Scholte ReasonCulture

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Reason and Culture: The Universal and the Particular Revisited

(American Anthropologist86 (4): 960-965, 1984)

Rationality and Relativism. Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes, eds. Cambridge,Mass.: MIT Press, 1982. viii + 312 pp. $12.50 (paper).

Bob Scholte

University of Amsterdam

Certain issues in cultural anthropology are fundamental and perennial. The

nature and scope of reason, its universality and relativity, is one of them. This

becomes even more evident if we include directly related problems: questions

of cross-cultural translation, ethnographic interpretation, and ethnological

explanation. These are also the central issues raised in Rationality and

Relativism. Before reviewing their theoretical significance and the different

options taken by the contributors to this stimulating volume, let me try to

place the issues in a historical perspective.

The editors informative introduction takes us a long way in this regard

though not far enough in my estimation After distinguishing between three

related issues moral, perceptual and conceptual relativism the editors

announce the central focus of their book conceptual relativism or, conversely

the truth of reason They locate the question of rationality on several historical

levels Most broadly as an issue that has preoccupied us since the

Enlightenment and the Romantic reaction. The editors might, however, have

gone further. The preoccupation with rationality actually dates from our disen-

chantment with myth as an explanatory model. We would thus have to go back

as far as Plato. He first defined the nature of academic knowledge and abstract

rationality-a definition wrought, with anthropological implications (see Diamond

1974).

The volumes constant reference to rationality in terms of science also

demands a reference to the twin philosophers who indirectly inspire most ofthe, contributors to the book(for it is lopsided in favor of rationalism): Ren


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Descartes and Roger Bacon. They are not discussed anywhere in the book

(though both are mentioned incidently) Instead the editors favor a narrower

historical framework Even Marx Weber, and Durkheim arepassed over in favor

ofcontemporary developments One could argue of course that space is limited

But the omission has significant consequences These absentee fathers of the

social sciences (like Vico before them and explicitly, in reaction to Descartes)

agonized over the possibilities; and limitations of reason, rationality,

rationalization, and so on especially in relation to scientific and technological

values and their sociological embodiment and normative implications. This

critical dimension is lacking, not only in the introduction, but in the book as a

whole. To put it another way, the contributors to Ra[961]tionality and

Relativism are eminently reasonable, but hardly empassioned. That has ad-

vantages and disadvantages. The issues are well argued and the positions

taken, sober. But I never got the sense that the contributors really go to the

actual root of the matter, that is, sufficiently radicalized the problem of

rationality in order to see it for what it is: an Occidental obsession. Yet one

would expect critical anthropologists and reflexive philosophers to do precisely

that.

The historical weight is placed on contemporary and multidisciplinary

developments surrounding the rationality debate. The semiotic dimension, for

instance, is given its due (at least as far as the Anglo-American variants are

concerned). The philosophy of language since Wittgenstein, including Quines

indeterminancy thesis, are crucial and find their anthropological analogue in

the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Even more directly related to the

intellectual-historical tradition in which this volume must be placed is Peter

Winchs (1958) historic reassessment of Evans-Pritchards interpretation of

Azande magic.

Interestingly enough, two important contemporary links are not

mentioned: one, the y rationalism of Levi-Strauss and the structuralist

movement generally; and, two, the recent interest in rationality and

anthropology exhibited by members of the so-called Frankfurter Schle (see

Habermas 1982; Wellmer 1980). Especially the latter connection would have

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necessitated a discussion of critical and normative issues, including the

legitimacy and implications of a developmental and evolutionary perspective on

rationality (in the volume under review, only Sperber refers to both structural

anthropology and developmental psychology, but he seems unaware of recent

German literature on the topic).

The editors also correctly point out that the rationality debate in cultural

anthropology is intimately tied to recent developments in the philosophy and

sociology of science (see Phillips 1977). In philosophy proper, they mention

Rortys recent work (1980) and his skepticism with regard to the rational

foundation of scientific knowledge. Another philosophical tradition that might

have been included, incidently, is the hermeneutical one, especially since

questions of translation and understanding are central to that tradition.

Moreover, the importance of hermeneutics- to the social sciences has been

amply documented recently (see, e.g., Rabinow and Sullivan 1979).

The most radical sociological challenge to scientific rationality is said to

derive from the so-called strong programme in the sociology of science. I

personally find the strong programme far less relativistic or antiscientific than

Hollis and Lukes (see, for example, Bloors concluding paragraphs inKnowledge and Social Imagery[Bloor 1976]) and I would also have given far

more weight to Paul Feyerabend and Thomas Kuhn than the editors or the

contributors do (see Scholte 1983). But it is nevertheless a significant step

forward to have an entire volume devoted to crucial anthropological issues that

pays proper attention to the pivotal contributions of the sociology and

philosophy of science. The book is worth the trouble on that score alone.

There are additional issues more specifically related to the recent history

of cultural anthropology, especially in Great Britain. Notwithstanding Kupers

inexplicable neglect of the rationality debate in his recently updated history of

the British school (Kuper 1983), that debate has been like a breath of fresh air

in the stuffy academic drawing rooms of the structural-functional

establishment. It all started, as I have said, with Evans-Pritchards

interpretation of Azande magic and Winchs important critique. Subsequent

reassessments appeared in two important books (Wilson 1970; Horton and

Finnegan 1973) as well as numerous articles in Philosophy of the Social

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Sciences and the Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford, Though

several important participants in the earlier debates did not contribute to

Rationality and Relativism (most notably Winch), most of them are back to

defend or to explicate their positions further. In other [962] words, the present

volume is most profitably read and assessed with the previous material in

mind.

What, precisely, is being debated in Rationality and Relativism and what

are the different positions taken by the respective contributors? The editors

introduction lucidly summarizes both the central issues and the differing

viewpoints. Three questions provide the key to the volumes content: Does the

rich and extensive evidence of apparently irrational beliefs require us to

accept relativism in any strong form?; In identifying beliefs, must we-indeed

can we-discriminate between those which are true and rational and those

which, in varying ways, are not?; and, If so, does the kind of explanation to

be sought vary with the category of belief explained or does it remain uniform

an symmetrical throughout? (p. 12).

The answers given to these questions indicate ones affinity to rationalism

or relativism The rationalist would answer no to the first, yes to the second,and he or she would favor the first of the two alternatives offered in question

three. The relativist, on the other hand, would answer yes to the first, no to

the second, and he or she would prefer the second alternative in question

three. Put in another way, the rationalist believes that universal standards of

reason exist and that they may be context-free and thus irreducibly) true.

Therefore, translation, interpretation, and explanation are in fact possible and

in principle true. The relativist, in contrast, believes that all standards of

reason are in the final analysis local and conventional and thus

context-dependent and reducible to identifiable sociocultural circumstances.

Therefore, translation, interpretation, and explanation are in fact partial and in

principle problematic.

Let me briefly summarize the reasons given and the arguments made by

the rationalists and the relativists respectively. Let me repeat that Rationality

and Relativism is by-and-large a volume for and by rationalists (both editors

adhere to this position, albeit in different degrees). I have therefore given the

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relativists a fairer treatment and a greater voice in my summary than they

receive in the book itself. I should add, in all fairness, that 1, too, am a

(reluctant) relativist.

There are essentially two types of argument for both positions. Lets call

them epistemological and substantive. The latter tries to give to rationalism or

relativism a specific content: a set of biological, historical, and cultural

characteristics. The former give procedural reasons why the one or the other

position is plausible, desirable, or necessary in order to do anthropology.

With regard to the epistemological argument, the rationalist makes in

excellent case- at least on the surface. Hollis, for example, argues that a priori

rational assumptions are required if we hope to do any anthropology at all.

That is, unless a communicative bridgehead is posited between ourselves and

others, no translation, interpretation, or explanation would be possible. If, in

other words, the anthropologists rationality would be radically

incommensurable with native rationality, understanding of whatever kind

would be precluded. As a result, ethnography would be impossible (Sperber,

pp. 149-180), as would the resultant ethnology (Gellner, pp. 181-200). One

might, in fact, be forced to deny the native any rationality whatsoever(Newton-Smith, pp. 106-122) and relativism, which preaches charity and

humanism, would in actual practice be neither. It would instead be incoherent

(Lukes, pp. 261-305) and self-subverting (Newton-Smith).

From a relativist point of view, the epistemological dangers of rationalism

far outweigh its superficial benefits. For when we ask the rationalist to define

the exact nature of this a priori and necessary bridgehead, we are either given

no definition at all (Hollis, pp. 67-86) or one that begs the question; for

example, If the natives reason logically, at all, then they reason as we do

(Hollis 1970:239). Even worse, as I shall show, the definitions of universal

reason that are proposed are either ethnocentric or totally abstract. Better

[963] to assume, as does the relativist, that rationality is multiple and diverse

and that all forms of logic are, in the final analysis, socio-logical or ethno-

logical (Barnes and Bloor, pp. 21-47, or see Scholte 1980).If the relativist is right, incommensurability must be accepted as the likely

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state of affairs in cultural anthropology. Perfect translation and exhaustive

explanation are impossible in the light of actual practice and concrete

experience (Barnes and Bloor). Communication and understanding, to the

extent that they may be said to take place at all, ire conditioned and

conditional achievements. In fact, in a certain sense, anthropology is not about

the other at all; it is more properly about us a metaphorical extension of

our own cultural resources (see Barnes 1974:183). Anthropology has in the

course of its history denied the other rational faculties or it has claimed for the

other a superior rationality. But the crucial point remains constant: we are the

ones who define what the other is or is not.

It follows that the charity and humanism that the rationalist now claims

for himself and denies to the relativist is in reality neither benevolent nor

humane. It is at most noblesse oblige. Moreover, noblesse oblige motivated by

self-interest, that is, generated a professional desire to enter into a dialogue

with the other. A dialogue, furthermore, initiated by us and defined in terms of

our own needs and purposes. Actually it is more a monologue.

The rationalist argument becomes even less convincing when we turn to

the substantive characteristics attributed to rationality. They are of three

kinds: epistemological (as substantive attributes of genuine knowledge),

historical (as stages in the development of human cognition), and cultural (as

traits of rationally privileged societies). Let me examine and criticize them in

turn.

For the rationalist, Western scientific method however incomplete in

fact is in theory the ideal vehicle for the eventual achievement of true

rationality (Hacking, pp. 8-66). Only scientific method rests on the requiredepistemological dualism of false and rue belief and on the necessary distinction

between the context of discovery and the context of verification. Happily, the

rationalist also finds that reality is actually constituted in accordance with the

prerequisites of his method: fact exist independently (Hollis, pp. 7 -86), thus

guaranteeing an observational core (Newton-Smith, pp. 106-122) that permits

detached understanding (Taylor, pp. 87-105). Even more fortunately, all this is

said rest on irrefutable ontological grounds: innate dispositions (Horton, pp.

201-260), primary theories (Lukes, pp. 261-305), and neurological constants

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(Horton again). And that werent enough, we can always refer to the sine qua

non of rationality in action: its universal payoff (Taylor) or, what amounts to

the same thing, its success over time (Newton-Smith).

The relativist might counter in numerous ways, none of them very

thoroughly represented in this volume. One could argue, for instance, that

scientific method is merely one F several legitimate means of acquiring

knowledge and that, as one among a number of changing symbolic forms, it is

comparable to other symbolic forms (symmetrical in terms of the third

question raised above). In that case the distinction between genesis and

verification is simply ad hoc or post hoc, that is, descriptive of the belief

system held rather than an a priori, inherent, or necessary property of

rationality tout court.

Furthermore, reality as constituted by the rationalist confirms what the

relativist has always maintained: that the factual depends on a theory of

facticity, that what is considered an observational core is paradigmatically

generated, and that detached understanding or context-free knowledge is in

fact historically and culturally mediated (what the critical sociologist would call

an Erkenntnisinteresse).

Finally, the relativist might argue that what is considered a biological

constant is also culturally generated and potentially no less ethnocentric than

the ideologies of payoff, [964] success, maximalization, self-interest, or

whatever. Upon critical reflection, biological constants have proven to be

something else entirely: ideological constructs. Law and order in nature

become scientific means to rationalize law and order in society (see Elias

1974). In any event, we should not fall back on would-be neurological

constants without radical contextual and thus anthropological critique. Even

relativists, it must be said, are not always consistent in this regard. For

example, both Wittgenstein and Winch anchor their arguments in the final

analysis on a biological infrastructure.

The historical and cultural arguments of the rationalist are, from a

relativist point of view, even more explicitly ethnocentric or, at the very least,

distinctly evolutionistic. Horton, for example, continues a line of argument he

had previously made to describe both the continuities and discontinuities

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between traditional and modern modes of thought (see Horton 1967). Despite

the fact that his present position is more subtle and self-critical than his

previous one, he does not measurably alter his conviction that the West has

developed cognitive proclivities that the Rest did not. Whether we inoffensively

phrase these developments in terms of styles of thought (like Hacking, pp.

48-66, or Horton himself) or more judgementally in terms of cumulative

cognitive capacities (Gellner, pp 181-200), the crucial point is clear:

rationalism entails evolutionism. The transition from traditional to modern

thought is not only marked by technological success (Taylor), the

scientific/rationalist Weltanschauung presupposes precisely those cultural traits

that our own societies exhibit in such abundance: heterogeneity,

competitiveness, critical monitoring, progress and order, regularity,

predictability, and writing (Horton and Gellner).

The relativist might argue that the rationalist has resurrected familiar and

question able dichotomies between us and them-dichotomies, moreover,

that are never innocently descriptive but quite judgemental and self-serving.

Take writing as an example. Why should ordinary language and oral discourse

be equated with stone-age metaphysics (Horton, p. 236) while the written

word-the pillar of Judeo-Christian and Occidental logos--be equated with open

societies and critical reflection (Gellner, p. 194)? Written discourse, whatever

its merits, is an ambiguous virtue (see Goody 1977). Unlike oral performance,

writing is, after all, an abstract competence that cannot be directly challenged.

Its author is hidden. It is in that sense less rather than more critical compared

to oral discourse (see Ong 1982). Moreover, writing generates-

abstractcategories that may in turn function as political means to order and co -opt the

concrete other (see Asad 1979; Said 1979). Lvi-Strauss, an unlikely critic of

rationalism, repeatedly emphasized this relation between power and writing,

adding: When we make an effort to understand, we destroy the object of our

attachment, substituting another whose nature is quite different (Levi-Strauss

1955:394). In other words, rationality as epistemocide the crucial issue that

this otherwise stimulating volume leaves totally unilluminated.

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REFERENCES CITED

Asad, Talal

1979 Anthropology and the Analysis of Ideology. Man 14:607-627.

Barnes, Barry

1974 Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory. London: Routledge

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Bloor, David

1976 Knowledge and Social Imagery. London: Routledge& Kegan Paul.

Diamond, Stanley

1974 In Search of the Primitive: A Critique of Civilisation. New Brunswick,

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Elias, Norbert

1974 The Sciences: Towards a Theory. In Social Processes of Scientific

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Goody, Jack1977 The Domestication of the Savage Mind. N.Y.: Cambridge

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Hollis. Martin

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Kuper, Adam

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Phillips, Derek L.

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Scholte, Bob

1980 Anthropological Traditions: Their Definitions. In Anthropology:

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Wellmer, Albrecht

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