Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 5.11: World War II: The U.S. Navy in the Pacific, 1941-1945.

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Sea Power and Maritime Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Affairs Lesson 5.11: World War II: The Lesson 5.11: World War II: The U.S. Navy in the Pacific, 1941- U.S. Navy in the Pacific, 1941- 1945 1945

Transcript of Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 5.11: World War II: The U.S. Navy in the Pacific, 1941-1945.

Page 1: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 5.11: World War II: The U.S. Navy in the Pacific, 1941-1945.

Sea Power and MaritimeSea Power and Maritime Affairs Affairs

Lesson 5.11: World War II: The U.S. Lesson 5.11: World War II: The U.S. Navy in the Pacific, 1941-1945Navy in the Pacific, 1941-1945

Page 2: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 5.11: World War II: The U.S. Navy in the Pacific, 1941-1945.

Enabling ObjectivesEnabling Objectives• EXPLAIN EXPLAIN the political and economic forces the political and economic forces

that led Japan to strike at Pearl Harbor and that led Japan to strike at Pearl Harbor and colonial possessions of the U.S. and Britain.colonial possessions of the U.S. and Britain.

• DEFINEDEFINE the Japanese strategy for an early the Japanese strategy for an early victory and their concept of the postwar victory and their concept of the postwar Pacific power balance.Pacific power balance.

• EXPLAINEXPLAIN the impact of Pearl Harbor and the the impact of Pearl Harbor and the subsequent Battles of Coral Sea and Midway subsequent Battles of Coral Sea and Midway on the transformation of the aircraft carrier's on the transformation of the aircraft carrier's role in Naval Warfare.role in Naval Warfare.

Page 3: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 5.11: World War II: The U.S. Navy in the Pacific, 1941-1945.

Enabling ObjectivesEnabling Objectives

• LISTLIST the significant highlights of the the significant highlights of the evolution of U.S. operational strategy in evolution of U.S. operational strategy in the Pacific, including major battles or the Pacific, including major battles or campaigns and instances where strategy campaigns and instances where strategy was flawed or ambiguous. was flawed or ambiguous.

• RECOGNIZE RECOGNIZE the geopolitical and military the geopolitical and military implications of President Truman’s implications of President Truman’s decision to utilize atomic weapons in decision to utilize atomic weapons in ending the war in the Pacific.ending the war in the Pacific.

Page 4: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 5.11: World War II: The U.S. Navy in the Pacific, 1941-1945.

Background InformationBackground Information

• Japanese-American relations tense Japanese-American relations tense throughout 1930s. throughout 1930s. – Japan challenged America’s “Open Door” policy Japan challenged America’s “Open Door” policy

by attacking Manchuria in 1931by attacking Manchuria in 1931– In 1937, Japanese expansion in China resulted in In 1937, Japanese expansion in China resulted in

attack on American gunboat, the attack on American gunboat, the PanayPanay, by , by Japanese aircraftJapanese aircraft

• Roosevelt adopted economic sanctions Roosevelt adopted economic sanctions leading to an oil embargo by Americans, leading to an oil embargo by Americans, British and Dutch (July 1941)British and Dutch (July 1941)

Page 5: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 5.11: World War II: The U.S. Navy in the Pacific, 1941-1945.

Background InformationBackground Information

• The Japanese home islands were not rich in The Japanese home islands were not rich in natural resources.natural resources.– Japanese struck for the oil-rich Dutch East Japanese struck for the oil-rich Dutch East

Indies (Indonesia), Singapore, and the Indies (Indonesia), Singapore, and the surrounding British-owned Malaya, Thailand, surrounding British-owned Malaya, Thailand, the Philippines, and Hong Kong.the Philippines, and Hong Kong.

• The Japanese camouflaged their plans with The Japanese camouflaged their plans with diplomatic negotiations in Washington. diplomatic negotiations in Washington.

• The United States expected an assault The United States expected an assault somewhere in the Pacific because cryptanalysts, somewhere in the Pacific because cryptanalysts, in a technique called “Magic,” had broken the in a technique called “Magic,” had broken the Japanese Diplomatic Code.Japanese Diplomatic Code.

Page 6: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 5.11: World War II: The U.S. Navy in the Pacific, 1941-1945.

Admiral Isoroku YamamotoAdmiral Isoroku Yamamoto • Commander in ChiefCommander in Chief

– Japanese Combined FleetJapanese Combined Fleet

• Lived in the United StatesLived in the United States– Boston - Studied EnglishBoston - Studied English– Washington D.C. - Naval Washington D.C. - Naval

AttachéAttaché

• Against war with the U.S.Against war with the U.S.• Demanded Pearl Harbor Demanded Pearl Harbor

AttackAttack– Destruction of U.S. Pacific FleetDestruction of U.S. Pacific Fleet

September 1940: September 1940: “If I am told to fight regardless of the “If I am told to fight regardless of the consequences, I shall run wild for the first six months or a year, consequences, I shall run wild for the first six months or a year, but I have utterly no confidence for the second or third year.”but I have utterly no confidence for the second or third year.”

Page 7: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 5.11: World War II: The U.S. Navy in the Pacific, 1941-1945.

Japanese Strategic AssessmentJapanese Strategic Assessment

• Attack on Pearl HarborAttack on Pearl Harbor::– Great risk: U.S. would surely enter the warGreat risk: U.S. would surely enter the war– Greater potential gain: U.S. Pacific Fleet would be Greater potential gain: U.S. Pacific Fleet would be

knocked out of the warknocked out of the war– Japan would buy time after Pearl Harbor- then Japan would buy time after Pearl Harbor- then

consolidate gains throughout China and the Pacificconsolidate gains throughout China and the Pacific– Possibility of U.S. agreeing to Japanese territorial Possibility of U.S. agreeing to Japanese territorial

gains to make peacegains to make peace– Good possibility that U.S. involvement in Europe will Good possibility that U.S. involvement in Europe will

drain naval resources from Pacific Ocean.drain naval resources from Pacific Ocean.

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““A Day That Will Live in Infamy”A Day That Will Live in Infamy”

• The attack on Pearl The attack on Pearl Harbor surprised Harbor surprised the U.S., who had the U.S., who had not anticipated a not anticipated a strike so far east or strike so far east or one mounted solely one mounted solely by carrier-born by carrier-born aircraft.aircraft.

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The AttackThe Attack

• Six newest and largest Japanese carriers Six newest and largest Japanese carriers at core of striking forceat core of striking force

• Sortie from Kuriles, rendezvous 7 Dec, Sortie from Kuriles, rendezvous 7 Dec, 200 miles N of Pearl Harbor200 miles N of Pearl Harbor

• Japanese fleet traveled across entire Japanese fleet traveled across entire Pacific Ocean without being detected.Pacific Ocean without being detected.

• Launched 183 aircraft at 0600, strike 0755Launched 183 aircraft at 0600, strike 0755

• 90% of damage inflicted by 082590% of damage inflicted by 0825

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U.S. Pacific Fleet - Pearl HarborU.S. Pacific Fleet - Pearl Harbor• No clear warning from WashingtonNo clear warning from Washington

– Intercepts did not identify Pearl Harbor as a targetIntercepts did not identify Pearl Harbor as a target

– Slow communications between Washington and Slow communications between Washington and Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific FleetCommander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

• Admiral Husband E. Kimmel dismissed after attack.Admiral Husband E. Kimmel dismissed after attack.

• Battleships in berths at Pearl for weekend libertyBattleships in berths at Pearl for weekend liberty– ““Battleship Row”Battleship Row”

• Carriers Carriers LexingtonLexington and and EnterpriseEnterprise delivering delivering aircraft to Midway and Wake Islandsaircraft to Midway and Wake Islands

• Yamamoto - “Climb Mount Niitaka” message to Yamamoto - “Climb Mount Niitaka” message to Vice Admiral Nagumo to commence attackVice Admiral Nagumo to commence attack

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Pearl Harbor 7 December 1941