No. _________

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In The

Supreme Court of the United States

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STEPHEN D. CHAMBERLAIN,

Petitioner,

v.

PAUL F. HARRIS, JR.,

Respondent.

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On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Fourth Circuit

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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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STEPHEN D. CHAMBERLAIN Pro Se Litigant

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i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The United States District Court for the District of Maryland, dismissed a fee-paid 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint, sua sponte, having determined no relief could be granted based on the concept of absolute judicial immunity. The District Court further deter-mined it did not have jurisdiction to consider the complaint because the alleged constitutional viola-tions occurred in a post-divorce declaratory judgment action. A panel on the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed these determinations and a Rehear-ing En Banc was subsequently denied.

The questions presented are:

Does absolute judicial immunity apply when a judge acts in the clear absence of jurisdic-tion?

Do certain classes of litigation provide sanc-tuary for the violation of Constitutional rights?

Did the Federal District Court in this case abuse its discretion by dismissing, sua sponte, the well-pleaded, fee-paid complaint?

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ................................ i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................. iv

OPINIONS BELOW ............................................. 1

JURISDICTION ................................................... 1

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATU-TORY PROVISIONS ........................................ 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............................. 3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION .... 5

I. JUDGES WHO ACT IN THE CLEAR ABSENCE OF JURISDICTION ARE NOT AFFORDED ABSOLUTE JUDI-CIAL IMMUNITY ...................................... 6

II. NO SANCTUARY EXISTS FOR THE VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ..................................................... 9

III. THE SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL OF THIS WELL-PLEADED, FEE-PAID COMPLAINT WAS CLEAR ERROR ................................ 16

CONCLUSION ..................................................... 23

APPENDIX

Unpublished United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit per curiam Decision affirming District Court Order of Dismissal, filed October 19, 2015 ...................................... App. 1

Judgment, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, filed October 19, 2015 ...... App. 3

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TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued

Page

United States District Court for the District of Maryland Order of Dismissal, filed June 8, 2015 .................................................................. App. 4

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Order denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc dated December 1, 2015 .................... App. 7

Petitioner’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Complaint ............ App. 8

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 556 U.S. 662, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) ......................................... 18

Attorney Gen. v. A.A. County School Bus, 286 Md. 324, 407 A.2d 749 (1979) ................................... 8

Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S. Ct. 773, 90 L. Ed. 939 (1946) ..................................................... 17

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) ... 17, 18, 19, 20

Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) ................................................. 24

Boyd’s Civic Ass’n v. Montgomery County, 526 A.2d 598 (Md. 1987) .................................................. 8

Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 20 L. Ed. 646 (1872) ............................................... 6, 7, 8

Brandon v. District of Columbia Board of Parole, 236 U.S. App. D. C. 155, 734 F.2d 56 (1984) ....................................................................... 19

Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989) .......... 17

Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1980) .............. 6

Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) ....................... 6

Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S. Ct. 472, 84 L. Ed. 716 (1940) ........................................ 25

Chu By Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1985) .......................................................................... 6

Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985) .................. 6

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

Page

Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244 (1996) ........................ 8

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957) ............................................ 18, 20

Davani v. Virginia Dep’t of Transp., 434 F.3d 712 (4th Cir. 2006) ............................................ 14, 15

Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980) ........................... 6

District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feld-man, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) ................................. 12, 14

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) ........................ 24

Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) ........................................... 13, 14

Floyd v. Barker, 12 Coke 23, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (1608) ......................................................................... 6

Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988) ................... 6, 7

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963) ..................................... 25

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585, 100 L. Ed. 891 (1956) .............................................. 25

Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 104 S. Ct. 2229, 81 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1984) ......................... 20

H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 109 S. Ct. 2893, 106 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1989) ................................................................ 20

Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2005) .............................................. 14

Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994) .............. 13

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

Page

Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) ........ 24

King v. Myers, 973 F.2d 354 (4th Cir. 1992) ................ 6

McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) .......................................... 24

Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 112 S. Ct. 286, 116 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1991) .................................................. 6, 7

National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 114 S. Ct. 798, 127 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1994) .................................................. 20

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989) ............. 17, 19, 21, 24

Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986) ................................. 20

Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987) .......... 12

Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) ............................. 6

Pressly v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1987) .......... 6

Raftery v. Scott, 756 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1985) ............ 10

Reyes v. Prince George’s County, 281 Md. 279, 380 A.2d 12 (1977) ..................................................... 8

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) ................................................................. 13, 14

Sanjuan v. American Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247 (7th Cir. 1994) ........... 20

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1974) ............................. 18, 21

Stevenson v. Lanham, 127 Md. App. 597 (1999) .......... 8

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

Page

Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) ............... 6, 7

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S. Ct. 992, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2002) .............. 20, 21

The Fair v. Kohler Die Co., 228 U.S. 22 (1913) ......... 15

Tingler v. Marshall, 716 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1983) ........................................................................ 22

Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635 (2002) ................................................. 13

Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1982) ........................................................... 10, 11

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220 (1886) ................................................ 24

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ....................................................... 1

28 U.S.C. § 1331 ................................................. passim

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) ....................................... 3, 11, 18

28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) ........................... 3, 11, 12, 15, 18

42 U.S.C. § 1983 ................................................. passim

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) .................................................. 18

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) .......................................... 16, 23

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ........................................ passim

U.S. Const. amend. XIV ..................................... 2, 4, 10

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

Page

OTHER CITATIONS

Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Rooker-Feldman: Worth Only the Powder to Blow It Up?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1081 (1999) .................................... 13

Allison B. Jones, “The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: What Does It Really Mean To Be Inextricably Intertwined,” DUKE LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 56:643 (2006) ........................................................... 14

5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004) ......... 21

F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court: A Study in the Federal Judicial System 65 (1927) ....................................... 10

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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

On June 8, 2015, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed, sua sponte, a fee-paid lawsuit filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal on appeal and denied a petition for rehearing en banc. Petitioner Stephen D. Chamber-lain respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review this decision.

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OPINIONS BELOW

The June 8, 2015 Order of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland is printed in full text at Pet. App. 4. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s affirmation of the District Court’s Order on October 19, 2015 can be found at Pet. App. 1. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s denial of the Peti-tioner’s request for Rehearing En Banc on December 1, 2015 can be found at Pet. App. 7.

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JURISDICTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied the Petitioner’s request for Rehearing En Banc on December 1, 2015. This Peti-tion has been timely filed and this Court has jurisdic-tion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

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RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

1. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part: “No State shall . . . de-prive any person of life, liberty, or prop-erty, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-tion the equal protection of the laws.”

2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Co-lumbia, subjects, or causes to be subject-ed, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory de-cree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress appli-cable exclusively to the District of Co-lumbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.”

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fee-paid com-plaint in a United States Federal District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3). The pro se complaint was “for money damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and under federal law and state law, against Paul F. Harris, Jr., a Circuit Court Judge in Anne Arundel County, Maryland, in his individual capacity.”

The complaint acknowledged the general rule of absolute judicial immunity, clearly articulated the case involved one of the long held exceptions to that general rule, and provided a clear basis for the Dis-trict Court’s jurisdiction:

“Maryland Circuit Courts have no statutory authority or jurisdiction to hear moot cases. Jurisdiction to hear moot cases has been con-ferred exclusively on appellate courts in Maryland. Both parties to the case in the Anne Arundel County Circuit Court had de-clared the only issue before the Court to be moot in formal motions filed before the hear-ing. The Plaintiff proved the only issue before the Court was moot at the com-mencement of the hearing. Yet the Defendant willfully and deliberately acted under the color of law, and in the clear absence of juris-diction, to force the Plaintiff to stand trial for an action without a live controversy. This

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action directly violated rights protected un-der the United States Constitution and caused special and general injury to the Plaintiff for which damages are sought.”

“Judicial immunity, under the circumstances of this case as will be proven at trial, is not applicable. Judicial acts taken in the clear absence of jurisdiction are not protected acts.”

“Defendant acted in his individual capacity under the color of law to deprive the Plaintiff of certain constitutionally protected rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States including, but not limited to: (a) the right to due pro-cess, and (b) the right to equal protection under the law.”

“ . . . the Defendant acted under the color of law and deprived the Plaintiff of his liberty interests by holding the Plaintiff for trial in the clear face of an absolute lack of jurisdic-tion.”

The District Court stated it dismissed the case sua sponte for two reasons. First, the District Court determined the defendant, a Maryland State Circuit Court Judge, was afforded absolute judicial immunity. Second, because the alleged constitutional violations occurred in a post-divorce declaratory judgment action, the District Court determined it did not have jurisdiction over the matter.

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Petitioner filed a timely appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit alleg-ing the District Court clearly had jurisdiction over the case, and the Court had the authority to provide relief. A three judge panel issued an unpublished per curiam decision affirming the legal reasoning for the sua sponte dismissal of the complaint by the District Court. Petitioner requested a Rehearing En Banc which was subsequently denied. It is important to note, the petition for Rehearing En Banc was circu-lated to the full court yet no single judge requested a poll under Fed. R. App. P. 35.

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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

Federal District Courts and Federal Courts of Appeals are bound by federal law, the United States Constitution, and the decisions of this Court. When errors of law are made at the District level, appellate review affords a remedy to those errors. When an appellate panel affirms the decision of a lower federal court which clearly contravenes the decisions of its own circuit, every other federal circuit, and the decisions of this Court, a Rehearing En Banc is justified. When a federal appellate court unanimously denies a petition to review such egregious and facially erroneous determinations of law, its conduct “has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure

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by a lower court,”1 it militates the exercise of this Court’s supervisory power.

I. JUDGES WHO ACT IN THE CLEAR AB-

SENCE OF JURISDICTION ARE NOT AF-FORDED ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL IMMUNITY

An exhaustive and unbroken string of decisions in this Court, and within the Fourth Circuit, stipulate specific exceptions to the general rule that judges enjoy absolute immunity. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 112 S. Ct. 286, 116 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1991); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 20 L. Ed. 646 (1872); King v. Myers, 973 F.2d 354 (4th Cir. 1992); Pressly v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1987); Chu By Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1985); Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1980). Every other federal circuit has an equally long list of unwavering decisions which itemize the excep-tions to the general rule regarding absolute judicial immunity.

The immunity of a judge for acts within his jurisdiction has roots extending to the earliest days of common law. See Floyd v. Barker, 12 Coke 23, 77 Eng.

1 Rules of the Supreme Court, Rule 10(a), adopted April 19, 2013.

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Rep. 1305 (1608). The Supreme Court accepted the rule of judicial immunity in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872), however this case and others make clear that immunity can be overcome by two sets of circumstances. First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 112 S. Ct. 286, 116 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1991); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 227-229 (1988); Stump v. Spark-man, 435 U.S. 360 (1978); Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall., at 351 (1872). Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the com-plete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 112 S. Ct. 286, 116 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1991); Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. at 351 (1872).

The Bradley Court provided a clear distinction between acting in “excess of jurisdiction” and acting in “the clear absence of jurisdiction”:

“A distinction must be here observed be-tween excess of jurisdiction and the clear ab-sence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter. Where there is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject-matter any authority exer-cised is a usurped authority, and for the ex-ercise of such authority, when the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible.”

The instant complaint clearly outlined facts which showed the only issue before the circuit court was moot, the judge was aware of these facts, and yet proceeded to act “in the clear absence of jurisdiction.”

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It has been settled law for nearly 4 decades that Circuit Courts in Maryland have absolutely no juris-diction to hear moot cases. See Stevenson v. Lanham, 736 A.2d 363 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999); Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 250 (1996); Boyds Civic Ass’n v. Montgomery County, 526 A.2d 598, 609 (Md. 1987); Attorney General v. Anne Arundel County Sch. Bus Contractors Ass’n, 286 Md. 324 (1979); Reyes v. Prince George’s County, 281 Md. 279, 380 A.2d 12, 297 (1977). The District Court, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, apparently overlooked the explicit factual allegations in the complaint concerning ac-tions taken by the Defendant in the clear absence of jurisdiction which left no room for the District Court to suggest, much less determine, the general rule concerning judicial immunity was applicable to this case. The complaint alleged, with clarity and specific-ity, that absolute immunity did not apply if the judge acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction. It cited long-standing Maryland law that described moot cases as a class of case its Circuit Courts did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider, and that exclusive jurisdiction to hear moot cases is conferred exclusive-ly to appellate courts in the state. The District Court’s sua sponte determination that absolute judicial immunity exists under the circumstances presented, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ affirmation of that determination, is in direct conflict with this Court’s ruling in Bradley v. Fisher, as well as the unwavering string of cases in the subsequent 140 years which make it settled law that judicial actions taken in the clear absence of jurisdiction are not

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protected acts. The sua sponte dismissal by the Dis-trict Court on the basis of absolute judicial immunity is erroneous.

II. NO SANCTUARY EXISTS FOR THE VIO-

LATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

The second justification the District Court pro-vided for its summary dismissal of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint was that “the merits of the decisions made regarding the . . . divorce proceedings are “inextricably intertwined” with every claim asserted in the complaint”, “such review by this court is not permitted”, that “[d]omestic relations cases may not be heard by this Court,” and that “this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the case.” Un-fortunately, the District Court and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals completely mischaracterized the nature of the complaint and the relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The District Court further misapprehended the Rooker-Feldman derived “inextricably intertwined” argument which has no applicability whatsoever to this complaint. Jurisdic-tion over the subject matter in this case is facially apparent.

The complaint filed was a complaint between Stephen D. Chamberlain, a citizen of Colorado, and Paul F. Harris, Jr., a Circuit Court Judge (acting in his individual capacity) who is a resident of Mary-land. The complaint specifically alleged Judge Harris acted under the color of law, in the clear absence of

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jurisdiction, and deprived Mr. Chamberlain of rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Mr. Chamberlain sought monetary damages for these actions. This case cannot be classified as a “domestic relations” case.

The District Court cited Raftery v. Scott, 756 F.2d 335, 343 (4th Cir. 1985), summarizing that “domestic relations exceptions to federal courts’ jurisdiction [is] based on [the] idea that [a] state has a stronger more direct interest.” While the state may indeed have a stronger interest in a domestic relations case, the state clearly does not have a stronger interest in the violation of federal statutes and the United States Constitution than does a federal court. This is a case which singularly seeks the enforcement of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. It is inarguable that federal questions and the vindication of federal rights can be brought before a federal tribunal. As the Honorable Felix Frankfurter and his former student James Landis wrote in 1927, while the duty of the federal courts to adjudicate and protect federal constitutional rights is shared with state courts, there can be no doubt that the federal courts are “the primary and powerful reliances for vindicating every right given by the Constitution, the laws and treaties of the United States.” F. Frankfurter & J. Landis. The Business of the Supreme Court: A Study in the Fed-eral Judicial System 65 (1927).

The district court also pointed to Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1982) to justify its

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assertion it had no jurisdiction. Wasserman has no applicability to the instant case as this case does not involve using diversity jurisdiction to “ . . . grant divorces, determine alimony or support obligations or decide child custody rights.”

Subject matter jurisdiction for this complaint is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1331:

Federal question – The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or trea-ties of the United States.

Subject matter jurisdiction for this complaint is further provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1):

Diversity of citizenship; amount in contro-versy; costs – (a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between: (1) citizens of dif-ferent States.

Additionally, subject matter jurisdiction is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3):

Civil rights and elective franchise – (a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: (3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or us-age, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United

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States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.

The district court’s re-classification of this action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a “domestic relations” matter must be rejected. Nothing in the complaint is “intertwined”, either “inextricably” or even tangentially to the merits of the underlying action. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The complaint does not involve a domestic issue, nor does it seek review of the merits of any decision in the state court. This is a federal question, brought forward as a result of alleged constitutional violations by a state actor acting under the color of law. Neither 28 U.S.C. § 1331 nor 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) can be read to have carved out a sanctuary in specific types of underlying litigation to eliminate the applica-tion of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a mechanism for seeking redress for alleged violations of a liti-gant’s constitutional and federal statutory rights.

Furthermore, the district court’s “inextricably intertwined” reasoning does not comport with the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and cannot be used as a basis for denial of jurisdiction over the complaint. The “inextricably interwined” inquiry was borne from a footnote in the Feldman case. In Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 107 (1987), Justice Marshall expanded on the point by stating:

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“a federal claim is inextricably intertwined . . . if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.”

The “inextricably intertwined” inquiry, employed to determine Rooker-Feldman doctrine applicability, has regularly, and wrongly, been used by the lower courts to deny federal jurisdiction. (See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Rooker-Feldman: Worth Only the Powder to Blow It Up?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1081, 1083 (1999)).

“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine merely recognizes that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is a grant of original jurisdic-tion, and does not authorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments . . . ” Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 644, n. 3 (2002). “Rooker-Feldman bars a losing party in state court ‘from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.’ ” Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-1006 (1994) (underline and italics added).

In other words, the doctrine is based on the principle of federalism, particularly the statutory rule that lower federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to review state court judgments.

Notably, this Court has only applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine twice: first in Rooker v. Fidelity

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Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and sixty years later in Feldman. Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005). Recently, in Exxon Mobile, this Court provided clarifying guidance to the doctrine, restricting Rooker-Feldman to the narrow ground of the Rooker and Feldman cases, both of which involved federal plaintiffs calling upon district courts to “overturn an injurious state-court judgment.” The unanimous Court specified four requirements for invocation of the doctrine: 1) the case must be brought by a state court loser; 2) the injury alleged must be caused by the state court judgment; 3) the judgment must have been rendered before the district court proceedings commenced; and 4) the case must invite the district court review and rejection of that judgment. (Allison B. Jones, “The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: What Does It Really Mean To Be Inextricably Intertwined”, DUKE LAW JOUR-NAL, Vol. 56:643, (2006), referencing Exxon Mobile and Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005)).

In Davani v. Virginia Dep’t of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 713 (4th Cir. 2006), the Fourth Circuit itself held that “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only when the loser in state court files suit in federal district court seeking redress for an injury allegedly caused by the state court’s decision itself.” That is, “Exxon requires us to examine whether the state-court loser who files suit in federal district court seeks redress for an injury caused by the state-court decision itself.

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If he is not challenging the state court decision, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply.” Id. at 718.

The complaint dismissed by the District Court in this case did not assert injuries caused by the state court judgment. The alleged injuries were sustained when a judge acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction by hearing a case which was facially devoid of a live controversy and for which he had no authority to preside over. Secondly, the complaint cannot be read, nor can it be inferred, to “invite the district court review and rejection” of the state-court judgment. As two of the four requirements for invoking “Rooker-Feldman” are not met in this case, the district court’s application of the doctrine and use of the “inextrica-bly intertwined” inquiry was an error. Seeking a remedy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of constitutional rights, for which the district court has jurisdiction, is wholly separate from an attempt to seek review of a state-court judgment, which has not been requested of the District Court in this com-plaint. Legal reasoning that the claims in this com-plaint are “inextricably intertwined” with the merits of the state court decisions is flawed.

Jurisdiction is the authority conferred by Con-gress to adjudicate a given type of case. The Fair v. Kohler Die Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913). Here, §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3) unquestionably authorize federal courts to adjudicate all civil actions arising under the consti-tution, and to redress the deprivation of constitution-al rights under the color of law. It is also plain that the complaint formally and explicitly alleged such a

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deprivation. The district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was an error.

III. THE SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL OF THIS

WELL-PLEADED, FEE-PAID COMPLAINT WAS CLEAR ERROR

This case concerns a well-pleaded, fee-paid complaint. Though the statutory authority for its sua sponte dismissal was not clearly stipulated in the Order, the District Court reasoned dismissal was appropriate because it determined the complaint failed to state a claim for which relief could be grant-ed, i.e., the judge “enjoys absolute immunity.” (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)), and, because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)).

The District Court, however, did indeed have a cause of action before it for which relief could be granted. The complaint alleged a judge acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction to deny rights guaran-teed under the Constitution, and provided factual allegations of the circumstances from which the complaint arose. This action clearly falls within the exception to absolute judicial immunity established, and pointed to, since 1872. If the District Court questioned whether the allegations as presented constituted action in “excess of jurisdiction” rather than “the clear absence of jurisdiction”, that question of both law and fact must be resolved after the parties have presented their case on the merits.

17

In 1989, this Court reviewed the dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint which had been dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and found by a 9-0 vote that it had, in fact, stated a “cognizable claim.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989), referring to Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989). The circumstances of this case also demand such review and reversal.

In the instant case, the District Court could not determine that the complaint failed to state claim for which relief could be granted without first assuming jurisdiction to make that determination. It is a ques-tion of law whether a complaint adequately states a cause of action for which relief could be granted. The determination of such a question must be based on the merits, and not determined sua sponte before affording the Plaintiff an opportunity to be heard on the matter. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S. Ct. 773, 776, 90 L. Ed. 939 (1946).2

When ruling on a motion to dismiss, all the factual allegations in the complaint must be accepted as being true. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, n. 1, 122 S. Ct. 992, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2002); Neitzke v.

2 “Jurisdiction . . . is not defeated . . . by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover. For it is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.”

18

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1974)). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only “give the defen-dant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 550 U.S. 544, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957)). Also see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 556 U.S. 662, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). Here, the complaint was well-pleaded, and the cause of action and how the “pleader [was] entitled to relief ” was articulated with specificity.

Furthermore, District court jurisdiction, as clearly laid out in the complaint, is provided by three statutes: 28 U.S.C. § 1331, § 1332(a)(1), and § 1343(a)(3). The complaint is a civil action arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, the parties are citizens of different states, and the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000.00. The complaint was filed to “redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.” It is inarguable the District Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the complaint.

19

It does not appear this Court has previously had the opportunity to pass judgment on a sua sponte dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). In Neitzke, however, the Court clearly stated how lower courts should proceed when presented with a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6):

“Under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff with an ar-guable claim is ordinarily accorded notice of a pending motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and an opportunity to amend the complaint before the motion is ruled up-on. These procedures alert him to the legal theory underlying the defendant’s challenge, and enable him meaningfully to respond by opposing the motion to dismiss on legal grounds or by clarifying his factual allega-tions so as to conform with the requirements of a valid legal cause of action. This adver-sarial process also crystallizes the pertinent issues and facilitates appellate review of a trial court dismissal by creating a more com-plete record of the case. Brandon v. District of Columbia Board of Parole, 236 U. S. App. D. C. 155, 158, 734 F. 2d 56, 59 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1127 (1985)”

In Bell Atlantic Corp., this Court provided in-structive guidance regarding the minimum standard of adequate pleading to overcome a complaint’s dis-missal:

“Once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the

20

complaint. See Sanjuan v. American Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (C.A.7 1994) (once a claim for relief has been stated, a plaintiff “receives the benefit of imagination, so long as the hypotheses are consistent with the complaint”); accord, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. at 514, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); Na-tional Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 256, 114 S.Ct. 798, 127 L.Ed.2d 99 (1994); H.J. Inc. v. North-western Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249-250, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984).”

The Bell Atlantic Court provided additional amplification on the sufficiency of a complaint:

While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need de-tailed factual allegations, ibid. [Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)]; Sanjuan v. American Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (C.A.7 1994), a plaintiffs obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief ” requires more than labels and con-clusions, and a formulaic recitation of the el-ements of a cause of action will not do, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (on a mo-tion to dismiss, courts “are not bound to ac-cept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”). Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

21

speculative level, see 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed.2004) (hereinafter Wright & Miller) (“[T]he pleading must contain some-thing more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of ] a legally cognizable right of action”), on the assump-tion that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact), see, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, n. 1, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed 2d 1 (2002); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (“Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance . . . dismissals based on a judge’s disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations”); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it appears “that a recov-ery is very remote and unlikely”).

The factual statements in the complaint before the District Court in this case provided far more than “a suspicion [of ] a legally cognizable right of action.” Substantial initial evidence was clearly provided in support of the allegations made, the allegations were more than plausible, and they were directly in line with precedent found within the Fourth Circuit, those of every other circuit, and this Court. The averments in this case fall squarely within one of the settled exceptions to judicial immunity. The facts as laid out in the complaint cannot be characterized as being “labels”, “conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” The factual allegations

22

in the instant case are more than sufficient to war-rant the opportunity to present the merits of the case before a fair tribunal for adjudication. Both parties to the underlying proceeding had filed formal motions explicitly declaring the only issue before the court to be moot, both sought dismissal, and at the com-mencement of the trial, the only issue before the court was proven to be moot. The complaint further provided citations to Maryland law that showed Circuit Courts have no jurisdiction to hear moot cases and jurisdiction to do so has been conferred exclusive-ly on appellate courts in that state.

The most clear and comprehensive rules for dismissing a complaint sua sponte were articulated by the 6th Circuit in Tingler v. Marshall, 716 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1983):

Under our supervisory power, we hold that a district court faced with a complaint which it believes may be subject to dismissal must: (1) allow service of the complaint upon the defendant; (2) notify all parties of its intent to dismiss the complaint; (3) give the plain-tiff a chance to either amend his complaint or respond to the reasons stated by the dis-trict court in its notice of intended sua sponte dismissal; (4) give the defendant a chance to respond or file an answer or mo-tions; and (5) if the claim is dismissed, state its reasons for the dismissal.

The District Court’s sua sponte dismissal, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ affirmation of that

23

decision, appears to disregard the 6th Circuit’s pru-dent guidance. The District Court did not allow service of the complaint upon the Defendant, provid-ed no notification of its intent to dismiss, did not offer the Plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint or respond to the concerns of the Court, nor did it give the Defendant an opportunity to respond by filing an answer or motion. Instead, the District Court dis-carded a well-pleaded, fee-paid complaint on its own accord, in contravention to settled law, supporting such a decision with facially erroneous legal reason-ing.

The District Court reliance on either Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6) as justification for its sua sponte dismissal of this complaint cannot be recon-ciled with settled law. The Plaintiff has a right to prove his case at trial.

--------------------------------- ---------------------------------

CONCLUSION

The framers of the Constitution understood that a properly functioning judicial system required a Supreme Court with authority to intervene, when necessary, in a supervisory role. When a District Court, and an entire Federal Circuit Court of Ap-peals, demonstrates a willingness to deny jurisdiction it clearly possesses and ignores over a century of precedent in order to prevent the prosecution of a lawsuit against a fellow jurist, this Court’s interven-tion is required. The settled exceptions to absolute

24

judicial immunity exist because the dangers in not affording citizens these very limited exceptions are palpable and clear.

This case is of extraordinary importance. “The law is the definition and limitation of power.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220 (1886). The rationalization cited, and affirmed, for the sua sponte dismissal of this case demonstrates a purely personal and arbitrary application of settled law which would fall under the weight of any cursory judicial scrutiny by this Court or any impartial jurist. That such settled law has been ignored by an entire Federal Circuit is unfathomable, and invoking this Court’s supervisory authority is the Petitioner’s last avenue to correct such a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

“Close questions of federal law, including claims filed pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983, have on a num- ber of occasions arisen on motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and have been substantial enough to warrant this Court’s granting review, under its certiorari jurisdiction, to resolve them.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989). Also see, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). As this case does not involve a “close question

25

of federal law,” but rather, the overt disregard for it, this Court’s review is warranted.

“From the very beginning . . . state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law.” Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963) (underline added). “Both equal protection and due process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system – for all people charged with crime must, so far as the law is concerned, ‘stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every Ameri-can court.’ ” Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585, 100 L. Ed. 891 (1956); quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S. Ct. 472, 84 L. Ed. 716 (1940).

Supervisory authority over a Federal Circuit’s decision is rightly invoked when no fair minded jurist could disagree that those decisions contravene the precedents of this Court and settled law. The clarity of the issues can be found in the Complaint itself, the Order of the District Court, and the affirmation of that Order by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. No formal briefs or oral arguments are necessary to demonstrate the need for review. A judge who know-ingly acts in the clear absence of jurisdiction is not protected by the concept of absolute judicial immunity.

26

The Petitioner respectfully prays the Writ of Certio-rari is granted.

Respectfully submitted,

STEPHEN D. CHAMBERLAIN Pro Se Litigant

App. 1

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

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No. 15-1710

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STEPHEN D. CHAMBERLAIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

PAUL F. HARRIS, JR.,

Defendant-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District Judge. (1:15-cv-01476-JFM)

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Submitted: October 15, 2015 Decided: October 19, 2015

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Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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Stephen D. Chamberlain, Appellant Pro Se.

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App. 2

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Stephen D. Chamberlain appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. Chamberlain v. Harris, No. 1:15-cv-01476-JFM (D. Md. filed June 8, 2015; entered June 9, 2015). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

App. 3

FILED: October 19, 2015

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

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No. 15-1710 (1: 15-cv-01476-JFM)

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STEPHEN D. CHAMBERLAIN

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

PAUL F. HARRIS, JR.

Defendant-Appellee

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JUDGMENT

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In accordance with the decision of this court, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

This judgment shall take effect upon issuance of this court’s mandate in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 41.

/s/ PATRICIA S. CONNOR, CLERK

App. 4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

STEPHEN D. CHAMBERLAIN Plaintiff

v.

PAUL F. HARRIS, JR. Defendant

* * * *

Civil Action No. JFM-15-1476

*** ORDER

Self-represented plaintiff Stephen D. Chamber-lain, a resident of Castle Pines, Colorado, filed this fee-paid case, seeking money damages from the Honorable Paul F. Harris, Jr., a judge in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Maryland. Plaintiff alleges that Judge Harris, who is sued in his individ-ual capacity, violated plaintiff ’s civil rights in connec-tion with divorce proceedings commenced against plaintiff.1 ECF No. 1.

The defendant is sued for decisions made in the context of his role as a judge, and the claims against him must be dismissed as he enjoys absolute immuni-ty. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226-27 (1988)

1 See Judith C. Chamberlain vs. Stephen D. Chamberlain, Case No. 02C09139690, filed March 26, 2009, http://casesearch. courts.state.md.us/casesearch/inquirySearch.jis. Access to the Maryland electronic docket is limited; however, it appears the case is ongoing.

App. 5

(“If judges were personally liable for erroneous deci-sions, the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous but vexatious, would provide powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering decisions likely to provoke such suits.”). Further, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the case.

Domestic relations cases may not be heard in this court.2 See Raftery v. Scott, 756 F. 2d 335, 343 (4th Cir. 1985) (domestic relations exception to federal courts’ jurisdiction based on idea that state has a stronger more direct interest); Wasserman v. Wasser-man, 671 F. 2d 832 (4th Cir. 1982) (diversity jurisdic-tion does not include power to grant divorces, determine alimony or support obligations, or decide child custody rights). The merits of the decisions made regarding the Chamberlains’ divorce proceed-ings are inextricably intertwined in every claim asserted in the complaint; such review by this court is not permitted.

Accordingly, it is this 8th day of June, 2015, by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, hereby ORDERED that:

1. The complaint IS DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction;

2. The Clerk SHALL PROVIDE a copy of this order to plaintiff; and

2 The court notes that if plaintiff is aggrieved by the Circuit Court’s decision appellate review may be available.

App. 6

3. The Clerk SHALL CLOSE this case.

/s/ J Frederick Motz J. Frederick Motz

United States District Judge

App. 7

FILED: December 1, 2015

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

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No. 15-1710 (1: 15-cv-01476-JFM)

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STEPHEN D. CHAMBERLAIN

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

PAUL F. HARRIS, JR.

Defendant-Appellee

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ORDER

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The petition for rehearing en banc was circulated to the full court. No judge requested a poll under Fed. R. App. P. 35. The court denies the petition for rehear-ing en banc.

For the Court

/s/ Patricia S. Connor, Clerk

App. 8

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

Stephen D. Chamberlain

Plaintiff

vs.

Paul F. Harris, Jr. Anne Arundel County Circuit Court 8 Church Circle Annapolis, MD 21404 410-222-1397

Defendant

* * * * * * * * *

Civil No.: ________

Jury Trial Demanded

* * * * * * * * COMPLAINT Comes the Plaintiff and for cause of action would state as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

This is an action for money damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and under federal law and state law, against Paul F. Harris, Jr., a Circuit Court Judge in Anne Arundel County, Maryland, in his individual capacity.

App. 9

Maryland Circuit Courts have no statutory authority or jurisdiction to hear moot cases. Jurisdic-tion to hear moot cases has been conferred exclusively on appellate courts in Maryland. Both parties to the case in the Anne Arundel County Circuit Court had declared the only issue before the Court to be moot in formal motions filed before the hearing. The Plaintiff proved the only issue before the Court was moot at the commencement of the hearing. Yet the Defendant willfully and deliberately acted under the color of law, and in the clear absence of jurisdiction, to force the Plaintiff to stand trial for an action without a live controversy. This action directly violated rights protected under the United States Constitution and caused special and general injury to the Plaintiff for which damages are sought.

II. Jurisdiction and Venue

1. This court has jurisdiction over the subject matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3). The complaint alleges a deprivation, under the color of law, of constitutional rights. The parties are citizens of different states and the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000.00. The Plaintiff is a citizen of Colorado and upon information and belief, the Defendant is a citizen of Maryland.

2. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(1) and 1391(b)(2), the venue is appropriate in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland,

App. 10

where the acts complained of took place and Plain-tiff ’s cause of action arose.

III. THE PARTIES

3. The Defendant, The Honorable Paul F. Har-ris, Jr., upon information and belief, is a citizen of Maryland, employed as a Circuit Court Judge in Anne Arundel County, Maryland, and in his individu-al capacity, is a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Judge Harris may be served with process at his place of work, the Anne Arundel Coun-ty Court, 8 Church Circle, Annapolis, Maryland 21404.

4. The Plaintiff, Stephen D. Chamberlain, is a citizen of Colorado.

IV. FACTS

5. On September 19, 2013, Judith C. Chamber-lain, the Plaintiff ’s ex-wife, sought a declaratory judgment concerning a single, clear and unambiguous sentence in a college education provision in the parties’ Marital Settlement Agreement.

6. Ms. Chamberlain maintained this litigation for 207 days before filing a Request for Voluntary Dismissal on April 14, 2014, four days prior to trial. In this motion she explicitly declared the only issue before the Court had become moot and sought volun-tary dismissal.

App. 11

7. The Honorable Paul F. Harris, Jr., was as-signed to preside over the case on April 17, 2014.

8. Mr. Chamberlain’s then attorney filed a response with the Court on April 17, 2014 and addi-tionally hand delivered a copy to the judge. This motion explicitly agreed the only issue was moot, requested the case be dismissed, and sought fees as the action had been maintained for over 4 months after it had become moot.

9. The following day at the commencement of the hearing, Judge Harris granted a verbal motion by Ms. Chamberlain’s counsel to withdraw her Request for Voluntary Dismissal. The basis for Ms. Chamber-lain’s request for voluntary dismissal was that the only issue before the court had become moot. Those facts did not change. No explanation was provided to Judge Harris by Ms. Chamberlain’s counsel as to how the issue declared “moot” on Monday could now be “un-moot” on Thursday. Mr. Chamberlain’s counsel not only provided evidence proving the only issue before the Court was moot, but specifically noted that the withdraw of a motion requesting voluntary dis-missal, while allowed by leave of the Court, cannot change the declared facts made in support of the motion.

10. The record will show that Judge Harris was fully aware of the jurisdictional challenge on the morning of April 18, 2014, that he understood a legal determination had to be made concerning the issue of mootness, and that he intentionally refrained from

App. 12

making that determination in order to proceed with the hearing in the clear absence of jurisdiction. The transcript of the hearing will also show Judge Harris had most likely engaged in ex parte communication with opposing counsel prior to the commencement of the hearing and had predetermined he would proceed to hear the moot case prior to the commencement of the trial.

11. Subsequent to this action, Judge Harris then failed to comply with clear law, the most basic canons of contract interpretation, and demonstrated his partiality and lack of objectivity during an in chambers conference with the parties’ attorneys which he directed take place. These actions created the duress required to coerce Mr. Chamberlain into orally placing general settlement terms on the record to end the litigation. Weeks later, and without the consent of Mr. Chamberlain, Judge Harris added terms not found in the oral agreement and unilateral-ly signed an order committing the Plaintiff to a monetary contract on June 5, 2104.

12. Judge Harris was afforded numerous oppor-tunities to acknowledge he acted without subject matter jurisdiction on April 18, 2014, and to take corrective action.

13. On May 16, 2014, now having to act pro se due to an inability to pay for legal counsel, Mr. Chamberlain filed a Motion Requesting Declaration of Mistrial and Request for Scheduling of Expedited

App. 13

Merits Hearing. Judge Harris denied this Motion on June 5, 2014.

14. On June 4, 2015, after more fully under-standing Judge Harris’s clear absence of jurisdiction and lack of authority on the day of the hearing, Mr. Chamberlain filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Judge Harris failed to rule on this motion.

15. On October 6, 2014, Mr. Chamberlain filed a Motion to Vacate Judge Harris’s order of June 5, 2014. This motion explicitly outlined the court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction on April 18, 2014 and the unlawfulness of the June 5, 2014 order. Judge Harris denied this motion on October 21, 2014.

16. On November 13, 2014, Mr. Chamberlain filed a Motion to Revise Denial of the motion to vacate the June 5, 2014 order. Judge Harris failed to rule on this motion.

17. Judge Harris subsequently denied a motion he [sic] recuse himself and found Mr. Chamberlain in contempt of court for breaching a contract he himself had unilaterally mandated. The transcript of this hearing will show that Judge Harris, again, disre-garded the clear and incontrovertible evidence pre-sented by Mr. Chamberlain that the sole issue which had been before the Court on April 18, 2014 was moot and the court was facially without subject matter jurisdiction to proceed. Judge Harris additionally took the extraordinary action of awarding legal fees to the opposing counsel after Mr. Chamberlain had

App. 14

presented numerous sound and legally supported defenses to the contempt charges. Mr. Chamberlain has been forced to file two appeals as a result of the errors of law which occurred solely because Judge Harris decided to hear a case for which he knew there was no live controversy and for which he clearly lacked all jurisdiction to preside over.

18. Judge Harris’s decision to act, under the color of law, in the clear absence of jurisdiction on April 18, 2014, deprived Mr. Chamberlain of rights clearly secured by the United States Constitution, namely, the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

V. CAUSE OF ACTION

COUNT 1

Violation of Civil Rights Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Deprivation of Constitutional Rights)

19. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1-18 of this Complaint.

20. In committing the act complained of herein, Defendant acted in his individual capacity under the color of law to deprive the Plaintiff of certain consti-tutionally protected rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States including, but not limited to: (a) the right to due

App. 15

process, and (b), the right to equal protection under the law.

21. In violating Plaintiff ’s rights as set forth above and other rights that will be proven at trial, Defendant acted under the color of law and deprived the Plaintiff of his liberty interests by holding the Plaintiff for trial in the clear face of an absolute lack of jurisdiction. As a direct and proximate result of this clear violation of the Plaintiff ’s constitutional civil rights, the Plaintiff suffered special and general damages as alleged in this Complaint and is entitled to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

22. The conduct of the Defendant was premedi-tated, deliberate, oppressive, and discriminatory. The nature of such conduct militates that compensatory and punitive damages be imposed in an amount commensurate with the wrongful acts alleged herein.

23. Judicial immunity, under the circumstances of this case as will be proven at trial, is not applica-ble. Judicial acts taken in the clear absence of juris-diction are not protected acts.

VI. DAMAGES

24. Special and general damages have been sustained as a result of the Defendant’s conduct as outlined in Paragraphs 1-23 above.

25. Special damages sustained include, but are not limited to, loss of wages, medical expenses, and loss of earnings potential.

App. 16

26. General damages include, but are not limited to, intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, damage to the parent/child relationship, mental anguish including but not limited to emotional pain, torment and suffer-ing, and physical pain and suffering.

27. The Defendant’s willful and reckless disre-gard for federally protected rights of a citizen, federal law, state law, and his own judicial code of conduct, demands that punitive damages be awarded to deter similar conduct in the future and protect other citi-zens from injury.

VII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court:

A. Enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant;

B. Enter an order declaring Defendant’s con-duct to have violated constitutionally pro-tected rights;

C. Find the Defendant liable for compensatory and punitive damages for the injuries sus-tained and award Plaintiff monetary relief in the amount of $300,000.00;

D. Grant Plaintiff such other and further relief as may be just and proper under the circum-stances.

App. 17

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff respectfully demands a jury trial pursu-ant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b).

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ SD Chamberlain Stephen D. Chamberlain

Pro Se Litigant