robbery, were asked to pinpoint the perpetrators. At that time, appellants were handcuffed and bore contusions on their faces caused by the blows inflicted on them by the police investigators.We held that the right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation,i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information, confessions or admissions from the accused (Gamboa v. Cruz)NOTE: After the start of the custodial investigation, any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is INADMISSIBLE. This is particularly true in the case at bench where the police officers first talked to the victims before the confrontation was held. The circumstances were such as to impart improper suggestions on the minds of the victims that may lead to a mistaken identification. Appellants were handcuffed and had contusions on their faces.They were etopped (after an invalid arrest) when they have not moved for quashing of the info.RULING: AFFIRMED.

PEOPLE v. JUDGE AYSONFACTS:Controversy at bar is the equation by the respondent Judge of the right of an individual not to"be compelled to be a witness against himself"accorded by Section 20 (1973 Consti) Article III of the Constitution, with the right of any person"under investigation for the commission of an offense . . . to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right,"granted by the same provision.Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station. It having allegedly come to light that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets,the PAL mgt notified him of an investigation to be conducted into the matter of February 9, 1986. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained.HANDWRITTEN. Before investigation, Ramos gave to his superior notes alleging that he would like to settle irregularities charged v. him in the amount P76,000 s.t conditions imposed by PAL.(Dated Feb. 8, 1986)INVESTIGATION. Ramos' answers were to the effect inter alia that he had not indeed made disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the Audit Team's findings, that the proceeds had been "misused" by him, that although he had planned on paying back the money, he had been prevented from doing so, "perhaps (by) shame," that he was still willing to settle his obligation, and proferred a "compromise x x to pay on staggered basis, (and) the amount would be known in the next investigation;" But it would seem that no compromise agreement was reached much less consummated. (Dated Feb 9, 1986)An info was filed against him for estafa.Private prosecutors made a written offer of evidence included "the (above mentioned) statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office," as well as his "handwritten admission x x given on February 8, 1986."DEFENSE: In Exhibit A (his confession w audit team), the objection was that "said document, which appears to be a confession, was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer." Exhibit K (handwritten letter) was objected to "for the same reasons interposed under Exhibits 'A' and 'J.'INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCES PER JUDGE. The respondent judge admitted all the exhibits "as part of the testimony of the witnesses who testified in connection therewith and for whatever they are worth," except Exhibits A and K, which it rejected. EXHIBIT A: His Honor declared Exhibit A "inadmissible in evidence, it appearing that it is the statement of accused Felipe Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office, in an investigation conducted by the Branch Manager x x since it does not appear that the accused was reminded of this constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. He also declared inadmissible "EXHIBIT K: HELD:Provision in question:SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.NOTE: 2 rights under this section:1) the right against self-incrimination i.e., the right of a person not to be compelled to be a witness against himself set out in the first sentence, which is a verbatim reproduction of Section 18, Article III of the 1935 Constitution, and is similar to that accorded by the Fifth Amendment of the American Constitution,and2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights of every suspect "under investigation for the commission of an offense."The 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the individuality and disparateness of these rights. The right against self- incrimination, "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself," is now embodied in Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The lights of a person in custodial interrogation, which have been made more explicit, are now contained in Section 12 of the same Article III)RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION.Accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding.The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against himself.It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." However, the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions.That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does not impose on the judge, or other officer presiding over a trial, hearing or investigation, any affirmative obligation to advise a witness of his right against self-incrimination. It is a right that a witness knows or should know (ignoratia legis non excusat). Furthermore, in the very nature of things, neither the judge nor the witness can be expected to know in advance the character or effect of a question to be put to the latter.This right is NOT self- executing or automatically operational. It must be claimed. WHY? If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate timeRIGHTS IN CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONFor "under investigation for the commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects" under investigation by police authorities (specific); and this is what makes these rights different from self-incrimination which, as aforestated, indiscriminately applies to any person testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or administrative. This provision is avowedly derived from the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona,19a decision described as an "earthquake in the world of law enforcement.Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense"--1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right,2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him;and3) any confession obtained in violation of (these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence)In Miranda, CJ Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid down for a person in police custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as the commencement of an adversary proceeding against the suspect.WARNINGS. Prior to any questioning that he has: (a) the right to remain silent,(b) that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, (c) that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunities during interrogation.. After such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. OBJECTIVE: to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional rights."NOTE: The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of accused persons.CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION - questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in some crime is within the scope of the constitutional protection. If not made "under custodial interrogation," or "under investigation for the commission of an offense," the statement is not protected. Example: where a person went to a police precinct and before any sort of investigation could be initiated, declared that he was giving himself up for the killing of an old woman because she was threatening to kill him by barang, or witchcraft, this Court ruled that such a statement was admissible, compliance with the constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation not being exigible under the circumstances.RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT IN CRIMINAL CASEAs regards giving of testimonyDefendant ON TRIAL or UNDR PRELIM INVESITGATION is not under custodial interrogation. His interrogation by the police, if any there had been would already have been ended at the time of the filing of the criminal case in court (or the public prosecutors' office). Hence, if one has pending case in court there is no occasion to speak of his right while under "custodial interrogation" for the obvious reason that he is no longer under "custodial interrogation."BUT NOTE: The accused in court under preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor possesses the right against self- incrimination set out in the first sentence of Section 20 Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, i.e., the right to refuse to answer a specific incriminatory question at the time that it is put to him.Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled among others- 1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself,and 2) to testify as witness in his own behalf; BUT if he offers himself as a witness he may be cross-examined as any other witness; however, his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him.OTHER RIGHTS. Meaning- he cannot testify or produce evidence in which he is the accused (nor compelled thru subpoena) He can refuse to take the witness stand, be sworn, answer any question.And, as the law categorically states, "his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him.IF AGREED TO BE CROSS-EXAMINED: He may not on cross-examination refuse to answer any question on the ground that the answer that he will give, or the evidence he will produce, would have a tendency to incriminate him for the crime with which he is charged.IF INCRIMINATORY QUESTION FOR SOME OTHER CRIME, distinct from that of which he is accused, he may decline to answer that specific question, on the strength of the right against self-incrimination granted by the first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (now Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution).RIGHTS, TO WIT:1.BEFORE CASE IS FILED: OR WITH THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, FOR PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION), but after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and2. AFTER THE CASE IS FILED: a) to refuse to be a witness; b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal; c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution; d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted.IN THE CASE AT BAR: respondent Judge has misapprehended the nature and import of the disparate rights set forth in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He has taken them as applying to the same juridical situation, equating one with the other. In so doing, he has grossly erred.His Orders were thus rendered with grave abuse of discretion. They should be as they are hereby, annulled and set aside.Felipe Ramos was NOT in any sense under custodial interrogation, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand.It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand.CONSTI rights did not come to playRamos had VOLUNTARILY answered questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded,. They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.MIRANDA RIGHTS. which, to repeat, are relevant only in custodial investigations. RULING: PETITION GRANTED.

PEOPLE v. PINLACFACTS:Automatic review: accused Ronilo Pinlac y Libao was charged in two (2) separate information for Robbery.Long before April 1984, two Japanese nationals were neighbors in San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro Manila.Mr. Koji Sato, 27 years old, married and a mechanical engineer by profession rented a house in the said plush subdivision. He was living alone in said house, although he had a housemaid by the name of Irene Jandayan, who started working for him in 1981, and a cook by the name of Delia Marcelino. The latter was employed for almost a year; although went for maternity leave since she was due to deliver a child with her husband, Pinlac, who had frequently visited her in Sato's place.A low concrete fence separated the house rented by Sato from that rented by Mr. Saeki Osamu, 35 years old. The latter, whose wife, Hiroko Saeki, was in the same address but who returned to Japan sometime after his untimely demise, was a staff member of the Japan International Cooperation Agency in the Philippines.Returning home at around 11:30 in the evening of the same day, Sato noticed that the front door was already unlocked. Upon returning to his room upstairs he discovered that his Walkman transistor which was placed beside his bed was already missing. He searched for it upstairs, downstairs and around the house. It was only after entering Jandayan's room that he found his transistor together with his twowrist watches(he was then wearing one), cigarette lighter and eyeglass case. Another watch, an Alba Seiko, which he bought in Japan for 7,000 yen (the approximate equivalent of P300.00), a gold necklace, cash money were all lost.Sato thereafter went to the Makati Police Station to report the robbery. He requested some policemen to repair to his residence to investigate. It was when the police investigators had already reached his residence that he learned about the death of Osamu.Osamu's maid, Evelyn Salomea, was investigated. She revealed that she saw Pinlac enter the house of Sato at seven o'clock in the evening, although she did not see him leave thereafter; and that Jandayan has knowledge of the address of MarcelinoHer two statements were introduced in evidence. Subsequently, the policemen went to Marcelino's residence in Taguig and, finding Pinlac thereat, invited him to the police station. Detective Samson (who also took the witness stand) opined that the killer made his entry by removing the panels of jalousies at the rear of the house.ALLEGATION: During the investigation at the Police Headquarters in Makati, Metro Manila, he was tortured and forced to admit the crimes chargedISSUE: Is the extrajudicial confession of accused violative of Consti?HELD:No direct evidence or testimony of any eyewitness was presented Identifying the accused as the perpetrator of the crime charged. The only evidence furnished by the police authorities were merely circumstantial evidence regarding the fingerprints of the accused found in the window stabs of the maid's quarters and in the kitchen cabinet in the house of Mr. Sato. His defense: But this was satisfactorily explained by the accused that aside from being a frequent visitor in the house of Mr. Sato where his wife works as a cook wherein at those times he could have unknowingly left his fingerprints, but most especially during the time when he was arrested and ordered to re-enact.In the process he held some of these window slabs, walls, furniture, etc., in accordance with the order of the arresting officer.

In People vs. Galit: the Court reiterated correct procedure for police officer to follow when making arrest and in conducting a custodial investigation.1. Inform reason of arrest2. Be informed of his constil rights to remain silent and to counsel3. That any statement he might make could be used against him4. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. 5. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory in whole or in part shall be INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.TO BE INFORMED OF RIGHT TOR REMAIN SILENT AND TO COUNSEL. Transmission of a meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.NOTE: . Police officer is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the person has been "informed" of his rights.VERBAL ADMISSION may be held INADMISSIBLE if appraisal of right is not fully explained.The Court found that the evidence for the prosecution failed to prove compliance with these constitutional rights. Furthermore, the accused was not assisted by counsel and his alleged waiver was made without the assistance of counsel. The record of the case is also REPLETE with evidence which was not satisfactorily rebutted by the prosecution, that the accused was maltreated and tortured for seven (7) solid hours before he signed the prepared extra-judicial confession.RULING: NOT PROVED BRD

PEOPLE v. BOLANOSFACTS:Accused-appellant Ramon Bolanos was convicted by murder.The evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of Pat. Marcelo J. Fidelino and Francisco Dayao of the Integrated National Police (INP), Balagtas, Bulacan, Calixto Guinsaya, and Dr. Benito Caballero, Medico-Legal Officer of Bocaue, Bulacan and documentary exhibits. The testimonial evidence were after the fact narration of events based on the report regarding the death of the victim, Oscar Pagdalian which was communicated to the Police Station where the two (2) policemen who responded to the incident are assigned and subsequently became witnesses for the prosecution. Alcantara ad Dayao testified that they proceeded to the scene of the crime of the Marble Supply, Batangas, Bulacan and upon arrival they saw the deceased Oscar Pagdalian lying on an improvised bed full of blood w/ stab wounds. Deceased was with two (2) companions, on the previous night, one of whom was the accused who had a drinking spree with the deceased and another companion (Claudio Magtibay) till the wee hours of the following morning.Pat Dayao testified that when they apprehend the accused-appellant, they found the firearm of the deceased on the chair where the accused was allegedly seated; that they boarded Ramon Bolanos and Claudio Magtibay on the police vehicle and brought them to the police station.EXTRAJUDICIAL ADMISSION. In the vehicle where the suspect was riding, "Ramon Bolanos accordingly admitted that he killed the deceased Oscar Pagdalian because he was abusive.RTC: Extrajudicial admission was admissible.Being ALREADY under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the way to the Police Station where formal investigation may have been conducted, appellant should have been informed of his Constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution which explicitly provides RULING: ACQUITTED.PEOPLE v. ANDANFACTS:PER CURIAM:Accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby" was accused of the crime of rape with homicide.On February 19, 1994 at about 4:00 P.M., in xxx, AAA, twenty years of age and a second-year student at the xxx, left her home for her school dormitory in xxx. She was to prepare for her final examinations on February 21, 1994. AAA wore a striped blouse and faded denim pants and brought with her two bags containing her school uniforms, some personal effects and more thanP2,000.00 in cash.AAA then walking when invited by the accused in his house. AAA agreed to take her blood pressure as the old woman (accuseds wifes grandma) was her distant relative.Appellant then punched her in the abdomen, brought her to the kitchen and raped her. Appellant dragged the unconscious girl to an old toilet and left her there until dark. Appellant stood on a bench beside the pigpen and then lifted and draped the girl's body over the fence to transfer it to the vacant lot. When the girl moved, he hit her head with a piece of concrete block. He heard her moan and hit her again on the face. After silence reigned, he pulled her body and dragged to shallow portion of lot and abandoned.AAA's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Mayor xxx of xxx to form a crack team of police officers to look for the criminal. Initially, appellant denied any knowledge of AAA's death. However, when the police confronted him with the concrete block, the victim's clothes and the bloodstains found in the pigpen, appellant relented and said that his neighbors, Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo Dizon, killed AAA and that he was merely a lookout.By this time, people and media representatives were already gathered at the police headquarters awaiting the results of the investigation. Mayor xxx arrived and upon seeing the mayor, appellant approached him and whispered a request that they talk privately. Appellant broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed AAA." The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and media representatives witness the confessionThe mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist appellant but since no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings photographed and videotaped. In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and appellant's own wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt.His confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media nationwide.On arraignment, however, he pleaded NOT GUILTY.

HELD:Plainly, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed of such rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this provision is INADMISSIBLE in evidence against him.The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent.INCOMMUNICADO CHARACTER OF CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION: obscures a later judicial determination of what really transpired.Rights under Sec. 12 are accorded to ANY PERSON under investigation for the commission of the offense. An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a PARTICULAR PERSON as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense.CONSTIL CONVENTION: Investigation conducted by police authorities which will include investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other police agencies in our government.IN THE CASE AT BAR: When the police arrested appellant, they were no longer engaged in a general inquiry about the death of AAA. Indeed, appellant was already a prime suspect even before the police found him at his parents' house. NOTE: Appellant was already under custodial investigation when he confessed to the policeIt is admitted that the police failed to inform appellant of his constitutional rights when he was investigated and interrogated. Confession INADMISSIBLE and 2 BAGS RECOVERED from appellants house. WHY? The victim's bags were the FRUITS OF APPELLANT'S UNCOUNSELLED CONFESSION to the police. They are tainted evidence, hence also inadmissibleThe police detained appellant after his initial confession. And that the following day, Mayor visited appellant and then and there appellant confessed alone.HOW ABOUT CONFESSION MADE TO THE MAYOR? it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the mayor is inadmissible.It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him.NOTE: When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. WHY? Ans. Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do NOT apply to a SPONTANEOUS statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What Consti bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. This is to guarantee the slightest use of coercion by the State as would lead the accused to admit sth false.Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. (Accdg to news interview, accused was a cousin of the vicvtim; in the long loine of interview w/ the news reporter, there was a candid, free of undue influence) Here (verbal confessions during the newsman interview), The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual.RULING: BRD

NAVALLO v. SANDIGANBAYANFACTS:The Provincial Auditor of Surigao del Norte, Antonio Espino, made a preliminary audit examination of cash and other accounts of Ernesto Navallo (then Collecting and Disbursing Officer of Numancia National Vocational School). Espino found Navallo to be short of P16,483.62. Before departing, Espino sealed the vault of Navallo.Leopoldo A. Dulguime was directed by Espino to complete the preliminary examination and to conduct a final audit. Dulguime broke the seal, opened the vault, and made a new cash count. Dulguime next examined the cashbook of Navallo. After the audit, he had the cashbook likewise deposited with the same office. The audit covered the period from July 1976 to January 1978 on the basis of postings and record of collections certified to by Navallo. Dulguime confirmed Navallo's shortage of P16,483.62. DEMAND FOR RESTITUTION. Dulguime made a Report of Examination and wrote Navallo a letter demanding the restitution of the missing amount. The latter neither complied nor offered any explanation for the shortage. The official receipts and cashbook, together with some other records, were subsequently lost or damaged on account of a typhoon that visited the province.Sandiganbayan: Guilty BRD of malversation of public fundsSC: No merit in the petition.Accused-petitioner, invoking Section 7, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules of Court, pleads double jeopardy. We cannot agree. Double jeopardy requires the existence of the following requisites: (1) The previous complaint or information or other formal charge is sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction;(2) The court has jurisdiction to try the case;(3) The accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the charge; and(4) The accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is dismissed without his express consent.When all the above elements are present, a second prosecution for (a) the same offense, or (b) an attempt to commit the said offense, or (c) a frustration of the said offense, or (d) any offense which necessarily includes, or is necessarily included in, the first offense charged, can rightly be barred.In the case at bench, the RTC was devoid of jurisdiction when it conducted an arraignment of the accused which by then had already been conferred on the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, neither did the case there terminate with conviction or acquittal nor was it dismissed.CONTENTION: Deprived of his constitutional rightsSC: A person under a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. In any case, the allegation of his having been "pressured" to sign the Examination Report prepared by Dulguime appears to be belied by his own testimony. RULING: AFFIRMEDPEOPLE v. DYFACTS:Testimonial for the prosecution (given by Wilson Tumaob):At around 12:00 midnight while inside the bar, he saw the accused Benny Dy shoot a white person, (meaning a European) who was hit on the right side of the neck. He recognized the accused as the one who shot the white person because of the light coming from the petromax lamp which was in front of him and he was just one-and-one-half meters from the accused and about the same distance from the victim.When he saw the accused shoot the victim, he did not hear any conversation between them. At that precise time, there were many people of different nationalities coming in and out of the bar. He did not know anyone of them except the accused Benny Dy. Neither did he know the helpers in the bar, nor see anyone of these customers to be residents of, or friends of his from, barrio Balusbos, Malay, where he resides.Additional prosecution evidence is to the effect that in the early morning after the incident, the Accused confessed orally to Pat. Rodolfo Padilla, the operator of the radio station on the Island, and voluntarily surrendered the gun he had used in shooting the victim.ISSUE: Whether the Accused had orally admitted his authorship of the crime and surrendered the gun he had used in shooting the victim, as the prosecution claims, or, whether he had no involvement whatsoever, the gun surrendered having been found by a boy helper inside the bar while cleaning the place the morning after the incident, as the defense would have us believe.HELD:The Court erred in denying the accued-appellants motion for new trial.The revolver, in turn, was Identified by Pat. Padilla as the firearm surrendered by the Accused. When Pat. Padilla stated that he saw the fatal gun, its serial number and name for the first he was clearly referring to particulars which he did not concern himself with at the time of surrender.The ORAL CONFESSION made by the accused to Pat. Padilla that he had shot a tourist' and that the gun he had used in shooting the victim was in his bar which he wanted surrendered to the Chief of Police is competent evidence against him.RES GESTAE. It may in a sense be also regarded as part of the res gestae. The rule is that, any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it must be given in substanceWhat was told by the Accused to Pat, Padilla was a SPONTANEOUS STATEMENT not elicited through questioning, but given an ordinary manner.The gun surrendered was a clear and direct evidence which caused death of the tourist.RULING. AFFIRMED

PEOPLE v. ALICANDOFACTS:On June 29, 1994, appellant was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO, Department of Justice. Appellant pleaded guilty.The prosecution evidence shows that in the afternoon of June 12, 1994, Romeo Penecilla, father of the four year old victim Khazie Mae, was drinking liquor with Ramil Rodriguez and Remus Gaddi in his (Penecilla's) house at Barangay Rizal, Zone 1, Pulo Bala, Iloilo. Appellant joined them but every now and then would take leave and return. Appellant was living in his uncle's house some five (5) arm's length from Penecilla's house. At about 4:30 p.m., Penecilla's group stopped drinking and left.Luisa Rebida testified that she was shocked when she saw appellant was naked, on top of the victim, his left hand choking her neck. She retreated to her house in fright. She gathered her children together and informed her compadre, Ricardo Lagrana, then in her house, about what she saw. Lagrana was also overcome with fear and hastily left.Romeo Penecilla returned to his house at 8 o'clock in the evening. He did not find Khazie Mae. He and his wife searched for her until 1 o'clock in the morning. Their effort was fruitless. Rebada was aware that the Penecillas were looking for their daughter but did not tell them what she knew. Instead, Relada called out appellant from her window and asked him the time Khazie Mae left his house. Appellant replied he was drunk and did not know.Neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago, discovered the lifeless body of Khazie Mae under his house. Her parents were informed and so was the police. Rebada suffered a change of heart. She informed Romeo Penecilla and his wife Julie Ann, that appellant committed the crime. Forthwith, appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow up interrogations, the police came to know and recovered from appellant's house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt all of which were presented as evidence for the prosecution.HELD:We find that the Decision of the trial court sentencing the appellant to death is shot full of errors, both substantive and procedural. The conviction is on an amalgam of inadmissible and incredible evidence and supported by scoliotic logic.LANGUAGE NOT KNOWN. In the case at bar, the records do not reveal that the Information against the appellant was read in the language or dialect known to him. The Information against the appellant is written in the English language. It is unbeknown whether the appellant knows the English language. Neither is it known what dialect is understood by the appellant. Nor is there any showing that the Information couched in English was translated to the appellant in his own dialect before his plea of guilt. The scanty transcript during his arraignment,Theplea of guiltmade by the appellant is likewise null and void. The trial court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant. The records reveal how the trial judge inadequately discharged this duty of conducting a "searching inquiry." In the hearing of June 28, 1994The questions of the trial court failed to show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the appellant nor did the questions demonstrate appellant's full comprehension of the consequences of his plea. The records do not reveal any information about thepersonality profile of the appellant which can serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to givea free and informed plea of guilt. The age, socio-economic status, and educational background of the appellant were not plumbed by the trial court. The questions were framed in English yet there is no inkling that appellant has a nodding acquaintance of English. It will be noted too that the trial court did not bother to explain to the appellant the essential elements of the crime of rape with homicide.Did not tell the appellant what are the effects of mandatory death penalty.Some prosecution evidence, offered independently of the plea of guilt of the appellant, wereinadmissible, yet, were considered by the trial court in convicting the appellant.INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE. These physical evidences (pillow with blood stains and shirt) areinadmissibleevidence for they were gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan of the Iloilo City PNP as a result of custodial interrogation whereappellantverballyconfessed to the crime without the benefit of counsel. PO3 Tan admitted under cross-examination,UNCOUNSELLED CONFESSION = INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCEIn the case at bar, PO3 Tan did not even have the simple sense to reduce the all important confession of the appellant in writing. Neither did he present any writing showing that appellant waived his right to silence and to have competent and independent counsel despite the blatant violation of appellant's constitutional right, the trial court allowed his uncounselled confession to flow into the records and illicitly used it in sentencing him to death.NOTE: It is not only theuncounselled confessionthat is condemned as inadmissible,but also evidence derived therefromFRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE. We have not only constitutionalized theMiranda warningsin our jurisdiction. We have also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the"fruit of the poisonous tree,"a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case ofNardone v.United States.Accdg to this rule:the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, anysecondary or derivative evidence (the " fruit " ) derived from it is also inadmissible..illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the"fruit of the poisonous tree"is theindirect resultof the same illegal act. The"fruit of the poisonous tree"is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible.PRINCIPLE: evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.No examination of the shirtIt must also be noted that it is not unnatural for appellant to have bloodstains on his shirt. He is a butcher by occupation.RULING: Decision in Criminal Case No. 43663, convicting accused Arnel Alicando of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death is annulled and set aside and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

SEC. 13 RIGHT TO BAILBASCO v. RAPATALOFACTS:AN ADMIN MATTER:Complainant Inocencio Basco charged respondent Judge Leo M. Rapatalo w/ gross ignorance or wilful disregard of law granting bail.Complainant, father of victim, alleged that info for murder was filed against Roger Morente, one of the 3 accused. Accused Morente filed a petition for bail. Hearings were reset many times. In the meantime, complainant allegedly saw the accused in Rosario, La Union and later learned that accused was OUT ON BAIL despite the petition being unheard at all. Upon investigation, complainant discovered that bail had been granted and was issued on a basis of MARGINAL NOTE of the Asst. Prosecutor when another hearing was scheduled. In his Comment, respondent Judge alleged that he granted the petition based on prosecutors option not to oppose the petition as well as latters recommendation setting the bailbond in the amount of P80,000.00. He averred that when the prosecution chose not to oppose petition for bail, he had the discretion on whether to approve it or not.Respondent Judge stated that in any case, bailbond posted was cancelled and WoA was issued and thus accused was confined at the La Union Provincial Jail. WHAT IS BAIL? It is the security required by the court and given by the accused to ensure that the accused appears before the proper court at the scheduled time and place to answer the charges brought against him or her. FUNCTION: In theory, bail is to ensure the appearance of the defendant at the time set for trial. And to prevent release of an accused who might otherwise be dangerous to society. WHY DETAIN ACCUSED BEFORE CONVICTION? To assure his presence at the trial. EXCEPTION TO RIGHT TO BE BAILED applied in DIRECT RATIO to the extent of probability of evasion of the prosecution. In other words, if the denial of bail is authorized in CAPITAL OFFENSES it is only in theory that the proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has an opportunity rather than to face conviction.NOTE: Bail is NOT a MATTER OF RIGHT in cases where the person is charged with: capital offenses punishable by death, rec. perpetua or life imprisonment. Art. 114, Sec. 7 prohibits admittance to jail on these offenses REGARDLESS of stage.When the grant of bail is discretionary, the PROSECUTION has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the DETERMINATION of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge.it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal."The DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT, "is not absolute nor beyond control. It must be sound, and exercised within reasonable bounds. An uncontrolled or uncontrollable discretion on the part of a judge is a misnomer. It is a fallacy. Lord Mansfield, speaking of the discretion to be exercised in granting or denying bail said: "But discretion when applied to a court of justice, means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful; but legal and regular.BAIL; WHEN CAPITAL OFFENSES. a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. "A SUMMARY HEARING means such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent PURPOSE: to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross examination."If a party is denied the opportunity to be heard, there would be a violation of procedural due process.HEARING MANDATORY. That it is MANDATORY FOR THE JUDGE TO REQUIRE A HEARING in a petition for bail is emphasized in the following cases:1. PEOPLE v. SOLA (when Prosecution has not given its opportunity to prove guilt to accused is strong, defendant can post bail. )2. PEOPLE v. NANO n this case. the judge issued an order admitting the accused in a kidnapping and murder case to bail without any hearing. We held: "The prosecution must first be given an opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong."3. PICO v. COMBONG, Jr. (In this administrative case, the respondent judge granted bail to an accused charged with an offense punishable byreclusion perpetua, without notice and hearing and even before the accused had been arrested or detained.The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and warned to exercise greater care and diligence in the performance of his duties.)The aforecited cases are all to the effect that when bail is discretionary, a HEARING, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence, or lack of it, against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the parties.NOTE: Mere ordering the Prosecution to file a Comment on the accuseds motion to fix bail is NOT SUBSTANTIAL compliance w/ reqt of formal hearing.A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail. "It is stillmandatoryfor the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it, against the accused.AFTER HEARING. The court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution.On the basis thereof, the judge should then formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough as to indicate the guilt of the accused. IN THE CASE AT BAR: respondent Judge granted bail to the accused without first conducting a hearing to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong despite his knowledge that the offense charged is a capital offense in disregard of the procedure laid down in Section 8, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-94. (Due to prosecutions declaration not to oppose declaration)Section 8 of RULE 114 was added to address a situation where in case the prosecution does not choose to present evidence to oppose the application for bail, the judge may feel duty-bound to grant the bail application. In such a case, the judge may well lose control of the proceedings. In a sense, this undermines the authority of a judge since all that the prosecution has to do to "force" the judge to grant the bail application is to refrain from presenting evidence opposing the same. In effect, this situation makes Sections 6 and 7 of the 1940 Rules of Court on "Bail" MEANINGLESS since whether or not the evidence of guilt of a person charged with a capital offense is strong cannot be determined if the PROSECUTION CHOOSES NOT to present evidence or oppose the bail application in a hearing precisely to be conducted by the trial judge for that purpose, as called for in the two sections. HEARING MEANS PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE. And the filing of a comment or a written opposition to the bail application by the prosecution will not suffice.DUTIES OF THE JUDGE IN APP FOR BAIL:(1)Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended)(2)Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8, supra); (3)Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison,supra);(4)If the GUILT OF THE ACCUSED IS NOT STRONG, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. (Section 19,supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied.RULING: REPRIMANDED W/ WARNING.PEOPLE v. JUDGE DONATOFACTS:Instant petition for certiorari and prohibition and prayer to set aside the order of respondent judge granting bail to the accused Rodolfo Salas (alias Cdr. Bilog).Private respondent Rodolfo Salas,alias "Commander Bilog", and his co-accused were charged for the crime of rebellion under Article 134, in relation to Article 135, of the RPC.The Communist Party of the Philippines, its military arm, the New People's Army, its mass infiltration network, the National Democratic Front with its other subordinate organizations and fronts, have, under the direction and control of said organizations' leaders risen publicly and taken arms throughout the country against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines for the purpose of overthrowing the present Government, the seat of which is in the City of Manila.Instead of asking for a reconsideration of said Order, private respondent filed on 9 May 1987 a petition for bail, herein petitioner opposed in an Opposition filed on 27 May 1987on the ground that since rebellion became a capital offense under the provisions of P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834, which amended Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, by imposing the penalty ofreclusion perpetua to deathon those who promote, maintain, or head a rebellion the accused is no longer entitled to bail as evidence of his guilt is strong.On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Thus, the original penalty for rebellion,prision mayorand a fine not to exceed P20,000.00, was restored.his Order of 7 July 1987respondent Judge, taking into consideration Executive Order No. 187, granted private respondent's petition for bail, fixed the bail bond at P30,000.00 and imposed upon private respondent the additional condition that he shall REPORT TO THE COURT once every two (2) months within the first ten (10) days of every period thereof. now entitled to bail as a matter of right.An order of the RTC increased bail form 30k to 50kPETITIONERS CONTENTION: that private respondent is estopped from invoking his right to bail, having expressly waived it in G.R. No. 76009 when he agreed to "remain in legal custody and face trial before the court having custody of his person. Also, respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he did not allow petitioner to present all the evidence it may desire to support its prayer for the denial of bail and when he declared that the State has forfeited its right to do so since during all the time that the petition for bail was pending, it never manifested, much less hinted, its intention to adduce such evidence. And that even if release on bail may be allowed, respondent judge, in fixing the amount of bail at P50,000.00ISSUE: Whether the right to bail may, under certain circumstances, be denied to a person who is charged with an otherwise bailable offense, and whether such right may be waived.HELD:The Court agree with the respondent court that bail cannot be denied to the private respondent for he is charged with the crime of rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to which is attached the penalty of prision mayorand a fine not exceeding P20,000.00.It is, therefore, abailable offenseunder Section 13 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution.NOTE: Therefore, before conviction bail is either a MATTER OF RIGHT or of DISCRETION.BAIL A MATTER OF RIGHT. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower thanreclusion perpetua.To that extent the right is absolute. No need for prosecution to present evidence as to denial of such right.The 1987 Constitution strengthens further the right to bail by explicitly providing that it shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpusis suspended. This overturns the Court's ruling inGarcia-Padilla vs.Enrile, et al.,supra.BAIL A MATTER OF DISCRETION. if the offense charged is punishable byreclusion perpetua. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. LIMITATIONS OF COURTS DISCRETION. The court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong.But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right.HEARING TO FIX BAIL. Erroneous for the respondent court to fix the bond at P30,000.00, then later at P50,000.00 without hearing the prosecution. The guidelines for the fixing of the amount of bail provided for in Section 10 (now sec. 9) of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court are not matters left entirely to the discretion of the court.We agree with Petitioner that private respondent has, however, waived his right to bail in G.R. No. 76009. The petition forhabeas corpuswill be withdrawn by petitioners and Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be immediately released but shall appear at the trial of the criminal case for rebellion. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial before the court having custody over his person. simply meant that Rodolfo Salas, herein respondent, will REMAIN IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF THE COURT, or in actual confinement or detention, as distinguished from the stipulation concerning petitioners.Consequently, havingagreedin G.R. No. 76009 to remain in legal custody, private respondent had unequivocably waived his right to bail. IS SUCH WAIVER VALID? Art. 6 of the CC states: Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.WAIVER: "a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed.DOCTRINE OF WAIVER. Extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since the word "waiver" covers every conceivable right. GR: that a person may waive any matter which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with statute or guaranteed by constitution,provided such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy.2 CLASSES OF RIGHTS (Commonwealth vs.Petrillo): (a) those in which the state, as well as the accused, is interested (NOTE: cannot be waived); (b) those which are personal to the accused, which are in the nature of personal privileges (can be waived).This Court has recognized waivers of constitutional rights such as, for example, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures;the right to counsel and to remain silent;and the right to be heard. RIGHT TO BAIL CAN BE WAIVED. It is a right which is PERSONAL to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.The respondent Judge then clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting bail to the private respondent. (should not have allowed to bail since such right is waived)RULING: ORDERS OF JUDGE PEOPLE v. SALAS, et al. NULLIFIED.PEOPLE v. FORTESFACTS:Agustin Fortes y Garra convicted for the rape of a young of only 13, [a] sixth grade pupil, bred in a barangay of rural atmosphere, and the denial by the trial court of his application for bail pending his appeal from the judgment of conviction are questioned in these consolidated cases.In 25 January 1989, found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetuaand pay the victim the sum of P20,000.00 to answer for damages and costs.Agripino Gine accompanied his 13-year old daughter, Merelyn, to the police station of the said municipality to report a rape committed against the latter by the accused at around 11:00 o'clock in the morning of that day. Following this, the accused was forthwith apprehended.The bond for the latter's temporary liberty was initially fixed at P30,000.00 but was later reduced to P25,000.00upon motion of the accused. The latter then put up the required bond; upon its approval, the court ordered his release on 15 December 1983.On 5 December 1984, the accused, through his counselde oficio, informed the court that he was waiving his right thereto. HELD:No merit. Crime is punishable by rec. perpetua (hence a bail is a matter of discretion; The court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right).IMPLICATION: Accused who is charged with a crime punishable byreclusion perpetua, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. Bail must not then be granted to the accused during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment of conviction.(NOTE: Accused no longer entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he APPEALS the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong.)IN THE CASE AT BAR: the rape for which the accused was indicted is punishable byreclusion perpetuapursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code; he was convicted therefor and subsequently sentenced to serve that penalty. It is thus evident that the trial court correctly denied his application for bail during the pendency of the appeal.Moreover, the appellant has not shown that the complainant and her father were actuated by any ulterior motives which could have induced them to falsely implicate him in the commission of the crime.RULING: Increased indemnity; Appeal deniedB/GEN. COMENDADOR, et al. v. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, et al.FACTS:Petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged participation in the failedcoup d' etatthat took place on December 1 to 9, 1989. CHARGES: violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder).Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel had been constituted pursuant to Office Order No. 16 dated January 14, 1990, TO INVESTIGATE THE PETITIONERS IN G.R. NOS. 93177 AND 96948. The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated January 30, 1990, individually addressed to the petitioners.CONTENTION: There was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of War 71 (No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a thorough and impartial investigation thereof shall have been made..)In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by GCM No.14. . After considering the petition and the answer thereto filed by the president and members of GCM No.14, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an order granting provisional liberty to Ligot.RTC: bail - the assailed orders of General Court- Martial No. 14 denying bail to petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken assumption that bail does not apply to military men facing court-martial proceedings on the ground that there is no precedent, are hereby set aside and declared null and void.Private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with this Court a petition forhabeas corpuson the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.InG.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were given several opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial investigation The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been denied due process because the investigation was resolved against them owing to their own failure to submit their counter-affidavits.There is SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE with Article of War 71 by the PTI Panel. Moreover, it is now settled that "even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court- martial of jurisdiction.PRE-TRIAL INVESTIGATION is that it is directory, not mandatory, and in no way affects the jurisdiction of a court-martial. Pre-trial investigation is NOT an indispensable pre-requisite to the exercise of the Army General court martial jurisdiction.A trial before a general court-martial convened without any pretrial investigation under article of war 71 would of course be altogether irregular but the court-martial might nevertheless have jurisdiction. Absence of preliminary investigation does not go into the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings.Article of War GCM: The President of the Philippines, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Chief of Constabulary and, when empowered by the President, the commanding officer of a major command or task force, the commanding officer of a division, the commanding officer of a military area, the superintendent of the Military Academy, the commanding officer of a separate brigade or body of troops may appoint general courts-martial.PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE. Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War), as amended by Rep. Act No. 242, on June 12, 1948. Members of general or special courts-martial MAY BE CHALLENGED by the accused or the trial judge advocate for cause stated to the court. The court shall determine the relevancy and validity thereof, and shall not receive a challenge to more than one member at a time. Challenges by the trial judge advocate shall ordinarily be presented and decided before those by the accused are offered. Each side shall be entitled to the peremptory challenge, but the law member of the court shall not be challenged except for cause.History: Martelino v. Alejandro (there was a complete dearth of officers learned in military law, its aside from the fact that the officer corps of the developing army was numerically made equate for the demands of the strictly military aspects of the national defense program; Because of these considerations it was then felt that peremptory challenges should not in the meanwhile be permitted and that only challenges for cause, in any number, would be allowed.)On September 27,1972, President Marcos issued General Order No. 8, empowering the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as may be referred to them.On November 7,1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters relevant to military Tribunals). This decree disallowed the peremptory challenge.With the TERMINATION OF MARTIAL LAW and the dissolution of the military tribunals created thereunder, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically. STATCON: that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex.This principle is also expressed in the maximratio legis est anima:the reason of law is its soul.RIGHT TO BAIL IN MILITARY AN EXCEPTION .We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where we observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.RATIONALE: it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from the people. All other insurgent elements carry out their activities outside of and against the existing political system. National security considerations should also impress upon this Honorable Court that release on bail of respondents constitutes a damaging precedent.But, the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court, and replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of government and justice.NOT VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTETION. The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians.RULING: G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is GRANTED, and the respondents are DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under Article 18 of the Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also GRANTED, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.BAYLON v. J.UDGE SISONFACTS:This present admin matter was initiated by City Prosecutor Alicia A. Baylon charging Judge Deodoro J. Sison, presiding judge of RTC Dagupan w/ utter disregard of judicial decorum by excessive display of interest in handling a case assigned to and then pending in his branch. This letter is sent to Chief Prosecutor Fernando P. de Leon Court for appropriate action.People v. Manolo Salcedo, et al.Prosecutor Office filed a case re double murder against several accused and thereafter raffled to respondent judge. Accused then filed a petition for reinvestigation w/c was granted by the SC.

However, during the pendency of reinvestigation, accused filed a petition for bail and requested that it be set for hearing. However, this was opposed by the prosecution on the bases of the sworn statements of several eyewitnesses to the incident which constitutes CLEAR and CONVINCING EVIDENCE of the guilt of the accused; and that the accused should wait for the outcome of the reinvestigation.Then a hearing was conducted purportedly held by the RTC. And on the basis of the joint counter-affidavit of the accused, and allegedly w/o objection on the part of prosecution, the court forthwith granted bail for his provisional liberty in the amount of P40k.A motion for reconsideration of said order was duly filed by the prosecution but the same was denied by the respondent judge. WHY? He granted the bail ostensibly AFTER DUE HEARING AND AFTER A CAREFUL AND DELIBERATE CONSIDERATION OF THE PERTINENT PAPERS OF BOTH PARTIES.These orders (granting bail and the denial of the reconsideration) became the subject of a petition for certiorari. There was another accused , Roberto Untalan who was denied motion for respondent judge to inhibit himself from the case contending that such act of the judge had invited serious doubt re impartial disposition of this case. CONTENTION of Private complainants: alleged that respondent judge failed to give notice of at least 3 days before scheduled hearing; Asst. City Prosecutor Rosito Castro who happened to be present during said hearing was NOT authorized to appear for and in behalf of the prosecution or to comment on the proceeding of the bail.ANSWER OF JUDG RE CONTENTION: That petitioner never asked for opportunity to show that the evidence of guilt against the accused was strong and that asst. prosecutor raised no question and instead left the matter in the sound discretion of the court. (motion to inhibit was said to be a forum shopping)Respondent judge stands charged with the familiar malfeasance of granting bail in a non-bailable offense w/o notice and hearing. He alleged that the lack of previous notice was CURED by the filing of the MR. (This admin matter was referred to the Office of Court Admin but still unresolved).

HELD:LACK OF SUFFICIENT NOTICE. Since the petition for bail was filed in the court on a Saturday, and was craftily set for a hearing on a Monday, prosecution, in effect was given only one day, Sunday, to prepare opposition thereto. This, the respondent judge, condoned, and aggravated by the unusual and precipitate haste w/ which the petition was granted.The judge exacerbated his deisregard of settled rule of procudere by justifying non-observance of 3-day notice as under Sec.4, Rule 15 of the RC on the theory: petition of bail is an urgent motion and may therefore be heard on shorter notice. Given this, the judge should have carefully scrutinized the validity of the petition for bail and its veracity (since it is not a matter of right when offense is punishable by death, rec. perpetua or life imprisonment.)2 MAIN ARGUMENTS OF ACCUSED: 1. Grant of bail to the accused was of the essence considering that the accused had been detained since Oct. 19912. Prosecution failed to interpose an objection granting the bail and to ask for an opportunity to prove the strength of the evidence of guilt against the accused.FIRST ARGUMENT: REJECTED. First, the accused were charged w/ double murder and thus bail is not a matter of right. Second, no bail was recommended in the info w/c was filed on the bases of the sworn statement. Third, reinvestigation was at the instance of the accused themselves, hence any delay is naturally and logically attributable to them. Finally, guileful setting of the hearing for petition for bail casts doubt.Code of Judicial Conduct: requires judges toa ct w/ competence integrity, independence, and should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.ERRONEOUS DECISION IN GOOD FAITH (defense by judge) may be negated by the circumstances on record.NOTE: Bail in this case being a matter of right, must be addressed to the sound discretion of the court. IN THE CASE AT BAR, a LUBRICIOUS and UNTRAMMELED exercise of discretion was made. BAIL as a MATTER OF DISCRETION: Prosecution must be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because by their very nature, evidence need be weighed.As a matter of law, discretion of the court, in cases involving capital offenses may be exercised only after there has been a hearing called to ascertain the weight of the evidence against the accused.SECOND ARGUMENT. Accdg to the him, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to seek permission from the RTC to prove evidence of guilt and if it failed to do so, respondent judge was left w/ no other recourse but to grant the app for bail.WELL-SETTLED: When an accused is charged w/ serious offense punishable w/ rec.perpetua to death, such as murder, BAIL MAY BE GRANTED ONLY AFTER MOTION FOR THAT PURPOSE HAS BEEN FILED AND A HEARING THEREON CONDUCTED BY THE JUDGE TO DETERMINE W/N the EVIDENCE FOR ACCUSED IS STRONG. (MUST BE GIVEN REASONABLE TIME)NOTE: In granting or refusing bail, summary of the evidence offered by the prosecution needed.HEARING-MANDATORY. As such, there must be searching and clarificatory questions from which the court may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or lack of it, against the accused.In Borinaga v. Tamin, etc., the Court held that where the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the court may ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the strength of the Peoples evidence.In Tucay v. Damagas, stated that although there was no objection by prosecutor, the respondent judge should have nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing and diligently ascertained from the prosecution was not really contesting the bail app.AFTER CAREFUL PERUSAL OF RECORDS: only the evidences presented by the defense appear and prosecution was not given the chance to cross-examine the accused on their counter-affidavit. RULING: JUDGE GUILTY OF GROSS IGNORANCE OF LAW AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; ORDERED TO PAY P 20K W/ STERN WARNING.MANOTOC v. CA

FACTS:Petitioner Ricardo Manotoc, jr. is one of the 2 principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Mgt.Inc. and Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house. The mgt of the latter was transferred into the hand of professional men, he holds no officer-position in said business, but acts as of forme corp.Petitioner (came home from U.S) filed w/ his co-stockholders a petition w/ the SEC for the appointment of a mgt committee for both companies. SEC requested the then Commissioner of Immigration, Edmundo Reyes, not to clear petitioner for the departure and a memorandum was issued.When a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc securities was suspected to be a facke, 6 f its clients filed criminal complaints against petitioner and one Raul Leveriza, Pres. and VP of said company. Charges of estafa were filed but admitted to bail for 105,000.00 w/ an insurance company as surety.Petitioner then filed a motion for permission to leave the country stating his desire to go to the US relative to his business transactions and opportunities. But such motion was denied.CONTENTION: Having admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts w/c granted him bail nor the SEC has no jurisdiction over his liberty to prevent him from exercising his right to travel.ISSUE: Does a person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally released on bail have an unrestricted right to travel?HELD:Petitioners contention is untenable. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail form leaving the Phils. This is a NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE of the nature and function of a bail bond.RULE 114, SEC. 1 of RC, defines BAIL security reqd and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in w/c his appearance may be reqd as stipulate in the bail bond or recognizance.This condition is a VALID RESTRICTION on the petitioners right to travel. As per People v. Uy Tuising: Not to prohibit the said accused would otherwise make said orders and processes NUGATORY inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issues does NOT extend that of the Phils (no more binding force) ergo, he may be placed BEYOND the reach of courts if allowed to leave.EFFECT OF BAIL. To transfer the custody of the accused from public officials keepers of his own selection. Such custody has been regarded merely as continuation of the original imprisonment. Also, the sureties become invested w./ full authority over the person of the principal and have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state. If the sureties have the right to do so, more so then has the court from whcich sureties derive such right.In Shepherd case, the accused was able to show urgent necessity and the conforme of her sureties satisfied the court that she would comply w/ the conditions of her bail bond.FOR THE PETITIONER: There was no urgent or compelling reason to be discerned to justify the grant of judicial imprimatur. The court cannot allow the accused to leave the country w/o assent of his surety bec, in accepting a bail bond, the govt impliedly agrees that it will not take any proceedings w the prinicipal that will increase the risks of the sureties or affect their remedies against it.RIGHT TO TRAVEL IS NOT AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT. RULING: PETITION DISMISSED.

GOVT OF U.S v. JUDGE PURGANANFACTS:In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and hearing before warrants for their arrest can be issued? Are they entitled to right to ail and provisional liberty while such proceedings are pending? NO. Explained in the decisionThis is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the RC seeking to set aside Orders by the RTC. First Order assailed is re set hearing for issuance for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez. The second one directed the issuance of a warrant and at the same time granted bail to Jimenez. (The latter is directed to surrender passport and the likewise included in the Hold-Departure List)Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the Bail Order, cancellation of the bond, and taking Jimenez to legal custody.AntecedentsThis petition is a sequel to Sec. of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion. Accdg to RP-US extradition treaty, the U.S Govt, thru diplomatic channels, sent to the Phil Govt Note dated 1999 requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, aka Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the notes and docs, Sec. of foreign affairs transmitted them to the secretary of justice for appropriate action (Sec. 5, PD 1609, aka Extradition Law).Jimenez was granted TRO w/c was assailed by SOJ in a Petition before the Court. But w/ a vote of 9-6 after justices changed their votes - it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. Held: Private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. Since there is no more legal obstacle, Govt of US, represented by DOJ, field w/ RTC Petiiton for Extradtiion. WHY? Alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by US District Court for the Southern District of Florida re CONSPIRACY to defraud the US, TAX EVASION, WIRE FRAUD, FALSE STATEMENTS, ILLEGAL CAMPAIGN DISTRIBUTION.Judge directed issuance of a WoA and fixed bail for P1M and granted provisional liberty. Hence, this petition.CONTENTION: In case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of 100kISSUES: 1. W/N Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued2. W/N he is entitled to bail and provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings ar are pending.

HELD:Petition is meritorious. Contention of the SOJ: Assailed orders by the judge is a patent nullity, absent factual and legal basis therefor; need for relief is extremely urgent for the accuseds ample opportunity to escape.5 POSTULATES of EXTRADITION:NOTE: Cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ASCERTAIN and give effect to its INTENT.1. Extradition is Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime- extradition treaties intended to SUPPRESS a crime by facilitating arrest and custodial transfer of a fugitive from one state to the other. (because flight of criminals has become more frequent w/ advent of easier and faster means of intl travel).- extradition is a major effective instrument of intl co-operation in the suppression of crime. It is the only regular system that has been devised to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a competent court in accordance w/ municipal and intl law. (PRACTICAL EFFECT: Reduction of criminals seeking refuge abroad) 2. The requesting State will accord due process to the accused.- extradition treaty presupposes both have examined each others legal sys. and judicial process. OUR REPS SIGNATURE IN THE TREATY: signifies our confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of the person sought to be extradited. (signifies our full faith that the accused will be given ALL RELEVANT AND BASIC RIGHTS in a criminal proceedings.3. The proceedings are sui generis.- as pointed out in SOJ v. Lantion, extradition proceedings are NOT criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings, constitutional rights are at fore, in extradition it is not.NOTE: In criminal proceedings, it will call into operation all the rights of the accused in Bill of Rights. The process of extradition does NOT involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused.EXTRADITIONCRIMINAL

Summary in natureFull-blown trial

Rules of evidence allow admission of evidence under less stringent standardsProof BRD; fugitive may be ordered extradited upon showing of prima facie evidence

Our courts may adjudge an individual extaditable but the Pres. has the final discretion to extradite him.Executory when rendered final

From the above, it is evident that extradition court is NOT called upon to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the person sought to be extradited. (Since it will only cause needless duplication and delay). Extradition is merely a measure of intl judicial assistance through w/c a person charged or convicted of a crime is RESTORED to jurisdiction w/the best claim to try that person.ERGO, ULTIMATE PURPOSE OF EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS IN COURT: TO DETERMINE W/N EXTRADITION REQUEST COMPLIES W/ THE EXTRADITION TREATY AND WHETHER PERSON SOUGHT IS EXTRADITABLE.4. Compliance shall be in good faith.- Executive branch voluntarily entered into such and our leg. Branch ratified it. Hence, it carries presumption that its implementation will serve the NATIONAL INTEREST.- Fulfilling our obligations promotes: COMITY. Such failure would discourage other states from entering treaties w/ us particularly on extradition treaties wc hinges on reciprocity. - PACTA SUNT SERVANDA. This principle requires that we deliver the accused to the requesting party if the conditions precedent to the extradition are SATISFIED. 5. There is an underlying risk of flight- Persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks (nothing short of confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart extradition to requesting state)- Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit a trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of respondent: left the US right before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there. Having fled once, there can now be an opportunity for his fleeing the second time.ISSUE #1: IS RESPONDENT ENTITLED TO NOTICE AND HEARING BEFORE ISSUANCE OF WoA? NO.SEC. 6, PD 1069: The presiding judge may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest should he found reasons to best serve ends of justice. After receipt of warrant or failure to answer presiding judge SHALL HEAR the case or set another date for hearing. RTC Judge Purganans acts cannot be sanctioned for immediately setting a hearing re Woa.1. On the bas