Sectarianism and the Syrian Uprising

7/30/2019 Sectarianism and the Syrian Uprising

1/9

Sectarianism and the Syrian Uprising

By Edith Szanto

Contents

Introduction ............................................................................................................................. - 1 -

Background of the Uprising .................................................................................................... - 1 -

Sectarianism and the Uprising ................................................................................................ - 3 -

The Shrine of Sayyida Zaynab ................................................................................................ - 5 -

Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. - 7 -

Endnotes .................................................................................................................................. - 8 -


2/9

- 1 -

Introduction

When the Syrian Uprising broke out in mid-March 2011, experts who did not necessarily

agree with Bashar al-Asads government, but who nevertheless valued stability, warned of

sectarian conflict. Supporters of the Uprising dismissed these fears and claimed that patriotism

would trump ethnic and sectarian identities. Two years later, sectarianism has indeed emerged as

a major, though certainly not the only, issue at stake. Other divides include class differences and

rural-urban divides. Generally, I look at the intersection of sectarianism and violence during the

current Syrian Uprising, though I will also comment on the impact of other socio-economic

schisms.

First, I will provide an overview of the Syrian population and explain the main religious

alliances before 2011. Secondly, I will recount the history of sectarianism in Syria starting with

the French Mandate. Let me note that although I only look at the twentieth century here, it

should be noted that sectarian differences have always existed in the Levant. Thirdly, I draw

attention to the case of Twelver Shiis, many of whom lived in the Syrian shrine-town of Sayyida

Zaynab merely fifteen kilometers south of Damascus. My talk concludes by noting a couple of

scenarios regarding how sectarianism may affect the future of Syria.

Background of the Uprising

The economic conditions which frame the Urpising spring from the fact that

Rural Syria was hit by a major drought from 2007-10. [As] the peasantry was hithard, Assads inept government exacerbate[ed] matters through mismanagementof agricultural resources and corruption. This prompted a wave of migration fromthe countryside to the over-crowded cities. Syria, like many Arab states, hadwitnessed a demographic boom in the 1980s that brought a glut of youth to thelabour market that the economy could not accommodate. J ust when more jobswere needed, Assads reforms actually shrank the labour market further. 1


3/9

- 2 -

These economic changes further resulted in class divisions, as well as urban-rural divides

which in turn affected the Uprising. At a conference on Syria at the University of Denver less

than two months ago, the journalist Stephen Starr explicated that in the current Uprising, the

silent majority consists of middle and upper middle class urban Syrians. 2 He notes that while

the recent droughts have forced peasants to migrate to poor suburbs, where the protests began,

urban Syrians, especially those who benefitted from the states economic policies mainly want

the Uprising to end. They dont care who wins. 3 For them, the Uprising is an obstacle and a

nuisance. It hinders them from travelling outside Damascus because the proliferation of check-

points has made travelling time-consuming and taxing.As the states economy shrank, the Baath Party and the armys funding decreased, the

influence of the ruling party lessened. At the same time, Bashar al-Asad broke with his fathers

dedication to support Shiism and secularism and allowed, maybe even encouraged, conservative

Sunnism to flourish. For example, the previously banned conservative Sunni womens

Qubaysiyyat group was permitted to spread by 2006. This trend towards piety in Syria mirrors

similar developments across the region. Thomas Pierret from the University of Edinburgh

attributes the fact that the first demonstrations made Sunni references and spatially extended

from mosques to this growing piety. 4 Yet, Pierret emphasizes that even though pious language

and symbolism pervaded these early demonstrations, they cannot be labeled as Islamist

because they did not articulate an Islamist agenda. Nevertheless, since then, there has been a

proliferation of militias, some of which are more and some of which are less Islamist in their

demands. In part, Pierret blames the lack of US and European support for the opposition for the

growing popularity of Islamists.


4/9

- 3 -

Currently, Syria consists of 70% Arab Sunnis, 15% Alawis, 5% Christian, 3% Druze, one

percent Ismaili Shiis, and one percent Twelver Shiis. 5 There are 10% Kurds, who are mainly

Sunni but do not necessarily support Arab Sunnis. In the past, Ismailis have sided with Sunnis,

while Alawis have sided with Twelver Shiis. These alliances were already visible during riots

around Homs in 2005. While Christians are more likely to live in the major cities, Damascus

and Aleppo, the Druze, Alawis, and Ismailis are much more likely to live in the country-side. 6

These divides complicate alliances and common perceptions. Not all minorities have sided with

the Syrian government: most notably, Ismailis have joined the opposition, while many city

dwelling Christians simply want the conflict to end so that they may continue with their lives.

Sectarianism and the Uprising

While religious differences have always played a role in the Levant, it was the French

who institutionalized these divisions in the twentieth century. The French used these divisions in

order to justify their rule by portraying themselves as the protectors of minorities, especially

Maronite Christians. To protect Maronites, they created Lebanon in 1920, and by 1922, they had

divided Syria into four distinct states: the state of Damascus, the state of Aleppo, Jabal Druze in

the south, and an Alawite state on the coast. In 1924, the French bureaucratically reunited the

state of Damascus and the state of Aleppo, which in effect

isolated the Druze and the Alawis from national politics and ensured thatwhatever Syrian political life might exist would be dominated by a propertied and

conservative class of urban Sunni Muslims. The destructive political instabilitythat came to characterize Syria after independence in 1946 must be traced, in part,to the institutionalized fragmentation practiced by the French mandateauthorities. 7

Concurrently, the French founded a military academy, which became a way for

marginalized ethnic groups and the poor to enter political life. The same happened in Egypt and


5/9

- 4 -

Iraq. It was through the military that the Alawi Hafez al-Asad and his associates were able to

rise above their modest origins, through the ranks of the armed forces, and finally take over the

government. Moreover, the religious and political marginalization of Alawis also explains why

they heralded the secular ideology of the Baath party, which was founded by a Christian, a

Sunni and notably an Alawi, Zaki al-Arsuzi.

Under the Baath, post 1963, Hafez al-Asad promoted both ethnic and religious

minorities. For instance, he instituted Ahmad Kuftaro, a Kurd, as the grand mufti of Syria.

Kuftaro proved his loyalty to Asad when he stood up to the urban Sunni Arab religious elites of

Damascus and backed by backing the regime during the 1970s when the Muslim Brotherhoodattempted to instigate rebellions. This alliance between Kuftaro and Asad complicates the

presumption of simplistic Alawi-Sunni cleavages.

Kuftaro was not the only Muslim leader who supported Hafez al-Asad in the 1970s. In

1974, the Lebanese Shii cleric Musa al-Sadr gave a fatwa which declared Alawis Shiis. This

fatwa marked the beginning of the alliance between Twelver Shiis and Alawis. At the same

time, it positioned Ismailis in opposition to Alawis and aligned Ismailis with Sunnis. Again,

this complicates the assumption that all minorities back the Alawi Syrian regime.

As in Lebanon, sectarian divisions have made Syria receptive to external influences. For

instance, Saudi Arabia has and continues to fund Sunni militias, while Iran funds Shii militias

(including Alawi ones). Before the rise of Saudi Arabia and Iran, it was the Soviet Union and

the United States which funded and armed their respective allies in the Middle East during the

Cold War. Proxy-wars, in other words, have always played a role in the region. At the same

time, this does not mean that all trouble-makers come from the outside, as the Syrian regime

claims these days. Moreover, as Thomas Pierret notes, the funding which Saudi Arabia and the


6/9

- 5 -

other Gulf countries are currently channeling to the rebels are rather minimal, which has forced

the rebels to come up with creative solutions. 8 Of course, this raises questions: What constitutes

minimal funding? And from the rebels point of view, how much would be enough?

In terms of outside influences, there are Iran and Saudi Arabia. Bashars fathers friends,

China and Russia, continue to support the regime. In terms of the West, France is currently the

only vocal supporter of the rebel forces. One may well deduce that France is counting on the

regime to fall and wants to ensure its continued political and economic interests in its former

colony. As for the United States and Germany, they have cautioned against selling weapons to

the rebels, which puts them in an interesting position. Let me elaborate: The Nusra Front is oneof the most controversial Islamist groups which has sprung up over the last year. Three months

ago, the United States State Department blacklisted the Nusra Front. Designating al-Nusra as a

terrorist group means US authorities can freeze any assets the group or its members have in US

jurisdictions. It also prohibits US citizens from giving it any material support. 9 Through its ban,

the US echoes the language of the Syrian government which calls the rebels terrorists. On the

one hand, it is ironic that they use the same terminology. On the other hand, it reveals the US

intention not to get involved militarily.

The Shrine of Sayyida Zaynab

Personally, I am particularly interested in the shrine-town of Sayyida Zaynab. It was the

field-site for my doctoral research from 2007 to 2010. Located around 15 kilometers south of Damascus, the town is named after the saint buried at its center: Sayyida Zaynab, the

granddaughter of Prophet Muhammad, daughter of Fatima and the first Shii Imam Ali. There

is another shrine that claims to hold the remains of Sayyida Zaynab in Cairo and it is mainly


7/9

- 6 -

Sunnis who visit her there, while in Syria her shrine was popular among Twelver Shiis.

Zaynabs shrine rose to prominence in the 1970s when it became difficult for devotees to visit

the Iraqi shrine-towns of Najaf and Karbala, where Zaynabs father and brothers are buried.

Until 1948 when Palestinian refugees were settled in the area, the shrine stood in the

midst of olive groves. Less than two decades later, internally displaced Syrians from the Golan

Heights came and doubled the size of the shrine-town. From the early 1970s, Iraqi Shiis fleeing

violence in the Iraqi shrine-city of Karbala took refuge in Sayyida Zaynab. In 1973, the exiled

Iraqi Ayatollah Hasan Shirazi built the first Shii seminary roughly 200 meters north of the

shrine.10

When the Syrian Uprising intensified in Sayyida Zaynab in 2012, the first cleric whowas shot and killed was the representative of Hasan Shirazis seminary. 11

After 2003, waves of Iraqi refugees flooded the town. Many stayed for a couple of years

and attended seminary classes. Others wanted to live near the shrine in order to benefit from

Zaynabs healing powers, before they moved on.

Aside from Iraqis, Palestinians, and Golani Syrian, rural elderly Iranians were a common

sight in Sayyida Zaynab before the Uprising. They came on pilgrimage seeking Sayyida

Zaynabs blessings and combined their visits with shopping tours, as Syria offered relatively

affordable goods. Other seasonal visitors included Shiis from the Gulf countries who sought

respite from the summer heat and combined their vacations with religious summer classes for

their children.

All of this changed with the Syrian Uprising. It is difficult to tell what happened exactly.

However, it is clear that that Sunnis and Shiis have turned on one another. Even Iraqi Sunnis

and Iraqi Shiis have joined opposing sides in Syria. As the violence increased, Shiis began to

leave. In the spring of 2012, Sunni rebels captured Iranian visitors (though some insisted they


8/9

- 7 -

were fighters). 12 Since then, the number of Shiis has dwindled. Most Iraqi refugees in Syria

have left some have gone back to I raq, others have tried to smuggle their way into Europe.

On the one hand, they left because of generalized violence. On the other hand, many

reported that they were individually threatened and told to leave, similarly to the way the Jaysh

al-Mahdi has dealt with Sunnis and former Baath Party members in Baghdad. 13 Also, the shrine

itself was hit by car bombs at least twice in 2012: once in June and again in October. 14

In the vicinity of Sayyida Zaynab, there are several more Palestinian camps. In

Yarmouk, located between the shrine-town and Damascus, shootings and fighting occurred

regularly throughout 2012. Some Palestinians have sided with the government. Others havesided with the rebels. Last month, rebels hung two Palestinians in public for aiding the regime. 15

This illustrates how divided the Palestinian community is in Syria.

Conclusion

Unfortunately, I cannot offer solutions. Whether or not the US or others get involved, I

am afraid the killings will continue. Syria expert, J oshua Landis offers three possible scenarios:

the Lebanon model, the Iraq model, and the Turkish model. Both the Iraqi and the Lebanese

models predict a prolonged civil war before a power-sharing arrangement can be reached. The

Turkish model predicts ethnic cleansing. Bashar al-Asad cannot simply let go of power, because

similarly to some other minorities in the Middle East, the Alawis have everything to lose. This

means there will be more violence.16

When will it likely end? According to historian Juan Cole, the regime will only fall if the capital

rises. 17 However, given that the Damascene upper and middle classes have much to lose should

they rise up, it is difficult to say when and how that will happen if at all.


9/9

- 8 -

Endnotes

1 Christopher Phillips, Syrias Bloody Arab Spring After the Arab Spring: Power Shift in the Middle East?(London: LSE IDEAS Special Report, May 2012), 2.2 The Assad Regime & the Evolving Dynamics of the Opposition, University of Denver, 23 January 2013(accessed 10 March 2013).3 Ibid.4 Ibid.5 Library of Congress Country Studies: Syria Religious Life, April 1987 (accessed 10 March 2013); What Would a Post-Assad Syria LookLike? University of Denver, 23 January 2013 (accessed 10March 2013).6 The Assad Regime & the Evolving Dynamics of the Opposition.7 William Cleveland and Martin Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East , 4 th edition (Philadelphia: WestviewPress, 2009), 222.8 The Assad Regime & the Evolving Dynamics of the Opposition.9 US blacklists Syrian rebel group al-Nusra, Al-J azeera , 11 December 2012(accessed 9 March 2013).10 Sabrina Mervin, Sayyida Zaynab, Banlieue de Damas ou nouvelle ville sainte chiite? (Sayyida Zaynab, a suburb

of Damascus or a new Shiite holy city?) in Cahiers dEtudes sur la Mediterrane Orientale et le Monde Turco-Iranien: Arabes et Iraniens , vol. 22 (1996), 149-162. Electronic document,(accessed 23 March 2009).11 Head of Hawza e Zainabia Martyred By Target Killing in Syria, J afrian News , 15 April 2012 (accessed 20April 2012).12 The Iranian pilgrims were later released. Fate of 18 Iranian citizens abducted in Syria remains unknown, Press

TV (accessed 21 March, 2011); Babak Dehghanpisheh, Iranianpilgrims kidnapped in Syrian capital as fighting flares anew, Washington Post , 4 August 2012(accessed 24 August 2012). 13 Lara Jakes, Iraqi refugees flee Syria to avoid sectarian revenge, Times of Israel , 31 July 2012 (accessed 24 August 2012);

Ryan Villarreal, Refugees, Twice: Iraqis in Syria Displaced Again by Conflict, International Business Times , 26 July 2012 (accessed 24 August 2012).14 Bomb attack targeting Syrian holy shrine leaves 14 people wounded, Press TV , 14 June 2012 (accessed 24 August2012); Syria jets bomb rebel strongholds in Damascus and north, BBC News , 31 October 2012(accessed 10 March 2013).15 Syrian rebels hang two collaborators, Al-Akhbar English , 3 March 2013 (accessed 10 March 2013).16 What Would a Post-Assad Syria Look Like?17 Syria and the US: The complicity of silence, Al-J azeera , 30 J anuary 2013(accessed 10 March 2013).

Sectarianism and the Syrian Uprising

Documents

Transcript of Sectarianism and the Syrian Uprising