SEC. 17 RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATIONU.S v TAN TENGFACTS:The defendant was charged of the crime of rape. After hearing the evidence, the Honorable Charles S. Lobingier, judge, found the defendant guilty of the offense of abusos deshonestos, as defined and punished under article 439 of the Penal Code.Oliva Pacomio, a girl seven years of age, was, on the 15th day of September , 1910, staying in the house of her sister, located on Ilang-Ilang Street, Manila.That on said day a number of Chinamen were gambling had been in the habit of visiting the house of the sister of the offended party; that Oliva Pacomio, on the day in question, after having taken a bath, returned to her room; defendant followed her into her room and asked her for some face powder, which she gave him; that after using some of the face powder upon his private parts he threw the said Oliva upon the floor, placing his private parts upon hers, and remained in that position for some little time. Several days later, perhaps a week or two, the sister of Oliva Pacomio discovered that the latter was suffering from a venereal disease known as gonorrhea. It was at the time of this discovery that Oliva related to her sister what happened upon the morning of the 15th of September. The sister at once put on foot an investigation to find the Chinaman. A number of Chinamen were collected together. Oliva was called upon to identify the one who had abused her. The defendant was not present at first. Later he arrived and Oliva identified him at once as the one who had attempted to violate her.The policeman who examined the defendant swore from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea.CONTENTION: defendant objected strongly to the admissibility of the testimony of Oliva, on the ground that because of her tender years her testimony should not be given creditDEFENSE: Attempted to show that the venereal disease of gonorrhea might be communicated in ways other than by contact such as is described in the present case, and called medical witnesses for the purpose of supporting the contention.HELD:The medical experts who testified agreed that this disease could have been communicated from him to her by the contact described. Believing as we do the story told by Oliva, we are forced to the conclusion that the disease with which Oliva was suffering was the result of the illegal and brutal conduct of the defendant.The defendant testifed and brought other Chinamen to support his declaration, that the sister of Oliva threatened to have him prosecuted if he did not pay her the sum of P60.ALLEGED INADMISSIBBLE EVIDENCE. That to admit such evidence was to compel the defendant to testify against himself.Judge Lobingier: The accused was not compelled to make any admissions or answer any questions, and the mere fact that an object found on his person was examined: seems no more to infringe the rule invoked, than would the introduction in evidence of stolen property taken from the person of a thief. THERE WAS NO OBJECTION WHEN THE SUBSTANCE WAS TAKEN FROM HIM.ANALOGY: So also if the clothing which he wore, by reason of blood stains or otherwise, had furnished evidence of the commission of a crime, there certainly could have been no objection to taking such for the purpose of using the same as proof.Holt vs. U.S.: But the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself, is aprohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him,NOT AN EXCLUSION OF HIS BODY AS EVIDENCE, WHEN IT MAY BE MATERIAL.The objection, in principle, would forbid a jury (court) to look at a person and compare his features with a photograph in proof. Moreover we are not considering how far a court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself, for when he is exhibited, whether voluntarily or by order, even if the order goes too far, the evidence if material, is competent.It was not erroneous to permit the physician of the jail in which the accused was confined, to testify to wounds observed by him on the back of the hands of the accused, although he also testified that he had the accused removed to a room in another part of the jail and divested of his clothing. The observation made by the witness of the wounds on the hands and testified to by him, was in no sense a compelling of the accused to be a witness against himself. If the removal of the clothes had been forcible and the wounds had been thus exposed, it seems that the evidence of their character and appearance would not have been objectionable.NOTE: The prohibitioncontained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself,is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt.Mr. Wigmore: In other words, it is not merely compulsionthat is the kernel of the privilege, . . . but testimonial compulsion.MAIN PURPOSE: isto PROHIBIT COMPULSORY ORAL EXAMINATION of prisoners before trial. or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations IMPLICATING THEM IN THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME. (Peoplevs. Gardner, 144 N. Y., 119.)The doctrine contended for by the appellant would also prohibit the sanitary department of the Government from examining the body of persons who are supposed to have some contagious disease.IN THE CASE AT BAR: Evidence are generally proved by CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. In cases of rape the courts of law require corroborative proof, for the reason that such crimes are generally committed in secret.RULING: GUILTY.

VILLAFLOR v. SUMMERSFACTS:The petitioner prays that a writ of habeas corpus issue to restore her to her liberty.Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are charged with the crime of adultery. Upon the petitioner of the assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the court ordered the defendant Emeteria Villaflor to submit her body to the examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. The accused refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination. Thereupon she was found in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination required by the court.ISSUE: Whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnant, violates that portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights and that portion of our Code of Criminal Procedure which find their origin in the Constitution of the United States and practically all state constitutions and in the common law rules of evidence, providing that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.

Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt v.U.S: The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material."BUT, other courts have likewise avoided any attempt to determine the exact location of the dividing line between what is proper and what is improper in this very broad constitutional field.Here in the Philippines, being in the agrreable state of breaking new ground, would rather desire our decision to rest on a strong foundation of reason and justice than on a weak one blind adherence to tradition and precedent.The protection of accused persons has been carried to such an unwarranted extent that criminal trials have sometimes seemed to be like a game of shuttlecocks, with the judge as referee, the lawyers as players, the criminal as guest of honor, and the public as fascinated spectators. Against such a loose extension of constitutional guaranties we are here prepared to voice our protest.Fully conscious that we are resolving a most extreme case in a sense, which on first impression is a shock to one's sensibilities, we must nevertheless enforce the constitutional provision in this jurisdiction in accord with the policy and reason thereof, undeterred by merely sentimental influences.Once again we lay down the rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, AN OCULAR INSPECTION OF THE BODY OF THE ACCUSED IS PERMISSIBLE. The proviso is that torture of force shall be avoided. Whether facts fall within or without the rule with its corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided as cases arise.Itis a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not to embarass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection to the physical examination being made by the family doctor of the accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen.RULING: WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS DENIED.

BELTRAN v. JUDGE SAMSONFACTS:This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner complains that the respondent judge ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter.The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting and determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified.Of course, the fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the proper judge, upon motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the investigation of any crime or misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to appear.And the petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks refuge in the constitutional provision contained in the Jones Law and incorporated in General Orders, No. 58.Par 3, section 3 of the Jones Law which (in Spanish) has been incorporated in our Criminal Procedure (General Orders, No. 58) in section 15 (No. 4 ) and section 56.English text of the Jones Law, which is the original one, reads as follows: "Nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."As to its scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of evidence.The rights intended to be protected by the constitutional provision that no man accused of crime shall be compelled to be a witness against himself is so SACRED, and the pressure toward their relaxation so great when the SUSPICION OF GUILT IS STRONG AND THE EVIDENCE OBSCURE,that is the duty of courts liberally to construe the prohibition in favor of personal rights, and to refuse to permit any steps tending toward their invasion. Hence,there is the well-established doctrine that the constitutional inhibition is directed not merely to giving of oral testimony, but embraces as well the furnishing of evidence by other means than by word of mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact which the accused has a right to hold secret. (28 R. C. L., paragraph 20, page 434 and notes.) (Emphasis ours.)ISSUE: Whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under examination.NOTE: Whenever the defendant, at the trial of his case, testifying in his own behalf, denies that a certain writing or signature is in his own hand, he may on cross-examination be compelled to write in open court in order that the jury maybe able to compare his handwriting with the one in question.We have also come upon a case wherein the handwriting or the form of writing of the defendant was obtainedbeforethe criminal action was instituted against him. We refer to the case of People vs. Molineux (61 Northeastern Reporter, 286). Neither may it be applied to the instant case, because there, as in the aforesaid case of Sprouse vs. Com.,the defendant voluntarily offeredto write, to furnish a specimen of his handwriting. Measuringorphotographingthe party is not within the privilege. Nor it is theremovalorreplacementof his garments or shoes. Nor is the requirement that the party move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.Requiring him to makespecimens of handwritingis no more than requiring him to move his body . . ."People vs. Molineux which, as we have seen, has no application to the case at bar because there the defendant voluntary gave specimens of his handwriting, IN THE CASE AT BAR: the petitioner refuses to do so and has even instituted these prohibition proceedings that he may not be compelled to do so.Furthermore, in the case before us, writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; WRITING IS NOT A PURELY MECHANICAL ACT, BECAUSE IT REQUIRES THE APPLICATION OF INTELLIGENCE AND ATTENTION; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. And as to such production of documents or chattels. which to our mind is not so serious as the case now before us, the same eminent Professor Wigmore, in his work cited, says (volume 4, page 864): MAY BE REFUSED UNDER THE PROTECTION OF PRIVILEGE.SIMILARITY. We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself.MORE SERIOUS than compelling the production of docs of chattelsbecause here the witness is COMPELLED TO WRITE create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier.ALTHOUGH NOT ORAL IN FORM still no line can be drawn short of any process which treats him as a witness; because in virtue it would be at any time liable to make oath to the identity or authenticity or origin of the articles produced.NOTE: Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, according to Exhibit A, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even if supposing it is impossible to obtain sig. specimen, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution.PRIVILEGE NOT TO GIVE SELF-INCRIMINATING EVIDENCE ABSOLUTE when CLAIMED, WAIVABLE by anyone entitled to invoke it. In Villamor v. Summers, she was not compelled to execute any positive act, much less a testimonial act; she was only enjoined from something preventing the examination; all of which is very different from what is required of the petitioner of the present case, where it is sought to compel him to perform apositive, testimonial act, to write and give a specimen of his handwriting for the purpose of comparisonBesides, in the case of Villamor vs. Summers, it was sought to exhibit something already in existence, while in the case at bar, the question deals with something not yet in existence, and it is precisely sought to compel the petitioner to make, prepare, or produce by this means, evidence not yet in existence; in short, to create this evidence which may seriously incriminate hiRULING: DESIST FROM COMPELLING PETITIONER TO TAKE DOWN DICTATION IN HIS HANDWRITING FOR COMPARISON.

CHAVEZ v CAFACTS:The thrust of petitioner's case presented in his original and supplementary petitions invoking jurisdiction of this Court is that he is entitled, on habeas corpus, to be freed from imprisonment upon the ground that in the trial which resulted in his conviction he was denied his constitutional right not to be compelled to testify against himself. There is his prayer, too, that, should he fail in this, he be granted the alternative remedies of certiorari to strike down the two resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing his appeal for failure to file brief, and of mandamus to direct the said court to forward his appeal to this Court for the reason that he was raising purely questions of law.QUALIFIED THEFT of motor vehicle. The accused conspired, with intent of gain, abuse of confidence and without the consent of the owner thereof, Dy Sun Hiok y Lim, in asporting the motor vehicle above-described.Upon arraignment, all the accused, except the three Does who have not been identified nor apprehended, pleaded not guilty. During the trial, the counsel for the accused, herein petitioner Chavez, was surprised that his client was presented as a witness for the prosecution. When askd by the Court if the accused will going to be a state witness, the Fiscal replied that he will serve as a ordinary witness. Counsel: As a matter of right, because it will incriminate my client, I object. AFTER RECESS so that counsel would explain the consequences of the accuseds acts, judge said: What he will testify todoes not necessarily incriminate him, counsel. And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness-stand including the accused.ROGER CHAVEZ, 31 years old, single, buy and sell merchant, presently detained at the Manila Police Department headquarters, after being duly sworn according to law, Trial proceed. It began with the "direct examination" of Roger Chavez by "Fiscal Grecia".VERSION OF PROSECUTION:Roger Chavez saw Johnson Lee, a Chinese, driving a Thunderbird car. With Ricardo Sumilang (movie actor Romeo Vasquez) in mind, whom he knew was in the market for such a car, Chavez asked Lee whether his car was for sale. Lee answered affirmatively and left his address with Chavez.PLAN: capitalize on Romeo Vasquez' reputation as a wealthy movie star, introduce him as a buyer to someone who was selling a car and, after the deed of sale is signed, by trickery to run away with the car. Asistio would then register it, sell it to a third person for a profit. Chavez known to be a car agent was included in the plan. He furnished the name of Johnson Lee who was selling his Thunderbird.CONSPIRACY. Here, Asistio handed to Sumilang P1,000.00 cash and a golf set worth P800.00 as the latter's share in the transaction. On the 14th of November, the registration of the car was transferred in the name of Sumilang in Cavite City, and three days later, in the name of Asistio in Caloocan.The trial court gave evidence to Sumilang's averment, strengthened by Baltazar's and Cailles' corroborations, that he paid good money for the car. Sumilang was thus cleared. So was Asistio whom the trial court believed to be a mere buyer of the car. And so, the prosecution's theory of conspiracy was discounted.he sum of all these is that the trial court freed all the accused except Roger Chavez who was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime ofqualified theft and indemnify Dy Sun Hiok and/or Johnson Lee in the sum of P21,000.00. The Thunderbird car then in the custody of the NBI was ordered to be turned over to Ricardo Sumilang, who was directed to return to Asistio the sum of P1,000.00 unless the latter chose to pay P21,500.00, representing the balance of the contract price for the car.HELD: 1.Petitioner's plea: his rights against self-incrimination was violated. He asks that the hand of this Court be made to bear down upon his conviction; that he be relieved of the effects thereof. He asks us to consider the constitutional injunction that "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself,"9fully echoed in Section 1, Rule 115, Rules of Court where, in all criminal prosecutions, the defendant shall be entitled: "(e) To be exempt from being a witness against himself."NOTE: It has been said that forcing a man to be a witness against himself is at war with "the fundamentals of a republican government";1that [i]t may suit the purposes of despotic power but it can not abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom.HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THIS RIGHT (J. Abad Santos). Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare(No one is bound to accuse himself) had its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused persons, which has long obtained in the continental system, and, until the expulsion of the Stuarts from the British throne in 1688, and the erection of additional barriers for the protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary power, was not uncommon even in England. DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION: the ease with which the questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation to press, the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so painfully evident in many of the earlier state trials,Mr. Justice Malcolm, in expressive language, tells us that this maxim was recognized in England in the early days "in a revolt against the thumbscrew and the rack."NOTE: Not merely technical rule, the enforcement of which is left to the discretion of the court"; it is mandatory; it secures to a defendant a valuable and substantive right.INTENDED AS SHIELD. Speaking thru Mr. Justice Harlan warned that "[t]he constitutional privilege was intended to shield the guilty and imprudent as well as the innocent and foresighted."ESTABLISHED ON GROUNDS OF PUBLIC POLICY AND HUMANITY. Of policy because it would place the witness against the strongest temptation to commit perjury, and of humanity because it would be to extort a confession of truth by a kind of duress every species and degree of which the law abhors. (US v. Navarro)Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an admission of his guilt. Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will.NOTE: compulsion DOES NOT necessarily connote VIOLENCE; it may be the PRODUCT OF UNINTENTIONAL STATEMENTS. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant."2. Petitioner is a defendant in a criminal case. He was called by the prosecution as the first witness in that case to testify for the People during the first day of trial thereof.Petitioner objected and invoked the privilege of self-incrimination. This he broadened by the clear cut statement thathe will not testifyBut petitioner's protestations were met with the judge's emphatic statement that it "is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness standincluding the accused," CUMULATIVE IMPACT: petitioner had take the stand.In reality, the purpose of calling the accused to the witness stand is to incriminate him. The rule positively intends to avoid and prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person "to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction."This rule may apply even to a co-defendant in a joint trial.INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEPT. Accused shall not be compelled to furnish evidence against himself "is not the probability of the evidence but it is thecapability of abuse."Thus it is, that it was undoubtedly erroneous for the trial judge to placate petitioner with these words: What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him, counsel. And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness-stand including the accused.Chief Justice Marshall in Aaron Burr's Trial: While a defendant's knowledge of the facts remains concealed within his bosom, he is safe; but draw it from thence, and he is exposed" to conviction.By those words, petitioner was enveloped by a coercive force; they deprived him of his will to resist; they foreclosed choice; the realities of human nature tell us that as he took his oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, no genuine consent underlay submission to take the witness stand. Constitutionally sound consent was absent.3. The record discloses that by leading questions Chavez, the accused, was made to affirm his statement given to the NBI agents on July 17, 1963 at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon.And this statement detailed the plan and execution thereof by Sumilang (Vasquez), Asistio and himself to deprive the Chinese of his Thunderbird car. And he himself proceeded to narrate the same anew in open court. He identified the Thunderbird car involved in the caseThe decision was built primarily around the admissions of Chavez himself. STAR WITNESS - the damaging facts forged in the decision were drawn directly from the lips of Chavez as a prosecution witness and of course Ricardo Sumilang for the defense.4. With all these, the Court have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. NOTE: There is therefore NO WAIVER OF THE PRIVILEGE IN THIS CASE. "To be effective, a waiver must be certain andunequivocal, andintelligently,understandably,andwillinglymade; such waiver following only whereliberty of choicehas been fully accorded. After a claim a witness cannot properly be held to have waived his privilege on vague and uncertain evidence."The foregoing guidelines, juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to, make waiver a shaky defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his original claim remains valid. For the privilege, we say again, is a rampart that gives protection -even to the guilty.5. ISSUANCE OF WRIT IS PROPER (extends to all cases of confinement)RULING: DISCHARGE ACCUSED

PEOPLE v GALLARDEFACTS:Accused-appellant Radel Gallarde was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. Gallarda was charged of special complex crime of rape w/ homicide. Witnesses presented by the prosecution were Mario Fernandez, Jaime Cabinta, Rosy Clemente, Felicisimo Mendoza, Alfredo Cortez, Renato Fernandez, SPO4 Oscar B. Lopez, and Dr. Perfecto Tebangin.In the evening of May 26, 1997, at the house of spouses Eduardo and Elena Talan in Brgy. Trenchea, Tayug, Pangasinan, their neighbors converged. Among them were appellant Radel Gallarde, Francisco, Renato, Edwin, all surnamed Fernandez, Romel Hernandez, Jaime Cabinta, Rosy Clemente, Jon Talen, Noel Arellaga and Ramil Bargon. Idling by was Editha, 10 year old daughter of spouses Talan. A fluorescent lamp illuminated them as they partook beer.By 10:00 oclock that evening, the drinking buddies had dispersed but Jaime, Francisco, Edwin and Rose regrouped at Renatos place where they talked and relaxed. Moments later, Roger arrived and informed them that Editha was missing. Roger asked the group to help look for her. Elena Talan informed his uncle, Barangay Ex-kagawad Mario Fernandez, about her daughters disappearance. The latter, together with his son Edwin, wife Virginia and nephew Freddie Cortez wasted no time in joining their neighbors search the houses, dikes and fields to look for the missing child. The searchers used a lighted rubber tire.About 7 meters away from appellants house, one of the searchers, Alfredo Cortez, found Edithas left foot slipper (TSN dated October 22, 1997, pp. 4-6). Suddenly, Edwin Fernandez announced: "Tata, Radel is here!" pointing to the toilet about 6 meters away from appellants house. The searchers found appellant squatting with his short pants. His hands and knees were covered with soil. When confronted by ex-kagawad Hernandez why he was there, appellant answered he was relieving himself.From the dishevelled grasses, nephew of the Ex-kagawad found Edithas hand pitted out. Brgy. Captain Mendoza decided to bring appellant to the municipal building. On their way though, they met policemen on board a vehicle. He flagged them down and turned over the person of appellant, saying: "Here is the suspect in the disappearance of the little girl. Since you are already here, I am giving him to you.GALLARDE further declared on cross-examination and on questions by the court that he considered Editha Talan as a sister and her parents also treated him in a friendly manner. When he came to know that Edithas parents suspected him of the crime, he was still on friendly terms with them. However, he did no go to them to tell them he was innocent because they brandished a bolo in anger.RTC: Murder only.HELD:We sustain GALLARDEs contention that the trial court erred in convicting him of murder in an information charging him of rape with homicide. A reading of the accusatory portion of the information shows that there was no allegation of any qualifying circumstance.In the absence then in the information of an allegation of any qualifying circumstance, GALLARDE cannot be convicted of murder.An accused cannot be convicted of an offense higher than that with which he is charged in the complaint or information under which he is tried.The rules on evidence and precedents sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial evidence, as long as the following requisites are present: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt of the guilt of the accused.TAKING OF PICTURES NOT VIOLATION OF RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. We cannot agree with the trial courts rejection of the photographs (Exhibits "I," "J" and "K") taken of GALLARDE immediately after the incident on the ground that "the same were taken while [GALLARDE] was already under the mercy of the police." The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination[26]proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required.[27]The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act.[28]Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy;[29]and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim;[30]to expel morphine from his mouth;[31]to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints;[32]and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.[33]Besides, no evil motive has been established against the witnesses for the prosecution that might prompt them to incriminate the accused or falsely testify against him. It is settled that when there is no showing that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that the witnesses were not so actuated and their testimonies are thus entitled to full faith and credit. Testimonies of witnesses who have no motive or reason to falsify or perjure their testimonies should be given credence.RULING: HOMICIDEaPASCUAL v. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERSFACTS:This Court is of the opinion that in order that the constitutional provision under consideration may prove to be a real protection and not a dead letter, it must be given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable to the person invoking it." As phrased by Justice Laurel in his concurring opinion: "The provision, as doubtless it was designed, would be construed with the utmost liberality in favor of the right of the individual intended to be served. (Bermudez v. Castillo)Arsenio Pascual, Jr., petitioner-appellee, filed on February 1, 1965 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners. Alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness herein petitioner-appellee, who was the respondent in such malpractice charge. OBJECTED invoking right to be exempt from being witness against himself.RTC ordered a writ of preliminary injunction against respondent Board.CONTENTION: Petitioner-appellee's remedy is to object once he is in the witness stand, for respondent "a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law," precluding the issuance of the relief sought. HELD:The Court find for the petitioner appelle.1. InCabal v. Kapunan, proceeding for certiorari and prohibition to annul an order of Judge Kapunan, it appeared that an administrative charge for unexplained wealth having been filed against petitioner under the Anti-Graft Act, the complainant requested the investigating committee that petitioner be ordered to take the witness stand, which request was granted. Upon petitioner's refusal to be sworn, a charge for contempt was filed against him in the sala of respondent Judge. He filed a motion to quash and upon its denial, he initiated this proceeding. We found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand."IN THE CASE AT BAR: The petitioner will be similarly be disadvantaged for his license will be revoked as a medical practitioner. J. DOUGLAS: that it extends its protection to lawyers as well as to other individuals, and that it should not be watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it." We reiterate that such a principle is equally applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice the medical profession.2. MISCONCEPTION OF THE RIGHT TO OBJECT ONLY WHEN THERE IS AN INCRIMINATING QUESTION. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as 1905, we had occasion to declare: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt."12Only last year, inChavez v. Court of Appeals,13speaking through Justice Sanchez, we reaffirmed the doctrine anew that it is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will."To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens."NOTE: The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender to his detriment.Judge Frank who spoke of "a right to a private enclave where he may lead a private life. That right is the hallmark of our democracy.CANNOT COMPEL A PERSON TO TAKE THE WITNESS STAND W/O HIS CONSENT.RULING: AFFRIMED.

MAPA, JR. v. SANDIGANBAYANFACTS:The denial of the right to be free from further prosecution of a cooperative witness who has been granted immunity is the core issue posed in this petition. On balance are important RIGHTS IN CONFLICT: the right of an individual who has surrendered his constitutional prerogative to be silent to the State to be exempt from further prosecution; the right of the State to prosecute all persons who appear to have committed a crime and its PREROGATIVE TO REVOKE THE IMMUNITY IT HAS GRANTED TO AN ACCUSED FOR BREACH OF AGREEMENT; and the extent of the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as an impartial tribunal to review the grant of immunity extended by the PCGG to an accused.On January 20, 1987, petitioners Placido L. Mapa and Lorenzo Vergara, together with Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, Fernando Balatbat, Ramon Aviado, Jr., Dominador Lopez, Jr., Fernando Maramag, Jr., and Jose Crisanto, Jr., were charged with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019).Accused Mapa, Jr. among others, acting in various capacities as mgt officials of the PNB, Natl Investment and Devt Corp. and Pantranco North Express Inc., ALL GOCCs, with intent to gain, conspiring w/ Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, son-in-law of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and therefore related to the deposed President by affinity within the third degree, PROMOTE AND FACILITATE THE SALE OF A MAJOR PORTION of the public utility assets of Pantranco Express for P775M to North Express Transport, Inc. owned and controlled by co-accused Gregorio Araneta III (utility buses).IN THE INTERIM: former Pres. Marcos and wife were charged by violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Org Act (RICO) by transporting investment money thru cronies. To insure conviction, petitioner herein and Vergara were to testify in the said cases IN EXCHANGE OF A PROMISE OF IMMUNITY FROM FURTHER PROSECUTION. They agreed. PCGG formalized agreement w/ petitioners in writing.IMMUNITY. The immunity has been granted by the REPUBLIC to MAPA on the basis of and relying on MAPA's promise of cooperation as described herein. In case of breach of his commitment to fully cooperate and make himself available as a witness in the case entitled "United States of America vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al.", the immunity herein granted shall forthwith be deemed revoked, and of no force and effect.The petitioners complied with their respective undertaking. They travelled to New York to testify against the Marcoses. Their travel fare and hotel accommodations were even furnished by the PCGG. But despite their availability and willingness to testify, the US prosecutors decided not to call them to the witness stand. The result was a debacle for the US prosecutors and the PCGG. Mrs.Imelda Marcos was acquitted by the jury. Earlier, former President Marcos was delisted as an accused as he died in the course of the proceedings.After, petitioners filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss concurred by PCGG on the ground of immunity. Respondent court denied MR. Hence, this recourse where petitioners charge the respondent court with grave abuse of discretion in denying their Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration.HELD:There is merit in petition. The practice of granting government, its officials, and some accused or respondents immunity from suits, has a long history.EXPRESS PROVISIONS ALLOWING IMMUNITIES.Article XVI, section 3 provides that "the State may not be sued without its consent."Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: ". . . there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends." Article VI, section 11 of the Constitution also grants parliamentary immunities. Pres. is also immunized from suit during tenure.PD 749. Congress has enacted laws giving immunity to witnesses to facilitate the solution of crimes with high political, social and economic impact against the people. Some of these statutory grants are related in the impugned ResolutionSection 1. Any person who voluntarily gives information about any violation of Articles 210, 211, 212 of the Revised Penal Code, Republic Act No. 3019, as amended; Section 345 of the Internal Revenue Code and Section 3604 of the Tariff and Customs Code and other provisions of the said codes penalizing abuse or dishonesty on the part of the public officials concerned; and other laws, rules and regulations punishing acts of graft, corruption and other forms of official abuse; and who willingly testified, such violator shall be exempt from prosecution or punishment for the offense with reference to which his information and testimony were given, and may plead or prove the giving of such information and testimony in bar of such prosecution:Provided, That this immunity may be enjoyed even in cases where the information and the testimony are given against a person who is not a public official but who is a principal or accomplice, or accessory in the commission of any of the above-mentioned violations:Provided,further, That this immunity may be enjoyed by such informant or witness notwithstanding that he offered or gave bribe or gift to the public official or is an accomplice for such gift or bribe-giving; And,Provided,finally, That the following conditions concur:1. The information must refer to consummated violations of any of the above- mentioned provisions of law, rules and regulations;2. The information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of the accused public officer;3. Such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the State;4. Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its material points; and5. The informant or witness has not been previously convicted of a crime involving moral turpitudePD No. 1886, the Agrava Fact Finding Board, created to conduct a fact-finding inquiry in the Aquino-Galman double murder case, was given the power to compel testimony of a witness. In exchange for his testimony, such a witness was extended transactional immunity from later prosecution.(Note: he shall NOT be exempt from perjury)2 types of immunity (US):a. Transactional immunity- broader in the scope of protection; a witness can no longer be prosecuted for any offense whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction.b. Used-and-derivative use immunity - witness is only assured that his or her particular testimony andevidence derived from it will not be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecutionRATIONALE (Kastigar v US): The power of government to compel persons to testify in court or before grand juries and other governmental agencies is firmly established in Anglo-American jurisprudence . . . The power to compel testimony, and the corresponding duty to testify, are recognized in the Sixth Amendment requirements that an accused be confronted with the witnesses against him, and have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. . .NOTE: Power to compel is NOT absolute. EXCEPTIONS: PRIVILEGE AGAINST COMPULSORYSELF-INCRIMINATION (The privilege reflects a complex of our fundamental values and aspirations, and marks an important advance in the development of our liberty. It can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory; and it protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used.We shall now examine the powers granted to PCGG by EO 14, as amended, to grant immunity from criminal prosecution.Sec. 4. A witness may refuse on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before the Sandiganbayan if the witness believes that such testimony or provision of information would tend to incriminate him or subject him to prosecution. Upon such refusal, the Sandiganbayan may order the witness to testify or provide information.The witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under the order may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the other.'Section 4 deals with the power which PCGG can use to compel anunwilling witness/hostileto testify. On the other hand, section 5 speaks of the power which PCGG can wield to secure information from afriendly witness.He can still be prosecuted but "no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case . . . ." In contrast, under section 5, the friendly witness is completely immunized from prosecution.IN THE CASE AT BAR: exercise of immunity under Sec. 5 Petitioners are not hostile but friendly witnesses.ISSUE to resolve gauging the range of the power of the respondent court to review the exercise of discretion of the PCGG granting immunity to petitioners pursuant to section 5 of E.O. No. 14, as amended. RTC: It is urged that its plenitude and panoply empower the respondent court to reverse the grant of immunity made by the PCGG by supplanting the latter's judgment.SC: We are not prepared to concede the correctness of this proposition. Neither the text nor the texture of E.O. No. 14, as amended, lends color to the suggested interpretation. Section 5 of E.O. No. 14, as amended, vests no such role in respondent court. In the case at bench, E.O. 14, as amended, is eloquently silent with regard to the range and depth of the power of the respondent court to review the exercise of discretion by the PCGG granting a section 5 immunity. This silence argues against the thesis that the respondent court has full and unlimited power to reverse PCGG's exercise of discretion granting a section 5 immunity. Legitimate power can not arise from a vacuum.Accdg to the Court Section 5 of E.O. No. 14, as amended, confers on the PCGG the power to grant immunity alone and on its own authority. The exercise of the power is not shared with any other authority.The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent part of the prosecution process. It is essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of a person for government to achieve a higher objective.NOTE: Prescinding from these baseline propositions, we hold that in reviewing the grant of a section 5 immunity made by the PCGG to the petitioners, the power of the respondents court can go no further than to pass upon itsprocedural regularity.THE court need only to ascertain: (a) whether the person claiming immunity has provided information or testimony in any investigation conducted by the PCGG in the discharge of its functions;(b) whetherin the bona fide judgment of the PCGG, the information or testimony given would establish the unlawful manner in which the respondent, defendant or accused has acquired or accumulated the property or properties in question; and (c) whetherin the bona fide judgment of the PCGG, such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove the guilt or civil liability of the respondent, defendant or accused.GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. With this, We hold that the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners' motion to dismiss based on a claim of immunity granted by the PCGG under section 5 of E.O. 14, as amended.It is also fairly established that the pieces of information given by the petitioners would in the judgment of the PCGG, establish the "unlawful manner" with which the Marcoses acquired or accumulated their properties and were "necessary" to prove their guilt.Thus, after their interview, the PCGG was obviously convinced of the evidentiary value of the information given by the petitioners.FAILURE TO TESTIFY IN NY CAN NOT NULLIFY IMMUNITY. Their duty was to give info to the prosecution which they did. Since petitioners' failure to testify was NOT of their own choosing nor was it due to any fault of their own, justice and equity forbid that they be penalized by the withdrawal of their immunity.EVEN IF PETITIONERS WERE UNDERGOING TRIAL, PCGG NOT BARRED.PROPER CONSTRUCTION OF SEC. 5 This is a special privilege NOT to be construed against accused.To guard against the recurrence of this totalitarian method, the RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION was ensconced in the fundamental laws of all civilized countries. To accommodatethe need, the right against self-incrimination was stripped of its absoluteness. Immunity statutes in varying shapes were enacted which would allow government to compel a witness to testify despite his plea of the rightagainst self-incrimination. To insulate these statutes from the virus of unconstitutionality, a witness is given what has come to be known as transactional or a use-derivative-use immunity, as heretofore discussedThose given the privilege of immunity paid a high price for it the surrender of their precious right to be silent.RULING: RESOLUTION ANNULLEDSEC. 18 RIGHT AGAINST INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDEPHIL. REFINING CO. WORKERS UNION v PHIL. REFINING CO.FACTS:On September 26, 1946, Philippine Refining Company, Inc. vs. Philippine Refining Company Worker's Union (CLO),was scheduled for hearing before the Court of Industrial Relations. Upon that date, said court renewed its efforts to effect a temporary settlement of the case before going on the merits of the petition. Thereafter, considering the circumstances and facts of the case at that stage of the proceedings, the Court of Industrial Relations came to the conclusion that, "for the welfare of everybody concerned, for the interest of the public," and because the court might not be able to decide the case promptly, the striking laborers should be directed to return and resume their work in the Philippine Refining Company on September 27, 1946, at 7:00 o'clock in the morning, and the management of the respondent company should accept them beginning that date; and it was so ordered by the court.FROM THE ORDER: The striking laborers, pending the final determination of this case, are enjoined not to stage any strike or walk out from their employment without authority from and without first submitting the grievances to the Court.The court ruled that the strike staged by the union or by the workers of the company therein mentioned on April 30, 1947, "is contemptuous and illegal because it is a violation of the law and the order of the court.CONTENTION: Such order was an infringement of constil inhibition prohibiting involuntary servitude in any form.HELD:The question in the case is the same as Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Pilipinas vs. Gotamco Saw Mill, wherein judgment went against the petitioning union. There the court's order for the striking workers to return to their work was made after hearing.The power conferred upon the Court of Industrial Relations by section 19 of its organic law to enjoin, under the circumstances therein required, a strike or walk out, or to order the return of the striking workers and to correspondingly enjoin the employer to refrain from accepting other employees is one of the most important virtues of this capital-labor legislation.As to the contention that section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 is unconstitutional, we held in, Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Pilipinas vs. Gotamco Saw Mill,supra, that it is unconstitutional. NO OFFENSE TO RIGHT AGAINST INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE. An employee entering into a contract of employment after said law went into effect,VOLUNTARILYACCEPTS, among other conditions, those prescribed in said section 19, among which is the "implied condition that when any dispute between the employer or landlord and the employee, tenant or laborer has been submitted to the Court of Industrial relations for settlement or arbitration, the employee, tenant or laborer shall not strike or walk out of his employment when so enjoined by the court after hearing and when public interest so requires, and if he has already done so, that he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the court, which shall be issued only after hearing when public interest so requiresor when the dispute can not, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled. ..." The voluntariness of the employee's entering into such a contract of employment he has a free choice between entering into it or not with such an implied condition, negatives the possibility of involuntary servitude ensuing. RULING: ORDERS AFFIRMED.

IN THE MATTER OF HABEAS CORPUS OF SEGIFREDO ACLARACION v. GATMAITANFACTS:Segifredo L. Aclaracion functioned as a temporary stenographer in the Gapan branch of the CFI of Nueva Ecija His appointment expired on November 21, 1972 while he was working as a temporary stenographer in the CFI of Manila. Thereafter, he was employed as a stenographer in the Public Assistance and Claims Adjudication Division of the Insurance Commission, where he is now working.After having ceased to be a court stenographer, CA REQUIRED him to transcribe the steno notes in 2 cases decided by Gapan court which had been appealed. He had failed to comply declared in contempt of court.Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan and Justice Jose N. Leuterio, Chairmen of the Third and Seventh Divisions of the Court of Appeals, respectively, ordered the Chief of Police of Makati, Rizal, to arrest Aclaracion, a resident of that municipality, and to confine him in jail until he submits a complete transcript of his notes in the said cases. he was arrested and incarcerated in jail.CA then ordered his release. Later on he transcribed the notes in Muncal case. Still, warden did no release him bec. of an order of arrest issued.The petitioner now filed habeas corpus. He advanced the novel contention that to compel him to transcribe his stenographic notes, after he ceased to be a stenographer, would be a transgression of the rule that "no involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted."The petition was moot since the 3rd div. ordered his release. At that hearing, this Court resolved to order Aclaracion's provisional release on condition that within twenty days thereafter he would complete the transcription of his notes in thePaderescase in his office at the Insurance Commission, Manila.He was provisionally released without prejudice to the final ruling on his contention that he could not be compelled to transcribe his notes in the other cases because he was no longer connected with the judiciary and because his stenotype machine notes were standard notes which could be transcribed by stenographers trained in stenotype machine shorthand.SC:After much reflection, we have come to the conclusion that his request that he be relieved from transcribing his notes in the other cases cannot be granted.Why? We hold that an Appellate Court may compel a former court stenographer to transcribe his stenographic notes. That prerogative is ancillary or incidental to its appellate jurisdiction and is a part of its inherent powers which are necessary to the ordinary and efficient exercise of its jurisdiction and essential to the due administration of justice.NOTE: Section 12, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court INCLUDES stenographers who are no longer in the judiciary.The traditional mode of exercising the court's coercive power is to hold the recalcitrant or negligent stenographer in contempt of court if he does not comply with the order for the transcription of his notes and imprison him until he obeys the order (Sec. 7, Rule 71, Rules of Court). Another SANCTION to compel the transcription is to hold in abeyance the transfer, promotion, resignation or clearance of a stenographer until he completes the transcription of his notes. This is provided for in Circular No. 63 of the Secretary of Justice.The same Court in its resolution of February 20, 1975 inPaterno vs. Tumibay, CA-G. R. No. 51330-R imposed on Aclaracion a fine of one hundred fifty pesos for his failure to transcribe his notes in the said case and warned him that he would be arrested if he failed to submit his transcript within ten days from notice.CONTENTION was untenable. Involuntary servitude denotes a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another (Hodges vs. U.S., 203 U.S. 1; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) or the condition of one who is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment, and against his will, to labor for another, whether he is paid or not (Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., p. 961). That situation does not obtain in this case.NOTE: The incarceration of the contemning stenographer is lawful because it is the direct consequence of his disobedience of a court order.RULING: HABEAS CORPUS DISMISSED. FINE OF P150 WAS REMITTED;

SEC. 19 PROHIBITED PUNISHMENTPEOPLE v. ESTOISTAFACTS:The appellant was acquitted of the first offense (homicide thru reckless imprudence) and found guilty of the second, illegal possession of firearms. Objection: Penalty from 5 10 years of imprisonment and fines provided by RA No. 4 is cruel and unusual.Firearm with which the appellant was charged was a rifle belonging to his father, Bruno Estoista, who held a legal permit for it. From a spot in the plantation the defendant took a shot at a wild rooster and hit Diragon Dima a labourer of the family who was setting a trap for wild chicken and whose presence was not perceived by the accused.The evidence is somewhat conflicting on whether the owner of the rifle was with the accused at the time of the accidental killing.The defendant's key testimony is: "When I heard wild rooster crowing I told my father about the said wild rooster crowing near our house and he told me to shoot the said wild rooster, so I went to shoot it." but fathers testimony was different.It being established that the defendant was alone when he walked to the plantation with his father's gun, the next question that presents itself is: Does this evidence support conviction as a matter of law?HELD:Republic Act No. 4, amending section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, in it pertinent provision is directed against any person whopossessesany firearm, ammunition therefor, etc. A point to consider in this connection is the meaning of the word "possesses.It should be construed in its broadest sense to carry and hold. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which the Act penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. Proprietary concept has no bearing whatever.In the light of these considerations, it is a mistake to point toUnited States vs. Samson, supra,as authority for the appellant's plea for acquittal. The implied holding in that case that the intention to possess is an essential element of a violation of the Firearms Law was not intended to imply title or right to the weapon to the exclusion of everyone else. The court did not mean only intention to own but also intention to use. CONTROL or DOMINION is an essential factor.TEST: Possession that is temporary, incidental, casual or harmless possession or control of a firearm is not a violation of a statute prohibiting the possessing or carrying of this kind of weapon (US v Samson). APPELLANT does not meet the above test. Away from his father's sight and control, he carried the gun for the only purpose of using it, as in fact he did, with fatal consequences.NOTE: In Samson case, the defendant was permitted by owner to carry shortgun for hunting. IN THE CASE AT BAR: Unlike the appellant herein, Samson carried the gun solely in obedience to its owner's order or request without any inferable intention to use it as a weapon. It is of interest to note that even in the United States where, as stated, the right to bear arms as a means of defense is guaranteed, possession such as that by Samson is by the weight of authority considered a violation of similar statutes.PROHIBITION OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. it is our opinion that confinement from 5 to 10 years for possessing of carrying firearm is not cruel or unusual, having due regard to the prevalent conditions which the law proposes to suppress or curb (date of decision was 1953)The rampant lawlessness against property, person, and even the very security of the Government, directly traceable in large measure to promiscuous carrying and use of powerful weapons, justify imprisonment which in normal circumstances might appear excessive.BUT, the constitutionality of an act of the legislature is not to be judged in the light of exceptional cases. Small transgressors for which the heavy net was not spread are like small fishes, bound to be caught, and it is to meet such a situation as this that courts are advised to make a recommendation to the Chief Executive for clemency or reduction of the penalty.RULING: RECOMMENDATION OF 6 MOS. INSTEAD OF 5 YEARSPEOPLE v ESPARASFACTS:Accused Josefina A. Esparas was charged with violation of R.A. No. 6425 as amended by R.A. No. 759 for importing into the country twenty (20) kilograms of "shabu.After arraignment, the accused escaped from jail and was tried inabsentia.On March 13, 1995, the trial court found her guilty as charged andimposed on her the death penalty.ISSUE: W/N the Court shall automatically review her death sentence as she was at largeHELD:In the 1910 ground-breaking case ofU.S. vs. Laguna,et al.,[1]we already held thru Mr. Justice Moreland, that thepower of this Court to review a decision imposing the death penalty CANNOT BE WAIVED EITHER BY THE ACCUSED OR BY THE COURTS."It is apparent from these provisions that the judgment of conviction and sentence thereunder by the trial court does not, in reality, conclude the trial of the accused.The judgment of conviction entered on the trial is not final, can not be executed, and is wholly without force or effect until the cause has been passed upon by the Supreme Court."The requirement that the Supreme Court pass upon a case in which capital punishment has been imposed by the sentence of the trial court is one having for its object simply and solely the protection of the accused.Having received the highest penalty which the law imposes, he is entitled under that lawthat all the facts and circumstances be clearly and conclusively determined. Such procedure is merciful.It gives a second chance for life.Neither the courts nor the accused can waive it.It is a positive provision of the law that brooks no interference and tolerates no evasions."Laguna case: Both our Rules of Court of 1940[2]and 1964[3]require the transmission to this Court of the records ofallcases in which the death penalty shall have been imposed by the trial court, whether the defendant shall have appealed or not, for review and judgment as the law and justice shall dictate. Both our Rules of Court of 1940[2]and 1964[3]require the transmission to this Court of the records ofallcases in which the death penalty shall have been imposed by the trial court, whether the defendant shall have appealed or not, for review and judgment as the law and justice shall dictate.NOTE: Withdrawal of appeal by death convict does not bar the Court to review his conviction (People v. Villanueva).In the 1971 case of People v Cornelio escape of the death convict does not relieve this Court of its duty of reviewing his conviction. Moreover, until after this Court has spoken, no finality could be attached to the lower court decision.NOTE: 1935 and 1973 Consti did NOT prohibit imposition of death penalty. Section 10, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure even reenacted this procedure of review.Significantly, it expressly used the term "automatic review and judgment" by this Court.Finally, we have the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes Congress so provides. On December 13, 1993, Congress reimposed the death penalty in cases involving the commission ofheinous crimes.(n December 13, 1993, Congress reimposed the death penalty in cases involving the commission ofheinous crimes.)This is the text and tone of section 10, Rule 122,Sec. 10. In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment,within twenty (20) days but not earlier than (15) days after promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of any motion for new trial or reconsideration.The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten (10) days after the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter."NOTE: the reliance inPeoplevs. Codilla,[13]by our dissenting colleagues is misplaced.Codillais not a death penalty case.Only the penalty ofreclusionperpetuawas imposed on appellant.Consequently, we ruled that the escape of the appellant or his refusal to surrender to the proper authorities justifies dismissal of his appeal.NOTE: Nothing less than life is at stake and any court decision authorizing the State to take life must be as error-free as possible Our efforts must not depend on whether appellant has withdrawn his appeal or has escaped. The power is more of a sacred duty which we have to discharge to assure the People that the innocence of a citizen is our concern not only in crimes that slight but even more, in crimes that shock the conscience.This concern cannot be diluted.RULING: COUNSEL GIVEN 30 DAYS TO FILE BRIEF OF ACCUSED.ECHAGARAY v. SEC. OF JUSTICE

SEC. 20 NON IMRPISONMENT OF DEBTSERAFIN v. JUDGE LINDAYAGFACTS:Respondent municipal judge grossly failed to perform his duties properly and is UNFIT FOR THE OFFICE and therefore orders his separation from the service. It is self-evidentfrom the very faceof the "criminal complaint" for estafa, filed with and sworn to before him as well as the very notes of preliminary examination taken by him that the "criminal" charge against complainant showed no vestige of the essential elements of estafa but ONLY complainant's failure to pay the creditors as alleged offended parties asimple indebtedness. Respondent judge's subsequent crass attempt at exculpation by the submission of spurious evidence to cover up his liability shows his unworthiness for the office.Complainant originally filed with the Sec. of Justice the instant administrative complaint for capricious and malicious admission of a criminal complaint for estafa against complainant and causing her wrongful arrest and detention, against respondent Santiago Lindayag, municipal judge of Guiguinto, Bulacan. Then Executive Judge Andres Sta. Maria sent his indorsement to the Department of Justice recommending the exoneration of respondent on the ground that complainant, assisted by her counsel, had filed a motion to withdraw her complaint.2 years after, Department of Justice forwarded the record of the case to this Court. The Court per its Resolution of December 19, 1973 denied respondent's petition to "consider the matter close and terminated" by virtue of the previous recommendation in 1971 of Judge Sta. Maria and directed the District Judge to proceed with the investigation.The complaint with its documentary evidence, the Investigator's Report and record of the proceedings and the evidence of record amply substantiate the complaint, notwithstanding complainant's desistance because she afterwards took pity on respondent and no longer wanted to be involved in the case, as manifested by her when she appeared at the hearing and submitted the documentary evidence supporting her complaint, pursuant to the process issued by the Investigating Judge for her attendance.Said complaint sworn to by said police chief (who filed the complaint) before respondent judge on its face does not charge any crime but merely recites complainant's failure to pay asimple indebtedness.It was a simple debt of P1,500.00 borrowed by complainant from Mrs. Mendoza and which she hadfailed to repaydespite her promise to do so by January and February, 1971.Based on prelim. Examination: no vestige of the essential elements of estafa as provided in Article 315 of the RPC but that they had simply lent complainant the sum of P1,500.00 without any collateral or security because complainant was an old friendNOTE: Non-payment of an indebtedness is not a criminal act, much less estafa; and that no one may be criminally charged MOTION TO QUASH - well taken and ordered dismissal of the case.ALSO, respondent utterly failed to comply with this requirement of searching questions and answers in his examination of the complaining witness. AMENDED COMPLAINT WAS FOUND SPURIOUS. The absence of "staple-holes on the top and sides of these documents" which are present in the admitted genuine and authentic records of said Crim. Case 1602, would lead us to the inescapable conclusion that these Exhibits (1, 1-a, 1-b, 1-c, 1-d and 2) aredefinitely not genuine and authentic partsof the records of Crim. Case No. 1602; SIGNATURE OF ESTRELLA was also NOT GENUINE.In the analogous case ofCarreon vs. Flores,16the Court ordered therein respondent municipal judge's separation from the service for having rendered a verdict of conviction against therein complainant for alleged theft of about a cavan of palay which could in no way be factually or legally justified, in that the essential elements of unlawful taking and that the property stolen belonged to another were lacking.RULING: DISMISSED FROM OFFICE.

LOZANO v MARTINEZAmong the constitutional objections raised against BP 22, the most serious is the alleged conflict between the statute and the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt. It is contended that the statute runs counter to the inhibition in the Bill of Rights which states, "No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax."16Petitioners insist that, since the offense under BP 22 is consummated only upon the dishonor or non-payment of the check when it is presented to the drawee bank, the statute is really a "bad debt law" rather than a "bad check law." What it punishes is the non-payment of the check, not the act of issuing it. The statute, it is claimed, is nothing more than a veiled device to coerce payment of a debt under the threat of penal sanction.The constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt is a safeguard that evolved gradually during the early part of the nineteenth century in the various states of the American Union as a result of the people's revulsion at the cruel and inhumane practice, sanctioned by common law, which permitted creditors to cause the incarceration of debtors who could not pay their debts. At common law, money judgments arising from actions for the recovery of a debt or for damages from breach of a contract could be enforced against the person or body of the debtor by writ of capias adsatisfaciendum.By means of this writ, a debtor could be seized and imprisoned at the instance of the creditor until he makes the satisfaction awarded. As a consequence of the popular ground swell against such a barbarous practice, provisions forbidding imprisonment for debt came to be generally enshrined in the constitutions of various states of the Union.Mr. Justice Malcolm speaking for theSupreme Court in Ganaway vs. Queen,22stated: "The 'debt' intended to be covered by the constitutional guaranty has a well-defined meaning. Organic provisions relieving from imprisonment for debt, were intended to prevent commitment of debtors to prison for liabilities arising from actionsex contractuThe inhibition was never meant to include damages arising in actionsex delicto, for the reason that damages recoverable therein do not arise from any contract entered into between the parties but are imposed upon the defendant for the wrong he has done and are considered as punishment, nor to fines and penalties imposed by the courts in criminal proceedings as punishments for crime."NOTE: The gravamen of BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is NOT THE NON-PAYMENT OF AN OBLIGATION which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of a debtex contractuBut certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Actsmalain se are not the only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, notmalumin se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished asmalum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power.POLICE POWER. The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.CHECK v. PROMISSORY NOTE. check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank and payable on demand.It is a written order on a bank, purporting to be drawn against a deposit of funds for the payment of all events, of a sum of money to a certain person therein named or to his order or to cash and payable on demand.Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of money.. There is therefore an element of certainty or assurance that the instrument will be paid upon presentation. For this reason, checks have become widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and commerce. Although not legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial transactions. The basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. According to: CJ Stacy in a 1927 case of State v. Yarbor: The 'check flasher' does a great deal more than contract a debt; he shakes the pillars of business; and to my mind, it is a mistaken charity of judgment to place him in the same category with the honest man who is unable to pay his debts, and for whom the constitutional inhibition against' imprisonment for debt, except in cases of fraud was intended as a shield and not a sword.In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.RULING: PETITION DISMISSED.

SEC. 21- DOUBLE JEOPARDYPS BANK v BERMOYFACTS:Based on a complaint filed by petitioner Philippine Savings Bank respondents Pedrito and Gloria Bermoy were charged with estafa thru falsification of a public document.During the hearings of 18 June 1997 and 3 September 1997,) the prosecution presented the testimonies of Felisa Crisostomo, manager of petitioners Libertad Manila Branch, and one Hermenigildo Caluag also an employee of petitioner. Crisostomo testified that she came to know respondent spouses when they applied for a loan in February 1994. The spouses allegedly offered TCT as collateral for loan. (Allegedly forged the TCT)RTC: Acquitted respondentsCA: DeniedHELD: No merit.On Whether Double Jeopardy isApplicable Here

Paragraph 1, Section 7, Rule 117 (Section 7) of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure[14]on double jeopardy provides:Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

For double jeopardy to apply, Section 7 requires the following elements in the first criminal case:(a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction;(b)The court had jurisdiction;(c)The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and(d)He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.[15]

On the last element, the rule is that a dismissal with the express consent or upon motion of the accused does not result in double jeopardy. EXCEPTION: if the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or on the denial of the right to speedy trial.[16] A dismissal upon demurrer to evidence falls under the first exception.[17] Since such dismissal is based on the merits, it amounts to an acquittal.[18]

As the Court of Appeals correctly held, the elements required in Section 7 were all present in Criminal Case No. 96-154193. Thus, the Information for estafa through falsification of a public document against respondent spouses was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. The trial court had jurisdiction over the case and the persons of respondent spouses. Respondent spouses were arraigned during which they entered not guilty pleas. Finally, Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Consequently, the right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense became vested on respondent spouses.The Extent of the Right AgainstDouble JeopardyTHE RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY CAN BE INVOKED IF (a) the accused is charged with the same offense in two separate pending cases, or (b) the accused is prosecuted anew for the same offense after he had been convicted or acquitted of such offense, or(c) the prosecution appeals from a judgment in the same case.[19]The last is based on Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court[20]which provides that [a]ny party may appeal from a final judgment or order,except if the accused would be placed thereby in double jeopardy.Here, petitioner seeks a review of the 21 April 1998 Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 96-154193 for insufficiency of evidence. It is in effect appealing from a judgment of acquittal. By mandate of the Constitution[21] and Section 7, the courts are barred from entertaining such appeal as it seeks an inquiry into the merits of the dismissal. Thus, we held in an earlier case:In terms of substantive law, the Court will not pass upon the propriety of the order granting the Demurrer to Evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and the consequent acquittal of the accused, as it will place the latter in double jeopardy. Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not place the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two exceptions, namely: INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE AND DENIAL OF THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL.

The strict rule against appellate review of judgments of acquittal is not without any basis. As the Court explained inPeople v. Velasco: It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal.. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction.

With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jurys leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.

The contention has no merit. To be sure, the rule barring appeals from judgments of acquittal admits of an exception. Such, however, is narrowly drawn and is limited to the case where the trial court act[ed] with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdictiondue to a violation of due processi.e.the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case xxx orthat the trial was a sham.However, as the Court of Appeals correctly held, any error committed by the trial court on this point can only be an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction.

RULING: PETIITION DENIED.

PEOPLE v. OBSANIA

FACTS:Indictment for rape against Willy Obsania. barely a day after the occurence of the alleged crime, Erlinda Dollente, the 14-year old victim, and her parents, Ciriaco Dollente and Carmelita Lureta, filed in the municipal court of Balungao, Pangasinan a complaint for rape with robbery. the assistant provincial fiscal filed an information for rape against the accused, embodying the allegations of the above complaint, with an additional averment that the offense was committed "with lewd designs".DEFECT. The accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, and forthwith his counsel moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that the complaint was fatally defective for failure to allege "lewd designs" and that the subsequent information filed by the fiscal which averred "lewd designs" did not cure the jurisdictional infirmity. court a quo GRANTED motion to dismiss. REASON of judge: "the failure of the complaint filed by the offended party to allege that the acts committed by the accused were with 'lewd designs' does not give this Court jurisdiction to try the case." From this order, the fiscal brought the instant appeal.ISSUES: first, are "lewd designs" an indispensable element which should be alleged in the complaint?, and, second, does the present appeal place the accused in double jeopardy?HELD:Both must be answered in the negative.DISPENSABILITY OF ALLEGATION. Judge relied on People v. Gilo where Court opined that lewd design is an indispensable element of all crimes against chastity, such as abduction, seduction and rape, including acts of lasciviousness.Nothing in the foregoing statement can be reasonably interpreted as requiring anexplicitallegation of "lewd design" in a complaint for rape. We hold in no uncertain terms that in a complaint for rape it is not necessary to allege "lewd design" or "unchaste motive", for to require such averment is to demand a patent superfluity. Lascivious intent inheres in rape and the unchaste design is manifest in the very act itself the carnal knowledge of a woman through force or intimidation, or when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when the woman is under twelve years of age.COMPLAINT in the case at bar satisfies the reqts of legal sufficiency of an indictment for rape as it unmistakably alleges that the accused had carnal knowledge of the complainant by means of violence and intimidation. trial judge erred.ISSUE ON JEOPARDY. Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court provides THE REQUISITES for one to invoke double jeopardy. In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor of an accused, the following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. IN THE CASE AT BAR:a. Complaint was validb. Court a quo was a competent tribunal w/ jurisdiction to hear the casec. Accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignmentd. Now, the QUESTION is whether the dismissal of the case was without the express consent of the accused.The accused admits that the controverted dismissal was ordered by the trial judge upon his motion to dismiss. However, he vehemently contends that under the prevailing jurisprudence, citingPeople vs. Bangalao, et al. an erroneous dismissal of a criminal action, even upon the instigation of the accused in a motion to quash or dismiss, DOES NOT BAR HIM from pleading the defense of double jeopardy in a subsequent appeal by the Government or in a new prosecution for the same offenseSC: This particular aspect of double jeopardy dismissal or termination of the original case without the express consent of the defendant has evoked varied and apparently conflicting rulings from this Court. We must untangle this jurisprudential maze and fashion out in bold relief a ruling not susceptible of equivocation. Hence, a searching extended review of the pertinent cases is imperative.DOCTRINE OFWAIVER OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY. People vs. Salico: this Court held that the dismissal was erroneous because the evidence on record showed that the crime was committed in the town of Victorias and the trial judge should have taken judicial notice that the said municipality was included within the province of Negros Occidental and therefore the offense charged was committed within the jurisdiction of the court of first instance of the said province.Mr. Justice Felicisimo Feria, speaking for the majority, reasoned that :When the case is dismissedwith the express consentof the defendant, the dismissal WILL NOT BE A BAR to another prosecution for the same offense; because, his action in having the case dismissed constitutes a WAIVER of his constitutional right or privilege, for the reason that he thereby prevents the court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him.Salico doctrine was adhered to and affirmed in People v. Marapao: ... it appears that the appellee was neither convicted nor acquitted of the previous charge against him for slight physical injuries, FOR THAT CASE WAS DISMISSED UPON HIS OWN REQUEST before trial could be finished. Having himself asked for such dismissal, before a judgment of conviction or acquittal could have been rendered, the appellee is not entitled to invoke the defense of double jeopardy...NOTE: In essence, this Court held that where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with the express consent of the accused but even upon the urging of his counsel, there can be no double jeopardy under section 9, Rule 113, if the indictment against him is revived by the fiscal. This decision subscribes substantially to the doctrine on waiver established inSalico.NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY THRU DISMISSAL. An appeal of the prosecution from the order of dismissal by the trial court will not constitute double jeopardy if(1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent, of the defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal; so that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant. DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL. In relation to the plea of double jeopardy was first enunciated inAciertowhich held that when the trial court dismisses a case on a disclaimer of jurisdiction, upon the instigation of the accused, the latter is estopped on appeal from asserting the jurisdiction of the lower court in support of his plea of second jeopardy. same as doctrine of waiverNOTE: From the above named statement, it is clear that what inSalicowas repudiated inLabatetewas thepremisethat the dismissal therein was not on the merits andnottheconclusionthat a dismissal, other than on the merits, sought by the accused, is deemed to be with his express consent and therefore constitutes a waiver of his right to plead double jeopardy in the event of an appeal by the prosecution or a second indictment for the same offense. This Court, inLabatete, merely pointed out that the controverted dismissal in Salico was in fact an acquittal." Reasoninga contrario, had the dismissal not amounted to acquittal, then the doctrine of waiver would have applied and prevailed. As a matter of fact we believe with the majority in Salico that the dismissal therein was not on the merits and therefore did not amount to an acquittal: If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal.InCloribel, the case dragged for three years and eleven months, that is, from September 27, 1958 when the information was filed to August 15, 1962 when it was called for trial, after numerous postponements, mostly at the instance of the prosecution. On the latter date, the prosecution failed to appear for trial, and upon motion of defendants, the case was dismissed. This Court held "that the dismissal here complained of was not truly a 'dismissal' but an ACQUITTAL. For it was entered upon the defendants' insistence on their constitutional right to speedy trial and by reason of the prosecution's failure to appear on the date of trial."Here the controverted dismissal was predicated on the erroneous contention of the accused that the complaint was defective and such infirmity affected the jurisdiction of the courta quo, and not on the right of the accused to a speedy trial and the failure of the Government to prosecute. T