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SecondPersonsandtheConstitutionoftheFirstPerson*

JayLGarfield

SmithCollegeTheHarvardDivinitySchoolUniversityofMelbourne

CentralInstituteofHigherTibetanStudiesKyotoUniversity

jgarfield@smith.edu

Loveisjustlikebreathingwhenit’strue;

AndI’mfreeinyou.TheIndigoGirls

PhilosophersandCognitiveScientistshavebecomeaccustomedtodistinguishing

thefirstpersonperspectivefromthethirdpersonperspectiveonrealityor

experience.Thisissometimesmeanttomarkthedistinctionbetweenthe“objective”

or“intersubjective”attitudetowardsthingsandthe“subjective”or“personal”

attitude.1Sometimes,itismeanttomarkthedistinctionbetweenknowledgeand

mereopinion.Sometimesitismeanttomarkthedistinctionbetweenanessentially

privateandprivilegedaccesstoaninnerworldandamerelyinferentialor

speculativeaccesstothatworld.Nodoubtthereareotherusesaswell.Butthis

dichotomyisnotthetopicofthisessay.2

Instead,Iwanttocallattentiontothecentralroleofthelessoftenacknowledged

grammaticalandphenomenologicalcategory,thatofthesecondperson.This

*ManyoftheideasdevelopedhereemergedinthecontextofanNEHSummerInstitute,“Self-KnowledgeEastandWest,”attheCollegeofCharlestonin2018.IparticularlythankAnitaAvramides,AkeelBilgrami,ArindamChakrabarti,AmberCarpenter,ChristianCoseru,SheridanHough,BirgitKellner,JenniferNagel,ShaunNichols,VasuReddy,EvanThompson,andDanZahaviforconversationsthatincubatedthesethoughts.ThankstoAnitaAvramides,NaliniBhushan,AmberCarpenter,JohnConnolly,StephenHarris,EmilyMcRae,VasuReddy,andEvanThompsonforveryhelpfulcommentsonanearlierdraft.ThanksalsototwoanonymousreviewersforHumanaMenteforexcellentsuggestionsthathaveimprovedthispaper.1Theliteratureonthisputativedistinctionisvast.SeeGallagher(2012),Kriegel(2009),Thompson(2014),andZahavi(2008)forgoodexamples.2SeeGarfield(2015),chapter6formycritiqueofthisdistinction.

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categoryisessentialnotonlyforunderstandingthedevelopmentofself-

understanding,butalsoforthedevelopmentofthemoralsensethatallowsusto

participateinthesocietiesthatconstituteusaspersons.Thetaskofmoral

educationisthecultivationofcareforsecondpersons.Butwedosobyextending

notself-regard(forthatisinextensible—othersarenotoneself),butbyextending

thespontaneouscaringresponsewehaveforthosewithwhomweimmediately

interact—secondpersons.Ourmorallives,Iwillargue,likeourcognitivelives,

cannotbeunderstoodwithoutunderstandingthespecialnatureofsecondperson

relationships.Inshort,Iwillarguethatthesecondpersonperspectiveisinfact

essentialtotheconstitutionofhumansubjectivity,andthatitpermeatesallformsof

interpersonalconsciousnessandevenself-consciousness.

Iwillfirstreviewsomeimportantdevelopmentalevidenceforthespecialroleof

secondpersonsbeforeturningtosomecross-culturalandphenomenological

perspectivesonthisquestion.Iwillconcludewithattentiontotheethical

dimensionsofthesecondpersonperspective.

1.SomeDevelopmentalEvidencefortheImportanceoftheSecondPersonVasudeviReddyhasdonemorethananyotherrecentdevelopmentalpsychologist

todemonstratethatsecondpersonengagementisfoundationaltotheoriginsof

subjectivity.Herempiricalworkandherreflectiononthatworkprovides

compellingevidenceregardinghowearlyhumaninfantsrecognizesecondpersons,

andhowcentralthatrecognitionisnotonlytotheirlaterrecognitionofthird

persons,but,moreimportantly,totheirownself-conceptionasfirstpersons.

In(2003)Reddyasks,“whatdoesittaketobeawarethatsomeoneisattendingto

you?”(397)Thisapparentlysimplequestionraisestwoothersthatconstitutethe

focusofthestudiesshereportsinthispiece:first,whatdoesittaketorecognize

another’sattention?;second,whatdoesittaketorecognizeoneselfastheobjectof

thatattention.Onemightthinkthatthesetwoareindependent,andindeed,she

notes,manyhavearguedthatself-representationarrivesinthesecondyear,as

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measuredbymirrorself-recognition,whileawarenessthatothershavemental

statesdoesnotemergeuntilthefourthyearwhentheoryofmindtasksarepassed.

Reddyarguesthatthisdeconstructionofasinglequestionintotwoismisguided,

andthatself-and-otherrecognition,orrecognitionofthefirstpersoninthecontext

ofthesecond,co-emergeveryearly.Asheputsit,“…theawarenessofselfasthe

objectofothers’attention…mustleadto,ratherthanresultfrom,representationsof

selfandotheraspsychologicalentities.Thisperspectiveassumeswhatonemight

calla‘second-person’approachtothedevelopingawarenessofselfandother.”

(Ibid.)Thatis,Reddyargues,ourawarenessofourselvesassubjectsiscoevalwith

ourawarenessofthosewhoaddressusandwhoweaddress:first-personand

second-personareco-emergent,andareontogeneticallypriortothethirdperson.

Wewillfindreasontocomplicatethispicturesomewhatabitlater.

Reddyprovidesevidenceforthisco-emergencethroughobservationofinfant-

parentinteractionsinfirsttwoyearsoflife.Byage2-4months,infantsrespondto

another’sgazewithpleasureorfear,andattempttoengageattentionandgaze.By

6-8months,theymonitorthegazeofothersandorienttheirowngazeinresponse.

Importantly,thismonitoring,sheargues,includesaffectiveawareness.Asearlyas

twomonthsofage,sheshows,infantsshowcoyness,embarrassment,pride,and

pleasureandrespondtotheaffectivestatesofthosewithwhomtheyinteract.The

affectiveandthecognitiveco-emerge,andemergeessentiallyinthesedyadic

contexts.Inshort,theemergenceofsubjectivityisinextricablyboundupwiththe

recognitionofanother’sattentionandmood,andsowiththeprimitiveawarenessof

oneselfasobjectforanothersubject.Thesecondpersonisinextricablyboundup

withthefirst.

ThispictureisenrichedinReddy(2016).Inthatessayshearguespersuasivelyfor

twoimportanttheses:first,earlydyadicinfant-parentinteractionsinvolvethe

spontaneousperceptionofactionasintentionalonthepartoftheinfant;second,

theseinteractionsareoftendialogical,andsoinvolvetheexplicitrepresentationof

subjectivedifferencebetweentheparticipants;thatis,evenpre-linguisticinfants

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representthedifferenceinperspectivebetweenthemselvesandthosewithwhom

theyinteract,andthedistinctroleseachtakesindyadicinteractions.

Thefirstpointisstraightforward—evenobvious—butprofoundinitsimplications.

Infantsinteractwiththeircaregiversnotthroughlanguage,butthroughnon-

linguisticactions.Thoseactions,whetherplayfulorprotesting,areinterpreted.A

parentreachesforaninfant,andtheinfantpreparesherbodytobelifted;she

interpretsthegestureasareachingforher.Aparentplayspeekaboo,andtheinfant

interpretsthecoveringandrevealingofthefaceasanenticementtoplay,etc.The

infantmakesfacialexpressionsorgesturestoattracttheattentionofthecaregiver

ortoengagehimininteraction.Theinfantishenceimmediatelyattributing

intentionality,interest,andsubjectivitytotheother,takingthesecondpersontobe

apersoncapableofexperiencingherownactionsandwithintentionsofhisown.3

Andhereinconsiststherecognitionofdifference,aphenomenonequallyimportant

toappreciateifwearetounderstandthesignificanceofthesecondperson.For

theseinteractionsarenotonlydyadic;theyaredialogical,witheachparticipant

takingadifferentrole.Theinfantrecognizesthedifferenceinperspective,in

intention,andincapacityofthesecondperson.Subjectivityishenceunderstood,

fromthebeginningofhumanlife,notashomogenous,butasheterogeneous;the

infant’sownsubjectivestates,intentionsandexperiencesarenotsimplyprojected

ontothedialogicalpartner;theyaredifferentiatedfromthem.Mindsconstitutea

multiplicity,withmanydifferentinstances.Andthislongbefore“theoryofmind”

emergesinthefourthyearoflife,asmeasuredbypassingfalsebelieftasks,andwell

beforetheacquisitionofcompetencewiththesemanticsorsyntaxofsentential

complementclausesthatenablechildrentosucceedatthesetasks,suggestingan

importantdichotomybetweenimplicitandexplicittheoryofmind.(deVilliersand

deVilliers1999;Garfield,PetersonandPerry2001;Fenici2012,2017a,2017b)

3SeealsoCarpendaleandLewis(2004,2006,2010)foradditionalevidenceforthesephenomena.CarpendaleandLewisalsoemphasizetheimportanceofearlydyadicinteractionsforthedevelopmentbothofsocialintelligenceandofself-understanding.

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In(2007)Reddyextendsthispicturetothethirdandfourthyearsoflife,examining

theonsetofdeception.Deceptionis,bydefinition,theattempttoproduceafalse

beliefinthemindofanother.Onemightthink,then,thatachildcouldnotpractice

deceptionuntilshemastersTheoryofMind.Butthisissimplyfalse.AsReddy

shows,childrentellfalsehoodsdeliberately,knowingthemtobefalse,andoften

withtheclearintenttoconvinceaconversationpartneroftheirtruth,wellbefore

theycanpassTheoryofMindtasks.Deception,likeanycommunicativeact,is

initiallydyadic.Andchildrenlearntodeceiveastheylearntotellthetruth,in

conversationwithotherstheytaketobegullible,andsowhosebeliefsand

intentionstheymustrecognizeasdifferentfromtheirown,butassensitivetowhat

theysay.IfTheoryofMindisthecapacitytoattributefalsebelieftothirdpersons,it

isscaffoldedinpartbytheabilitytoattributethemtosecondpersons.

Reddy(2018)drawstheseinsightstogetherintoacomprehensiveaccountofthe

originsofsocialcognitioninthesecond-personperspective.Shewrites:

Thetypicaldevelopmentofsocialcognition…originatesin…second-personengagementsthatirresistiblyinvolvetheinfant,changingnotonlytheinfantcognizer’scapacitytocognize,butalsothatwhichdevelopstobecognized.Theemotionalinvolvementofpersons,inparticularthosemostsalientofemotionalinvolvementsthatoccurinsecond-personengagementswheretheinfantisdirectlyaddressedorrespondedtobyanother,becomesthecrucibleofcognition.(433-434)

Butifcognitionandaffectivematurationbegininearly-childhoodsecond-person

interaction,thesecondpersondoesnotloseimportanceonceonebecomes

explicitlyawareofthirdpersonsandofoneselfaspartofacommunityofsecond

andthirdpersons.Secondpersonsremainimportant,Reddyemphasizes,through

adulthood.Reddycontinues:

Bothtypesofexperiences,second-personinvolvementsandthird-personobservations,mustinfluenceeachotherandbothmaybenecessaryevenforstablepre-inferentialperceptionsofotherminds.…ButbeingaddressedasaYouandaddressingtheotherasaYouarousesemotionalresponsesdifferentlyfromwatchingsomeoneelsebeingaddressed,andengenders—evenifbriefly—amutualityand

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suspensionofseparateness.Theotherbecomesapersontoyou,someonewhoknocksyouoffbalanceorentersyourconsciousnessinamorefundamentalwaythanwhenyouarelargelyuntouchedbytheother,orjustwatchingthem.(438)

Werespondinspecialways—withdistinctneuralsignatures—tobeingaddressed

byournames,orevenas“you,”andouraffectivearousalishigherwhenindyadic

interactionsthanwhenobservingothers.4Wenotonlybecomewhoweareinearly

second-personinteractions,butwemanifestwhoweareintheseinteractionsin

maturity.5

Reddy(439-442)arguesthatsuchengagementrequiresacomplexco-constituted

intentionalsituation:first,wemustbeopentoengagewithothers.Tobeopenin

thissenseistoseeothersaspersons,assubjectsintheirownright.Wedonot

addresstreesortablesasYou,onlypersons.Andaddresspresupposesthe

possibilityofuptake.Butthisisnotenough.Toaddressanotherasasecondperson

presupposesthattheotherrecognizestheaddresseeasaperson.Idonottake

myselftobeaddressedbythesoundofthesurforthunder,orbybirds.Address

requiresthatIfindmyselfinadyadinwhichInotonlyrecognizetheother’s

personhood,butinwhichIamalsorespectedbytheotherasaperson.This

constitutesakindoftwowaystreet.

Butthereisahigher-levelrequirementaswell.IfIamtrulytoaddressyou,whether

asaninfantorasanadult,Ihavetobeabletorecognizethefactthatyourecognize4Therearedozensofstudiesthatconfirmthisresult.Hereareafew.Grossman,PariseandFriederici(2010),usingnearinfraredspectroscopy(NIRS),foundthatspecificadjacentareasoftheprefrontalcortexareactiveininfantsinresponsetocommunicativeintentionfromadults,onethatrespondstoeyecontactandonetotheuseoftheinfant’sname;thisresponseissubservedbyacommonareainolderchildrenandadults.Farroni,Csibra,SimionandJohnson(2002)usedanERPstudytoshowthatspecificneuralactivityrespondstoeyecontactin2-5dayoldinfants.Grossman,Johnson,FarroniandCsibra(2007)showthatspecificgammabandoscillationininfantbrainsrespondstoeyecontactfromhumanfaces.Turningtoadults,Kamp,FrithandFrith(2003)findthathearingone’sownnameactivatestheparacingulatecortextandtemporalpoles,areascloselyassociatedwiththeattributionofmentalstatestoothers;HietanenandHitanen(2017)findthateyecontactwithagenuineinterlocutorincreasesself-awarenessandtheuseoffirst-personpronouns.5Note,forinstance,howeffectiveŚāntidevaandPatrulRinpoche’sproseisinvirtueoftheirforcefuluseofthesecondperson.ThankstoEmilyMcRaeforpointingthisout.

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me.IfIdonot,thenevenifyoumighttakemetobeaddressingyou,Icannottake

myselftobedoingso.Second-personrecognition,evenininfancy,ishenceanactof

higher-ordercognitioninwhichItakeyoutotakemeassomeonewhosemessages

areworthyofuptake.Butatthesametime,todosoistoseemyselfasjustsucha

being.Reddy’swork(aswellasthatofotherswehavecited)henceshowsthatfirst

personawarenessofourselvesassubjectsishencepossibleinthecontextof

second-personrelations.

Thisdevelopmentalstoryisimportantbecauseitdemonstratesjusthowco-

constitutedoursubjectivityis.Wemaytakeourselvesnaivelytobeindependent

subjectswhoaccidentallydiscoverothers;wemaytakeouraccesstoourown

mindstobemorefundamentalthanouraccesstoothers;wemaytakeassociationto

besomehowaccidentaloroptional.Butwearewrongtodoso.Webecomepersons

ininteractionswithsecondpersons;andaspersons,wefullymanifestwhoweare

onlyinsuchinteractions.Inowleavetheterrainofdevelopmentalpsychologyfor

anexaminationofadultsubjectivity.Herewewillseethatthesecond-person

perspectiveisdeeplyenmeshedwiththefirst-andthird-personperspectives.

2.TheSecond-PersonPerspectiveasConstitutiveofAdultSubjectivityAsadults,asmembersofepistemiccommunities,andaslanguageusers,weare

accustomedtoclaimingakindofepistemicauthorityoverourowninnerstates.In

theordinarycase,wearemanifestlymorecompetenttoreportonourowninner

livesthanareothers.Thisprimafaciefirstpersonauthority,however,isoftenused

asthethinendofanepistemologicalandmetaphysicalwedgeintheenterpriseof

splittingthecognitivesubjectfromitsobject,andintheenterpriseofsplittingself-

knowledgefromtheknowledgeofothersinamorecategorialsense.Weseethis

tendencyinIndianandWesternphilosophyalike.

Whenwedrivethiswedgetoohard,weendupconstitutingaspecialdomainof

innerlifetowhichwehaveimmediate,infallibleaccess,asopposedtoanouter

worldincludingotherstowhoseowninnerliveswehaveatbestinferential,mediate

access.Epistemicprivilegestandsagainstskepticism,andreflexiveknowledgeis

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valorizedwhileothermindsareproblematized.Thegulfbetweenthefirst-person

andthethird-personperspectivethenleadstoacomplexmetaphysicscomprising

qualitativepropertiescorrespondingtophysicalproperties,possiblezombies,etc…

Thisisonefaceofthesubject-objectdualitythatbothMadhyamakaandYogācāra

philosophersalikearguethatweprojectontoourexperience,distortingitand

generatingthemassofconfusionthatBuddhistphilosophersargueconstitutes

samsara.(Garfield2015)

Iwillshowthatre-introducingthesecond-personperspectiveoffersawayto

reconcilethesedichotomies.Itallowsusadifferentwayofconceptualizingself-

knowledgeaswellastheknowledgeofothermindsthatexplainstheepistemic

authorityofself-knowledge.Italsoshowswhy,nonetheless,self-knowledgeis

absolutelycontinuouswithourknowledgeofothers,andimplicatesneitherthe

dualityofinnerandouternorthespookymetaphysicsandhyperbolicepistemology

thosedichotomiesentail.Toappreciatethisrequiresustoseethedegreetowhich

ourself-understandingisfundamentallyhermeneutical,andthedegreetowhichthe

actsofinterpretationinwhichweengagearemediatedbyconversationand

address.

Wesawabovehowoursubjectivityisconstituteddevelopmentallyinsecond-

personinteractions,andthatwecanonlyknowourselvesassubjectstotheextent

thatothersaddressus,andthatweaddressothers,inthecontextofamutual

expectationofunderstanding.Ontogenesishereconstitutesontology.Asessentially

socialorganisms,webecomeconstitutedassubjectswhoaddressoneanother,and

whoareworthyofaddress;asweacquirelanguage,wecometoaddressone

anotherinthatmedium,andourself-understandingaswellasourunderstandingof

othersispermeatedbythemetaphoroflinguisticmeaning.Whenweascribeothers

beliefs,desires,intentions,hopesandfears,wedosowithpropositionalcontent;it

islessobvious,butnolesstruethatwedothesamewhenwecometounderstand

ourselves.(Sellars1963)Oncelanguageisinthepicture,thepre-linguistic

innocencethatguidesourinteractionsislostforever.Forthisisthemomentwhen

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webecomefullyresponsibletoanorm-constitutingcommunityinordertomake

andtoabsorbmeaning.(SeeWittgenstein1991;Sellars1949,1951,1963,1969)

Inordertoexploremoredeeplythisentanglementofselfandother,andofself-

knowledgewiththeknowledgeofotherminds,Inowturntotheworkoftheearly

twentiethcenturyphilosopher,KCBhattacharyya,perhapsthefirstphilosopherto

appreciatefullytheimportanceofthesecondpersonintheconstitutionoffirst-

personconsciousness.Wewillseethathisinsightsanticipatethoseofmanybetter-

knownphilosophers,andthattheyprovideacompellingframefortheempirical

workwediscussedabove.InTheSubjectasFreedom(1930)Bhattacharyyaargues

foranintimateconnectionbetweenthefirst-,second-andthird-personperspectives

intheconstitutionofsubjectivity.Thefirst-personpronoun‘I’,heargues,is

“speakable,”butnot“meanable.”ThemeanableroughlycoincideswithKant’s

knowable.Whatevercanbedesignatedintersubjectivelyasanobjectfalls,according

toBhattacharyya,undertheheadofthe“meanable.”6

In¶¶2-3(87-88),Bhattacharyyaexplicitlytiesmeaningtointersubjective

agreementandavailabilityofreferentsforterms.ThisanticipationofWittgenstein

andSellarstakeshimabitbeyondKant,ofcourse,buttheideasarenonetheless

congruent.Thespeakable,ontheotherhand,iswhatevercanbespokenofor

communicatedaboutthroughlanguage.Itisabroadercategorythanthemeanable,

sincetheremaybesomethingswecancommunicate—thatarenotnonsense—even

thoughwecannotassignthemmeanings.So,wecantalkaboutourselves,even

thoughthereisnotermthatcanmeantheself.

6ThisdistinctionisdrawninthefirstparagraphofTheSubjectasFreedom:

1.Objectiswhatismeant,includingtheobjectofsense-perceptionandallcontentsthathavenecessaryreferencetoit.Objectasthemeantisdistinguishedformthesubjectorthesubjectiveofwhichthereissomeawarenessotherthanmeaning-awareness.Thesubjectivecannotbeameaninglessword:tobedistinguishedfromit,itmustbeasignificantspeakableandyetifitbeameantcontent,itwouldbebutobject.Itcanthusbeneitherassertednordeniedtobeameantcontentandwhatcannotbedeniedneednotbeassertable.Apparently,thesignificantspeakableiswiderthanthemeanable:acontenttobecommunicatedandunderstoodneednotbemeant.(87)

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Thesubjectcannotbetakentobemeant,foritisnotintersubjectivelyavailableas

thereferentforI.Nobodybutme,Bhattacharyyaargues,isawareofmyown

subjectivityinthewaythatitispresenttomeassubject,andsothereisnowayto

establishaconventionofreferenceormeaningfortheIthatdesignatesitinthat

modeofpresentation.7Butheargues,thefirstpersonpronounhasauniquerolein

designatingtheself.WereItorefertomyselfusinganameoradescription,inthe

thirdperson,thepossibilityoferrorthroughmisidentificationintrudes.8Butthe

first-personindexicalgetsimmediately,directly,atthespeakingsubject,andisso

understoodbyaddresseesaswellasbythespeaker.So,althoughthewordIhasno

meaninginthisstrictsense,itisnotmeaningless.Itconveyssomething,andis

understood;indeed,itisindispensible.Itisthereforespeakable,butnotmeanable.

Butevenanon-meanablespeakablegetsitspointonlyindiscourse,oraddress.And,

aswehaveseen,wheneverwespeak,weaddressoneanotherassubjectsin

dialoguewithoneanother.InthisdiscussionatthecloseofTheSubjectasFreedom,

Bhattacharyyarecurstoanimportantinsighthedefendsnearthebeginningofthe

book:totakeoneselfasthereferentofIistotakeaddresseesasyou,othersasheor

she.Inshort,hearguesinthefirstchapterofthebook,thepossibilityofspeech—

andhencesubjectivity—isconditionaluponintersubjectivity,simplybecause

speechpresupposesbothaddresseswhocanbeexpectedthemselvestobesubjects

capableofself-reference,andmeaning-constitutedconventionsinstitutedbyothers

whosesubjectivitywealsopresume.Hedeploysthatinsightatthedenouementof

thediscussiontoarguethattounderstandoneselfasasubjectistounderstand

oneselfasamemberofaclassofthosecapableofintrospectiveself-awareness:

120.TherealizationofwhataspeakermeansbythewordIisthehearer’sawarenessofapossibleintrospection.Suchawarenessisasmuchknowledgeasactualintrospection.ThespeakercallshimselfIandmaybeunderstoodbythehearerasyou.Asthusunderstood,the

7ComparetoWittgenstein’sdiscussionofdiscourseaboutinnerstatesinPhilosophicalInvestigations.8AsSidneyShoemakerwasfamouslytopointoutin(1968),aninsightdevelopedfurtherbyJohnPerry(1979).So,ImighterroneouslybelievemyselftobeJohnPerry.IwouldthenmisidentifyJohnPerryasthepersonthinkingthisthought.Icannot,howeverbewrongaboutthefactthatIamthinkingthisthought.

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introspectiveselfisindividual,notanindividualbeing—forintrospectionisnotasubjectivebeinglikefeeling—butthefunctionofaddressinganotherself.ThespeakerdoesnotunderstandhimselfthroughthemeaningofthewordI:hisintrospectionisthroughthewordandnotthroughitsmeaningandislessaself-knowingthanaself-revealing,revealingtoapossibleunderstanderofthewordI.Yetastheaddressingattitudeisonlyimplicit,itistohimaccidentalandposteriortohisself-knowing.Totheunderstandingself,however,althoughheunderstandsthespeaker’sself-knowingbecauseheishimselfself-knowing,hisunderstandingoftheotherIisprimarywhilehisownself-knowingisaccidentalandsecondary.Thespeakerknowshimselfinimplicitlyrevealingtothehearerandthehearerknowsthespeakerinimplicitlyknowinghimself.…Therearethustwocases—self-intuitionwithother-intuitionimplicitinitandother-intuitionwithself-intuitionimplicitinit.Bothareactualknowledge…BecausethewordIisatoncethesymbolandthesymbolized,itcannotbesaidtohavesimplythesymbolizingfunction….(161-162)

121.Actualintrospectionisimplicitlysocial,beingaspeakingoraddressingorself-evidencingtoanotherpossibleintrospectionorself…(162)

InvirtueoftheroleofIasavocable,butnon-denotingterm(herenoteaswellthe

anticipationsofAnscombeonthefirstperson),9thisspeakingoftheself,andhence

fully-fledgedadultself-consciousnessitself,Bhattacharyyaargues,isparasiticonthe

verypossibilityoflanguage,andsotheexistenceofaddresseeswhoarealsocapable

ofusingthefirst,andthesecondpersonpronouns.So,self-knowledgeandtherefore

alsogenuinelyhumansubjectivity,areessentiallyintersubjectivephenomena,not

private.10Bhattacharyyahenceshowsthatthereisnoknowledgeofsubjectivity

whatsoeveroutsideofthecontextofsocialinteractionanddiscourse.

So,Bhattacharyya,likeReddy,emphasizesthespecialroleofsecondpersons,in

virtueofthefactsthatspeechpresupposesaddressandthatwebecomereflective

subjectsinthecontextofaddress.Moreover,Bhattacharyyaargues,wecanonly

9Balslev(2013pp.136-137)alsonotestheanticipationofAnscombe.10Formoreonwhythisisthecaseregardingpropositionalattitudeattributions,seeGarfield,PetersonandPerry,op.cit.;foramoreextendeddiscussionofthesocialdimensionsofpersonhoodandself-knowledgeinthecontextofHume’sphilosophy,seeGarfield2019.

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fullyunderstandourselvesandourinterlocutorseachasaddresseesandas

addressorstotheextentthatwerecognizeandfollowthemeaning-constituting

linguisticrulesandconventionsthataregroundedinthepracticesofacommunity

ofthirdpersons.Otherwise,wecannottakeourownstatementsorthoughtstobe

meaningfulatall.So,justasthefirst-personperspectiveisentirelyboundupwith

thesecond-personperspective—ontogenetically,subjectively,constitutivelyand

phenomenologically—thesecond-personperspectivecomes,asaresultoflanguage

acquisitionandentryintoalinguisticcommunity,tobe,foradults,entirelybound

upwiththethird.

ThepointofjoiningReddy’sandBhattacharyya’saccountsisthatwhenwedoso,we

canseethatwecouldneverfirstencounterourselves,thenourimmediate

interlocutors,andthenothers,buildingourunderstandingofourconspecificsby

analogyinanever-wideningcircle.Instead,wecomeininfancytounderstand

ourselvesandourinterlocutorstogether;thisunderstandingbecomesarticulateand

reflectivethroughthemediationoflanguageandaraftofothersocialconventions,

andagainispossibleonlyinthecontextofaseamlessunderstandingofthe

communityinwhichweparticipateandofourmutualrelationstooneanotherin

thatcommunitythatconstitutethenormativitythatmakesunderstandingpossible.

For,asInotedabove,toperceivesomeone—whethermyself,mypartner,ora

stranger—asmakingsense,orashavinganinnerlife,isalwaysaninterpretativeact,

whetherthatinterpretationisexplicitorimmediateintheperceptionof

intentionality.ThesapienceinadultHomosapiensisalwayshermeneutic,andso

alwaysbeholdentonorms,andsoalwayscollective.Intakingmyselftobeaperson,

Itakeyoutobeaperson;intakingyoutobeaperson,Itakethemtobepersons;

thatis,Itakeallofustobecommittedandresponsibletonormsofhermeneutical

rationality.Ialsotakeusalltobecollectivelycommittedtotheconstitutionofa

rule-governedlinguisticcommunityinthecontextofwhichmeaningcanbe

constituted,andsoinwhichfullyarticulateaddressispossible.

Thishasdeepramificationsforthenatureofintrospection,forprivilegedaccess,

andforourunderstandingofthemindsofothers.Introspection,onthismodel,is

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notinnerperception,butself-interpretation.Firstpersonauthorityisnotinfallible

perceptualaccesstoourinnerstates,butrather,asSellarsarguedsoforcefullyin

(1963),reflectstheskillwehaveinunderstandingandpredictingourownbehavior.

Wearebetteratthisthanweareatinterpretingothers,butwearefallible;andwe

arebetteratinterpretingothersthanwemightthink.Firstperson-thirdperson

asymmetryintheknowledgeofmindsis,then,amatterofdegree,andnotofkind.11

Whenweassignmentalstatestoothers,wemighttakeitthatourattributionsare

trueorfalsedependingonthepresenceofabsenceofindependentlyexistentinner

statesthataretruthmakersfortheseclaims.Tothinkthisway,asWittgenstein

arguesin(1991),istoworkone’swayintothe“problemofotherminds.”The

problemofothermindssoposedisadoubleproblem,withbothanepistemological

andasemanticface.Epistemologically,theproblemisthatwecanhaveatbestonly

inferentialknowledgeofthemindsofothers,andnogoodinductivereasonsfor

thinkingthatothershavemindsatall.Afterall,theonlymindswehaveever

directlyexperienced,onthisview,areourown.Semantically,since,onthisaccount,

wecaninprincipleneverhaveaccesstothetruthmakersofourattributionsofinner

states,weliterallyhavenoideawhatitwouldbefortheseattributionstobetrueor

11Afewqualificationsareinorderhere.First,thehermeneuticalstoryItellaboutintentionalinterpretationiscertainlynottheonlyalternativetoaclassicalmodelaccordingtowhichwehaveimmediateaccesstoourownmindsandonlyinferentialaccesstoothers.Onemighthaveaperceptualmodelofmentalknowledge,forinstance.(SeeGallagher2012andZahavi2008,forinstance.)Butmypointinthepresentessayistopressthecasefortheplausibilityofthismodel,andtodemonstrateitsadvantagesasanaccountofthedevelopmentofourunderstandingofthemental.Carruthers(2011),despitethefactthatwedisagreeregardingmuchofthebroaderlandscape,defendsasimilarpositionregardingprivilegedaccess.Ishouldalsopointoutthatthereisanimportantasymmetryincertainkindsofreportsofmentalstatesbetweenthefirstandthethirdpersoncases.Weoften“report”ourownmentalstatesnotasaconsequenceofintrospectionorreflection,butratherasprofessions,effectivelyactualizingwhatSellarslikedtocall“short-termpropensitiestospeakoutloud”byinfactspeakingoutloud,producingcandidutterancesthatmanifestourbeliefs,desires,orevensensoryexperiences.Itisthepossibilityofthiskindofexpressionthatoftenunderliesthesuspicionofadeepasymmetrybetweenfirst-andthird-personknowledgeofthemental.Butthesearenotcasesinwhichweexpressknowledgeofourownminds,butratherinwhichourstatesofmindaremanifested,bothtoourselvesandtoothers.SeeGarfield(1989).

14

false.Andinthatcase,weliterallyhavenoideawhatwemeanwhenweascribe

psychologicalstatestoothers.

Thisapparentproblemarisesfromthesupposedasymmetrybetweenfirst-person

andthird-personattribution.Ifourownmentalstatesareimmediatelyavailableto

us,butthoseofothersareinvisible,thereisnopossibilityofunderstandingmental

stateascription,orknowingthemindsofothers;butalsonopossibilityofknowing

ourown,astoknowourownstatesistoknowthemasinstancesofkinds.The

second-personperspective,anditshermeneuticmodelofunderstandingshowsthe

wayoutofthisparticularfly-bottle.Foronthismodel,ascriptionsofmentalstates

arenothostagetoindependenttruthmakersinanycase;theyareactsof

interpretation,andlikeallsuchactsareanswerableonlytothehermeneutical

norms,nottocorrespondence.(SeealsoKusch1997andGarfield2015fora

defenseofthehermeneuticalaccountofself-understanding.)

Thisisnot,however,ananti-realist,oraneliminativistviewofthemental.Forthe

absenceoftruthmakersdoesnotentailanabsenceoftruth.Interpretation,onthis

view,doesnotreflect,somuchasconstitute,therealityofourcognitivelives.

Interpretation,thatis,isconstitutive,whentakenasawhole;notreflectiveofpre-

existingpsychologicalreality,althoughanysingleattributionstandsorfallsonthe

groundsofitsharmonywithallothers.Thatis,whiletheentireensembleofsocial

andhermeneuticconventionsinwhichweparticipatemayconstitutethecontextin

whichitistruethatIbelievethatOsloisthecapitalofNorway,oncethatcontextis

inplace,thereisaclearfactofthematterregardingwhetherornotIholdthisbelief.

Thisislikesomanynorm-constitutedinstitutions.Wedonotdiscovermoney,but

createitbyinterpretingvariousbitsofpaper,metalandstatesofcomputing

machineryasmonetary;butthisdoesnotmeanthatthereisnotruthofthematter

regardingwhetheraparticularnoteisadollarnote,orwhatmybankbalanceis.The

wholeiscreated;butitcreatesacontextinwhichparticularstatementscanbetrue

orfalseinvirtueoftheinterpretationsalreadyassignedtoothers.

15

Forthisreasontherecanbeno“problemofotherminds”anymorethantherecan

bea“problemofotherdollars.”Tobeamindisnottohousehiddeninner

particulars;itistointerpretandtobeinterpreted;toaddressandtobeaddressed;

toparticipateinthecomplexhumanconversation.Weeachknowimmediatelythat

wearemindsnotthroughintrospection,butthroughparticipation.Weknowthat

othersaremindsnotthroughinferenceandnotthroughclairvoyance,butthrough

co-participation.Toallowourselvestobeaddressedby,ortoaddress,anotheristo

takehertobeaperson,tohaveamind;itisatthesametimetotakeourselvestobe

persons.Thisphenomenonofaddressrequiresneitherreflexiveself-consciousness,

qualitativeexperience,behavioralevidence,noranyoftheothersupposedly

empiricalmarkersofthementalproposedbythosewhotakethistobeanempirical,

ratherthananormative,matter.

IfweturntoanIndianBuddhistcontext,thissecond-person,hermeneutical

approachtosubjectivityandintersubjectivitygivesusanotherperspectivefrom

whichtoseewhypersonsareconventional,orlokavyāvahāraentities,asopposedto

independentlyexistentselvesorātman,repletewithindependentlyinherent

intentionalandqualitativeproperties.Tosaythatwearesociallyconstructedisnot

justtosaythatsomesuperficialproperties,suchasoursocialstatus,oroccupations,

areconstructedsocially,orthatsomeofourpreferencesandhabitsreflectour

cultures.Allofthatistrue,butitonlyscratchesthesurface.Onceweadoptthe

perspectiveIamsuggestinghere,wealsoseethat,inasmuchastobeapersonisto

beanaddressorandanaddressee,andistobeonewhotakesoneselfandothersto

bethesubjectsofintentionallycharacterizedstates,thatstatusisoneonly

achievable,andonlycomprehensible,inasocialcontext.Ourverybeing,likethe

institutionsinthecontextofwhichwefunction,issociallyconstructed.As

MandevilleandHumealsosawclearly,weareessentiallysocialanimals,

complicatedbees.Onedoesnotcometounderstandabeehivebystudying

16

individualbeesandscalingup;oneunderstandsanindividualbeebyunderstanding

howahiveworks,andwhatthatbee’sroleistherein.12

ThismayalsohelpsustoilluminateanideaadvancedbyŚāntaraksitainOrnament

totheMiddleWay(Madhyamakālaṃkāra)whenheclaimsthatreflexiveawareness

iswhatdistinguishesconsciousnessfrominsentientmatter.

16. Consciousnessarisesasdiametricallyopposed Innaturetoinsentientmatter. Itsnatureasnon-insentient Justisthereflexivityofitsawareness.

Incontext,itappearsthatŚāntarakṣitaissimplymakingthepointthattobe

genuinelyconsciousistobeself-conscious,distinguishingourawarenessofthe

sun’spositionfrom,say,thatofasunflowerorasundial:oursisconsciousbecause

weareawarethatweareaware;theirsisnotbecausetheyarenotsoreflexively

aware.Ihavecriticizedthisargumentelsewhere.(2006)Butwemightadoptan

alternativereadingofthisverse(perhapsmorecharitable,perhapsmore

tendentious,perhapssimplyacreativevamponŚāntarakṣitainaconversational

mood):tobegenuinesubjects,wecanimagineŚāntarakṣitasaying,istorepresent

ourselvesassubjects;and,wemightthenadd,torepresentourselvesassubjectsis

onlypossibleinanintersubjectivecontext.So,onthisreading,Śāntarakṣitais

pointingustowardsthenecessaryintersubjectivityofsubjectivity,evenifthiswas

nothisoriginalintention.Thisisthenausefuladumbrationoftheideaoftheperson

asaconventionallyconstitutedentity,involvingacreativedialoguewithaclassical

text.

Notethatitalsoallowsanti-reductionistBuddhistphilosopherssuchasŚāntarakṣita

awayofunderstandingtheirreducibilityofmindtothebodywithoutasubstance

dualism:wemightnotethatevenifwecantellapurelyphysicalcausalstoryabout

ourbodies,weneedaverydifferentkindofstoryaboutourintentionally

characterizedlives.Thatstorywillbehermeneutical,andwillrelyonsocial

12FormoreonHumeandMandevilleonthesocialdimensionofpersonhood,seeGarfield(2019).

17

conventionsandprocesses.Itwillbeasirreducibletothephysicalstoryas

economicsistometallurgy,oraestheticstogeometry.Itisthesuggestionthatfor

humanbeings,Mitseinisontologicallyaswellasphenomenologicallyand

epistemologicallypriortoDasein.Anditwillbeastoryaccordingtowhichmutual

recognitionliesattheheartofourconsciouslives.13

BuddhistphilosophershadnomonopolyinIndiaontheideathatthesecondperson

isindispensibletoself-understanding.AsChakrabarti(2011,p.31)shows,the

KashimirŚaivaphilosopherAbhinavagupta’srefutationofDharmakīrti’sanalysis

leadsdirectlytoarecognitionoftheprimacyofthesecondpersoninour

subjectivity.DharmakīrtiarguesthatsinceasIobservethatmyownspeechis

alwaysprecededbythoughtsandintentions,Icanconcludethatallspeechis

precededbythoughtsandintentions,andapplythisentailmenttothespeechof

others,concludingthattheirspeech,tooisalwaysprecededbythoughtsand

intentions,andsothattheyhaveminds.TheargumentiscastinthestandardIndian

probativeinferenceform,involvingasubject(speech),aproperty(precededby

thoughtsandintentions),anobservationofuniversalconcomitancethatjustifiesthe

assertionofanentailment,andtheextensiontoanewcase(thethoughtofothers).

Abhinavaguptademonstrates(aswouldWittgenstein900yearslater)thatthis

argumentisstraightforwardlyfallacious.14Theonlyentailmenttowhichmy

observationoftheconcomitanceofintentionandspeechinmyowncaseentitlesme

isthatmyownspeechisprecededbymyownintentions.Thisdoesnotvalidatethe

claimthatothers’speechisprecededbyothers’intentions.Theonlyalternativefor

13ItisalsoworthnotingthatwhilethiswayofreadingŚāntarakṣita,maynotbehistoricallyaccurate—foronething,Śāntarakṣitaiscommittedtoreflexivityasaprimitivecharacterofallconsciousness,humanandnon-human;foranother,heisanindividualist,notacollectivistregardingconsciousexperienceandsubjectivity—itisaplausiblewaytoplacehimindialoguebothwithhiscontemporariesandnear-contemporariesinIndia,andwithus.ItalsosuggeststhatŚāntarakṣitaprovidestheBuddhisttraditionwiththetoolstorefutetheDignāga-Dharmakīrtiviewthatweknowthemindsofothersonlyinferentially,onanalogywithourown,arefutationthat—whileneverdevelopedwithintheBuddhistworld—wasadvancedwithgreatforcebytheKashmiriŚaivaphilosopherAbhinavagupta.14Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Vimarśīnī216,astranslatedinChakarabarti2011

18

theBuddhist,Abhinavaguptasuggests,istoassumethatothers’speechisacase

exactlylikemyown,whichiswhatistobeproven.

Instead,Abhinavagupta,asChakrabartiputsit,“findstheYoutobeafoundational

middle-realitybetweenthepureSelfandtheapparentNon-Selfincontrastand

communitywithwhichtheSelfdiscoversitsownplayfulknower-hood.”(32)

Abhinavaguptaputsthepointthisway:

Thesenseinwhichtheaddressorandtheaddressee,thoughdifferent,becomeoneintheaddressingisindicativeoftheparaparaGoddess,whosecharacteristicisidentityindifference.(Ibid.)15

Thatis,itcannotbethecasethatwediscoverthatothershavemindsbyconsidering

thecausesoftheirspeechandbehavior.Fortodoso,wealreadymustpresuppose

thatthatspeechandbehaviorismeaningful—thatitisaptforinterpretation.Andto

supposethatisalreadytosupposethattheyarepersonswithminds,differentfrom

usinperspectiveandperhapsinbeliefsanddesires,butidenticaltousnature,asco-

participantsinthecommunitythatconstitutesmeaninginthefirstplace,playerson

thesameteam,occupyingdifferentpositions.JustasIcannotbeahalfbackwithout

afootballteam,Ican’tbeaspeakerwithoutacommunityofotherstoaddressand

bywhomtobeaddressed.The“problemofotherminds,”Abhinavaguptasuggests,

musthavebeenalreadysolvedinordereventobeposed.

3.TheBroaderSocialDimensionofSubjectivityThisbroadersocialandnormativedimensioninthestoryofthestructureofhuman

subjectivitysetsaccountsofself-knowledgeandself-consciousnesssuchasthoseof

Bhattacharyya,Wittgenstein,HeideggerandSellarsapartfromthoseofmore

individualisticphilosopherssuchasHusserlorZahavi,whotakefirstperson

subjectivitytobepre-reflectivelygiven,andtaketherecognitionofotherstobethe

automatic,preflectiveextensionofsomethingweknowfromourownsidetothem.

HusserlandZahavi,tobesure,recognizetheessentialroleofsecondpersonsin

discourse,inethics,andinourarticulateself-understanding.Zahaviwrites:

15Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Vimarśīnī70-71.

19

Thesecond-personpronounisyou.Thissuggeststhattoadoptasecond-personperspectiveonsomebodyistorelatetothatpersonasayou,ratherthanasaheorshe….[R]eciprocalengagementisacrucialanddistinctivecomponent.Formetorelatetoanotherasayouistorelatetosomeone,anI,whoisinturnrelatedtomeasayou.Second-personengagementisasubject-object(you-me)relationwhereIamawareofanddirectedattheotherand,atthesametime,implicitlyawareofmyselfintheaccusative,asattendedtoandaddressedbytheother.Second-personengagementconsequentlyinvolvesnotmerelyanawarenessoftheother,butalso,andatthesametime,aformofinterpersonalself-consciousness.(2016,p.5)

ZahavithenquotesHusserlonthispoint:

Theoriginofpersonalityisfoundinempathyandinthefurthersocialactsthatgrowoutofit.Forpersonality,itisnotenoughthatthesubjectbecomesawareofitselfasthecenterofitsacts;rather,personalityisconstitutedonlyasthesubjectentersintosocialrelationswithothers.(1973,p.175,translatedandquotedatZahavi2016,5)

HusserlandZahaviarguethattoseeoneselfasanaddresseeistoseeoneselfasa

subjectandassomeonerecognizedasasubject;toaddressanotheristotakethat

otherasasubject.16Tothispoint,theyareincompleteagreementwiththe

perspectivewehavebeenexploring.Butthereisahairsbreadthofdifference,and

thathairisworthsplittinginthiscontext.Thequestionconcernsepistemicand

ontologicalpriority.HusserlandZahavitakesubjectivitytobeprimordiallygivento

usinfirst-personexperience,andthenextendedtothesecondperson;

Abhinavagupta,Bhattacharyya,Chakrabarti,Reddy,andI(andonemightaddHume

andHeideggertothismix)taketherecognitionofsecondpersonstobeprimordial

andconstitutiveoffirst-personsubjectivity.

Weendupinthesameplaceinouraccountofmaturesubjectivity,butwediffer

regardingtheroute.Andinparticular,weagreethatinthesecond-person

perspective,wedonotseeourselvesfromthestandpointoftheother,butrathersee

thattheotherhasadistinctperspectiveofherown.Zahavialsomakesanicepoint

16And,asEmilyMcRaenotes(personalcommunication),withholdingthesecondperson,andreferringtoanotherbythethirdpersoninherpresence,isapotentwaytoconveydisrespect.

20

whenhearguesforthepriorityofthesecondpersonoverthethird,contrastingthe

intimate“we”ofdyadicengagementwiththeanonymous“we”ofidentificationwith

alargeclassofthirdpersons.(2016,pp.63ff)Iagreeentirelywiththatcontrast,

andwiththepriorityofthesecondpersonoverthethird.Ontheotherhand,Itakeit

thattheargumentIhaveofferedsofardefendstheprimordialityofthesecond

personoverthefirst.

IndianandWesternphilosophersarenotaloneinthisfield.Thereisalsoaclassical

Chinesesourceofinsightintothismatter,andthatisZhuangzi’sdiscussionofthe

“HappyFish.”Hereistherelevantpassage:

Oneday,ZhuangziwasstrollingbesidetheriverwithHuizi.Huizi,amanoferudition,wasfondofarguing.TheywerejustcrossingabridgewhenZhuangziaid,“Thefishhavecomeuptothesurfaceandareswimmingaboutattheirleisure.Thatishowfishenjoythemselves.”ImmediatelyHuizicounteredthiswith:“Youarenotafish.Howcanyoutellwhatafishenjoys?”“Youarenotme,”saidZhuangzi.“HowdoyouknowthatIcan’ttellwhatafishenjoys?”“Iamnotyou,”saidHuizitriumphantly.“SoofcourseIcannottellaboutyou.Inthesameway,youarenotafish.Soyoucannottellafish’sfeelings.Well—ismylogicnotunanswerable?”“Wait,letusgobacktotherootoftheargument,”saidZhuangzi.“WhenyouaskedmehowIknewwhatafishenjoyed,youadmittedthatyouknewalreadywhetherIknewornot.Iknew,onthebridge,thatthefishwereenjoyingthemselves.”(Yukawa2015,p.27)

Thereisawealthofcommentaryandamountainofdisputationregardingthis

passage.(SeeAmesandNakajima2015foragoodsampler.)Thisisnottheplaceto

enterintothoseextensiveinterpretativecontroversies.Ifocusinreadingthis

passage(asIoftendowhenreadingZhuangzi)onthefinallines.Zhuangzipointsout

toHuizithateventohavethisconversation,HuizimusttreatZhuangziasasecond

person:someonewithaperspectivedifferentfromhisown,anobjectofaddress,

andonewhocanhimselfaddress;butmorethanthat,someonewhois

interpretable,whosecognitivestatescanbeknown,andwhoseutterancescanbe

understood.Otherwise,evendisagreementisimpossible,letaloneagreement.

Conversation,andhenceunderstandingitself,andhencehumanityitself,relyonthis

second-personengagement.Thefisharenothingbutametaphorforthispoint.

21

Zhuangziengageswiththefishas(reduced)secondpersons.Whetherheisrightor

wrongtodosoacrossspecieslines,hispointisthatimmediatesecond-person

engagementisessentialtowhoweare.Huizi’schallengeistoostrong(andagain,

thisisnottosaythatthereisnotaweaker,fallibilistchallengeavailabletohim):it

suggeststhatanysubjectivedifference,anydifferenceinexperienceorperspective

makesunderstandingimpossible.Thathastobewrong;anditisZhuangzi’spoint

thatthatdifferenceinperspectiveiswhatmakessecondpersonengagement

possible,andhenceunderstandingitselfpresupposesnotidentitybutdifference.

4.TheEthicalDimension:ResponsivenessvsReactivityAsInotedattheoutset,thisrecognitionoftheimportanceofthesecondpersonin

IndianandinWesternphilosophyhasanimportantethicaldimension.Inethical

discourseweareoftenaskedtotakeadisinterestedperspective,whetherinorder

tobefair,asinaKantianframework,tobeagent-neutral,asinaUtilitarian

framework,totakeupthedisinterestedpointofviewinHumeanterms,orto

cultivateupekṣaasinaBuddhistframework.Ineachcase,weareaskedtodevelop

equalregardandconcernforallpersons,nomatterhoworwhethertheyarerelated

tous.Thisisademandtotreatthirdpersonsaswewouldtreatourselvesorour

second-personintimates;toelidethedifferencebetweentheintimateandthe

anonymous“we,”inZahavi’sterms.Doesthisunderminethespecialregardthat

seemstobeimpliedbytheprimacyofthesecondperson?

Ithinknot,andindeedthatsecond-personprimacyhelpstounderstandhowthis

perspectivecanbeachieved.Itwouldbeonethingtounderstandthisasademand

eithertomovedirectlyfromthefirstpersoncasetothethirdpersoncase,astheso-

calledGoldenRulemightbeinterpretedtosuggest,ortobeaskedtotreatallsecond

personsasthirdpersons,assomeKantiansmightsuggest.Inthefirstcase,weare

askedtoextendegoisticregardtoallpersons,whichisincoherentonitsface;onthe

second,weareaskedtotreatintimatesasstrangers,whichisequallymorallyand

psychologicallyproblematic.Butthesearenottheonlyoptions.Theother

possibilityistotreatthirdpersonsassecondpersons,andtoextendthenatural

non-egoisticregardandaffectionwehaveforintimateinterlocutorstoothers.This

22

istheworkofmoralcultivation.Humesuggestsasmuchwhenhediscussesthe

waysinwhichwewidenthecircleofthosetowhomwefeelintimatelyrelatedby

theuseofthemoralimagination.17IntheBuddhistcontexts,thisisthepointof

imaginingallsentientbeingsasone’smother.

Notethatthemoralexerciseisneithertothinkofallsentientbeingsasoneself,norto

thinkofone’smotherasjustlikeanyothersentientbeing.Rather,thespecial

second-personrelationonehastoone’smotheriswhatistobegeneralizedinthe

moralattitude.Thesecondpersonhasprideofplacehere,andisthestartingpoint

formoralconsciousness.Incultivatingmoralimpartialityornon-egocentricity

(upekṣa̛),wedoaimtoattainakindofde-centerednessinmoralvision,inwhichwe

nolongerstandatthecenterofourmoraluniverse,butwedonotaimatcomplete

anonymityinthatuniverse,butratherextendedintimacywithit,andthatisenabled

byoursecond-personrelationshipsandourabilitytogeneralizethem.Insteadof

seeingaYouasoneofmany,weaimtoseethemanyasinstancesofYou.18

17StephenDarwallin(2006)arguesforaversionofsecondpersonethics.HisapproachisrelatedtothatIdevelophere.Darwallreliesontheideathatmoralengagementinvolvesmakingclaimsonothers,havingobligationstowardsothers,andrecognizingothersasmakingclaimsonusandhavingobligationstowardsus.ThisideaisgroundedinStrawson’s(1968)discussionofreactiveattitudes.(SeeDarwall2013a,xi).Nonetheless,Darwallalsonotes(2013b,92)thatspecialrelations,andinparticular,intimaterelationships,requirethat“genuinecareforothersisanattitudetowardsthemasparticularindividualsandnotjustas“generalizedothers.”AndendorsingBuber’scritiqueofHeidegger,Darwallnotesthatintimatesecond-personrelationshipsrequireaspecialkindofaccesstooneselfsharedwiththeother.(Ibid.,112)Healsonotestheprimacyofparent-childrelationshipsinestablishingtheabilitytobewithanother.(130)Ontheotherhand,despitehisnodstoHume,HutchesonandSmithinthiscontext,Darwall’spositionisimportantdifferentfromthatIdefendhere,andthisinatleasttwoimportantrespects.First,Darwalltakessecond-personethicalrelationstofalloutofmoregeneralprinciplesofautonomy,justiceandrights,thatareindependentofspecialdyadicrelations;Itakethesespecialdyads,andtheintimacytheyaffordtogroundthemoregeneralmoralperspective.Second,Darwalltakesthemoralpointofviewtobeindependentofaffect;Itakeittobeessentiallyaffective.Third,Darwallseesouridentityasconstitutedindependentlyofthesecondpersonrelationshipsintowhichweenter;Iseethesecondpersonasessentialtoconstitutingouridentities.So,whileweshareacommitmenttothesecondpersonperspectiveasessentialtomorallife,wedosofordifferentreasons,andweconnectthatperspectivetopersonhoodinverydifferentways.18ThispositionalsohasdeepaffinitiestoStoicethicalthought,andinparticular,Hierocles’insistencethatethicalsensibilityinvolvesbothwideningourcircleofconcernfromour

23

Thisismadepossiblebytheultra-socialityofourspecies.Wearebiologicallytuned

forcooperation,includingcooperationwithpassingacquaintances.Weseethisin

oureverydaylifeandinourregularinteractionswithstrangers,whetherin

commerceorcasualmeeting.Thisultrasocialityisessentialtoourbeing—toour

DaseinaswellasourMitsein.Ifwearetothrive,wemustthriveinasocialcontext,

andifwearetothriveinasocialcontext,wemustbebothtrustingandtrustworthy.

Moreover,tothriveinasocialcontext,wemustbebothgoodatinterpretingothers,

andwemustourselvesbeinterpretable.Ifwefailintrust,intrustworthiness,in

interpretation,orintransparency,wefailtobesocial,andifwefailtobesocial,we

failtobefullyhuman.Itisthecontextofsecond-personinteractionsinwhichthese

skillsarecultivated;andwhattheyenableisthecultivationofmore,moremature,

andmorevariedandinterlockedsecond-personrelations.19

Weknowourselvesandourfellowsinmanyguises:asknowersandinquirers;as

moralandpoliticalactors;asfriends;ascompetitors;asloversandasenemies;as

seekersandasteachers.Burfirstandforemost,weknoweachotherasaddressees

andaddressors,andsoassecondpersons.Togetherweimprovisetheeveryday

worldinwhichweinteract—lokavyāvahāra—thatistheonlycontextinwhich

humanlifecanhavemeaning.

immediatefamilytoourclan,toourstate,toallofhumanity,andthennarrowingthatcircletobringasmanyaspossibleintocloserelation,anideathatwesee(Garfield2019)developedinHume’sethicalthoughtaswell.IthankAmberCarpenterfordrawingthisconnectiontomyattention.19SeeRoughleyandBayertz(2019)foracollectionofsuperbessaysfrombiology,anthropology,ethology,psychology,andphilosophythattogethermakeanoverwhelmingcaseforthisevolutionaryperspectiveonourultra-sociality.

24

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