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Full text of "The knowableness of God : its relation to the theory of knowledge in St. Thomas"

THE KNOWABLENESS OF GOD

ITS RELATION TO THE THEORYOF KNOWLEDGE IN ST. THOMAS

DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY OF THE

CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA IN PART

FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR

OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

MATTHEW SCHUMACHER, C. S. C.

(A. B., S. T. B.)

NOTRE DAME, INDIANA

UNIVERSITY PRESS

igo5.

MAR 2 S 194S 4

Go tbe dfcemorE

of


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TRev. peter Jobannes, C. s. C.

CONTENTS.

Introduction 1

Historical 10

CHAPTER I.

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

SECTION I.

General Principles of Knowledge 33

a. Union of Subject and Object 36

b. Object Known according to the Nature of the

Subject 41

c. Immateriality and Actuality of Subject and Object 46

section n.

Theory of Intellectual Knowledge 54

a. Prime and Connatural Object of the Intellect 54

b. Active and Passive Intellects 58

c. Intelligible Species, Completion of the Act of

Knowledge 64

section in.

Validity of Knowledge 65

a. Sensible and Intellectual 67

b. Adaequatio Rei et Intellectus 73

c. Relativity of Knowledge 79

SECTION rv.Causality and Knowledge 83

/

J


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CHAPTER II.THE KNOWABLENESS OF GOD.

SECTION I.

Existence of God 95

a. Relation between Chapters I. and II 96

b. Existence and Conception, Relation of. 98

c. Existence of God How Known ? 99

1. Ontological Argument, not by 101

2. Demonstration, by 106

3. Innatism of Aquinas 109

4. Arguments to Prove Existence of God 116

^ SECTION II.

The First Cause ........... 119

section m.Nature of God 130

a. Infinitely Knowable in Itself. 132

b. Ontologism Rejected 136

c. Position of Aquinas God Known by His Mani-

festations 141

1. Primum Ens 142

2. Remotion, Eminence, Causality 143

3. Analogy, Similarity, Relation 148

4. Anthropomorphism 161

SECTION IV.

Application of Principles to :

1. Infinity 165

2. Omniscience: 169

3. Omnipotence 173

4. Personality 175

5. The Rounded Concept, Qui est 179


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Epilogue 183

Bibliography 187

ABBREVIATIONS.

C. G. for Contra Gentes. C. G., 1. i, c. 10 means,Contra Gentes, book i, chapter 10.

Sum. Theol. for Summa Theologiea. Sum. Theol.,I, q. 10., a. i ad 2 means, Summa Theologiea,first part, question 10, article 1, second objection.

De Veri. for De Veritate. De Veri., q. 1, a. 2 meansDe Veritate, question 1, article 2.

Com. on Lomb. I, Dis. 5, q. 1. a. 3 means, Commen-tary on the Lombard, first book, distinction 5,question 1, article 3.

Others can be understood from these.

INTRODUCTION.

If truth is God's handwriting, the ink is indel-ible and the page indestructible. If the world isGod's, it cannot deny its allegiance. The Con-ception of God as found in the works of St.

Thomas is the expression of the power of theCreator as witnessed to by the work of Hishands. The question of God has never been aproblem of the past ; in some phase it hasalways demanded the best thought of the bestthinkers of all epochs. There are times, however,when it seems to arouse especial attention when its full import for all thought is pressedhome. We are now in such a time, for we havegone to the very root of the problem we arenow concerned with the Idea of God. Not somuch the existence of God, nor a discussion ofHis Attributes specifically, but the quest is for

a Conception of God that will quell our uneasi-ness in presence of many apparent confusions, andsatisfy our demand for an adequate explanation.Many have been and are to-day seeking thisConcept, but it is an idle attempt unless the paththat leads to it has been shown to be sure andconsistent, for this Idea is not the product ofbare thought. In other words, our Concept can


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only have the validity of the methods that havebeen employed in reaching it.

Prof. Ladd has pointed out what he considerspreliminary to the formation of the Concept ofGod. We must know the development of man'sreligious life, we must know human nature in itstotality, and, finally, we must have "points ofview for regarding the sum-total of human ex-perience which will bear the test of the severestcritical and reflective thinking." ' This last pointas stated in another place "A tenable and con-sistent theory of knowledge is then, an indis-pensable part of the prolegomena to an argumentfor the being of God," 2 is what we wish to showin the present paper. Our aim and this is theimplicit burden of all Scholastic treatments ofthis subject is to show the intimate connectionbetween the Theory of Knowledge set forth bySt. Thomas and his handling of the Knowable-ness of God. The principles he uses in arrivingat a knowledge of any subject are unchangedwhen he comes to discuss the question of our

knowledge of God. Ladd also notes that we musthave some theory of reality we shall state like-wise the theory of reality held by our author andfollow it throughout. "In general the cause of

1 G. T. Ladd, Prolegomena to an Argument for the Being ofGod. Phil. Rev., v. 12, pp. 130-137.

2 hoc. cit., p. 136.

Theodic}' is bound up with that of Metaphysics.

The science of God is a part of the science ofbeing. ' M The relation of the knowableness ofGod to the theory of knowledge is so close inAquinas that a presentation of the two togethermay give a more satisfying view of the positionhe held, and which Christian Philosophy alsoholds, than those unacquainted with his worksand not in sympathy with his thoughts areaccustomed to have. With this purpose we havewritten what cannot be new to students ofScholastic Philosophy, but what may serve toawaken in others a friendly regard for a Concep-tion of God arrived at b} r ways so unlike the

ones they are wont to use.

There are a few points in the method of St.Thomas that are worth noting at the outset. Hebegins with a vague sort of a Conception of Godthat he considers common to all men. By induc-tion he arrives at a concept more specific yet notcomplete; this concept he treats by deductionand evolves its implications. The developmentof this concept by deduction is done according to


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carefully formulated tests ; its necessity is due tothe nature of our mind, for God is truly one, allattributes are identical in Him, but we can onlyknow Him by considering them separately. As

1 Janet et Se"ailles, Histoire de la Philosophic, p. 888.

4

a result we have a full and many-sided concept,and no one attribute in particular is made tobear the burden of the whole.

One of the most striking differences betweenthe attitude of Aquinas and that of Modernswho have no specific interest in the Conceptionof God they reach, provided it harmonizes in someway with the general trend of the philosophicalsystems they are following or framing untothemselves, is the directness and consistency with

which he meets the problem in all its develop-ments. "Even when we recognize that themodern spirit is less trammeled in its researches,we shall be forced to admit that it is to someextent hampered by the restrictions which arisefrom the cultivations of 'systems' and from loyaltyto the traditions of the 'schools.' " 4 St. Thomassees his way clearly and he utilizes his light tothe fullest measure there is no hesitation whenit is asked is such an attribute to be found inGod. At once the answer is given and this is sobecause his principles are plainly before him andthey are the test of his Concept. This fact is

highly commendable whether we agree with hisprinciples or not. There are few Conceptions ofGod given us at present outside of Christian

4 Prof. W. Turner, Recent Literature on Scholastic Philosopity. The Journal of Phil., Psychol., and Scientific Methods,April 14, 1904, p. 201.

5

Philosophy where the position is ever essen-tially the same, that cannot be criticised on thescore of unwarranted assumption, inconsistentdevelopment, incomplete presentation, some of-fend against all three.

If we contrast a thought taken from Spencerand one from Paulsen with the position ofAquinas this will be evident. It will show how


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he admitted the truth in each of their doctrinesand yet did not stop where they did. WithSpencer from a consideration of Causation in theworld he comes to a First Cause; but Spencersays, if we reason on the nature of this Cause weland in contradiction "the conception of theAbsolute and Infinite, from whatever side weview it, appears encompassed with contradic-tions", 5 and hence is practically unknowable.Paulsen, speaking of the God of Pantheists, re-marks : "We cannot presume to give an exhaus-tive definition of the inner life of the all-real God.. . . The difference between human and divineinner life must indeed be great and thorough-going, so great that there can be no homogeneit}'at any point." 6 With this statement St. Thomasholds that we cannot have an exhaustive defini-tion of God ; his fundamental thesis we canknow God from creation as a likeness of Him

5 First Principles, p. 42.

6 Introd. to Phil., p. 252, trans.

6

is opposed to the second half of Paulsen's view."From sensible things", Aquinas says, "ourintellect cannot attain to a view of God's essence( inner life ) because creatures are effects of Godnot equalling the power of the Cause. . . Theylead us, however, to a knowledge of God's exist-ence and from them we learn what we must

ascribe to God." 7 Agnosticism wishes to knowtoo much, Pantheism is too modest, as usual themean is more satisfying. What Caldecott saysof the Idea of God found in Bradley's "Appear-ance and Reality," we quote in a more generalsense as applicable, in our opinion, to the short-comings of much writing on this question. "Isit an impertinence to suggest to an originalthinker that a consideration of the canon of ' ap-plication of terms of human thought to theDeity' formulated by Aquinas, and never sur-passed in penetrative and judicious subtlety,might relieve the vacillation and inconsistency,

which is the great defect of Mr. Bradley's workas it stands." 8 This, to our mind, is also thedefect of Prof. Royce's "Conception", as weshall point out in the text ; Prof. Royce uses thesame terms as Mr. Bradley. 9

There is no need of presenting the views of the

*


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7 Sum. Theol, q. 12, a. 12.

8 The Philosophy of Religion, p. 396.

9 The Conception of God, pp. 44, 45.

thinkers of all times on our question. At mostwe might show how their Idea of God wasan outcome of their Theory of Knowledge andReality. We shall be content to bring to lightagain the view of Aquinas, for we are apt tooverlook what has been done when all energiesare bent on doing something new. As far aswe know, the question has not been handledexplicitly in the way we are presenting it, atleast in English. 1 " It seemed more satisfactoryto give the Theory of Knowedge of Aquinas asa basis for his Conception of God, rather thanstart with the Conception itself and be con-stantly referring to a set of principles that arenowhere given together, and yet are closelyconnected with the subject itself.

It is but fair to admit that Aquinas hadadvantages in the construction and developmentof his Idea of God that are not at hand formany to-day who are busy with this problem. Hesaw guiding -posts on all sides and he waspresented with a set of ideas the value of whichhe did not question. The teaching of theFathers, especially St. Augustine, the attitudeof his age toward the Scriptures, the doctrine

10 A Commentator on St. Thomas, Capreolus, handles thequestion practically in this way. He discusses the basicprinciples of knowledge, and then applies them to God.Cfr. Revue Thomiste, v. 8, Pegues.

and influence of the Church in her variedactivities, were all helps to one who gave hisattention to the Supreme Thought of all thesefactors. Yet withal, Aquinas saw clearly thework of reason in the question of God and sethimself to know what the powers of man could

do to solve its meaning. His works beartestimony to the careful and detailed methodhe brought to bear on this question. We aretold, however, by Dr. Carus, "the God ofmediaeval theologians is a mere makeshift.""The more I think about the God-problem, thesurer grows my conviction that the God ofscience is the true God, and the God of mediaevaltheologians is a mere makeshift, a substitutionfor the true God, a temporary surrogate of God,


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a surrogate which at the time was good enoughfor immature minds, but too often only leadpeople astray." 11

Dr. Carus tells us that our conception of Godwill be true "if only we agree to be serious inthe purification of the God idea, if only we thinkof God as a truly divine being, if only we areserious in looking upon Him as truh r eternal,omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent, etc." Headds the astounding sentence: " The theologiansof the past have never been serious in thinking

11 "The God of Science," The Monist, April, 1904.

9

out these qualities of God to their very lastconclusions." Without speculating on what ledto this statement, or inquiring into the author's

acquaintance with the writings of mediaevaltheologians, I will simply remark that had hesat in the lecture -hall of Aquinas and wasdetermined to swear by his word, he could nothave followed more faithfully, in essence, themethod of Aquinas than he gives signs of inthe present article, especially in the paragraphbeginning, "God's thoughts are not transientsuccessive representations." The method ofAquinas in this problem is golden, and its mainimport is to be ' serious in the purification ofthe God idea'. As Dr. Carus acknowledges noallegiance to the formulator of this method, it

ma} ? be advantageous to consider that whenthe human mind is serious, no matter at whatage it lives, it will be true to itself, and itsmethods will be commendable though the resultreached may vary. Dr. Carus violates his owndictum in dealing with the mediaeval theo-logians; he says, "in my opinion it is the dutyof the philosopher to judge every religionaccording to the best interpretation that its

best representatives have given it." His attitudeis sufficient warrant for our recalling the Con-ception of God according to Aquinas, for it is

certainly a Conception of a worthy represen-tative of the mediaeval theologians.

JO-

HISTORICAL.


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Before we take up the problem directly, weshall say a few words on the principal worksof St. Thomas in which he treats this question,and also point out briefly the position of thissubject in his writings, as well as the influencethat affected his view and presentation. Theworks that we shall outline are: Summa Theo-logies, Summa Contra Gentes, Commentary onthe Lombard, Quaestiones Disputatae, Com-pendium Theologiae.

"The Summa Theologica is the first s} r stem ofTheology scientifically carried out. The theo-logical and speculative works of his predecessorsand elder contemporaries as well as his ownnumerous works of many sorts are but a greatand massive preparation for this work." 1 Thedevelopment of theological science from the daysof Anselm to those of Aquinas here finds com-prehensive and systematic expression. We findthe purpose of the work stated in its prologue :

"Our intention in this work is to present theteaching of the Christian Religion in a waysuited for the instruction of beginners." He,

1 Werner, Der heilige Thomas von Aquino, v. 1, p. 801.

II

therefore, proposes to avoid questions anddistinctions that confuse the beginner, and togive a connected view of the whole field ofsacred knowledge. There are three parts tothe work; the first treats of God in Himself,the second of man in his relation to God, thethird of Christ as the way that leads to God.The parts are made up of questions ; eachquestion is divided into a number of articles,and each article opens with a few objectionsagainst the special point to be discussed; thenthere is a positive statement of doctrine with

accompanying arguments; and finally, thepreviously proposed objections are answered.The first part is the one that interests usespecially and only that portion which tells uswhat the human reason can know of God.This portion is well set forth in the followingdiagram taken from Werner. 2


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a) num sit;

b) quomodo

DE ESSENTIA DIVINA.

( a. sit vel potius non sit:

1. simplicitas,

2. perfectio (bonitas) remota omni

imperfectione creaturarum,

3. infinitas,

4. immutabilitas,

5. aeternitas,

6. unitas;

p. a nobis cognoscatur,( y. a nobis nominetur;

Loc. cit., p. 803.

12

c) quomodooperetur

ad intra:

ad extra:

[1. de scientia Dei,a. cognos- \ 2. de ideis,

cendo } 3. de vero et falso,(4. de vita Dei;

1. de voluntate divina,


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2. de iis, quae absolute advoluntatem pertinent:

aa. amor

/3/3. justitia et miser-/3. volendo { icordia,

. de iis, quae simul adintellectum pertinent:aa. providentia./3/3. praedestinatio(liber vitae) ;de potentia Dei.

This diagram comprises questions 2-26 of theSumma Theologica. It is completed for ourpurpose by adding questions 44-49, relatingspecifically to the First Cause of all things,duration and distinction of created things, eviland its cause.

The Summa Contra Gentes is an Apology forthe Christian Religion. The title given it bySt. Thomas himself shows this: Summa deVeritate Fidei Catholicae. It was written atthe request of St. Raymond of Pennafort, whowished to have a systematic presentation of thedoctrine of the Church as a defence against theMoors in Spain. The work is divided into fourbooks and each book is made up of chapters.The first three deal with doctrine in the light ofreason, the fourth is concerned with the data ofrevelation as beyond reason. The question of

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God is paramount in these pages : God in Him-self, His essence and attributes, are treated of inthe first book, God as the efficient and finalcause of all things make up the second andthird, as named.

"It is the first work in which he (Aquinas)presented his system as a coherent whole"/though not entirely complete, for the final

expression of his thought is found in the SummaTheologica. These two works have much incommon, vet differ in scope and method. Theformer is practically philosophical throughout, 4the latter is principally theological, though ineach there are philosophical and theologicaldiscussions according to the topic treated. Inmethod, the former is almost entirely positive inin its treatment, at least objections are seldomformally presented and answered, in the latter


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each article begins with a number of objections ;again, in the former there are a number ofarguments advanced to support each question,in the latter there is usually but one. This isdue to the fact, no doubt, that St. Thomaswished to make the Summa Theologica as clearand as easy as possible, since, in his own words,he wrote it for beginners. In the Summa ContraGentes, "It is much more a question of basis

3 Werner, Joe. cit., p. 403.

* Hence often cited as Summa Philosophica.

1 4

for the points raised than a development ofthem, hence the desire to vindicate in severe briefpresentation the right value and necessarilyconcise acknowledgment of the truth containedin the question by means of as large a numberof reasons as possible." 5 We shall shortly recur

to the position of God in these works.

In his Commentary on the Lombard, St.Thomas followed the division of the work ofthe author. There are four books containingin a systematic form the theology of the Church-God, Angels, man, creation, the saints, and likequestions are discussed. Each book is made upof a number of distinctions, and these again aredivided into questions and articles. The text of' the Lombard served as a basis for the Com-mentators to give their own solution to thesubject under consideration. These commen-

taries are rather works on the Lombard thansimple expositions of his meaning. This issufficiently evidenced for by the diversity ofopinion of the various commentators. This wasthe first comprehensive work of St. Thomas, andit "formed a mighty foundation for the furtherextension of theological efforts. The Commen-tary on the Lombard contains his wholeteaching . . . though not in the thoroughly

6 Werner, loc. cit., p. 404.

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constructed forni of an independent sj^stem 6 ."The Quaestiones Disputatae comprise thelectures delivered by St. Thomas in thellniversityof Paris after he had finished his Commentaryon the Lombard. " These are concerned with


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the most important and the most excellent ob-jects of theological speculation, namely, withthose matters which are treated of in the firstand second parts of the Summa Theologica 7 ."They contain in rounded form the treatment ofcertain questions that a commentary, followinga given plan, forbids one attempting. There aresixty-three questions in all with four hundredarticles ; all these are given under a few generalheads: De Potentia, De Malo, De SpiritualibusCreaturis, De Anima, De Unione Verbi, De Virtu-tibus, De Veritate. The articles are preceded bynumerous objections, sometimes as many asthirty, under the form quod videtur non. St.Thomas gave his "best and most active atten-tion to theirelaboration. . . It has been remarkedthat Thomas wished to bring the art of theScholastic Dialectic to its highest perfection inthese Quaestiones Disputatae."* They were writ-ten rather for the trained philosopher than for

6 Ibid., pp. 358-359.

7 Ibid., p. 360.

s Werner, loc. cit., pp. 360-1.

i6

the beginner. 9 Under the heading De Veritate,the question of knowledge and of God arehandled in detail.

The Compendium Theologiae was written forhis dear companion, Bro. Reginald. Its originalplan was to embrace briefly all theology, in threebooks, based on the virtues, faith, hope, andcharity. The first book alone, containing twohundred and forty-six chapters, was completed.The chapters are short and concise. "The wholework is an intelligible and succinct summaryview of the system of St. Thomas." 10 This isstrikingly true on the points of God, man'snature, and man's relation to the First Cause."The doctrine of one God and the necessity ofthinking of the condition of His existence, is de-

rived in a strong and continuous series from theproof of a first highest mover of the world." 11

The problem of God occupies the first place inall the works of Aquinas. " There is not a singleone of St. Thomas's works that does not beginwith the discussion of the existence and at-tributes of God." 12 This statement shows the

a A. Portmann, Die Systematik in den Quaestiones Disputa-


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tae des hi. Thomas von Aquino, Jahr. f. Phil, u Spek Theol.,1892, pp. 127-150.

10 Werner, loc. cit., p., 389.

11 Ibid., loc. cit., p., 388.

'- Jourdain, La Philosophic de St. Thomas d'Aquin, v. 1,p. 184.

17

importance attached to the question of God inour author's system; a glance at any of hisgreater writings will suffice to make this evident.God, for him, is the creative and sustainingPower of all things, and He is also their last end.Creation in all its forms gets meaning only whenviewed in relation to Him. In the developmentof our subject we shall see how all comes fromthe hand of God, how everything bears sometrace of His operation, and how He is the

unifying element in the variety about us. Aknowledge of Him, no matter how meagre, isworth more than a thorough knowledge of allthat is less than Him, for He is the greatestobject that the human intelligence can considerand seek to know. "Among all the perfectionsfound in created things, the greatest is to knowGod." 13 In a proem to the second questionof the Summa Theologica, part I, St. Thomasgives his attitude on this question: "Since theprincipal intention is to give a knowledge ofGod, and not only as He is in Himself, but alsoas He is the Source and End of things, especially

of rational creatures, we shall first treat of God,secondly, of the tendency of the rational creaturetoward God, and thirdly, of Christ who is ourway in tending toward God." Here we have his

13

C. G., 1 1, c. 47.

i8

principal work outlined, and its basic thoughtis God.

In both Summae, God is the all-embracing, all-important problem. (The Idea of God is thepivotal idea in these worksj The subsequent


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developments and deductions are so intimatelybound up with it that all stands or fallstogether with it. .This is seen very strikinglyin the fact that St. Thomas considers God asthe cause of all things and likewise as their lastend thus comprising the whole realm of theactual and the possible under all aspectsj It isnot an arbitrary measure on the part of Aquinasto give this prominence and preeminence to theGod-question, for it arises from the very natureof the subject itself, from the very content of theIdea of God. The introductory remarks to themain divisions of the questions in the first partof the Summa Theologica show this clearly; thesame is evident in the other Summa where hedevotes a chapter (1. 1, c. 9) to outlining hisorder and method, saying, he will first treat ofGod in Himself, then of God as Creator, and fin-ally of the relation of creation to God as an end.

It is natural to ask in view of the detailedpresentation of this problem in St. Thomas, howmuch of this delicate net -work is due to hisworkmanship. Is he responsible for all, or is

he only a systematizer? Neither, exactly. He

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inherited an Idea of God that showed signs ofthe thoughts of some great minds, and whichhad been growing and becoming richer underthe guidance of a solicitous tradition ; but thisIdea was fully grasped by him and set forth ina way that combined all previous thought, andyet evidenced a selection that proclaims the

master mind and gives title to originality. Acursory view of the principal authors he drewfrom, and the condition of philosophy at histime, will give his position more accurately.

Among the Greeks, the influence of Aristotleand Plato is unmistakable. His proofs for theexistence of God are taken from them. God asPrime Mover and Intelligence are found inAristotle, and "Thomas derived the mostincisive proofs for the existence of God andfor many of the divine perfections fromPlato." 14 That Aquinas went beyond the

Conception of God arrived at by these twophilosophers is no matter for surprise, for theirConception had been enriched by modificationand addition long before the days of ourauthor. In the Christian era, St. Augustine,and Dionysius the Areopagite, and Boethius arelargely utilized. They are quoted frequently,and some of their statements are taken as a


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14 Schneider, Jahr. f. Phil. u. Spek. Theol, 1893, p. 4-70.

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basis for the development of the particularaspect of God he is considering. It is true, St.Thomas quotes from other writers both beforeand after Christ, yet there is not the samepractical intimacy betrayed as in the case ofthe writers just mentioned. He considered ofsufficient importance the De Divinis Nominibusof Dionysius and the De Trinitate of Boethiusto write a commentary on them. His presen-tation however, is rather the outcome of hisassimilating the various elements that attendedthe growth of the Conception of God than aconscious borrowing from different sources; hebrought his synthetic and selective mind to bearon the materials the past had gathered, andthrew these into the form that ChristianPhilosophy has recognized as its own since his

time. The synthesis is partly due to the stimu-lation of his age, and partly to the actualityof certain problems at that epoch. Wernerpoints out that the fundamental thoughts oraxioms in the questions 2-26 of the SurninaTheologica are derived from some philosopher,some philosophical writing, or Father of theChurch, and thus concludes the acquaintance ofAquinas with the learning of the past and hisleaning toward tradition; we might add, it isa characteristic of the work of St. Thomasto assimilate all the good he knew of in the

21

efforts of others, no matter who they were.The question of God was given especial con-sideration in the generations immediatelypreceding Aquinas. The attitude of St. Anselm,who thought about the subject, with a viewof giving it a simple yet comprehensive basis,until he was weary and about to desist from

his inquiries, is a worthy introductionto the attention it received at the handsof Scholasticism during its growing days." Theodicy was always regarded by the Scho-lastics as one of the most important chapters inphilosophy . . . Theodicy (and it alone) remainedfaithful to the proper genus of Scholasticism." 15The close connection between Theodicy andReligion in those days made this a practicalnecessity. Before St. Thomas took up the


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question, the Schools had witnessed the Con-troversy about the Universals ; Eclecticism,Mysticism, Pantheism, in turn passed by; theArabian and Jewish Thinkers had given theirversion of Greek Philosophy that called forattention ; his contemporaries or immediatepredecessors, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure,Albert the Great, wrote and influenced thought.There was certainly activity from the Pantheismof Scotus Erigena to the Angel of the Schools.

15 DeWulf, Histoire de la Philosophic Medieval, p. 155.

22

The merit of Aquinas consists in the fact thathe was not bewildered by the divergent viewsof previous thinkers, and that he did not branch

off into a particular view of his own butaccepted the truth contained in each, refutedfearlessly what he considered error, and outof it all gave us a conception that justlyappreciates the careful efforts of many mindsand ages.

If we specify in greater detail the condition ofthought at the time of St. Thomas, we shall bein a better position to judge the value of thestatement so frequently made that Aquinas waslittle else than an imitator. Philosophy in theMiddle Ages was not a unit; there was much

diversity in the opinions held and defended.Scholasticism was but one form of philosophicthought, and thus does not stand for MediaevalPhilosophy as a whole, as DeWulf and Lindsayvery well point out. "The philosophy of scho-lasticism should be understood as really not thesame thing as mediaeval philosophy." Ib Thisdistinction is important in the sense that it re-calls the fact too often overlooked that therewas great mental activity in those times, withthe consequence that a thinker had to chooseone view among many. Aquinas chose pure

16 Dr. Lindsay-, Scholastic and Mediaeval Philosophy,Archivf. Gesch. der Phil., v. 15, p. 42.

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Aristotelianism, and gave form to the systemthat honors him as its chief exponent.


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This choice implied a discrimination and an in-dependence of thought that modifies to a largeextent the imputation of a mere follower. Hisattitude toward the Pantheism of his time andthe Arabian Philosophy are instances to thepoint. The statement of W. T. Harris "Panthe-ism versus Christian Theism was on trial" in thedays of Aquinas, is true. None the less true ishis tribute to the wa} r St. Thomas met theissue of his day regarding the problem of God.Aquinas "stated the Christian Idea so clearly inthe language of the Intellect that the develop-ment of six hundred years has not superseded hisphilosophical forms. In fact, his comprehensionis confirmed by the profoundest thought of ourown time. The necessity of a philosophical sys-tem that shall make personality its central prin-ciple, and exhibit the true difference between thebeings of nature and human souls should revivein our theological seminaries the study ofAquinas." 17 It is noteworthy that the discussionof the question of God during the last centurywas carried on along the same lines as wereprominent in the Middle Ages, according to the

view of Janet and Seailles. "The progress made

17 Journal of Speculative Philosophy, v. 9, p. 327.

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in our century consisted in sifting more preciselythan ever the problem of God, in putting inpresence of each other, for the first time, in an al-

together direct manner, Theism and Pantheism.To limit this problem, to measure with accuracythe merits and defects of the personal and imper-sonal theory as such, has been the work of ourcentury." 18 St. Thomas had to meet the Panthe-ism of Erigena, that of Bernard of Tours,Amaury of Bene, and David of Dinant. Thelast named identified God with first matterand provoked the only severe condemnationuttered by the ever mild and calm Angel of theSchools.

Pantheism was also taught by the Arabians.

Creation out of nothing was unknown to them,matter was eternal. Their dualism, however,admitted of emanation, and was thus Panthe-istic. They did not wish to separate God andmatter absolutely, so they held that God createda first intelligence and from it all else proceeded.The source of this emanation was the thought ofGod, not His will. They taught the unity ofthe divine nature; finally, they denied to Goda knowledge of individual and contingent


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things. 19 Ueberweg says of their philosophy :

lf Histoire de la Philosophic, p. 288.

19 Stockl, Gesch. der Phil, des Mittelalters, v. 2-1, pp. 124-130.

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" The whole philosophy of the Arabians wasonly a form of Aristotelianism, tempered moreor less with Platonic conceptions.""'" And thischaracterization is common with the historiansof philosophy; to quote another. "In theirmethod however, in their principles by whichthey apprehend the universe, and in their entiresystem of philosophical conceptions they stand,so far as our information on the subject reaches,entirelv under the combined influence of Aristot-elianism and Neo-Platonism; and the same istrue of the Jews."" 1 Aquinas has these philoso-phers in mind throughout his work, and refutes

them as occasion offers, and he is also careful toshow by explicit argument that his own positionis not open to a Pantheistic interpretation.

Perhaps the question of God is the portion ofthe doctrine of St. Thomas that shows best thathis undoubted admiration for Aristotle did notprevent him from being an independent thinker.No one that has contrasted his theodicy withthat of the Stagyrite can fail to note the largerand more thorough treatment of Aquinas, andthe presence of ideas wholly absent from thework of the Philosopher. These additions are

due to the development of the Divine Idea inChristianity, but their full comprehension and

20 Hist, of Phil, v. 1, p. 246. trans.

21 Windelband, A Hist, of Phil., p. 316.

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expression are the work of Aquinas, and, torepeat the words of Harris, 'his comprehension

is confirmed by the profoundest thought of ourtime.' Some writers also remark that St.Thomas never got beyond the teaching of hismaster, Albertus Magnus. "Thomas of Aquinis led and determined by Albert, and it would bea great mistake to consider him an independentthinker. . . . For the historian of philosophyThomas is but a very secondary person-age." 2i! The relation of master and pupil inthis case is of course very close, yet we can


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recognize the specific work of each. Windelbandsays justly: "The intellectual founder of thissystem (Scholasticism) was Albert of Bollstadt.It owes its organic completion in all directions,its literary codification, and thus its historicaldesignation to Thomas Aquinas." " j On thequestion of God itself, the exprofesso treatmentof St. Thomas is much more extended and com-plete than that of his master, who only wrote asmuch of his Summa as we have, at earnestsolicitation.

Eucken says of Aquinas: "He was certainlyno thinker of the first order . yet he was not onthis account a mind of no consequence or a fana-tic. He was not much ahead of his times, but he

22 Prantl. Geschichte der Logik, v. 3, p. 107.

23 hoc. cit., p. 311.

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synthesized and reconstructed what the ageoffered, and thus satisfied a pressing need of thehistorical situation." 24 Dr. Lindsay, in thearticle referred to, though he says Scholasticismhas received undue contempt, yet refers to the"servility of Aquinas before Aristotle." Prof.Dewey, in an article on Scholasticism, seems tothink that Albertus and Thomas were whollydependent on Aristotle. He says: "In spite of(or better, because of) the conviction of Albertus

and St. Thomas as to the relation of Aristotle toChurch dogma, they are compelled to set asidecertain doctrines as simply the products of reve-lation, utterly inaccessible to the natural mind it being clear that Aristotle had not taught thedoctrine of the Trinity or the Incarnation,&c." 25 In contrast we have the words of Prof.Royce, "He (Thomas) also vindicated for phil-osophy a certain limited, but very genuine,freedom of method and of opinion, within itsown province. As a result, Thomas stands from

24 Die Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker, pp 245-6,

also, Thomas von Aquino und Kant.Ein Kampf zweierWelter, Kant-Studien, v. 6.

25 Diet, of Phil, and Psychol., Baldwin, vol. 2, p. 494.Prof. Dewey seems to forget that Albertus and St. Thomasbelieved in the Trinity and the Incarnation before they knewof Aristotle. They used the Stagyrite as an instrument;they explained these myteries, as far as human reason couldgo, by principles derived from Aristotle. This is ratherevidence of independence of thought.


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insufficient for our time: "for his day Thomaswas the leader of all Christendom, to-day hecan be but the leader of a party." 28 Paulsenis similarly minded, for in the preface to hisPhilosophia Militans, he sets up the Philosophyof Kant as the true one, and says, Kant notonlv destroved Materialism and Naturalism,

27 Die Philosophic des Thomas von Aquino und die Culturder Neuzeit, Zeitschr. f. philo&ophische Kritik, vol. 87-88,p. 161.

K Die Lebensansch., p. 249.

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but likewise, "dogmatic Supernaturalism orScholastic Metaphysics." We will end with astatement of Prof. Royce. His article alreadyreferred to is very appreciative of Scholasticism

and St. Thomas, yet he thinks the fundamentalpositions of the Philosophy of Aquinas call forreadjustment if they are to meet the modernview of these problems. To quote him on thetwo points that bear on our work. "His(Thomas') theory of the nature and limits ofhuman knowledge, a theory derived fromAristotle, especially calls not merely for restate-ment, but for readjustment, as soon as you tryto apply it to the interpretation of our modernconsciousness." We shall state the theory ofAquinas in the following chapter, and try toshow that it is still applicable.

The other point bears still more directly onthe subject we are handling, so we shall citeit at length. "The problem of the relationbetween God and the world, as St. Thomastreats that topic, is one which has only to bereviewed carefully in the light of modern scienceand modern philosophy, to secure an alterationof the essentially unstable equilibrium in whichThomas left this heaven -piercing tower of hisspeculation. Here I, of course, have no spaceto speak of a philosophical problem to whichas a student of philosoph}' I have directed so

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much of my attention namely, the problemabout the conception of God. But when I read,in more than one recent philosophical essay ofCatholic origin, expressions that admit thedecidedly symbolic and human character of the


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language in which even the dogmas of theChurch have to be expressed so far as theyrelate to the nature of God, when stress isalso laid, very rightly, upon that aspect ofSt. Thomas' teaching which emphasizes thisvery inadequacy of even the traditional formulasto the business of defining divine things, whenI meet at the same time with admissions thatSt. Thomas' positive theory of the divineattributes involves these or these apparentcontradictions, which still need philosophicalsolution then, indeed, I see not that our moremodern thinking is wholly right and Thomaswrong but that Catholic Theology is nowa-days in a position where it is bound either toprogress, or to abandon the whole business ofreviving the spirit of serious philosophical think-ing, so that they like the rest of us are livingin an age of transition."

These are but a few of the statements of themany that might be cited Froschammer,Hermes, Giinther, and others might be quoted.We hope to show in this study that the

estimates given against the value of the view

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of St. Thomas are incorrect, and that thetreatment of the question of God by Aquinas a question of prime importance with him andall philosophy is not a thing of the past.

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CHAPTER I.

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

SECTION I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF

KNOWLEDGE.

Knowledge is a fact. What is the process ofknowledge, and what is the value of knowledge,are the important considerations. What makesa thing knowable, how do we know it, andwhat is the validity of our knowledge? Ananswer to these questions gives the psychologyand epistemology of knowledge. There is asentence in one of the works of Aquinas that


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contains the factors involved in the problem ofknowledge. "There are", says he, "but threerequisites for knowledge, namely, the activepower of the knower by which he judges ofthings, the thing known, and the union ofboth." 1 Before we can have knowledge, theremust be something knowable, some one capableof knowing, and both the knowable object andthe knowing subject must come into someunion or relation. Knowledge is onlv realized

1 De Veri., q. 2, a. 1, praeterea.

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when the object and the subject enter into adetermined relation. These elements are admit-ted by all philosophers as necessary for a theoryof knowledge. We shall now consider theirorganic connection in the theory of St. Thomas,

and also the objective value of our knowledgeas resulting from this theory.

It is a Scholastic axiom that all knowledgeor every cognition is in the knower through anassimilation of the knower to the known. 2 Thenature of this assimilation and how it isbrought about forms the problem of knowledgefor the Scholastics. This assimilation runsthrough all knowledge and is its basis. Thereare two sorts of knowledge distinct in kind sensory and intellectual. From the externalsenses that receive the forms of material things,

without matter indeed, but yet with manymaterial conditions, up through the internalf senses which retain and combine the imagesof these forms, the human intellect, the angelicintellect, the Divine intellect, there is a steadyrise and the attainment of more perfect knowl-edge on the basis of immateriality. The assimi-lation or likeness that is brought aboutbetween the knowing power and the object isnot simply according to the nature of the object

a Omnis cognitio fit per assimilatiouem coguoscentis etcogniti. C. G., 1. 1., c. 65.

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in itself, but rather according to the nature ofthe knowing faculty. Hence the object is inthe knower not according to its natural formas it exists in its real being, but through arepresentative form, through a form which the


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Scholastics called intentional. This represen-tative or intentional form was also known tothem as species. The species in itself, as anentity, agrees in nature with the power inwhich it is, in representing it agrees with theobject it stands for. It is sensible or intellectual(species sensibilis, species intelligibilis ) accordingto the knowing faculty senses or intellect."For sensible vision as well as for intellectual,two things are required, viz., the power ofvision and the union of the seen with the onewho sees. For there is no actual vision exceptthe things seen be in some way in the oneseeing." This cognitive assimilation furtherdemands from the object to be known somedegree of immateriality, for the concept ofknowledge and the concept of materiality areopposites. 4This is a brief statement of the question of

3 Ad visionem tarn sensibilem quam intellectualem duorequiruntur; scilicet, virtus visiva, et unio rei visae cum visu.Non enim fit visio in actu, nisi per hoc quod res visaquodamraodo est in vidente. Sum. Theol, I, q. 12, a. 2.

4 Ratio cognitionis ex opposito se habet ad rationemmaterialitatis. De Veri., q. 2.

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knowledge as set forth by St. Thomas. It canbe reduced to three fundmenial principles, thatwe shall examine in detail, and thus arrive at aclearer view of the psychology of this system andthe critical value given it by Aquinas.

These principles are: First, knowledge is theresult of the union of the subject and object;second, the object known is in the knowing sub-ject according to the nature of the knower;third, the perfection of knowledge is in propor-tion to the immateriality of the knowing sub-ject. In other words, the essence of knowledgeconsists in the intrinsic presence of the object inthe knower in such a way that the knower isaware of it, and this recognition is due to an actthat contains in itself the object as a knownterminus. In knowledge the knowing subject

and the known object must be one ; this unity isattained by an assimilation based on imma-teriality. The words unity, assimilation, imma-teriality, comprise the whole question.

The truth of the first principle is beyond doubt,if we do not seek to determine the nature andorigin of this resemblance or assimilation. It is afact that we possess knowledge, and it is equallyclear that we have not the object according to


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its natural or physical being, for the nature ofthe knowing power forbids this hence theremust be some means by which the object is made

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knowable and the union between the knowerand the known takes place. This assimilationor union is of the essence of knowledge ; the ob-ject must be in the knower in such a way that itmakes the subject know the object, and this iswhat is meant by saying that it is in the knowerrepresentatively. There is a two-fold similitudeor likeness : there is one according to the natureof things and there is a representative one.This latter "likeness of the knower to the known

is required for knowledge." The subject andthe object concur in one common action the

known object must be present to the knowingsubject, according to the nature of the knowing

subject, and the knowing subject by its activitymust respond to the specific determination of theobject. 6

The part of the object in this union is to deter-mine the knowing faculty which of itself isindifferent and indeterminate ; ' and this deter-

5 This representative likeness is the same as image, for itimplies some imitative reproduction of another thing, of theobject to be known.

6 The unity of action in knowledge is due to two co-prin-ciples. On the side of the subject, there is no complete actwithout the co-operation of the object, and the object isincapable of effecting a complete act without the work ofthe subject.

7 Sic etiam intellectus, si haberet aliquam naturam deter-minatam, ilia natura connaturalis sibi prohibet eum acognitione aliarum naturarum. De Anima, 1. 3, lect. 7.The soul is quodammodo omnia.

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mination is brought about, as noted above, bysome representative presence of the object, whichthe Scholastics called by the special name ofspecies. This species is synonymous with thewords forma and similitude), and is a specialdetermination coming from the object bywhich the subject is aroused and directed


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to know the object itself. When the mindis not engaged in any actual cognition, itis inactive and indetermined ; the object actingon the mind determines the mind to knowit. The element by which the object is in con-nection with the subject, which is its substi-tute, is called by the Scholastics species im-pressa; excited by this determination the mindacts, and the result is given in the speciesexpressa by which the mind knows the object.

This word species is of constant occurrence inthe Scholastic theory of knowledge, so an under-standing of it will obviate misinterpretations,and will likewise simplify the problem as pre-sented in these terms. It is hardly necessan r tosay that the word species has no community ofdoctrine with the floating images of Democritusand Epicurus which Aristotle rejected, and whichis not to be found in the best Scholastic writ-

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ings. s The true meaning is simply this : the mindis affected or modified by objects acting on theknowing power, sense-organ or intellect. Themind is in a peculiar attitude or modified to per-ceive an object, The species has no independentexistence, but is bound up with the state or con-dition of the mind viewed at the time of cogni-tion; it is due to the action of objects on sense-organs or intellect. There are no pre-existingspecies, for the "knowing soul is in potentia tothe species which are the principles of sensation,as well as to the species which are the principles

of intellection... In the beginning, it is in potentiato all the species by which it understands." 9 Itis the condition by which activity-sensory and

8 Though so recent an article as that of Dr. Lindsay, al-ready- referred to, has the following misconception of species :"Both Thomas and Duns Scotus held, each in his own way,to the doctrine of intelligible species, by which a copy of theobject was supposed, in the process of knowledge, to ariseand be seen by the soul." " In their doctrine of the "speciesintelligibiles" the two "Realists," Thomas and Duns Scotus,had alike followed, through some variations, the old Greekidea, that in the knowing process, by means of the coopera-

tion of the soul and the external object, a copy of the latterarises, which is then apprehended and beheld by the soul."Windeband, A Hist, of Phil. p. 325. This thought is quotedby Ladd in a note of his Phil, of Knowledge, p. 53.

9 Anima cognoscitiva sit in potentia tarn ad similitudinesquae sunt principia sentiendi, quam ad similitudines quaesunt principia intelligendi. . . Est in principio in potentia adhujusmodi species omnes. Sum, Theol., I. q. 84, a 3.


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intellectual, is actualized. The intellect is act-ually intelligent through the intelligible species,as the sense is actual through the sensiblespecies. 10 "The intelligible species is the formal.principle of intellectual operation, as the form ofany agent is the form of its specific operation."Through it the object becomes known. Themind does not perceive it primarily, but it is themeans of perception "that which is understoodis the very concept of things existing outside themind."" It is the object that is understood, butby means of the species. "The intelligible speciesis not that which is understood but that bywhich the intellect understands." 12 The objectis not inferred from the species, as though it werean intermediate representation, but the species is

simply the means that brings about the union ofsubject and object resulting in knowledge.

The species expressa was sometimes calledintentio. Very often this word was made anadjective intentionalis in conjunction withspecies. This intentio in us is "neither the thingitself which is understood, nor is it the very

10 Species intelligibilis se habet ad intellectum sicut speciessensibilis ad sensuin. Ibid., 2. 85, a 2. There is a parallelbetween both species.

11 Id vero quod intelligitur est ipsa ratio rerum existentiumextra animam. C. G., 1. 2, c. 75.

12 Species intelligibilis non est id quod intelligitur, sed idquo intelligit intellectus. Sum. TheoL, I. q. 85, a. 2.

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substance of the intellect, but it is a certain like-ness conceived in the intellect of the thing thatis understood." 13 It was also known in intel-

lectual knowledge as verhutn mentale. It is theterminus of the intellectual activity aroused bythe intelligible species. This word intentionalwas used to show in what way the object waspresent to the knowing subject, to show thenature of the resemblance between the knowerand the known. It offsets the view that theobject is present in knowledge in its real andphysical being; it is present really, but not ac-cording to the condition in which it is found in


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nature. This leads us to our second principle :The object known jjsjn _the knower according to jthe nature of the knower.

We have now seen the meaning of the wordspecies, and its fundamental importance in theScholastic system. The first principle gives thenature of the species from the point of view ofthe object, as representative of the object; thesecond princple views the nature of the speciesfrom the standpoint of the subject, as it exists inthe knower. It exists in the knower accordingto the nature of the knower.

The second principle strictly taken is but a

13 Quae quidem in nobis neque est ipsa res quae intelligiturneque est ipsa substantia intellectus, sed est quaedam simili-tude) concepta intellectu de re intellecta. C. G-, 1. 4, c. 11.

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corollary of the first rightly understood, for ifknowledge is but the union of the subject andthe object, both must be of the same nature orreduced to it before the union can be effected."All knowledge is according to some form,which is the principle of knowledge in theknower. This form or species can be viewedin a twofold light: in its relation to the know-ing subject, and also in its relation to the objectwhose likeness it is. In the former it arousesthe knowing faculty to cognitive activity, andin the latter it points out a definite object ofknowledge. Hence the manner of knowing a

thing is according to the condition of theknower, in whom the form is received accordingto his nature. But it is not necessary that thething known exist according to the nature ofthe knower or according to that manner bywhich the form, which is the principle of know-ing, has existence in the knower." u The mannerof knowing must be that of the knower, but

14 Ouinis cognitio est secundum aliquara formam, quae estin cognoscente principium cognitionis. Forma autemhujusmodi potest considerari dupliciter: uno modo secun-dum esse, quod habet in cognoscente, alio modo secundum

respectum quern habet ad rem, cujus est similitudo. Secun-dum quidem primum respectum facit cognoscentem actucognoscere; sed secundum secundum respectum determinatcognitionem ad aliquod cognoscibile determinatum. Et ideomodus cognoscendi rem aliquam est secundum conditionemcognoscentis, in quo forma recipitur secundum modum ejus.Non autem oportet ut res cognita sit quae est cognoscendiprincipium, habet esse in cognoscente. De Veri., q. 10, a. 4.


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the thing itself in rerum natura need not be onewith this mode, for knowledge is not " hy meansof identity, but by means of a certain represen-tation ; whence it is not necessary that thenature of the knower and the known be thesame." 15 This conformity of the subject andobject is "not a likeness of conformity in naturebut a likeness of representation only, as weare reminded of some man through a goldenstatue.""' In fact, "the perfection of knowl-edge consists in this, that the thing be knownto exist in that nature in which it is, and notthat the nature of the thing known be in theknower." 1 '

The truth of this principle is emphasizedindirectly or negatively by St. Thomas whenhe criticises the views of those who went astrayon this point. Some of the ancient philosophersmisapplied the axiom "like is known by like" and landed in a position the extreme opposite

of that held by Plato. They understood thisprinciple to mean that the "soul which knowsall things is naturally made up of all : earth

16 De Veri., q. 2, a. 5, ad 7.

16 Ad cognitionem non requiritur similitude conformitatisin natura. sed similitudo repraesentationis tantum ; sicut perstatuam auream ducitur in cognitionem homiuis. De Veri.,q. 2, a. 5, ad 5.

17 Ibid., ad 6.

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that it may know earth, fire to know fire, andso of the rest." 18 This of course would makethe soul corporeal, since it knows corporealthings; in fact, it would make it a compoundof all things since it can know all things, andnot only made up of the elements these philoso-phers considered as contained in their first

matter. If their interpretation of this principlewere true, then the possibility and diversity ofknowledge would be at an end.

St. Thomas likewise sets aside the theory ofPlato regarding this principle. "Plato", hesays, "seems to deviate from the truth in thismatter, for since he considered all knowledgeto take place by means of likeness, he believedthat the form of the known is of necessity in


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the knower in that manner in which it is inthe known." 19 This led Plato to conceive theindependent reality of general concepts to bringabout the requisite conditions for knowledge asthey appeared to him; ideas and not corporealthings would be the object of our intellectualrepresentations, according to Plato. This theoryresults in an arbitrary knowledge, neglecting

18 Ibid., a. 2.

19 Videtur autem in hoc Plato deviare a veritate, quia cumaestimaret omnem cognitionem per modum alicujus simili-tudinis esse credidit, quod forma cogniti ex necessitate sitsimilitudinis esse modo, quo est in cognito. Sum. Theol,q. 84, a. 1.

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things as they are and failing to account for

our knowledge of corporeal things.

St. Thomas rejected these two views becausethey did not accord with what he conceived tobe the basis of conformity between object andsubject. His critical spirit is shown by his put-ting aside the Naturphilosophen and Plato,and embracing a principle contained in thebook De_ Causjs : That everything received \is received according: to the nature of the re-

>

1

ceiver. 2u This principle is important for thetheory of knowledge, embracing as it does oursecond principle. We know the object directly,as noted before, and the object also has theprior activity in knowledge, yet it must adapt

itself to the conditions of the knowing power.Subject and object must be so intimately con-nected as to form one sole principle of knowledgeaccording to the axiom: Ah utroque notitia pari-tur a cognoscente et cognito. In this union theobject comes under the conditions of the know-ing power, for the object is knowable only whenit has entered the field of consciousness by beingassimilated by the subject. 21 This assimilation


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20 Omne quod recipitur in aliquo, est in eo per inodum re-cipients. De Causis is a work of Proclus the Platonist.

21 This assimilation is a vital assimilation. In the cognitivelife there is exactly the same process of assimilation as in theorganic life, the process of nutrition ; it is but a special andhigher degree of assimilation.

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makes it an integral part of the knowing power,and thus a partaker of its nature. The subjectalso is modified by the object to the extent, thatit is knowing under this condition and for thisobject. From the psychological point of viewthis principle presents no great difficulties, butit is important in the question of the objectivityof knowledge.

The third principle flows easily from the twopreceding. If knowledge depends on the assimi-lative union of object and subject, and if the

object is known according to the nature of theknower, it follows readily that the knowablenessof'the object depends on its immateriality. " Theconcept of knowledge and the concept of materi-ality are opposites"; "the more immaterialthings are, the more knowable they are."" "Thisprinciple or axiom is very important ; in a way,it underlies the whole question of knowledge, it isthe condition that makes a thing knowable, andmakes knowledge the possession of a particularclass of beings. Immateriality, in general, is thecapacity a thing has to be itself and to becomesomething else. In knowledge, the object must

be immaterial in itself or else immaterialized, andthe subject must be immaterial the object isassimilated and the subject assimilates. This

22 Secundum ordinem immaterialitatis in rebus, secundumhoc in eis natura cognitionis iuvenitur. De Veri., q. 2, a. 2.

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double aspect is brought out clearly by St.Thomas immateriality on the part of object

and subject. The distinction between a knowingbeing and one that does not know is based onimmateriality. The non-knowing has simply theone form of its own being, whereas the knowingis capable of receiving the form of another thing,for the species or form of the known is in the oneknowing. The non-knowing can be assimilatedbut cannot assimilate; the knowing has thepower to assimilate and thus become more andmore. Hence the nature of the non-knowing is


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more restricted and limited, whereas the know-ing has greater amplitude and extension. It isfor this reason Aristotle said the soul is quodam-modo omnia. It is because of the universality ofthe knowing power, that matter, which is theprinciple of individuation and restricts the formto one condition or result, cannot be admittedinto it; rather in proportion to the absence ofmateriality will the knowledge be the freer andmore perfect. 23 If the soul were naturally deter-mined in one direction, to one set of activities,all its operations would be influenced by thisspecific bent, just as all things taste bitter to anunhealthy tongue. The soul must then be capa-

23 Quanto autem aliquid immaterialius habet formam reicognitae, tanto perfectius cognoscit. Sum. Theol., I., q. 84,a. 2.

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ble of adjusting itself to receive the various

cognitions we know it actually possesses, itmust have in its nature none of those things itseeks to know and can know. 24

St. Thomas has knowledge graded on the scaleof immateriality the knowableness of the objectand the knowing capacity of the subject rest onthe same basis. A thing is knowable in propor-tion to its immateriality, and a subject knows inproportion to the extent of the immaterialityof its nature. There is a passage in the SummaTheologica, Part I, q. 84, a. 2, that bringsout this fact clearly. Knowledge is per

formam, and its concept is the opposite ofthe concept of materiality. When forms existmaterially only immersed in matter there isno power of knowledge, as is the case inplants; but in proportion as the form of thething is possessed more immaterially, the moreperfect is the knowledge. Thus the intellectwhich has the form of the object freed frommatter and all individuating conditions is morecognoscitive than the senses which possess theform, without matter it is true, yet with mate-rial conditions. Even among the senses them-selves this principle is verified, for vision is the

24 Quod autem potest cognoscere aliqua, oportet ut nihileoruni habeat in sua natura, quia illud quod inesset ei natur-aliter, impediret cognitionem aliorum. Ibid., q. 75, a. 2.

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most cognoscitive because it is the least mate-


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rial; likewise among concepts the degree ofimmateriality regulates the degree of perfection.There is no break in the application of thisaxiom, it leads straight up to the highest know-able and the most perfectly knowing God Him-self. The idea of immateriality as here under-stood, contains the idea of activity; potentiaand matter are pratically one and are the op-posites of immateriality and actuality. 23 In Godthere is an utter absence of potentia and matter.He is characterized by the possession of theircontraries, and thus he is especially knowableand knowing. "Since God, therefore, is theopposite extreme of matter, since He is entirelyimmune from all potentiality, it follows that Heis especially knowable and especially know-ing." 26There are objects that are immaterial in

25 St. Thomas uses the phrase, non enim cognoscitur ali-quid secundum quod in potentia est, sed secundum quod estin actu, very frequently. He uses this quality of actuality

as a proof for the immaterialit}* of the soul. "The species ofmaterial things as they are in themselves are not intelligibleactu, because they are in matter. But as they are in theintellective human soul they are intelligible actu." Quodlibe-tum 3, a. 20.

i6 Quia Deus est in fine separationis a materia, cum abomni potentialitate sit penitus immunis, relinquitur, quodipse est maxitne cognoscitivus et maxime cognoscibilis, DeVeri., q. 2, a. 2.

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themselves and are knowable so far as theyare concerned, and there are objects that donot possess this quality but must be broughtto this condition before they are propria of themind. God, the spirit world including Angelsand the souls of men, our own thoughts and thethoughts of others as thoughts, come under thefirst class; the second class embraces what weordinarily understand by material objects. Weshall take up the question of God shortly.That Angels come under this term is evident to

all who accept the doctrine about Angels "some essences are sine materia as separatedsubstances which we call Angels." 27 The mindknows itself, and the content of the mindtogether with the mind itself is immaterial.From the fact that we perceive ourselves tounderstand we know that we have an intel-lectual soul, but to understand the nature ofthis soul there is need of a careful consideration a subtilis inquisitio. In this latter quest many


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have erred through a misunderstanding of theprinciple like is known by like. They perceivedthat they had a knowledge of material thingsand at once concluded that these objects werepresent to the soul materially, not recognizingthat the concepts of knowledge and immaterial-

27 Sum. Theol., I, q. 87, a. 1, ad 3.

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ity are opposites. Plato, as St. Thomas notes,rightly conceived the soul to be immaterial andits knowledge to be likewise immaterial, buthis explanation of this truth was not satis-factory. He introduced unnecessary elementsto account for this doctrine; he did not givethe intellect the power to render a materialobject immaterial, but held there were imma-terial ideas independent of the object, and thatit was these ideas or forms the mind knew.This theory is unlike that of St. Thomas, who

says, "everything intelligible is immune frommatter in se, or is abstracted from matter bythe operation of the intellect," yet it is theactual recognition of immateriality as arequisite for knowableness.

The knowledge the soul has of itself empha-sizes further this requisite of immateriality.St. Thomas holds that we have a two -foldknowledge of the soul an actual and habitualone. We can simply know of its existence, and we can also know of its nature two distinctpoints, "for many know they have a soul who

do not know what the soul is," 29 do not knowits nature. The soul becomes aware of itselfthrough its acts "one perceives that he hasa soul, and lives, and is, because he perceives

* De Veri, q. 13, a. 3.29 Ibid., q. 10, a. 9.

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himself to feel and understand and to exercise

the other functions of a life of this nature." 30 Thisreveals its existence; "what the nature of themind itself is, the mind can only perceive froma consideration of its object."" From a knowl-edge of its object, the soul comes to know itsown nature. " Our mind can not so understanditself that it can immediately apprehend itself,but from apprehending other things it comesto a knowledge of itself. . . From the fact thatthe human soul knows the universal natures of


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things, it perceives that the species by whichwe understand is immaterial ; otherwise itwould be individualized and thus never leadto a knowledge of the universal." 32 The soul

30 Aliquis percipit se animam habere et vivere et esse, quodpercipit se sentire et intelligere et alia hujusmodi vitae operaexercere. De Veri., q. 10, a. 8.

31 Ibid., q. 10, a. 8, ad 1.

St. Thomas appreciated the difficulty of arriving at a

knowledge of the nature of the soul. " Each one experiences

in himself that he has a soul and that the acts of the soul

take place within him, but to know the nature of the soul is

most difficult." De Yen'., q. 10, a. 8 ad 8. The same

applies to our knowledge ol the nature of God.

k

32 Unde mens nostra non potest se ipsam intelligere, ita

quod se ipsam immediate apprehendat ; sed ex hoc quod ap-prehendit alia, devenit in suam cognitionem. . . Ex hoc enimquod species qua intelligimus est immaterialis ; alias essetindividuata, et sic non duceret in cognitionem universalis.De Veri., q. 10, a. 8.

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knows the universal, the proper object of theintellect is the essence of material things, thisessence is immaterial, and the soul perceivingthis immaterial essence recognizes its ownimmaterial nature, for operation follows being,the act is in accord with its source.

The idea running through these principles is knowledge is a vital act, an assimilation ofsubject and object. The degree of activity regu-lates the degree of knowledge, of perfection ; this

goes on without a break until we reach the mostperfect knowledge in God. Before we considerthe knowableness of God, we must outline thefactors involved in the activity of intellectualknowledge in man. "There is, therefore, a per-fect and supreme grade of life, that of the intel-lect, for the intellect reflects upon itself andknows itself." 33 The human intellect though itcan know itself, begins its knowledge withexternal things ; it is inferior to the Angelic and


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Divine Intellects, but leads to a knowledge ofthem.

33 Est igitur supremus et perfectus gradus vitae, qui estsecundum intellectum ; nam intellectus in seipsum reflectitur,et seipsum intelligere potest. C. G., 1. 4, c. 11.

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SECTION II. THEORY OF INTELLECTUALKNOWLEDGE.

There are two kinds of knowledge in manarising from two sets of cognitive activity thesensory and the intellectual. 1 The latter is ofespecial importance in arriving at a knowledgeoi God, so we shall present the stages of intel-lectual knowledge as found in St. Thomas.

The human intellect is primarily and directly

concerned with being in its widest acceptation.More speeificially, it is busied with the essence ofmaterial things, the universal. This essence asit exists in material things is not in an imme-diate condition to be known, so there is a power,an intellectual activity, required to make itactually knowable or intelligible. This poweris the active intellect, which by its abstractivepower immaterializes the corporeal object andbrings to light the intelligible species. Thisspecies is the likeness of the object in its specificnature; it makes the object actually intelligibleand determines the intellect proper to know.

This summary statement can now be viewedin its parts.

"What is primarily and per se known by a

1 Homo cognoscit diversis viribus cognoscitivis omniarerum genera, intellectu quidem universalia et immaterialia,sensu singularia et eorporalia. Sum. TheoL, I, q. 57, a. 2.

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cognitive power is its proper object." "Butbeing is primarily in the conception of theintellect, for everything is knowable in so faras it is actual. . . Whence being is the properobject of the intellect, and thus it is the firstintelligible as sound is the first audible." Beingis here taken for actual and possible existence,"it comprehends all the differences and possible


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species of being, for whatever can exist can beunderstood." 4 As we are now constituted weare not concerned with all being directly, butwith being as found in material things. "Thefirst object of our intellect in our present exist-ence is not being and true of any sort, butbeing and true viewed in material things,through which we come to a knowledge ofall other things."' This passage contains the

2 Id quod est primo et per se cognitum a virtute cognosci-tiva est proprium ejus objectum. Sum. Theol, I, q. 85, a. 7.

3 Primo autetn in conceptione intellectus est ens : quiasecundum hoc unumquodque cognoscibile est, in quantumest actu. . . Unde ens est proprium objectum intellectus ; etsic est primum intelligibile sicut sonus est primum audibile.Sum. Theol , I, q. 5, a. 2.

4 Est enim proprium objectum intellectus ens intelligibile,quod quidem comprehendit omnes differentias et speciesentis possibililis ; quidquid esse potest intelligi potest. C. G.,

1, 2. c. 98.

6 Nee primum objectum intellectus nostri secundum prae-sentem statum est quodlibet ens et verum, sed ens et verumconsideratum in rebus materialibus, ex quibus in cogni-tionem omnium aliorum devenit. Sum. Theol., I, q. 87,a. 3 ad 1.

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fundamental and oft-repeated truth that we

start from material things as a basis andrise gradually to our most immaterial andmetaphysical concepts. 6

The specific or connatural object of theintellect is then the essence of material things."Through the intellect it is connatural to usto know natures that exist only in individualmatter, but not as they are in individualmatter but as they are abstracted from it byintellectual consideration. Thus the intellectenables us to know things of this nature asuniversal. And this is beyond the power of the

senses." The intellect deals with the universalwhich, however, is found in sensible objects,and this power makes it superior to the senses."Sensitive cognition is occupied with external,sensible qualities, but intellectual knowledge

6 Proprium autem intellectus est quidquid est in sub-stantia rei. Igitur quidquid intellectus de aliqua re cognoscit,


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cognoscit per cognitionem substantiae illius rei. . . Cognitiointellectus oritur a sensu. . . Quidquid igitur est in re, quodnon potest cognosci per cognitionem substantiae ejus, op-ortet esse intellectui ignotum. C. G., 1. 3, c. 56.

7 Unde per intellectum connaturale est nobis cognoscerenaturas quae quidem non habent esse nisi in materiaindividuali; non tamen secundum quod sunt in materiaindividual; sed secundum quod abstrahuntur ab ea perconsiderationem intellectus. Unde secundum intellectumpossumus cognoscere hujusmodi res in universali; quod estsupra facultatem sensus. Sam. Theol, I, q. 12, a. 4.

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penetrates to the very essence of the thing, forthe object of the intellect is the quiddity of athing. "' " The_43roj)er_ jobject proportioned toour intellect is the nature of a sensible thing." 9This principle rests upon the very nature ofman, his relation to matter. The knowableobject is proportionate to the knowing power.

This, power varies according to its connectionwith matter. Man makes use of a bodily organin knowing, thus he knows matter, but onlywhat is essential to it reaches his intellect asits proper concept. Essence is intelligible for usonly in so far as it is actualized, and it isactualized only in material things. Our mindhas a natural tendency to know the intelligibleessence, but it reaches it only through sensuousimages. "Operation is proportioned to powerand essence, but the intellectual in man restson the sensitive, and thence its proper operationis to understand the intelligible in the phantas-

mata (images

t 10

8 Cognitio sensitiva occupatur circa qualitates sensibilesexterioris, cognitio autem intellectiva penetrat usque adessentiam rei; objectum enim intellectus est quod quid est.Sum. Theol, 22% q. 8, a. 1.

9 Proprium objectum intellectui nostro proportionatum,est natura rei sensibilis. Ibid., I, q. S4-, a. 7.

10 Operatio proportionatur virtuti et essentiae ; intellec-tivum autem hominis est in sensitivo et ideo propria ejusest intelligere intelligibilia in phantasmatibus. De Memoriaet Reminiscentia, lect. 4.


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How is the mind to get at the universal, theintelligible in things, for this is its object.This question is answered by the theory of-a bstrac tion. The mind possesses a power__called active intellect by which it brings inevidence the universal or the intelligible in thething considered. The existence of such apower, its relation to what is called the passiveintellect, its function, and the result of its opera-tion, are all clearly set forth by St. Thomas.

Nothing is changed from the potential to theactual save through something that is actual.Intelligibility requires the object to be actual,individualizing matter is opposed to this know-ableness, thus there must be an activit}' in themind to draw from material things the essencethey contain. This is the active intellect. Ifuniversals had an existence independent ofmatter, as Plato held, then this power wouldbe unnecessary, for its sole purpose is to makeactually intelligible the universal existing in

material things. This power is then dependenton the doctrine that universals have a funda-inentum in re, in things themselves, and mustbe abstracted before they can become propriaof the mind. This power is so necessary that"without it man can understand nothing." 11 Yet

n De Veri., q. 1, a. 1 ad 3.

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it is not of such a nature as to constitutewhat we might call a distinct mind ; it is ratherclosely associated with the passive intellect.The latter is the intellectual faculty proper "the passive intellect is that by which manformally understands," 12 the former is intel-lectual activity. They are distinct in the sensethat we can ascribe different operations tothem, but not in the sense of radical separationand totally independent action. "In every actby which man understands, there is the con-

current operation of both active and passiveintellects." 13The basis for the distinction between these/ two powers rests on the relation of potencyand act in general. 14 The mind is viewed as apassive power, immaterial and destined to know

12 Be Aaitna, I. 3, lect 7.


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iS In omni actu quo homo intelligit, coneurrit operatiointellectus agentis et iutellectus possibilis Be Mente, a. 8,ad 11. Ladd's statement that the power that apprehendsthe universal is an "intellective soul" is incorrect, and leadshim to the following misconception: "This results in adivision of the faculties of the soul, which is wholly incon-sistent with his (Aquinas') maintenance elsewhere of thetrue view of the soul as one, but gifted with diverseenergies." Phil of Knowledge, p. 53. St. Thomas neverabandons the " true view of the soul as one, but giftedwith diverse energies."

14 "The active and passive intellects are diverse powers,as in all things there is an active and passive power." Sum.Theol., I, q. 79, a. 10. This is the fundamental thoughtin the Faculty Theory of the Scholastics ; the principle itselfis very extensive, operating throughout their whole system.

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the intelligible, which must be immaterial and

intelligible actu before it is an object of intel-lectual knowledge, "but the intelligible actu isnot something existing in rerum natura," 15 hencethere is need of an active power in the mind tobring about this intelligibility and actuallyaccount for the knowledge we possess. "Theact of the passive intellect is to receive theintelligible, the action or the active intellect isto abstract the intelligible." 16 In discussingthe general principles of knowledge, we sawthat there was both passivity and activityin the operation of knowing, that both subjectand object played a part in effecting knowledge.

Here we have the object in the phantasma orimagination acted upon by the active intellectand the result admitted by the passive intellect,as the intelligible in things. " The active intellectis a certain power of the soul extending itselfactively to the same things to which the passiveintellect extends itself receptively." ,? The formerenables the soul to "do all things" (omnia

''' Sum. TheoL, I, q. 79, a. 3 ad 3.

Jti Actus intellectus possibilis est recipere intelligibilia;actus intellectus agentis est abstrahere intelligibilia. Q. Dd.,De Anima, a. 4 ad 7.

17 Intellectus agens est. . virtus quaedam animae ad eademactive se extendens ad quae se extendit intellectus possibilisreceptive. Sum. TheoL, 1, q. 88, a. 1.


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facere), the latter to "become all things"(omnia fieri).

We have said that the purpose of this activeintellect is to bring out for the mind the realobject existing in material things, to abstractthe universal from them. It is an abstractivepower and exercises itself solely on the intelligi-ble in sensible things. "Everything is under-stood in so far as it is abstracted from matter

Schumacher Matthew Aloysius (1905) the Knowableness of God, Its Relation to the Theory of Knowledge...

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