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Transcript of Science arrangements for the regional management of tuna fisheries
Marine Policy 24 (2000) 93}108
Science arrangements for the regional management of tuna"sheries
Peter Ward!,*, Bob Kearney", Nektarios Tsirbas!!Bureau of Rural Sciences, P.O. Box E11, Kingston ACT 2604, Australia
"Faculty of Applied Science, University of Canberra, Belconnen ACT 2616, Australia
Accepted 29 April 1999
Abstract
Paci"c, metropolitan and distant-water "shing nations are negotiating a regional regime for managing the western and centralPaci"c tuna "shery. The regime will require an arrangement that delivers high-quality scienti"c advice. But regional sciencearrangements have often developed without the bene"t of planning and without close attention to management requirements. We usethe western and central Paci"c "shery to highlight the types of science functions and attributes required for e!ective regional "sherymanagement. In establishing science arrangements, nations will need to balance national interests, such as participation in stockassessments, against the wider interests of resource management which requires unbiased scienti"c advice. ( 2000 Elsevier ScienceLtd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Scienti"c advice; Institutional arrangements; Fishery management; Tuna "shery; Pelagic; Highly migratory "sh stocks; United NationsImplementing Agreement; South Paci"c; Western and central Paci"c
The past 20 years has seen a rede"nition of the rightsand responsibilities of nations in managing marine natu-ral resources. Most coastal and island nations pro-claimed 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zones(EEZs) following the 1982 United Nations Conventionon the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS also recog-nised the need for nations to cooperate through regionalregimes to manage straddling stocks, and highly migra-tory "sh stocks such as tuna. The 1995 United NationsImplementing Agreement (UNIA) outlines how theyshould be managed at regional and international levels.It speci"es the functions of science in regional regimesand the need for such arrangements to collect, analyseand disseminate information on target species. It alsorecognises the need for assessment of non-target, or`bycatcha, species.
In 1994, Paci"c, metropolitan and distant-water "sh-ing nations started negotiating a regional regime for thewestern and central Paci"c tuna "shery. The regime'smanagement body will require high-quality scienti"c ad-vice to facilitate resource management. In this article
*Corresponding author. Tel.: #612-6272-5534, fax: #612-6272-4014.
E-mail address: peter [email protected] (P. Ward).
we review approaches to providing scienti"c advice toregional "shery regimes. First we provide an overviewof existing science arrangements, then evaluate thestrengths and weaknesses of six regional science arrange-ments. The evaluation is based on interviews with emi-nent scientists and others associated with the six sciencearrangements. Finally, we propose guidelines for sciencearrangements that would meet the needs of regional"shery regimes, like the one envisaged for the westernand central Paci"c.
1. Overview of existing arrangements
1.1. Approaches to obtaining scientixc advice
Since the creation of the International Council for theExploration of the Sea (ICES) in 1902, many regional"shery regimes have been established as nations havebecome aware of the need to cooperate in order toe!ectively research and manage shared natural resources.
Regional "shery regimes tend to use what Caddy [1]terms the `standard management procedurea. It con-sists simply of a two-tiered structure: a science arrangement providing advice to a "shery management body.
0308-597X/00/$ - see front matter ( 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.PII: S 0 3 0 8 - 5 9 7 X ( 9 9 ) 0 0 0 1 6 - 0
Fig. 1. The structure of the science secretariat approach to providingscienti"c advice for regional "shery management. Also listed are themain functions of science secretariats.
The science arrangement relies upon scientists and tech-nical experts to analyse information and formulateadvice in the form of management recommendations.The adoption of recommendations is left to the manage-ment body, which is comprised of member nations.
In regional "shery regimes there are two funda-mentally di!erent approaches to developing scienti"cadvice. One approach is for a `science secretariata withits own sta! to provide that advice (Fig. 1). The alterna-tive is a `multinational approacha (Fig. 2) where nationalscientists meet to develop agreed advice for the manage-ment body. The source of sta! is the key feature thatdistinguishes science secretariats (independent sta! ) frommultinational approaches (national scientists).1
Other approaches exist for "shery science at nationaland provincial levels, e.g. integration of science functionswith management, and purchaser-service provider ar-rangements where the management body contracts agen-cies and private consultants to provide speci"c scienceservices.
The regional science arrangements listed in Table 1can be classi"ed as either science secretariats or multina-tional approaches, with some slight variations on thestructure and functions of the basic models. The multina-tional arrangements all involve meetings of nationalrepresentatives that coordinate research, promote collab-oration and provide a forum for the peer review of stockassessments and research projects. Almost all of thescience secretariats and a few of the multinational
1Multinational arrangements are often supported by a secretariat.However, those secretariats mainly provide administrative support tothe arrangement, and are not true science secretariats.
arrangements actively assess stock status and presentscienti"c advice and recommendations to a managementbody.
Many of the arrangements have had only limitedsuccess in managing marine resources. However, mosthave made signi"cant contributions to regional coopera-tion and, in various ways, in#uenced how resources areexploited. Cushing [2] notes that the very existence ofa "shery regime is a positive in#uence on stockconservation.
Most (20) of the 25 arrangements listed in Table 1are multinational arrangements. Multinational arrange-ments are common in other disciplines dealing with re-gional resources. For example, the International SeabedAuthority, which manages mineral resources of the deepseabed, obtains advice from experts elected by membernations to the Authority's Legal and Technical Commis-sion. We do not consider that the apparent preference formultinational arrangements in regional "shery regimesre#ects some inherent weakness in science secretariats. Itis more likely that the predominance of multinationalarrangements is the result of nations opting for an ap-proach that has low up-front costs and secures theirindividual, immediate and direct involvement in the "sh-ery's science and subsequent input to management.
1.2. Studies of science arrangements
In reviewing science arrangements we encounteredmany reports and papers describing regional "shery re-gimes and several evaluating management bodies. Butthere were few studies that examine regional sciencearrangements. The paucity of publications speci"cally onscience arrangements is surprising given the importanceof science in "shery management and the relatively largebudgets required to support science arrangements overlong periods.
Starr et al. [4], Caddy [1] and Kesteven [5] considerthe structure and goals of science arrangements in re-gional "shery regimes. Kesteven [5] suggests that theexistence of science within a "shery regime changes thenature of the system, so that science becomes the basis formanagement. He argues that the success of "shery re-gimes is proportional to their ability to deliver coherentand relevant advice in a timely manner to the manage-ment body and "shing industry. Such advice builds theindustry's faith in the science arrangement and its out-puts. Whilst Kesteven believes that e!ective science leadsto better communication and management, he doubtsthat resource management will succeed where nations arein con#ict over the resources. In this paper we agree thathigh quality scienti"c advice is a prerequisite for e!ective"shery management. However, we argue that the man-agement body's authority, including mechanisms to en-sure the implementation of scienti"c advice, are alsocrucial for "shery management.
94 P. Ward et al. / Marine Policy 24 (2000) 93}108
Fig. 2. The structure of the multinational approach to providing scienti"c advice for regional "shery management. Also listed are the multinationalapproach's functions.
Caddy [1] notes that members of management bodiesrarely have access to information on the risks that theirdecisions may pose to the stock. He proposes that deci-sions on safe harvesting should be delegated to anoverview committee that is responsible for long-termmanagement objectives. A second group, responsible forshort-term measures and allocations, should work withinthe limits provided by the overview committee. Scientistswould be involved in both groups. But, to ensure ac-countability, membership by individuals of the twogroups should not overlap.
Starr et al. [4] consider the merits of contested stockassessments, which involve scientists representing alter-native "shery interests. Traditionally, peer review is lim-ited to comments on the science arrangement's "naloutput * usually a written report. Contested assess-ments may have several advantages when the variousparties work cooperatively on assessments. In addition toproviding more intensive review, they often reveal errorsand oversights in calculations. Furthermore, involve-ment in the assessment process promotes ownership ofthe assessment, so that participants lose their ability tolobby politically at "shery management meetings.
Other publications review science functions in speci"c"shery regimes. Kearney [6] examines the implicationsof UNCLOS and the declaration of EEZs to the manage-ment and harvesting of western Paci"c tuna resources.He articulates the need for "shery management that isbased on scienti"c advice. Such advice should be objec-tive and be derived through region-wide data collection,biological research and stock assessment. He proposesthe phased development of regional "shery regimes thatinclude broad-scale economic appraisals of the "shery aswell as science, management and surveillance functions.Kearney [6, p. 282] concludes that `2it is unlikely thata regional "sheries body could best represent the devel-oping countries and territories of the area without its
own impartial secretariat and independent data-compil-ing and research facilitiesa.
Joseph and Greenough [7] consider biological, legaland political aspects of the international management oftuna, bill"sh and dolphins. They identify four main prob-lems faced by international "shery regimes: catch alloca-tion; the viability of commercial "shing operations;enforcement; and science. They suggest that a key prob-lem of "shery science* securing the necessary data* istractable. Joseph and Greenough [7] maintain thatscience must be kept independent of economic, enforce-ment and political functions. They compare the perfor-mance of several international regimes and conclude thatscience secretariats have been successful in managingshared marine living resources. In contrast, multinationalarrangements have had varying degrees of success. Inparticular, Joseph and Greenough [7] doubt the abilityof multinational arrangements to build the sciencecapacities of less developed members, and question theindependence of multinational arrangements. In multina-tional arrangements, political and economic pressures`2can lead to questions concerning the impartiality ofstock assessment studies carried out by nations withstrong interests in the tuna "sheriesa [7, p. 188].
In a study sponsored by the Ocean Wildlife Campaign,Weber reviews international e!orts to conserve [8]pelagic "shes in the Paci"c Ocean. He identi"es geo-graphical gaps in "shery regimes, such as the north-western Paci"c Ocean, and biological gaps, such as thelack of attention given to pelagic sharks. Functional gapsresult from a management body lacking authority toaddress some key element of conservation, such as en-forcement or data collection. He highlights the reluctanceof many regimes to adopt the precautionary approach to"shery management. Weber also notes that the accept-ance of management decisions is rarely legally binding onindividual nations.
P. Ward et al. / Marine Policy 24 (2000) 93}108 95
Tab
le1
Listof
regi
onal
org
anisat
ions
esta
blished
tom
anag
eor
rese
arch
mar
ine
livin
gre
sour
ces
Acr
onym
Org
anisat
ion
Found
ing
year
Spec
ies
Geo
grap
hic
alar
eaSci
ence
and
man
agem
ent
obje
ctiv
esA
ppr
oac
hto
scie
nce
ICES
Inte
rnat
iona
lC
ounc
ilfo
rth
eE
xplo
ration
ofth
eSe
a
1902
Var
ious
com
mer
cial
spec
ies
incl
udin
g;hal
ibut,
cod,
salm
on
Atlan
tic
Oce
anPro
vide
info
rmat
ion
and
advi
ceto
mem
ber
gove
rnm
ents
and
inte
rnat
iona
lre
gula
tory
com
missions
for
the
pro
tect
ion
ofth
em
arin
een
viro
nm
entan
d"sh
ery
conse
rvat
ion
Multin
atio
nal
IPH
CIn
tern
atio
nalP
aci"
cH
alib
utC
om
mission#
1923
Hal
ibut
Nort
hPac
i"c
Oce
anan
dBer
ing
Sea
Join
tm
anag
emen
tan
dpr
eser
vation
ofth
ehal
ibut"sh
ery
inth
eC
onv
ention
area
Scie
nce
secr
etar
iat
IWC
Inte
rnat
ional
Wha
ling
Com
mission
1946
Wha
les
All
Oce
ans
Pro
vide
for
the
prop
erco
nser
vation
ofw
hal
est
ock
san
dth
usm
ake
poss
ible
the
ord
erly
deve
lopm
ent
ofth
ew
halin
gin
dus
try
Multin
atio
nal
APF
ICA
sia-
Pac
i"c
Fisher
ies
Com
mission"
1948
Var
ious
spec
ies
Indo
-Pac
i"c
area
incl
udin
gin
land
wat
ers
Ass
ist
inth
eco
llect
ion
ofin
form
atio
nM
ultin
atio
nal
Pro
mot
eco
oper
atio
nam
ong
gove
rnm
enta
lorg
anisat
ions
Advi
seon
the
dev
elopm
entofin
land"sh
erie
s
GF
CM
Gen
eral
Fishe
ries
Coun
cilof
the
Med
iter
ranea
n"
1949
Var
ious
spec
ies
incl
udin
gtu
nas
and
smal
ltu
nas
Aqua
culture
Med
iter
ranea
nSe
a,Bla
ckSea
and
connec
ting
wat
ers
Pro
mot
eth
ede
velo
pmen
t,co
nse
rvat
ion
and
man
agem
ent
ofliv
ing
mar
ine
reso
urc
esM
ultin
atio
nal
Form
ulat
ean
dre
com
men
dco
nse
rvat
ion
mea
sure
sEnco
ura
getr
ainin
gpro
ject
s
IATTC
Inte
r-A
mer
ican
Tro
pic
alTuna
Com
mission#
1949
Tuna
,tu
na-
like
spec
ies,
dolp
hin
Eas
tern
Pac
i"c
Oce
anM
aint
ain
the
pop
ula
tions
ofth
ose"sh
esat
ale
velth
atw
illper
mit
max
imum
sust
aine
dca
tche
sSc
ience
secr
etar
iat
CPPS
South
Pac
i"c
Per
man
ent
Com
mission
1952
All
livin
gm
arin
ere
sourc
esM
ember
stat
eE
EZs
and
beyo
nd
inth
eSouth}E
astP
aci"
cO
cean
The
conse
rvat
ion
and
opt
imum
utili
sation
ofth
em
arin
ere
sourc
esbey
ond
thei
rEEZs
whe
nth
ese
are
part
ofth
esa
me
spec
ies
existing
inth
eir
EE
Zs,
or
pop
ula
tions
ofsp
ecie
sas
soci
ated
with
them
Multin
atio
nal
CA
RPA
SR
egio
nal
Fishe
ries
Com
mission
for
the
South
Wes
tA
tlan
tic
(inac
tive
since
1974
)
1961
Var
ious
spec
ies
South
wes
tA
tlan
tic
and
inla
ndw
ater
sofm
ember
nat
ions
Dev
elop
anorg
anised
appr
oach
among
mem
bers
for
the
man
agem
entan
dre
gional
explo
itat
ion
ofm
arin
ean
din
land
"sh
ery
reso
urc
es
Multin
atio
nal
Enco
ura
getr
ainin
gan
dco
ope
rative
inve
stig
atio
ns
CEC
AF
Fisher
yC
omm
itte
efo
rth
eE
aste
rnC
entr
alA
tlan
tic
1967
Var
ious
spec
ies
Eas
tern
Cen
tral
Atlan
tic
bet
wee
nC
ape
Spa
rtel
and
the
Cong
oR
iver
Pro
mot
epr
ogra
ms
ofdev
elopm
ent
for
the
ration
alutilisa
tion
of"sh
ery
reso
urc
esM
ultin
atio
nal
Ass
ist
ines
tablis
hin
gbas
isfo
rre
gula
tory
mea
sure
sEnco
ura
getr
ainin
g
ICC
AT
Inte
rnat
ional
Com
mission
for
the
Cons
erva
tion
of
Atlan
tic
Tunas
#
1969
Tuna
and
tuna
-lik
esp
ecie
sA
tlan
tic
Oce
anan
dad
jace
ntse
asC
ons
erve
tuna
and
tuna
-lik
esp
ecie
sM
ultin
atio
nal
Coop
erat
ein
mai
ntai
ning
the
popu
lation
softh
ese"sh
esat
leve
lsw
hic
hw
illpe
rmit
the
max
imum
sust
ainab
leca
tch
for
food
and
oth
erpurp
oses
(con
tinu
edon
nextpa
ge)
96 P. Ward et al. / Marine Policy 24 (2000) 93}108
Tab
le1
(cont
inued
)List
ofre
gion
alorg
anisat
ions
esta
blishe
dto
man
age
or
rese
arch
mar
ine
livi
ng
reso
urce
s
Acr
ony
mO
rgan
isat
ion
Foun
din
gye
arSp
ecie
sG
eogr
aphi
calar
eaSc
ience
and
man
agem
ent
obje
ctiv
esA
ppro
ach
tosc
ience
IBSF
CIn
tern
atio
nal
Bal
tic
Sea
Fisher
ies
Com
mission
1973
Var
ious
spec
ies
incl
udi
ng
cod,
salm
on,
spra
t,he
rrin
g
Bal
tic
Sea
Eva
luat
eth
est
atus
ofco
mm
erci
alst
ocks
inth
eC
onve
ntio
nar
eaan
dde
cide
onto
talal
low
able
catc
h(T
AC
)an
dits
appo
rtio
nm
ent!
Multin
atio
nal
WEC
AF
CW
este
rnC
entr
alA
tlan
tic
Fisher
yC
omm
ission
1973
Var
ious
spec
ies
Wes
tern
Cen
tral
Atlan
tic
Oce
anFac
ilitat
eth
eco
ord
inat
ion
ofre
sear
chM
ultin
atio
nal
Enco
urag
eed
uca
tion
and
trai
ning
Ass
ist
mem
ber
gove
rnm
ents
ines
tabl
ishi
ng
rationa
lpol
icie
sPro
mot
eth
era
tiona
lm
anag
emen
tofre
sourc
esof
inte
rest
totw
oor
mor
enat
ions
CIT
ES
Con
vention
on
Inte
rnat
ional
Tra
de
inEnda
nger
edSp
ecie
s
1975
Enda
nger
edfa
una
and#or
aW
orldw
ide
Pro
tect
spec
ies
thre
aten
edby
inte
rnat
iona
lco
mm
erci
altr
ade
Multin
atio
nal
OF
PO
cean
icF
isher
ies
Pro
gram
me
(Sec
reta
riat
ofth
ePac
i"c
Com
mun
ity)
#
1977
(194
7)Pel
agic"sh
spec
ies
South
Pac
i"c
EE
Zs
incl
udin
gG
uam
,Tru
stTer
rito
ries
ofth
ePac
i"c,
and
encl
ose
dse
as
Mee
tth
edev
elopm
entan
dsc
ience
nee
ds
ofSP
Cm
ember
sin
rega
rdto"sh
erie
sSc
ience
secr
etar
iat
FF
AForu
mFisher
ies
Age
ncy
1979
Tuna
EE
Zs
ofm
embe
rna
tions
inth
eW
este
rnan
dC
entr
alPac
i"c
Secu
reth
em
axim
umben
e"ts
from
the
regi
on's
livin
gm
arin
ere
sourc
esfo
rde
velo
pin
gnat
ions,
and
tofa
cilit
ate
the
colle
ctio
n,
anal
ysis,e
valu
atio
n,an
ddi
ssem
inat
ion
ofre
leva
ntst
atistica
l,sc
ienti"c
and
econom
icin
form
atio
nab
out
those
reso
urc
es,
part
icula
rly
the
hig
hly
mig
rato
rysp
ecie
s
Multin
atio
nal
NA
FO
Nort
hA
mer
ican
Fisher
ies
Org
anisat
ion
1979
Var
ious
spec
ies
incl
udi
ng
cod,
hake
,G
reen
land
halib
ut,tu
rbot
Nort
hwes
tA
tlan
tic
Oce
anou
tsid
eC
anad
a's
"sh
ing
zone
Pro
mot
eth
eco
nse
rvat
ion
and
opt
imal
utilis
atio
nofth
e"sh
ery
reso
urce
sof
the
Nort
heas
tA
tlan
tic
area
!
Multin
atio
nal
CC
AM
LR
Com
mission
for
the
Cons
erva
tion
Anta
rctic
Mar
ine
Liv
ing
Res
our
ces#
1980
Ant
arct
icliv
ing
reso
urc
es,in
cludi
ng
krill
,Pat
agon
ian
tooth"sh
,lan
tern"sh
South
ern
Oce
anD
evel
opm
ent
ofm
easu
res
nec
essa
ryfo
rth
eco
nse
rvat
ion
of
livin
gm
arin
ere
sourc
es.G
reat
erem
phas
ispla
ced
onth
elo
ng
term
sust
aina
ble
har
vest
ing
ofA
nta
rctic
reso
urc
es
Multin
atio
nal
NEA
FC
Nort
hE
astA
mer
ican
Fisher
ies
Com
mission
1980
Var
ious
spec
ies
incl
udi
ng
salm
on,
polla
ck,tu
rbot
red"sh
,w
hitin
g
Nort
heas
tA
tlan
tic
Oce
anPro
vide
for
the
conse
rvat
ion
and
man
agem
entof"sh
stoc
ks
inth
eR
egula
tory
Are
a!M
ultin
atio
nal
NA
SC
ON
ort
hA
mer
ican
Salm
onC
onse
rvat
ion
Org
anisat
ion
1983
Salm
onN
ort
hA
tlan
tic
Oce
anC
oor
dinat
em
anag
emen
tan
dco
nser
vation
e!ort
san
dad
vise
onre
sear
chre
quirem
ents
!
Multin
atio
nal
(con
tinu
edov
erle
af)
P. Ward et al. / Marine Policy 24 (2000) 93}108 97
Tab
le1
(cont
inued
)Listof
regi
onal
org
anisat
ions
esta
blished
tom
anag
eor
rese
arch
mar
ine
livin
gre
sour
ces
Acr
onym
Org
anisat
ion
Found
ing
year
Spec
ies
Geo
grap
hic
alar
eaSci
ence
and
man
agem
ent
obje
ctiv
esA
ppr
oac
hto
scie
nce
NR
MU
(OE
C)
Nat
ional
Res
ourc
eM
anag
emen
tU
nit
(Org
anisat
ion
ofE
aste
rnC
arib
bean
Sta
tes)
1986
(198
1)V
ario
ussp
ecie
sEas
tern
Car
ibbe
anEst
ablis
ha
regi
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98 P. Ward et al. / Marine Policy 24 (2000) 93}108
The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organiza-tion (FAO) has sponsored several studies of regional"shery regimes, providing an information base for thedevelopment of new "shery regimes, and as input toUnited Nations conferences (e.g. UNIA). In 1993, FAOorganised an international consultation on the role ofregional "shery bodies in assembling high seas "sherystatistics [9]. The FAO Consultation examined howthose statistics were reported, collated and exchanged. Itspeci"ed the data requirements of "shery managementand science, and discussed the logistical and "nancialimplications of data collection. The consultation high-lighted the need for veri"cation of logbook data againstobserver or landings data, the need for real-timemonitoring programs and the support needed by devel-oping nations in "shery monitoring.
Burke and Christy [10] examine options for the man-agement of the Indian Ocean tuna "shery. They assessfour management functions (information collection, re-gulation, enforcement and allocation of bene"ts). Burkeand Christy [10] emphasise the importance of collectinginformation on the "shery's economic and social at-tributes in order to maximise net bene"ts and facilitateallocation between the various stakeholders. They con-clude that a single agency is the most desirable approachto data collection and research.
Shomura and Jayewardene [3] review internationaltuna management bodies as background for the creationof the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC). Theyconclude that the quality and quantity of "shery datadepend on the regime's mandate and membership, andthat close liaison with the "shing industry is required forthe collection of data and other information. Like Burkeand Christy [9], they suggest that dedicated researchagencies are the best way of obtaining biological data.They also note that most regional "shery regimes includean objective of optimum utilisation, so that the resourceis harvested to provide maximum social and economicbene"ts to regime members. They conclude that in-creased attention to research on economic and socialfactors is required for "shery regimes to meet goals ofoptimum utilisation.
2. Comparison of approaches
The performance of science arrangements is often ob-scured by external factors such as the priorities set bymembers, the "nancial and human resources available,biological characteristics of the species and acceptanceand implementation of advice by management. Eventhough a healthy and pro"table "shery is the ultimatemeasure of the performance of the entire "shery regime,judgements based on the status of the mandated stocksdo not necessarily provide an insight into how well thescience component of the regime actually performs.
We take a qualitative approach to evaluating regionalscience arrangements. Table 2 lists the six science ar-rangements examined. They represent a variety of ap-proaches to providing scienti"c advice to regional "sherymanagement bodies (e.g. science secretariat and multina-tional arrangements; pelagic and demersal species; singlespecies "sheries, multispecies "sheries and wider, ecosys-tem approaches; bilateral and multilateral involvement).We evaluated each arrangement using published reportsand other, unpublished literature, and conducted hour-long telephone interviews in 1997}98 with 41 eminentscientists and people associated with the arrangements.2
We structure our evaluation according to four sciencefunctions (data collection, research, stock assessment,provision of advice) and six attributes (independence,priority setting, review, industry and non-governmentorganisation involvement, training and development,costs and funding). We considered those functions andattributes to be the most important for a science arrange-ment for the western and central Paci"c tuna "shery.Consideration of science arrangements for other "sheriesmay need to have di!erent criteria.
2.1. Data collection
Data collection and the maintenance of databases areaccepted as essential for most "shery science and man-agement activities. The mandate and support providedby the regime's membership largely determine its successin data collection. In either approach to "shery science,the coverage of "shing activities by data collection pro-grams can be compromised where important "shing na-tions are not members of the arrangement. Problemsmay also be encountered where "shing activities outsidethe regime's jurisdiction take targeted or incidentalcatches of species that are the regime's responsibility,e.g. catches of halibut by Russian trawlers present prob-lems for the International Paci"c Halibut Commission(IPHC) whose membership is limited to Canada andthe USA.
Through central control, science secretariats can es-tablish data sets of relatively uniform quality. Manyscience secretariats, like the Inter-American TropicalTuna Commission (IATTC), have been able to guaranteedata con"dentiality. Consequently, they can access de-tailed information that is not usually available to othergroups or even the national government responsible forthe vessel.
In contrast, the quality of data submissions can varygreatly between members in multinational arrangements,and there is often little that the arrangement can do toredress the problem. The need for con"dentiality can alsoresult in problems for multinational arrangements. It is
2Ward et al. [11] provide details of the interview process.
P. Ward et al. / Marine Policy 24 (2000) 93}108 99
Table 2List of science arrangements evaluated through literature reviews and telephone interviews with scientists and people associated with eacharrangement
Acronym Organisation Landed value($US million)
Annual budget($US million)
(%)
Multinational approachesCCSBT Commission for the Conservation of Southern Blue"n Tuna 172 0.4 0.3ICCAT International Commission for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas1000 0.9 0.1
CCAMLR Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic MarineLiving Resources
67 1.2 1.8
Science secretariatsIPHC International Paci"c Halibut Commission 150 2.8 1.9IATTC Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission 800 3.5 0.4OFP Oceanic Fisheries Programme 1700 1.4 0.1
Note: Also shown are estimates of the arrangement's budget and the landed value of the catch in its area for 1994 or 1995. The budget is shown asa percentage of the landed value.
quite feasible to establish conditions to maintain datacon"dentiality. But, in the interests of uniformity of inputfrom members and to simplify data submissions andprocessing, many multinational arrangements havesettled for broad-scale units for all data submissions, e.g.the International Commission for the Conservation ofAtlantic Tunas (ICCAT) requires longline catch ande!ort data by "ve-degree-square and month. Individualnations involved in ICCAT rely on their own, often adhoc, arrangements to gather and access "ne-scale data.
2.2. Research
Science secretariats have several advantages over multi-national arrangements in their capacity to undertake bio-logical research. Their research can be region-wide andspeci"cally designed to meet the information needs ofregional stock assessment and management. Secretariat ofthe Paci"c Community (SPC) regional research projects,for example, have tagged and released tunas throughoutthe western Paci"c unhindered by national boundaries.Those projects provided critical information on region-wide population dynamics and assessed stock status.
In contrast to science secretariats, multinational ar-rangements rely on national research e!orts, which canrarely mount region-wide research programs. Multi-national arrangements also su!er from competing na-tional priorities. However, multinational arrangementsmay have an advantage over science secretariats in theirsuperior ability to utilise extensive, national researchfacilities for multidisciplinary studies.
2.3. Stock assessment
Multinational arrangements show advantages inhaving a transparent, democratic approach to stock
assessment. They usually involve many scientists repre-senting expertise in a wide range of "elds. Compared withscience secretariats, members of multinational arrange-ments have greater opportunity to question and discusseach step and assumption in the assessment process.
Nevertheless, multinational arrangements must oftenadopt standard models and inputs for stock assessmentsbecause of time constraints and the need to reach consen-sus at meetings. They may also be more prone to com-putational errors where assessments and modelling areattempted during brief, annual meetings. On the otherhand, Starr et al. [4] conclude that having two or moreparties replicate stock assessments almost always revealserrors in the original calculations.
Whereas multinational arrangements are vulnerableto external in#uences, science secretariats run the risk ofbecoming dominated by a single view. Vigorous peerreview is the best remedy, both for the problem of inde-pendence in multinational arrangements and that ofisolation in science secretariats.
2.4. Provision of advice
Quanti"ed assessment of the risk of management op-tions is one way in which communication between scien-tists and "shery managers has been improved in recentyears. Yet, the level of interaction between science ad-visers and "shery managers is believed by many scientiststo be unsatisfactory.
The six science arrangements communicate advicethrough a summary report presented to the managementbody by a representative (usually the `Directora in thecase of science secretariats; the `Chairpersona of thescience committee in the case of multinational arrange-ments). Having advice communicated by one representa-tive promotes the delivery of a single, clear message to themanagement body.
100 P. Ward et al. / Marine Policy 24 (2000) 93}108
Because they are not necessarily all involved in thescience, members of science secretariats may not feela sense of ownership of the scienti"c advice delivered.
In contrast, informal communication between nationalscientists and their members on the management bodycharacterise multinational arrangements. Such commun-ication can be useful in providing members with aninsight on assessments. However, some interviewees sug-gested that it may also be counter-productive, in certainmultinational arrangements, where some members mayselect elements of the scienti"c advice that support theirnation's political or economic positions on managementmeasures and quota allocation. Consequently, somemembers may attend management meetings with pre-determined versions of the assessment.
2.5. Independence of science
Results from interviews con"rmed the conclusion ofJoseph and Greenough [7], that science secretariats areless prone to external interference than are multinationalarrangements. The science conducted by science secret-ariats is relatively insulated from national politics, indus-try lobbying and conservationist interests. Secretariatsta!, under the guidance and protection of their director,have a clear mandate to conduct science objectively andto present scienti"c advice to their members without bias.They are wary of aligning their priorities with those ofindividual members. The sta!s of science secretariats aregenerally viewed by their members as international civilservants and presumably above national politics [2].
The sources of funding for science secretariats havethe potential to in#uence their independence. Resultsfrom interviews, however, revealed no clear evidence thatfunding sources have a signi"cant e!ect on the indepen-dence of the science secretariats evaluated.
Multinational arrangements involve national scientistsin all aspects of the science, from data collection throughto assessment and interpretation. Their backgroundsrange from semi-autonomous research institutions, suchas universities, through to government agencies. Forsmall nations it is common for the person involved tohave responsibilities spanning other "shery activities,such as licensing and surveillance, in addition to science.A few interviewees suspected that some national scien-tists might attend science meetings with positions thathave been pre-determined by political or economic for-ces. This can leave the science open to criticism, evenwhere the science may be completely independent andobjective.
Wealthy nations often dominate multinational ar-rangements where participation in the various sciencemeetings is self-funded. Providing a central pool of fundsto support the participation of scientists from all interest-ed nations, and collaborative research projects and pro-grams for building the capabilities of less advanced
nations, are measures which promote equity in thescience arrangement.
In the Commission for the Conservation of SouthernBlue"n Tuna (CCSBT) national scientists conduct stockassessments together. However, the southern blue"ntuna stock's high level of exploitation and CCSBT's smallmembership (currently three nations) have encouragedan adversarial approach to many science meetings. InCCSBT, each component of the stock assessment be-comes a matter of debate as nations attempt to reachconsensus on technical issues such as inputs, models to beused, weighting of uncertainties and subsequent interpre-tation of results. The small membership also makes it di$-cult to maintain a balance between views, and often leadsto a polarisation in interpretations of uncertainties instock recovery. Certainly, trust is an essential ingredient inthe science arrangements evaluated, particularly for thosewith few members. It is a quality that cannot be manufac-tured. It is the product of the long-term honesty of actionsand interactions of all participants in the regime.
The adoption of standard models and inputs for stockassessments has improved independence in multinationalarrangements. Also, in most multinational arrangements,a science committee reviews the outputs of technicalgroups before formulating advice for the managementbody. Such science committees have a broad member-ship, and may rewrite the technical advice in a form thatthey perceive the management body requires. Many in-terviewees considered "ltering and interpretation to beuseful functions of science committees. However, somewere concerned that intervening layers, such as sciencecommittees, might provide an opportunity for nations todilute or distort the scienti"c advice.
2.6. Priority setting
The insulation of science secretariats against externalin#uences promotes independence, but it may in theprocess promote an arrangement that does not adequate-ly meet the information needs of members. Work pro-grams are usually developed by science secretariat sta!and approved by members without detailed discussion.National representatives with backgrounds in inter-national policy and "shery management attend annualmeetings associated with science secretariats. They maysee little value in devoting time and e!ort to reviewingpriorities when secretariat sta! have a superior under-standing of the "shery and appear to be doing anadequate job.
Interviewees recalled instances where science secret-ariats have been slow to respond to new developments.IATTC, for example, continued to focus primarily on thetraditional problems with yellow"n tuna and dolphin inthe Eastern Paci"c. It was, in the opinion of some, slow torespond to the emerging problem of purse seine bycatchof bigeye tuna in the early 1990s.
P. Ward et al. / Marine Policy 24 (2000) 93}108 101
In contrast to science secretariats, multinational ar-rangements are often more responsive to emerging issueswithin a "shery. If any member gives weight to a particu-lar issue, it is likely to be at least debated. ICCAT, forexample, has recognised the vulnerability of bigeye topurse seine "shing since 1979, long before the issue hadbeen accepted as a priority in the Eastern Paci"c.
Multinational arrangements provide all members withopportunities to identify science priorities whether or notthey have the experience and ability to do so. Membersare able to concentrate on national science requirementsand are encouraged to cooperate and develop collab-orative projects. ICCAT's Blue"n Year Program is anexample of a multinational arrangement successfullyfostering regional cooperation in "shery science.
Several of the multinational arrangements producedonly generic recommendations on regional science prior-ities. Individual nations are then responsible for adoptingthose priorities and integrating them with their ownnational programs. Many members lack the capacityto undertake the recommended work. Others simplyhave national priorities that di!er from the agreedposition. Such a process may also result in membersconducting research without due consideration ofhow assessments will be used by the regional "sheryregime.
In contrast to many other multinational arrangements,CCSBT vigorously pursues agreement on science priori-ties. Here, priority setting is driven by southern blue"ntuna's precarious status and the need to remove uncer-tainties in assessments that directly a!ect the restrictivetotal allowable catch and national quotas.
The SPC's Oceanic Fisheries Programme (OFP) com-bines a science secretariat approach with many of thestrengths of multinational arrangements. Nations main-tain a role in providing input to the research processthrough the Regional Technical Meeting on Fisheries(RTMF) and the Standing Committee on Tuna and Bill-"sh (SCTB). The creation of species research groups foridentifying advice needs has recently strengthened na-tional involvement in priority setting. Through themForum Fisheries Agency (FFA), individual nations andgroups of nations have also been able to provide feed-back to OFP on the use of scienti"c advice in "sherymanagement.
2.7. Review
None of the arrangements evaluated have establisheda review process that ensures the highest possible qualityof its scienti"c advice. Existing review processes aremostly disjointed, with science secretariats tending toavoid serious, ongoing review of their activities byworld-leading scientists, be they national or independent.
IATTC has an established process for nationalscientists to review recommendations prior to their
consideration by the management body. Those reviewsfocus on the results of stock assessments and the overallvalidity of the science. Yet, members have rarely usedIATTC's review mechanism.
IPHC has no formal external or national review pro-cess, although the inclusion of advisers to speci"callymonitor IPHC stock assessments does provide someavenue for review. Even with those advisers and publictestimonies, IPHC's science has rarely been publiclyquestioned to the point that secretariat sta! havehad to repeat or alter signi"cant components of theirassessments.
Both IATTC and IPHC have engaged independentscientists to conduct ad hoc reviews of particular assess-ments. Although various reviews have been conducted,neither arrangement has instituted review as a formalfunction. This reduces the accountability of those ar-rangements to their members. Of further concern is thetendency for science secretariats to organise the reviewsand have review teams reporting to secretariat sta!rather than to members.
Multinational arrangements also lack formal mecha-nisms for reviewing their science. However, ICCAT andthe Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Mar-ine Living Resources (CCAMLR) have the advantage oflarge numbers of scientists being involved in assessments.Interviewees agree that such a diversity of views tends toincrease debate which adds to the quality of science.Member science capacities and national priorities may,however, limit the level of review. Many multinationalarrangements have standardised their assessments to en-sure consensus within tight time frames. This may lead toan acceptance of inferior science in the interests of ob-taining agreement.
CCSBT, where the three member nations have largescience capacities, has agreed on a `standarda stockassessment model. Yet, CCSBT has also begun to focuson the need for independent review. In CCSBT an inde-pendent `umpirea is needed to help resolve a deadlock onmodelling, input weightings and stock recovery projec-tions. Other multinational arrangements (e.g. IPHC),which have relied upon member scientists to maintainthe quality of their science, have also required indepen-dent arbitration on their assessments, particularly whenstocks fall to low levels.
2.8. Industry and NGO involvement
Unless managed e!ectively, the inclusion of industryand non-government organisations (NGOs) in sciencearrangements has the potential to a!ect the indepen-dence of the science. However, several interviewees sup-ported the assertion of Burke and Christy [9], that the"shing industry and NGOs can provide useful technicalinputs to regional "shery science. Participation of thosegroups may also aid acceptance of scienti"c advice and
102 P. Ward et al. / Marine Policy 24 (2000) 93}108
recommendations. However, none of the arrangementsevaluated has satisfactorily involved industry or NGOsin their science.
In our review, IPHC was the only arrangement to dealwith the issue of industry participation. IPHC hasfostered close links with industry through port samplingprograms that place its sta! in direct contact with "shers.IPHC's Conference Board provides industry with formalinvolvement in assessment and management of the hali-but "shery. Industry is able to comment on assessmentsand recommendations prior to their consideration by themanagement body. Through public testimonies the"shing industry can also present their views on "sherydevelopments, catch rate trends, stock status and sciencepriorities directly to Commissioners. Public testimoniesalso provide other NGOs with access to stock assess-ments and scienti"c advice. Although IPHC allows in-dustry and other interests to comment on assessmentresults, it is noteworthy that IPHC does not accommod-ate their involvement in the actual stock assessmentprocess.
In multinational arrangements, some members haveincluded non-government groups and industry represen-tatives in their national delegations. At CCSBT Scienti"cCommittee meetings, for example, Australia and Japanregularly include industry representatives in their delega-tions. CCAMLR has also invited a scientist from theInternational Union for the Conservation of Nature(IUCN) to participate in its working group.
2.9. Training and development
Science arrangements in many regions need to addressthe lack of science capacities of coastal and island na-tions. It is noteworthy that many arrangements consider`development needsa to be a matter of acquiring stockassessment modelling skills. One interviewee pointed outthat those nations may need to "rst develop their abilitiesto establish monitoring programs, to interpret assess-ments of the extent of their tuna resources and toevaluate advice on how to maximise economic returns.
In contrast to Joseph and Greenough [7], our inter-views suggest that science meetings held by multinationalarrangements do provide a useful training experience formany member scientists. However, the time constraintson meetings often reduce the opportunity for more quali-"ed scientists to give individual colleagues appropriateguidance.
Several multinational arrangements have supportedmore formal training and development programs outsideof science meetings. ICCAT, for example, has convenedtraining courses and has been active in improving thequality of national information systems through theStanding Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS).Some ICCAT members, such as the USA, have providedexchanges for scientists from developing nations to
enhance national science capacities and involvement inthe "shery regime.
Science secretariats, which control the full range ofscience activities, would seem to be in a good positionto address member training and development needs.IATTC has assisted many members by developing andsupporting national data collection systems and throughcollaborative research on coastal resources. It has alsosupported exchange programs with member scientists.
In general, however, science secretariats are usuallyfocussed on assessing the status of stocks. They rarelyhave a clear mandate for training and development. Con-sequently, science secretariats have provided training andexchanges of scientists in an opportunistic, rather thana structured, manner. Sta! exchanges are often designedto bene"t science secretariats by facilitating access tonational data sets and establishing contacts in membernations; exchanges are not always developed for theprimary purpose of building national science capabilities.
Of the science arrangements reviewed, OFP appearsthe most successful in delivering training to membernations. Among other activities, it has combined a struc-tured exchange program with extensive e!orts underSPRTRAMP to develop the capacities of Paci"c islandnations in scienti"c monitoring. A factor in OFP's suc-cess in training is the recognition by members and sta!that the parent body, SPC, is a development agency.
2.10. Costs and funding
The annual budgets of the science secretariats evalu-ated were up to 1.9% of the annual landed value of their"shery. There are many dangers, however, in applyinga set rate of landed value to science funding. For example,a multispecies "shery is comparatively more expensive tostudy than a single species one. A collapsing one mayrequire a greater science e!ort than a moderately ex-ploited "shery, yet a collapsing "shery may have areduced capacity to provide funds for science.
Science secretariats are likely to be cheaper than multi-national arrangements in terms of total costs and e!ec-tiveness (i.e. the relevance and quality of scienti"c adviceto regional resource issues). Nations may not need tomaintain duplicate data collection and research pro-grams when science secretariats take on those responsi-bilities and centralise data and research. The budgets ofIATTC and IPHC, for instance, are much larger thantheir multinational counterparts (Table 2), and their costsaccount for a much greater component of regionalscience activities. Also noteworthy is the IPHC surveyprogram, which "nances much of IPHC's science activ-ities through the sale of catch taken during resourceassessment surveys.
Science secretariats often depend on just a fewfunding sources. Those sources are sometimes unreliableand many are unwilling or unable to make funding
P. Ward et al. / Marine Policy 24 (2000) 93}108 103
commitments beyond one year. Consequently, sciencesecretariats have little con"dence in long-term workplans.
The region-wide perspective and centralised approachof science secretariats makes them attractive to fundingdonors in addition to member governments. IATTC hasattracted external funding through consultancies toFAO, the US National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)and the "shing industry. OFP has long-term fundingdeals with the European Union (EU) for tagging, portsampling and observer programs. Such activities, how-ever, have been restricted by the need for grant recipientsto concentrate on their fundamental responsibilities tomembers.
Compared with science secretariats, multinationalarrangements are less attractive to external funding agen-cies. Although running on relatively low budgets, multi-national arrangements take little advantage of economiesof scale. Member nations are called upon to individuallytake on the core science functions for their #eets andwaters. Subsequently, the costs of the arrangement arethe sum of all science activities undertaken by all mem-bers. The hidden costs of multinational arrangementsinclude:
f duplication of administrative support amongst nation-al "shery agencies,
f high costs of participation by large delegations tonumerous science meetings; and
f duplication of research, especially where the prioritysetting process is loose and there is limited collabora-tion between members.
The 1990s have featured signi"cant advances in com-munications technology, such as the development ofelectronic mail (`e-maila) and Internet facilities. Thoseadvances have improved access to data and information,but interviewees did not believe that this technologywould replace the need for personal contact, such asannual conferences and meetings, required in multi-national arrangements.
3. Recommendations for future science arrangements
3.1. Ideal science arrangements
The six arrangements evaluated deliver on the fourbasic science functions of data collection, research, stockassessment and provision of scienti"c advice. The qualityof science is dependent on the arrangement's structureand level of funding. It is also dependent on how thescience arrangement's responsibilities are speci"ed, howthey are implemented and the personnel that are in-volved. The science secretariat and multinationalarrangements are both capable of providing regional"shery management bodies with high quality scienti"c
advice. But both approaches have weaknesses. Tables 3and 4 list weaknesses identi"ed for each approach andinclude possible remedies for each weakness.
The distribution and scope of authority to managethroughout the life history of the "sh species is a crucialfactor in the performance of science arrangements.IPHC, for example, did not have authority to deal withhalibut bycatch in the trawl "shery as it expanded duringthe 1950s. Consequently, trawl bycatch became the lar-gest cause of stock declines in the halibut "shery by the1960s. Moreover, IPHC was not permitted to deal withthe economics of the "shery so that questions of over-capitalization were beyond its control.
Science secretariats are superior to multinational ar-rangements on many of the criteria considered in ourevaluation. Through agreements with data custodians,science secretariats can access con"dential "shery data,and establish centralised and relatively uniform data-bases. They are attractive to external funding agenciesand can mount region-wide research projects. Theiractivities are cost-e!ective, addressing the speci"cadvice needs of the management body. Importantly,science secretariats are largely insulated from externalin#uences that have the potential to prevent "sheryregimes meeting their objectives. Although members areresponsible for scrutinising and guiding the activitiesof science secretariats, our interviews supported a tend-ency for members to allow secretariats to conduct theiractivities in relative isolation. While such isolationcan create problems for priority setting, it can be usefulin arrangements where nations must negotiate catchallocations.
Science secretariats do, however, have other weak-nesses. Sometimes they are not responsive to the needs ofindividual members. Recognising this de"ciency, somescience secretariats have developed formal arrangements,such as steering committees, that help members developtheir advice needs and to focus on priority setting. Train-ing and development is another area that regimes need torecognise as a valid function of science arrangements.The development of wide funding bases and long-termfunding commitments for science secretariats would easethe problem of funding instability.
Small, diverse "sheries were the only situations whereinterviewees identi"ed a potential weakness in data col-lection by science secretariats. Monitoring costs fora science secretariat would be high for diverse "sheries.In such situations, science secretariats may be more e!ec-tive if they arrange for national agencies to includemonitoring of those activities under their individualprograms.
Stock assessments conducted by science secretariatsoften rely on a few scientists. This may result in restrictedassessments. Science secretariats could broaden their as-sessments by encouraging greater involvement of ex-ternal experts in assessments and by establishing formal
104 P. Ward et al. / Marine Policy 24 (2000) 93}108
Table 3Common strengths and weaknesses in multinational approaches, and suggested modi"cations that should be considered if a multinational approach isto be adopted for providing scienti"c advice to a management body responsible for the western and central Paci"c tuna "shery
Functions andattributes
Strengths Weaknesses Modi"cations
Data collection Variable coverage andquality
Secretariat establish and maintain a central database
Research Disjointed Secretariat to have a prominent role in coordinating researchCentral research fund
Stock assessment Product of ademocratic forum
Lowest commondenominator science
Establish formal processes for external reviewEstablish sub-committees of national and international experts
Provision of advice Sense of ownership Informal channels tomanagement body members
Institute decision rules to reduce the capacity of members to ignorescienti"c advice
Lack of accountability
Independence ofscience
Susceptible to externalin#uences
Restrict terms of reference to science issuesRestrict membership to scientists
Dominated by wealthy andadvanced nations
Central pool of funds to support participation of scientists from allinterested member nations
Technical advice dilutedby science committee
Standardise stock assessment models and inputs
Priority setting ResponsiveDemocratic
National priorities maynot match regional priorities
Form sub-groups of members with common interests to pursuenational issues
Review Range of scienti"cviews
Time constraints preventthorough review
Develop formal arrangements for review by members and independentscientists
Industry andNGO involvement
Included in few nationaldelegations
Develop speci"c arrangements for technical inputEncourage technical input through national delegations to appropriatemeetings
Training anddevelopment
Public presentationof science activities
Lack of attention tomember requirements
Develop programs to provide theoretical training in addition to practi-cal experience provided by science meetingsEncourage exchange of sta! between national "shery science agencies
Costs and funding Di$cult for individualmembers to monitor thecosts of their contributionto regional science
Secretariat to assist with the identi"cation of training opportunities formember scientistsDevelop regional programs that are attractive to external fundingdonors
DuplicationUnattractive to externalfunding donors
Note: Not all the arrangements may have all of the strengths or weaknesses listed, and there are di!ering degrees of strengths and weaknesses for eacharrangement.
processes for independent review. Ideally, science secret-ariats should involve member nations in many aspects oftheir work, particularly in priority setting and the reviewof assessments.
We classi"ed science arrangements as either sciencesecretariat or multinational arrangements, depending onwhether the arrangement uses independent sta! or na-tional scientists. However, combinations of the two ap-proaches are possible. Nations might choose to combinethe best features of science secretariats (e.g. independentsta! responsible for data and research) with the strengthsof multinational approaches (e.g. multinational meetingsfor reviewing stock assessments and setting priorities).Indeed, several arrangements have adapted features ofthe two approaches. OFP, for example, obtains national
input on priorities and review of stock assessmentsthrough its Standing Committee on Tuna and Bill"sh.ICCAT, a multinational arrangement, has a large secret-ariat that is responsible for many aspects of data.
3.2. Options for the western and central pacixc
The nations involved in the western and central Paci"cregime are reluctant to establish a totally new sciencesecretariat. The coastal nations are comfortable with thecurrent arrangement but accept that there are advant-ages in formally involving distant-water "shing nations.
Distant-water "shing nations have large commercialinterests in the resources, and the income derived fromthe "shery is critical to the economies of several Paci"c
P. Ward et al. / Marine Policy 24 (2000) 93}108 105
Table 4Common strengths and weaknesses in science secretariats, and suggested modi"cations that should be considered if a science secretariat approach is tobe adopted for providing scienti"c advice to a management body responsible for the western and central Paci"c tuna "shery
Functions andattributes
Strengths Weaknesses Modi"cations
Data collection Centralised andrelatively uniformquality
Di$cult to cover small,national "shing activities
Negotiate with individual nations to collect data on science secretariat'sbehalf
Research Centralised Di$cult to conduct multi-disciplinary research
Develop links with research agencies with expertise in other "elds
Stock assessment Dedicated scientists Few individuals involved Greater involvement of members and independent scientists in stockassessmentsHave two or more stock assessment teams
Provision of advice Single voiceSense of accountability
Lack of ownership Involve member scientists in all activities (data, research, assessment,formulation of advice)
Independence ofscience
Insulated from mostexternal in#uences
Funding sources may exertsubtle in#uences
Encourage wide funding base
Priority setting Resist change Develop formal arrangements for national inputMembers have a peripheralrole
Encourage hands-on involvement of member scientists
Review Resist external review Develop arrangements for review by members and independentscientistsHave review teams report directly to members
Industry and NGOinvolvement
Technical input not includedin science
Develop alternative mechanisms for technical input to science
Training anddevelopment
Support sta! exchangeDevelop nationalmonitoring programs
Lack of attention to memberrequirements
Provide organisation with a clear mandate for training anddevelopment
Costs and funding Donors canmonitor costs andperformance
Unstable funding Allocate sta! to identifying and securing fundingDevelop wide funding bases and long term funding commitments
Attract external funding
Note: Not all the arrangements may have all of the strengths or weaknesses listed, and there are di!ering degrees of strengths and weaknesses for eacharrangement.
island nations. Consequently, many nations will insist onmaintaining an active involvement in the sciencearrangement because it is an important determinant ofcatch levels, and hence commercial pro"tability and re-gional prosperity.
Furthermore, the nations involved in establishingthe regime are unlikely to o!er the funding required toestablish a new science secretariat. A science secretariatwould require a large, up-front and long-term commit-ment of funding from the regime's members.
An existing arrangement* the OFP* is an attract-ive basis for developing a science arrangement for thewestern and central Paci"c. It successfully combinesa science secretariat with many features of multinationalarrangements, e.g. accommodating national input intoassessments and priority setting. OFP has a well-de-served reputation for providing high quality, unbiasedscienti"c advice to a broad range of interests, including
Paci"c island and metropolitan nations. It has earnedthat reputation by performing tasks that are almost iden-tical to those required of a regional science arrangementwith broader membership.
Nevertheless, the key issue facing OFP is the dichot-omy between its responsibilities at the national level, asdictated by SPC membership, and the possible accom-modation of a broader role encompassing extra high seasareas and distant-water interests. The paucity of sciencecapability in many Paci"c island nations makes OFP anessential resource to those members. Several intervieweesexpressed doubts over the OFP taking on the dual re-sponsibilities of providing advice to SPC members whileservicing a regional "shery regime that incorporates allinterests in the "shery. One way of ensuring that Paci"cisland nations retain OFP technical support would be forOFP (in competition with other agencies) to tenderfor contracts that provide science services (e.g., research
106 P. Ward et al. / Marine Policy 24 (2000) 93}108
projects, stock assessments) to the broader managementbody. Under that option, the arrangement's sciencecommittee would be more active in reviewing assessmentresults and formulating advice, than in attempting toconduct stock assessments itself. Of critical importance isthe maintenance of service to SPC members as OFP'sprimary function.
3.3. Adjusting existing arrangements
Whereas science secretariats have several advantages,many nations and have opted for multinational arrange-ments that present a small up-front cost and securestheir involvement in the "shery. However, our reviewidenti"es several de"ciencies in multinational arrange-ments. Most notable are concerns over independence,inequities in participation and problems with data. Manyof those de"ciencies have possible, though not necessarilyinexpensive, solutions. For example, the numericaldominance of wealthy nations in multinational sciencemeetings can be countered by funding the partici-pation of less a%uent nations. Data coverage andquality in multinational arrangements can be improvedby strengthening the administration secretariat's role indata maintenance and veri"cation, and by upgradingnational capacities.
External in#uences can be reduced in multinationalarrangements by introducing expert panels for peer re-view and engaging independent chairpersons for sciencemeetings. A variation would be to have an expertise-based science committee, instead of each membernominating a representative to the science committee.Compared with a representative science committee, anexpertise-based science committee is more likely to beobjective and independent of political in#uence. How-ever, our review of international "shery regimes did notreveal any expertise-based science committees. Clearly,nations are not prepared to allow scientists from othercountries and backgrounds to be given preferentialaccess to the science-management process. Their positionis quite understandable because they may ultimatelyneed to act on the scienti"c advice. Nevertheless, it doesnot necessarily match the UNIA requirement of basingmanagement on the best available scienti"c advice.
Another useful way of diminishing the e!ects of ex-ternal in#uences* appropriate for science secretariats aswell as multinational arrangements * is to establishstrict decision rules for the consideration of scienti"cadvice by the management body. By stipulating pre-cautionary reference points that trigger speci"c manage-ment actions, UNIA attempts to embed biological con-siderations in decision-making. Yet, most regional "sheryregimes have been reluctant to incorporate decision rulesin "shery management.
Even with the best available scienti"c advice, there isno guarantee of maintaining sustainable "sheries because
of inherent uncertainty in "shery science and because"shery science is often decoupled from decision-makingprocesses. Furthermore, "shery management requires co-ordination of various forms of technical advice, and itmust integrate biological considerations with social andeconomic imperatives.
Paci"c island nations are currently well served withquality scienti"c advice from OFP. The OFP's parentbody, SPC, also provides economic and social advice tomember nations. The need to provide funding securityfor key SPC programs, such as OFP, and to ensure fullcooperation with nations with common "sh resourcesoutside the area of jurisdiction of SPC members isgenerating pressure to expand existing arrangements.The performance to date of OFP compares favourablywith other regional science arrangements. Therefore SPCmembers must be convinced of the need for changebefore altering a proven science arrangement.
Acknowledgements
The article is partly based on interviews with scientistsand other people associated with science arrangements.The Commonwealth Fisheries Resources Research Fund(FRRF) provided "nancial support for that work whichwas guided by a project steering committee involving Mr.Jon Barrington, Mr. Mark Gray, Dr. John Gunn, Ms.Mary Harwood, Ms. Dorothea Huber, Ms. Janaline Oh,Dr. Derek Staples. Mr. Gray provided information onthe International Seabed Authority, and Dr. Ed Milescommented on a draft of the Marine Policy journalarticle. The views expressed in the article are not neces-sarily those of the Department of Agriculture, Fisheriesand Forestry * Australia, University of Canberra orFRRF.
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