Secretary Wynne Pieces on the F-35 and Related Issues

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Table of Contents

Reset, Rebuild, Rethink US Defense Security! 3

A GLOBAL ENABLER: AMERICAN AIR POWER IN THE NEXT PART OF THE 21ST CENTURY! 8

THE ROLE OF THE US AIR FORCE IN THE FUTURE FIGHT! 21

THE UNITED STATES AT A KEY TURNING POINT: THE CORE NECESSITY FOR A MILITARY REBUILDING STRATEGY! 33

SHAPING THE WOLFPACK: LEVERAGING THE 5TH GENERATION REVOLUTION! 40

ENABLING THE TIP OF THE SPEAR: RE-FOCUSING THE USAF!46

“DEMOCRATIZING THE BATTLEFIELD”: THE ROVER EXPERIENCE! 50

LIVING THE TRANSITION: SHAPING THE F-35 MAINTENANCE APPROACH AT EGLIN! 53

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Reset, Rebuild, Rethink US Defense Security

This piece is currently being edited but seems a good lead in to the visit.

Recently; Deputy Secretary Ashton Carter on the News Hour on PBS was very convincing that as the US Military looks to the future; it must turn from the current engagements in the Middle East; and look instead to the greater world threats. He remained concerned about terrorist entities; but felt they could definitely be a smaller part of our planning. As he said clearly; we must look to the future as we make decisions that will affect the next twenty years of American security. Sequestration is not going away; and thus all of this must be done during a period of austerity. In the past we had a forceful leader who is often quoted, Sir Winston Churchill famously opined the 'Now that we are out of money, we must think.' This then is the challenge to the department of defense. Reset the tactical forces worn out from the extended engagement. Rebuild the Strategic and Maritime Force structure to deter and dissuade nation states wanting to impose their will on our freedoms.

Rethink the application of the totality of our force structure and the softer side of our government to interoperate; and 'see' into the near future to develop plans and strategies which accomplish the mission in the most peaceful way possible. As President Reagan once said, 'I never believed that having a strong military was a cause of war; but do believe it is a cause for peace'.

Given the present state of affairs; there is an acceptance that the immediate future will hold more budget reductions driven by sequestration. I note that the Defense Department has requested permission to re-arrange its accounts to minimize furlough days. This amounts to a realization that this is the future.

The Army has begun to identify a general troop force reduction. Though they have yet to identify specific units, they suddenly recognize that they compete with the US Marine Corps for quick strike.

The Navy has realized that the impact will be to fleet size; and have tentatively announced the imminent retirement of two additional Aircraft Carriers; and the pre-mature retirement of the vandalized 688 attack submarine that is nearing its point of no return relative to budget and life expectancy.

The Air Force has limited training, and must consider how to train while deployed. This has not been the plan over the decades of steady deployment. With aspects of Red Flag shut down; and the suspension of the fighter weapons school; the Air Force will need to position itself for a leap into the fifth generation tactics as they symbolically and for budget reasons fold their tent regards fourth generation air combat. With only one gun kill in the storied history of the F-15 Aircraft, and the apparent standoff ranges that are driven by triple digit integrated air defense systems; re-thinking future warfare may be upon them.

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The Marine Corps has uniquely been thinking this way as they stood firm to acquire both the V-22 Osprey; and the F-35B; developing and proofing tactics and techniques that drew a rebuke from the Naval Admirals; and praise from the Secretariat. They had determined that to truly effect the ‘from the sea’ construct, that speed and range were going to be determinant variables. They are still learning how to employ true fifth generation capability; but so far greatly understand the reinvention of ‘Air Assault’.

It is good to see the Air Force, and the support of the DoD in standing firm against the F-35 critics. Though the loss of the F-22 was serious; contemplating the loss of the F-35 capability in series would expose our nation to being second rate.

Admiral Mike Mullin in his earlier role as Chief of Naval operations talked in terms of a 1000 ship Navy; widely interpreted as engaging with allies more fully than before; introducing interoperability and joint defense mechanisms wherein a mixed allied fleet can operate as a unit. With the landing and refuel of the USMC Osprey of a Japanese warship; such concepts are being brought to life. The same construct is even more distinctive with the continued ramp up of the F-35. In the days where the PEO was sniping at his own program; the Pacific group of allies were angling to usurp early delivery slots and early training slots to bring their Air Forces into the 21st century. They watched as competitive air forces rolled out near replica versions of the F-22. With the designed in ‘need to share’ incorporated into the F-35; targets can be pushed onto companion targeting screens bringing into modern operations the interoperable operations practiced between the F-16 and F-15 fighters before, but now available across many more air forces.

Though available technically; these are described tactics and procedures that will require practice and training to be truly instinctive in any future engagement. But, even this aspect appears to be simply a replacement platform for the Fourth Generation. They are decidedly not; as the fifth generation embodies aspects of command and control only dreamed of by the great pilots.

The Air Force has a truly unique opportunity to re-boot the Weapons School curriculum into battle periods. From the analysis of a Red offensive operation against a Blue defending force, one thing rings very clear, the age old theory of mass matters. This is the obvious thought that comes to mind as the USAF is not investing sufficiently in Air Combat platforms, and thus cannot stream enough of them into the battle to tip the scales. Military historians would revel in this outcome that the cleverest of opponents fortified by great technologies falters and is defeated for running out of weapons. This outcome relies on the classic platform versus platform models, giving some credit for massing on their own, but one must consider and train for a Defensive Enterprise. This certainly would nullify analysis where there is no expectation of use of platforms or assets other than the involved air assets. Constructing a defensive enterprise is a clarion call for greater integration, as this is the real outcome of the analysis, calling for additional innovation, given the apparent reduction in Air Combat quantities in the future, and supposing the continued expeditionary requirement for US forces. Using concepts of the

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defensive enterprise, when targets might be passed to surface to air components while the airmen continue to conceal the source of the targeting; and integrate with Naval and Army weaponry to truly own the skies. There is a real need to be convincing that as a platform alone no aircraft can bring enough weapons to the fight as effectively as sharing their acquired targets with others in the defensive enterprise. Clearly; as the effect of future funding takes hold; doing more with less will involve building around the total enterprise. The second battle period; neutralizing the Air space; will involve the Offensive Enterprise. In this second battle period the going in assumption of Integrated Air Defenses, plus sophisticated Air Defenders will complicate the mission. As we reset the battlespace for Joint and Coalition Forces, we as well need to rethink the force application. Here the Air Force can return to its roots, and look to small unit tactics from the Army.

Under current thinking American Planners called for increases the quantity of penetrators to meet global competitors; and for co-opting the Integrated Air Defenses. Given the current forecasts; this will not be achievable and so different strategies, and different tactics will be required to cause the Integrated Air Defenses to expose themselves in ways that allow the penetrators to shape the Battlespace, and as well allow a diversified set of shooters to open or breach the battlespace.

Rethinking, the concept of having your best sensors be the last to shoot will be a key to victory.

Such a concept will be a difficult one as it goes against many years of training to be a first strike asset. Such is the concept of Knowledge as an Asset in Warfare must be embedded in our construct of the Offensive Enterprise for penetration planning.

As this thought series is extended; there might be great utility for which Unmanned or remotely piloted systems might have an exceptionally useful role. The carriage of weapons in fifth generation aircraft is both limited and limiting. Pilots who are the first to launch expose themselves in a dramatic way; and one must presume that once exposed the probability of survival is greatly diminished. Again, one must see Stealth as shelter from the enemy, prolonging the exfiltration of intelligence and reducing the probability of aggregate mission failure; not as a medium to enhance the probability of mission success for the individual fight. Once we make the mental leap; now the Air Battle Manager construct can move into the cockpit where they can become the closed form kill chain and turn the available assortment of weapons to target time within the enemy’s cycle. Given the “re-normed” knowledge-based battle management system shaped by the F-22 and F-35, we need to consider how to best use the legacy assets. There will be long range missiles from the Navy; high speed fighters with long range radars, and in some cases coalition air defenses looking to participate from the ground based sights with all having the simple requirement of a validated target set. For example, the commanders should consider bringing fourth generation to the forward edge of the battle to also act as throw weight in the advanced

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missile sphere; would seem initially unnerving; but might be highly effective as an ‘over the shoulder’ launch; picked up and retargeted by the lead fifth generation aircraft. Once the training takes hold these stealthy fighters will revel in the role as armed scouts; and fire control assets managing the entirety of the battlespace on behalf of the commander.

For positioning commanders can consider the use of legacy fighters in a defense mode as a protective curtain for the Tanker Operation and might even allow the Tanker to double as a router/ retransmission system for exfiltration of battlefield information. They will clearly be identified as soft targets very similarly as Navy oilers were identified in prior wars, then having to be protected by fast Destroyers.

This leads to constructing a Enterprise wide required weapons management plan for any and all available shooters that can reach the battlespace that must be imposed as a target rich environment can easily exhaust and thus waste the see deep capability. As well; spread the assets across the sky as we can to effectively employ the weapons, both in terms of legacy and UAV.

In time they should act in similar ways to ground commanders organizing the ingressing command, making sure that the Central Air Operations Center is distributing targets to other shooters, but protecting his area of operation; keeping his fire teams progressing to the objectives; while saving the best shooters for the end game mission; then as well organizing force withdrawal; hopefully with covering fire from other now ingressing force elements. The third battle period is the introduction of ground combat forces and the learned tactics from the current set of engagements. Whether commencing as the Navy and Marines vision of from the Sea; or derived from the Air Sea Battle Vision scenario; or from the gathering storm of marshalling the Army into the Battlespace; this third period can be very prolonged; or can be foreshortened with calls for cessation or peace. As we've seen from the introduction of Sniper pod and RPV sensors; ground commanders have become aware of and embraced the utility of spherical situation awareness, referred as well as the z - axis to enhance the perimeter defense taught for decades.

Interoperability is a turn of phrase captivated the department of defense for the first decade of the two thousand. It underpins the construct allowing data sharing across multiple platforms and command centers, to include the ground forces. This can require excessive bandwidth; and complex engineering to properly present the incoming information to decision makers and maintain it in context with the displays that are being used on the various platforms and command centers. It contains a Cyber twist; as it will require streams of intelligence as well as operational plans, and logistics to effectively manage the joint and coalition forces in motion.

With the Russian forces having introduced the Cyber domain as an adjunct to ground combat; full integration with theatre commanders will require joint exercises.

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It seem to be time to unveil a fully integrated Joint Operations Requirement Document (JORD) where all activities in support of an action are documented for the Battlespace commander to gain a sense of what when and how around GPS coordinates.

Simple in concept; and imperative in a rapid fire engagement; where target development, verification, and validation will be a multiplayer game. This will be about data taxonomy, and security through data integrity. The phrase every shooter a sensor; and some sensors a shooter accurately frames the notion of leverage in the interoperable third phase of the battle space. Because of the evolving nature of modern warfare; the need to share trumps the need to know; and concepts of horizontal command occur, where low level commanders can task high powered assets to relieve enemy pressure around their position. This leaves battle and theater commanders with ensuring that the proper weaponry is expended; and reserve weaponry is available to confront unknowns which occur with frightening speed.

With the fielding of the F-35, we can take full advantage of the ability to interchange information. This because the aircraft capability will allow the pilot to be a node on the net with an internal router able to receive and transmit information to Air Operation Centers, Air Operation Commanders and Combatant Commanders.

For years, the airforce and ground force commanders have engaged in Green Flag exercises where both learn the requirements for close air support in this changed battlespace for the three dimensional warrior. This needs to be carried forward as a part of the training syllabus, including conflict resolution in the close and deep fight. Now this can be truly enhanced.

The Reset of our forces considers not just the restoration of combat capability but looking forward to a very different battle space. Training for the reset might require returning to a prior age where primary missions for defense, and primary mission for offense were separate elements in the syllabus.

The rebuilding of our forces considers what occurs in boot camp; tearing down concepts of operation; and training for different concepts such that we leverage not just our units forces; but those of our joint and coalition partners. This might require building to a portfolio of capabilities; as well as enhancing the Defensive and Offensive enterprises.

Rethinking is the hardest; and will require straight forward training, as the employment of forces to optimize kills and one weapon for one kill is not the way American forces currently engage. For years we have trained to expend ordnance. In the Navy it is an absolute requirement. But as we introduce the F-35B the threat of an accident is greatly diminished; and weaponry might be better husbanded. First strike will also need to be rethought; as the Army has long discovered in both the Infantry and Artillery, scouts for large unit targets; and Fire placement trumped small unit engagement. Concealment as well trumped exposure.

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Developing the training syllabus has never been more complex, but as our capable Pilots and Commanders have re-learned, operating jointly saves lives. In the future, with diminished apparent force; this will be the key to victory.

A GLOBAL ENABLER: AMERICAN AIR POWER IN THE NEXT PART OF THE 21ST CENTURY

2013-07-18 by Michael W. Wynne, 21st Secretary of the USAF

We are now 13 percent complete of the 21st Century and it is time to really assess what constitutes airpower for this century. 

We have over a century of maturation and have pursued the widest range of complimentary science to augment the notion of flight.  We have gone very slowly, with vertical take-off and landing; we have gone very fast with the breaking of the sound barrier, and the achievement of both commercial and military supersonic transport.

Most of this experimentation was accomplished during the first half century of flight. 

We see cost as an overriding factor which puts the air domain well beyond the scientific realm; and into the context of engineering.

Unfortunately; our consideration of cost (without consideration of context) blinds us to the competitive spirit that might allow a competitive nation state to overtake our capability and thus see themselves in a position to best us in a local or world struggle. 

Or we might simply self-deter for we fear the outcome, and are not certain to prevail.

The OODA Loop AnalogyInterestingly; we are now at the point where we need to assess the Air Power domain; and we should do this in a context.  One feature that we need to emphasize is the underpinning for what all of our Armed Forces are purposed.

We source the Armed Forces from the preamble of the Constitution wherein the proposition of forming our nation was first  ‘To Provide for the common defense.’

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http://www.nwlink.com/~donclark/leadership/ooda.html

Thus we can assess whether we are continuing to accomplish this dominant mission.

As a part of the mission is to preserve to the maximum extent America’s ability to act in its best interest to preserve the nation.  

In that context, let us look at the contribution of the Air Power Domain as a part of the larger Observe, Orient, Decide, Act Loop, which we refer to as the OODA loop which was brought to our attention by John Boyd (From “The Essence of Winning and Losing,” John R. Boyd, January 1996). John even saw his signature achievement of the theory of Energy Maneuverability as an execution element in the larger OODA theory.

Boyd breaks this cycle down to four interrelated and overlapping processes through which one cycles continuously (From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia) :

• Observation: the collection of data by means of the senses• Orientation: the analysis and synthesis of data to form one’s current mental

perspective• Decision: the determination of a course of action based on one’s current mental

perspective• Action: the physical playing-out of decisions

Boyd expanded on this in his later years to be applicable to other aspects of competition.

His lectures would allow for multiple sensor functions delivering the data or converting it into information. Further the lectures took on an academic look at

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mental perspective; allowing for a look into cultural, and genetic as well as other inputs arriving at later stages of the orientation period.   This is then followed by a decision point by an authority determining the course of action based upon their mental accumulation of data converted to information, and sufficient command and control relative to the situation at hand; and then a presumption of guidance and control at achieve the expected effect and cause an action to occur.

The Vision for 2013 was released as the New Chief of Staff was finding the fiscal situation to be very real; so one must consider it aspirational; in spite of the use of the Commanders intent.  That said it is instructive to look at the vision along the continuum of the early Strategic ideas and in light of the intellectual underpinning of the OODA loop.

The Current USAF Vision StatementThe OODA loop baseline will be revisited later to talk about the overall evolution of airpower, but we first need a baseline statement of the current orientation of the USAF.  A way to do this is to look at the key elements highlighted from the recent USAF vision statement.

‘The world’s greatest Air Force – powered by Airmen, fueled by innovation.”

The Air Force’s enduring contributions are rooted in our original roles and responsibilities that were assigned in 1947.

Today we call them:

(1) Air and space superiority;

(2) Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;

(3) Rapid global mobility;

(4) Global strike; and

(5) Command and control.

We already combine our air, space, and cyber forces to maximize these enduring contributions, but the way we execute these five calling cards must continually evolve as we strive to increase our asymmetric advantage.

To strengthen our enduring contributions, the Air Force will:

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• Deter and defeat adversaries with a credible first look, first shot, and first kill capability;

• Hold our adversaries and what they value at risk while operating on a global scale with unmatched joint integration;

• Exploit and defend air, space, and cyberspace, especially in contested environments, while denying our adversaries unrestricted use  of the same;

• Integrate and organize our Active, Reserve, and Guard forces to leverage the unique strengths and perspectives of each to seamlessly execute Air Force missions;

• Enhance relationships and interoperability with our sister Services, other government agencies, allies, and partners;

• Train better Airmen to bring their unique specialties together in more realistic, intense, and diverse environments to advance integrated airpower operations;

• Emphasize readiness to ensure the highest quality force, regardless of size;

• Modernize our capabilities to reduce operating costs while attaining desired effects with greater persistence, survivability, longer range, and more versatile payloads.’

This excerpt allows a future look but it is important to look back to gain some grounding.

It bears noting as well that with Cyber in the Mission of the Air Force; neither the Air Force, nor the Nation possess the capability of superiority; so Cyber struggles as did Air and Space in their formative years to be defined within the domain of warfighting.

Returning to the OODA Loop Analogy Casting the current USAF Air force vision against the underpinnings of the OODA loop is revealing.

ISR and Observe

Strategically; the Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance activity fits nicely into the Observe element, as does the emphasis on Space. This is all about gaining access to information that might otherwise be denied.

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There is also an emphasis on enhancing relationships, and interoperability with our ‘go to war’ partners.  This should, in the era of social media, extend to the area under current analysis; the Observable Data that is captured by all of the flying or orbiting sensors that the ‘go to war’ partners bring.

This is an element that our intelligence services are currently concerned with, the flow of observable data that is shared all around the globe.  The Air Force must raise the awareness of data made available from its fleet; and from allied and sister services fleet of sensors.

For the moment, let us presume that there are plans underway to increase the flow of data and apply advanced data analytics such that our forces can be made aware of all available observable data; and that it can be converted into information that can be made available to commanders and planners.

In this way, for certain, we can fulfill the requirements of step one of the OODA Loop by addressing fully Observe.

As we know this must be an investment stream that can extract maximum knowledge from all the investment the Us has made into ‘see deep’ RADARS; whether they are on flying or space platforms.

The real issue is where does the captured observations go; and how do they contribute to the next step in the OODA Loop? 

Data for data’s sake is hardly the point; better decision making and better risk management is the challenge to be met.

Orient and Training, Readiness and Con-Ops Innovations

In the Orient part of the OODA loop, the Vision emphasizes readiness and training, in two major areas, training for Air Power Exercises; which points to exploring the capabilities, limits and surprise elements that may be available to the engaged forces, on behalf of the commander.

Joint and partner exercises will add to the leverage and agility in the planning cycle.

Clearly, training the decision makers in the capability of their forces is a tricky element as well.  If the US military has capabilities which the decision process or the civilian strategic elites do not understand or do not understand how to use, there is a serious policy gap.

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F-35As flying to the tanker at Eglin AFB 2013. Credit: 33rd Fighter Wing

Concepts for joint effect; such as ‘Extending the reach of AEGIS’ which was published in the Naval proceedings, shows that there is a compounding effect of application of our modern systems is ripe for exploitation, but only if you do so.

Recently, Air Force Commanders were speculating as to the relevance of the international component of a fleet of F-35′s when they realized that in this modern system; it was a social media effectively.

That is, that any relevant data was shared across the reach of the fleet, and therefore could be made available to at least the lead airman. Further it was accomplished machine to machine, and did not require a question and response; but was data pushed from machine to machine.

This advance impinges on Orient at the local level; and could with sufficient transmissibility, alter the Orient view for the Battle Manager; and the Strategic Decision Makers up to and sometimes including the National Command Authority. 

It is good to see the vision point to integration of the usually more experienced Guard and Reserve.  It is relevant to realize that when the order came to neutralize Mr. Zarqawhari in Iraq; it went to a guardsman who was trained and ready to conduct the mission and fulfill the effect requested by the Battle Manager.

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Orientation really goes to the nature of readiness. It is now necessary, but not sufficient to understand readily the capability of the platforms under one’s command but to as well understand the synergy and extension available through the interaction of the various offered platforms from the ‘go to war’ partners.

The discussion on Orientation could extend, as it does during War Games at the Diplomatic level to competitor reactions and moves; but in this look; we will limit ourselves to implementers of Options developed by the National Command Authorities; or to the Engagement commanders.

A key aspect is the use of new combat systems to determine the situational decision making and to shape coalition strike and defense strategies.

Dynamically, the use of fifth generation aircraft as target location systems is not as satisfying to the pilots, but may serve in the role of Army forward observers in concealed locations.  If done fluidly, the flow of information on targets must be near real time, such that the data proves useful to commanders in pressing the plan.

Decide and C2 Dynamics

Thus we come to the point of Decide; and the Decision methodology.

The Vision Statement talks of Command and Control Systems as a paramount operating commitment.  This operation of a resilient system, which could be under assault during the run up to an engagement; as the World saw during the run up to the invasion of Georgia by the Russian Forces; and the run up to diplomatic negotiations with Estonia.  Our peer competitors got to practice with real time integration of Cyber and Physical Forces; which we have done in Joint Exercises since.

Whether it is a day without space; or communicating under duress; it is all a part of the Decide point in the OODA Loop. 

When looked at as a process leading up to and flowing from a point of decision; it becomes clearer what the value of pre-decision direction and expectations for force disposition; and the training for Commanders around and below the Command Authority.

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As the Air Force considers itself to be a part of the run up and flow down; it is incumbent on the Air Force to ensure integrity of the data flow in both directions.

Thus, there is a sharing of this integrity with the various agencies that are information providers; and decision executors.  The Air Force mission to be in Cyber is all about an awareness of this responsibility; and the impact of trusted data to its forces. As the saying goes; once you take off; it is all about Wi-Fi.

Act and Operations

Finally it is time to examine Act.

Strategically; this is where most Armed Forces dwell.  This is also the beauty of the OODA loop; as it transcends levels of scope and allows each level to explore uses of the components of its forces.

At the same time, this devolvement may result in independent behavior and what has become ‘islands of excellence’; or rule by ‘stovepipe’.

One of the best examples is the use of geography to establish operations order between units. In Iraq 2003, the Euphrates River was used by Commanders to separate successful campaigns by the Coalition Army and Marine forces; who contributed to each other by protecting the common flank, which was the river itself.

This became muddled, as progress was different; and the command authorities began to order slowdowns and halts; strikingly similar to Eisenhower commands to the British and American forces in WW II as they approached common objectives.

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The “engagement process of content in battle context” which empowers dynamic situational decision making at all levels has the best chance of prevailing. It is the foundation of war winning in the 21st century. Credit: Graphic and Concept Ed Timperlake

http://www.sldinfo.com/shaping-a-new-approach-to-combat-learning-the-role-of-the-f-35/

For these reasons and more yet, it is heartening to see in the vision statement words like integrate, and interoperable, and building relationships.

Actions taken in the rapid fire future engagement will need nearly machine to machine coordination as the weaponry flies farther; and with more devastating effect.

Also with our forces diminished by obsolescence or budget; we must believe our ‘First look; first shot; first kill’ slogan so as not to waste the most precious commodity of the future fight, projectiles, either missiles, or bullets, or Cruise Missiles.

Credible feedback as the battle progresses may be a difficult commodity, but it is incumbent on the Observe element to continue to provide Situation Awareness to every level of command.

Fully integrating the forces, such that every shooter a sensor; and some sensors as shooters provide facts about targets and anti access platforms will minimize our own casualties.

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But, in this element of the OODA loop is where the offensive enterprise resides. 

This enterprise is comprised of all the elements for expeditionary warfare, to include resupply.

The Air Force, in designing its force structure is also the supply element for other services in rapid mobility exercises.  As an example, their Tanker fleet is not just a servicing agent for itself; but as well for joint and coalition forces.

In the same vein; the Air Force must, in this time of reduced resources, look to its coalition partners as it has in the past to provide some of the needed firepower, and support elements, well beyond airfield support.

Thus, to paraphrase Adm. Mike Mullen’s oft-repeated comment about the Thousand Ship Navy, which relied on and thus counted coalition partners among the fleet elements. So also the Air Force must count the Tankers and C-17′s; as well as the complementary Fighter elements that may be made available to counter competitor actions.

It is increasingly clear that our governing body; whether Executive, or Legislative; will not be providing the complete complement of ready forces.

How this risk is characterized should be left to the word of the active Military Commanders; but it has been clear in the last century of warfare; that there will be available coalition equipment.

This makes interoperability more than a slogan; but a requirement.

Governance for situation awareness sharing becomes an issue, when they are your wingman.

How this develops during this current transitional period will be crucial to future outcomes, both diplomatic, and militarily; for either regional or global competition.

One of the first uses for the OODA loop was to foster energy maneuverability in Fighter design.  This application of physics was at first left to the winners of engagements during World War I and World War II; but Col. Boyd used it to advocate for the design of the Light Weight Fighter that became the F-16.

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In a famous Photo Comparison; his theory was played out illustrating the turning radius of the F-4 and the F-16; where it was clear that the F-16 could start out as the hunted and end up quickly as the hunter.  From this illustration, well over 7,000 aircraft have been produced for use by Air Forces all over the world; and many more configurations of missiles, which even the odds with very high G-turns to counter the initial effect.

This has clearly resulted in fewer one on one fights; and a greater concentration on fleet-to-fleet operational concepts.

‘First look, first shot’ is the war cry today; not ‘Give them the gun’.

During this same period; concepts for anti access; and counter anti access became design elements; and conceptions for 5th Generation Fighters came about via the F-117; the B-2; the F-22, and the F-35.

It is safe to say that the ferocity of the anti access forces appearing in a less than peer competitor during the Vietnam War was a strategic surprise; and countered by technological advance and investment.

As we will read further, the Act part of the OODA loop is highly dependent on whether this technological advance will be followed through to a real force advantage.

It seems clear that our competitors would love to see abandonment of this long themed strategy; and they were particularly cheered by the cancellation of the B-2 and the F-22 in their time; leaving America with stunts of force, in lieu of show of force in both cases.

The fate of the F-35 remains fluid; but for the peer competitor; another termination would be simply thrilling.

In this current budget squeeze, there are ample supporters thus far.

There seem no doubters among those allies who sense danger; and thus orders from our future coalition partners are ripening.

The ChallengeWe have seen the Air Force role in the Observe, Orient, and Decide elements, but in the Act is where the essence of Military Force lives.  Sir Winston Churchill has best described the current state of affairs as follows: “The power of an air force is terrific when there is nothing to oppose it.” (1948)

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This has been the state of play in the engagements for the past quarter century.

But this has misled key decision makers to consider investment in the air domain as wasted; as they did not see peer competitors in the near future; and decided that sitting on their lead was sufficient and saved resources to boot.

Sec Gates in his speech to the Economic Club in Chicago said:” Consider that by 2020, the United States is projected to have nearly 2,500 manned combat aircraft of all kinds. Of those, nearly 1,100 will be the most advanced fifth generation F-35s and F-22s. China, by contrast, is projected to have no fifth generation aircraft by 2020. And by 2025, the gap only widens. The U.S. will have approximately 1,700 of the most advanced fifth generation fighters versus a handful of comparable aircraft for the Chinese. Nonetheless, some portray this scenario as a dire threat to America’s national security.”

This projection turned out to be false in two directions.

First fifth generation fighters began to pop up before he left office; and cutbacks started almost immediately to the F-35 program.  The potential for the threat to America’s security is certainly not yet dire; but one wonders about the drift.

Chinese J-20 (Credit: CNN)

As Gen. George Kenney put it. “Air power is like poker. A second-best hand is like none at all — it will cost you dough and win you nothing.” (1945).

Even Secretary Donley; who, while Sec Gates was in position, wrote a letter supporting Sec Gates decision to stop producing F-22′s; has now testified in Jan 2013 that: ” The Air Force has stretched the risk we can prudently take and must push now to get the most combat power possible from our forces.”

General Michael Moseley in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee testified in 2008. The Air Force should have the capability to put an American silver cloud over any GPS location on earth, to deter and dissuade competitors from taking actions counter to our nations well being.

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This follows a long line of similar attributions; and was underscored in the early 1950′s when Gen Curtis Lemay argued during a similar period of drawdown that he needed a sufficient fleet of B-52′s and KC-135 Refueling Tankers to allow ranging targets anywhere on the globe.

Whether Long Range Missiles or the current fleet of bombers; the recent flight of the F-22 and the B-2 to Korea and back was symbolic of this desire.

The action was at once applauded and then decried as too much military show of force.

Applauded as it showed both the friends and enemies that we retained the power to hold hostage distant targets, including those states, which have substantial Integrated Air Defenses.  Decried by those that worried about any force engagement.

Did this deter, did it dissuade?  One has to simply listen to the dissipation of the noise and furor. 

Innovation such as the X-51 needs to be fostered to ensure that we are a global leader and not simply a receiver of decisions made by other world powers more committed to gaining the technological edge.Credit: http://www.11news.us/05/speed-of-soundx-51a-waverider.html

All of the elements of our current Air Force, whether Space, Cyber, transport, and our magnificent Airmen who provide at a moments notice; or at a deliberate pace are responding to the National Command Authority decision to act.

My own doctrine can be clearly put: ” If you are ever involved in a fair fight; it is the result of poor planning.” emphasizes proper action throughout the OODA

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loop; and entails actions by resource decision makers and department leadership to maintain our strength and resilience in periods of high activity; and periods of pause.

We have a clear need to by 2025, for the Air Force to size its  its forward deployed and tip of the spear capabilities around the Fifth Generation force construct. 

The Fourth Generation Aircraft should be dominantly assigned to the defensive enterprise, protecting the homeland and some expeditionary locations.

The vulnerability of large Command and Control aircraft is currently well known; but America continues the belief that we will own the skies in the future fight; an unsustainable prediction.

They may retain utility in a positive aftermath; but one wonders about the allocation of resources between assured victory, and the aftermath.

This is the decision that must underscore the future of Air Power. As one fighter pilot put it when asked about the results of ‘Cope India’ as early as 2007; thank goodness we competed with degraded capability; because when the competitor discovers they can ‘kick your ass; they won’t stop at their border or yours’.

That’s when it will get ugly.

‘Peace is our Profession’ stated the Strategic Air Command Motto. Herman Kahn reminded his listeners at SAC that he hoped that some of them could fight and win a war.

THE ROLE OF THE US AIR FORCE IN THE FUTURE FIGHT2013-02-08 by Michael W. Wynne, 21st Secretary of the USAF

The start of a new year and of a new Administration is good time to think about the future.

A key challenge facing the new Administration and Congress is to ensure that US military capabilities continue to innovate and evolve in challenging times. 

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A key element which can help shape leveraged innovation is the role of jointness among the services and among the allies.  Leveraging the current force structure of both this nation and our potential allies is crucial to innovation going forward and to learn once again the Adage of General (ret) George A. Joulwan; ‘One Team; One Fight’.

A key example is the shaping and support for the Mission of the US Air Force, which is to Fly, Fight, and Win in Air Space and Cyberspace.  This; of course in direct support of the Nation’s Leadership, developing, for them, a multitude of responses to crises in conjunction with the Joint Chiefs and Political leaders.

As we describe the implementation of this mission and point it towards the future fight; some things are clear.  As we dive into this seemingly vast subject; we will strive to focus on the mission; for with this focus the rest of the capabilities of our Air Force are first developed in support of the mission; and then found to be missions unto themselves; such as Education, Training; Medical; and Program Development.

Securing the Global CommonsThe challenge of securing the global commons is a global challenge and requires significant allied and partner collaboration.  As seen recently in Mali or in crises in Haiti or Japan, USAF assets play a key role in providing support for security in the global commons.

Securing the commons implies knowledge, which implies information and data about security.  The mission of the Air Force expands is implemented by acquiring capabilities in Air, Space and Cyberspace by detecting incursions, developing some frames of reference for decision makers to determine, with interpretation and added information from various agencies, what actions to take, politically with Allies; and potentially various stages of aggression to deter, and dissuade aggressors; or with measured effect, defeat the incursion.

While Cyber is developing, and appears to be best managed as an joint enterprise; the integration into various capabilities benefits the entire force structure down to the lowest level.

Similarly, the USAF provides capabilities for supplying either logistics or forces via air transport.  It provides as well as advanced  but now integrated technology into society such as weather, Global Positioning; and many times clearer views of natural disasters or critical accident investigations.  All of this allows the USAF to assist by providing information, or food stocks where needed to offset natural or

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man made disaster from enveloping a population become an integral part of offering our National Leadership a variety of options with which to approach and assist other national or international organizations.

Many times; these capabilities, originally conceived to assist in open warfare, migrate to provide alternate and important uses which are possible due in no small measure to the trend toward interoperation and leveraging allies around the world.

Global DeterrenceThe USAF develops capabilities to assist with allies in the deterrence and dissuasion portion, which again requires capabilities to bring a credible threat.  This is the essence of the discussion of the capability of our Nuclear Arsenal, as it ages in place.

Paul Bracken has underscored that we are in a Second Nuclear Age, and in this age deterrence is different but as significant as the first. Bracken is concerned that we are ignoring the rebirth of nuclear weapons within the global dynamic at our peril.

http://www.sldinfo.com/the-challenge-of-deterrence-in-the-second-nuclear-age-a-discussion-with-paul-bracken/

This raises a fundamental question for the USAF.  How does the USAF contribute to or lead US thinking and capabilities to deter in the Second Nuclear Age?

Does the USAF forces retain sufficient credibility to assist our nation’s leaders to dissuade threats of aggression with similar horrific weapons of war?  

In the same way as described in General (deceased) Curtis Lemay’s era; in which the role of Bombers was to hold hostage any point on the globe, now delimited by a Global Positioning Locator. Some would rightly say that with sixty percent of our globe covered with water, this is the mission of the Navy; but this is the essence of joint for where the Air meets the Sea; the issue becomes joint.

Is the current state of our Bomber Fleet living up to this adage?

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An F-22 Raptor from the 3rd Wing, Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, rejoins the fight after refueling during Northern Edge 2008 May 8. Twelve Elmendorf F-22s were part of the more than 120 aircraft participating in the largest military training exercise in Alaska. An Alaska Air National Guard KC-135 Stratotanker, from Eielson Air Force Base’s 168th Air Refueling Wing, delivered the fuel during the refueling mission. This electronic warfare exercise separates the 5th generation aircraft from the rest. Credit: Northern Edge 2008.5/8/08

We note that there is a partial fall back; and recently some recommended that we abandon this notional concept and instead convert some of our Nuclear Missiles into Conventional Missiles to effect this outcome at considerably less expense.  A review of potential target sites in any portion of an ever-changing landscape of our world today makes one blanche at this substitution, as it marginalizes our capability; and thus our credibility to effectively dissuade a determined aggressor.

One thing we learned in the early 1990’s was that an aggressor strains to believe in their success; and the least bit of encouragement, however benign, strikes the spark of invasion. Thus did Hussein inquire as to whether an option to a Kuwait defense was in our National Interest; and when advised of uncertainty, seized on the wrong decision?

And as Bracken warns:

The kind of crisis in which learning might occur could revolve around something like the Pacific islands in dispute in the South China Sea. 

If there’s a major Chinese move against one of these islands, the Japanese and US forces will be forced to respond. 

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But what if the Chinese start moving some nuclear weapons around? 

What do we do then?

 Avoiding the Far FightThe Air Force develops capabilities to defeat an aggressor. The essence of ‘win’ implies an overwhelming match.

If deterrence or dissuasion is the point; or if not then sufficiency to assure victory at the end of the fight.

Currently there is obvious concern with the diminishing capability of US air and naval forces to prevail when confronted what are characterized as Anti-Access or Anti-Denial adversaries.  There is a seeming reluctance to enter sovereign Air Space where the possibility of the availability of an Integrated Air Defense System or simply having Advanced Surface to Air Missiles available.

Our leaders have suffered from criticism about not supporting aggressively current sets of Freedom Fighters; or their associated populations, but are potential adversaries looking at this as cover for marginal equipage?

Is this a policy choice or a realistic calculus on the current balance of power?

Future historians may have to make this assessment.  But as a student of military art, one wonders what message we are sending when you suggest that you can not operate in increasing areas worldwide.

The plan to convert from fourth generation to the fifth generation of apparent fighter aircraft across the flying services is a key element of avoiding tough fights.

This dramatic slowdown in transition has reduced the concept of overwhelming match, moving towards sufficiency. 

At the heart of missing the point, is the impact of new technologies, like 5th generation, on driving innovation across the force. Here it is interesting to note that Germany’s Blitzkrieg was buttressed by new technological weaponry but the majority of the force structure, perhaps eighty percent, was more than a decade or two removed from the new technologies.

The point is that new platforms can drive innovation in the entire force structure as a culture of innovation pervades the effort.  Thus; recognition of the nature of the capability puts a premium on coordination, leverage and interoperation to

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move not the entire set of platforms in the force but the force structure back towards overwhelming match.

Fortunately, this is not only conceptually true, but given the nature of the training tempo that has been our history.  And such innovation can be tested in very realistic operational situations.

Conceptually, the fifth generation fighters have the following characteristics:

• They can acquire greater information about the situation.• They can rapidly disseminate this situation to other nodes around them,

considered the 360-degree nature of their communication capability.• This provides for opportunities to assess the nature of the aggressor, to receive

updated political or military instructions as to a plan of approach or attack, to coordinate with accessible fourth generation fighters as well as Bombers in the region of interest;

• And leverage available ground and sea based sensor or shooter assets to become an extension of their target acquisition systems.

In prior articles, it has been noted that one of the most difficult arts that these Combat Controllers who fly the Fifth Generation Fighters must learn is restraint.  Their mission task is to deter, dissuade, and defeat using all means at hand.  This form of fighting might not involve their firing weapon, though clearly being armed increases the margin of victory. When they do fire, having relief at hand may be the reason or covering a withdrawal.  This is parallel to how ground force commanders recover to a more defensible position may be the order of the battle.

That said, clearly they represent the tip of the spear for the onset of warfare. They must enter contested airspace with an eye towards mapping the path to victory.  They need to be able to provide detailed targeting data to following forces and where possible eliminating the most contentious threats.

Training needs to embed that the nature of their fight implies that when they directly engage, they become instantly targetable. Therefore, their engagement must be at the point of victory or withdrawal.

To hearken back to Lemay’s concept of holding hostage any point on the globe, escort duty may become an issue, again either on ingress or on egress but more likely accepting the mission of suppression of enemy air defenses which then allows the Bomber multiple target opportunities on a given mission.

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The nature of the emergent Bomber provides it with extraordinary sensor acquisition characteristics as it takes in the swath of then enemy territory and with that swath the placement and scope of potential secondary targets.  This is all too off-boarded and transcribed into follow-on forces as needed. This means potential landing areas; and potential safe placement of ground forces.

How To Achieve Mission Success: From Experimentation to Operational InnovationThese are terrific discussion points, but what of practical application?

What of areas of training and operational situations can be a first use to further hone these concepts?

How can these capabilities as described be evidenced outside of the fertile imagination of the very talented gamers that populate more and more realistic multi-player simulations?

The current wisdom is that testing must conclude before operations can be fully implemented has been turned on its head during the past two decades.

Operational use at crucial points is the real testing of systems.

F-16s in South Korea. Credit: Caters News Agency

With the introduction of the Predator, and the Global Hawk to be tested and faulted by the operators to yield a far better overall operational capability yet found not operationally suitable by the test community.

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But, for all the faults, once introduced, there was no rush to withdraw the capability.  Rather it was corrected and better used, more fully implemented and in fact called revolutionary as some big thinkers forecast the end of piloted aircraft.

Then on You Tube, the Russians were seen shooting down a Georgian RPV, which filmed its own demise to get the posted video.  Though there was no retraction of the prognosticators, the forecasts were quieted.  The reality of warfare is that the enemy gets to vote.

Nonetheless, operators drew enormous military capability during this period where control of the sky in both theaters of engagement was unquestioned.  But even in the conditions of complete air supremacy allowed these systems to operate, another problem emerged: how to operate effectively with the areas covered and the data generated?

The area was vast and the sensor capability was being expanded. The ability to evaluate what data was collected, and how to best use it and disseminate it brought issues to the front that had never been faced before.

The onslaught of data brought outcries from operators who decried the age of information; and simply wanted first to see it, and then to analyze; and then see it again.

This learning impacts the utility of fifth generation data acquisition, which was being developed before, and during the data and information revolution, when finally interoperability has come to mean need to share in near real time.

It meant putting allies in a position of knowledge to avoid harms way and to protect the accomplishment of their mission.  It meant extolling the virtue of connectedness between ground troops and the air fleet and it may even mean the emergence of fluid command where the command authority moves from air to ground and back again.

The Navy is experimenting with fluid command between on shore and off-shore fire control. Can that command authority be extended beyond visual range in support of battles formerly out of range of engagement?

It is noteworthy that to truly exploit the significant discontinuity that the fifth generation affords will require experimentation to determine the most effective operational approaches.

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Such experimentation has already commenced within the US Marine Corps. 

They see the formation of a very different version of the Army Air Assault force introduced in the Ashau Valley and documented in When We Were Soldiers and Young.  This updates the MEU in a decisive way and portends potentially the era of independent action with an Expeditionary Assault Group.

Experimentation can and should as well be with the fleet, and combine fluid command between the ship and the shore with directed indirect ships fire in support of the dynamic air assault.

The utility of the 360-degree sensors and the utility of the z axis providing for vertical assault and support is being fully tested by the Marines.

http://www.sldinfo.com/the-ace-of-the-future-yuma-and-beyond-2/

As in the case of the ROVER link, the testing is in the hands of the operator and the feedback is direct and forceful.

http://www.sldinfo.com/%E2%80%9Cdemocratizing-the-battlefield%E2%80%9D-the-rover-experience/).

Whereas there are restrictions between the test community and the Corporate Engineering staff, no such restriction occurs when trying to make or extend the mission or mission set in real operations.

What the USMC has set in motion, the USAF needs to expand upon.

Similar to a children’s game of leap frog, the USAF and the USMC can tag team to drive con-ops innovation.

The Air Force F-35s needs the same pressure of experimentation and operator feedback as the Marines have set in motion.

This stands now as better than any fourth generation aircraft, but will be subject to the pain of the best being the enemy of better than ever.  This is the nature of operational tests which does not extend the mission; and does not in parallel enhance the mission capability.

The OT&E are statically forced to evaluate specifications designed years ago and with the technologies available at the time.

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As the Marine Corps is fast learning, the best way to combat the critics that simply see the F-35 as a replacement for the F-16 or F-18 is to put it in stressful situations and then marvel at how the operators see farther, operate more capably and frankly don’t want to go back ever to older aircraft.

They begin to worry about their brethren consigned to fourth generation fighters, absent the fifth gen lead.   The Air Force has a true partner in exploitation, and as the AF did with the F-22.  They should allow interspersion between Air Force and Marine Pilots.

This is always the case when co-assigned; and will be again, but this time the leadership can and should sponsor the interaction.

(For a USMC pilot’s reflections upon his experience in a USAF F-22 billet, see the following:

http://www.sldinfo.com/discussing-fifth-generation-aircraft-with-the-usmc-pilot-of-the-f-22/

http://www.sldinfo.com/the-fifth-generation-experience-updated-the-f-35-is-a-situational-awareness-machine/).

What a great legacy of jointness this will allow.

Applying an Innovative Operational Approach: Shaping a Fleet Impact StrategyLet’s discuss the application of the operational training approach for fleet innovation.

There was a recent contract asking for the production of at least 31 additional F-35’s. This should be enough for a robust squadron.

The Air Force should encourage deployment to distant theaters. Previously, I argued that the Air Force put 3 squadrons of F-35’s in Korea.

http://www.sldinfo.com/f-35as-to-korea-shaping-a-defense-transition-to-deal-with-real-threats/

Obviously, there is an opportunity to add the F-22s to the mix and get on with innovation in the defense of South Korea.

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http://www.sldinfo.com/shaping-the-way-ahead-for-airpower-general-hostage-focuses-on-the-future/

Let the Wolfpack rule. It is about using the initial 5th generational lead elements infusing innovation throughout the force and laying down a template for further innovation as new elements are added.

http://www.sldinfo.com/shaping-the-wolfpack-leveraging-the-5th-generation-revolution/

Bring back all the fourth generation Fighters and their maintenance.  This would allow a theater wide application of USAF Fifth Gen Fleet operations; and truly test the maintenance philosophy being taught at Eglin at the Joint Maintenance Training.

http://www.sldinfo.com/living-the-transition-shaping-the-f-35-maintenance-approach-at-eglin/

As a bonus; there could be a bonafide test of integrating fourth generation operations into the fleet.  The Korean Air Force is very proficient in the F-16 operations would yield a true training ground for leveraging the fourth generation capabilities into the fifth generation command and control loop.

This takes leadership courage. The last time the Air Force tried to deploy the fifth generation, it was considered to disruptive to the international order.

It is encouraging and maybe a foreshadowing that this Administration has allowed such a deployment; and will see merit in the accomplishment. 

For the Air Force, this would be a break through on several levels.

First it would demonstrate conclusively the true advance of a total fleet change to fifth generation fighters.

Second, it would boldly demonstrate to the whole of Asia that we are with them.

Third, it would represent a terrific opportunity to test the interoperation of the fifth and fourth generation fighters as well as introduce both the Japanese and Australian air fleet to this type of joint operation.

With the Army, both Korean and American being involved in the peninsula, the connectivity and fluid command and control would be thoroughly exercised.

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Naval Fleet operations, which have already considered what the inherent capability of the F-35 is in extending the reach of the AEGIS Platform can now gain an amazing sensor capability should the time come for practicing missile defense; or in exercising throughout the Pacific Theater.

With the Pacific being the most demanding for air operations, perhaps it is time to consider drop tanks for the fifth generation fleet where the range extension can move the launch point wherever needed, and the stealth cover can be automatically emplaced once the tanks are jettisoned.

This useful device can alter concepts of operation as they have for generations of range extended aircraft.   While none are in evidence as of yet, it does seem like an ideal rapid acquisition program, in advance of the military requirement.

As a nation, we have had a strategic peace for a long extended period, even while the tactical theater struggle challenged our attention.

Now, there is an opportunity to recover to a position of strategic strength; and make not expensive choices to create a long range, command and control fleet trained and ready for the future fight.

Admiral Mullen once talked of the ‘Thousand Ship Navy’ as he extolled the virtue of the inter-operational allied fleet.  The Air Force should do the same in the Air, for the future fight will not be ‘mano-a-mano’; but fleet on fleet; and tactics and strategies that more mimic old ground strategies may yield big dividends.

Leveraging distant fires, creating opportunities for fourth gen success in a fifth gen engagement will be central to mission success.  The Air Force role in the future fight looks to be Air Combat Manager, recalling the mission to Fly, Fight and Win.  But this will be done through the Fifth Generation-led revolution not by older systems such as AWACS.

http://www.sldinfo.com/the-emergence-of-the-z-axis-changing-the-way-airpower-enables-combat-operations/

Editor’s Note: Secretary Wynne played a key role in putting Lt. Col. Berke into the F-22 to start the joint learning process.

Also see the following recent pieces on USAF innovation approaches:

http://www.sldinfo.com/shaping-the-way-ahead-for-airpower-general-hostage-focuses-on-the-future/

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http://www.sldinfo.com/new-capabilities-new-constraints-call-for-new-concepts-of-operation/

An earlier version of excerpts from this piece appeared on AOL Defense.

http://defense.aol.com/2013/01/29/mike-wynne-former-air-force-secretary-says-us-should-deploy-fi/

THE UNITED STATES AT A KEY TURNING POINT: THE CORE NECESSITY FOR A MILITARY REBUILDING STRATEGY2012-10-17 by Michael Wynne, the 21st Secretary of the Air Force

In a speech at the Virginia Military Institute, Governor Mitt Romney began a great conversation about the United States role in the world going forward.  How this conversation is framed will influence many emerging international realities.

In fact in the book The World America Made, Robert Kagan underscores how central the United States has been to shaping what is often called the positive good of the global commons.  But this comes at a price.

If America were indeed to commit “preemptive superpower suicide,” the world would see the return of war among rising nations as they jostle for power; the retreat of democracy around the world as Vladimir Putin’s Russia and authoritarian China acquire more clout; and the weakening of the global free-market economy, which the United States created and has supported for more than sixty years. We’ve seen this before—in the breakdown of the Roman Empire and the collapse of the European order in World War I.

http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/13329906-the-world-america-made

And this is not just occurring in books, but in the thinking of US allies. For example, the Australian Defense White Paper made a strong charge that America was essentially abandoning the field of the pacific to the Chinese; and that sparked an announced pivot towards Asia, that placed a Marine unit in Australia; and shifted future force structure away from Europe.

This reaction to a complaint by an ally in public underscores a real need to re-evaluate the strategic defense posture going forward.

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The latest salvo came from the North Koreans, who in response to an apparent public request from the United States that South Korea upgrade its missiles to extend to all of North Korea, announced in turn that its missiles could target the US Mainland.

In previous times the South Koreans would have made such a decision by themselves; knowing that the US was fundamentally underwriting their defense structure. But the US has steadily been withdrawing forces and turning the defense of the peninsula over to the South Koreans.

With that in mind, why not wait for the US to make the request?

Again with that in mind; the North Koreans want to assert that they can hold US policy hostage to their threat.

The Japanese are in successive confrontations with each of their neighbors over isolated rock formations that China, South Korea; and Japan want to extend their territorial control and perhaps the mineral wealth that lies beneath.

At a Turning PointWhen the U.S. was seen as the strongest, this was not an issue; but with the description by the then sitting Chairman of The Joint Chiefs that our deficit was the number one enemy, it put our major creditor and regional competitor in a global pole position.

Under the previous Defense Secretary and continuing under this administration, we see the fixation with defeating the terrorists groups and a interesting disregard for peer competitors.  This unfortunate strategy has dramatically reduced the perceived strength margins, as the time lengthens for upgrading our fifth generation Air Force.

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The US could move ahead to produce F-35s at 10 a month. The sunk cost in the plant is already there; idling plant not only cost jobs, but deployed capability and global influence. It is not JUST about a plane; it is about global leadership. Credit Photo: Lockheed Martin

This has left all of the services and our Allies and partners to scramble for upgrades for the increasingly obsolete fourth generation fighter complement.  They see our program managers excoriating the sole builder of 5th generation aircraft for perceived faults; and the Congress mandating a slower and slower recapitalization rate.

It is as if the US has all the time in the world to get around to modernization of capability and re-working our allied capabilities.  But we do not.

The current policies push needed capabilities ever further in the future as keeping the old alive mortgages the innovation needed now.  It is not just a generation change being delayed; it is putting our capacity to lead at serious risk.

Meanwhile the competition continues to prowl our technologies; and make quick moves to bring them to support their strategies.  So they fly a prototype over the head of the Defense Secretary who challenged them by saying they were two decades behind.

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Secretary Rumsfeld told all of us after Sept 11, 2001 that we needed to thank the prior administrations for laying in the tools and technologies such that we could fight and win anywhere on the globe.

Who can we thank now as each year; the Service Chiefs find their forces aging and getting smaller.

They also feel on a merry go-round, as the fixation with the wars of choice has not allowed for rebuilding an exhausted force structure for deterring future wars not of our choice.

This is not just about the people, and warriors we have in our military; but the technologies that when their courage is synergized with, make them the greatest fighting force on earth.

This is now lacking; and in a worrisome way celebrated by some, made a cornerstone in sequestration by others; and lately become a politicized social program by directing non-compliance with the laws regarding lay-off notices.

When the term ‘strengthen our military’ is used; it begins to beg definition. 

This needs analysis to determine just what the priorities are for accomplishing such a slogan?

Did we notice that when Russia’s Rulers were rebooting their armed forces; they effectively reduced their Army strength dramatically, and pushed resources towards the strategic arms of the Navy and the Air Force, not to mention their rocket forces?

This reach for technology is quite instructive; as they were faced with a shortfall in resources and had a loss of face in diplomatic circles; but had a unified zeal to restore their preeminence.

America Talks of being expeditionary; and talks as well of maintaining the freedom of the sea lanes and the air lanes; and reaching back to Mr. Kagan; no doubt this has fostered growth in all parts of the world; even allowing for Tom Friedman’s The World Is Flat; which presumed that these freedoms would be maintained without assigning maintenance responsibility.

This is a decision that is beginning to bind our armed forces.

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What is the responsibility for the United States to continue this task; and what part of our tax structure should in fact be dedicated to world commerce freedom?

This is a policy decision, which when coupled with the proper resource allocation has been a by product; an ‘other duty as assigned’ to our historic but steadily eroding strength resident in our strategic military.

With this policy in mind; early advocates for Air Power said that ‘you either dominate the skies or suffer the ones that do’ for the past half century; the United States has worn that mantle; and watched the ‘Dunkirk’s’ when we didn’t.

We have pushed our Navy out to the limits of the oceans; and now into the expanding Northern Passage; and need to ensure that ‘Remember the Maine’ does not get subsumed by ‘Remember the (Air Craft Carrier)’ as the rationale and battle cry for restoring America to its once held lofty position of freedom’s guardian.

Our residual strength is surely being distracted and tested as we hunt for the killers of our diplomatic corps.  ‘Muddling Through’; a time tested British Strategy; requires some strength of purpose; and maybe some lethal push back;

The reality is that ‘Laissez Faire’ is more where we are now; awaiting the outcome of a power game in which we are increasingly seen as weak, or perhaps as best ‘observers’. 

This weakness can be viral if flare-ups occur elsewhere.

Advocates of ‘Peace through Strength’ like to recall Ronald Reagan’s admonition during his debate as never hearing that too much strength was the cause of war.

Is there a magic tonic to restore our position with out effort and expense?

I would say there is not; but like the old auto mechanic advertisement, you can pay now; or pay much more later.

A Rebuilding StrategyLet’s examine a pay now strategy.

President Reagan did this on his assumption of Command; and as either Presidential candidate can do on theirs.

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President Reagan, faced with a high inflation and reduced jobs restarted the B-1 line; and here is an opportunity to do likewise; restart the F-22 line.  The B-2 likely meant 100,000 jobs instantly restored; and likewise for the F-22; and these are American jobs, using high technologists to build a high technology defense. Are there improvements; absolutely; and let’s include those improvements such as an improved engine; and adapted avionics that are currently being tested in the Joint Strike Fighter.

Rather than drag out production of the Joint Strike Fighter; let’s immediately surge them and move to replace the fourth generation aircraft with the fifth.

This show of resolve will also add on the order of 50,000 jobs across America.  Though the concept of concurrency has been looked down upon; and the difficulty of producing in that environment found to require active management in all aspects of the program; we need to lean into the wind; and act like there is a war on; as there is a true need to demonstrate America’s resilience across the world.

Getting this frontline fighter into the hands of operators and out of the sole hands of testers will change the game; and bring weapons development into the internet age where users dominate the product cycle; and tester are relegated to pushing the edges of the product, in reliability, in maintenance, and in performance.

Never better emphasized by the introduction of the Global Hawk; and the Predator; which was first sent to combat while the test community made contributions throughout its life cycle; but so did the operators who drove for better controllers; and better weapons; and truly socialized the concept of GPS enabled Remotely Piloted Vehicles.

We still have much to learn; and their use can and will transform future battles, but operators and concepts of interactivity are needed to truly maximize our current advantage. 

Similarly in the area of Joint Tactical Controllers, where the Rover Program was a real example of users pushing the engineers, and getting product cycles well before the notion of a program was drawn.   The MRAP is yet another example of a operator induced down select as we maximized the number of vehicles sent forward; and essentially let the testers and operators, like logisticians downselect to preferred manufacturers.

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Not to forget America needs a new Bomber to replace the venerable and vulnerable B-52; we need to restore the idea that we can hold hostage any GPS location on the globe to not only a missile shot; but to the monotonous drumbeat of bombing that truly imposes one’s will over the enemy.

One is on the drawing board; but accelerating the design and build would again put many to work in high technology jobs that highlight Science Technology Engineering and Mathematics as requirements for our future citizens. 

What of the Navy, that diminishing force that used to be distributed across the ocean blue; but over the past two decades has gotten very confused with Littoral Pursuits; and substituting small ships for large; and even with those not achieving even close to the once demanded 600 ship Navy. Briefly calling for the unified 1000 ship Navy with all allies being interoperable; now opting for a some here and some there strategy; while leaving the Carriers pretty vulnerable.

The amphibious assault ship USS America under construction in Pascagoula, Mississippi, June 12012 It will be commissioned on October 20, 2012. These two photos are closely linked, for the F-35s will fly on this deck.(Huntington Ingalls Industries) 

We need a solid and growing ship construction program, that again restores needed capability; and harkens back to the aftermath of the Civil War when they knew that keeping the ship yards open was a strategic decision; and the nation went in debt to do it.

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Now we go into debt for myriad other purposes; but providing jobs that directly impact the constitutional mandate to provide for the common defense is slowly slipping from its central importance.

In all of this we can take a page from one of our tiniest allies, the Singaporeans; who mandate that 4% of their GDP be dedicated to preserving their freedoms and go to defense.   We have much work to do; but years of warfare; and patching must stop if we are to have the Navy that was reflected in Kagan’s premise.

Jobs would jump across the American land as in each case these items are dominantly made in the USA for US purposes.  As for Airpower; the Navy has been questing after a fifth generation airplane for two decades or more; they are now very close; but again are worried and submitting upgrades to their fourth generation aircraft. They admit it is an industrial policy more than a defense policy.

In this case let’s admit that and get the policies to mesh; putting fifth generation aircraft into our forward forces is a matter of National importance.  This should be our goal; and the operators need to be in the drivers seat for use and operational realities.

Our partners and allies are actually asking to take our positions on the line if we choose to give them up as the congressional budget ebbs and flows. This is further indication of what signals we are sending to our allies.

When are allies are more serious about orders for the F-35 than the United States there is something seriously wrong.

Clearly we will support delivery to our partners and allies, but we can accelerate the entire F-35 line to ensure that we along with our allies jump into the future, rather than being mortgaged by past systems and capabilities.

SHAPING THE WOLFPACK: LEVERAGING THE 5TH GENERATION REVOLUTION2012-09-14 by Secretary Wynne, 21st Secretary of the USAF

It is great to hear the excitement in the voices of the testers and the latest operators of the fifth generation fighters.  

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They reflect the hope for the future of air dominance that the requirements community and the design engineers intended for continuing the peace that we as a nation have enjoyed and have offered to the world for the past half century.

Now with a multi-polar world emerging; and with the United States seemingly ceding its technological dominance by slowing down the emergence of the fifth generation aircraft and terminating the best outright performer in the F-22 at a much lower quantity than requested; and instead moving to a coalition of equals with the F-35; there is a certain nip in the air.

One can see it as the coming of winter; but our Pilots see it as the competition clearly seen in the design and production of the Mig, Yak and Suhkoil communities.

We last saw this as we broached the skies of Korea.

We came to realize that we needed to catch up with the forces of design from the then Soviet Bloc.  In response, we had a burst of talented entries in the Century Series Fighter. Later as we learned that the F-4 was not survivable against the Ground Based Air defenses in North Vietnam, we invested in the F-16/F-18 and the F-15 following advances in the RADAR available.

These aircraft first entered service in the mid 1970’s; almost 40 years ago.

Today they are better; but one wonders about the combat arena; and whether this is the right bet.

Shaping an Investment Strategy for Viable CapabilityAre upgrades on 40-year airframes, with a very slow roll out of 5th generation “replacements” a sound strategy?

Though we hope to never find out; and pray that our strength will never be tested, the current situation should be looked at as an inter-war period; where resolve is often tested; and teams form through treaties; and common defense postures.

In such an interwar period; realistic assessments need to be made; and realistic resources need to be applied.

In this regard, one needs to assess the value to the enterprise; whether Defensive or Offensive that an investment would bring.

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For example; if information is to be the asset of greatest importance, then we need to ensure its availability and capability for transmit and receive to all of the force structure to be engaged.

Based upon the admonition of the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; that the national debt ranks as a national enemy, our military investment faces tough scrutiny.  Interestingly; the United States is resting on past strengths and has a very difficult time adapting to technologies particularly if there is an upset to the order of battle.

Although we’ve had Unmanned Air Vehicles for many years, we needed Global Positioning and Satellite communications to put them into the front lines of warfare.

Now that our forces have them, it seems very difficult to alter the role of the Remotely Piloted Aircraft as used to date and extract new and different utility from these workhorses that fly friendly skies.

One simply has to watch on U Tube the self-filmed death of a Georgian Remotely Piloted Aircraft by a Russian Mig-30 Aircraft missile to realize the vulnerability if they are not protected.

In fact as one watches the film; one wonders if the Russian Pilot would have been so bold had the warning audible been on his Head up Display from a second RPA or from a protective follow Aircraft.

The response of the services has been a study in outlook. 

The USMC is driving forward with an entirely new definition of Air Assault that would make the 82nd Airborne proud; combining the agility of the ‘Z axis”, with the speed and capability of the Osprey and the JSF.  They are fundamentally altering the operational concept of force employment; and none to subtly increasing their reliance on Satellite Positioning; as well as Vertical Logistics for resupply.

The Navy is moving to increase the fleet of F-18’s and slowing the UCAV program. The UCAV is the only Navy stealth unit.  This series of investment decisions is occurring while they push out the F-35C.  Navy Pilots are among the best in the unified test squadron; and therefore are fully conversant with the likely outcome for any engagement of integrated air defenses; as is being employed by Iran, and China; and in part in Syria with the support of the Russians.

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A far better outcome is to accelerate the investment in F-35c and the UCAV; to allow for better detection and for better expeditionary actions.  The expectation that in this way they will protect the number of carriers is not sufficient and should be separated in concept from the Air Component.

A different way to look at the construct is to deploy the carriers with a minimal air component, including two UCAV’s per carrier for defensive observation and potentially, if armed, for limited offensive action.  This concept would use the agility of the F-35C to move up to the carrier and be the aggressor from that geospatial location.  With the speed of the F-35; deployment from the several available Naval Aviation Bases would mean a likely 8-hour time from deployment order to arrival on the carrier.  This would provide the Navy command structure with enormous potential at the point of attack; and provide the Naval Aviation Component with the right generation of aircraft to engage.

The Air Force Investment is informative; as with the foreshortened nature of the F-22 program; and now the very much-predicted slowdown of the F-35A deliveries.  The current move is to invest in the remaining fourth generation legacy aircraft.

But here again; with a nod to the criticism of the Navy, to what purpose is this investment? 

Presaging the Wolfpack? An F-16 takes off to accompany the F-35 at Eglin AFB. Credit: Major Roganov, PAO, Team Eglin

For years the Air Force has trained to lean on the longest range Radar and shifted targets from the F-15 to the shorter capability F-16.  This is a well known

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deficit for this versatile fighter; so investing in F-15 Radar makes limited sense; but what is far clearer is continuing to upgrade the F-22 and F35 Radars such that targets from these stealthy observers can be shifted to un-stealthy shooters makes the most sense.

As a recent comment from an F-35 pilot underscored, the F-35 radar ALREADY is superior to the legacy systems.

Question: “Dog” Davis made the comment that one of his pilots was flying from Fort Worth to Eglin and was accompanied by two F-18s.  He told me that the pilot asked the F-18s could see the “clean” F-16 meeting them from Eglin a significant distance ahead.  Does that square with your experience?

Bachmann: Actually I was the pilot that General Davis was talking about.

Even in its relatively immature state, the combat systems are superior to legacy systems.

In an operational exercise in Northern Edge, this concept was clearly understood as a Return to Base was denied for the F-22 and he was ordered to continue to access and distribute targets until the bandits were demised or he ran out of fuel.

Given this much clearer operational imperative; which has been supported by years of joint exercises leads to another investment requirement.

There is a clear requirement and imperative to off board all the swept targets to a command node; such that the command node can then assess and assign targets to the joint or coalition shooters; and relieve the Stealthy Observer Pilot of this task.

As the success of the Remotely Piloted Vehicles is celebrated in Afghanistan, there arises a question as to what to do with this renowned capability in the absence of friendly skies.

How to best employ the concept of operations means considering how to extract utility when the hunters are not just friendly but are targeting you?

Shaping and Offensive and Defensive Enterprise for the 21st CenturyTo really consider this; we need to break apart operations into the Offensive Enterprise; and the Defensive Enterprise.  These two are different, and assets can be deployed in different ways.

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For example, the United States relies on geographic distance for its major coastal defense; but employing Remotely Piloted Vehicles could dramatically enhance the integration of available defenses; even providing early warning relatively inexpensively, Air to Air Missiles; and some Air to surface missiles are an additional enhancement to even low speed platforms.

These are being flown currently by National Guard and Reserve Squadrons; and allowing their integration into the off shore airspace adds enormously to detecting and deterring threats.

In a very similar way; around some of the distant states and possessions of the United States that serve as staging areas or forward operating bases, a squadron of Remotely Piloted Vehicles equipped with SONAR and RADAR together with limited means of response to threat would provide great training and be a part of a layered defensive system.

Examining the Offensive Enterprise requires a similar exploitation construct as any Military Force, but adds the third dimension to the mix.  This would have the fifth generation platforms as the scouts and observers; and the fourth generation platforms as shooters to be thrown towards enemy defenses to force their response and identification as well as be the swarm to deter any further penetration.

This aspect requires rethinking the use of fourth generation platforms and introduces the concept of using fourth generation assets as Remotely Piloted Vehicles.

They would, as they can now, receive targets from the fifth generation platforms; be able to verify and validate the received target; and engage either enemy air or enemy integrated air defenses to smooth the way for further operations.

This concept is ‘The Wolfpack’; employing two fifth generation platforms with four fourth generation remotely piloted vehicles.

(For a Defense News story on Boeing and the F-16 robotics approach see

http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120831/DEFREG02/308310006/Boeing-Sees-Promise-F-16-Drone-Conversion-Market).

The fifth generation platforms; as scouts would be admonished to not shoot lest they give away their position; but rather to expend all the weaponry from the fourth generation platforms; or from any available shooter that could reasonably

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engage the designated target.  If they are required to engage owing to the fact they have been detected; then shoot and scoot is the motto. This concept would seek to preserve the quantity of fifth generation assets well into the second and third day of warfare.

Realizing that you go to war with the weaponry you have, not the weaponry you want, our Air Forces, whether Naval Aviators or Marine Aviators or Air Force Aviators need to think about force multiplication and affordability.  

Apparently, our leaders are relating in as loudly as they can that our Nation will no longer ‘darken the skies’ with the quantity of Air Assets made available to our forces.

As a nation we are reaching out to coalition partners and other friendly nations to adapt our capabilities so there is a symbolic and real reserve force worldwide to thwart any determined competitor.  The United States capability must be interoperable with these forces and within our own forces to leverage what we can using situation awareness, the ability to share this situation awareness; and overwhelm competitors needs training and early employment.

Concepts for exploiting the best of fourth generation assets and available fifth generation assets; in combination with what we have learned in the first decade of Remotely Piloted Vehicles will be crucial to deterrence in the face of increasing attention to economics.

The ‘Wolfpack’ can be more than casual thought; properly employed by well trained pilots, it can change the outcome in surprising ways.

Crafting the ‘Wolfpack’ can provide a strategic advantage and a best value-leveraging proposition. 

For an update on the 5th generation dynamic see the following:

http://www.sldinfo.com/the-fifth-generation-experience-updated-the-f-35-is-a-situational-awareness-machine/

ENABLING THE TIP OF THE SPEAR: RE-FOCUSING THE USAFby Michael W Wynne, 21st Secretary of the USAF

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All of the services were and are confronted by the new realities of the future defense budget in a very straightforward manner. Not only through the first budget agreement wherein the outgoing Defense Secretary volunteered to yield some $450 Billion; but in a subsequent sequestration that is nearly certain to come, there was a second nearly $450 Billion to be levied against defense.  This activity and the panicked response brings to mind a quote once attributed to Sir Winston Churchill, “Gentlemen, we have run out of money. Now we have to think”. (1)

One of the early lessons that we learned was that joint operations were to be the key to success in our engagement with the modern dispersed enemy. This construct has recently been supported in a brief from Mike Sheehan, the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low intensity conflict. He pointed to the “brilliant operation” in October 2001 that ousted the Taliban from power in Afghanistan, a combination of special operations, intelligence agencies and Air Force capabilities. He said that operation was a “precursor” to many successful operations since.

Putting this into current realities, Budget stringencies are to be expected; but re-enforcing the core enabling capabilities which each of the services  provide for the joint and coalition force are not a budget cut they are more or less a withdrawal into service isolation.   There was a clear mandate for leveraging and connecting legacy and modern platforms to extract yet greater lethality from the total force.  This budget imperative must result in a intense requirement to expand on this early described operation;  to leverage the operation that the coalition of forces used in Libya against an ill trained, but potentially lethal Air Defense System.  This is the set of decisions now confronting the Air Force leadership.  There are a strategic necessity for the service, the nation and global partners.

As we withdraw from the wars of uncontested airspace, the joint and coalition forces face an uncertain future.  As the forces become smaller, there survival in operations more crucial to mission success.  An ability to dominate the 360 degree battle space with the initial insertion force becomes a crucial one to that success. The whole requirement set for the fifth generation fighter was effectively aimed at this problem.  Should the Air Force now shrink from the future and pursue the past?  The nation needs the Air Force to  ‘risk up’ and reassert deterrence for all, especially our peer competitors, to see.

There comes a definitive time for putting aside the catapults and bows and arrows that have stood firm against an enemy; and face the enemy to come.  In

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modern terms; there comes a time to see clearly that Integrated Air Defenses that can reach out several hundred miles, and effectively deter penetration by fourth generation platforms which our peer competitors have both sold and trained their buyers have changed the nature of the next fight. Larger enemies that have remained peer competitors have retained this same or enhanced capability for themselves; and are specifically training against some of our more useful tactics of the past decade.   They were present and accounted for in the engagements where we used our penetrating F-117s; including celebrating the loss of at least one when the Pilot got overconfident.  Now the F-117s are gone.  They likely trained the Libyan force which caused excessive planning, but could not allow the usage of the F-22, because we neglected to connect the F-22 to the remaining joint and coalition force.

Putting MADL into the F-22s is an essential investment to enable the F-22 to operate as the tip of the spear and to be completely integrated in the F-35 fleet. Credit Photo: http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123074194

In the place of the F-117; the Air Force pushed for the F-22.  Across administrations, and in times of tough budgets, they realized the necessity for making the ‘unfair fight’ the basis of deterrence.  Now, there is a smaller fleet than planned, OK.  Let’s make it ‘all that it can be’.  Rather than simply ignoring the modernization of the F-22s in favor of upgrades to older significantly less survivable systems, whether the F-15s or F-16s, it is time to put this core force back on track as the lynchpin of what the USAF does – crack the backbone of air defenses and other systems providing protection against the US and allied insertion forces.  The Air Force needs to truly evaluate the question of why and the utility of extending the life of lass capable platforms; and accelerate those they know are survivable.  The best is fast becoming the enemy of good enough

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What does this mean, and how to best go about reintroducing the unfair fight?  We all know that P-51’s would make a cheaper alternative, but it is also clear that peer competitors would brush them aside.  No, we want the dominance that the fourth generation of Eagles and Falcons enjoyed at their introduction.   We have some evidence from Northern edge, and now from Bold Alligator. The exchange pilots are telling the story about what constitutes the next generation fight.  Let’s hear from them in a straightforward way.  Get the best from the budget, stop listening to the permissive, and realize that every great platform has had the critics; but they are now the backbone of our forces.  When President Reagan endorsed the ‘Star Wars’; it had technical and budget critics; but the emphasis on deterrence was clear; and contributed to the end of the cold war, and the ‘budget crisis’ of that era.

The F-35 will become the dominant new 360 degree fighter to enable the USN-USMC-US Air Force team to establish battlespace dominance.  But the F-22 has a unique role in providing for SEAD and other mission capabilities unique in the US force structure.  But to get full value out of what this fleet can deliver, the F-22 needs to be MADL enabled.  The data delivery systems which MADL allows, enables the F-22 to provide the spear in the attack, and then transition into a key wolfpack role in establishing 360 situational dominance.

MADL in the F-22 is not an option; it is not a luxury; it is a way to remind the USAF of what its role is.  It provides a core function no other element of the joint force can provide, and not sometime in the deep future, but right now.  Later is not good enough.

And not only does the F-22 recover its role, but its ability to work fully with the F-35 and to shape con-ops innovations across the board will be enabled for the decade ahead as the new fighter enters the fleet.

There is another possibility equally powerful.  As with Rover, there is no reason MADL cannot be linked directly to laptops or to the ground warriors.  Imagine an F-22/F-35 fleet mutually enabled by ground operations, and such operations which provide the foundation for shaping an entirely new approach to maneuver warfare.  This is the missing link to bring into the fifth generation that concept of operations where Special Operations, Intelligence and Air Power can open the Fight, operating wth full leverage from both Joint and Coalition forces to be a true deterrence.

Budget reductions are not time for standing down capability and turning away from innovative thinking.  Rather, they can be an opportunity to make choices

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and propel needed capabilities fast forward.   Yes, there is risk; but looked at clear eyed, isn’t there a bigger risk if our competitors are not deterred.

So make it time to think forward; and take each in its turn before the forcing function of further budget reductions; or worse, the incursion of a capable enemy hurries our Air Force into the era of next fight making us all wish we had done things differently.

Recall, it was unfair that the pesky Americans wouldn’t line up to confront the enemy in our own revolutionary war.  Our Air Force needs now, during this lull in world conflict, to think forward and plan for a different style of fight.

(1) The quote is newly a runaway favorite of venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, and government sorts looking to be crisis-blessed with innovation and invention. Is originally  attributed to Sir Ernest Rutherford, the famous New Zealand physicist

For a discussion of the centrality of data and communication for the new air fleet please see

http://www.sldinfo.com/fifth-generation-aircraft-and-3-dimensional-warfare/

“DEMOCRATIZING THE BATTLEFIELD”: THE ROVER EXPERIENCE01/03/2012: The Second Line of Defense team in looking to the future of defense and key tools for the 21st century believes that the last decade is not prologue to the next.  Many important experiences and con-ops have emerged in the past decade, which provide key elements, which need to be harvested for the future.  The position of SLD is simply put: “Harvest the Best and Leave the Rest.”

The Rover experience is a core example of “harvesting.”  Rover has been a key element in the air ground revolution, in which ground elements led by JTACS, have been able to leverage various air-breathing assets to enhance mobility, security and targeted lethality.

In a wide-ranging discussion with Lt. Col. Charles Menza, who has been involved with Rover from the beginning, the evolution and contribution of Rover was discussed.  Secretary Wynne participated in the discussion from the SLD side and some of his overview comments have been published in a separate piece.

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From Menza’s perspective:

Rover has been a key element of democratizing the battlefield.  The General has the generally same picture as the guy in the field does.  And this rover essentially creates a horizontal command structure where any Special Forces Team or Captain or a Lieutenant on the ground or a Battalion Commander or a theater committee can call in the air strike commensurate with the Rules of Engagement (ROE). It’s really the story about the JTACS and how they into very effective fighting tools that we have used in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Menza has provided a detailed briefing, which provides an effective presentation of the evolution of the program and its evolving capabilities.  This briefing can be found below, and readers are advised to go through the brief carefully to understand the program more clearly.Here we are going to focus upon the evolution of the program and the challenge for the next year.The program is not a program of record.  It started as a result of a demand from a Special Forces officer who saw an opportunity.  The officer saw the ability to feed video to the C-130 gunship and wondered why that capability could not inform ground operations, and to empower JTACs.

Menza: Almost 10 years ago Chief Warrant Officer Manuel saw the ability of push full-motion video initially to a AC-130 gunship which was taking a lot of fire when it was going over a target area because it had no Situational Awareness (SA). We then sent the Predator to provide that SA and then sent full motion video of the target area back to the AC-130 gunship.  He asked: Why can we not do this directly to the ground?

Then he meets the Major and now Lt Col Greg Harbins and he thinks it’s a great idea.  Then Harbs builds a connection whereby he can talk to the Predator.  Coming from a Panasonic hard book and a collection of gear from Radio Shack, Haves took the system to the field pinned all over him to try to make this connection work.  And it works.Harvs then goes with this idea to the Big Safari office to get the idea operational.  Big Safari is a prototype and innovation shop.  And over time, the Rover sets sold way beyond Big Safari’s wildest imaginations.

We have provided 7,000 sets so far with an additional 5,000 radios ordered by the Army recently. The initial Rover was a single downlink from the Predator to a single box.

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SLD: And by pushing video down to a distributed ground element, you are changing the decision-making dynamic.  In effect, this disruptive technology is enhancing capabilities to have a distributed operational battlefield.

Menza: Right. It is disruptive technology because it is not in the Army’s or Air Force’s doctrine.  It’s not in any type of Army doctrine that you can get full-motion video down to the guys on the ground, they can make some decision, and they can fire.Commanders are feeling really uncomfortable with a lot of this.  But this is a technological revolution that can’t be stopped.

Much of the discussion then focused on the evolution of the program whereby the opportunity to develop two-way video links could re-shape how air platforms can be used and maneuver units can operate in determining targets as well as SA.  A key thrust of an interactive link is that the various air assets can function as airborne Wi-Fi hot spots.  The diversity of platforms also provides redundancy, which is part of a sensible approach to enhancing security.

The various waveforms currently require an airborne translator like BACN to provide an ability to manage the video and audio on the fly.  But over time, BACN can be eliminated and direct links possible.  Menza raised the possibility of the video link going directly to the helmet of the “grunt” on the ground.

Menza emphasized that the Rover revolution has gotten ahead of the platforms, which can embed Rover.

I can receive video and I can push video.  Here’s the problem:  since we are rapidly developing this, I could push video to what?  Nothing. This great product was way before its time. I’m still waiting for the airborne assets to be encrypted right now.  It’s coming slowly.  I’ve had this for three years waiting for type one encryption platform.  I’m logged and waiting for a platform I can push the information to and it’s not there yet.  We can do it very quickly. So the next phase is we are going to finally push video up.Another dynamic has been to leverage commercial technology to make the Rover system much smaller and portable.

Menza: I was getting feedbacks from the user, the users go, this is really great, it beats this, but you know what?  This thing breaks; I have to throw the whole thing away.  Make it smaller, make it lighter, and make it a better-rated system. The battery pack (seen) here, it’s made specifically for the Rover.  This battery, I pulled off a Harris radio and I can put this on there.  I could, this battery I can pull off a Tawas radio and I can put it on here.  So L3 makes this, doesn’t make batteries, it made it adaptable to put any battery you can possibly think of that the

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JTACS already carry, I can snap it on here.  And you know what?  If this breaks, I can throw this away.

And the Rover link has been used a key element of the airdrop revolution.

Menza: Because of Rover, we’re changing the logistics impacted.  The Commander on the ground can call for a pallet drop. And on his Rover, he gets the pallet drop and he can tell the pilot in the airplane, I’ll have the pallet drop here and he can get either a GPS pallet drop or he can follow the video all the way to the ground.  It’s amazing.An additional aspect of the outreach of the Rover revolution is the diversity of platforms, which can be part of the video network.

Menza: We are going to put this on ships now.  Because we can direct video from the aircraft down to the ship and we’re going to shoot this up to the U-2, U-2s going to go down to the Mach. And the XP47, which the USN believes, is the guardian at night and it will be Rover capable.

We are planning to push video from the Predator to the U-2 at 70,000 feet where it can function is a highflying Wi-Fi. The next phase of Rover is rolling out this next year.

Menza: We have been funded to network the airborne platforms and ROVERs and we have got to have this done in 12 months.  We are getting the staffing to designate this as a QRC (Quick Reaction Capability).

LIVING THE TRANSITION: SHAPING THE F-35 MAINTENANCE APPROACH AT EGLIN09/25/2011 – In early August 2011, Second Line of Defense sat down with Col. Sampsel and Secretary Wynne to discuss the transition in maintenance culture and its challenges for the F-35.  Col. Sampsel is living through the transition and Secretary Wynne was one of the architects of the F-35 and its maintenance approach.  It was unusual to have an architect and a key implementer in a dialogue about transitional dynamics.  This article summarizes some of those interactions and ways to understand the transitional dynamics and challenges.

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Col. Laura Sampsel, 33rd Maintenance Group commander, is responsible for the bed-down and operational readiness of the three variants of the Joint Strike Fighter F-35 aircraft. The primary mission is to enable the production of pilots and maintainers for future training and combat units. (Credit: USAF)

Second Line of Defense sat down with Col. Laura Sampsel shortly after her departure from Eglin and retirement from the USMC. During her time at Eglin, Col. Laura Sampsel, 33rd Maintenance Group commander, was responsible for the bed-down and operational readiness of the three variants of the Joint Strike Fighter F-35 aircraft. The primary mission is to enable the production of pilots and maintainers for future training and combat units.

Secretary Wynne with his years of industrial, and acquisition experience was the dialogue partner with Sampsel during this interview and provides an interesting look inside the transition ahead for maintenance practices for the three services moving ahead with the new airplane.

The F-35 is the first combat aircraft designed with maintainability as part of the con-ops of the airplane.  Increased ability to share maintenance practices across the services and the partners, as well as common parts provisions, are at the heart of allowing the aircraft to operate globally more efficiently and effectively.  In light of the financial stringencies facing the allies and the services, if such a plane

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and approach were not available, air power capabilities would be reduced even more.

If one took the report which projected more than a trillion dollars to support the F-35 over its lifetime in 2065 dollars, and if one used those same 2065 dollars the figure for support would be north of 4 trillion dollars.  We are not fans of using hypothetical 2065 dollars to do any analysis, but using the terms of the projected 1T in support, the maintenance revolution if fully realized can save more than 3 trillion dollars in hypothetical 2065 dollars.

At the heart of the maintenance approach is the digital capability built into the aircraft. As we argued earlier:

Digital systems allow many changes to occur throughout the military.  We have already seen these changes in the commercial sector, and it is difficult to believe that the military cannot mimic such changes.

First, there is a significant reduction in the touch labor required to maintain modern vehicles or planes.  The computer chips provide sensors and information, which allows a significant migration of knowledge to the machine, rather than relying upon armies of maintainers.

Second, the machines can tell when maintenance needs to be done.  Rather than having a manpower intense scheduled maintenance regime, the platform tells you when it needs to be maintained.

Third, firms like Fed Ex manage fleets.  They buy with a fleet in mind and with as much commonality as possible.  This allows them to drive down cost by supporting more assets with common maintenance procedures and operations.

Fourth, commercial aerospace firms build their products with maintainability as a key driver.  And they can use incentivized-based systems such as fly by hour to gain savings, which they can then invest in evolving the systems, which they build to optimize operational savings.

Fifth, the commercial standard is clearly to manage a supply chain to build and sustain a fleet.  The global supply chain to produce modern products is assembled by manufacturers to deliver a viable and cost effective product.  The same supply chain is used to deliver support.  Having a core firm to manage both is a cost driver both for support as well as gaining information about planned product improvements.

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SLD is a group populated by realists.  The ability to realize the advantages rooted in the new aircraft will not happen overnight or without significant cultural shifts.  In an interview with Master Gunnery Sergeant McKay, shortly before his retirement, the challenge was highlighted:

When I first got into the program a couple of years ago, the Nirvana was a USMC jet can land in an Air Force-Navy Base that has F-35s and be repaired, and fly home.  The reality is that nobody else wants to play in that world; the Air Force and the Navy have no desire to play the game that way.  Even the Marines at some point along the way have a real problem with somebody else fixing their toys and calling it good.

There is no standardization of maintenance practices among the services, let alone internationally. You’re talking an entirely different nightmare of, “I’m over-flying some other country, you need to land for whatever emergency, and need to get fixed.”  Traditionally, you send a maintenance crew from very far away to fix that one aircraft, takes days, and then you fly home.  Where if it was already resident on the base, why couldn’t you fix it right there with what you’ve got?

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Tech. Sgt. Matthew Burch and Staff Sgt. Jason Westberry, from the 58th Aircraft Maintenance Unit, review post operations tasks on their Portable Maintenance

Aid after the fourth F-35 Lightning II taxied into its new home at Eglin. The Airmen are among the first Department of Defense maintainers trained by

Lockheed Martin logistics support personnel in the joint strike fighter’s recovery and inspection procedures. Both aircraft in the photo arrived here Aug. 31 in a

four-ship formation with Lockheed Martin pilots flying the F-35As and F-16 escorts piloted by the wing. (Credit: USAF)

And the interview went on to discuss the challenge of transition:

SLD: But clearly the technology can drive change. The problem with maintaining the maintenance stovepipes, as they exist now, is that the technology and the plane doesn’t require them.  It is as if Southwest Airlines with a common fleet of 737s would have three different maintenance cultures.  This makes no sense. Deployment differences among the services are real and adjustments to the culture needs to be made to provide for such differences but simply to ignore commonality is costly, ineffective and reduces core combat capability significantly going forward.

MGySgt McKay: Absolutely. If we can have the services drive towards even common terminology, this would be good.  For example, the USAF and the USMC do not have a common understanding of what being expeditionary means, and the maintenance challenges associated with expeditionary are different for the two services.

If we could get the services to agree on common terms and explanations of exactly what those mean.  Differences in services, absolutely, there should be were appropriate but working through expeditionary logistics is a good place to start, at least, so we’re talking on the same sheet of music.

SLD: Why not use the common maintenance training facility at the JSF training compound at Eglin? One could build a cadre of cross-service folks who could shape that dictionary or build that language because you’re trying to do the cross-service training, cross-service maintenance.

Maybe one should be thinking about adding a core-competence to that schoolhouse of an elite corps of instructors who are actually bargaining through some of the language.  And of course, you have the advantage of having the maintainers from the different nations there and the different pilots, which are

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actually informed by some cultural reality as opposed to just making it up.  Does that make sense?

MGySgt McKay: It absolutely does.  And I believe the pilot portion is much more integrated than the maintainer side.  Because the core structure is broken out into modules, you can insert modules as you see fit for you service.

They can rebuild or they can build that courseware to fit a service need.  The pilots like combat integration.  USMC pilots like the fact that they fly with the Navy and will fly with the Air Force; maintainers, not so much.  You haven’t broken that paradigm at all. And breaking that paradigm will be crucial to taking advantage of what the F-35 program offers.

The dialogue between Sampsel and Wynne focused on the core challenges of transition. Sampsel has shaped and lived through the beginnings of the revolution; Wynne was one of the architects in setting the revolution afoot.

It was a complex and varied discussion.  In this article we will breakdown the conversation into several key elements around which the transition is evolving.  The following chart summarizes some of those key themes and each will be discussed separately.

Breaking Glass Shaping the Cultural Revolution with Regard to People, Processes and Training

Shape and Leverage the Joint Experience

Shape and Leverage the Joint Experience

Re-Alignment of Maintainers and Maintenance Process with the Airplane

Re-Shape Grades and Skill Sets of Maintainers and Shape Appropriate Transition Metrics

Shape a Service-Contractor Relationship or PBL For Effective Sustainment

Focus on Mission Effectiveness and Proper Roles for Government and the Contractors in Maintenance and Supply Chain Management

Management of the ALIS Upgrade Process

ALIS will Evolve Through Block Upgrades; Manage the Process and Expectations with Realistic Block Upgrades in Overall Maintenance Practice

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Alignment of F-35 ALIS Information Systems With Other Maintenance Information Systems

Build Migration Strategy and Tactical Realignment to Get Most Effective Outcomes for Mission Effectiveness

Sampsel started the conversation by underscoring the core strategic opportunity offered by shaping a new maintenance approach.

Col. Sampsel: If we can align processes and policies within the services, I have full confidence that in the future decades, there will be two significant positive outcomes.

One, deploying fewer airman, marines, or sailors into harm’s way, quite honestly, which would be a key objective, especially for me.  I’ve got a marine lieutenant who’s going out there.  So the fewer that need to be deployed the better.

Second, you can shift your operational paradigm. It would give you untold flexibility when you’re doing your operational planning. You are no longer bounded by any of the basing or sustainment things that can, today, limit your capability. You can potentially launch, recover or divert anywhere, anywhere where there are F-35 deployments. The entire battle space grows exponentially.

And for me, I want Eglin to be the proof of principle for integration and jointness because this is what the F-35 program really is all about.

Breaking glass is how Sampsel described the paradigm shift.  She argued that a cultural revolution in the maintenance and supply culture would be affected as one changed the approach of personnel, the processes to govern maintenance and logistics, and the training necessary to do joint and coalition maintenance and logistics.

Sampsel indicated that at Eglin they had put together a process among the services to both reflect and generate change.

Col. Sampsel: A key driver in getting the cultural shift was shaping and then leveraging the joint experience.

I had to figure out a way to force the Air Force and the Marine Core to stop talking past each other. My Deputy, now the Commander, was Col Mark Fluker.  He and I started by realigning people and structure.  The F-35 and the Eglin opportunity were new and unique.  Neither a USMC nor USAF cookie cutter was

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going to work. We looked at what was best from each of our services and then decided to build an organization within the Maintenance Operations Squadron called the Joint Integration Division.  It is “affectionately” referred to as the “JID” at the 33 MXG.  It is actually quite simple.   For every Air Force Maintenance Specialty that was built you had to have a buddy from another service.  That’s your buddy.  You, Mr. Air Force, are going to come in and tell me everything I never wanted to know about the NAMP (Naval Aviation Maintenance Program).  How does an Air Force maintainer do it? You Mr. Marine are going to tell me everything you loathingly never wanted to know about the Air Force approach.  I’m talking about in terms of their competency. Then they each had to come back in.  All briefed me independently.  Then they had to come back together, and put a piece of paper together to tell me that where were the significant differences between what they did.

Almost across the board, they together decided that really, there weren’t that many differences.  Not only did this structure change and process build an increased technical competence; yet, equally important, it brought about, and continues to drive, a significant amount of respect and trust among the service members.  That was the only way we were ever able to get a set of common maintenance operating instructions within the 33rd Maintenance Crew.

The shaping of a joint experience of providing what Sampsel referred to as commonalities appropriate to the task is central to the transition. And Sampsel indicted that the services have already swapped personnel to help with cross testing.

Col. Sampsel: One way you do it is you do exactly like what we did, which is you send Airmen to Pax, and you send Marines to Edwards!  That’s one way to do it. Pax River needed qualified individuals to support some activity.  The reality is the Air Force, in my opinion as a Commander, had the singular most hands on time with the aircraft. So after collaborating with my Air Force Deputy, Col Mark Fluker, we said, “Send the Air Force.”  I didn’t care what color their uniform was because they didn’t have to deal with uniform paradigm, they had to deal with a plane.

Secretary Wynne added that as this gains strength the application of commonality where appropriate can shape an allied approach as well.

Secretary Wynne: The approach she is discussing can be extended into the international arena as an operating baseline. And as you shape in effect a maintenance Top Gun, why can’t you invite the partners WHO ARE ALREADY

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training there. This can be extended to an international Top Gun for maintenance, because the maintenance activities are across the board the same.

Marine Col. Laura Sampsel gives her final salute to her squadrons during the 33rd Maintenance Group change of command ceremony July 22 at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla. Col. Mark Fluker took command of the group from Sampsel. (Credit: USAF)

The third way to understand the transition is shaping the maintenance structure with the capabilities of the aircraft.  You will need different skill sets for the F-35 than for legacy aircraft; and you will need to shape the grade structure differently.

Col. Sampsel: We need to figure out what are the core competencies required to actually fix the aircraft, and align our personnel to those core competencies versus persistently taking round holes and trying to shove them into square pegs.

If you do that, everything, a huge amount of the current inefficiencies start falling apart because now I can have Air Men, Marines, and Sailors in the same classroom learning the same core competencies.

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Right now we have three separate service training tracks, we have different training curriculums and that’s driven by the fact that we’re all just different enough to warrant having to do that.

You’re really only different at the very micro levels based upon your operating paradigm.  But technically you have significant commonalities.

With shaping common training, a lot of the inefficiencies start falling apart if you can get as far ahead of the game in terms of the man-power management, and really necking down to what are the core competencies required to correct the aircraft, to fix the jet.

And you need to focus on those core competencies.

Sampsel and her colleagues have made significant progress in shaping a correlation of the different service approaches and the ability to bring about core commonalities.  It is important to respect service differences, but the commonality inherent in the plane drives significant change.

As Secretary Wynne put it: “Operational tempos and rhythms will shape differences.  But those differences should not be used to block the commonality inherent in the aircraft or the weapon systems.”

The fourth key element to understand transition revolves upon re-shaping the contractor-services relationship in evolving the maintenance approach.  The current structure is for contract services, but the goal is to evolve into a Performance Based Logistics Program.

Secretary Wynne argued that the key challenge is to focus on mission effectiveness and aircraft availability, rather than the government simply spending its time on oversight of contractors, or the contractors seeking to use government metrics to shape profit structures.  The point of a common supply chain and support structure is to enhance significantly mission effectiveness and to seek optimization of the working relationship between the services and the contractors.

The fifth key element is managing the transition through the various block upgrades of the core software for the digital management systems for the aircraft.  The Autonomic Logistics Information System or ALIS is at the heart of the revolution.

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http://www.sldinfo.com/crafting-the-f-35-sustainment-approach-a-central-element-of-the-con-ops-of-the-new-aircraft-system/

Col. Sampsel: ALIS is a true paradigm shift.  It is not just an enhancement of current technology. But, and this is key, its full capabilities will not show up Day 1.  We are in the very early blocks of ALIS’s software, and we are doing things with this software we have NEVER done before with an aircraft.  We will transition through many blocks of the software as capability is rolled out.  This part of the transition is without doubt, in my opinion, the most difficult to execute and manage.

We need as we do the rollout to have effective and realistic transition plans for each phase.  We should have realistic expectations of what we can achieve at each phase.  We have not done enough in this area.

Secretary Wynne underscored that a key challenge was gaining confidence in the reliability of the data as one moved forward with the new maintenance regime.

Col. Sampsel: I agree. .  You have to mitigate it by getting service and industry experts aligned and putting them in the “right” place.  Cut out all the middle men between the tactical unit and ground truth.  Get people the information they need quickly.  That ensures that you build that level of confidence. I remember when ATM’s first started.  I remember my mother saved every single little piece of paper printed by the ATM, and checked her bank statement. Tell me how many Americans do that today? If you start demonstrating capability, you can gain people’s confidence.

Secretary Wynne: Except for one thing, and that is that safety is paramount.  And I think you need to say that. And safety drives you to strong configuration control. Especially when it comes to expected maintenance activities. And until you get, frankly, reliability of presentation, you can’t get to reliability of expectations In other words, if you’re told you’re going to be presented with your bank statement then and there, and you don’t, there is a confidence problem.

A final element of the transition, which was discussed, is making sure that ALIS does not end up being a stove-piped information system. Sampsel emphasized that the USN and USMC have worked hard and long to shape an IT system for maintenance in which they had confidence to determine aircraft reliability and availability.  That system required massive amounts of manpower to generate the data up to the Navy Aviation Enterprise, but is was considered reliable.  How will

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this system be modified to work with ALIS and how would ALIS evolve to play a similar function?

Col. Sampsel: The Naval Aviation Enterprise has for the last 20 years, 15 years, evolved to one of the most significant and effective forums for Navy and Marine Corps deliberate logistic decision making.  . Once something makes it to the top of the NAE, the F18’s are doing great, but this commodity is under performing, decisions are mad to reallocate focus or resources. . Decisions that you never ever have seen happen in the past are now capable of happening because the NAE is very powerful.

Within an NAE you have an IT system, which has been put together to report to the NAE. And the IT system is called Marine Commanders’ Current Readiness Assessment Tool (MACCRAT.). The cockpit charts, if you’ve ever seen them, they’re genius.  Once you learn how to read it, unfortunately they’re not intuitive, but once you learn how to read it, it is one stop shopping at the General Officer level to truly be able to make permanent decisions.  The key to that is they have absolutely confidence that the data they’re looking at is accurate and there is integrity from the sources.

There are very significant manpower costs to generate the verification of data. How much benefit do you get out of those and how much man-power are you willing to spend to keep it?

Final conclusions were provided by both participants about the challenges facing the transition process.

Secretary Wynne: We have effectively subscribed to and paid for a culture shift in capabilities that we now need to take advantage.

And your frustration is two-fold.

Number one, you see the cultural transformation that can happen.  And you’re faced with a system that at West Point we call it 200 years of tradition unhampered by progress. So we, what you see, a system that doesn’t want to move forward.

Second, the things that you see that can really lead to breakthroughs are having berthing problems. So you are afraid to, frankly, risk your credibility by asking people to change this cultural phenomenon and bring those two systems together because the system might not work fully as expected, and indeed won’t.

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Col. Sampsel: I agree.  A key challenge is to figure out what are the core competencies required actually to fix the aircraft, and align our personnel to those core competencies.  I.

If you do that a huge amount of the current inefficiencies start falling apart and you can shape the Cultural Revolution.  Quite honestly, Eglin is the place to do it!

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