HAL Id: halshs-00735817https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00735817

Submitted on 26 Sep 2012

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open accessarchive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-entific research documents, whether they are pub-lished or not. The documents may come fromteaching and research institutions in France orabroad, or from public or private research centers.

L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, estdestinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documentsscientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,émanant des établissements d’enseignement et derecherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoirespublics ou privés.

From Mutual denegation to Mutual RecognitionYves Schemeil

To cite this version:Yves Schemeil. From Mutual denegation to Mutual Recognition. Cosmopolis, 2009, pp.1-16. <halshs-00735817>

!"#$%&'(#)#*+,% -./0)%12324+%5#6#743*06%30%12324+%8#'076*3*069%:;<=>;<%?4/36#/$(*@% *6%

A/4B#%46B%C30),D%E0$)0@0+*$,%:0F%G%H&0@(*4%I6*"#/$*3J,%;/4B243#%?/07/4)%*6%>63#/643*064+%

8#+43*06$,%14/'(%KLLMN,%@@F%OPOQF%

%

%

CR&A8CEA9% !"#$% &'(#)#*+,% -./0)% 12324+% 5#6#743*06% 30% 12324+% 8#'076*3*069% :;<=>;<%

?4/36#/$(*@%*6%A/4B#%46B%C30)D%

%

>63#/70"#/6)#634+%</746*S43*06$% H>;<N% 4'3% *6% 4%T0/+B% U/4)#B% VJ%643*064+% $343#$% *6%T(*'(%

:0670"#/6)#634+% </746*S43*06$% H:;<N% 4+$0% '0)@#3#% VJ% )#46$% 0U% 4B"0'4'J% 46B%

*)@+#)#6343*06% 0U% 60/)$%46B%@0+*'*#$F% % 5#$@*3#% 3(#*/% B*$$*)*+4/*3*#$% 46B% 3(#% '06U/06343*06%

3(43%$0)#3*)#$%34W#$%@+4'#%V#3T##6%>;<%46B%:;<,%3(#J%4+$0%'0++4V0/43#F% % A0%3#$3%3(*$%)0B#+%

0U%'00@#/43*06,%3(*$%@4@#/%#X4)*6#$%3(#%U*#+B$%0U%'0))#/'#%HY0/+B%A/4B#%</746*S43*06N%46B%

3(#%430)%H>63#/643*064+%C30)*'%Z6#/7J%C7#6'JN%46B%$(0T$%3(43%$3/43#7*'%'00@#/43*06%V#3T##6%

>;<%46B%:;<%34W#$%3(#%$(4@#%0U%-)2324+%/#'076*3*06,D%4%U0/)%0U%'0++4V0/43*06%3(43%*$%*)@+*'*3,%

*6U0/)4+,% 46B% 4$J))#3/*'F% % E06B*3*06$% U0/% $2'(% $2''#$$U2+% '00@#/43*06% *6'+2B#% $2UU*'*#63%

:;<%$@#'*4+*S43*06%06%3(#%*$$2#$%4BB/#$$#B%VJ%3(#%34/7#3#B%>;<%46B%6#3T0/W%V2*+B*67%4)067%

:;<%30%U4'*+*343#%[0*63%4'3*06F% % 5*UU#/#6'#$%V#3T##6%3(#%3T0%'4$#$%4/#%4+$0%#X4)*6#B,%46B%4%

V/04B#/%4''0263%0U%3(#%@0$$*V*+*3J%0U%'00@#/43*06%V#3T##6%$2'(%26+*W#%26*3$%*$%4+$0%@/0@0$#BF%

From Mutual Denegation to Mutual Recognition: NGO / IGO partnership in

Trade and Atom1

Yves Schemeil

(Institut d’Etudes politiques, Grenoble, and Institut Universitaire de France ;

Visiting professor, Sophia University![2008-2009])

Introduction

Intergovernmental Organizations (IGO) are active in a world framed by national states –

a world where their decisions and non decisions are also contested by Nongovernmental

Organizations (NGO). Therefore, IGO are squeezed between two powerful stakeholders:

governments may belong to the past, but they still keep a last resort capacity to validate

multilateral resolutions; advocacy coalitions may have to wait to play a role in the future but

they already urge international institutions to fully endorse emerging norms and duly

implement adopted policy measures2. That so many IGO manage to resist cross pressures of

this sort in the long run is a challenge to most IR theories.

In this paper, I shall not address the relationships between states and IGO, nor the

competition or cooperation between IGO themselves: I limit the discussion to the confrontation

between intergovernmental organizations and their nongovernmental challengers. Assuming

that collaboration between “unlike units” (Waltz) is not natural in a state of anarchy, it is

nonetheless true that international bodies do collaborate in spite or their variety. Since IGO and

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%1 A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the International Studies Association 49th Annual

Convention, San Francisco, 25-28 March 2008.

K % \2334,% \04'(*),% R0V% 8#*64+B4,% 46B% R#/3[46% ]#/V##WF,% >63#/643*064+% 0/746*S43*06$% 46B%

>)@+#)#6343*06,%^06B06,%8023+#B7#%KLL_F%

NGO are still more dissimilar than great powers and weak states are, it is worth testing the

theoretical prediction that they, too, must cooperate.

To test this assumption, I shall review the softest and the hardest possible examples of

such collaboration: commerce and security. Kantian and Hobbesian visions of IR – the

institutional and liberal explanations on the one hand opposed to various sorts of realisms on the

other hand – seem best documented, respectively, by the WTO and the IAEA. Moreover, these

two agencies have achieved some degree of enforcement with little equivalent in peer

institutions – the WTO through its “dispute settlement mechanism”, the IAEA via its

“additional protocol”.

The exemplarity of the WTO and the IAEA also stems from the fact that despite the

technicality of their mandate they address broader and sensitive issues like the opposition

between the haves and the have-nots. Both are dedicated to the current redrafting of the social

contract between the affluent and the deprived – i.e., the rich and the poor within the WTO; or

the nuclear powers and the non-nuclear ones within the IAEA. In both agencies, there is a deep

asymmetry between ordinary members and the founding fathers (the “four major trade

powers”; the “ten most advanced in the technology of atomic energy”). The former are

increasingly tempted to contest the original situation, and depart from the juridical obligations

to which they once consented at a time they were much weaker than now. The United States of

America and the European Union, as well as Japan (within the WTO) and Russia plus China (in

the IAEA) are therefore pressed to relinquish some of their privileges by emerging commercial

(Brazil, India, Korea) or nuclear (Iran, Pakistan, India, South Africa) states. Impatience in the

South is growing since the North is years away from agriculture’s deregulation and nuclear

disarmament.

There is one more similarity between the two agencies that especially matters for this

paper3: contrary to the UN, they tend to accredit very few NGO. Of course, from time to time

both invite some non governmental stakeholders to a “seminar” (WTO) or a “forum” (IAEA),

but these events on which more will be said later are too loudly celebrated by the organizations’

websites to be considered routine. Additionally, visits to their headquarters show that going

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%3 Actually, they share other characteristics as well, like having been created later that most other multilateral

agencies (1957 for the IAEA; 1994 for the WTO). However, their staff shows an equal reluctance to acknowledge

any similarities between the two institutions.

along with NGO is not on the top of their agenda: raising the issue in face-to-face interviews

generates embarrassment if not confusion. There seems to be no ready made answer on the role

played by NGO in the organization’s life. No list of accredited nongovernmental organizations

can be produced, contrary to the UN4. Some NGO are even banned from the decision-making

system at any level since they are perceived as hostile, not only by the IGO staff, but also by its

member states that are little tolerant towards outsiders’ watch5.

Comparing the WTO and the IAEA – a non UN and a UN agency – is therefore an

appropriate way to test a global model of interaction between international actors that was

designed in another context to explain cooperation and competition between IO!(international

organizations)6

. The model predicts that full cooperation between the three types of

stakeholders in world affairs is inevitable: national states, IGO, and NGO must collaborate on a

permanent basis and should increasingly do so. Even governmental and intergovernmental

agents will opt for closer relationships with specific non governmental ones when alternative

strategies do not suffice to consolidate their position in the international system.

However convenient they are to explore strategic interaction between IGO and NGO,

both cases have their limits, too. For instance, their perimeter of action is blurred since

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%4 A prominent staff member of IAEA recently declared that “IAEA not being a UN Agency has it own rules on

NGO relations; for many years only technical or industry bodies had been accredited, but in recent years the type

of NGO had been expanded (e.g. Greenpeace is now accredited).” [CONGO Board meeting, Vienna, August

22-23, 2006, available at http://www.ngocongo.org/files/minutes_of_congoboard_vienna_aug_2006doc.doc]. 5 Although these two organizations have similar privileges that distinguish them from other international

institutions, we must keep in mind that their scope of action is not similar. The WTO imposes change in trade

policies because its internal Appellate Body is a supreme court that can authorize major retaliatory measures

against members that are reluctant to comply with its verdicts. On the contrary, prior to any sanction the IAEA

must rely on an external institution, the UN Security Council, for possible endorsement and follow-up of its

recommendations. In spite of this, few organizations are as influential. The only examples that come to mind are:

the WIPO arbitration system whose decisions on domain name assignments are uncontested; the Wassenaar

agreement against chemicals dual-use and light weapons that achieved some success in a comprehensive ban of

both; the recently established tribunals, like the International Criminal Court – but all have their shortcomings.

Q% A(*$% )0B#+% (4$% V##6% B#$*76#B% *6% ;/#60V+#% B2/*67% B*$'2$$*06% T*3(% $'(0+4/$% $@#'*4+*S#B% *6%

*63#/643*064+% $32B*#$% V#% 3(#J% @#/)46#63% H+*W#% Y0+UP5*#3#/% ZV#/T#*6N% 0/% [2$3% "*$*3*67% H4$% R0V%

8#*64+B4NF%&#"#/4+%T0/W*67%@4@#/$%(4"#%V##6%B/4U3#B%$0% U4/,%46B%@2V+*'43*06% *$%@#6B*67F%<6#% *$%

4+/#4BJ%0239%&'(#)#*+,%!"#$,%-ZX@#/3*$#%46B%?0+*3*'4+%E0)@#3#6'#9%E06$#6$2$%14W*67%T*3(*6%3(#%

Y0/+B%A/4B#%46B%3(#%Y0/+B%1#3#0/0+07*'4+%</746*S43*06$D,%@@F%__P`M,%*6%R0V%8#*64+B4%46B%R#/3[46%

]#/V##W,%5#'*$*06P14W*67%Y*3(*6%>63#/643*064+%</746*S43*06$,%^06B06,%8023+#B7#,%KLLaF%

commerce is confused with finance, whereas non-proliferation is mistaken for disarmament.

Therefore, more NGO are involved in the public debate launched by the WTO and the IAEA

than should be normally the case in terms of actual expertise, a fact that complicates data

finding. To the opposite, usual caveats are not as problematic here as they may be elsewhere:

interviews are easy to organize, discussions are long and lively, questions are answered

sincerely and exhaustively, and censorship is nonexistent.

This paper is organized as follows: first, I present a theoretical model of cooperation

with three hypotheses: (HYP 1) cooperation between IGO and NGO is possible in spite of the

theoretical problems raised by such possibility, and despite mutual denegation that it happens at

all at both ends; (HYP 2) strategic cooperation between IGO and NGO is of limited scope, and

it takes the shape of “mutual recognition” – a form of collaboration which is not explicit but

implicit, not formalized but informal, and not symmetric but asymmetric; (HYP 3) conditions

for a successful cooperation between IGO and NGO are: firstly, sufficient NGO specialization

on the issues addressed by the targeted IGO; secondly, network building among NGO to

facilitate joint action. In the second part of the paper, I test and probe these hypotheses on the

World Trade Organization and the International Atomic Energy Agency: each is actually

surrounded by a cob-webbed sort of partnership with the NGO active in its field, but only the

WTO managed to establish a partnership with them. I close the section with a brief review of

factors that may account for the differences between the two partnerships. In a third part, I try to

give a broader account of the possibility of cooperation between unlike units.

Part 1. Towards a new look at cooperation and institutionalization in world politics

In international studies, cooperation is an enigma. It is difficult to tell why states should

cooperate, and even more difficult to explain why they establish international institutions and

consolidate them once the initial conditions that led to their creation disappear. The perfect

example of such resilience is NATO, operating in Afghanistan against the Taliban after the fall

of the Berlin Wall and the correlate dismantling of the Warsaw Pact. For a counter example, the

UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva is permanently contested and could not only be

reformed, as was recently the case, but shut down, as periodically demanded by human rights

activists. However, even though states have more leeway in international politics than on the

domestic stage to close an agency, they rarely do it: Germany, Japan, and Italy did leave the

League of Nations, but the US and the UK pulled out temporarily from UNESCO.

Inertia may be attributed to resilient bureaucracy7, or to adaptive strategy. Since each

organization’s legitimacy is reinforced by the gains in reputation of neighboring institutions

with which it collaborates, cooperation between organizations is a better guarantee of their

survival than routinely servicing their members’ cause in international negotiations. For IGO,

obsolescence, irrelevance, or dereliction are major threats; and the most appropriate way to

avoid such a bleak perspective is to generate new assignments. The problem stems from the

simultaneity of such moves: since every IGO tends to enhance the scope of its activities, they

inevitably interfere with each other. Do they have options? They do not: if they enlarge their

mandate, they create redundancy; if they don’t, they risk obsolescence. At any rate, they must

willy-nilly associate with their very competitors, at the risk of empowering their rivals, and

enhancing their competitors’ relative relevance.

This sort of collaboration is strategic because it is both calculated, and kept to a

minimum8: it is rational, and not emotional; instrumental, and not expressive; cautious, and not

bold; discrete, and not public. As such, it is better depicted by rational choice than

functionalism: the cooperative trend is also a cognitive turn. Stakeholders learn how to adjust to

globalization, and build up cognitive skills to resist its subversive effects on institutions that

were designed nearly (or more than) a century ago. This does not validate RC!(rational choice)

as the best possible paradigm in IR, since, as already said, IGO strategists have actually no

choice: they must “cooperate or perish” (which, in that particular case, means being dismantled

or merged with rivals). Moreover, organizational constraints are so strong that they tend to

convert rational calculation into a collective, diffuse, and bounded rationality: our hypothesis is

that the interactivity and mutual adjustment at the root of IGO!external decision-making cannot

be fully utilitarian, individual, and egoistic. By referring to “rational” choice, we simply point

out the “logic of consequentiality” and its impact on the emergence of cooperative attitudes,

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%7 As in Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global

Politics, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2004, 226 p.

`% C$%*6%Y*++*4)%bF%8*W#/,%A(#0/J%0U%?0+*3*'4+%E04+*3*06$,%!4+#%I6*"#/$*3J%?/#$$,%OMQKF% %

whereas the “logic of appropriateness” is still effective when opting for going it alone instead of

going along is at stake9.

Finally, strategic cooperation is also multifold: four cooperative styles can be identified,

that may be adopted separately, or simultaneously: mandate enlargement and its derivatives:

uncontrolled overlap, controlled overlap, nesting, and mutual recognition10

.

The rationale behind mandate enlargement is trivial: to fight irrelevance, secretariats are

always looking for new ventures. Most just trim the aging parts of their mandate and define

more fashionable goals: the WMO, for instance, progressively added to its core activity –

weather forecast –, the conservation of rare water and the mitigation of climate change (it is

now the “Weather, Water, and Climate” section of the UN). In this process, IGO’s staff

members display a tremendously imaginative propensity to endorse emerging norms and apply

them to their field. Examples abound, from the “precautionary principle” to “education for all”,

“food security”, “traditional, knowledge” or “creative heritage”. This language is not only

weird; it also pre-empts a realm of competence, evincing the contestants that cannot catch up

with the pace of change, and disclaiming future competition. However, “parametric” overlap11

resulting from simultaneous and contradictory initiatives with no consideration for the impact

of one’s decisions on the other, and with no coordination whatsoever leads to duplication and

waste. To avoid this undesirable outcome, it must be controlled. In this case, mandate

enlargement stops at the doorsteps of potential partners’ benchmark activities. The WMO race

to enlargement, for instance, includes water management but leaves apart river basins’ issues as

well as depletion of non-hydraulic environmental resources since powerful institutions or

regional organizations claim responsibility in these realms12

.

In this race to the enlargement of their initial mandate, IGO increase the likeliness that

they may face new challengers coming from the nongovernmental sector. It raises new

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%M% R03(%'06'#@3$%4/#%B*$'2$$#B%*6%\4)#$%;F%14/'(%46B%\0(46%?F%<+$#6,%8#B*$'0"#/*67%>6$3*323*06$9%

A(#%</746*S43*064+%R4$*$%0U%?0+*3*'$,%:#T%!0/W,%./##%?/#$$,%OM`M,%KK_%@F% %10 Since this theoretical design was elaborated during an empirical survey of dozens of organizations – that are

counted by the hundreds – the possibility to find several additional strategies when other IGO are reviewed cannot

be discarded. 11 To quote Charles Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy, New York, The Free Press, 1965, 352 p. 12 In Sub-Saharan Africa, the NEPAD, the African Union, the International Commission on Large Dams and the

World Commission on Dams are expected to keep control of such schemes, although they lack the hydraulic

expertise provided by the WMO.

opportunities for NGO that gained reputation in very specialized fields to coalesce and address

broader issues together – and this is precisely what these organizations themselves need to

survive. Since size is of the essence, to make the grade with IGO despite differences in purpose,

status, scope, and funding, large NGO networks must be built. Once established, they hold

“international partners’ conferences” whose statements are endorsed by dozens of participant

organizations, then disseminated via each NGO’s website (with links to each other’s

publications). The network puts tremendous pressure on a targeted IGO, until it releases

classified information about sensitive issues, or amends its decisions. Conversely, IGO adapt to

this new context, they learn how to control the information that they let circulate among NGO,

and to pay lip service to their cause without changing the substance or their resolutions.

According to this explanatory model of collaboration between international

stakeholders, the WTO and the IAEA are each flanked by a constellation of NGO working

closely together on a series of related issues (intellectual property and access to drugs; nuclear

safety and access to radiotherapy). In this process, NGO specialize, and division of labour

eventually brings about a powerful advocacy coalition made of policy networks, activist groups,

and epistemic communities. The multi-positioning of prominent scientists, experts, jurists,

economists, physicians, is a guarantee that demands will be heard and recommendations

examined. Time after time solid connections are established on a piecemeal basis between

NGO and IGO, even though a full organizational partnership is not yet reached. The

relationships between these strategic “partners” are both positive and negative, and critics are

frequently exchanged at the two ends. However, the overall legitimacy of the spokespersons, if

not the legitimacy of the entire organization on behalf of which they issue statements and make

recommendations, is greatly increased. This is a sort of cross-validation of each organization’s

claims, within the constraints that must be accepted by both partners: respect for the other and

open-mindedness towards the opinions expressed provided they are conveyed with a minimum

honesty on the IGO side, and with sufficient professionalism, on the NGO side. Furthermore,

mutual recognition is an additional instance of the “strength of weak ties”, or an example of

loose ties that complement stronger links between IGO, and between their member states when

it is not possible to adopt a more cooperative and more enduring strategy.

I shall now focus on this IGO/NGO’s empowerment strategy in the two selected cases.

Part 2. Mutual recognition: the ultimate resource in strategic cooperation?

The WTO and the IAEA became really prominent after the end of the Cold War, as if both came

to the fore simultaneously and promised a brighter future to the peoples of the world. Actually,

each puts “peace” at the heart of its activities: “commerce helps to keep the peace” is the first of

the ten benefits expected from the WTO; “atoms for peace” are the IAEA raison d’être.

From its creation, the WTO came under severe critics from which its predecessor, the

GATT, was exempt. This difference is probably due to a coincidence between the birth of the

new trade organization and the emergence of a so-called “international civil society”. It may

also stems from the capitalist nature of commerce once communism lost the last war: the

newborn organization emerged just in time to be the scapegoat of an unfair distribution of

economic resources between North and South. As for the IAEA, although it existed for nearly

four decades when the Marrakech agreements were signed, the agency was less exposed to

criticism since its very existence remained somewhat hidden. In spite of its dealing with the

most threatening issues for the planet – until ozone layer depletion and greenhouse effect

became known – the IAEA lived a discreet life in Vienna, far from the seats of most IGO

headquarters. Fame came with the Gulf war, when inspections of possible nuclear sites in Iraq

were under the spotlights.

In recent years, addressing NGO assessments of IGO activities became nonetheless

normatively correct within the two IGO themselves. Moreover, NGO in the field became

depicted as “allies in the fight”, actors whose “usefulness” had been proved by their own

achievements in the realm of disarmament13

. The sudden popularity of references to NGO

within IGO does not imply that the latter are fully open to cooperation with the former: it simply

means that talking cooperation and trying to organize or to contain it is now considered

inevitable at both ends.

A(#%Y0/+B%A/4B#%</746*S43*06F%52#%30%+4'W%0U%$@4'#,%>%$(4++%60T%7*"#%4%'+0$#/%+00W%43%06#%0U%3(#%

'0263+#$$% YA<c$% 4'3*"*3*#$% 06+J,% *63#++#'324+% @/0@#/3J% H>?NOaF% Y*3(*6% 3(#% 0/746*S43*06,% 3(#%

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%13 Rhianna Tyson, “Reframing the Debate against Nuclear Weapons”, IAEA Bulletin, 46/2, 2004. 14 Most empirical data were collected by Rachel Polaud during the completion of her Ph.D. thesis on this topic,

under my supervision. I am grateful to her for authorizing me to use her findings. I made additional interviews

A8>?&% '0))*33##% *$% *6% '(4/7#%0U% 3(*$%B*)#6$*06%0U% '0))#/'#d% *3% *$% V#J06B%B02V3% 3(#%)0/#%

'063#$3#B%V0BJ%0U%3(#%0/746*S43*06F%C''0/B*67%30%3(#%3#X3$,%'063/4B*'30/J%@/*6'*@+#$%4@@+J%30%

>?9% 3(#% -$@#'*4+% 46B% B*UU#/#63*43#% 3/#43)#63D% '+42$#,% @+2$% 3(#% -V*0B*"#/$*3J=$0'*0B*"#/$*3JD%

'+42$#%06%3(#%06#%(46Bd%46B%3(#%-06#%$*S#%U*3$%4++D%'+42$#%4$%T#++%4$%-U/##%3/4B#%U*/$3D,%06%3(#%

03(#/%(46BF%&*)@+J%@23,%3(*$%*$%4%@#/)46#63%$02/'#%0U%$3/*U#%U0/%)#)V#/%$343#$%3/J*67,%$4J,%30%

@/0"*B#% '*3*S#6$%T*3(%@(4/)4'#23*'4+%B/27$%43%46%4UU0/B4V+#%@/*'#d%46B% 30%423(0/*S#%0/%V46%

;1<%*6%47/*'2+32/#F%A(*$%*$%#X4'3+J%T(#/#%:;<%(4"#%4%T#B7#9%V#U0/#%'06$#63*67%30%U/##%3/4B#%

@0+*'*#$% 3(#J% '4++% U0/% U2++% /#$@#'3% 0U% #"#/J% @/*6'*@+#% #)V0B*#B% *6% 4% $34323#F% A(#J% B#)46B% 4%

@/#+*)*64/J%/#"*#T%0U%4++%@0$$*V+#%*)@4'3$%0U%U/##%3/4B#%06%@0@2+43*06$F%A(#J%T463%30%U*6B%023%

(0T%46B% 30%T(*'(%#X3#63%'0))#/'#%'46%4UU#'3%(#4+3(,% '/#43*"*3J,%46B% *6'0)#% *6% 3(#%@00/#$3%

'0263/*#$F%A(#J% /#[#'3% 3(#% $0P'4++#B% -(4/)06*S43*06%0U%@43#63$D%46B%$2@@0/3% 30% 3(#%0@@0$*3#%

@0+*'J% -U+#X*V*+*3JD% e% *63#/@/#3*67% +#74+% B0'2)#63$% 46B% 3/#43*$#$% 4''0/B*67% 30% @4/3*'2+4/%

'063#X3$F% %

A(#% 06+J% T4J% 30% )4W#% $2/#% 3(43% U/##B0)% 46B% [2$3*'#% 4/#% '0)@43*V+#% *$% U0/% :;<%

/#@/#$#6343*"#$%30%#$'4@#%@+#64/J%$#$$*06$%46B%U/#f2#63%-T0/W*67%7/02@$D%3(43%4/#%4++#7#B+J%

)0/#% /#$@06$*"#% 30% 4B"0'4'JF% C% '02@+#% 0U% 4/3*'+#$% 0U% 3(#% A8>?&!H3/4B#P/#+43#B% 4$@#'3$% 0U%

*63#++#'324+%@/0@#/3J%/*7(3$N%47/##)#63$%(4"#%3(#/#U0/#%V##6%B*$'2$$#B,%3(#6%/#*63#/@/#3#B%VJ%

$2'(% 7/02@$% e% +*W#% 4/3*'+#% K_% H06% 3(#% @/03#'3*06% 0U% /#'#63% *6"#63*06$% 46B% 3(#% 603% J#3%

7/46BU43(#/#B% -B*$'0"#/*#$D,% 3(43%)4J% /#$2+3% U/0)% 3/4B*3*064+% 2$#% 0/% 6#T% 2$#% 0U% 3(#% $4)#%

B/27NF%<3(#/$%(4"#%V##6%4)#6B#B,%+*W#%4/3*'+#$%GL%H+*$3*67%#X#)@3*06$%30%@43#63%/2+#$N%46B%GO%

HU/4)*67%3(#%/*7(3%30%*$$2#%-'0)@2+$0/J%+*'#6$#$D%46B%+#74+*S*67%3(#%2$#%0U%7#6#/*'%B/27$NF%A(*$%

*$% '+#4/+J% 4% "*6B*'43*06% 0U% :;<% '+4*)$9% $*6'#% OMMM,% $#"#/4+% 0/746*S43*06$% (4B% +426'(#B% 4%

T0/+BT*B#% *6U0/)43*06% '4)@4*76% 06% V03(% 30@*'$F% A(#% E?% A#'(% T#V$*3#% 46B% 3(#% g24W#/$c%

3/4*6*67%E#63#/%T#/#% *64272/43#B% 3(43% "#/J% J#4/F% C$% 4% '06$#f2#6'#,% #*7(3% J#4/$% +43#/% 3(#%

YA<%'02+B%#X@/#$$%*3$%@/*B#%30%0/746*S#%3(#%3(*/B%T0/W$(0@%U0/%B#+#743#$%-4*)#B%30%#6$2/#%

3(43%3(#%@4/3*'*@463$%(4"#%3(#%*6U0/)43*06%6#'#$$4/J%$0%3(43%3(#*/%'0263/*#$%'46%)4W#%2$#%0U%

3(#%A8>?&%C7/##)#63c$%U+#X*V*+*3*#$%U0/%@2V+*'%(#4+3(%@2/@0$#$DOhF%

% b0T%T4$%$2'(%46%4'(*#"#)#63%@0$$*V+#i%&*6'#%:;<%$@0W#$@#/$06$%4/#%0/%T#/#%4+$0%

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%between 2000 and 2007 that helped me draw a broader depiction of the issue. 15 WTO website, 7 December 2007 (emphasis mine).

-'06$2+3463$D%U0/%>;<%e%46B%(4B%3(#%0@@0/326*3J%30%V#%43%+#4$3%06'#%'+0$#+J%4$$0'*43#B%T*3(%3(#%

YA<,% 3(#% I:EAC5,% 3(#% Yb<,% 0/% 3(#% Y>?<% e% 3(#J% W6#T% (0T% 30% U/4)#% 3(#*/% '+4*)$% *6%

4''#@34V+#%3#/)$%U0/%>;<%$34UU%)#)V#/$%46B%70"#/6)#63$c%/#@/#$#6343*"#$F%.0/%*6$346'#,%4$%

$006% 4$% 3(#% J#4/% KLLL,% \4)#$% ^0"#% H06% V#(4+U% 0U% 3(#% A/46$43+463*'% E06$2)#/% 5*4+072#N%

#X@/#$$#B% 26#X@#'3#B% '06'#/6$% U0/% B/27% B#"#+0@#/$c% U*646'*4+% +0$$#$,% 46B% $277#$3#B%

'0)@#6$430/J%)#4$2/#$%)2'(%V#J06B%3(#%'06B*3*06$%3(43%$(02+B%V#%)#3%V#U0/#%423(0/*S*67%

'0)@2+$0/J%+*'#6$#$%4$%3(#J%4/#%+*$3#B%*6%3(#%A8>?&%47/##)#63$%3(#)$#+"#$F%A(#%$4)#%J#4/,%

E4/+0$%E0//#4%U/0)%&023(%E#63#/%3/*#B%30%4$$#$$%3(#%*660"430/J%3(/#$(0+B%V#J06B%T(*'(%4%6#T%

@43#63%(4B%30%V#%/#7*$3#/#B,%46B%4/72#B%*6%U4"0/%0U%B*UU#/#63*43#B%/#7*)#$9%*U%4%@/0B2'3%*$%603%

-3/2+JD%6#T,%3(#6%*3%'46603%V#%@/03#'3#B%VJ%4%@43#63,%46B%'06$2)#/$%(4"#%4%/*7(3%30%@/0B2'#%*3%

43% 60% +#74+% '0$3F% A(#% 6#X3% J#4/,% ;/4(4)%523U*#+B% U/0)%R/*B7#$% 4B"0'43#B% 4% @/#'423*064/J%

@0+*'J% 0U% @43#63*67% @+463$,% +*"*67% 0/746*$)$,% 46B% 3(#*/% 3/4B*3*064+% 2$#$,% *6% $@*3#% 0U% 3(#%

/#+2'346'#% 30% -@43#63% +*U#D% *6% &023(#/6% '0263/*#$,% 46B% '063/4/J% 30% 4% 3/#6B% 30T4/B$% V/04B%

/#[#'3*06% 0U% 3(#%A8>?&%T*3(% 60% B*$'/*)*643*06% V#3T##6% 3(#*/% @0$*3*"#% 46B% 6#743*"#% #UU#'3$F%

&2'(%4%@0+*'J%T02+B%V/*67%$#"#/4+%4B"46347#$,%#F7F% +*)*3*67%V*0%@*/4'J%*6%3(#%&023(%T*3(023%

/4*$*67% +#7*3*)43#% U#4/$% 4)067% Y#$3#/6% U*/)$% 3(43% /#$#4/'(% 46B% B#"#+0@)#63% T02+B%

#"#6324++J% V#% $30@@#BF% >6%\2+J%KLLL,% 4%(26B/#B%:;<%433#6B#B% 3(#% [0*63%<XU4),%1&.,%46B%

AY:%@/#$$%'06U#/#6'#%06%@43#63$%46B%)#B*'*6#$,%/#'0))#6B*67%4%7+0V4+%47/##)#63%V#3T##6%

:0/3(%46B%&023(F%A(#J%B#+*V#/43#+J%@23%*3%4$%4%3/4B#%0UU%V#3T##6%/#$@#'3U2+%4@@+*'43*06$%0U%3(#%

A8>?&% 474*6$3% /#'076*3*06% 0U% $@#'*U*'% '063#X3$% VJ% 3(#% YA<F% C74*6,% 3(#% 023'0)#% 0U% $2'(%

)0V*+*S43*06%'4)#%4$%4%$2/@/*$#%*6%50(4,%KLLO,%T(#6%4%[0*63%B#'+4/43*06%06%@43#63$%46B%B/27$%

T4$%47/##B%2@06%VJ%YA<%)#)V#/%$343#$F%.2/3(#/%$2/@/*$#%T4$%/4*$#B%*6%KLLG%06%3(#%#"#%0U%

3(#%E46'26%'06U#/#6'#,%T(#6%3(#%47/##)#63%/#4'(#B%06%4%'0)@2+$0/J%@43#63%U/4)#T0/W%T4$%

4+307#3(#/%$@06$0/#B%VJ%$343#$,%3(#%Yb<,%3(#%YA<%46B%@(4/)4'#23*'4+%U*/)$OQF% %

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%OQ% ZX@#/3% 4B"0'4'J%)4J% V#% U026B% *6% "4/*02$% 3#X3$,% 4)067%T(*'(9% ./#B#/*'W%CVV033,% -A(#%50(4%

B#'+4/43*06% 06% 3(#% A8>?&% 47/##)#63% 46B% @2V+*'% (#4+3(9% +*7(3*67% 4% B4/W% '0/6#/% 43% 3(#% YA<D,%

\02/64+%0U%>63#/643*064+%Z'060)*'%^4T,%KLLK,%"0+2)#%h,%aQMPhLhd%-A0T4/B%4%6#T%4/#4%0U%0V[#'3*"#%

4$$#$$)#63%*6%3(#%U*#+B%0U%A8>?&%46B%"4/*4V+#%7#0)#3/J%U0/%3(#%@/#$#/"43*06%0U%)2+3*+43#/4+*$)D,%

\02/64+%0U%>63#/643*064+%Z'060)*'%^4T,%`HON,%KLLh,%__POLLd%E4/+0$%E0//#4,%->)@+#)#63*67%643*064+%

@2V+*'%(#4+3(%@0+*'*#$%*6%3(#%U/4)#T0/W%0U%YA<%47/##)#63$D,%\02/64+%0U%Y0/+B%A/4B#,%GaHhN,%KLLL,%

`MPOKOd%->)@+*'43*06%0U%3(#%50(4%5#'+4/43*06%06%3(#%A8>?&%C7/##)#63%46B%@2V+*'%(#4+3(D,%Yb<%

Z'060)*'$%46B%5/27$,%Z51%$#/*#$%6jOK,%E>5%T0/W*67%@4@#/%6jMK,%KLLKd% -.0/)2+43*67%#UU#'3*"#%

@/0PB#"#+0@)#63% 643*064+% *63#++#'324+% @/0@#/3J% @0+*'*#$D,% *6% E(/*$30@(#% R#++)466,% ;/4(4)%

% A(*$%V/*#U% /#"*#T%0U% 3(#%/04B% 30%50(4%$(0T$% 3(43%B*4+072#,%)2324+%26B#/$346B*67,%

46B%*66#/%W60T+#B7#%0U%3(#%6#703*43*06$%U/4)#$%4++0T#B%#X@#/3$%46B%$'*#63*$3$%T#++%(#+@#B%VJ%

$0@(*$3*'43#B%*6U0/)43*06%6#3T0/W$%46B%'4$'4B#%B*$'2$$*06$%4)067%:;<%46B%>;<,%30%/#U/4)#%

3(#%@#/'#@3*06$%0U%3(#%A8>?&%VJ%V03(%&023(#/6%46B%:0/3(#/6%'0263/*#$F%

%

A(#%>63#/643*064+%C30)*'%Z6#/7J%C7#6'JF%A(#%>CZC%0@#/43#$%*6%4%U*#+B%T(#/#%-*B#4+*$3*'D%46B%

-/#4+*$3*'D%"*#T$%'0)@#3#%30%U/4)#%3(#%U232/#F%E06$#f2#63+J,%(#4B$%0U%:;<%B#B*'43#B%30%@#4'#%

$@#4W%023%3(#*/%U#4/$%4V023%@/0+*U#/43*06,%62'+#4/%4/)4)#63,%46B%430)*'%T#4@06$%2$#F%A(#*/%

"0*'#,%(0T#"#/,%B0#$%603%$3/*W#%4%'(0/B%*6%46%47#6'J%3(43%)2$3%T0/W%T*3(*6%3(#%+*)*3$%0U%*3$%

)46B43#,%4''0/B*67%30%4%'06$3/4*6*67%$34323#,%#f2*@@#B%T*3(%4%@/#'*$#%+#74+%4@@4/432$,%46B%

3(43% *$%@#/)46#63+J%26B#/% $2/"#*++46'#%0U% *3$%)#)V#/%$343#$F%Y(#6% 3(#/#% *$% +*33+#% /00)% U0/%

*63#/@/#343*06%e%4%@0*63%/#@#43#B+J%)4B#%VJ%*63#/"*#T#B%$34UU%)#)V#/$%0U%3(#%47#6'J%e%U#T%

0@@0/326*3*#$% 4/#% 0@#6% 30% #X@/#$$% B*$$#63*67% 0@*6*06$F% >6% $@*3#% 0U% 3(*$,% 3(#/#% 4/#%)0)#63$%

T(#6%023$*B#/$% 4/#% *6"*3#B% 30% B*$'2$$% 3(#% 47#6'Jc$% 47#6B4d% U2/3(#/)0/#,% 46% -:;<% 32/6D% *$%

0V$#/"4V+#%T*3(*6%3(#%47#6'J,%#"#6%*6%$2'(%$#6$*3*"#%*$$2#$%4$%62'+#4/%'0634*6)#63O_F%C$%$4*B%

VJ%4%(*7(%/46W*67%>CZC%47#63,%-0"#/%3(#%J#4/$%T#%(4"#%#6(46'#B%02/%*63#/4'3*06$%T*3(%:;<,%

#"#6%T(#6%3(#*/%704+$%4/#%*6%'063/4B*'3*06%T*3(%02/%)46B43#DO`F%>3%)*7(3%V#%4%+067%/04B%30%U2++%

/#'076*3*06,%$*6'#%3(#%U*/$3%/#$0+23*06%06%>CZC=:;<%/#+43*06$(*@$%T4$%4B0@3#B!4%+067%3*)#%470%

e%06+J%3T0%J#4/$%4U3#/%3(#%#$34V+*$()#63%0U%3(#%47#6'JOMF%C3%3(43%3*)#,%3(#/#%T4$%4%+*$3%0U%U*"#%

/#$3/*'3*"#%'/*3#/*4%3(43%U/4)#B%3(#%7/463*67%0U%4%-'06$2+343*"#D%$3432$%e%4%+#74+%/#7*)#%3(43%

T4$%$(0/3%0U%U2++%4''/#B*343*06F%A(#%'/2X%0U%3(#%)433#/%*$%3(43%60T,%3(#/#%*$%$0)#%U0++0TP2@%06%

:;<% $343#)#63$,% /#'076*S#B% 4$% 4% @0$$*V+#% $02/'#% 0U% *6U0/)43*06,% T(#/#4$% B2/*67% B#'4B#$%

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%523U*#+B,%8*'4/B0%1#+#6B#SP</3*S,%#B$F,%A/4B*67%*6%W60T+#B7#,%B#"#+0@)#63%@#/$@#'3*"#$%06%A8>?&,%

3/4B#% 46B% $2$34*64V*+*3J,% Z4/3($'46% ?2V+*'43*06$,% ^06B06,% KLLa,% KLMPKO_d% ;/4(4)% 523U*#+B,%

-E0))*$$*06% 06% *63#++#'324+% @/0@#/3J% /*7(3$% 2/7#$% /#3(*6W*67% 0U% >?8% /#7*)#$D,% R/*B7#$,% 6jQ,%

&#@3#)V#/% KLLK,% O% @d% -?/0)03*67% +0'4+% *660"43*06% 4$% 4% B#"#+0@)#63% $3/43#7JD,% >660"43*06$,%

$2))#/%KLLQ,%Q_P__d%A*)%b2VV4/B%46B%\4)#$%^0"#,%-%14W#%B/27$%4UU0/B4V+#%9%/#@+4'#%A8>?&k%VJ%

8l5kD,%R/*B7#$,%6jQ,%KLLa,%GPaF% %17 For instance, on the IAEA website, a full-size section is devoted to an IAEA-NGO forum held in February 2004

in Vienna on “Nuclear Verification and Nuclear Fuel Cycle”. 18 Interview, head, external relations, 14 February 2008, Vienna. 19 INFCIRC/14, 7 November 1959, IEAE, Vienna.

)#)V#/%$343#$%(4B%3(#%)060@0+J%0U%*63#++*7#6'#KLF%>6%'0)@4/*$06,%'00@#/43*06%T*3(%-'#/34*6%

'43#70/*#$%0U%*63#/70"#/6)#634+%0/746*S43*06$D%T4$%47/##B%2@06%43%3(#%"#/J%*6'#@3*06%0U%3(#%

0/746*S43*06 KO F% b0T#"#/,% $2'(% 47/##)#63$% T#/#% $*76#B% $#@4/43#+J% T*3(% #4'(% @4/36#/%

0/746*S43*06,% 46B% 4$% 4% '06$#f2#6'#,% B23*#$% 46B% '0))*3)#63$% "4/J% U/0)% 06#% 30% 4603(#/F%

10/#0"#/,% 60670"#/6)#634+% 0/746*S43*06$% '02+B% 603% V#6#U*3% U/0)% 3(#% @/*"*+#7#B% 3/#43)#63%

/#$#/"#B%30%>;<%T(*'(%(4B%60%'00@#/43*06%47/##)#63%T*3(%3(#%>CZC%263*+%3(43%B43#,%V23%T#/#%

+43#/% *63#7/43#B% *630% 3(#% V/04B% @/0'#$$% 0U% '06$2+343*06KK,% $*6'#%:;<%T#/#% 300% $)4++% 30% V#%

3/#43#B%$#@4/43#+Jd%46B%300%(#3#/07#6#02$%30%V#%B#4+3%T*3(%7+0V4++JF%

% C'324++J,% 3(#% B*$$0'*43*06% )4B#% T*3(*6% 3(#% >CZC% )46B43#% V#3T##6% 3(#% )*+*34/J,%

*6B2$3/*4+,%46B%T#+U4/#%2$#$%0U%430)*'%$'*#6'#%@4"#B%3(#%T4J%30%3(#%$@#'*4+*S43*06%0U%3(#%:;<%

3(43% '063#$3#B% 3(#% 47#6'Jc$% B#'*$*06$% *6% #4'(%0U% 3(#$#% 3(/##% $#'30/$F% &*6'#% *3% $##)$% /43(#/%

'063/4B*'30/J%30%@/0)03#%62'+#4/%#6#/7J%06%3(#%06#%(46B%46B%"#/*UJ%*3$%2$#%06%3(#%03(#/%(46B,%

V2*+B*67%2@%4%'04+*3*06%0U%:;<%*6%3(*$%/#4+)%*$%)0/#%B*UU*'2+3%3(46%*6%*63#++#'324+%@/0@#/3JF%A0%

V#% $2''#$$U2+,% #4'(%:;<%)2$3% U0'2$% 06% 46B%)0V*+*S#% #X@#/3$% 0U% 3(43% @4/3*'2+4/% *$$2#F%A(#%

30@*'$% 0U% B#V43#% 46B% 4'3*06% 4/#%)0/#% B*"#/$#% 3(43% *6% '0))06$#6$*'4+% "*#T$% B#$'/*V*67% 3(#%

47#6'J%4$%-B*$4/)*67%/072#%$343#$%3/J*67%30%@/0B2'#%62'+#4/%T#4@06$DF%C'324++J,%3(#%>CZC%*$%

4'3*"#%*6%#"#/J%U*#+B%3(43%(4$%$0)#%'066#'3*06%T*3(%430)$,%(0T#"#/%3(*6%3(*$%'066#'3*06%)4J%

V#F% >3% *$% 603% 06+J% *6"0+"#B% *6% $#4/'(% U0/% @0$$*V+#% 4/)$,% *3% 4+$0% '(#'W$% 3(#% $4U#3J% 0U% 62'+#4/%

@+463$%@/0B2'*67%'*"*+%#6#/7Jd%*63#/"#6#$%*6%B*$@23#$%4V023%2/46*2)%#X3/4'3*06d%B*$$#)*643#$%

$'*#63*U*'% W60T+#B7#% 4V023% 430)$d% U*7(3$% 2/46*2)% 3/4UU*'W*67d% 7*"#$% +#74+% 4B"*'#% 46B%

'063/*V23#$%30%3(#%B/4U3*67%0U%+#74+%B0'2)#63$%*6%3(#%62'+#4/%$#'30/F%10/#0"#/,%*3%'00@#/43#$%

T*3(%#X@#/3$%*6%47/*'2+32/#,%)2$#2)$,%46B%(0$@*34+$%30%(#+@%3(#)%)4$3#/%3(#%2$#%0U%*$030@#$F%

.0/%*6$346'#,%3(#%47#6'J%(4$%/#'#63+J%V##6%*6"0+"#B%*6%$#+#'3*67%3(#%)0$3%4@@/0@/*43#%$##B$%30%

V#%@+463#B%*6%$4+*6#%0/%$3#/*+#%U*#+B$,%46B%*6'/#4$#%'/0@$%*6%B#"#+0@*67%'0263/*#$d%'063/*V23*67%

30% /#$#4/'(% 474*6$3% '46'#/d% 423(#63*'43*67% $30+#6% @4*63*67$,% #3'F% C'324++J% $2'(% 2V*f2*3J% *$%

#67/4*6#B%*6%*3$%)46B43#9%430)$%(4"#%4%B24+%2$#d%3(#%>CZC%(4$%4%B02V+#%)*$$*06%HT*3(%4%@26%

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%20 Interviews, policy officer, division of information management, 14 February 2006, Vienna. 21 See the 26 September 1958 agreement with UNESCO; the 21 November 1958 agreement with the ILO; the 228

May 1959 agreement with the WHO; the 12 August 1959 agreement with the WMO; the 1st October 1959

agreement with the International Civil Aviation Agency; the 18 November 1959 agreement with the FAO

(INFCIRC/20/23 September 1960). Later on, the agency signed agreements with major regional organizations. 22 GC (XVI)/RES/291, November 10, 1972, Vienna.

74)#,%*3%'02+B%V#%$4*B%3(43%*3%0@@0$#$%-430)$%U0/%@#4'#D,%*3$%4'324+%)0330,%30%-4/)$%U0/%@#4'#D,%

*3$%@/#$#63%34$WNF% %

A(#/#%4/#%3T0%'06$#f2#6'#$%U/0)%$2'(%46%#6+4/7#)#63%0U%3(#%47#6'Jc$%)46B43#9%U*/$3+J,%

*6% 3(#% B0)4*6$% '0"#/#B% VJ% 3(#% >CZC% $'*#63*U*'% 46B% @/0U#$$*064+% '2+32/#$% 4/#% )46J% *U% 603%

'063/4B*'30/J,%4%3/#6B%3(43%U4'*+*343#$%3(#%)2+3*@+*'43*06%0U%60670"#/6)#634+%6#3T0/W$9%30%34W#%

V23% 4% $*67+#% #X4)@+#,% '2+32/#$% '#/34*6+J% B*UU#/% U/0)% @(J$*'*46$% 30% @(J$*'*$3$F% &#'06B+J,%

60670"#/6)#634+% '04+*3*06$% 4BB/#$$*67% 3(#$#% *$$2#$% 4/#% B*'(030)*S#B% e% 4''0/B*67% 30% 3(#%

B*)#6$*06%3(#J%@/*"*+#7#,%-@#4'#%60TD,%0/%-'46'#/%3(#/4@JDF%

C%'#/34*6%B#7/##%0U%U/47)#6343*06%*6%704+$%*$%*6#"*34V+J%'06B2'*"#%30%U/47)#6343*06%*6%

@4/36#/$(*@$9%#4'(%>CZC%B#@4/3)#63%(4$%*3$%0T6%+*$3%0U%4''/#B*3#B%:;<%4''0/B*67%30%*3$%0T6%

$#+#'3*06%'/*3#/*4,%46B%3(*$%*$%4+$0%B#@#6B*67%06%3(#%700BT*++%0U%3(0$#%)#)V#/%$343#$%3(43%4/#%

3(#% )0$3% 4'3*"#% *6% 3(*$% B#@4/3)#63KGF% A(#% R04/B% 0U% ;0"#/60/$% 06+J% *63#/"#6#$% 30% 7/463%

-0V$#/"#/D% $3432$F% ]*#T#B% U/0)%T*3(*6% 3(#% 47#6'J,% 3(#% U/47)#6343*06% *$% 4+$0% *)@4'3*67% 06%

:;<,% B*"*B#B% V#3T##6% -)*+*3463=@0+*3*'4+D% :;<% 46B% -$'*#63*U*'% 3(*6W% 346W$D% H+*W#% -3(0$#%

>6$3*323#$% 3(43%B#4+%T*3(% /4B*04'3*"#% $02/'#$DNF%Y(#/#4$% 3(#% +433#/%4/#% /#72+4/+J% '06$2+3#B,%

$2V'063/4'3#B,% 46B% #"#6% '0P$@06$0/#B,% '0634'3$% T*3(% 3(#% U0/)#/% 4/#% 4"0*B#B% 4$% 0U3#6% 4$%

@0$$*V+#F%?#/*0B*'4+%.0/2)$%H#"#/J%3T0%0/%3(/##%J#4/$N%4/#%V23%/4/#%0''4$*06$%30% *6"*3#%V03(%

$0/3$% 0U% :;<% 30% ]*#664,% V23% 3(#% 60)*643#B% 0/746*S43*06$% 4/#% $#+#'3#B% 30% 724/463##% 4%

'06'+2$*"#%B#V43#,%46B%30%/#$@#'3%7#07/4@(*'4+%/#@/#$#6343*06F%>6%03(#/%3#/)$,%$0)#%:;<%4/#%

@/*"*+#7#B% 4$% -U/*#6B$% 0U% 3(#% '(4*/D,% +*W#%:A>% 46B% >:11%e% 3T0%T#++% W60T6% 4B"0'43#$% 0U% 4%

@4'*U*'%2$#%0U%62'+#4/%#6#/7JF%

^4'W% 0U% /#$02/'#$% 46B% @#/$066#+% 4+$0% #X@+4*6$% T(J% >CZC% $34UU% )#)V#/$% 4/#% 603%

0@#6*67% 3(#% B00/$% 30%)0/#% 60670"#/6)#634+% 4'30/$F%C+3(027(% 3(*$% /#$3/*'3*"#% @0+*'J% +#4"#$%

V#(*6B%4%62)V#/%0U%'063#6B#/$,%*3%(4$%06#%)#/*39%*3%/#4++J%4$$0'*43#$%06%4%3#)@0/4/*+J%V4$*$%

3(0$#%:;<%3(43%)4J%-(4"#%46%*)@4'3%06%B#'*$*06%)4W*67D%46B%2@7/4B#%*3$%023'0)#$KaF%A0%3(#%

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%23 19 non-governmental organizations have formal consultative status with the IAEA. Twenty others have been

invited by the IAEA Board of Governors as observers to the General Conference or to undertake specific tasks.

Ka% >63#/"*#T$,%@0+*'J%0UU*'#/,%#X3#/64+%/#+43*06$%46B%B#@4/3)#63%0U%$4U#724/B$,%Oa%.#V/24/J%KLLQ,%

]*#664F%C''0/B*67% 30% 4% 603#% VJ%RF%C6B#)*'4#+% HO`%C@/*+% KLLO,% >CZC%T#V$*3#N,% 3(#%:;<% /0+#% *$%

B#$'/*V#B% 4$% U0++0T$9% -A(#% B*$3*6'3*06% V#3T##6% U4'3$% 46B% 0@*6*06$,% 4T4/#6#$$% V2*+B*67% 46B%

4B"0'4'J% $(02+B% V#% /#'076*S#B% *6% 46J% 023/#4'(% 4'3*"*3*#$F% ^#4/6*67% $(02+B% 4*)% 43% 4% U2++%

26B#/$346B*67%0U%3(#%@/0V+#)$%46B%@0$$*V*+*3*#$%46B%43%'06$3/2'3*"#%4'3*06F%A(2$%B*4+072#%V4$#B%06%

0@@0$*3#,% *3% 4+$0% (4$% $*B#% #UU#'3$9% @4/3% 0U% 3(#% >CZC% @/#B*'4)#63% *$% B2#% 30% 4% @/03#'3*06*$3%

433*32B#% 30T4/B$% 606P@/0+*U#/43*06F% CB)*33#B+J,% 4"0*B*67% @/0+*U#/43*06% *$% 3(#% '0/#% [0V% 0U% *3$%

*6$@#'30/$F%C$%4%'06$#f2#6'#,%:;<%#X@#/3$%T(0%'02+B%4/724V+J%V#%(#+@U2+% *6%/#+43#B%4/#4$%

+*W#%3(#%"*0+43*06%0U%3(#%:?A%VJ%3(#%V*+43#/4+%A/#43J%V#3T##6%3(#%I&C%46B%>6B*4%3#6B%30%V#%

V4//#B%U/0)%4''#$$%30%3(#%47#6'JKhF% %

:06#3(#+#$$,%#"#6%T(#6%W60'W*67%43%3(#%B00/$%0U%3(#%47#6'J%:;<%U*6B%T4J$%30%(4"#%

+#"#/47#F%5#4+*67%T*3(%#"#/J%@0$$*V+#%3(/#43,%46B%@4/3*'2+4/+J%T*3(%3(#%)0$3%B467#/02$%/*$W$%

H-4$%+067%4$%62'+#4/%T#4@06$%#X*$3,%3(#J%T*++%06#%B4J%V#%2$#BDN,%:;<%0@#/43*67%*6%3(#%U*#+B%

(4"#%H0/%)4J%(4"#N%4%'06$*B#/4V+#%+##T4J%06%@2V+*'%0@*6*06F%Z"#6%3(027(%430)*'%$'*#6'#%*$%

'0)@+#X,%3(#%B#)46B$%4BB/#$$#B%30%$343#$%46B%>;<%4/#%V03(%)0B#/43#%e%T(*'(%70"#/6)#634+%

4'30/% '02+B% 32/6% B0T6% $277#$3*06$% 3(43% -7/#43% '(467#$% *6% (*$30/J% (4"#% '0)#% 3(/027(%

'06'#/3#B%@0+*3*'4+%4'3*06Di%e%46B%@0@2+4/%e%T(0%T*++%V#%0@@0$#B% 30% -#6$2*67% 3(#%'063*62#B%

)0/430/*2)%0U%62'+#4/%3#$3*67D,%46B%30%4%-'0)@+#3#%@/0(*V*3*06%06%3(#%B#@+0J)#63%46B%2$#%0U%

$343#% T#4@06$Di KQ F% E4++$% U0/% 4% -/#$@06$*V+#% $'*#6'#D% 4/#% '06$06463% T*3(% 10(4))#B%

#+PR4/4B#*c$%'06'#/6$%4V023%3(#%U232/#%0U%4%[#0@4/B*S#B%T0/+B,%4%U#4/%(#%@#/*0B*'4++J%#X@/#$$%*6%

*63#/643*064+%$#)*64/$%T*3(%4'4B#)*'$%46B%:;<%/#@/#$#6343*"#$F%ZX@#/*#6'#B%@(J$*'*$3$%46B%

B*@+0)43$%4/#%3(#%)0$3%4V+#%30%U#4/%46J%+0$$%0U%'063/0+%06%62'+#4/%*6B2$3/JF%1#)0/*#$%0U%3(#%

@4$3% Hb*/0$(*)4%46B%:474$4W*N% 46B%4% +067%#X@0$2/#% 30% $'*#6'#% U*'3*06% $'#64/*0$% H4%62'+#4/%

T*63#/N%7*"#%3(#)%3(#%$3/#673(%30%4'3%*6%$@*3#%0U%47#%H4%'06'#/6%#X@/#$$#B%43%$#"#/4+%0''4$*06$%

VJ% #+PR4/4B#*% T(#6% (#% T4$% '4)@4*76*67% U0/% 4% /#6#T#B% )46B43#,% 4$% T#++% 4$% 47*67% :;<%

)*+*3463$%T(0$#%)0V*+*3J%*$%B*)*6*$(*67NF%C$%3*)#%@4$$#$%06,%'06'#/6$%7/0T,%46B%@#0@+#%U##+%46%

*6'/#4$*67%6##B%30%$(4/#%3(#*/%#X@#/*#6'#%46B%7*"#%V4'W%30%3(#%T0/+B%'0))26*3J%@4/3%0U%3(#%

@/*"*+#7#B% W60T+#B7#% 3(#J% /#4'(#B% *6% 3(#*/% @/0U#$$*064+% +*U#% HT0/W*67% *6% 430)*'% 0/% @4/3*'+#%

@(J$*'$d% 0/%B/4U3*67% '0)@/#(#6$*"#%V46$%06%62'+#4/%T#4@06$NF%C74*6,% 3(#%)0/#% /#$@06$*V+#%

3(#J%U##+%30T4/B$%U232/#%7#6#/43*06$,%3(#%)0/#%/#$@06$*"#%3(#J%4/#%30%'4++$%U0/%B*$4/)4)#63,%

46B%3(#%+#$$%3(#*/%@/0@0$4+$%4/#%#6B0/$#B%VJ%$343#%+#4B#/$%0/%3(#*/%@#/)46#63%/#@/#$#6343*"#$%

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%4''2/43#%*6U0/)43*06%$(02+B%V#%#6'02/47#B%V#3T##6%3(#%@/0"*B#/$%46B%/#'*@*#63$%0U%3(#%m#B2'43*06c%

46B% @2V+*'% *6U0/)43*06F% A(#% '06$3/2'3*"#% /0+#% 0U% T#++% *6U0/)#B% 46B% '06'#/6#B% :;<c$% 4$%

*63#/+0'230/$%*6%/#4'(*67%3(#%T*B#/%:;<%'0))26*3J%$(02+B%V#%U0$3#/#BFFD%&02/'#9%I:P:;^&%H:06%

;0"#/6)#634+%^*4*$06%&#/"*'#N%T#V$*3#%(33@9==TTTF26P67+$F0/7F%25 Interview, director, division of information management, 14 February 2008; Swiss Pugwash, 18 March 2008. 26 Both quotes from Pugwash Newsletter, July 2007.

30%T(0)%$#'2/*3J%*$$2#$%4/#%$0"#/#*763J%*$$2#$F% %

>6%$@*3#%0U%3(*$,%3(#/#%*$%43%+#4$3%06#%$#'30/%*6%T(*'(%3(#%4$J))#3/J%V#3T##6%3(#%>CZC%

46B% *3$% @4/36#/% :;<% '02+B% V#'0)#% )0/#% #f2*+*V/43#B% $0069% 3(#% #6"*/06)#63F% A(#%

4/'(PB#V43#B% @/0V+#)$% 0U% 62'+#4/% T4$3#% 46B% 4% @0$$*V+#% )2+3*@+*'43*06% 0U% 06P$*3#% 62'+#4/%

*6'*B#63$% )4J% V03(% V#% '06B2'*"#% 30% )0/#% *63#/"#63*06% U/0)% 46% *6'/#4$*67% 62)V#/% 0U%

0/746*S43*06$F%Y(#/#4$%3(#%$#'2/*3J%$#'30/%*$%3*7(3+J%'063/0++#B%VJ%)#)V#/%$343#$,%T*3(%+*33+#%

'0263#/T#*7(3%$*6'#%#X@#/3*$#%06%430)*'%*$$2#$%*$%/4/#,%3(#%#6"*/06)#634+%*)@4'3%0U%62'+#4/%

4'3*"*3J% *$% @/#'*$#+J% 3(#% /#4+)%T(#/#%:;<% '46% #)@0T#/% 3(#)$#+"#$% *6% 3(#*/% /#+43*06$(*@$%

T*3(% 3(#%47#6'JF% >6$3#4B%0U% V#*67%W#@3%4T4J% U/0)% 3(#% $#'2/*3J% *$$2#$,% *U% 06+J%V#'42$#% 3(#J%

'+4*)%'0)@#3#6'#%*6%-B*$4/)4)#63D%e%4%704+%T(*'(%*$%603%4$$*76#B%30%3(#%>CZC%4+3(027(%*3!*$%

3(#%)0$3% 433/4'3*"#% U0/%:;<c%)#)V#/$% e% 3(#J%T*++% V#% V#33#/% '0)@#3*30/$% 30% 3(#% 47#6'J% 4$%

60/)P$#33#/$%46B%/2+#$%*)@+#)#63#/$%*6%#6"*/06)#634+%46B%'+*)43*'%*$$2#$K_F%

Be it as it may, this is not yet the case. For the moment, NGO working with or against

the IAEA are mostly focusing on security issues. An example of this tendency is the inclusion of

one NGO only (International Crisis Group) within the “High-Level Panel of Experts to

Recommend Future Course for IAEA”28

. As long as specific nuclear issues will be considered as

broader disarmament issues, NGO access to the IAEA will remain limited. Therefore, the

potential benefits from the agency’s regulation process are concealed behind its limited success

in disarmament. This is particluarly obvious when rewiewing NGO statements about the IAEA.

Comparison between the two partnerships

A comparison between the two cases under review shows that some conditions must be met for

an IGO/NGO partnership to succeed. The first condition is the focalization of the IGO. That the

relationships between the atomic agency and NGO are less structured than is the case in

commerce may be due to the larger range of problems discussed in the WTO compared to the

specificity of the issues raised within the IAEA. Whereas experts involved in trade deregulation,

intellectual property, drug patents, agricultural exports, and access to domestic services are

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%27 Interview, safeguards information analyst, 14 February 2006, Vienna. 28 IAEA Press Release, Vienna, 25 February 2008.

countless, few scientists are able to understand atom. This discrepancy in topic may explain why

the eldest organization of the two was the latest to be targeted by NGO.

A(#%$#'06B%'06B*3*06%*$%3(43%'063/4B*'3*06$%*6%>;<%)46B43#%)2$3%V#%4BB/#$$#B%U2++J%

46B%0@#6+JF%.0/%*6$346'#,%3(#%B24+%4$@#'3%0U%>CZCc$%4'3*"*3*#$%e%3(#%)*+*34/J%46B%'*"*+*46%2$#$%

0U%430)$%e%(4$%*3$%#f2*"4+#63%*6%'0))#/'#%T(#/#%U/##%3/4B#%V/*67$%@#4'#%46B%7/0T3(,%V23%4+$0%

3#4/$%B0T6%0V$0+#3#%#'060)*'%#63#/@/*$#$%46B%4''#63243#$%74@$%*6%B#"#+0@)#63F%>6%'0))#/'#,%

(0T#"#/,%3(*$%B24+*3J%T4$%4''#@3#B%VJ%$343#$,%46B%)4B#%"*$*V+#%T(#6%3(#%YA<%T4$%'/#43#B%e%

46B%+0'43#B%e%6#X3%30%I:EAC5F%:0%$2'(%B*"*$*06%0U%+4V0/%*$%B#V43#B%*6%3(#%/#4+)%0U%430),%30%

3(#%7/#43%+4)#63%0U%)0$3%:;<%$@0W#$@#/$06$F%

C% 3(*/B% '06B*3*06% *$% 3(43% 0V$34'+#$% 30% 4B"0'4'J% )4J% V#% 0"#/'0)#% VJ% @/0)*6#63%

*63#++#'324+$F% >6% 3(*$% 4$@#'3,% 3(#%YA<% *$% @/*"*+#7#B9% '063/4/J% 30% '0))#/'#% 46B% *63#++#'324+%

@/0@#/3J,% U#T%:;<% $@0W#$@#/$06$% (4"#% 3(#% '4@4'*3J% 30% U0/'#% 3(#% >CZC% (#4B% 30% 34W#% 3(#*/%

$343#)#63$%06%62'+#4/%2$#%*630%'06$*B#/43*06F%&4"#%U0/%3(#%:0V#+%?/*S#!T*66#/%\0$#@(%803V+43%

e%603%30%$@#4W%0U%Z*6$3#*6%46B%82$$#++,%T(0%4/02$#B%@(J$*'*$3$c%'06$'*#6'#$%4V023%430)$%e%V*7%

64)#$%4/#%/4/#%*6%3(*$%/#4+)F%A(#%U*#+B%*$%4'324++J%@0@2+43#B%VJ%(26B/#B$%0U%@(J$*'*46$%46B%

@(J$*'*$3$,% @+2$% $0)#% +#74+% 4B"*$0/$% '063/*V23*67% 30% 3(#% '/#43*06% 0U% 60/)$% T*3(% -@4@#/$D%

@/#$#63#B%*6%4%"#/J%4'4B#)*'%$3J+#%30%+0'4+%T0/W$(0@$%46B%T0/+B%'067/#$$#$%42B*#6'#$KMF%A(#%

463*P62'+#4/%4B"0'4'J%6#3T0/W%*$%3(#/#U0/#%+00$#/%3(46%*3$%#f2*"4+#63%*6%'0))#/'#F%

A0% $2)% 2@% 02/% U*6B*67$,% 3(#% $3/43#7*'% @4/36#/$(*@% V#3T##6% >;<% 46B%:;<% 4'324++J%

V/*67$%)2324+% /#'076*3*06%46B% *$%(#+@U2+% 30%V03(%T(#69%ON%:;<%V#'0)#%)0/#% *6$3/2)#634+%

3(46% #X@/#$$*"#d% HKN% 3(#J% U*6B% @/0@#/% 4''#$$% 30% 3(#% B#'*$*06% )4W*67% @/0'#$$% "*4% @#/$064+%

'066#'3*06$,%0/%)#)V#/P$343#$%$2@@0/3d% HGN%3(#J%4/#%'06$*B#/#B%4$%@0$*3*"#+J%'063/*V23*67%30%

3(#%*)@/0"#)#63%0U%$2'(%023'0)#$%*6$3#4B%0U%-@0+*3*'*S*67%3(#%B#V43#D,%*U%603%32/6*67%*3%*630%4%

-I:%T4JD% 0U% 6#703*43*67d% HaN% 3(#J% U*6B% 4++*#$% 46B% '04+#$'#% *6% 46% *)@/#$$*"#%:;<% 6#3T0/W%

*6$3#4B%0U%/#)4*6*67%T#4W%46B%*$0+43#BF%

Part 3. Discussion, comparison and concluding remarks

:;<% #)#/7#B% *6% 3(#% +4$3% B#'4B#% 0U% 3(#% KL3(% '#632/J% 4$% 7+0V4+% B*$$#63#/$% 0U% 3(#% 6#T%

*63#/643*064+% 0/B#/F% A(#J% #X@/#$$#B% /#@#43#B% B#)46B$% 30% /#4'(% 4% )0/#% @4/3*'*@430/J%

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%29 Interviews, Swiss Pugwash, 18 March 2008.

B#)0'/4'J%43%T0/+B%+#"#+,%46B%#"#6%'+4*)#B%3(43%3(#J%'02+B%#X@/#$$%3(#%"0*'#%0U%3(#%@#0@+#%*6%

46%*63#/643*064+%/#@/#$#6343*"#%/#7*)#%30%'0)#F%&2''#$$%0U%3(*$%@/0[#'3%T4$%'06B*3*06#B%06%3T0%

U4'3$9% U*/$3,% 4% $T*3'(% U/0)% :;<% 4'3*"*$3% /#@#/30/*#$% 30% )0/#% '06"#63*064+% $0/3$% 0U% @/03#$3d%

$#'06B,% 3(#% 0@#6*67% 2@% 0U% >;<% 46B% 3(#*/% '4@4'*3J% 30% 4''0))0B43#% 46B% *63#7/43#% 6#T%

$34W#(0+B#/$c%B#)46B$F%>6%3(#%@/0'#$$,%4%'02@+#%0U%3/4B#P0UU$%T#/#%6#703*43#B9%:;<%@/0)*$#B%

+#$$% "0'*U#/43*06% 30% 0V34*6% )0/#% '06$*B#/43*06d% 3(#J% V#'4)#% +#$$% )*+*3463% 46B% )0/#%

@/0U#$$*064+%*6%0/B#/%30%V#%4''/#B*3#BF%E06"#/$#+J,%>;<%/#+#4$#B%)0/#%'+4$$*U*#B%*6U0/)43*06%30%

7#3%$0)#%/#$3%U/0)%3(#*/%'/*3*'$,%46B%B*)*6*$(%3(#%60/)43*"#%(4/4$$)#63%30%T(*'(%3(#J%T#/#%

'06U/063#BF% %

% C$% 3*)#%@4$$#B%06,%:;<%+#4B#/$%V#'4)#%)0/#%'06$'*02$%0U% 3(#% +*)*343*06$%0U% $2'(%

V4/74*6*67F%A(#%'0))26*'43*06%V433+#%T4$%603%4$%#4$J%30%T*6%4$%#X@#'3#B9%>;<%/#$@06B#B%30%

'/*3*'$% T*3(% @4/3*'2+4/+J% T#++% B#$*76#B% T#V$*3#$,% 4% 6#T% '0)@+*'*3J% T*3(% [02/64+*$3$,% 46%

*6'/#4$*67% @4'#% 0U% @2V+*'43*06% 0U% 3(#*/% /#@0/3$,% 46B% 4% $2''#$$U2+% )0V*+*S43*06% 0U% 3(#*/% 0T6%

#X@#/3$F% A(#% /#4+% V4+46'#% 0U% @0T#/% V#3T##6% *6B*"*B24+% :;<% 46B% 3(#% $@#'*U*'% >;<% T(0$#%

)46B43#%T4$%f2#$3*06#B%T02+B%/#)4*6%4$J))#3/*'%T(43#"#/%3(#%#UU0/3$%)4B#%30%7#3%@2V+*'%

433#63*06%*6%3(#%)#B*4%46B%06%3(#%>63#/6#3F%

10/#0"#/,% 4+3(027(% :;<% 0V34*6#B% $0)#% >;<% 30+#/43*06% 30T4/B$% 3(#*/% '/*3*'$,% 3(#J%

'02+B%603%7#3%4''#$$%30%#"#/J%*6$3*323*069%)0$3%>;<%$*)@+J%'0P$@06$0/#B%[0*63%)##3*67$d%$0)#%

7/463#B%:;<%4%@#/)46#63%0V$#/"430/J%$3432$d%03(#/$%4''/#B*3#B%3(#)%*6%$@#'*4+%0''4$*06$d%

46B%4%U#T%/#)*6B#B%V+*6B%30%3(#*/%B#)46B$F%A(#%3027(%/#$@06$#%)4B#%30%:;<%'+4*)$%B*B%603%

'0)#%U/0)%>;<%$#'/#34/*43$,%V23%U/0)%)#)V#/%$343#$%4++%"#/J%)2'(%4334'(#B%30%3(#*/%@/*"4'J%

T(#6%V4/74*6*67%*6%'+0$#B%$#$$*06$F%

A(#/#%T4$%06+J%06%0@3*)4+%$0+23*06%30%3(#$#%@/0V+#)$9%[0*6*67%4%6#3T0/W%0U%:;<%46B%

(0@*67% 3(43% 3(#% '0)V*6#B% @0T#/% 0U% *3$% )#)V#/$(*@% T02+B% #f243#% 3(#% @0T#/% 0U% 3(#*/%

*63#/70"#/6)#634+% @4/36#/$% *6% 6#703*43*06F% E06$#f2#63+J,% 4U3#/% 4% B#'#63/4+*S43*06% @#/*0B%

B2/*67%T(*'(%:;<%)2$(/00)#B%T*3(%60%'00/B*643*06,%4%'#63/4+*S43*06%@(4$#%T4$%+426'(#B%

VJ%$0)#%@*06##/*67%0/746*S43*06$9%-:;<%U0/2)$D%46B%-:;<%'04+*3*06$D%H$##%U0/%*6$346'#%3(#%

>CZC=:;<%-;+0V4+%E46'#/%@4/36#/$(*@D%+426'(#B%*6%KLLaN%T#/#%3(#%023'0)#%0U%4%$60TV4++*67%

#UU#'3F%Z"#6324++J,%3(#%:;<%$60TV4++%703%V*7%#6027(%30%V#%'06$*B#/#B%4$%4%@0$$*V+#%@4/36#/%VJ%

3(#%>;<%$60T)46F%

A(*$%V/04B%4+V#*3%$W#3'(J%64//43*"#%U*3$%T#++%3(#%(*$30/J%0U%3(#%/#+43*06$(*@$%V#3T##6%

:;<%46B%3(#%YA<%0/%3(#%>CZC,%4$%'2/$0/*+J%30+B%*6%3(*$%@4@#/F%C3%3(#%@/#$#63%$347#,%3(#J%4/#%

U4/% U/0)% #$34V+*$(*67% 4% /#@/#$#6343*"#% W*6B% 0U% B#)0'/4'J,% +#3% 4+06#% 4% @4/3*'*@430/J% 06#F%

b0T#"#/,%3(#J%703%'+0$#/%30%4%B#+*V#/43*"#%$0/3%0U%-*63#/643*064+%B#)0'/43*'%/#7*)#D9%VJ%60T,%

'/*3*'$% 46B% B02V3$% 4/#% )0/#% +#7*3*)43#% 3(46% #"#/d% 30% (4"#% 4% '(46'#% 30% V#% '06$*B#/#B,%

$#+UP[2$3*U*'43*06$%)2$3%V#%B0'2)#63#BF% >6%$@*3#%0U% 3(#*/%/#$#)V+46'#%T*3(%0/B*64/J% +0VV*#$,%

:;<%4/#%603%-*63#/#$3%7/02@$D%4'3*67%B*$'/#3#+J%46B%$#@4/43#+J%*6%;#6#"4%0/%]*#664%T*3(%3(#%

(0@#%30%V#%$006#/%0/%+43#/%/#'076*S#B%*6%3(#$#%3T0%*63#/643*064+%'*3*#$%4$%3(#J%4/#%*6%R/2$$#+$F%

A(#% W*6B% 0U% B0)#$3*'% 46B% *63#/643*064+% /#7*)#% *6% T(*'(% :;<% U0'2$*67% 06% *63#++#'324+%

@/0@#/3J% 46B% 7#6#3*'4++J% )0B*U*#B% 0/746*$)$% 06% 3(#% 06#% (46B,% 62'+#4/% $4U#3J% 46B% 606%

@/0+*U#/43*06%06%3(#%03(#/,%T*++%@/0V4V+J%603%V#%46%-4$$0'*43*"#%B#)0'/4'JD%4$%*$%4+/#4BJ%3(#%

'4$#%T*3(%'2//#63%Z2/0@#46%*$$2#$GLF%A(#%YA<%46B%3(#%>CZC%32)2+3202$%@4/36#/$(*@%T*3(%

:;<%T*++%+067%B*UU#/%U/0)%3(#%$)003(#/%4++*46'#%V#3T##6%*63#/#$3%7/02@$%46B%3(#%Z2/0@#46%

E0))*$$*06F%

b0T#"#/,%4$J))#3/*'4+%V4/74*6*67%4+$0%V/*67$%V#6#U*3$%30%#"#/J%6#703*430/9%3(#J%74*6%

*6% $4+*#6'J% 46B% +#7*3*)4'JF% E063#$3*67% B#'*$*06$% 46B% $343#)#63$% *$% 4+/#4BJ% "4+*B43*67% 3(#%

03(#/%4$%4%@4/36#/F%R03(%@4/3*#$%$2UU#/%V23%74*6%'06$0+*B43*06%*6%3(*$%@/0'#$$F%A(#/#U0/#,%3(#J%

4+$0% V#'0)#% +#$$% "2+6#/4V+#% 30% )#)V#/% $343#$% @/#$$2/#$% 46B% 3(/#43$F% 8#"*#T*67% 3(#% 3T0%

@0$$*V+J%(4/B#$3%'4$#$%$(0T$%3(43%*6%3(#%+067%/26,%3(*$%'04+*3*06%*6%3(#%0UU*67%*$%4%@/0)*$*67%

U0/)43% U0/% 4++% *63#/643*064+% 0/746*S43*06$,% V#% 3(#J% *63#/70"#/6)#634+% 0/% 60670"#/6)#634+F%

C++J%0/%+0$#,%'0)@/0)*$#%0/%@#/*$(9%3(#/#%*$%+*33+#%'(0*'#%V23%30%70%4+067%#"#6%T(#6%70*67%4+06#%

$##)$%)0/#%'0)U0/34V+#%*6%3(#%$(0/3%3#/)F%

<2/%*6*3*4+%(J@03(#$#$%T#/#%HON%3(43%'00@#/43*06%V#3T##6%>;<%46B%:;<%T4$%@0$$*V+#d%

HKN%3(43%3(#%U0/)%34W#6%VJ%46J%$3/43#7*'%'00@#/43*06%T(#6%V03(%>;<%46B%:;<%4/#%@0$$*V+#%

@4/36#/$%T02+B%V#%0U%4%+*)*3#B%$'0@#%46B%$(4@#9%*3%T02+B%V#%-)2324+%/#'076*3*06D%/43(#/%3(46%

U2++%'00@#/43*06F%A(#$#%3T0%(J@03(#$#$%$##)%'0//0V0/43#B%$0%U4/%VJ%02/%@/#+*)*64/J%*6f2*/JF%

A(#0/#3*'4++J,%:;<% $(02+B% @2/$2#% 3(#*/% 0T6% *63#/#$3%T*3(*6% 643*064+% $343#$9% U*/$3,% V#'42$#%

70"#/6)#63$%4/#%)0/#%4''#$$*V+#%3(46%)2+3*+43#/4+%*6$3*323*06$d%$#'06B,%V#'42$#%>;<%'46603%

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%30 Cf. Saurugger (Sabine) Européaniser les intérêts ? Les groupes d'intérêt économiques et l'élargissement de

l'Union européenne, Paris, Budapest, Torino, l'Harmattan, 2004.

#4$*+J% 0@#6% 4''#$$% 30% :;<F% .0/% >;<,% 3(#% 06+J% $02/'#% 0U% '4@4'*3J,% +#74+*3J,% 46B% +#7*3*)4'J%

0UU*'*4++J% '0)#$% U/0)% 3(#*/% )#)V#/% $343#$9% 3(#J% 4/#% 603% 4''02634V+#% 30% $2@/4643*064+%

0/746*S43*06$%+*W#%3(#%I:%0/%3(#%ZI,%+#3%4+06#%30%60670"#/6)#634+%4$$0'*43*06$F%E06"#/$#+J,%

$343#$% '06$3*323#% 4% B467#/% U0/% >;<,% $*6'#% 3(#J% )4J% V+0'W% 3(#*/% @+466#B% 0@#/43*06$% H4$%

;#/)46J%B*B%T*3(*6%3(#%>CZC%T*3(%$43#++*3#% *)47#/JN%0/%'0)@+4*6% U/0)%3*)#%30%3*)#%4V023%

3(#*/%@00/%)4647#)#63F%.0/%*6$346'#,%$0)#%$343#$%'/*3*'*S#B%3(#%>CZC%U0/%(4"*67%+067%*760/#B%

62'+#4/%)*+*34/J%4'3*"*3*#$%*6%/072#%643*06$,%*6%$@*3#%0U%/#@#43#B%06P$*3#%*6$@#'3*06$F%Y(#6%*6%

^*VJ4% '+4$$*U*#B% @4@#/$% 433#$3*67% 3(43% 3(#% $0P'4++#B% CFg% n(46% ?4W*$346*% 6#3T0/W% (4B%

$2''#$$U2++J% #X@0/3#B% 3#'(60+07J% 46B% 62'+#4/% )43#/*4+$% 30% >/4f% T#/#% U026B% 023,% 3(*$% +43#%

B*$'0"#/J% *//*343#B% 62'+#4/% @0T#/$% 30% $2'(% 46% #X3#63% 3(43% B02V3$% 4V023% 3(#% U232/#% 0U% 3(#%

0/746*S43*06%T#/#%U0/%3(#%U*/$3%3*)#%"0*'#BGOF%

E/0$$P@/#$$2/#B% V#3T##6% 70"#/6)#63$% 46B% $0'*4+% )0"#)#63$,% >;<% )4J% $*6'#/#+J%

T#+'0)#%:;<%(#+@%*6$3#4B%0U%@4J*67%+*@%$#/"*'#%30%4%/#'#63+J%@/4*$#B%'06"#/7#6'#%V#3T##6%3(#%

3T0% 3J@#$% 0U% $34W#(0+B#/$F%C'324++J,% V#'42$#% 3(#J% V03(% '06U/063% 3(#% $4)#% -@/*6'*@4+D% e% 3(#%

$343#$%e,%>;<%46B%:;<%$(4/#%4%'0))06%0V[#'3*"#9%-$@#4W*67%3(#%3/23(%30%@0T#/DGKF%C$%>;<%

B*$'/#3#+J%B0%V#(*6B%3(#%B00/$,%:;<%)4W#%4%U/#f2#63%2$#%0U%-64)*67%46B%$(4)*67D%34'3*'$9%

$*6'#% 3(#*/% -)*+*3463$D% 4/#% B#B*'43#B% 30,% /#$@#'3*"#+J,% B#"#+0@)#63% 46B% B*$4/)4)#63,% 3(#J%

$*67+#% 023% 3(0$#% )#)V#/$% 3(43% V#(4"#% *6'06$*$3#63+J% T*3(% 3(#% /43*U*#B% 3/#43*#$F% :;<%

)*+*3463$c%(4/4$$)#63%(#+@$%>;<%(#4B$%2/7#%606P'06U0/)*$3%)#)V#/%$343#$%30%$3*'W%30%3(#*/%

'0))*3)#63$ GG F% >6% 3(*$% $#6$#,% :;<% 4/#% 0V[#'3*"#% 4++*#$% 0U% >;<% V2/#42'/4'*#$F% <6% 06#%

'06B*3*069% 3(#J%)2$3% '063/*V23#% 30% *63#/70"#/6)#634+% B#'*$*06P)4W*67F% A(43% *$,% 3(#J%)2$3%

+#$$#6% 3(#*/% 4B"0'4'J% $346'#,% W##@% 4% +0TP@/0U*+#,% B#"#+0@% 3(#*/% #@*$3#)*'% '4@4'*3*#$% 46B%

V#'0)#%)0/#%'063/*V23*"#%30%)2+3*+43#/4+%023'0)#$%3(46%*B#0+07*'4++J%0@@0$#B%30%3(#)F% %

<V[#'3*"#% '0)@+*'*3J% *$% 3(#/#U0/#% @0$$*V+#F% >3%)2$3% V#% V4$#B% 06% 4% 3/4B#P0UU% V#3T##6%

/#'076*3*06=+#7*3*)*S43*06%HVJ%>;<%30%:;<N%46B%46%#UU#'3*"#=#UU*'*#63%'063/*V23*06%HU/0)%:;<%

30%>;<NF%<6'#%3(*$% *)@+*'*3%@0+*3*'4+%@4'3% *$%#6U0/'#B,%6#T%'00@#/43*"#%0@@0/326*3*#$%)4J%V#%

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%31 Interview, director, division of information management, 14 February 2008, Vienna. 32 Interview, head, non proliferation and policy making organs section, 14 February 2008, Vienna.

GG% C$%$343#B%VJ%:A>,%-A(#%I6*3#B%&343#$%$(02+B%*))#B*43#+J%V#7*6%T0/W*67%T*3(%3(#%03(#/%;+0V4+%

>6*3*43*"#%@4/3*'*@463$%46B%3(#%>CZC%30%B#34*+%3(#%#$$#63*4+%#+#)#63$%0U%46%-4@@/0@/*43#%#UU#'3*"#D%

$J$3#)%U0/%62'+#4/%$#'2/*3JF%

0@#6F%:;<%'46603%$3*)2+43#%'0++4V0/43*06%*U%3(#%>;<%3(#J%34/7#3%*$%603%$@#'*4+*S#B%#6027(F%

A(#%$2''#$$#$%0U%3(#%60670"#/6)#634+%'04+*3*06%T*++%4++%B#@#6B%06%3(#%B#7/##%0U%$@#'*4+*S43*06%

4'(*#"#B%T*3(*6%3(#%@4/36#/%>;<F%>6%'0))#/'#,%3(#%7/0T*67%U0'2$%06%*63#++#'324+%@/0@#/3J%4$%

$2'(% H4+3(027(% >?% *6% *3$#+U% *$% 4'324++J% $2VB*"*B#B% *6% $#"#/4+% $#'3*06$,% +*W#% @43#63$,% /2+#$% 0U%

0/*7*6,% 3/4B*3*064+% @/0@#/3J,% ;1<,% #3'FN% T4$% '06B2'*"#% 30% 4% $2''#$$% 0U% 60670"#/6)#634+%

'04+*3*06$F% A(*$% 4'(*#"#)#63% )4J% V#% #6"*#B% VJ% :;<% 0@#/43*67% *6% $#'2/*3J% *$$2#$,% $*6'#%

B*$4/)4)#63,%4%)2+3*U0+B%*$$2#,%*$%3(#%06+J%'0))06%7/026B%V#3T##6%3(#)F% %

RJ% '063/4$3,% V#*67% *6"0+"#B% *6% 4% U*#+B% T(#/#% 3(#% >;<% '06'#/6#B% $*)2+346#02$+J%

4BB/#$$% )46J% *$$2#$% *$% 46% 0V$34'+#% 30% *6U+2#6'#F% >U% '06U*B#63*4+*3J% 46B% '06'#/6% U0/%

)*$@#/'#@3*06%0U%46%>;<!@2V+*'%*)47#%4/#%'06B2'*"#%30%4%)46*@2+43*06%0U%*6U0/)43*06%46B%46%

#X'#$$*"#%$#+#'3*06%0U%$#6$*3*"#%B434%30%V#%B#'+4$$*U*#B,%:;<%)4J%U##+% *6$3/2)#634+*S#B%46B%

@2++%023%U/0)%3(#%U/47*+#%'04+*3*06GaF% %

A(#% 0@3*)4+% '06U*72/43*06,% 3(#6,% $##)$% 30% V#% 6#*3(#/% 4'3*"*$3% 60/% 3#'(60'/43*',% V23%

)*BB+#%0U%3(#%/04B9%06'#%46%:;<%'46%/#+J%V03(%06%#X@#/3*$#%46B%)*+*346'J,%*6$3#4B%0U%V#*67%

B#@#6B463%06%#*3(#/%$'*#63*$3$%0/%@4/3*$46$,%*3%)4J%U*6B%*3$%T4J%30%3(#%>;<%B#'*$*06%)4W*67%

@/0'#$$%46B,%@#/(4@$,%*6$3*++%*6%*3%4%U+4"0/%0U%7+0V4+%B#)0'/4'JF% %

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%34 Interviews, policy officer, division of information management, 14 February 2006, Vienna.

Table 1. The WTO/NGO strategic partnership on intellectual property NGO full name and

acronym, date of creation,

and headquarters

Type (A = activist/advocacy;

E = epistemic/expert) and

spokesperson

Focus/mandate

(self -reporting)

Interaction with the

WTO (channel,

frequency)

Recommendations made to the

WTO (topic, statements)

Consumer Project on

Technology, CPTech (1995,

Washington, Geneva,

London)

E (James Love)

Production and access to knowledge

(medical inventions, information and

knowledge goods)

Frequent statements &

memos

International Center for Trade

and Sustainable

Development, ICTSD

(Geneva)

E (Graham Dutfield)

Bridging trade and sustainable

development communities; providing

original, non-partisan reporting and

facilitation services

BRIDGES, weekly

periodical

Accredited by the WTO

(1996)

Trade Knowledge network,

symposium

Calls for a distinction between

natural resources and human

products

IP Watch

(Geneva)

A

(T. Gerhardsen)

Reports on interests and behind-the-scene

dynamics that influence the design and

implementation of international IP policies

Naming and shaming of

member states

Against the “green rooms”

processes?

Médecins sans frontières,

MSF (Paris)

A/E (Bernard Pecoul,

Ellen t’Hoen)

Apply special and differentiate

treatment for drugs against

pandemics in the South

NGO Energy Caucus E

Lobbying to establish an

International Sustainable

Energy Fund

Support the Doha Development

round

Oxfam International (Oxford,

1995) A

Quakers United Nations

Office, QUNO (1999,

Geneva)

A

Training WTO and other

IGO’s representatives

and NGO activists

South Center (1995,

Geneva)35 A/E (Carlos Correa)

Promotion of South solidarity, and South

to South cooperation Strategic Work Program

Make a distinction between

“discoveries” and “inventions”

Transatlantic Consumer

Dialogue, TACD

(Washington, 2000)

A Impact of IP rules on consumers of health

care services

Third World Network, TWN E (Martin Khor) Research on development and

North-South issues

South North Development

Monitor, SUNS (Geneva)

Press the WTO to accept

compulsory patents

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%

Table 2. The IAEA/NGO strategic partnership on nuclear safety and disarmament issues %

NGO full name and

acronym, headquarters

Type

(A: activist/advocacy;

E: epistemic/expert; I

= interest)

Focus/mandate

(self -reporting)

Interaction with IAEA (channel, frequency) Recommendations made to IAEA (topic,

statements)

Acronym Institute for

Disarmament Diplomacy (1994, London)

E/A

(Rebecca Johnson)

Promote further ratifications and the

full implementation of arms control

treaties

Promote talks among the nuclear weapon

states and identify concrete measures for

further progress in transparency, arms control

and confidence building

Help the IAEA to be “implementing

organization” of the NPT and empower it

to oversee important aspects of the Treaty

American Physics Society E Arousing the conscience of science; promoting

international freedom of scientists; building bridges

with other NGOs

Unknown Unknown

Bellona (1986, Oslo) A work on nuclear contamination in Russia Reporting on IAEA’s inspections in Russia Unknown

CivilG8 (Russia) During G8 summits Nuclear Safety first (Chernobyl, Armenia)

Global Threat Initiative (GTRI)

E/A To build and broaden international support for

efforts by national authorities to identify, secure,

recover, and/or facilitate the disposition of high-risk

nuclear and radioactive materials that pose a

potential threat to the international community

Conferences (e.g., The Global Threat

Reduction Initiative (GTRI); International

Partners’ Conference took place in Vienna,

Austria, from September 18-19, 2004. More

than 590 representatives from 100

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Member States attended the GTRI

Support IAEA programs,

recommendations, and codes of conduct.

Encourage states to consolidate, expand,

and accelerate domestic, regional, and

IAEA programs that address unsecured

vulnerable nuclear and radioactive

materials, as deemed necessary by Member

States

Global Policy Forum (1993, New York)

A Monitors policy making at the UN, promotes

accountability of global decisions, educates and

mobilizes for global citizen participation, and

advocates on vital issues of peace and justice

Indirect: bringing alternative interpretations

into many mainstream media outlets +

providing public speakers and organizes

international events and conferences

Support Mohammed el-Baradei’s

reelection against the will of the Bush

administration in the aftermath of the Iraq

inspection program

Institute of Nuclear

Material

Management(INMM)

E/I Advancing quality nuclear materials management

practices worldwide

Reporting, lobbying Support IAEA’s activities to promote a

safer energy

International Institute for

Peace (Vienna)

E Contributing to the maintenance and strengthening

of peace

Research activities, and dissemination of

knowledge

Unknown

International Network of

Engineers and Scientists

(INES, 1991, Berlin))

E/A Promoting a more responsible science;

enhance the awareness of ethical principles and the

specific responsibility of scientists and to support

those who have been victimized for acting upon

such principles

Meetings and papers (about a hundred NGOs) Unknown

International Peace

Society (London, 1816)

Against war Books, reports Unknown

International Physicians for

the Prevention of a Nuclear

War (IPPNW,

E/A) Fighting the undesirable effects of atomic science ;

prevent the catastrophic health and environmental

consequences of a nuclear war and advance

Meetings and papers

International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear

Stop IAEA interference with the WHO

(e.g., Chernobyl), free the WHO from its

subordinate status to the IAEA

Massachusetts + regional

branches)

understanding of the causes of armed conflict from

a public health perspective; produce a new research

study on health aspects of both vertical and

horizontal proliferation

Weapons (ICAN)

Send birthday e-cards to the IAEA for its 50th

anniversary

Substitute a new NWC Agency to the

IAEA: “unlike the IAEA, it would not

have the task of promoting nuclear

energy.”

NGO Committee on

Disarmament

E to inform NGOs worldwide of the status of the

disarmament negotiations, country positions, major

obstacles and opportunities

conference organizer, network clearing house,

newspaper publisher, international networking

Support IAEA’s inspections in Iran

Nuclear Age Peace

Foundation

A/E Pressure on states (and US candidates to the

presidency)

Networking e.g., “think outside the bomb

network”

unknown

Nuclear Energy Institute (Washington)

I promoting a clean source of energy Lobbying

Nuclear Threat initiative (NTI)

E

( Sam Nunn)

Towards a nuclear-free world

Galvanize global action to reduce urgent nuclear

dangers + build support for reducing reliance on

nuclear weapons, ultimately ending them as a threat

to the world

Consulting Agreement with IAEA on Yugoslavia in

2002

Expanding the mission, personnel, and

funding of the IAEA’s Office of Nuclear

Security, as there are many steps the

widely-respected international

organization can take more effectively than

the United States can unilaterally

Peace and Security

Pugwash (1957, Nova

Scotia)

E/A

[ (Joseph Goldblat, then

Paolo Cotta-Ramusino

(SG). Jeffrey Boutwell

(Director)]

Action to mount a global campaign to eliminate

weapons of mass destruction

Promoting a pacific use of atoms

Framing issues “academically”: meetings,

Journals (e.g., the International Student/Young

Pugwash ISYP Journal on Science and World

Affairs, No. 1, 2005)

Extending current IAEA prohibitions

(signing a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty,

FMCT); better NPT governance

(associating IAEA and the UN Office for

Disarmament Affairs)

Suggesting financial compensations to

Iran to help this country sign the

Additional protocol and stop enriching

uranium

Women’s International

league for Peace and

Freedom (WILPF)

(Rhianna Tyson) Strengthening the NPT Reporting The completion and implementation of the

Trilateral Initiative among the USA, the

Russian Federation, and the IAEA.

The placement of excess military fissile

materials under IAEA or other

international verification and the

disposition of such material for peaceful

purposes.

NGO full name and

acronym, headquarters

Type

(A = activist/advocacy;

E = epistemic/expert; I

= interest)

Focus/mandate

(self -reporting)

Interaction with IAEA (channel, frequency) Recommendations made to IAEA (topic,

statements)

TABLE 3: Selected NGOs’ statements on IAEA’s field and activities

Source Statement

http://www.nuclearfiles.org

“Article IV of the NPT, the mandate of the IAEA and agreements made between the IAEA and the World Health Organization are documents of their

time and reflect historically specific moments in science and in politics. Assumptions made in 1945, or 1968 about nuclear technology have to be

reevaluated in a world that has experienced Chernobyl and Three Mile Island. When the Non-Proliferation Treaty was negotiated, nuclear power was still

a relatively new technology. There were high hopes and indeed some assumptions that it would be safe, clean and cheap and that its proliferation risks

could be contained. Experience has now given us the data to say that these assessments cannot be supported. Indeed the risks were gravely

underestimated.”

“Agreements such as the 1994 Convention on Nuclear Safety go to the heart of the contradiction inherent in the mandate of the IAEA in recognising the

difficulty of simultaneously promoting and controlling an industry. Article 8 paragraph 2 of this agreement states that, "each contracting party shall take

the appropriate steps to ensure an effective separation between the functions of the regulatory body and those of any other body or organization

concerned with the promotion or utilisation of nuclear energy." This article of the 1994 Convention makes visible the need to structurally alter the

mandate of the IAEA on the understanding that history has proved the promotion and controlling function unworkable. If the International Atomic

Energy Agency promoted the support of the development of sustainable and environmentally safe energy sources, it would be a mandate that fitted better

with the role of safeguarding nuclear.”

PSR (Switzerland), WHO working

group on Chernobyl, 25 March 2001

http://www.aerztekomitee.ch/content/f

r/index_fr.htm

The IAEA Conference on Chernobyl accident acknowledged only 27 to 31 deaths directly attributable to it; plus several hundred irradiations that had to

be cared, and thyroid cancers that were considered benign and easy to prevent (see the "Proceedings of an International Conference, Vienna, 6-12 April,

1996".). Therefore, the IAEA was able to make 9 millions victims disappear from the statistics, although “numbers are consistently increasing until

now”, according to Martin Griffith, Head, U.N. Department of Humanitarian Affairs (WHO Conference, 1995).

Representing the nuclear lobby in the U.N. the IAEA, whose status principally assigns to "speeding and increasing the contribution of atomic energy to

peace, health, and prosperity in the whole world”, sees itself as a very victim of Chernobyl since no nuclear energy plants have been built in the West in

the past 15 years. The nuclear lobby throws discredit on, or even eliminate scientists who tell the truth about Chernobyl. Conversely, it supports those

academics who are prepared to contradict research revealing the scope of the medical disaster due to Chernobyl radioactive rains and fallouts.

PSR/IPPNW tries to assist researchers when they are under arrests (Bandazhevsky), since they are sidelined, ruined or destroyed by such interventions,

noteworthy when they come from persons who are close to the nuclear lobby.

ICAN: “An SOS for the Human Race:

Securing Our Survival (SOS) The

Case for a Nuclear Weapons

Convention

http://www.icanw.org/files/SOSSumm

aryIntlFin.pdf

Governments are the principal actors but civil society plays an important role. The experience of many international and intergovernmental bodies will

be useful, including the UN General Assembly and Security Council; the IAEA; the Conference on Disarmament; nuclear-weapon-free zone

implementation agencies; the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization; the International Court of Justice; and regional organizations such as the

EU. The scientific, medical, legal, policy, and other expertise of NGOs make them key partners in the process. It appears that neither the U.S.

government nor the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a comprehensive, prioritized list assessing which facilities around the world pose

the most serious risks of nuclear theft.

The recently launched Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism may provide the best forum to pursue some of these goals. For other goals,

high-level bilateral initiatives such as the nuclear security agreement reached between President Bush and President Putin in 2005 may offer the most

effective approach. For still other efforts, cooperation led by international organizations such as the IAEA may be the forum that other countries most

readily accept.