Science Education Volume 66 Issue 1 1982 [Doi 10.1002%2Fsce.3730660113] Colin Gauld -- The...
Transcript of Science Education Volume 66 Issue 1 1982 [Doi 10.1002%2Fsce.3730660113] Colin Gauld -- The...
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ISSUES
TRENDS
~~ ~~
J a m e s
R .
Okey , Sec t ion Ed i to r
The Scientific Attitude and Science
Education:
A
Crit ical Reappraisal
COLIN GAULD
School
of
Education University
of
New South Wales Sydney Austral ia
The Natu re of th e Scientif ic Att i tud e in Scienc e Education
For m ore tha n 60 years science educ ators have included the development of the sci-
entific attitude among the general aims of science education. Some writers label this
att itu de as “scientific-mindedness” Bur nett, 1 944), “th e habit of scientific thinking”
No ll, 1 933a ) or “the spirit of science” Educational Policies Comm ission, 1966) and
it is most often characterize d by a list of component attitud es “scientific attitudes”)
such as objectivity, open-mindedness, scepticism, and a willingness to suspend judgmen t
if
there is insufficient evidence.
M an y writers have pointed out th at knowledge abou t scientific facts a nd skill in the
use of scientific methods are of little value
if
there is no inclination to use them. The
scientific attitude represents the motivation which converts this knowledge and skill into
action and refers to a willingness to use scientific procedures and m ethods. I t may best
be described as “an a ttitu de to ideas and information and to particular ways of evaluating
them”, a formulation which distinguishes it from “an att itu de to science or scientists”
on the one hand and from “an ability
to
carry ou t scientific procedures” on the other
Ga uld Hukins, 1980).
Major statements
of
the goals of science education in the
US A
have consistently
stressed th e importance of developing scientific attitude s
in
studen ts see, for example,
Whipp le, 1932; Hen ry, 1947; Henry, 1960; Educational Policies Comm ission, 1966;
N.S.T.A. ,1971) and curriculum projects around the world include this among their aims
Gauld Hukins, 1980).
In
an analysis of 1,547 aims culled from the science education
literature Frase r 1977) found that almost half of these could be categorized as aims
related to the development of the scientific attitude. However, there is a grea t deal of
evidence that little emphasis is placed on this aim in the classroom, a ppare ntly because
Scie nce Education 66 1): 109-121 1982)
982 John Wiley
Sons,
lnc.
CCC 0036-8326/82/010l09-13 01.30
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GAULD
methods for teaching and testing a ttitudes m ay not be widely available rather than be-
cau se of a general dissatisfaction with the aim itself.
Th e scientific attitu de as it appears
in
the science education literature embodies the
adoption of a particular approach to solving problems, to assessing ideas and information
or to m aking decisions. Using this approach evidence is collected and evalua ted objectively
so tha t the idiosyncratic prejudices of the one making th e judgment do not intrude. N o
source of relevant information is rejected before it is fully evaluated and all available
evidence is carefully weighed before th e decision is made . If the evidence is considered
to be insufficient then judgm ent is suspended until there is enough information to enable
a decision to be made. N o idea, conclusion, decision or solution is accepted just because
a particular person makes a claim but it is treated sceptically and critically until its
soundness can be judged acco rding to the weight of evidence which is relevant to it.
A
person who is willing to follow such a procedure and who regu larly does so) it said by
science educators to be motivated by the scientific attitude.
It is clear tha t, in the minds of m any writers, “evidence” means “empirical evidence”
Downing, 1928;
Noll,
1933a; W ard, 1933; Henry, 1947, pp. 168- 17
1;
Lampkin, 1951 ;
Educational Policies Commission, 1966, p. 19; Diederich, 1967; Collette, 1973, pp. 14-1 5,
20; Sund and Trowbridge, 1973, pp. 5-7) and the discussion usually implies that empirical
evidence is the only type of evidence which needs to be considered in making scientific
decisions. Th e ultima te test in science is how th e conclusion fits with th e facts. Thus a
person who is motivated by t he scientific a tti tu de as it is generally conceived by science
edu cato rs is someone who makes decisions solely on th e basis of the weight of empirical
evidence and this view of the scientific attitude will be labelled here as “empiricist”.
Lampkin 195 l), Feigl 1955) and Kurtz 1976) have clearly shown how such a con-
ception is closely related to a particular view of knowledge in gene ral and of science
in
particular-a philosophical perspective which has also been labelled “em piricist”.
Th e empiricist a ttitu de in science education takes one of two forms depending on th e
type of decision which is presumed to follow from a consideration of the empirical evidence
relevant to a theory. In the “verificationist” version, empirical evidence is used to uerifv
or prove the truth of a proposition or hypothesis Dow ning, 1928; W ard, 1933; Lampkin,
195
1
Van Deventer, 1960, p 104;Diederich, 1967). Diederich 1 967) includes “a desire
for experimental verification” as a com ponent of the scientific attitude, while Lampkin
1 95 1) defines the component labelled “scepticism” as “an unwillingness to accept
statem ents w hich ar e not suppo rted by evidence defined as verification of predictions”.
W ard 1933 ) sees science as “th e body of experience and theory th at can be verified by
all observers alike” an d, for Kurz
1
976) “ a belief is tru e if, and only if, it has been con-
firmed, directly or indirectly, by reference
to
observable evidence”.
How ever, the realization t ha t logically the truth of a universal proposition canno t be
finally proven by appealing t o a finite number of items of confirming d at a has led some
writers to adopt a “falsificationist” version of the empiricist attitude. Empirical evidence
allows one to sta te unambiguously, not when a theory is true, but when it is false.
A
single new scientific fact disagreeing with the theory com pletely invalidates the theo ry.
T he w illingness to give up an old established theory as
soon
as it is proved to be definitely
inconsisten t with a single fact is the attitu de of Science; no branch of knowledge without
this attitud e can be called a science Podolsky, 19 65).
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SCIENTIFIC
ATTITUDE 1 1 1
Reasons for the Development of the Scienti fic Atti tude in Students
For m any science educa tors the importance of the scientific attitud e is
so
obvious that
no arg um ent is required to support its inclusion among those things which a school science
course shou ld aim to develop in students. This idea is also reinforced by the fact th at there
has been little, if any, argument
against
its inclusion among the aims of science education.
However, w hile it may be obvious that the scientific attit ud e is importan t in the profes-
sional lives of scientists and tha t students learning ab out science should also become aware
of the motive power w hich impels scientists in their work, it is not a simple matte r to move
on to the conclusion th at school students, many of whom do not intend t o become scien-
tists, should actu ally be encouraged to ado pt this atti tud e for themselves.
Two types of argum ent are offered by those who do provide reasons for taking this final
step . In the first, it is argued that an effective way of learning abou t the natu re of scientific
activity is for the student to act out th e role of a scientist in the classroom.
Every child-not just those who manifest interest
or
high motivation-must be viewed as a young
scientist by the teacher of science
. . .
he
or
she) must experience the mode and the excitement
an d the frustration of th e scientist. Link, 1967 ).
T h e student who enters this role most fully will be the one who ado pts for himself the
atti tud e which also motivates the scientist N ay and Crocker, 1970 ).
In th e second type of justification it is argu ed th at not only does the adoption of the
scientific attit ud e for themselves help studen ts to understand the n atu re of science and
th e activities of scientists better b ut scientific attitud es represen t desirable personal at-
tributes for all people. Th e tendency to be accu rate, intellectually honest, open-minded,
objective, and to demand reliable empirical evidence before making decisions may be
most clearly seen in the problem solving activity of scientists so this argument goes) but
they also represent predispositions appro pria te for solving problems
in
everyday life as
well. Under t he influence of such attitudes as these, it is claimed th at problems will be
approached in a m anner which is more likely to lead to successful solutions see, for ex-
am ple, No11 1933b). For the Educationa l Policies Com mission 1966 ) possession of the
scientific attitude is not only the mark of a scientifically-minded person , but also the sign
of a rational one. These benefits of a scientific education are primarily for the individual
but a number of writers have claimed additional benefits for the society.
As we consider the future responsibilities of citizens, we
will
probably ag ree tha t helping children
to become more co-operative, m ore responsible, more ‘open-minded’, an d, a t the s am e time, more
‘critical-minded’ is certainly worth the effort. He nry, 1947, p. 87).
By adopting scientific attitudes and transferring these to situations in everyday life,
students can be expected to be more tolerant of othe r points of view and to be more suc-
cessful in living and w orking alongside other people. According to the Educational Policies
Commission science can provide “power, prestige, standard of living, education, and
hea lth” but the spirit of science” promises two less tangible but equally profound benefits:
increased individuality and increased brotherhood of men” 1 966, p. 1 1).
Behind both these arguments is the assumption that scientists really are motivated
by the scientific attitu de as it is presented by science educators Offne r, 1937, Han ey,
1964; Diederich, 1967). In o ther words, in solving scientific problems, scientists adopt
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an empiricist a ttitude in which emp irical dat a, gathered objectively is the final judge of
truth,
if
not
in
accepting as tru e those hypotheses which a re supported by the evidence,
then certainly
in
rejecting as false those which conflict with i t ; an att i tude in which the
ideas of other scien tists are received
in
an open-minded manner and given full, impartial
but c ritical consideration.
Scient ists and the Scient i f ic Att i tude: Research Evidence
I n science education over the past sixty years a great deal of effort ha s been devoted
to identifying the na tu re of th e scientific at titu de and m ost of this work has been based
on detailed analyses of the w ritings of scientists, philosophers of science, and science
educators Curtis, 1926; Noll, 1933a; Davis, 1935; Crowell, 1937; Ebel, 1938; Lampkin,
1938; Vitrogan, 1967, 1969; N ay and Crocker, 1970; Cohen, 1971). In a num ber of cases,
the results of these analyses were submitted to panels of scientists or science teachers
to obtain e stimates of the relative value of each component of the scientific attitud e arising
from the analyses. T he primary source material for these investigations was the w ritings
o f philosophers of science who looked at science from an empiricist perspective and it
is easy to understand why the conception of the scientific attitude which emerged also
possessed an empiricist emphasis.
I t
is interesting to observe tha t,
in
spite of the obvious
value placed
on
empirical evidence by science educators who write abou t the scientific
attitude, almost no interest has been shown
in
whether scientists do, in fact, possess the
affective characteristics attributed to them on the basis of such analyses of the literature.
I t is difficult
to
find any reference in science education lite ratu re to studies of the psy-
chology of scientists, of sociological research into th e nat ur e of th e ethos of science, of
recent historical case studies of the activities of scientists,
or
of alternatives to the em-
piricist model of science which seem s to lie behind the science edu cator’s conception of
the scientific attitu de . For the past thirty years, relevant information from these areas
has been accumulating and
will
be reviewed
in
the following sections.
Th e Psychology
of
the Scientist
In
the early 195O’s, Roe carried out extensive psychological studies of em inent physical
and biological scientists, anthropologists and psychologists. She repo rted som e of her
conclusions from these investigations
in
the following way:
Ch arac teriza tion s of scientists almost always em phasize the objectivity of their work
and
describe
their cold, detached, impassive, unconcerned observation of phenomena which have no emotional
meaning for them. This could hardly be further from the tru th . .
The
creative scientist whatever
his field, is very deeply involved emotionally and personally in his wo rk . I think many scientists
are genuinely unaware of the extent,
or
even of th e fact,
of
this
personal
involvement,
and
themselves
accept the myth
of
impersonal objectivity Ro e,
1961).
Eiduson’s study of the psychological world of the scientist also led her to conclude that
scientists themselves misrepresent the diversity of personal cha racte ristics which exist
within
their occuptional group and
so
“perpe tuate some of the fixed and stereotyped-
notions that ex ist abo ut a scientist” 1962 , p.
250;
see also pp. 124, 153, 154, 255).
T he more recent work of Maho ney 1976, 1979)
in
this area was directed towards
exam ining the extent to which scientists possess the characteristics-objectivity, ra-
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SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDE
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t i ona li t y , open-mindedness , supe r io r i n t e ll i gence, i n t eg ri t y , an d communa l i ty - tha t t h e
wr i t i ngs of sc i en t i s t s and sc i e n ce e d u c a t o r s a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e m . H i s d e sc r ip t i o n of t h e
“rea l”
scientist
depa r t s cons ide rab ly from t he p i c tu re p re sen ted in t he sc i ence educa t ion
l i t e ra tu re . He a r r ived a t the fol lowing conclusions:
I .
Supe rior intelligence is neither a p rerequisite
nor
a correlate of scientific contribution ;
2. T he scientist is often saliently illogical in his work, particula rly when he is defending a pre-
ferred view or attack ing a rival one;
3. In
his experimen tal research, he is often selective, expedient, and not im mun e to distorting
the data;
4. Th e scientist
is
probably the most passionate of professionals; his theoretical and personal
biases often color his alleged “openness” to the data;
5.
H e
is
often dogm atically tenacious in his opinions, even when t he co ntrar y evidence is over-
whelming;
6.
H e is not the parago n of humility
or
disinterest but is, instead, often a selfish, ambitious a nd
petulant defend er of personal recognition and territoriality;
7. T he scientist often behaves in ways which a re diametrically opposite to commu nal sharin g
of knowledge-he is frequently secretive and occasionally suppresses da ta for personal reasons;
and
8. Far fro m being a “suspender of judgm ent” th e scientist is often an impetuous tr ut h spinner
who rushes to hypotheses and theories long before the data would warran t Ma honey , 1976,
Mahoney’s por t ra i t of th e “ real” sc ient i s t
is
of som eone wh o displays both object ivi ty
and emotionali ty, open-mindedness and tenac i ty , depending on t he con tex t . He speculates
a n d t h e t r u th of his specu la t ion i s borne o u t b y t h e w o r k of o t h e r s ) t h a t i t i s t h e le ss
eminent sc i en t i s t who
comes
c losest to possess ing th e qua l i t i e s
of the
empi r i c i s t ideal
1
979).
Among a s a m p l e of fo r ty - two sc i en ti s t s who wer e ac t ive ly invo lved in r e sea rch
r e l a t e d to data o b t a in e d t h r o u g h
the
A p o l l o m o o n missions, M i t r o f f
and
M a s o n 1974)
found a similar r a n g e of pe rsona l i t y t r a i t s as t h a t r e fe r re d t o by other invest iga tors .
Th e single dimension which most served to differentiate between t he scientists was th at of “spe-
culativeness” or “willingness to ex trapolate beyond the available data” . A t one end of the spectrum
whe re th e extrem e speculative scientists who in the words of the respondents “wouldn’t h esitate
to build a whole theory of th e solar system based
on no
data at all”; on the other extreme were the
data-bound scientists who “wouldn’t be able to save their own hide if a fire was burning next to
them because they’d never have enough data to prove the fire was really there”. On every subsequent
dimension on which these two types of scientists were compared they stood
in
extreme contrast
to one ano ther. O ne of the most significant things ab out these differences is tha t th e more out-
standing a scientist was, as judged by his peers, the more he lay near th e speculative end of the scale.
Conversely, the more “mundane”, “typical”, or “run-of-the-mill” scientists fell tow ard the
“data-bo und’’ end of the scale
A t th e sam e time the m ore speculative scientists ar e also the kinds of scientists who ar e more likely
to become rigidly com mitted to their ideas once they have produced them . Con trary to popular
misconception, it is the ‘‘lesser’’ not th e “gre ater” scie ntist , who is more likely to have a n “open
mind”. T he greater th e scientist the m ore likely he is to develop a line and to push it for all it is worth
. . In a word, the gre ater th e scientist, th e more likely he is to belie the my th of the disinterested,
uncom mitted scientist. 1974; see also Hill, 1 974).
T h e r e i s one no tab le d i sc repancy be tween t he obse rva t ions o f Roe a n d E i d u so n
on
t h e
o n e h a n d a n d M i t ro f f on the other . W hi le th e form er invest iga tors found th a t t he sc ienti s ts
P. 6).
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114 GAULD
they interviewed accepted t he emp iricist stereotype, “every one of the scientists inter-
viewed on [Mitroffs] first round of interviews indicated that they thought the notion
of the objective, emotionally disintere sted scientist naive” M itroff, I974 b). It may be
tha t, when discussing th e work they ac tually do, scientists ar e more aw are of the inap-
propriateness of the empiricist stereotype than when they ar e talking abou t science
in
gene ral see Mitroff, 1 974a, pp. 107-13 1).
The Ethos
of
Science
I n a n ar ticl e on th e ethos of science, originally published
in
1942, Merton described
the ethos
of
science as “th at emotiona lly toned complex of values an d norm s which is
held to be binding on the m an of science.” Control over th e scientist’s behavior is imposed
through these norms by sanctions and rewards and “are in varying d egrees internalized
by the scientist” M erton , 1968, p. 605).
Merton identified “universalism”, “organized scepticism”, “communism”, and
“disinterestedne ss” as four norms th roug h which h e claimed institutional control was
exerted over the behavior of scientists.
To
these Barber 1952, pp. 84-94) added “ra-
tionality” an d “emotional neutrality” an d Store r described the six norms as follows:
Unioersalism:
This norm
. .
refers both to the assumption that physical laws are everywhere
th e sam e and to the principle tha t the tr ut h and value of a scientific statement is independent of
the characteristics of its autho r . .
Organized Scepticism:
This norm embodies) the principle th at each scientist should be held in-
dividually responsible for mak ing su re that previous research by o thers
on
which he bases his work
is valid
. .
Communism or Communality:
This norm directs the scientist to sh are his findings with other
scientists freely and without favor.
. . .
Disinterestedness:
This
norm.
.
.
makes it illicit for the scientist to profit personally
i n
any way
from his research
.
.
Rationality:
This is) a faith in the moral virtue of reason
. . .
It may be interpre ted also as the
assumption t ha t necessary
to
the achievement
of
the goals of science are
1 )
empirical test rather
than tradition and
2 )
a critical approa ch to all empirical phenomena ra ther than a cceptance of
certain phenomena as exempt from scru tiny .
.
Emotional N eutrality:
This norm ) enjoins the scientist to avoid so much emotional involvement
in his work that he cannot adopt a new appro ach
or
reject
an old
answer when his findings suggest
th at this is necessary,
or
th at he intentionally distorts his findings in ord er to suppo rt a particular
hypothesis
1966,
pp.
78-80).
Storer adds that “i t
is
relatively easy to show that this com bination of n orms is admi-
rably suited to e nsure th e optimal progress
of
science; ideally, only when scientists’ be-
havior is guided by these no rms is it possible to keep scientists in touch w ith the frontiers
of knowledge” 196 6, pp. 82, 83). An exam ination of Storer’s description of t he norms
of science show th at it is an expression in sociological te rm s of the empiricist conception
of t he s cientific attit ud e foun d in science education.
Late r research by M erton 1 963, 196 9) suggested th at in addition to working und er
the control
of
norm s such a s those above, the scientist seemed als o to be influenced by
a set of what have been called “counter -norms ”. T hese represen t pressure from the sci-
entific institution to act legitimately that
is,
in th e interests of scie nce) in the
opposite
direction to that specified by the original norm s see also Rothm an, 197 2).
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On e purpose of M itro ffs study of moon scientists was to investiga te the extent to which
norm s and their counter-norms exercised control over scientists in their professional work.
Ab out forty eminent scientists who were directly interested in moon rock sam ples collected
on the Apollo missions were interviewed four times over a span of 3’/2 years between
Apollo 1 1 and Apollo 16. In addition, they w ere asked to respond to a nu mber of tests
and questionnaires. Extensive data were gathered which demonstrated the operation
of both conventional norm s and counter-norms within this group of scientists and Mitroff
produced an expanded list as
a
basis
for
further study 1974a, p. 79; 1974b).
This lack of acceptance of th e simple empiricist stereotype was found in an earlier study
in which W est 1960) ca rried out a survey of the scientific values of fifty-seven academic
scientists at a midwestern university. H e found th at there was a w ide variation in the
strength of adherence t o “th e classical ideology of science” and th at ther e was little re-
lationship between this and the extent of productive research.
Mulkay 1976 ,1979) has argued that neither the norms nor the counter-norms referred
to above ar e the strong determiners of behavior tha t M erton and Mitroff consider them
to be, since it is not the private behavior b ut th e public presentation of results which de-
termines the allocation of rewards
in
science. For him the so-called norms and c ounter-
norms constitute an informal, moral vocabulary “w hich scientists can use flexibly to
categorize professional actions differently in various social contexts and, presumably,
in
accord ance with varying social interests”
1
976; see also Barnes and Dolby, 1970).
Th is vocabulary points specifically to problem areas in scientific practice including those
related to objectivity-subjectivity, rationality-irrationality, and impartiality-commitment,
bu t it contains no solutions to these problems. F or example, a focus on the need for ob-
jectivity may be used to counteract an opponent who is judged to have been unduly
subjective, while an appeal to th e subjective aspects of science may be used w here claims
for objectivity appe ar to be excessive.
Historical Case Studies
Information abou t th e scientific a ttitu de is often conveyed and reinforced
in
an edu-
catio nal se tting by appealing to the work of scientists in the past. In particular, suppo rt
for the empiricist conception of this attitude is derived from the way scientists
in
the past
apparen tly constructed theories and made dec isions about their validity solely on the basis
of experiments. It is claimed, for example, that the Michelson-Morley experiment si-
multaneously d ealt the death blow to the L orentz electron theory and led to the birth
of Einstein’s special theory of relativity; or that Millikan’s oil-drop experiment once and
for all settled dispu te about th e indivisibility of the electron cha rge.
In his history of the Michelson-Morley-Miller experiments before and after 1905,
Swenson 1970 ) has shown that , following the 1887 version of the experiment, a num ber
of explanations for the null result were still available which did not require the rejection
of the concept of the aether. Because of this fact, modifications of the o riginal experiment
were carried out over the next forty-five or fifty years to attemp t to dem onstrate con-
clusively the presence or absence
of
an aethe r drift. In 1925, Miller announced th at he
had obtained an aether drift velocity of about 200 meters per second but, instead of
causing Einstein’s theory to be rejected, this result was effectively ignored for the next
thirty yea rs, in spite of M iller’s acknowledged competence. In 1954, Shankland suggested
th at the result may have been due to lack of ade quate tem perature control.
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Holton’s research 1969), and th e work of others, has also shown th at the Michel-
son-Morley experiment had little
or
no effect on the origin of the theory of relativity in
Einstein’s m ind. Einstein
was
apparently prompted more by “t he essential requirement
of finding sym metry an d universality in the op erations
of
nature” Holton, 1969) than
by substanially emp irical considerations. T h e myth which describes a direct link between
th e 1887 version of the Michelson-M orley expe rimen t and Einstein’s conception of the
theor y of relativity is, for H olton , an ex amp le of th e effect of experimenticism which
“is best recognized by the unquestioned priority assigned to experiments and experimental
data in the analysis of how scien tists do their own work an d how the ir work is incorporated
into the public e nterp rise of science.” 1 969).
T h e later study by H olton of Millikan’s labora tory notebooks for the years 191 1 and
19
12,
illuminates ano the r aspect of the “experimen ticist” notion of science. T h e results
published in Millikan’s 1913 paper so clea rly support M illikan’s view of th e indivisibility
of the electron ch arg e that , a t least in this case, it seems obvious that the oil-drop ex-
periment conclusively decided the point at issue between M illikan and E hre nha ft.
Mil-
likan annou nced there tha t “th e largest depa rture from th e mean value found anywhere
i n th e table [of values of
e,
determined
for
fifty-eight droplets] amounts to 0.5 percent”
quoted in Ho lton, 1978, p. 61). Howev er, Millikan’s notebooks show tha t results for
many more droplets were eliminated even a s they were being obtained. Millikan “eval-
uated his da ta a nd assigned qua litative indications on their prospective use, guided by
both a theory ab out th e natu re of the electric charg e and a sense of the quality or weight
of
the particular run” p.
70).
In ord er to account for Millikan’s behavior in the laboratory,
Holton introduces the notion of suspension o disbelief to describe the procedure of
holding in abeyance “final judgmen ts concerning the validity of app arent falsifications
of a promising hypothesis” p. 71) especially during th e early stages of theory construction
or
testing . It may also be possible to expla in inconsistencies in Mendel’s pub lished work
in a similar way Fishe r, 193 6).
Millikan’s exam ple demo nstrates one possible respon se to data which conflict w ith
expectations a t the sta ge of scientific work prior to publication. However, even after results
ar e published, a scientist whose theory is appar ently falsified by the evidence can h andle
the situation in a num ber of different ways in order to retain his theory. H e can deny the
validity of the da ta a nd suggest possible reasons why it should be ignored; he
can
accept
th e dat a but give reasons why it has no serious implications for the theory; or he can accept
both th e data an d the implications for the theory but a rgu e that when all the problems
have eventually been cleared up the theory will be vindicated Ma ho ney , 1976, 1979;
Popper, 1968, p.
50,
Kuhn , 1970). T he treatm ent of Miller’s 1925 results for the aether
dr ift velocity is one example of the third approach to da ta which apparently falsifies a
theory. In anoth er example, clear deviations in the orbit of the planet Uran us from that
expected on the basis of Newton’s t heory of grav itation did n ot lead to th e rejection of
the th eory . Instead they w ere eventually found t o be caused by an originally unexpected
factor-the existence of the planet Neptune-w hich had no part t o play in the theory
itself. For many years, similar deviations in the orbit of Mercury were not counted against
the th eory because it was felt th at th ey would eventually be explained when a furt her ,
as yet unobserved planet was fou nd. Barber’s survey 196 1) of the extent to which sci-
entists resist the in troduction of new ideas also dem onstra tes th e strength of opposition
to falsifying evidence.
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SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDE 117
If, as the above and m any other) examples demonstrate, experimental evidence does
not conclusively speak for or against a particular theory one is led to adopt a non-empiricist
position similar to that of Einstein who, “though unwilling to accep t the possibility of
con firmation of a theo ry by ‘verification’ of its prediction , n prac tice also held to
th e falsification principle only sceptically weakly) when the theory pu rportedly falsified
by experimental test had
in
his views certain other merits compared with its rivals”
Holton, 1978, p, 98).
Alternative Models
o
Science
T he above evidence concerning th e behavior of scientists and , in particular, their use
of experimental data in coming to conclusions about theories is at odds both with the
conception of th e scientific attitud e possessed by science educators and with an empiricist
philosophy of science to which this attitude
seems
to be related Feigl, 1955; Kurtz, 1976).
If
the “orthodox” view of the scientific attitude is to be modified in a way which
will
accom modate the evidence presented above, it will also be necessary to chang e the m odel
of science apparently adopted by science educators working in this area . Since about 1960,
an increasing range of nonem piricist philosophies of science has becom e available from
Kuhn’s model of paradigm conflict
1
962) to the anarchistic view of Feyerabend
1
970).
Th ere is also evidence that strictly empiricist philosophies have been modified in the light
of the mou nting evidence against them (see, for example, Scheffler, 1967).
These developments
in
the philosophy of science are well known and will not be further
discussed here. However, both Holton and Mitroff, whose research has been presented
above, have offered f urthe r suggestions abou t views of science which they consider to
be consistent w ith the results of their w ork.
In
1952, Holton introduced the distinction between “public” and “private” science
1952 , pp. 234-256). T he way in which argu me nts and evidence are publicly presented
“public” science) and not the way in which they were originally conceived, clarified,
an d tested “private” science) is used by others to judg e the scientific value of the work
of a scientist. Th e technical format of a scientific paper is such that references to personal
characteristics
of
the au thor are rigorously excluded. Holton suggested tha t the empiricist
stereotype of the scientist as detached and impartial is one which arises from this edited,
public image and not from a study
of
scientists themselves as they engage
in
“private”
science. His own work in the history of science has provided considerab le evidence tha t,
in the private work of a sc ientist, the range of appropriate personal characteristics is almost
unlimited. It certainly includes those which have been incorpo rated into the empiricist
scientific atti tu de together with their opposites as outlined by Mitroff 1 974a , p. 79;
1974 b). If the distinction between “public” an d “private” science is a valid one, it means
th at the a ttitudes toward scientists held by science educators and science studen ts can
be expected to have little, if any, necessary connection with the personal cha racte ristics
of scientists.
M itro ffs research raised for him th e problem that
if,
as seems to be t he case, the best
scientists are those who tenaciously hold on to their theories almost
in
spite of th e evidence
aga inst th em , how can science be considered to be objective even
in
the public domain?
In
order to solve this problem, he appealed to a dialectical
or
adversary
notion
of science
1 972; 1974 a, pp. 21 9-250 ). I n his view, a theo ry is most likely to get a fair h earing
i f
there are individuals passionately committed to its validity and who do all they can to
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118 GAULD
produce evidence and a rgum ents in its favor. Those most likely to come up with evidence
and a rgum ents against the theory a re those who disagree with it
or
who ar e committed
to an alternative view. The interaction between these two groups of passionately com-
mitted individuals helps to bring t o light as much relevant evidence as possible for as-
sessment by the relevant community of scientists without it being necessary for either
group to show complete objectivity, open-mindedness, impartiality, or emotional neu-
trality. The similarity between this way of
\
iewing science and the way tru th is sought
in
a courtroom is obvious as a re the parallels w ith Kuhn’s notion of parad igm conflict
1
962 ). Of course the degree of commitment which scientists adop t towards a particular
theory varies from individual to individual and th e situation is not so clearly defined as
may be suggested by th e above discussion. But, while th e empiricist stereotyp e allows
for little variation among the personal attrib utes of scientists, the views of H olton and
Mitroff appear to make more sense of their actual behavior.
Conclusions
Arguments for including the development of the scientific attitud e i n students among
the main goals of science education rest firmly on the assumption that this attitude is
dem ons trated in the professional behavior of successful scientists. Th e conception of the
scientific attitud e which appea rs in the science educa tion lite ratur e sees the scientist as
some one who m akes decisions solely on the basis of em pirical evidence and who at all
times prevents his personal in terests from in truding into these decisions. Th e evidence
presented dem onstrates clearly tha t this view, which seems to have been derived primarily
from the writings of scientists and philosophers of science before about 1960, is completely
untenable and may, a t best, be associated with th e less successful scientist.
The lack of attention which has been given by the science educators who carry out
research into the scientific att itu de to the evidence presented here from th e psychology,
sociology, history and philosophy of science, may be just ano ther exam ple of how com-
mitme nt to one view in this case , an empiricist view of science) can lead one to ignore
contrary evidence. The proliferation, since 1960, of nonempiricist philosophies of science,
has had little obvious influence on how the scientific at titu de is conceived by science
educators. Even Klopfer’s recent extensive and detailed outline of the structure of the
affective domain
in
relation to science education
1
976) retains many features of the
empiricist stereotype with little acknowledgemen t that contrary evidence has been taken
into account. One purpose of this paper has been to present the evidence against the
empiricist conception of the scientific attitud e.
A
conclusion tha t could be drawn from the material and argu men ts presented here
is tha t development of the scientific atti tud e in students should be elim inated a s one of
the ma jor goals of science education, an d this certainly follows for the at tit ud e as it has
been formulated by science educators for the past 60 years. Teaching that scientists
possess these characteristics is bad enough but it is abhorren t tha t science educators should
actually attem pt to mold children in the sam e false image. On the other hand, very few
writers explain what they m ean by open -mindedness, objectivity, or scepticism, and little
indication is given of how ev idence is weighed or of how o ne decides when the re is suffi-
cient evidence to m ake a decision. It is possible that, if such terms were clarified and the
way in which they r elate to scientific p ractice were more carefully discussed
in
the light
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SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDE 119
of the material presented here, one could retain a reformulated and more acceptable
version of the scientific attitud e.
This second alternative requires considerably more discussion than has taken place
up to th e present. I f any concep tion of the scientific attitude is to be retained
in
science
education it is no longer sufficient to build unquestioningly on th e consensus of science
educators.
Too
much relevant information has been ignored. If furth er work takes place
which clarifies, in th e light of the above evidence, the role which the developm ent of the
scientific attitude should play
in
science education then the second purpose of this paper
will
have been achieved.
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