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1

Port of

Riga

February 2017

Container

volumes

36,164 TEU

+3.1% Y/Y

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2-9 Apr 2017

Port of Ningbo

March 2017

Container

volumes

2.12M TEU

+13.2% Y/Y

SeaIntel Sunday Spotlight April 9, 2017 – Issue 307

Windows User

Content

Editorial: Spot rates continue erosion Page 2

Transatlantic Alliance capacity injections Page 3

Digitization: It is not about technology 0

Alliances: NEUR-North America Transit Times Page 15

Carrier Service Changes Page 30

Carrier Rate Announcements Page 31

SeaIntel products Page 34

Executive Summary

Transatlantic Alliance capacity injections

Both Transatlantic trade lanes will experience a significant injection of capacity

compared to 2016-Q2, with Med-USEC and North Europe-USEC showing a 19.4%

and 5.6% increase, respectively. Further, there does not appear to be any April

capacity shortage.

Digitization: It is not about technology

A trip through the last 20 years of eCommerce history in the container shipping

sector clearly shows that if this was a matter of technology, the whole industry

would have become digital long ago.

Alliances: NEUR-North America Transit Times

The trade lane will experience a rather positive development in terms of port-

pairs, as 29 distinct port-pairs will be gained against nine lost. The transit times

will improve slightly, but overall the trade lane remains mostly unchanged.

Port of

Klaipeda

February 2017

Container

volumes

38,773 TEU

+20.7% Y/Y

Port of

Incheon

February 2017

Container

volumes

192,981 TEU

+15.1% Y/Y

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SeaIntel Maritime Analysis – creating value from information

2

Editorial: Spot rates continue erosion SCFI spot rates this week either remained flat or continued eroding in all trade lanes

out of Shanghai, with the exception of the Asia-West Africa trade lane, which saw spot

rates increase modestly by 84 USD/TEU (+4.6%) to 1,911 USD/TEU.

Of biggest concern is the Transpacific trade, where there have been no noteworthy rate

increases since early January, but spot rates have been constantly eroding ever since,

at an erosion rate of close to 100 USD/week. While not quite as horrific as in 2015, at

the current lukewarm rate levels, it won’t take many weeks at this level of erosion

before we move into loss-making territory.

Even more concerning for the carriers, the failure of the April 1st General Rate Increase

will be viewed by many as a gauge of the relative market strength of the carriers, and

whether they will have the resolve to push for compensatory contract rates for the

2017/18 Transpac contracting season which ends at the end of April.

Carriers were likely hoping that the consolidation wave and new alliances would provide

a backdrop of stronger carrier resolve, and try to convince shippers that it would be in

their best interest to close contracts early. It is also not unthinkable, that some carriers

would be using the current alliance restructuring turmoil, to remind shippers and freight

forwarders of what they can expect, if carriers are not charging sustainable freight rates.

Rumours are that many large contracts are still open, as the large carriers are fighting

to keep contract rates above 1,000 USD/FFE. If they manage to stick it out, and not get

lured by market shares and the under-cutting of some of the smaller lines, 2017 may

become the turning point after 6 years of despair.

-140

-120

-100

-80

-60

-40

-20

0

Asia-USWC 12-week Average rate erosion

-200

-150

-100

-50

0

Asia-USEC12-week Average rate erosion


3

Transatlantic Alliance capacity injections

Both Transatlantic trade lanes will experience a significant

injection of capacity compared to 2016-Q2, with Med-USEC and

North Europe-USEC showing a 19.4% and 5.6% increase,

respectively. Further, there does not appear to be any April

capacity shortage.

In last week’s analysis, we found that

three out of four trade lanes on Asia-

Europe and Transpacific showed a

significant capacity injection from the

new alliances, with only Asia-USWC

recording a decrease in deployed alliance

capacity.

This week we turn our attention to the

Transatlantic trade, the oft-overlooked of

the main East/West trades. The

Transatlantic trade is usually considered

one of the more stable trades, as the

trade connects two mature economies,

the volumes are significantly lower than

on Asia-Europe and Transpacific, and the

volumes have traditionally been

relatively balanced, although this may be

changing due to long-term economic

stagnation in Europe. From the

perspective of port-pairs offered, transit

times and service frequency, we have

found that the Transatlantic Westbound

trade lanes are relatively stable with few

changes as a result of the new alliance

networks, as analysed in last week’s

issue of the Sunday Spotlight, as well as

in the second article in this issue.

In this article, we will cover the North

Europe-USEC and Mediterranean-USEC

trade lanes, and analyse the impact on

deployed capacity as the new alliance

networks come into effect.

Methodology

The data for this article has been sourced

exclusively from SeaIntel’s proprietary

Trade Capacity Outlook (TCO) database,

where we map out every single vessel

deployed on every service in all the main

deep-sea trade lanes, both historically as

well as 12 weeks into the future.

In this article, we include the historical

alliance and non-alliance capacity from

2015-Q1 when the 2M and Ocean Three

alliances were launched, up to and

including 2017-Q1, which is the last

quarter before the new alliance networks

come into effect. We report the historical

deployed capacity on a quarterly level,

calculated as the average weekly

capacity over the weeks of the given

quarter, and we benchmark the new

alliance capacities against both FY 2016

and 2016-Q2.


4

We also include medium-term

developments in deployed alliance

capacity, from five weeks prior to the

new alliances are launched in April 2017,

to 12 weeks into the future. As the five

weeks prior to the launch of the new

alliances are in March 2017, there is an

obvious overlap between 2017-Q1 data

and the weekly pre-launch capacity

deployment, and the quarterly to weekly

data should be viewed as overlapping.

It should be noted that the Transatlantic

trade is not offered exclusively by

alliances, but the weekly capacity is

rather supplied by a mix of alliance-

services, non-alliance services operated

by alliance members – both as exclusive

services from a single alliance carrier,

and as Vessel Sharing Agreements

(VSAs) operated by carriers within and

across alliance structures – as well as

services operated by smaller niche

carriers.

This gives rise to a methodological

challenge, as we would need to cluster

the previous and the new services offered

in the two trade lanes into carrier

groupings or alliances. We have opted to

divide the services into alliances –

whenever possible – or into “Others

Global” or “Others Niche”. While “Others

Global” covers services offered by

carriers that are members of an alliance

but the service is not an alliance service,

while the latter group covers services

offered by niche carriers (e.g. ICL, ZIM,

Turkon Line). All the services included in

the analysis are listed in the following

paragraphs.

We have decided to exclude the Europe-

US West Coast trade lane, as the trade

lane only has two dedicated services

deployed, the MSC-operated California

Express and the MCPS/Medpac service

operated by Hapag-Lloyd and Hamburg

Süd, and as neither service has been or

will be operated within an alliance, they

will not be impacted by the new alliance

networks. We have included The

Alliance’s AL5-service, as it also calls

USEC.

We have opted to only look at the

Westbound direction of the Transatlantic

trade, as this is the head-haul of the

trade, and as the capacity developments

on East- and Westbound will be the

same, although offset by a number of

weeks. Further, we have decided to split

the Europe to US East Coast trade into

two separate trade lanes, from North

Europe and Mediterranean, respectively.

For the North Europe-USEC trade lane we

have split the services into six different

groupings, as follows:


5

“old” alliance and non-alliance:

2M: TA1/NEUATL1, TA2/NEUATL2,

NEUATL3, TA4/NEUATL4

G6: AX1, AX2, AX3, PA1

Others Global:

- Canada America Express/Saint

Laurent 1 (Maersk Line/CMA CGM),

- TAE/AUE (Evergreen/Yang Ming),

- Victory Bridge/AGX (CMA CGM/APL),

- Liberty Bridge/APNE/NUE1 (CMA

CGM/Hamburg Süd/UASC),

- AT1/GEX1/Montreal Express (Hapag

Lloyd/OOCL/MSC),

- AT2/GEX2 (Hapag Lloyd/OOCL)

Other Niche: Transatlantic Service (ICL)

Future alliance and non-alliance:


TA3/NEUATL3

Ocean Alliance: Liberty

Bridge/TAE/AXS, Victory

Bridge/EAG/AGX

The Alliance: AL1, AL2, AL3, AL4, AL5

Others Global:

- Canada America Express/Saint

Laurent 1 (Maersk Line/CMA CGM)

- AT1/GEX1/Montreal Express (Hapag

Lloyd/OOCL/MSC)

- AT2/GEX2 (Hapag Lloyd/OOCL)

Other Niche: Transatlantic Service (ICL)

For the Mediterranean to USEC, we have

chosen to cluster the services into five

different groupings as follows:

“old” alliance and non-alliance:

2M: TA5/MED-USEC, TA6/MED-GULF

Others Global:

- Canada Express 1 (MSC),


- MCA (Hapag Lloyd),

- MGX (Hapag Lloyd/Zim),

- MEDGULF (CMA CGM),

- Amerigo/MENA (CMA CGM / UASC /

COSCON)

Other Niche: ZCA (ZIM), Med-America

Line (Turkon Line)

Future alliance and non-alliance:

2M: TA5/MED-USEC, TA6/MED-GULF

Ocean Alliance: Amerigo/MENA/WMS

The Alliance: AL6

Others Global:



- MCA (Hapag Lloyd),

- MGX (Hapag Lloyd/ZIM),

- MEDGULF (CMA CGM)

Other Niche: ZCA/AL7 (ZIM), Med-

America Line (Turkon Line)


6

It should be noted that the AL8 service

offered by The Alliance, is in reality a slot

charterer agreement on the con-ro “A

service” from ACL. As this service is not

included in the trade lane’s capacity

outlook, as a consequence the AL8

service is not encompassed in the

analysis.

North Europe – US East Coast

Figure A1 shows the average weekly

capacity deployed on North Europe-US

East Coast from 2015-Q1 until 2017-Q1,

as well as including the five weeks before

the launch of the alliances and a 12-week

outlook based on the named vessels in

the carriers’ schedules. It is important to

notice that the chart is showing the

cumulative deployed capacity. This

means that, on average, The Alliance will

in the future offer 22,500 TEU per week,

while 2M and Ocean Alliance follow with

19,400 TEU and 14,600 TEU per week,

respectively. The rest of the weekly

deployed capacity will be split between

Other-Global carriers, with three

remaining services and an average

weekly capacity of approximately 10,000

TEU, and the only service from a non-

alliance/niche carrier being ICL, with an

average weekly capacity of 2,500 TEU.

Figure A1 shows that we will see an

increase in weekly offered capacity when

the new alliances will go live. On average,

over the coming 12 weeks, the weekly

capacity shows a significant increase of

7.0% when compared to FY 2016, or

-

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

80,000

90,000

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

March April May June

2015 2016 2017

2M Other-Global Other-Niche OA TA G6

Fig A1: NEUR-USEC Weekly Capacity - New vs Old


7

5.6% when compared to 2016-Q2. The

number of services is left unchanged, as

seven services will be withdrawn, while

seven new ones will be launched by the

Ocean Alliance (two) and The Alliance

(five).

Nevertheless, this increase is due to the

fact that some of the remaining services

will see the deployment of larger vessels,

as for instance 2M’s service

TA2/NEUATL2 which will see its average

vessel size increase from 4,800 TEU in

2016-Q2 to 7,500 TEU in the next twelve

weeks.

As the only alliance that will be present

in both the old and new alliance

networks, 2M will be growing faster than

the market, as they will see their

deployed weekly capacity grow 16.8%

compared to 2016-Q2. The capacity

deployed by G6 will be almost taken over

by The Alliance’s new service network,

while Ocean Alliance with their two

services will completely replace the

capacity offered by the closed services

TAE/AUE, Victory Bridge/AGX and Liberty

Bridge/APNE/NUE1.

Last week’s analysis of the other trade

lanes showed a significant drop

throughout the first weeks of April, as

carriers will be re-deploying vessels to

the new alliance services, causing

possible disruption to the global supply

chains.

However, this pattern is not seen for this

trade lane, as we can actually observe a

spike in capacity offered out of North

Europe for the first week of April. This

indicates that the carriers may have been

able to effectively re-design their service

networks to ensure a smooth transition

into the new alliances.

Mediterranean – US East Coast

Figure A2 also shows a significant

capacity injection in Mediterranean to US

East Coast, as the new alliance networks

are launched. The average weekly

capacity over the coming twelve weeks

will be equal to 44,200 TEU, which

corresponds to a 23.0% increase over FY

2016 and 19.4% when compared to

2016-Q2.

The graph clearly shows that the largest

share of capacity on the trade lane will be

offered on non-alliance services from

carriers who are part of an alliance,

indicated by Other-Global, with an

average weekly capacity over the next

twelve weeks of 16,000 TEU. Further, 2M

will have the second largest share of

capacity with an average of 12,300 TEU

per week thanks to their two dedicated

services, while Ocean Alliance and The

Alliance follow with 5,200 TEU and 4,500


8

TEU per week, respectively. The two

services operated by non-alliance/niche

carriers will offer a combined average

weekly capacity in the coming twelve

weeks of 6,000 TEU.

The massive increase in deployed

capacity is partly explained by the fact

that the trade lane will see its number of

services increase to 10, compared to nine

services offered prior to the launch of the

new alliances. Moreover, MSC have

upgraded the size of the vessels deployed

on their exclusively-offered Canada

Express 2 service.

As seen in the North Europe to US East

Coast trade lane, shippers should not

experience major capacity shortage

issues as the new alliance networks are

launched, as we are not seeing the

distinct drop in deployed capacity that we

saw on the Asia-Europe and Transpacific

trade lanes.

Conclusion

As the new alliances go live, we will see

a massive injection of capacity in the two

trade lanes connecting Europe to US East

Coast, which is in line with the

conclusions we had in last week’s

analysis on deployed capacity in the main

East/West trade lanes.

North Europe-USEC will see average

weekly capacity grow by 5.6% compared

to FY 2016-Q2. The Alliance will be

leading the trade lane with a capacity

market share of 32.2% and 22,500 TEU

-

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

March April May June

2015 2016 2017

2M Other-Global Other-Niche OA TA

Fig A2: MED-USEC Weekly Capacity - New vs Old


9

in weekly average capacity. 2M will

closely follow with a capacity market

share of 27.9% and 19,400 TEU per

week, while Ocean Alliance will have a

capacity market share of 21.0% and offer

an average 14,600 TEU per week.

Services offered by alliance carriers

outside the alliances will account for

15.4% and 10,800 TEU/week, while

niche carrier ICL will have a capacity

market share of 3.5% and offer 2,500

TEU/week.

The trade lane connecting Mediterranean

to USEC will experience an even larger

capacity injection, as a 19.4% increase is

observed for the next twelve weeks

compared to 2016-Q2. Here, the major

share of capacity, 36.3% or 16,100

TEU/week, is supplied by alliance-carrier

services operated outside the alliance

framework, suggesting a rather

segmented and competitive trade lane.

2M follows with a 27,9% capacity market

share, offering 12,300 TEU/week, while

niche carriers combined come third with

6,000 TEU/week and a capacity market

share of 13.7%. Ocean Alliance comes

fourth with a capacity market share of

11.8% and offering 5,200 TEU/Week,

while The Alliance has the smallest share

at 10.2% and 4,500 TEU/Week

Interestingly, neither of the two trade

lanes showed the same capacity shortage

throughout the first weeks of April that

we could observe for the other East/West

trades. This shows that the alliance

carriers were able to effectively plan the

re-deployment of their Transatlantic fleet

to avoid any major disruption to their

services.


10

Digitization: It is not about technology A trip through the last 20 years of eCommerce history in container

shipping clearly shows that if this was a matter of technology, the

whole industry would have become digital long ago.

The liner shipping industry is currently

seeing a surge in digitization. Just this

week we saw the launch of Maersk’s new

offshoot, Twill, via their forwarding arm

Damco. However, Twill is not new in a

space of online freight, where players

such as Kontainers, FreightOS, Flexport,

iContainers and a multitude of other

players are emerging.

Additionally, we are seeing other

digitization projects emerge as well,

ranging from enforceable contracts in

NYSHEX, online containers from

TRAXENS, rate benchmarks from Xeneta,

equipment repositioning from BCG

xChange and predictive logistics from

Clearmetal. These are only a sampling of

the companies emerging.

Additionally, more digitized pilots are

coming from the carriers, with significant

market attention recently being levied on

Alibaba’s trials with Maersk Line, CMA

CGM and ZIM, as well as Maersk Line’s

foray into blockchain technology with

IBM.

More initiatives are in the pipeline from

both carriers and independent technology

companies, either being kept under wraps

during development, or simply not having

been picked up by the mainstream

shipping press.

Just to mention one example of the latter,

Maersk is working on a platform named

Fromtu, with some details provided back

in November 2016 on the East Africa

Trade Investment Hub, where it is

presented as platform designed to

connect the African market to

international buyers. It is not possible to

access the site, as that requires login

credentials, yet its existence and purpose

has been known for half a year without

the broader maritime community noticing

it.

All in all, we are facing a 2017 where we

will see an increasing amount of ventures

launched in the maritime domain – either

by independent companies or by carriers.

This is all part of the transition to a new

way of doing business in liner shipping, as

outlined in detail in the book “Liner

Shipping 2025” by Lars Jensen, co-

founder of SeaIntel.


11

Who will succeed?

Which ones of these many ventures will

then be successful? This is where

significant learning points can be

extracted from the immediate past. Many

of the initiatives launched these days are

actually not new at all. It has all been

done before

And, in reality, many of the initiatives

launched previously quite simply failed.

Hence, it is prudent to take a look at

history, identify why they failed and try to

ascertain what it is they need to do

differently this time.

As this is not intended to be a major

history lesson in maritime eCommerce,

we have chosen only to include a

sampling of past projects in the period

1998-2007 – i.e. all these initiatives were

operational more than decade ago.

2007: Maersk Line launched Youship as a

purely online container carrier, or more

correctly, forwarder. It was possible to

find a suitable schedule, see a spot rate,

book cargo, get instant confirmation,

submit relevant shipment details, pay and

print shipment documents, all online and

within 10 minutes. Youship even won the

2008 web award for outstanding

achievement in web development. In

reality, Youship was first launched in 2004

by P&O Nedlloyd on the Trans-Tasman

trade, but was temporarily mothballed

during the period where Maersk Line

acquired P&O Nedlloyd.

In essence, Youship provided all the

functionality that the new companies

promoting online spot shipping today

offers – only they did it successfully more

than 10 years ago.

2006: Clarkson and Synchronet launched

Global Slot Network (GSN). It was

intended as a neutral electronic trading

platform that facilitated ocean carriers,

shippers and other participants in the


12

container transportation industry to buy

and sell container slot capacity and cargo.

Carriers could post products and prices on

GSN, and whenever one offer had been

accepted by a customer, the price of the

other offers would be automatically re-

calculated.

2000: Bolero launched the concept of

purely electronic Bills of Lading in order to

facilitate trade – but that was not even

the first time the industry had seen such

an attempt. Instead, that was seen in

1993:

1993: Bimcom had been launching

electronic messaging capabilities, and

while they did not have a final solution for

the electronic Bill of Lading, it was stated

that the evolutionary process will move

through E-mail to the exchange of

constructed documents, initially within a

single company and eventually to trading

partners. Ultimately, it would be possible

to evolve into the sending and receipt of

more complex documents, central

databases and thence to the exchange of

negotiable instruments.

In a 24-year old article from Lloyds List,

Bimcom is referred to in the following

way: ”BIMCOM, which now has 300

subscribers and is growing at a rate of

more than 15% per month, offers the

shipping industry no less than a complete

information transfer package “

1998 saw Greybox launch

tradexonline.com which was a tool aimed

at reducing the costs associated with

repositioning of empty equipment. In an

article from Computerworld in September

1998 it is stated that the system is

interchanging 1200 containers per month

for 150 customers, and has a growth rate

of 30% per month.

2000: Topflight was launched in the UK

to provide transportation rate

benchmarks, initially for road and air, but

to be followed a year later by deep-sea

rate benchmarks. Data was based on

input from a large panel of logistics

purchasing managers, and the managing

director of Topflight stated: “The web

means only that you can buy freight

transport without seeing the sales reps.

Because we are, through the benchmark

reports, showing them which route they

need to concentrate where the

price/service ration is less than

satisfactory.”

1998/99: The launch of online freight

portal eRateRequest and GoCargo. In

1999 NeoModal acquired eRateRequest

and stated the following: “eRateRequest

was the first mover in the ocean

containerized cargo market and has


13

several thousand registered shippers,

intermediaries and carriers that have

collectively conducted over 1,000

transactions," said Randy Paulson, co-

president of NeoModal. "This established

base of users will provide significant

liquidity for the launch of NeoMarket in

July.”

What can we learn?

Reviewing the past history of eCommerce

in the container shipping sector clearly

shows that none of new initiatives being

launched now are truly “new”. Variations

over the same concepts have all been

tried in the past 19 years, and have

largely been met with no success.

But there is a very important lesson to be

learned here for the new players who wish

to be successful.

When one reads the old material from the

time of the previous launches, it quickly

becomes clear that they are often littered

with references to the brilliance of the

technology they are using. Not unlike

some of the new initiatives we are seeing

in 2017.

However, it should by now be clear to

everyone that if this was purely a matter

of technology, we would have already

seen the complete digitization of the

industry. The “old” technology used

previously did indeed work – it got the job

done. Yet that was insufficient to result in

success.

The failure of the past attempts – despite

well-functioning technology – was one of

business processes.

Online freight portals require the buy-in

from particularly carriers to actually post

dynamic and functioning spot rates for all

to see. And even that is insufficient – it

requires that the carriers in question

change their internal processes for setting

prices in the first place to match such an

environment.

Some of the old portals were framed

around the use of freight auctioning – a

concept where, again, the technology

worked well, but the carriers were

strongly opposed to using it on

commercial reasons.

And the reality is very simple – whilst

there are millions on shippers, and some

would always want to try new technology,

there is a relatively limited number of

carriers who control the physical assets,

and no digitized product can succeed

without the support of at least a handful

of the major carriers.

Furthermore, an opinion piece in Lloyds

List in 2001 captures another sentiment


14

quite well: “Shipping does not like being

pushed around by ‘entrepreneurs’.”

Conclusion

Just because past attempts have failed,

that does not in any way imply the current

and future attempts will meet the same

fate.

However, the ones who will emerge

successful are those who have learned

from history – and have learned the

lesson that it is not about technology, it is

about business processes. Importantly, it

is about getting the carriers onboard with

embracing changes in business

processes, assisting them in doing this.

And looking at the landscape

emerging right now, it clearly seems

that some players have indeed learned

the lesson and are business focused

instead of technology focused. Others

appear to go out of their way to

explain the brilliance of their

technology without realizing that it is

not the technology which is the most

important part.


15

Alliances: NEUR-North America Transit Times The trade lane will experience a rather positive development in

terms of port-pairs, as 29 distinct port-pairs will be gained against

nine lost. The transit times will improve slightly, but overall the

trade lane remains mostly unchanged.

Last week, we turned our attention to

the impact of the new alliance networks

on the Transatlantic trade, which has

been rather overlooked in comparison to

the high-volume Asia-Europe and

Transpacific trades. Our focus last week

was on the port-pairs connecting

Mediterranean to North America.

Our analysis showed a rather stable

trade lane, with limited impact of the

new alliances going forward. Most of the

existing networks will remain

unchanged, and the transit times for the

majority of the port-pairs will also

remain the same. Only six port-pairs

disappeared, four of which originated

from Cagliari. On the other hand, out of

the nine new port-pairs that will be

added, Salerno would gain five.

This week we will extend our analysis of

the impact of the new alliances to the

port-pairs connecting North Europe to

North America, only focusing on the

Westbound calls from Europe. We will

cover the Eastbound trade lanes going

into Europe in the coming weeks.

Methodology

[This is the mostly the same

methodology section as for the Asia-

Europe, Transpacific and Mediterranean

to North America articles in the past

weeks’ issues, so readers already

familiar with it can skip this section,

although there are a few methodological

concerns specific to the Transatlantic

trade]

Transatlantic-specific methodology:

There are few methodological challenges

that are specific to the Transatlantic

trade. Firstly, the other East/West trades

have alliance carriers operate (almost)

exclusively within their alliances, but in

the Transatlantic trade, alliance carriers

are more likely to operate services

outside or across the alliances, than

within the formal alliances. As an

example, Hapag-Lloyd have until April

2017 been an operator on 11 services on

Transatlantic, but only five of these

services were operated within the G6

alliance framework, while the rest were

a mix of exclusively-operated services


16

and vessel sharing agreements with

both alliance and non-alliance carriers,

including OOCL, MSC, Hamburg Süd,

NYK, and CMA CGM.

For Hapag-Lloyd, we find remnants of

the old pre-G6 “Grand Alliance”, but

there is no clear patterns of cooperation,

which also makes it incredibly difficult to

group carriers into distinct

constellations. MSC operates six services

exclusively, five services within the 2M

alliance, and one service together with

OOCL and Hapag-Lloyd. The CKYE and

Ocean Three alliances are not officially

extended into the Transatlantic trade,

but we see a lot of patterns of

cooperation similar to the two alliances,

but then again CMA CGM are on-board

two services that could conceivably be

called “Ocean Three”-like, but also

operate four other services that have

nothing to do with Ocean Three.

All-in-all this means that we have had to

group the carriers in non-alliance and

non-traditional carrier groupings, in

order to have just a little bit of sense,

but these groupings are far from perfect,

and they are a best-effort attempt at

finding commonalities across service

operators. This also means that we do

not have clean groupings like we do in

the other East/West Trades, where we

go from four distinct alliances to three

distinct alliances.

Furthermore, as we are concerned only

with the impact of the new alliances, we

have opted to consider only services that

are offered either as part of an alliance

or are operated by one or more carriers

which are members of one of the

existing or upcoming alliances. This

means that the services operated by the

niche carriers ACL, ARRC, ICL,

StreamLines, Turkon Line and ZIM are

not included in the analysis. Moreover,

we have decided to include also services

that are not purely dedicated to the

Transatlantic trade, but that de facto

provide connections between one or

more ports in Europe and North America,

e.g. the Panama Direct Line service

offered by CMA CGM that connects North

Europe-US East Coast-Oceania.

The service rotations, proforma

schedules and transit times have been

sourced from SeaIntel’s proprietary

vessel schedules database and from the

alliance announcements published by

the carriers. In order to keep the

analysis as consistent as possible, we

have aimed to source the data from as

few carriers as possible, and have mainly

collected the data from the following

carriers:


17

Existing alliances:

2M: Maersk Line

G6: Hapag-Lloyd

New Alliances:

2M: Maersk Line

Ocean Alliance: CMA CGM

The Alliance: Hapag-Lloyd

Old and New Non-Alliance services:

CMA CGM

Maersk Line

Hapag Lloyd

Evergreen

We have chosen the sourcing carriers

entirely on the basis of how much detail

they provide in their data, and how the

data is to work with, and our choice of

sourcing carrier does not confer any

opinion on the correctness or data

quality of the carriers’ data.

The “old” alliances are based on their

service networks as they looked at mid-

to-late January, so as to avoid any

undue influence from short-term

network adjustments as the carriers

prepare for the new alliance networks.

As some of the services could not be

grouped within either an alliance or a

single carrier grouping, we have grouped

them under “Other”.

In order to avoid any confusion as to

which services we have included under

which alliance/carrier grouping scope,

we list below all the services included

and how we have designated them.

Existing alliances and carrier groupings:


TA3/NEUATL3

G6: AX1, AX2, AX3, PA1

CMA CGM: Panama Direct Line, Victory

Bridge

Other: CAE (Maersk Line), Liberty

Bridge (CMA CGM), AT1 and AT2 (Hapag

Lloyd), TAE (Evergreen)

New Alliances and carrier groupings:


TA3/NEUATL3

Ocean Alliance: Liberty Bridge, Victory

Bridge,

The Alliance: AL1, AL2, AL3, AL4, AL5

CMA CGM: Panama Direct Line

Other: AT1 and AT2 (Hapag Lloyd), CAE

(Maersk Line)

It should be noted that, the AL8 service

advertised by The Alliance is not

included, as it is a slot charter


18

agreement on the A service operated by

ACL, and thus not operated by any of

The Alliance carriers.

General methodology:

When calculating the number of port-

pairs, we only count a given port-pair on

a service once, even though there may

in theory be two identical port-pairs, if

one of the ports is called twice as import

and export call. We exclude these

duplicates on a single service, as no

customer would intentionally use the

additional port-pair, e.g. discharging on

an export call.

We have calculated all transit times and

port-pair frequencies based on the

service rotations, rather than the transit

times tables, in order to ensure a

common calculation basis, as we have in

the past seen that carriers using quite

different approaches to calculating

transit times. Further, using the transit

time tables may leave out specific port-

pairs from the frequency overview, that

the carriers have not included in the

transit times tables, as they may not

offer a competitive transit time.

The analysis will focus only on the port-

pairs that are de facto currently

available in the existing networks, and

that will be offered in the future service

networks. Further, we will look at the

best transit time for a given port-pair in

the existing networks, and we will

compare it with the best one offered in

the future networks, as well as see which

of the three alliances will be offering the

most competitive transit times on these

specific port combinations.

Transit times are calculated as integer

calendar days, meaning that if carrier X

departs port A on February 1st at 1:00

AM, and arrives at port B on February

11th at 11:00 PM, while carrier Y departs

port A on February 1st at 11:00 PM and

arrives at port B on February 11th at 1:00

AM, they will both have a transit time of

10 days, even though there is a 46-hour

difference between the two. We have

done it this way, as this is the standard

industry convention, and calculating

transit times by the hour does not

materially alter the conclusions of this

analysis. Further, all transit times are

calculated on the basis of local time

zones, and do not take the time zone

differences into account, as this is also

the industry convention.

When comparing transit times across

alliances, we consistently use the


19

shortest transit time offered by an

alliance for a given port-pair, as they

may technically offer longer transit

times, but not actively market them.

In order to have a better overview, we

have split the North Europe-North

America trade lane into a number of sub-

trades based on sub-regions, where

North Europe is split into the following

regions:

North West Coast: Every port in North

Europe except for the UK ports.

UK: All of the UK ports.

We have also split the North America

side into five sub-regions:

North Atlantic: Everything above the

state of Virginia (included): Baltimore,

New York, Norfolk, and Philadelphia.

Canada: Canadian ports on the East

coast: Halifax and Montreal.

South Atlantic: Everything between

North Carolina (included) and Florida

(included), including Bahamas:

Charleston, Freeport, Miami, Port

Everglades, Savannah, and Wilmington.

Gulf: Everything in the US Gulf:

Houston, Mobile, and New Orleans.

Pacific West: Everything on North

America West Coast: Long Beach, Los

Angeles, Oakland, Tacoma, and

Vancouver.

Given the fact that there are very few

services going into North Atlantic, and

Canada from the UK, and to avoid

smaller tables, we have decided to group

North Atlantic and Canada into one sub-

trade for services originating from the

UK. The same has been done for South

Atlantic and Gulf.

For each sub-trade, we list all the port-

pairs offered across the existing and

future alliance networks, and highlight

the following:

Lost port-pairs: these are port-pairs

offered by at least one of the existing

alliances, but will not be offered as a

direct service combination in the new

alliance networks, and will thus only be

serviceable via transshipment. Port-pair

names are marked with Dark Red

Background and White Text. The

sixth column to the right of the port-pair

names (marked with the ∑-symbol)

counts the total number of weekly

services that will be lost on the

disappearing port-pair.

New port-pairs: these are port-pairs that

are not offered as direct combinations in


20

the existing alliances, but will be offered

as a direct service port-pair in the new

alliance networks. Port-pair names are

marked with Dark Green Background

and White Text. The twelfth column to

the right of the port-pair names (marked

with the ∑-symbol) counts the total

number of weekly services that will call

the new port-pair, across all three new

alliances.

Slower transit time port-pairs: these are

port-pairs that are offered as direct

combinations in both the existing

alliances and future alliance networks,

but the shortest transit time will

deteriorate from existing to the future

alliances networks. The rightmost

column in each table measures the

increase in shortest transit time. The

port-pair names are marked with Pink

Background and Red Text.

As an example, in Table B3 the fifth port-

pair from the top (Antwerp-Miami) is

currently offered by 2M and CMA CGM at

16 and 15 days transit time respectively.

In the future, this port pair will be

offered by 2M and the Ocean Alliance at

16 days transit time each. The rightmost

column shows that the shortest transit

time has increased by “1” day.

Faster transit time port-pairs: these are

port-pairs that will conversely see the

shortest transit time get even shorter in

the new alliance networks. The

rightmost column in each table

measures the increase in shortest transit

time. Port-pair names are marked with

Light Green Background and Dark Green

Text.

As an example, in Table B3 the port-pair

at the bottom (Hamburg-Savannah) is

currently offered by G6 at 20 days

transit time. In the future alliance

networks, The Alliance will offer this

port-pair with an 11 days transit time,

which is nine days faster than the

current shortest transit time, and the

rightmost column lists “-9” days to

signify this.

Changes in Service frequency: The

fourth column to the right of the port-

pair names lists the number of weekly

services connecting the port-pairs in the

current alliance networks, while the fifth

column sums the number of weekly

direct connections in the current alliance

networks, and if this column is marked

with pink it means that the total number

of weekly services decreased in the new

networks.

The next three columns show the

number of weekly direct service

connections in the new alliance

networks, with column to the right


21

showing the sum of weekly service

connections across the three new

alliances plus carriers groupings, and if

the column is marked light green it

means that the total number of weekly

services increases in the new networks.

Changes in shortest transit time per

alliance: The next five columns show the

shortest transit time offered by each of

the existing alliances plus carriers

grouping, across all their respective

services, with the shortest of the five

marked green and the longest marked

red. The next five columns show the

shortest transit time offered by each of

the future alliances plus carrier

groupings, and again the shortest is

green while the longest is coloured red.

Finally, this analysis is based on the

latest updated (and hopefully final)

alliance networks as announced by the

alliance carriers on or before April 7th,

and that any previous analyses of

alliance port-pairs, service frequency

and transit times was based on the

information published at the time, and

provided with lengthy disclaimers,

clearly stating that our analysis cannot

be more correct than the information

released by the carriers. As a number of

network changes have been announced

by the since our previous analyses,

several of the conclusions may have

changed.


22

Port-Pair and Transit Time changes

in Europe North West Coast to North

Atlantic

Table B1 lists all of the port-pairs being

offered by the old and new alliance

networks in the sub-trade connecting

North West Coast to North Atlantic.

Going forward, the overall outlook of this

sub-trade will be fairly negative.

Hamburg will be the most affected in this

sub-trade, losing connections to New

York and Norfolk – both of which were

offered exclusively by G6 through their

AX1 service. Instead, shippers will gain

two new connections to Philadelphia –

not previously offered on this sub-trade

– from Antwerp and Bremerhaven. Both

of these connections will be offered by

The Alliance through their AL1 service.

Twelve port-pairs will remain across the

old and new alliance networks, and

seven of these port-pairs will see a

decrease in their weekly service

frequency, with the largest decrease

being on Rotterdam to Norfolk (from five

times a week to just two).

Four port-pairs will see an increase in

their shortest transit times, with

Rotterdam to New York increasing by

two days. Only two port-pairs,

Bremerhaven to New York, and Antwerp

to Norfolk, will see a decrease in transit

times, both by two days.

Apart from CMA CGM – which offers only

three port-pairs – all three new alliances

will have a strong presence in the sub-

trade. 2M will be offering ten port-pairs,

while both The Alliance and Ocean

Alliance will offer eight each.


23


in Europe North West Coast to

Canada

Table B2 shows that the sub-trade

connecting North West Coast and

Canada will see relatively few changes in

the new alliance networks. No port-pairs

will be lost on this sub-trade and there

will be no new port-pairs as well.

As with their old alliance network, 2M

will not offer any services on this sub-

trade going forward. The Alliance will

also offer two port-pairs going into

Halifax, both of which were previously

offered by G6 through their PA1 service.

The three non-alliance services are the

Canada Atlantic Express (CAE)/Saint

Laurent 1 service from Maersk Line/CMA

CGM, and the AT1/GEX1/Montreal

Express operated by Hapag-Lloyd, OOCL

and MSC, and the AT2/GEX2 service

operated by Hapag-Lloyd and OOCL.

These services do muddy the waters a

bit, as we see many of the major alliance

carriers represented, but clearly not in

the formal alliance structures.

Interestingly, neither of these services

currently have any slot charters on-

board, so their port-pairs are offered

relatively exclusively.

All three port-pairs destined for Halifax

will see their transit times increase.

Rotterdam to Halifax will see the largest

increase in transit time, of 11 days,

because the PA1 service offered by G6,

which had the shortest transit time, will

not be a part of the new alliance

networks. On the other hand, all of the

port-pairs going into Montreal will have

the same transit times as before.

In both the old and future networks, this

sub-trade will only see a limited

presence of the formal alliances, rather

the majority of the port-pairs will be

offered by alliance carriers on services

offered outside the alliances.


24


in Europe North West Coast to South

Atlantic

Table B3 shows a fairly balanced outlook

for the sub-trade connecting North West

Coast Europe to South Atlantic. As seen

in the North West Coast Europe to North

Atlantic sub-trade, Hamburg will lose yet

another port-pair, this time to

Charleston. Wilmington, which was not

offered on this sub-trade in the old

alliance networks, will now be offered

from three different origins – Antwerp,

Bremerhaven, and Le Havre – all of

which will be offered exclusively by 2M

through their TA2 service.

Of the remaining port-pairs, four will see

their shortest transit times increase by

one day. Four port-pairs will see a

decrease in their transit times, with

Hamburg to Savannah improving

significantly by nine days, and Antwerp

to Savannah decreasing by four days.

Six port-pairs will see their weekly

frequency decrease by one or two.

As seen in the North West Coast to North

Atlantic sub-trade, all three alliances will

have a strong presence in this sub-trade

2M will offer 18 port-pairs, having the

shortest transit time on 14 of them.

Ocean Alliance will offer 12 port-pairs,

and The Alliance will offer 11.


25


in Europe North West Coast to US

Gulf

Table B4 shows a quite positive

development for the sub-trade

connecting Europe North West Coast to

US Gulf. No port-pairs will be lost and

there will be no new additions either.

Seven out of the twelve port-pairs

offered on this sub-trade will see an

improvement in their shortest transit

times, while only Rotterdam to New

Orleans will see a deterioration. Antwerp

to Mobile will be offered with its shortest

transit time improved by six days due to

the addition of The Alliance’s AL4

service, which will offer a much shorter

transit time than 2M. Five of the

remaining port-pairs will see their transit

times improve by two days, while the

last, Le Havre to Houston, will see a

transit time improvement of only one

day.

The weekly service frequency of all the

services going into Mobile will increase

by one due to the AL4 service offered by

The Alliance.


in North West Coast to Pacific West

Table B5 shows that the sub-trade

connecting North West Coast to Pacific

West will see some major changes in the

new alliance networks. In the old

networks, only G6 was offering a service

on this sub-trade, whereas in the new

alliance networks, only The Alliance will

offer a service on this sub-trade.

While four port-pairs will be lost,

fourteen new ones will be offered. On

the origin side, Bremerhaven will lose

both its connections to Pacific West. On

the destination side, Los Angeles will

lose all three of its connections to North

West Coast in favour of Long Beach.

What we can ascertain from this table –

when taken together with the North


26

West Coast to North and South Atlantic

sub-trades – is that Hamburg will lose

major connectivity to the East Coast in

favour of the West Coast. Charleston,

New York, and Norfolk will de facto no

longer be offered from Hamburg, while

Long Beach, Oakland, Tacoma, and

Vancouver will gain direct connections

from the German port.

With the addition of the new port-pairs,

Antwerp, Hamburg, Rotterdam, and Le

Havre will all gain connections to Long

Beach, Tacoma, Oakland, and

Vancouver. Previously, only two of these

connections existed – Rotterdam to

Oakland, which will see a one day

increase in transit time, and Antwerp to

Oakland, which will see a decrease in

transit time by six days.

All of these new port-pairs will be offered

by The Alliance’s AL5 service. It is

interesting to note that previously, G6

offered a similar network with their PA1

service. The main difference is that while

the PA1 service went up to Halifax and

New York before heading towards the

West Coast, the AL5 service will instead

connect with Savannah on the East

Coast before moving towards the West

Coast. This is the reason that we see a

shorter transit time from Antwerp to

Oakland.


in UK to North Atlantic and Canada

Table B6 shows the impact of the new

alliances on the sub-trade connecting UK

to North Atlantic and Canada.

Southampton will be the most affected


27

on this sub-trade – losing one port-pair

(to Halifax), seeing a decrease in weekly

service frequencies (to New York and

Norfolk), and an increase in transit times

(seven days to New York, and six days

to Norfolk).

London Gateway, on the other hand, will

benefit the most from the new alliance

networks, gaining four new connections,

all of which will be offered by The

Alliance through their AL1 (Norfolk,

Philadelphia, Halifax, New York) and AL2

(New York) services.

This sub-trade is fairly segmented

because out of the twelve available port-

pairs, where only one is being offered by

more than one alliance.


in UK to South Atlantic and Gulf

As seen in table B7, the sub-trade

connecting the UK to South Atlantic and

Gulf will be positively impacted by the

new alliance networks going forward.

As we saw in the previous sub-trade,

London Gateway will gain another new


28

connection (to Charleston), giving it a

total of five new connections. On the

destination side, Mobile, which benefited

from increased service frequency in the

North West Coat to US Gulf sub-trade,

will yet again benefit, this time with a

new connection from Southampton.

Wilmington gains another new port-pair,

making it a total of four new connections

from North Europe.

Felixstowe to Wilmington will be offered

exclusively by 2M through their TA2

service, while The Alliance will offer both

London Gateway to Charleston and

Southampton to Mobile through their

AL2 and AL4 services, respectively.

Of the remaining port-pairs, two will see

their shortest transit times being

lowered. Southampton to New Orleans

will decrease by two days, while

Southampton to Savannah will decrease

by six days. The weekly service

frequency will only change for

Southampton to Charleston (from four

weekly services to two), and

Southampton to Savannah (from five

weekly services to three).

2M and The Alliance will be the strongest

alliances on this sub-trade, offering six

and seven port-pairs respectively, while

Ocean Alliance will offer just two port-

pairs.


in UK to Pacific West

As in the previous sub-trades,

Southampton will once again be in the

focus. As seen is table B8, Southampton

to Los Angeles will no longer be offered.

On the other hand, shippers will be able

to choose from three new port-pairs

originating from Southampton (to Long

Beach, Tacoma, and Vancouver).

Southampton to Oakland, which was one

of the two port-pairs previously offered,

will see its shortest transit time improve

by two days. All of the aforementioned

port-pairs will be offered exclusively by

The Alliance.

What is not clearly evident from this

table is that – taken with the other sub-

trades – Los Angeles has lost all

connectivity to North Europe, losing all

four of the existing port-pairs that were

being offered. Long beach on the other


29

hand, now has five connections from

North Europe, none of which existed in

the previous sub-trades.

G6 exclusively offered Los Angeles in the

old networks, but after the alliance

shake up, the newly formed The

Alliance, which has remnants of G6, has

opted for Long Beach instead.

Conclusion

Table B9 shows how the changes in the

North Europe to North America trade

lane will compare against the other East-

West trade lanes once the dust settles

and the new alliance operations take

effect.

The developments in this trade lane will

be fairly positive, as we see a gain of 29

distinct port-pairs against a loss of just

nine. The increased connectivity comes

from the inclusion of London Gateway in

Europe, and Philadelphia, Wilmington,

and Long Beach in North America. As

discussed previously, the inclusion of

Long Beach in the new alliance networks

comes at the expense of Los Angeles,

which will lose all of its direct

connections to North Europe. 25 out of

the total 29 new distinct port-pairs can

be attributed to services being offered

by The Alliance.

The transit times on the other hand are

fairly balanced. We see seventeen port-

pairs with improved transit times, and

the same number of port-pairs with an

increased shortest transit time. The

difference between the ‘time saved’ and

the ‘time lost’ is also the same, since we

will see transit times increase by a total

of 52 days, and decrease by the same

number as well.


30

Carrier Service Changes CMA CGM to become operator on

EURAF5/WEWA service

This week CMA CGM has announced that

they will become an operator on their

EURAF5 service, currently operated solely

by NileDutch as WEWA. The carrier will

deploy two vessels on the service, while

the remaining six vessels will be provided

by NileDutch. The changes will be

effective from 5th April 2017.

The vessels deployed on the

EURAF5/WEWA service will call the

following ports (12 port calls):

Antwerp – Le Havre – Lisbon – Algeciras

– Tangiers – Pointe Noire – Luanda –

Lobito (fortnightly) – Namibe (fortnightly)

– Douala (fortnightly) – Abidjan –

Algeciras – Antwerp

Yang Ming to start TSE service

Yang Ming will combine their two services

of TBS and SE2 into one single service,

which will be called TSE. The changes will

be implemented with “Ibn Al Abbar”

departing from Taichung on 22nd April

2017. The carrier will deploy 4 vessels on

the service with an average vessel size of

1,700 TEU.

The port rotation of the new TSE service

is as follows (12 port calls):

Taichung – Kaohsiung – Hong Kong – Hai

Phong – Da Nang – Ho Chi Minh –

Singapore – Port Klang – Cat Lai – Da

Nang – Hai Phong – Hong Kong -

Kaohsiung


31

Carrier Rate Announcements


32


33

Tradelane Carrier Rate increase Effective date

India-Mozambique (SB) CMA CGM 150 USD/TEU April 10, 2017

ISC/ MEA-Indian Ocean (SB) CMA CGM 200 USD/TEU April 10, 2017

Iran-East Africa (SB) CMA CGM 300 USD/TEU April 10, 2017

Asia-East Africa (SB) CMA CGM 300 USD/TEU April 15, 2017

Asia-Red Sea (WB) Hapag Lloyd 250 USD/TEU April 15, 2017

Asia-ISC (WB) Hapag Lloyd 250 USD/TEU April 15, 2017

Asia/ Australia/ New Zealand-Arabian Gulf (WB) Hapag Lloyd 250 USD/TEU April 15, 2017

ISC/ MEA-West Africa (WB) CMA CGM 100 USD/TEU April 16, 2017

Asia-West Africa (SB) CMA CGM 500 USD/TEU May 1, 2017

Asia-Australia (SB) AADA 300 USD/TEU May 1, 2017

Asia-Caribbean/ East Coast Central America/ Gulf of Mexico (WB) Hapag Lloyd 1050 USD/TEU May 1, 2017

Asia-New Zealand (SB) Hamburg Sud 100 USD/TEU May 1, 2017

ISC/ MEA-North America (WB) Hapag Lloyd 500 USD/TEU May 1, 2017

USEC-ECSA (SB) Hamburg Sud 150 USD/TEU May 1, 2017

ECSA-Central America/ North America (NB) Hamburg Sud 400 USD/FFE May 1, 2017

North America-West Africa (EB) Maersk Line 250 USD/FFE May 1, 2017

North America-East Africa (EB) Maersk Line 40 USD/FFE May 1, 2017

North America-South Africa (SB) Maersk Line 50 USD/FFE May 1, 2017

Tradelane Carrier Rate level Effective date

Asia-Mediterranean (WB) Hapag Lloyd 1750 USD/TEU April 15, 2017

Mediterranean-MEA (EB) CMA CGM 900 USD/TEU April 15, 2017

Mediterranean-ISC (EB) CMA CGM 800 USD/TEU April 15, 2017

Turkey-West Africa (SB) CMA CGM 1300 USD/TEU May 1, 2017

North-Europe-Asia (EB) Hapag Lloyd 1525 USD/TEU May 1, 2017


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