FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE Scaling Up Complaints Handling Mechanism

in the Burkina Faso Portfolio – A Blueprint

February 2012

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This report was authored by Rima Al-Azar, Senior Operations Officer (INTSC) with the help of

Souleymane Sere, Consultant, and Monique Ouffoue, Intern (INTSC). Valuable guidance,

comments and feedback were received from Galina Sotirova, Country Manager for Burkina

Faso, Ousmane Kolie, Senior Financial Management Specialist (AFTM), and Bronwyn Grieve,

Governance Specialist (AFTPR).

The author would like to thank in particular Elisabeth Bambara, Program assistance (AFMBF)

for her valuable assistance in administrative and logistical matters.

ACRONYMS

AfDB African Development Bank

AFTFM Africa Region Financial Management Unit

AFTPR Africa Region Procurement Unit

APNAC African Parliamentarians' Network Against Corruption

ARMP Autorité de Regulation des Marches Publics (Public Procurement Regulatory Agency)

ASCE Autorité Supérieur de Contrôle d’Etat (High Authority for State Oversight)

BNAF Brigade Nationale Anti-Fraude de l'or (Gold Anti-Fraud Squad)

CdC Cour des Comptes (Auditor General)

CHM Complaint Handling Mechanism

CNSS Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale

CO Country Office

CRD Comité de Règlement des Différends (Committee to Settle Differences)

CRMP Conseil de régulation des marchés publics (Council for Public Procurement Regulation)

CSO Civil Society Organization

EITI Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative

FCFA Franc de la Communauté Financière Africaine

GAC Governance and Anti-Corruption

GIABA Groupe Intergouvernemental d’Action contre le Blanchissement d’Argent en Afrique de

l’Ouest (Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa)

GRM Grievance Redress Mechanism

HACLC Haute Autorité de Coordination de la Lutte contre la Corruption (High Commission for the

Coordination of Anti-Corruption Activities)

IGF Inspection Générale des Finances (General Inspectorate of Finance

IGS Inspecteur Général des Services (General Inspectorate of Services)

INT Integrity Vice-Presidency

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

MBDHP Mouvement Burkinabé des Droits de l'Homme et des Peuples

MEBF Masion de l’Enterprise du Burkina Faso

MOB Maîtrise d’Ouvrage de Bagré

MoU Memorandum of Understanding

NACP National Anti-Corruption Policy

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

QAG Quality Assurance Group

RAJIT Réseau Africains des Journalistes pour l'Intégrité et la Transparence

RENLAC Réseau National de Lutte Anti - Corruption

SDV Social Development Unit

UNCAC United Nations Convention against Corruption

WAEMU West African Economic and Monetary Union

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 1

II. BACKGROUND .............................................................................................................................. 3

PREVALENCE AND PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION ............................................................................ 3

POLICY AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK ............................................................................................................... 4

III. COMPLAINT HANDLING MECHANISMS ............................................................................... 7

PUBLIC COMPLAINT HANDLING MECHANISMS ........................................................................................... 7

CIVIL SOCIETY COMPLAINT HANDLING INITIATIVES ................................................................................ 16

IV. THE BALANCE BETWEEN STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS: THE ROLE OF NON-

STATE ACTORS ....................................................................................................................................... 18

CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS ............................................................................................................... 18

MEDIA ....................................................................................................................................................... 19

PRIVATE SECTOR ...................................................................................................................................... 19

PARLIAMENT ............................................................................................................................................. 20

V. THE BALANCE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND PROJECT LEVEL CHMS ........................ 22

PROJECT LEVEL CHMS ............................................................................................................................. 22

COUNTRY OFFICE LEVEL ........................................................................................................................... 23

VI. THE BALANCE BETWEEN INVESTIGATIONS AND SANCTIONS:

ADMINISTRATIVE AND CRIMINAL .................................................................................................. 24

COUR DES COMPTES (CDC, AUDITOR GENERAL) ...................................................................................... 24

THE JUDICIARY ......................................................................................................................................... 25

VII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................... 27

ANNEXES

Annex I: List of Institutions/Persons Met .................................................................................................... 28

Annex II: References.................................................................................................................................... 31

Annex III : Benefits and Challenges of CHMs ............................................................................................ 33

Annex IV: CHMs in Burkina Faso .............................................................................................................. 34

Annex V: ASCE Cases Referred to Justice in 2008, 2009, and 2010 .......................................................... 35

Annex VI: Donor-Funded Governance Activities in Burkina Faso ............................................................. 37

1

FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE

Scaling Up Complaints Handling Mechanism

in the Burkina Faso Portfolio

I. INTRODUCTION

As the World Bank’s agenda on Governance and Anti-Corruption (GAC) and better service

delivery for the benefit of beneficiaries moves forward, Complaint Handling Mechanisms

(CHMs) are likely to play an increasingly prominent role in Bank-supported projects (see Annex

III for benefits and challenges of CHMs).1 In Burkina Faso, the recent socio-political unrest

revealed public dissatisfaction with the existing apparatus for addressing grievances effectively,

efficiently and transparently. Public control institutions, government departments, service

providers and local governments tend to be poorly equipped to receive and investigate

complaints and grievances from the public. Country systems that have been developed, where

they exist, are rarely used effectively.

For financial /non-financial complaints, the existence of an effective investigation system in the

national oversight institutions is critical. Yet, while the oversight public institutions in Burkina

Faso are making progress in their institutional framework and operational mandate,2 challenges

remain in the scope of their work which currently focuses on reviewing books of account as a

main way to improve governance and accountability. Moreover, there is no coordination between

Bank and country system instruments developed to handle complaints both in terms of

information flow and dealing with referrals.

In this regard, relying on and developing these national institutions3 to handle this category of

complaints received from projects’ beneficiaries might be an opportunity to pave the way in

improving efficiency in processing the complaints. Moreover, it will also help develop a more

systematic and institutionalized investigations process which uses country systems and which

will be built into all new projects. It will also provide lessons to Bank operations, including

1 Complaint Handling Mechanisms (CHMs) are increasingly recognized as a critical tool for promoting transparency

and accountability in Bank-financed operations. The Quality Assurance Group (QAG) recently led a GAC

Benchmarking and Learning Review that assessed the responsiveness of Bank-supported operations to the GAC

agenda. The review found that CHMs were included in only 28 percent of reviewed projects. Moreover, many of the

CHMs were neither required to maintain written records of grievances nor obliged to act on complaints and provide

written feedback. The QAG report concludes that CHMs are one of the most underused demand-side governance

tools and notes that “if complaints handling mechanisms are to grow into effective instruments for GAC mitigation

they will need more careful design and greater attention during both preparation and supervision.” As these findings

demonstrate, there is much room for Bank-supported projects to improve performance in this critical area. 2 As evidenced by 2010 PEFA score B + on Indicator 21 on efficiency of internal control system, and B on third

dimension of Indicator 26 on external audit. 3 Such as High Authority for State Oversight (Autorité Supérieure de Contrôle d’Etat - ASCE), Inspectorate of

Finance (Inspection Generale des Finances – IGF), Public Procurement Regulatory Agency (Autorité de Régulation

des Marchés Publics - ARMP) and Supreme Audit Institution as well as the Office of the Ombudsman.

2

P4Rs and DPLs, on the use of country oversight systems to improve integrity at the project level.

The objective is to help develop the capacity of these institutions to handle complaints (whether

or not they relate to Bank projects) at the same time that Bank operations start to more

effectively integrate country systems for complaints handling into their design and

implementation.

This CHM initiative, led by the Bank’s Country Office in Burkina Faso, is innovative on two

fronts. First, it is an attempt – probably for the first time by a Country Team – to simultaneously

assess and develop complaint handling mechanisms both at the project level as well as in public

institutions and to explore ways to link them up together. Second, in implementing this activity

the Country Team has built strong partnerships and collaboration across several units of the

World Bank, including AFTFM, AFTPR, AFTPC, SDV and INT which is necessary to provide

the technical assistance required to develop CHMs both at the project and national levels.

This paper reviews the existing CHMs in Burkina Faso and explores ways of finding the right

balance between (i) public and project complaint handling mechanisms, (ii) government and

non-governmental actors (civil society, media, private sector), (iii) sanctions and capacity

building, and lastly (iv) addresses briefly the link between investigations and follow-up

sanctions. It provides a blueprint for CHMs in Burkina Faso with an emphasis on public

complaints handling mechanisms and some recommendations for linkages with project-level

CHMs which will be developed at a later stage. Annexes I and II include the list of

persons/institutions met and a reference to the documents and publications consulted.

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II. BACKGROUND

Prevalence and Public Perception of Corruption

The Heritage Foundation, in its Index of Economic Freedom Report (2010), cites a June 2009

public survey that shows that two-thirds of the surveyed population believes that corruption is

becoming more rampant, and nearly half of the respondents have been directly affected by

corruption. This is also supported in the Bertelsmann Foundation 2010 Index, according to

which, there has been a general public outcry over the serious corruption which flourishes in all

sectors, and an increasing number of people has started to demand that the government increase

the fight against corruption. Similarly, according to a study carried out in 2007 by the Ministry

of Public Administration and State Reform, a large number of citizens surveyed believe that

bribery (52%), extortion (56%), nepotism (44%), misuse of public funds (46%), and illicit

enrichment (39%) are widespread or very widespread (see Table 1).

Table 1: Citizens’ Perception of Prevalence of Corrupt Practices in Burkina Faso

Bribery

%

Extortion

%

Nepotism

%

Embezzlement

and diversion of funds

%

Illicit

enrichment

%

Inexistent 16 7 18 12 16

Limited 17 16 20 21 22

Rather

widespread

15 21 18 21 23

Widespread 20 27 19 21 18

Very

widespread

32 29 25 25 21

Total 100 100 100 100 100 Source: Etude sur les pratiques de corruption dans l’administration publique au Burkina Faso,

Rapport Provisoire, Décembre 2007.

In contrast, the same survey revealed that public officials’ are under the impression that bribery

(44%), extortion (42%), nepotism (42%), misuse of public funds (24%), and illicit enrichment

(25%) are widespread or very widespread (see Table 2), revealing a significant difference

between citizens’ and public officials’ perception of the prevalence of corrupt practices in

Burkina Faso.

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Table 2: Public Officials’ Perception of Prevalence of Corrupt Practices in Burkina Faso

Bribery

%

Extortion

%

Nepotism

%

Embezzlement

and diversion of funds

%

Illicit

enrichment %

Inexistent 16 23 24 32 30

Limited 26 18 19 23 32

Rather

widespread

15 17 15 21 14

Widespread 25 16 17 14 14

Very

widespread

19 26 25 10 11

Total 100 100 100 100 100 Source: Etude sur les pratiques de corruption dans l’administration publique au Burkina Faso,

Rapport Provisoire, Décembre 2007.

Policy and Legal Framework

Government Strategies

In response to the high level of corruption, the government launched in 2004 the National

Anti-Corruption Policy (NACP) which was adopted in 2006. The NACP aims at strengthening

regulatory and legal measures, making existing monitoring systems and law enforcement more

effective, improving the efficiency and transparency of public services, strengthening

international cooperation and improving civic participation in the fight against corruption.

However, the NACP is a general document with limited underlying analysis and little mention of

specific sectors. It is also weak on concrete implementation and monitoring processes. The

NACP was not endorsed by civil society organizations and donors did not participate in the

validation workshop which was held to present the NACP. As a result, no follow-up

implementation plan was elaborated. In 2010, a revised draft policy was prepared which was

virtually similar to that of 2006. Donors provided their consolidated comments to the ASCE and

suggested some improvements. Currently, the ASCE is updating the NACP; however no

consultations have taken place with external institutions to ensure that the updated policy enjoys

a broad consensus. The donors are waiting for the revised NACP to be made public and have

taken the decision to place more emphasis and importance on the implementation plan – once it

will be elaborated – in order not to delay any further the operationalization of the NACP.

Legislation

There is no comprehensive law that governs anti-corruption in Burkina Faso. However,

Articles 154 to 160 of the Penal Code criminalize corruption, embezzlement, abuse of office and

conflict of interest in the public sector (see Box 1). Currently, with financing from the African

Development Bank (AfDB), the ASCE is carrying out a study of all legal texts and laws that

relate to anti-corruption in Burkina Faso. REN-LAC – the coalition of anti-corruption NGOs - is

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currently preparing a proposal for a new comprehensive anti-corruption law which aims at

aligning Burkina’s Penal Code to the UNCAC.

Box 1: Articles Related to Corruption and Similar Misconduct

The Penal Code in Burkina Faso criminalizes the following practices:

Embezzlement and misappropriation of public funds (Article 154)

Extortion (Article 155)

Active and passive corruption (Articles 156 to 159)

Conflict of interest (Articles 161 and 162)

Illicit enrichment (Article 160)

Receipt of stolen goods (Articles 208 and 310)

Fraud in public exams (Article 312)

In addition, there is a specific law that covers money laundering (Law Number 026-2006/AN of 28

November 2006).

According to the Business Anti-Corruption Portal, Burkina Faso is a member of the West

African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) as well as the Groupe Intergouvernemental

d’Action contre le Blanchissement d’Argent en Afrique de l’Ouest (GIABA, Inter-

Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa), and has criminalized

money laundering in accordance with these memberships by passing Law No. 26 Concerning the

Fight Against Money Laundering in 2006. Sanctions for corruption range from fines and/or

imprisonment to the removal of civic rights. Active and passive bribery offenders can be fined

twice the value of bribes promised, received or demanded, but no less than FCFA 600,000.

Moreover, Burkina Faso has both signed and ratified the African Union Convention on

Preventing and Combating Corruption as well as the United Nations Convention against

Corruption (UNCAC).

Lastly, the government has also taken sector specific anti-corruption action which, according to

the US Department of State 2010, included the establishment of a new 11-member Brigade

Nationale Anti-Fraude de l'or (BNAF, Gold Anti-Fraud Squad) in January 2008. This was

backed by specific legislation allowing the BNAF to regulate gold marketing and curb fraud

cases.

Freedom of Information (FOI) and whistleblower protection laws are lacking in Burkina

Faso: The absence of these two necessary laws is a severe impediment to fighting corruption in

the country. Though, in Burkina Faso, the legal framework for freedom of information – as a

fundamental right to all citizens - is established by its Constitution and the Information Code of

1993 regulates the right to information specifically in the domain of professional journalism, a

proper FOI law which includes processes and mechanisms for accessing information is still

lacking. Furthermore, not all the reports of the oversight agencies are accessible to both civil

society and media and those that are, are only disclosed after much delay.

6

At the local level, Burkina Faso has passed a Local Government Code (Article 11) which gives

citizens the right to information on local management. This right may be implemented through

public debates on projects or local development programs, access to budgets and accounts,

participation in council discussions (except for in camera sessions), and publication of council

deliberations and decisions. Individuals may obtain a copy of these documents at their own

expense. Yet the latter measures constitute mere suggestions and the enforcement of the right to

information is left to local governments’ discretion.

Recommendations:

The NACP should be finalized as soon as possible and a participatory, consultative

process should be established to elaborate both the action plan to implement the NACP

and the monitoring mechanism to track implementation progress.

Based on the forthcoming review of anti-corruption laws, a harmonization and

streamlining effort should be undertaken to consolidate and harmonize all anti-corruption

laws in Burkina Faso.

A feasibility study should be carried out to explore options for developing a Freedom of

Information framework which would include establishing information management,

administrative systems and legislation in place to deal with FOI requests.

Whistleblower laws should be drafted and submitted to Parliament for approval. The

Réseau Burkindi should be consulted early on in order to ensure their support in

Parliament for the approval of the laws. In addition, libel and defamation laws applicable

to journalists - which often restrict them from disclosing information/stimulating public

comment on corruption cases - should be revised.

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III. COMPLAINT HANDLING MECHANISMS

In Burkina Faso, there are several public institutions that manage complaint handling

mechanisms. They include (i) the ASCE which deals with issues related to corruption, (ii) the

ARMP which receives complaints related to public procurement, (iii) the Ombudsman who

mediates between citizens and public administrations on administrative issues, and (iv) the REN-

LAC a network of civil society organizations which operates a hotline for citizens who have

been victims of corruption (see Annex IV for a comparative summary of the different

institutions). Finally, there is the traditional conflict resolution practice which is usually led by

the village chief and is known as the “arbre à palabres” (the tree of words) where villagers

would gather to address their grievances and the conflict would be resolved through customary

practices.

Public Complaint Handling Mechanisms

Autorité Supérieure de Contrôle d’Etat (ASCE, High Authority for State Oversight)

The ASCE is the anti-corruption structure established in 2007 under the Prime Minister's

Office. It merged the Haute Autorité de Coordination de la Lutte Contre la Corruption

(HACLC, High Commission for the Coordination of Anti-Corruption Activities) which was

established by President Compaoré in late 2001, the Inspecteur Général d'Etat (IGS, General

State Inspectorate) and the National Commission for the Fight Against Fraud. The head of the

ASCE is the Contrôleur Général d’Etat (CGE) who enjoys the rank of Minister. The ASCE was

given a larger mandate than the HACLC and is able to investigate corruption cases. In addition

to releasing annual reports from internal auditing entities, the ASCE is mandated to refer

substantiated cases either to the prosecutor’s office for criminal acts or to the relevant Ministries

and public institutions for administrative breeches. However, the law establishing the ASCE

does not specify the length of the tenure of the CGE and, if and how he can be removed from his

position. It merely states that he is appointed by decree by the Prime Minister.

The ASCE’s success depends on cooperative relationships with other public institutions. For this reason, it has established a Cadre de concertation (Forum for Policy Dialogue) which is

an annual meeting between the ASCE and other public oversight institutions during which the

agencies share their next year’s work plans (see Box 2 for agencies who participate in the Cadre

de concertation meeting).

8

Box 2: Cadre de concertation – Forum for a Policy Dialogue

The forum for a policy dialogue has the mandate to:

Coordinate the activities of the different control entities

Approve the annual activities reports of each control entity

Harmonize the intervention methods

Promote the enforcement of International Control standards

Highlight obstacles to an effective implementation of planned activities and the functioning of the

entities

Make recommendations

The composition of the forum consists of the following institutions:

Institutions that are permanent members:

Supreme Control Institutions (Institutions Supérieures de Contrôle)

General Inspectorate of Finance (Inspection Générale des Finances)

General Inspectorate of the Ministries’ Services (Inspection Générale des Services des Ministères-

IGS)

Technical Inspectorate of the Ministries’ Services (Inspection Techniques des Services des

Ministères – ITS)

Directorate General of Financial Control (Direction Générale du Contrôle Financier - DGCF)

Institutions having observer status:

The Court of Auditors (La Cour des Comptes)

The National Coordination of the Fight Against Fraud (La Coordination Nationale de Lutte contre la

Fraude)

The National Financial Information Management Unit (La Cellule Nationale de Traitement de

l’Information Financière – CENTIF)

The Public Procurement Regulatory Agency (L’Autorité de Régulation des Marchés Publics –

ARMP)

Source: Décret Number 2011-700/PRES/PM

The Inspection Générale des Finances (IGF, General Inspectorate of Finance) is a key

partner of the ASCE and carries out internal audits. The IGF carries out audits based on

specific requests from public institutions, and agreements with donors to audit their programs. It

sends individual audit reports to the ASCE however, it does not receive any feedback from the

ASCE on the status of the audit reports it has submitted. Since the IGF does not produce an

annual report, the only opportunity for information sharing is during the annual “Cadre de

concertation” meeting. The IGF’s capacities have considerably reinforced since 2007: it has

now more than double the number of staff and is located in new offices that are spacious and

functional. This progress has also been reflected in the improvement of the PEFA Indicator 21

on efficiency of internal control system which has moved from C+ (2007 PEFA) to B+ (2010

PEFA).

9

In addition, the ASCE has several informal partners which include civil society organizations

(CSOs) (see Box 4). It organizes an annual meeting with these CSOs and shares with them its

annual report of activities.

Box 4: ASCE’s Civil Society Partners

Le Comité National d’Ethique (CNE)

Le Centre pour la Gouvernance Démocratique (CGD)

Le Secrétariat Permanent de la Politique Nationale de Bonne Gouvernance (SP-PNBG)

Le Réseau des Parlementaires Burkinabè pour la Lutte contre la Corruption (BURKINDI), Section du

Réseau des Parlementaires Africains contre la Corruption (APNAC)

Le Réseau National de Lutte Anti-Corruption (REN-LAC)

Le Réseau Africain des Journalistes pour l’Intégrité et la Transparence (RAJIT)

L’Association de Culture Civique et de Défense des Droits Humains et Sociaux (CEDEV)

Le Centre pour l’Ethique Judiciaire (CEJ)

L'Association des Artistes Africains pour la Solidarité (AAAS)

La Commission Episcopale « Justice et Paix »

L’Agence Conseil en Communication Information et Edition (VITAL.COM)

L’Ordre des Médecins du Burkina

The ASCE receives complaints from several sources. Citizens come in person to the ASCE to

file a complaint, write letters, and call its hotline. The ASCE also scans the media to monitor

stories about corruption. However, most of the investigations that it carries out are requests from

the Prime Minister’s office (in 2010, this constituted 60% of ASCE’s investigations).

Furthermore, in order to better refine the scope of its investigations/audit missions, the ASCE -

with support from the Bank - has introduced a risk-based audit approach which aims at focusing

audit work on the higher areas of risk which may hinder the achievement of management

objectives, expected outputs and results. The approach started with three pilot ministries

(education, health and infrastructure) and later was extended to three additional ones (energy,

social affairs and agriculture).

While there is a real appetite from the population to use the hotline as evidenced by the

increasing number of calls received (approximately 500 in 2009 and 800 in 2010), currently the

hotline is not functioning (see Box 5). The ASCE does not have a database for its complaints,

therefore accurate statistics for source and type of complaints is unavailable.

Though several investigations are carried out annually, follow up by ASCE remains weak. In 2010, the ASCE conducted risk-based audits of 23 public entities which revealed misuse of

public funds in six of them. In addition, it received from the different ministerial inspectorates

442 files which revealed that in 43 of them there was misuse of funds. Out of the 43, only three

were referred to the prosecutor’s office for criminal sanctions (see Annex V for ASCE cases

refereed to justice). All the remaining cases were referred to the concerned ministries for

administrative sanctions. Based on its findings, the ASCE also provides recommendations to

public institutions on how to improve their procedures. The ASCE does not follow up and

monitor whether the administrative sanctions were implemented. On the other hand, it monitors

10

the implementation of its recommendations by either physical follow up (20%) or by sending

formal letters inquiring on the implementation of its recommendations (80%). In 2010, 291 out

of the 338 recommendations (i.e., 86%) were implemented by the concerned ministries.

Box 5: ASCE’s Hotline (80001102)

ASCE has a hotline which has stopped functioning in 2011. The hotline was linked to an answering

machine which recorded complaints. Several difficulties were noted:

1. Callers dialed ASCE’s number by mistake (its hotline number is very similar to other toll free

numbers such as the one for HIV/AIDS and callers left messages regarding HIV/AIDS).

2. Callers didn’t necessarily wait for the “beep” to start talking which meant that the messages that were

recorded were incomplete.

3. The tape has a limited capacity and since ASCE staff checked it periodically, some callers would call

but were unable to leave a message because the tape was full.

4. There were technical problems with the phone company and the line was disconnected several times

which discouraged citizens to call back since they assumed that the phone line was not functional.

5. Callers would hang up when they got the answering machine because culturally, citizens prefer to talk

to someone instead of leaving recorded messages.

The ASCE is considering the following possible solutions:

Linking up the hotline to a computer so that there is unlimited capacity to register messages.

Outsourcing the hotline function to a company (e.g. mobile phone companies) which would take

messages on behalf of ASCE.

Recruiting and training staff within ASCE who would answer phone calls and register the complaints.

The ASCE is also contemplating changing the number of the hotline to distinguish it from other toll free

numbers. One idea is to have an easy-to-remember number which corresponds to a word (s) associated

with fighting corruption. This new number could be selected on the basis of a national competition

through which citizens would submit a number. This national competition to create a new toll-free

number could serve another purpose: raising public awareness regarding the ASCE.

The ASCE carries out sensitization and outreach activities but lacks a comprehensive

communication strategy. The ASCE publishes annual reports, thereby promoting governmental

transparency and accountability (the most recent one which is publicly available is that of 2010).

It also carries out sensitization and awareness raising activities both in Ouagadougou and in the

provinces. However, it lacks a comprehensive communication strategy which would increase its

visibility and enhance public support. Such a communication strategy would improve the

ASCE’s image which is somewhat tarnished by the weak follow up to its investigations. The

public has a poor understanding of the different mandates of the oversight agencies and is

unaware that sanctions are outside the ASCE’s mandate. It would also raise public awareness

regarding corruption, raise awareness regarding ASCE and how to contact it, protect ASCE from

political interference, and put pressure on institutions responsible for follow up (e.g., CdC and

the judicial system).

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The ASCE faces challenges in recruiting well-qualified staff. In 2011, it was only at the third

round of recruitment that the ASCE succeeded in attracting qualified staff into its ranks. Even

though positions at the ASCE are better remunerated than other posts in the public administration

(except for judges), public servants are not interested in applying for a post at the ASCE. This is

partly explained by the fact that ASCE staff – unlike other public servants – are not allowed to

take consulting contracts. In addition, the requirements that staff have to be under 47 years of age

and have at least 15 years of experience as Category 1 in the public administration limits the pool

of eligible candidates. ASCE staff are subject to integrity reviews prior to their recruitment and

have to declare their assets. They enjoy appropriate immunity from civil litigation.

The ASCE does not have performance indicators. It is important to distinguish between (a)

the level of corruption in a given country or district, and (b) how well certain core anticorruption

functions are performed. In principle, the two are related, but the latter is essentially an output

measure. Box 6 includes examples of performance indicators. It would be easier to monitor

these indicators if the ASCE has a comprehensive database.

Box 6: Examples of Performance Indicators for ASCE

Numbers of investigations started or completed

Percentage of cases investigated that are brought to judgment

Percentage of complaints that resulted in administrative remedies

Specific institutional changes in response to complaints that result in greater transparency

Percentage of requests for information that are granted (and that are granted on appeal); and

Positive public opinion polls on the performance of the ASCE

The ASCE did not have an Operational Manual. It also lacked an organigram that clearly

defined the roles and responsibilities of its staff. During the mission, an Operational Manual

(OM) was elaborated in a consultative and participatory manner and was later validated in a one-

day workshop (see Box 7). The OM detailed the activities and responsibilities for each step in a

Complaint Handling Mechanism (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Complaint Handling Mechanism Sequence of Activities

UptakeSorting and Processing

Acknowledgment and Follow up

InvestigationMonitoring and

EvaluationFeedback

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Box 7: An Operational Manual for the ASCE

The Operational Manual was developed and a one-day validation workshop with the ASCE and its

partners took place. The meeting was well-attended and that the participants contributed substantively.

The next steps are the following:

The ASCE’s Secretary-General will present the Operational Manual during the annual Cadre de

concertation meeting in early December.

The CHM initiative in Burkina Faso and the ASCE’s Operational Manual will be presented

during the Fiduciary Forum next spring.

The ASCE’s Comptrolleur Général d’Etat will present the CHM initiative at the International

Corruption Hunters’ Alliance (ICHA) meeting which will be held next June.

The week following the Cadre de concertation another technical meeting should be held with

ASCE’s Controlleurs d’Etat and the AfDB’s consultant to refine the forms in the Operational

Manual and simplify them if need be. The AfDB’s consultant should be familiar with the

Operational Manual and the information system and database that he will develop should reflect

the forms in the Operational Manual.

Organize a training for all ASCE staff on Operational Manual.

Share Operational Manual with all of ASCE’s partners (formal, observers, and CSOs).

Recommendations:

Revise legal framework and organic law to strengthen the ASCE’s independence.

Establish a unit (cellule) and train staff on accepting and recording complaints

Re-activate the hotline and explore expanding the possibility of receiving complaints via

the internet and possibly via SMS

Develop a template for ASCE’s annual report (which includes key performance

statistics).

Develop a monitoring system for the ASCE to follow up on implementation of

recommendations given to Ministries and on referrals regarding administrative and

criminal sanctions. This monitoring system (simple tables) should also be included in the

information system that the AfDB consultant is developing for the ASCE.

Organize a visit by the ASCE (and the consultant recruited to design ASCE’s database) to

the Ombudsman’s office to examine the Ombudsman’s database system and discuss

lessons learned that could be applied to the design of the ASCE’s database.

Establish website and publish annual report and information on how to contact ASCE.

Provide technical assistance/training to train communication staff on writing press

releases and develop their communication techniques.

Provide technical assistance for improving the documentation and filing systems. The

files would need to be scanned and filed in a secure place.

Strengthen and reinforce the Cadre de concertation by more regular meetings and by

signing a MoU between the ASCE and its partners which would outline the type and

frequency of information exchange among the oversight institutions.

Include the Ombudsman as Observer in the Cadre de concertation

Encourage the ASCE to present its mandate and activities to the Ombudsman’s

decentralized representatives during their annual meeting.

13

Sign MoU between ASCE and all agencies who participate in the Cadre de concertation

Develop a simple fiche that includes all the information that the ASCE would need from

its partner institutions that they would fill out and include as a cover to the full report that

they send to the ASCE. This would simplify ASCE’s task to compile the data it needs to

produce its annual report and reduce the risk of errors.

Sign MoU between ASCE and INT for sharing information (e.g., the World Bank would

provide the ASCE the list of projects being financed in Burkina Faso and the ASCE

would share with the Bank list of allegations/investigations related to Bank financing).

Build ASCE’s investigative capacities; explore training possibilities at the International

Academy in Vienna and twinning with other anti-corruption agencies.

Autorité de Regulation des Marchés Publics (ARMP, Public Procurement Regulatory Agency)

The Autorité de Regulation des Marchés Publics (ARMP, Public Procurement Regulatory

Agency) was set up in April 2008 and aims at establishing and enforcing bidding criteria,

as well as ensuring free access to government contracts, equality in the bidding process and

overall transparency. The ARMP is made up of three entities: the Permanent Secretary, the

Conseil de régulation des marchés publics (CRMP, Council for the Regulation of Public

Procurement), and the Comité de Règlement de Différends (CRD, Committee to Settle

Differences). The CRMP is made up of twelve members who represent the government (4), the

private sector (4) and civil society organizations (4) and who are nominated by the Council of

Ministers. The ARMP has the authority to impose sanctions which can vary from one to five

years, initiate lawsuits and publish the names of fraudulent or offending companies on its

blacklist. Bids are published in local papers, international magazines, e-mailed to interested

foreign and local investors and published on the Internet on websites such as www.tradepoint.bf

and www.dgmarket.com. The last annual report which is publicly available is dated 2009. The

2010 report still has to be submitted to the Prime Minister before it can be published.

Box 8: Regulation of Public Procurement in Burkina Faso

Procurement by central authorities, state companies and local and regional authorities is regulated by the

decree of 7 March 1996. The new procurement rules came into effect in July 2008, aiming to increase

transparency and efficiency in the public procurement system. Under the new rules, any procurement

contract below FCFA 1 million only requires a purchase order. For a procurement contract that equals

FCFA 1 million or above, but below FCFA 20 million, a publication in the Government Procedure

Review and a letter of purchase is needed. Any procurement contract worth FCFA 20 million or above is

mandated to have an open invitation. The Direction Générale des Marchés Publics (DGMP, Directorate

General of Government Procurement) within the Ministry of Finance has exclusive power over the

awarding and performance of public contracts, and the monitoring of compliance with the relevant

legislation. The DGMP also maintains an online database where companies can search for public

procurements for relevant tenders.

Source: http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/sub-saharan-africa/burkina-faso/

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According to the WAEMU Directives, the ARMP should establish a hotline in order to receive

complaints (anonymous, if the complainant wishes). However, even though the ARMP has an

assigned toll-free number, it has never functioned. The only means of lodging a complaint to the

ARMP is in person. Once the complainant formally fills out and signs a complaint form, then

the Comité de Règlement des Différends addresses and resolves the complaint (see Box 9).

Box 9: Comité de Règlement des Différends (CRD)

The Comité de Règlement des Différends was established in 2008 and is made up of five members

representing the government, the private sector and civil society. These five members are selected as

follows: three from the CRMP, each one representing the government, the private sector and civil society

and two selected from a pre-established list (which is updated every year) of eight lawyers and eight

technical experts. This brings the total number of potential CRD members to 28 persons. The CRD’s

purpose is to respond to complaints arising from the public procurement process. Its President is always a

representative from the ARMP and its Vice-President comes from the private sector. The representatives

from the private sector and civil society are rotated every month. The complainants have five working

days from the date of the publication of the awarded contracts to file their complaint which have to be

done in person and in writing. The CRD has seven working days to resolve the complaint in order not to

slow down the procurement process. The CRD can also blacklist a company and the blacklist is available

on the DGMP’s website. The temporary suspension can last from one to five years. The CRD’s

decisions are immediately executed and it may also refer cases to the prosecutor.

According to private sector representatives, the establishment of the CRD is an improvement to the

procurement process because it provides an opportunity (i) to lodge a complaint if one is dissatisfied with

the process; and (ii) to learn about procurement rules and procedures (“perdant mais soulagé” – losing but

relieved). However, not all of the CRD’s members are familiar with good public procurement practices.

Their frequent rotation also poses a challenge for ensuring continuity when reviewing the complaints and

for building their capacity.

Recommendations:

Increase transparency of procurement process by publishing on DGMP’s website not

only the original tenders but also all future amendments and modifications to the

contracts.

Include on the DGMP’s website information and link to INT.

Implement the WAEMU’s recommendation by establishing a functioning hotline at the

ARMP.

Sign a MoU between the World Bank and the ARMP which details the procurement rules

of the World Bank and ensures that all complaints received related to Bank- financing are

shared immediately with the World Bank. In case of complaints related to corruption,

these should be forwarded immediately to INT.

Train and increase the capacity of CRD members to review procurement processes. A

special training on World Bank procurement processes and guidelines should be offered

to CRD members.

On a quarterly basis, the CRD should analyze the trends in complaints and produce

recommendations to the DGMP and ARMP.

15

Review the CRD’s organizational set up and explore lengthening the tenure of the

members on the CRD committee (i) to ensure greater continuity in reviewing the

complaints; (ii) to make sure that capacity building efforts are worthwhile; and (iii) to

improve the balance of power and information between governmental and non-

governmental representatives in the CRD.

Elaborate an Operational Manual for the CRD.

Carry out an evaluation of the CRD.

Le Médiateur du Faso (Office of the Ombudsman)

The Office of the Ombudsman was established by law in 1994 and handles written

complaints against the public administration from the public. If the Ombudsman receives a

complaint that is justified, the Ombudsman may not only instruct the relevant agency to initiate

disciplinary procedures but also can take action against the public servant. In addition, the

Ombudsman may order the administration at fault to revise its decision or make proposals for

improvements in the operation of the state agency in question. Furthermore, if the concerned

agency fails to respond satisfactorily to the Ombudsman’s injunctions, the latter can inform the

President of Burkina Faso in a special report or in the annual report. In theory, the Ombudsman

may also suggest legislative, regulatory or administrative reforms it deems in the general interest

in order to remedy harmful situations recorded during its intervention and to avoid their

recurrence. However, according to the “Local Governance and Accountability in Africa” report,

the Office of the Ombudsman lacks the necessary resources and independence to perform its

duties. In practice, the Ombudsman’s recommendations are seldom followed.

The Ombudsman is appointed by the President for a non-renewable five-year term and cannot be

removed during this term. The Ombudsman is the only complaint handling mechanism that has a

decentralized structure and has offices in 9 of the 13 regions and are planning to expand into two

new regions in the near future. It has received technical assistance from the Wallon Ombusdman

in Belgium with whom it has a twinning relationship. The technical assistance established a

database and elaborated an Operational Manual for the Ombudsman of Burkina Faso. As a result,

the reports generated by the Ombudsman’s offices (both the central and decentralized ones)

provide data on the number and type of complaints; whether they were justified and successfully

mediated, the geographical origin and are even disaggregated by gender. The latest available

annual report reveals that in 2009, the Ombudsman received 529 cases out of which 141

(approximately 27%) were successfully mediated.

Citizens can lodge their complaint in person or via the internet. They may also contact the

Ombudsman via their elected representative (mainly for the requirement of having an address to

send official correspondence). One condition that the Ombudsman places on citizens is that

prior to complaining they have to contact the concerned public entity and attempt to resolve their

grievance. If they do not receive a response and/or are not satisfied with the government’s reply,

then they may request the mediation services of the Ombudsman’s offices. The Ombudsman can

also initiate an investigation based on information reported in the media (e.g., unexplained death

of someone in prison). Alternatively, the government may also request the services of the

Ombudsman.

16

If the complaint relates to corruption, the Ombudsman may send the case to the Prime Minister’s

office. It is then up to the Prime Minister’s Office to forward the file to the ASCE for further

investigations. The Ombudsman does not communicate directly with the ASCE and some of the

decentralized offices are even unaware of the existence of the ASCE.4

The Ombudsman’s decentralized representatives implement outreach activities in several

creative ways, in effect acting as mobile Ombudsman. Before visiting the districts, they

announce their trip on the local radio so that citizens are aware of their upcoming visit if they

would like to avail of their services. They also use the “crieur public” the person who during

market days makes announcements on the loudspeaker. They also participate in local radio

shows and involve and inform the traditional leaders of their activities. Some of the challenges

faced by the decentralized offices are insufficient means to carry out field visits (they do not

have cars and have to get prior permission and funding from HQ before undertaking a field

visit). Another challenge is the high illiteracy among the population which means they are

unable to fill the forms and read the brochures that explain the role of the Ombudsman.

Recommendations:

Assess Ombudsman’s capacities to receive and mediate grievances at the project level

and explore possibility to link the project’s CHM to the Ombudsman.

Assess the capacity of the Ombudsman’s decentralized offices to act as a channel of

complaints related to corruption at the decentralized level which would be channeled to

the ASCE in Ougadougou.

Include the Ombudsman in the Cadre de concertation with “observer” status.

Explore the possibility of having the Ombudsman forward directly to the ASCE the

alleged corruption cases instead of forwarding them to the Prime Minister’s office.

Encourage the ASCE to present its mandate and activities to the Ombudsman’s

decentralized representatives during their annual meeting.

Organize a visit by the ASCE (and the consultant recruited to design ASCE’s database) to

the Ombudsman’s office to examine the Ombudsman’s database system and discuss

lessons learned that could be applied to the design of the ASCE’s database.

Civil Society Complaint Handling Initiatives

Réseau National de Lutte Anti-Corruption (REN-LAC, National Network to Fight Against

Corruption). The REN-LAC is a network of civil society organizations established in 1997. It

manages the only functioning telephone hotline (80001122) where acts of corruption can be

reported. In addition to callers, REN-LAC receives complaints through letters and by walk-in

persons. It also scans the media to follow up on articles reporting on corruption. They carry out

their own undercover investigation (“dans la peau” method) by approaching the concerned public

administration and verifying if a bribe is indeed requested for a certain service. Once they verify

the allegation, they write a letter to the concerned public administration and try to meet with

4 For example, in Ouahigouya, the Ombudsman’s representative did not know what was the ASCE and when asked

if he received an allegation of corruption what he would do, he replied that he would refer the citizen to REN-LAC.

17

managers to address the issue. If after a month there is no concrete response from the

administration, they apply pressure by mobilizing public opinion through the media. They

usually do not refer the cases they investigate to the ASCE. According to REN-LAC, for

citizens to complain they have to trust the organization, be certain that there would be a follow

up to their complaint, and not be afraid of retaliation which is guaranteed only when the

organization does not reveal the identity of the complainant. REN-LAC has observed that it is

only those citizens who are requested to pay a bribe but are dissatisfied with the service provided

who lodge a complaint. REN-LAC does not have a database and therefore does not have

statistics on source and type of complaints. In 2010, it investigated approximately 20 allegations

of corruption. It carries out extensive communication activities including publishing articles in

newspapers, participating in radio and TV shows, producing plays for children and adults, and

publishing comic books for children to sensitize the public on corruption in Burkina Faso.

Mouvement Burkinabé des Droits de l'Homme et des Peuples (MBDHP)

The MBDHP is a civil society organization that receives complaints addressing human rights

issues, family disputes, torture, etc. Until December 2010, they had 11 “boutiques d’écoute” at

the decentralized level which they closed down due to lack of funding. They still operate two

“centres d’écoute” in Ougadougou where citizens can walk in and seek legal advice.

18

IV. THE BALANCE BETWEEN STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS: THE ROLE

OF NON-STATE ACTORS

In order to ensure an effective national complaint handling mechanism, it is important to

involve several non-state actors. Civil society organizations are key for advocating greater

transparency and accountability. Also, given the importance of communication, close

collaboration with the media is essential. The media can keep the pressure in order to ensure that

sanctions are applied and that a culture of impunity does not settle in the country. Similarly, the

private sector has a big role to play since companies can be the perpetrators as well as the victims

of corruption and are the main complainants when it comes to public procurement. Finally,

establishing a good dialogue with members of Parliament helps in passing the laws necessary to

enhance a public CHM as well as to ensure appropriate oversight over the executive. Box 10

provides an example of how coordinated efforts among different non-state actors pushed the

public administration to follow up on a case of corruption and impose sanctions in Burkina Faso.

Box 10: “The Billions of the CNSS” Affair

The case of the billions of FCFA missing from the Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale (CNSS)

illustrates how concerted efforts by civil society organizations and the media can lead the government to

take corrective action and sanction high-ranking officials involved in corruption. The alarm was first

raised by the labor union before it was relayed to REN-LAC, then the press. After an article “Where have

the billions at the CNSS disappeared?” published in Le Pays and another article written by REN-LAC and

published in L’Observateur Paalga, REN-LAC was invited by the Minster of Labor and Social Security

to discuss the issue. Thanks to the joint efforts of the labor union, the media and REN-LAC which

galvanized public opinion, the Government undertook an audit which led to the removal of the CNSS’

Director-General from his position. However, and unfortunately, no other sanctions were imposed in

spite of the seriousness of the scheme and the large funds that disappeared.

Source: REN-LAC. 2007. Etat de la Corruption au Burkina Faso, Rapport 2006.

Civil Society Organizations

Burkina Faso has a strong civil society consisting of a diverse landscape of interest groups

dominated by unions, student associations and human rights organizations. As a rule, the

government respects the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of assembly and association. The

majority of the country's civil society organizations have adopted a code of conduct and a

national review committee has been set up to publish a list of those organizations that have

adhered to the code. There are numerous civic organizations, sometimes in cooperation with the

parliamentary opposition and the media that succeed in shaping economic and social welfare

policy. However, power to influence is reduced when it comes to issues such as impunity, the

courts or corruption. Several donors are developing the capacities of CSOs to utilize public

reports (e.g., ASCE and CdC’s annual reports) for monitoring and advocating for greater budget

transparency and follow up to the findings published in these reports. As mentioned earlier, in

Burkina Faso the leading anti-corruption NGO is REN-LAC (see Box 11).

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Box 11: REN-LAC: the Anti-Corruption NGO in Burkina Faso

The Réseau National de Lutte Anti-Corruption (REN-LAC) is Burkina Faso’s nationwide anti-corruption

network of more than 30 civil society organizations that have placed the fight against corruption on the

national agenda by campaigning for good governance and transparency in public administration. The

group publishes annual reports on the state of corruption in the country (in French only) and has

established a wide range of anti-corruption initiatives and tools, such as the Prix de la Lutte Anti-

Corruption (Anti-Corruption Award), which honors investigative journalism that exposes corruption in

the media. It is well-known in Burkina Faso and has a close relationship with Transparency International.

Media

Freedom of the press is provided by Article 8 of the Constitution of Burkina Faso and is

largely respected in practice. In general, the press can criticize the government without reprisal,

and foreign radio stations can operate freely with no government interference. Furthermore, the

government-controlled media are allowed to have significant participation in their programming

from people with opposition views. Access to the Internet is not restricted and no sites are known

to be blocked by the government. However, according to Freedom House, due to poor

infrastructure and poverty, only over one percent of the total population had access to the

Internet in 2009. Freedom of expression is permitted provided that the President and his

entourage are not challenged. The murder of journalist and newspaper editor Norbert Zongo,

who was killed in 1998 while investigating a case involving high-ranking political personalities,

testifies to the persistence of clear limits on investigating corruption. According to the

Bertelsmann Foundation 2010, journalists who investigate high-level corruption cases are

particularly exposed to threats, and there are reports of journalists being occasionally sued by the

government under the libel law. The Réseau Africains des Journalistes pour l'Intégrité et la

Transparence (RAJIT), a pan-African network of approximately 100 journalists, established their

Burkina chapter in 2005 which has around 10 members. RAJIT has received training from

RENLAC, UNDP, and EITI on corruption, investigative journalism, and monitoring of elections.

Private Sector

The private sector is both a perpetrator and a victim of poor public procurement

procedures and corruption. The government, in an attempt to reduce bureaucracy and related

opportunities for bribery and the use of facilitation payments, has set up Enterprise Registration

Centers under the Maison de l'Entreprise du Burkina Faso (MEBF), designed as one-stop shops

for business registration. These newly developed centers have simplified registration formalities

and eliminated obstacles relating to opening a business. This initiative reduces approval fees and

combines five separate payments into one. The MEBF is a membership-based organization of

more than 700 private sector companies and associations (e.g., Chamber of Commerce). More

than 20,000 companies have used its services which are included in its database.

20

Box 12: Private Sector Good Governance Initiative

At the initiative of Shell-Burkina, a workshop was held in 2004 on good governance in the private sector.

Around 100 multinational and national companies (primarily from the oil industry) participated, and it

was decided to launch a private sector code of conduct in which companies would be required to comply

with national legislation, introduce specific anti-corruption rules, monitor the practice of giving gifts, etc.

In April 2004, this code of conduct was adopted by civil society organizations.

Source: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre

However, in Burkina Faso there is rampant use of fraudulent documents and the SMEs do not

always know good procurement practices. The police recently dismantled a whole network of

persons who provided fraudulent stamps, letterheads, certificates, etc… However, fraudulent

practices continue as noted by both the CRD as well as Country Office staff. As the CRD’s

capacities are developed and as allegations of corruption will increasingly be communicated to

INT - it is hoped – a larger number of companies will be sanctioned.

It is important to balance the sanctioning of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) with

building their capacity and knowledge regarding good procurement practices. In Burkina

Faso, many SME are owned by illiterate persons. They use agents to assist them in responding to

tenders. In Bukina Faso, there is the opportunity to build the capacity of the private sectors

through two ongoing projects: the Bagré Growth Pole and the Projet d’Appui à la Competitivité

et Développement de l’Entreprise (PACDE).

Recommendations:

Carry out outreach activities targeting the private sector to raise their awareness regarding

INT and the World Bank’s cross-debarment agreements with the other multilateral

development banks, especially the AfDB.

With the ARMP and MEBF, provide training on good procurement and practices.

Establish a compliance unit within MEBF to monitor companies that have been

blacklisted by the CRD/World Bank.

Use the two private sector projects – the Bagré Growth Pole and the Projet d’Appui à la

Competitivité et Développement de l’Entreprise (PACDE) – to develop training modules,

brochures, and a system for SME compliance.

Parliament

The Parliament does not exercise fully its oversight role over the executive. For example,

the Parliament does not organize a session to discuss the annual reports of the Cour des Comptes

or the ASCE and does not exercise its oversight role of the executive to question the several

irregularities that are revealed in the public reports. This is reflected in the 2010 PEFA which

rates “C” the indicator thus confirming this weakness. The Réseau Burkindi is the African

Parliamentarians' Network Against Corruption (APNAC) chapter in Burkina Faso. It was

established in 2008 and has 45 Members of Parliament (out of a total of 111). It is an all-party

parliamentary anti-corruption coalition and has a close collaboration with the REN-LAC on

different anti-corruption pilot projects. The Réseau Burkindi is planning to propose the

21

establishment of a special court to deal with corruption cases. It is also planning to set a up a

Commission for fighting corruption with members from government institutions, civil society,

private sector, media representatives, and members of parliament.

22

V. THE BALANCE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND PROJECT LEVEL CHMS

Project level CHMs

The ongoing efforts to mainstream GAC in Burkina Faso have seen an increased focus on how

the Bank addresses complaints handling at an operational level. The GAC in projects filter for

Burkina Faso specifically encourages teams to include complaints handling mechanisms into

their operations. The application of the filter has principally been targeted towards supporting

teams with the design of new operations. In Burkina Faso, two projects have been selected to

pilot CHM: the Bagré Growth Pole project (see Box 13) and the PNGT III (Programme National

de Gestion des Terroirs III) which is currently under preparation. The Country Office, with

assistance from SDV, plans to design these initial pilot CHMs and link them to the country office

and national CHMs.

Box 13: CHM in Bagré Growth Pole Project

Under this component, the Project will also finance the establishment within the Maîtrise d’Ouvrage de

Bagré (MOB) of a Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM) to receive and address complaints related to the

Project. The GRM will be designed to address the full spectrum of complaints that may arise through the

implementation of the Project. Based on an analysis of the Project components, the complaints that are

likely to arise include the following: (i) land tenure issues and resettlement of local populations; (ii)

irregularities in land allocation; (iii) procurement and tendering irregularities; (iv) nonpayment of

contractors; (v) poor quality of works; (vi) misuse of matching grants; (vii) misuse of funds or abuse of

position by Project staff; and (viii) other issues related to social and environmental safeguards.

Project support includes: (i) Technical Assistance to develop standard operating procedures and

flowcharts that codify how grievances will be redressed for all stages of the process by MOB, MEBF

staff, and external grievance resolution focal points (including linkages to formal judicial dispute

settlement structures); (ii) training for MOB and MEBF staff; (iii) Technical Assistance to develop a

Project Communication Strategy on the mechanism to provide stakeholders with accessible information,

including access points and procedures; and (iv) development of an Excel-based or log-book-based

grievance registration and monitoring database and an annual report that will be submitted to Project

stakeholders as part of the Project’s M&E system.

Source: Project Appraisal Document on a proposed grant in the amount of US$115 million to Burkina Faso for A

Bagré Growth Pole Project, May 27, 2011.

Recommendations:

Carry out a survey to understand what informal/formal grievance redress mechanisms

processes citizens/communities are using (“arbre à palabres”, traditional chiefs, religious

leaders, CSOs, public CHMs).

Determine what challenges citizens face in accessing public CHMs (e.g., lack of

awareness and knowledge, lack of trust in the public institutions, fear of retaliation,

intimidation, cultural constraints, language barriers etc.)

23

Identify the informal project processes or country systems that exist and are or could be

used or harnessed by projects to facilitate complaints handling.

Assess feasibility of linking project CHMs to decentralized Ombudsman’s offices.

Develop linkages between project level CHMs with public CHMs. For example, projects

could sign MoUs with public oversight institutions to ensure that project-related

complaints referred by projects or submitted directly to central agencies (ASCE, ARMP,

Ombudsman) could be tracked and incorporated back into the annual project CHM

reports.

Carry out a joint training for project staff with the ASCE to raise their awareness on

corruption and provide them with contact information for ASCE and INT.

Country Office level

The Assistant Procurement Officer in the Burkina Faso Country Office is the focal point for

procurement-related complaints for Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinée. She receives complaints

related to the procurement process and enters them in the procurement database which is shared

with the Africa RPM. Though there is an internal country office procurement mechanism in

place, there is no systematic process for sorting and referring other types of complaints at the

country office level. The CO is planning to develop comprehensive guidelines - with SDV’s

assistance - to support staff in identifying appropriate filter channels when they receive

complaints. .

Recommendations:

Develop, in collaboration with SDV, comprehensive guidelines for country office staff to

deal with/refer complaints in line with World Bank rules and procedures.

Share and validate the guidelines with INT regarding the process to handle complaints

that relate to the five sanctionable practices by the World Bank.

Country Office staff should report to INT any allegations of corruption and should not

under any circumstance initiate any investigative activities.

Based on a request from the CO’s CHM focal point, carry out a joint INT/Procurement

training for all the CHM focal points in the region.

24

VI. THE BALANCE BETWEEN INVESTIGATIONS AND SANCTIONS:

ADMINISTRATIVE AND CRIMINAL

For any complaint handling mechanism to continue functioning, the results of

investigations should be made public and sanctions should be imposed. The biggest

challenge is to fight impunity because, otherwise, citizens will lose faith in the CHM and will

stop filing their complaints. In Burkina Faso, the four existing CHMs - the ASCE, the CRD, the

Ombudsman and REN-LAC - have different sanctioning possibilities. For the ASCE, it may

refer the results of its investigation either for administrative sanctioning to the concerned

ministries and for criminal pursuit it may forward the case to the Prosecutor. The CRD imposes

its own sanctions by blacklisting companies but can also refer corrupt enterprises to the

Prosecutor. The Ombudsman is a mediator and, as such, attempts to reconcile the different

parties by finding acceptable solutions and therefore does not sanction. As to REN-LAC, it

refers its cases to the ministries for appropriate administrative sanctions and uses the power of

public opinion by mobilizing the media to impose at least moral sanction.

In the end, the complaints involving financial implications will usually fall under two types of

sanctioning processes: (i) administrative - which can be imposed by either the Cour des Comptes

or the concerned ministries; and/or (ii) criminal – which are decided by the judicial system.

Cour des Comptes (CdC, Auditor General)

The Cour des Comptes (CdC) was established in 2002 with the mandate to monitor the execution

of budgetary legislation and the management of the state's funding of political parties. The CdC's

reports have, among other things, identified accounting errors and the non-reimbursement of

loans made to government officials and parliamentarians. Since 2003, the annual report is made

publicly available during a press conference. The CdC has very few enforcement powers and its

independence is limited. It is noteworthy, though, that the CdC's investigations have led to the

discovery of different types of financial irregularities in the public administration. For example,

in 2007, the CdC published an annual report revealing mismanagement in government agencies,

including by the Mayor of Ouagadougou. The report found that the government had failed to

comply with proper public procurement procedures for government tenders. However, no

known action has been taken in connection with any of the report's recommendations.

In 2008-2009, the CdC found 91 cases of ineligible activities and recommended sanctioning; and

in 2010-2011, 24 cases were found to be sanctionable. However, none of the cases were actually

sanctioned. Furthermore, in the CdC’s activity report of 2010-2011, it is reported that two audit

reports were made public before the end of the investigation and without the approval of the

CdC’s parquet (prosecutor), thus jeopardizing the investigation.

Though the CdC’s organic law includes provisions to implement administrative sanctions for

budget holders, the CdC does not have a Chamber of Discipline. The organic law is currently

being revised to clarify the CdC’s mandate and to clearly empower it to impose administrative

sanctions. After a rejection at the Supreme Court, a new attempt of revision is underway.

25

According to an evaluation of the European Commissions’ project to support the CdC which

ended in 2010, the CdC suffers from several weaknesses which include (i) lack of independence

(it is under the Ministry of Justice and its staff are nominated); (ii) the secondment of Ministry of

Finance staff to the CdC for a set period of time does not provide the right incentives to fulfill

their responsibilities; (iii) the insufficient number of magistrates (15 in total); (iv) the poor

working relations between the parquet and the magistrates; and (v) the departure of six

magistrates in 2012 (two of whom are Presidents of Chambers) which will reduce even further

the CdC’s capacities. All of these factors have contributed to the PEFA score of D+ for the

Indicator 26 which measures the extent, nature and follow-up of external control.

Recommendations:

Given the challenges facing the CdC, it is important to continue collaborating and

coordinating with the European Union and other donors regarding the capacity

development of the CdC, including the revision of its organic law in order to formally

create the Chamber of Discipline.

Appoint new staff with the aim to strengthen the capacity and pursue the judgment of the

pending cases.

The Judiciary

The judiciary is formally independent and institutionally distinct, but dominated and politicized

in practice by the executive branch. The executive orchestrates judicial appointments and

promotions, and prosecutors are part of the hierarchy headed by the Minister of Justice. This

allows for frequent executive interference in judicial decisions (e.g., the President of Burkina

Faso presides the Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature). The judicial system suffers from

rampant corruption stemming from an overall system that is inefficient, poorly trained and

poorly equipped. The economic vulnerability of its members is rife for exploitation, and operates

under extreme political pressure. A positive aspect is that the judges themselves are unhappy

with these conditions: a manifesto by the judges’ union in 2007 demonstrated that many judges

are dissatisfied with the current situation.

In terms of sanctioning corrupt practices, for offenses that involve less than FCFA 1 million, the

case goes to the Tribunal de Droit Commun which holds at least three audiences per week. For

those that involve larger amounts, the file is referred to the Chambre Criminelle de la Cour

d’Appel (of which there are two: one in Ouagadougou and another in Bobo-Dialassou) and holds

a maximum of two sessions per year. As a result, the courts have been unable to effectively

prosecute a range of senior officials charged with corruption. This also means that larger

corruption cases can drag on for years before they are judged and sanctioned. Concretely, of the

14 cases referred to the Prosecutor’s office in the last three years, only one (which was for the

amount of FCFA 500,000) has been judged and sanctioned (see Annex V). The lengthy time it

takes to judge and sanction corruption is a crucial issue and acts as an impediment to fight

corruption and for citizens to have faith in the system.

26

REN-LAC is putting forth a proposal to refer all corruption cases – regarding of the amount

involved – to the Tribunal de Droit Commun in order to expedite the sanctioning process.

Réseau Burkindi, on the other hand, is planning to propose the establishment of a special tribunal

to judge all corruption-related cases. An assessment should be undertaken to analyze the pros

and cons of both proposals and a reform should be implemented.

Notwithstanding all the above mentioned challenges, the combined influence of mounting public

pressure and recent donor interest in the sector, if effectively harnessed, could create the

necessary impetus for change in the justice sector. In the wake of recent events, donors are

increasingly placing pressure on the government to pursue governance and justice sector reform.5

The European Union has, for example, pledged eight million Euros to justice sector reform under

its 10th

EDF. In addition, the World Bank is currently preparing an analytical study on the access

to justice which could feed into the upcoming Country Partnership Strategy (CPS).

Recommendations:

Explore whether there is scope to address justice sector issues within the framework of

the Bank’s upcoming CPS and in the new development policy lending series targeting

governance, amongst other themes currently under preparation.

Given the challenges and sensitivities associated with justice reform, continue to

collaborate and coordinate with other donors to coax the government to implement

reforms.

Support multi-stakeholder discussions around the key issues currently being explored

such as (i) the legal framework for sanctioning corruption, and (ii) the sanctioning

processes (institutional structures, evidentiary and burden of proof issues).

Identify reform champions within the Ministry of Justice to explore the best ways to

introduce reforms in the sector (e.g., the two judges who work with REN-LAC and who

have assisted REN-LAC in preparing a draft proposal for a comprehensive anti-

corruption law).

5 This was underscored by the former European Union Ambassador to Burkina Faso in his departing speech in July

2011.

27

VII. CONCLUSION

Complaint Handling Mechanisms – whether they are at the national/public or project

level – do not exist in a vacuum. They are linked to policy and legal frameworks and to

the institutional set-up of the organizations that host the CHMs, especially their

independence or lack thereof. In Burkina Faso, in response to the level of corruption, the

government launched a National Anti-Corruption Policy and developed several anti-

corruption institutions. However, Burkina Faso still lacks comprehensive anti-corruption

legislation that can govern all relevant institutions. Moreover, the existing control

structures lack independence as the key anti-corruption agencies are controlled by the

executive. In addition, these agencies lack enforcement powers.

Furthermore, for CHMs to succeed and continue to function in a satisfactory manner, it is

necessary to maintain a balance between the ability to generate complaints and the

capacity to address and investigate them in a professional, confidential and equitable

manner. Also, any CHM needs to create alliances with different institutions ranging from

the media, civil society, the parliament, the private sector. These non-governmental

institutions can ensure greater visibility and understanding of the CHM’s mandate. They

can also be helpful to protect the CHM from undue political interference and can

advocate for greater accountability and follow-up of investigations and referrals.

Finally, to ensure that a culture of impunity - which leads to apathy among the greater

public - does not settle in the country and that citizens do not lose of faith in the CHM,

there should be a well-functioning sanctioning process the decisions of which should be

communicated to the public. It is only by closing this loop and providing feedback to

citizens that the CHM becomes a mechanism that is trusted and well-used by citizens.

28

Annex I: List of Institutions/Persons Met

Institution Last Name First Name Position

ARMP MAMADOU Guira Permanent Secretary

GNADA Hien Emilienne Director of Legislation

and Monitoring and

Evaluation

ASCE BESSIN Bruno CGE

SIRIBIE JB Ousmane Sec. General

AMADOU Maiga DAP

GANET SOME Goumouon DLC

OUEDRAOGO Marie DFSP

KIEMPTORE Maminata DLC

KOENOU Aime DAAF

DEDOUI Paul R. DDIC

ZOUNGRANA Gilbert DFP

COMPAORE Franck DRSAJ

Médiateur du Faso ZACHAE KI General Secretary

OUEDRAOGO Marcel IT Specialist

IGF SANWIDI Bruno Inspector of Finances

KONE Cheick M. Inspector of Finances

SOME Joanny Inspector of Finances

DAMA Moussa Inspector of Finances

OUATTARA Karamoko Inspector of Finances

CdC TRAORE Noumoutie First President

COMPAORE Christophe Government Official

TRAORE Senebou Chamber President

TAMINI N. Joseph Advisor- CCEP

OUEDRAOGO Sabine Chamber President

CRD BOUDA Justin PM

YAMEOGO Gaston SP/ARMP

ZOMA Roger REN-LAC

YAMEOGO Modeste ARMP/DAJC

SIANOU Tahirou AJT/Trésor

ROUAMBA Noel Quentin Ministry of Justice

ILBOUDO Jean-Luc ITSS/Ministry of Health

MILLOGO Dieudonné Private Sector

BAKORBA Moise ARMP

Ministry of Justice GNANOU Karfa Judge

Project

Implementation Unit

Staff

GOMINA Bakary PAFASP/RAF

SANON Noel PAFASP/RAF

ROUAMBA Gertrude PACT/SGF

YAMGOGO Rosine PST 2

OUEDRAOGO Fatoumata PNGT 2

KOURAOGO Mathieu PNGT 2

KABORE Kirsi Armand PEPP II/MESS

SANA Lassina PEPP II/MESS

HAROUNA Diarra PADS/SGF

29

Institution Last Name First Name Position

FAYAMA David MEBF

SAVADOGO Adama PAFASP/

Communication

Specialist

RASMATA Gnongueneba MEBF/Communication

Officer

OUATTARA Karim MEBF/DAF

Validation of

Manual of

procedures

SIRIBIE JB Ousmane Secretary General

COMPAORE Franck DRSAJ

GANET SOME Goumouon DLC

NOMBRE Benjamin MMCE/IGS

KONE Cheick Inspector IGF

YAMEOGO Modeste DAJC/ARMP

OUEDRAOGO Myriam Officer/ Ombudsman

NOMBRE Benjamin MMCE/IGS

SOMDA Calixte Investigator

Embassy of

Denmark

GUIGMA Gilbert Macro-Economist

DIAKONIA

(Swedish

Cooperation)

OUEDRAOGO Joséphine Program Officer

Coopération Suisse OUEDRAOGO Moise Program Officer

European Union SEBRE Dramane Economist

BORCHARD Arnaud Chief of section

Economist

Embassy of France VALLEUR Sebastien Cooperation Officer

UNDP KINI B. Dieudonné Economic and

Administrative

Governance Program

Analyst

Assemblée Nationale BONANET Dieudonné Member of Parliament,

Coordinator of Réseau

Burkindi

MBDHP SANOU ALY Secretary General

RAJIT PARE Bonaventure Journalist

DIALLO Moussa Photograph

REN-LAC WETTA Claude Deputy Secretary General

KERE Bruno Advocacy Specialist

SOMDA Calixte Investigator

CGD SAIDOU Karim Executive Secretary

Conseil d’Ethique KABORE Kiswendsida Agnès Monitoring and

Evaluation Specialist

KAM Guy Herve Lawyer

MEBF KARGOUGOU Issaka Director General

OUABA Timothée Business Administration

Advisor

30

Institution Last Name First Name Position

Private Sector OUEDRAOGO Souleymane MEGA-TECH Manager

SERE Hamidou TOUBA SARL,

Manager

SANON Kalefa Rigobert EXEKYS Manager

World Bank

Country Office

SOTIROVA Galina Country Manager

TIENDREBEOGO Mamata Procurement specialist

KABORE Rayes Suzanne Focal Point Procurement

Complaint Handling

DAHOUROU Adja Private Sector Specialist

Others SALIF Yonaba Lecturer (Public Law)

SANON Rigobert Capacity building expert

31

Annex II: References

Bertelsmann Foundation. 2010. Transformation Index - Burkina Faso 2010. Available at:

http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/84.0.html?L=1

Business Anti-Corruption Portal. Burkina Faso Country Profile. Available at :

http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/sub-saharan-africa/burkina-faso/

Camerer, Lala. 2001. “Prerequisites for Effective Anti-Corruption Ombudsman’s Offices and

Anti-Corruption Agencies”.

David, Post, and Agarwal, Sanjay. The World Bank, Social Development Department. “Dealing

with Governance and Corruption Risks in Project Lending”.

David, Post, and Agarwal, Sanjay. The World Bank, Social Development Department.

Freedom House. 2010. Freedom in the World 2010. Burkina Faso.

Government of Burkina Faso, Autorité de Régulation des Marchés Publics. 2010. Recueil de

Textes Relatifs aux Marchés Publics et aux Délégations de Service Publics.

Government of Burkina Faso, Autorité de Régulation des Marchés Publics. 2008. Code des

Marchés Publics: Décret No2008-173/PRES/PM/MEF, Décret No2007-243/PRES/PM/MEF,

Décret No2008-374/PRES/PM/MEF.

Government of Burkina Faso, Autorité de Régulation des Marchés Publics. 2010. Rapport

General d’Activités 2008-2009. Available at:

http://www.armp.bf/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=101&Itemid=82.

Government of Burkina Faso, Autorité de Régulation des Marchés Publics. 2008. Décision 2008-

02/ARMP/CR.

Government of Burkina Faso, Le Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances, Inspection Générale

des Finances. 2008. Arrêté No 2008-256-/MEF/IGF.

Government of Burkina Faso, Le Ministère de L’Economie et des Finances, Inspection Générale

des Finances. 2010. Termes de Références pour le Recrutement d’un Consultant Spécialiste des

Systèmes d’Information dans le Cadre de la Mise en œuvre d’un Système Automatisé

d’Information des Structures de Contrôles et de Dénonciation de la Corruption.

Government of Burkina Faso, Le Ministère de la Fonction Publique et de la Reforme de l’Etat.

2008. Etude sur les Pratiques de Corruption dans l’Administration Publique du Burkina Faso

(Rapport Final).

Government of Burkina Faso, Premier Ministère, Autorité Supérieure de Contrôle d’Etat. 2009.

Rapport Général Annuel d’Activités 2008.

Government of Burkina Faso, Premier Ministère, Haute Autorité de la Lutte contre la Corruption.

2007. Rapport de l’Analyse Critique des Dispositifs Nationaux de Lutte contre la Corruption au

Burkina Faso par rapport aux Conventions des Nations Unies, de l’Union Africaine et de Cedeao

sur la Corruption.

Heritage Foundation. 2010. Index of Economic Freedom - Burkina Faso 2010. Available at:

http://www.heritage.org/index/country/burkinafaso

International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions. 2010. INTOSAI Communication

Guideline. Available at: http://www.intosai.org.

32

Jennett, Victoria and Chene, Marie. 2007. Anti-Corruption Complaints Mechanisms.

Transparency International, U4 Expert Answer. Available at: www.U4.no.

Loada, Augustin. 2009. Centre pour la Gouvernance Démocratique Burkina Faso. “Avis et

Décisions Commentés de la Justice Constitutionnelle Burkinabé de 1960 à 2007”.

Ministère de la fonction publique et de la réforme de l’état. 2007. Programme d’appui à la bonne

gouvernance, “Etude sur les pratiques de corruption dans l’administration publique au Burkina

Faso”, Rapport Provisoire, Décembre 2007.

REN-LAC. 2007. Etat de la Corruption au Burkina Faso, Rapport 2006.

Republic of Burkina Faso, Le Médiateur du Faso. 2010. Rapport d’activités. Available at:

http://www.mediateur.gov.bf/SiteMediateur/rapports/index.jsp.

Republic of Burkina Faso, the President of Burkina Faso, Décret No 2011-700/PRES/PM. 2011.

Réseau Burkindi. 2008. Compte Rendu de la Réunion Constitutive du Réseau des Parlementaires

Burkinabé pour la Lutte contre la Corruption.

United Nations Development Program [UNDP]. 2003. Rapport sur le Développement Humain -

Burkina Faso.

US Department of State: Human Rights Report - Burkina Faso 2010.

USAID. 2006. “Anticorruption Agencies (ACAs) Anti-Corruption Program Brief”, prepared by

Patrick Meagher and Caryn Voland from the IRIS Center at the University of Maryland.

World Bank. “Local Governance and Accountability in Africa: Insights from Guinea, Burkina

Faso and Rwanda”. Prepared by Sylvie Mahieu and commissioned by the Social Development

Department (SDV).

World Bank. “Dealing with Governance and Corruption Risks in Project Lending”. Designing

Effective Grievance Redress Mechanisms for Bank-Financed Projects. Part 2: The Practice of

Grievance Redress. Available at: http://dfgg, http://gacinprojects.

World Bank. Feedback Matters: Designing Effective Grievance Redress Mechanisms for Bank-

Financed Projects. Part 1: The Theory of Grievance Redress. Available at: http://dfgg,

http://gacinprojects

World Bank. 2009. Governance and Anti-corruption in Lending Operations a Benchmarking and

Learning Review. October 14, 2009.

World Bank. 2010. Africa Development Indicators 2010: Silent and Lethal How Quiet Corruption

Undermines Africa’s Development Efforts.

World Bank. 2010. Mesure de la performance de la gestion des finances publiques au Burkina

Faso selon la méthodologie PEFA.

33

Annex III : Benefits and Challenges of CHMs Benefits Challenges

Setting integrity standards Protecting whistle blowers, whether internal or external

The introduction of complaints mechanisms demonstrates the commitment of

government to fight corruption and signals that corrupt practices are not to be

tolerated. They have an important deterrence effect and may contribute to creating a

“transparency culture” as well as a supportive environment.

The power inequalities between affected and perpetuating parties must be

acknowledged when designing effective complaints mechanisms. Whistle blowers,

whether staff or beneficiaries, must overcome their reluctance to make a complaint

out of fear of the consequences. Internal procedures must be put in place to protect

staff members who make disclosures from reprisals as well as to assure beneficiaries

that they will not be deprived from the project benefits if they report irregularities.

Complying with integrity standards Imposing sanctions

Complaints mechanisms have an important function in detecting and dealing with

fraud and corruption. When they are effective and have a redress capacity, they can

ensure that anti-corruption measures and processes are enforced.

Trust and credibility in a complaints mechanism result from its capacity to achieve

change, enforce recommendations and impose sanctions. Such trust and credibility

are fostered by ensuring that complainants experience an organized and reliable

process that arrives at an outcome. An effective complaints mechanism must have

the means to address the situation, enforce recommendations and provide safe and

satisfactory redress measures.

Mapping corruption risks Solving complainants’ problems

Complaints mechanisms are an effective way to get feedback on the way institutions

are operating as well as to help identify and address sensitive areas or processes

particularly vulnerable to corruption. They can be used as a diagnosing tool to

provide insights and information that may not otherwise emerge.

Compliance mechanisms, even if they do impose appropriate sanctions, do not

necessarily solve the problems referred to. Ideally, complaints handling mechanisms

must have a problem solving capacity as well. Of course, it may be difficult for the

agency to guarantee redress when required changes are out of control of the agency.

Enhancing accountability and transparency Empowering citizens

Complaints mechanisms provide a channel to lodge complaints and report

irregularities. When appropriate action is taken and sanctions are imposed, they may

contribute to promote accountability and achieve transparency in the institution’s

way of operating.

The challenge is to empower members of vulnerable citizens to use the complaints

mechanism that is made available to them. Such potential complainants need

information about the mechanism and need to have access to it. They should be able

to report irregularities without fear of reprisals and be assured of a credible process

and outcome. Designing complaints mechanisms that can actually be used by

citizens will require the participation of those intended to benefit from it.

Empowering citizens Managing complaints

With complaints mechanisms, the victims of corruption have an official recourse.

Complainants are encouraged as well to work within agreed policies instead of using

last resort solutions such as potentially damaging media campaigns or public

scandals.

The complaints system must have the capacity to receive and investigate complaints,

make appropriate recommendations to involved parties and provide advice on the

agency’s policies and standards. One of the challenges is to distinguish between

valid and invalid complaints as well as to deal with frivolous or malicious complaints

that may arise.

Raising public awareness

Governments that publicly demonstrate a political will to fight corruption can help

shape new standards and values. In highly corrupt environments the availability of

complaints mechanisms can help reduce public tolerance of corrupt practices and

support the creation of a corruption free environment. In doing so, they help to

restore trust in the government. What is more, the image and reputation of the

government can greatly benefit from this process.

Source: Adapted from U4 Expert Answer, Anti-corruption complaints mechanisms,

authored by Victoria Jennett and Marie Chene, U4 Helpdesk and Transparency

International, 18 April, 2007.

34

Annex IV: CHMs in Burkina Faso

ARMP OMBUDSMAN ASCE

REN-LAC

Mandate

. Develops public

procurement procedures,

and implement the action

of these reforms.

. Trains, sensitizes public

actors

. Assesses the

effectiveness and

compliance to the national

procurement system

. Handles claims and

complaints in the

administration

. Settles disputes between

individuals and the

administration, and

disputes among

communities at local

levels.

. Assesses the enforcement

of texts and regulations

related to administration

services

. Investigates allegations of

fraud, and corruption

. Monitors the

implementation and

coordination of anti

corruption measures

. Sensitizes on the issue of

corruption

. Ensures the enforcement

of anti corruption laws

. Receives and handle

complaints related to

corruption

. Advocates for the

adoption a code of conduct

of civil servants by the

government

CHM (Y/N) Yes Yes Yes Yes

Decentralized

offices

No Yes (14 regional offices) No No

Produce reports

(Y/N)

Yes to the Head of State

(latest 2009)

Yes to the Head of State

(latest 2009)

Yes to Head of State

(latest 2010)

Yes (latest 2009)

Reports available

to public? (Y/N)

Yes Yes Yes Yes

# of staff 12 85 34 19

Annual budget CFA 244.856.442 CFA 410.000.000 CFA 741.605.000 CFA 551.424.175

(07/08 to 12/11)

Channel of

complaints

In person, mail In person mainly Hotlines, mail, in person,

media

In person, hotline, mail,

media

Communication

Activities

No Yes Yes Yes

Criteria for

classification

No Yes Yes Yes

Database (Y/N) No Yes No No

35

Annex V: ASCE Cases Referred to Justice in 2008, 2009, and 2010

Dossiers Montant

compromis

en FCFA

Infractions présumées Date de

saisine

Situation

au 31 décembre

2010

Dossiers du rapport général annuel d’activités 2008 1 Haut-commissariat du

Koulpélogo 19 308 861 Faux et usage de faux,

détournement de deniers

publics

En cours

d’instruction à la

Cour de Cassation

2 Antenne CCVA

Bobo-Dioulasso 3 470 450 Détournement de deniers

publics

Dossier en cours au

cabinet d’instruction

n°1 de Ouagadougou

Dossiers du rapport général annuel d’activités 2009 1 ONG Espace Colin

POWELL pour le

Sahel

344 208 036 Fraude douanière 29/07/2009 Toujours en cours au

cabinet d’instruction

n°1 de Ouagadougou

2 Régie d’avances

chargée des

paiements des impôts,

droits et taxes ou

autres opérations

exonérées relatives

aux marchés publics

de l’Etat

1 577 541 923 Faux en écriture, usage de faux,

concussion et corruption

04/08/2009 Toujours en cours au

cabinet d’instruction

n° 3 de Ouagadougou

3 Greffe central de la

Cour de Cassation 31 520 000 Détournement de deniers

publics

05/10/2009 Toujours en cours au

cabinet d’instruction

n°3 de Ouagadougou

4 Perception de

l’Ambassade du

Burkina Faso en

France

61 171 506 Détournement de deniers

publics et dissipation de carnets

de quittances

09/11/2009 Dossier communiqué

au Procureur général

près la Cour d’Appel

de Ouagadougou

5 Programme de

réduction de la

pauvreté au niveau

communal (PRPC)

222 004 824 Détournement et complicité de

détournement de deniers

publics, abus de confiance,

corruption et recel de choses

détournées

16/11/2009 Toujours en cours au

cabinet d’instruction

n°4 de Ouagadougou

6 Centre hospitalier

universitaire

pédiatrique Charles

DE GAULLE

Néant Faux et usage de faux

documents administratifs,

corruption

16/11/2009 Toujours en cours au

cabinet d’instruction

n°1 de Ouagadougou

7 Travaux

d’aménagement de

975 km de pistes

rurales du Houet (lot

n°5)

79 225 250 Détournement et complicité de

détournement de deniers

publics, abus de confiance,

corruption, recel de choses

détournées

16/11/2009 Toujours en cours au

cabinet d’instruction

n°2 de Ouagadougou

8 District sanitaire de

Dandé, Province du

Houet

5 495 000 Détournement de deniers

publics

26/11/2009 Toujours en cours au

cabinet d’instruction

n°2 de Bobo-

Dioulasso

9 Commission

d’attribution des

marchés de la mairie

de Banfora

500 000 Corruption et/ou escroquerie 10/12/2009 Dossier jugé, auteur

condamné pour

escroquerie à trois

(03) mois de prison

avec sursis (Tribunal

de Grande Instance

36

Dossiers Montant

compromis

en FCFA

Infractions présumées Date de

saisine

Situation

au 31 décembre

2010 de Banfora)

situation des dossiers

transmis en justice en

2010

Dossiers du rapport général annuel d’activités 2010 1 Procès-verbal de

vérification de la

Régie de recettes

auprès de la Direction

régionale des

Transports du Nord

(Ouahigouya)

Période couverte : du

06 février 2008 au 23

juillet 2009

13 410 100

- Falsification de quittances ;

- -Non reversement de sommes

recouvrées d’un montant de

treize millions quatre cent dix

mille cent (13 410 100) francs

CFA.

12/03/2010 Transmis au

Procureur du Faso

près le Tribunal de

Grande Instance de

Ouahigouya

(En cours au cabinet

d’instruction)

2 Rapport d’inspection

du Projet de

Développement

Agricole en Aval des

Petits Barrages à l’Est

(PPB/EST)

Période couverte : de

janvier 2008 à juin

2010

22 291 750 - des manquants de matériel

d’une valeur de 2 615 000

FCFA ;

- des crédits recouvrés et non

reversés de 17 576 750 FCFA ;

- une contribution des

producteurs pour l’obtention de

forages non représentée de 2

100 000 FCFA ;

- des manquants de matériel

non encore évalués.

02/12/2010 Transmis au

Procureur du Faso

près le Tribunal de

Grande Instance de

Fada N’Gourma

3 Procès-verbal de

vérification

approfondie de la

Régie de recettes de

la Commune de

Bittou

Période couverte : du

1er mars 2003 au 14

septembre 2009

16 734 425 - manquant de caisse de quinze

millions trois cent vingt sept

mille huit cent soixante quinze

(15 327 875) francs CFA ;

- déficit de valeurs inactives

d’un montant de un million

trois cent dix sept mille deux

cents (1 317 200) francs CFA ;

- non reversement de

ressources collectées d’un

montant de deux cent quatre

vingt neuf mille trois cent

cinquante (289 350) francs

CFA.

17 /03/2010 Transmis au

Procureur du Faso

près le Tribunal de

Grande Instance de

Tenkodogo (En cours

au cabinet

d’instruction n°2)

37

Annex VI: Donor-Funded Governance Activities in Burkina Faso

The World Bank is currently leading a technical working group of donors’ governance initiatives. This activity will be included in the matrix

of coordinated initiatives monitored by the group.

UNDP AFDB

FRENCH

COOPERATION

DENMARK EUROPEAN UNION

BENEFICIARIES

-DGCOOP

-Réseau Burkindi

-ASCE, RENLAC

-CDC, MoJ, CENI

-Etc….

-Control Institutions

-ASCE, and technical

entities under the

control of ASCE

-IGF, DGCF

-NGOs (training)

-ASCE

-INDS

-Justice institutions

-REN-LAC

-CIFOEB

-Ministry of Finance

(Control Institutions,

CDC, IGF)

-Ministry of Health

(Inspection Générale de

la Santé)

SECTORS

-Capacity

reinforcement

-Administrative, local

governance, economic

governance

-Governance

-Public Finance

-Anti -Corruption

-Governance

-Public Finance

-Justice

-Anti-Corruption

-Governance

-Anti corruption

-Budget transparency

(CIFOEB)

-M&E

-Public Finance

-Health

-Planning

-Governance

BUDGET

USD 17,171,600

(Budget 2011-2015)

CFA 1,800,000,000 Euros 140,000 for 3

years

No assistance to ASCE

CFA 156,766,965

(since 07/08)

No assistance to ASCE

OUTCOME

-Sustainable economic

growth

-Improved human

rights

-Decentralization

-National institutions

capacities are built

-Increased participation

of CSOs, NGOs to

development

- A hotline

- An information

system (Intranet) and

public access website to

provide information

about the protection of

whistleblowers

-Technical assistance to

improve the justice

system, and the

functioning of ASCE.

Improvement of ASCE

internal control

Financial support to the

Troika. Improved

Monitoring and

Evaluation system;

coordinated donors’

actions; quality of

services; measurement

of corruption in

Burkina Faso

- Improved award of

contracts

Improved planning

capacities

Improved transparency

in control institutions

TIMELINE

Period from 2011 to

2015

Originally December

2011 but extended to

June 2012.

Ends December 2011 Budget till Dec. 2011 Budget till December

2011