Saulius Geniusas: The Origins of the Horizonin Husserl’s Phenomenology

Springer, Dordrecht, 2012 (Contributions to Phenomenology,Vol. 67), ISBN 978-94-007-4643-5 (hardbound), 978-94-007-4644-2(e-book), 243 pp + xii, US-$ 129 (hardbound), US-$ 99 (e-book)

Luis Roman Rabanaque

Published online: 5 December 2013

� Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Saulius Geniusas’ work on the origins of the horizon is arguably the first book that

specifically addresses this fundamental, yet frequently neglected, issue in Husserl’s

phenomenology. It attempts to fill this gap in philosophical inquiry by highlighting

the elementary fact of the irreducible horizonal givenness of both world and

subjectivity, and he does so by taking as a clue the question of the horizon’s origins.

The horizon’s unique feature consists in being a ‘‘peculiar figure of intentionality’’

whose problematic ‘‘unfolds as inseparably tied to the question of origins’’ (p. 9).

The book is structured in 13 chapters arranged in three major Parts. The first chapter

is a general introduction. Part I deals with the problem of the emergence of the

horizon. Part II is concerned with the horizons of transcendental subjectivity, and

Part III discusses the world-horizon.

The inquiry into the emergence of the notion of horizon begins in Chap. 2 of Part I

by addressing Husserl’s remark that the Logical Investigations still lacked a theory of

horizon intentionality, which was first developed in Ideas I, and for that reason he in

the earlier work ‘‘could not finish with occasional judgments and their signification’’

(p. 11; Hua XVII, p. 207/199). Geniusas puts forward that even though it is true that

the notion originates in Ideas I, its problematic precedes that text (p. 11). It is related

to occasional expressions, now usually called indexicals, which in virtue of their

being context-bound pose a threat to the ideal status of scientific meanings. He argues

that the Logical Investigations offers a rather drastic solution on the basis of what he

calls the ‘‘replaceability thesis’’, according to which every occasional expression can

in principle be replaced by a context-free one. But this amounts to abolishing ‘‘the

very distinction between subjective and objective expressions’’ (p. 25). The notion of

the noema in Ideas I allows Husserl to overcome these shortcomings because it

provides a new conceptual framework to thematize indexicals. The noema is ‘‘an

L. R. Rabanaque (&)

CONICET/ANCBA/Universidad Catolica Argentina, Alicia Moreau de Justo 1500,

1107 Buenos Aires, Argentina

e-mail: rabanaque@yahoo.de

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Husserl Stud (2014) 30:187–194

DOI 10.1007/s10743-013-9145-6

intrinsic dimension of horizon-intentionality’’ (p. 30), within which three compo-

nents can be disclosed—namely, the noematic sense, the full noema, and the

noematic core. Their analysis lays bare an interplay between objective sense and

subjective manners of givenness such that both subjective (indexical) and

objective (ideal) expressions are shown to have an irreducibly subjective origin of

sense (p. 34).

Chapter 3 turns to the question of the relation between Husserl’s horizon and

William James’ notion of fringes. Geniusas gives a fine account of this concept,

acknowledges James’ influence on Husserl, and points out its limitations. Fringes

prove to be psychological in that their analysis is confined to the inner world of

experiences, and the objective side is excluded in advance. Moreover, a comparison

of fringes and horizons in connection with the distinction between horizon and halo/

background (p. 48; Hua III/1, p. 59/55) proves that horizons, unlike fringes, are

transcendental conditions of possibility for the appearing of objects (p. 51).

Chapter 4 discusses the notion of the horizon as presented in §27 of Ideas I in the

context of the account of the world’s ‘‘pregiveness’’ for the natural attitude.

Geniusas claims that in this text the world is ‘‘the original figure’’ of the horizon, a

discovery that is immediately suppressed there. The reason lies in the way Husserl

considers the ‘‘thesis’’ of the natural attitude, which he first conceives as a potential

thesis but then assumes to be an actual one (p. 59). Such an assumption seems to be

‘‘ineluctable’’ in order to perform the epoche, but it leads the investigation astray

because it thematizes the structure of the acts of consciousness but excludes the

world’s pregivenness, which is not yielded by any act but underlies each and every

act (p. 63).

It is only after these considerations that the investigation focuses on the features

of the horizon itself (Chap. 5). Over against James’ psychological fringes,

Husserl’s horizons are both intentional and transcendental (p. 65). They do not

belong to the natural world in the natural standpoint but are rather ‘‘indispensable

components’’ of lived-experiences and objects constituted in them (p. 67). Hence

they can be examined both noematically, as experiences, and noetically, as

experiencings. Geniusas further distinguishes self-givenness as thematic from

originary givenness as potential givenness (p. 68; he quotes Hua III/1, p. 71/70)

and takes up again the three levels of the noema mentioned above in order to

confirm their essential horizonality. As to the horizon’s noetic side, Geniusas

stresses what he calls the ‘‘primacy of the practical’’ (p. 73, title of the subsection).

Experiencing as consciousness always co-intends its own possibilities—i.e. the

non-given modes of appearance—and this being-aware is a ‘‘first form’’ of self-

consciousness that unfolds as an experience of the ‘‘I can.’’ This is in turn related

to the subjective movements of the lived-body (Leib) and thus to kinaestheses in

the twofold way of ‘‘kınesis,’’ which includes ‘‘stasis’’ and ‘‘aisthesis’’. Geniusas

concludes that the correlate of static kinaestheses is an abstract noematic sense

(correlate of the ‘‘I do’’), whereas kinetic kinaestheses are correlated with a

multiplicity of noematic senses (correlates of the ‘‘I can’’), so that the system of

practical possibilities (Vermoglichkeiten, and not merely logical Moglichkeiten) is

correlated with the synthetic unity of that manifold. Since these possibilities may

be objectively determinate or indeterminate, they prove to be the correlates of the

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inner- and outer-horizon respectively (p. 76). After briefly turning to the horizons

of inner perception, the chapter ends by summarizing the limits of this early

analysis.

Part II begins by stating a main thesis: as a genetic notion, the horizon is a

horizon of subjectivity (p. 89). Chapter 6 proceeds to disclose the most salient

features of static and genetic analysis in order to show that they do not differ

thematically but methodologically. The laws of genesis concern both the emergence

of ‘‘events’’ in the stream of lived-experiences, and the formation of apperceptions.

Static analysis addresses apperceptions structurally and teleologically, while genetic

analysis thematizes their essential multi-leveled history (p. 93). Geniusas then goes

on to discuss the objection against the egologic character of the horizon raised by

post-Husserlian phenomenologists (notably by Hans-Georg Gadamer), which

amounts to the exclusion of the possibility of inquiring into its origins (p. 95).

Geniusas turns to ‘‘the horizon of typical pre-acquaintance in which every object is

pregiven’’ (Husserl 1964, p. 172/150) and thus to the horizon’s plasticity (p. 103).

On the side of consciousness we have habitualities, on the objective side, a field of

sedimented accomplishments. This step leads naturally back to the question of the

‘‘mineness’’ or self-centering of experience, a topic the author now discusses on the

basis of §§30–33 of the Cartesian Meditations.

At this point, the question can be addressed as to why this notion of a horizon of

subjectivity remains alien to Ideas I (Chap. 7). Geniusas’ answer, anticipated earlier

in Chap. 2, is that the reduction as performed in that book blocks access to the

genetic phenomenon of the horizon. Over against the idea of absolute justification—

understood as apodictic indubitability—that guides the Cartesian path (p. 115),

Husserl’s analyses of the double reduction in the second volume of his First

Philosophy offer an alternative to apodicticity as phenomenological ground because

they make apparent that within every lived-experience the whole life of

consciousness is mirrored or implicated (p. 120). But First Philosophy II also

addresses the horizon in terms of validity, as a Geltungshorizont, and this requires

the performance of a new epoche and reduction, a ‘‘universal’’ one that is not meant

to suspend the world-thesis but to inhibit all worldly interests (p. 124; Hua VIII,

§§41–43). As a result one can say that both inner- and outer-horizons entail not only

the dimension of implicit reference but also of implicit validity (p. 126).1 The

chapter closes with a discussion of Ludwig Landgrebe’s interpretation of this

alleged transformation in Husserlian phenomenology.

Chapter 8 aims at showing that both the meaning and the possibility of the

question of origins are related to the genetic notion of the horizon, so that the latter

clarifies its sense as a system of validity while its possibility is secured by the

horizon as a system of references. Geniusas addresses the issue of the regressive

inquiry (Ruckfrage) and then engages in a discussion with Jean-Luc Marion as

representative of those post-Husserlian phenomenologists who reject its starting

point on the level of predicative judgment. In his view, Marion’s concept of

saturated phenomena still presupposes horizonality if it is to make any sense at all

1 In his first approach to this question in Chap. 5, Geniusas discloses two features intrinsic to the horizon

as a philosophical notion: it is an implicit system of references, and it is a horizon of validity (see p. 28).

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(p. 143). The deepening of this argument leads Geniusas to the contrast between the

notion of reflection operative in Ideas I, and the notion of ‘‘sense-investigation’’

(Besinnung) employed in First Philosophy II, which allows him to tackle the three

levels of manifestation of pre-predicative experience that Husserl develops in

Experience and Judgment. At the end of this chapter he briefly discusses the import

of the question of evidence for this context.

Chapter 9 again takes up the issue of the ego by ‘‘opening a dialogue’’ between

phenomenology and hermeneutics. The starting point is again Gadamer’s critique of

Husserl’s notion of constitution (p. 158). Geniusas further discusses Dieter

Lohmar’s ‘‘functional’’ reading of the ego as a plausible but insufficient answer,

and then he briefly engages in an investigation of the primal ego as it is presented in

the most relevant texts, notably the Crisis, the C-manuscripts, and the Bernau

manuscripts. The discussion reveals that for Husserl, the ego cannot be regarded

either in a Kantian sense or as something vorhanden but rather as a Vorgegebenheit

(p. 172 n. 24), and it provides, moreover, an inkling of how phenomenology and

hermeneutics may turn out to be complementary rather than mutually exclusive.

Part III is devoted to the correlate of subjective horizonality, namely the

phenomenon of the world-horizon. Chapter 10 begins by distinguishing two

manners of givenness of the world. The first—world-experience (Welterfahrung)—

is reflective, thematic, and to a certain extent intuitive. The second—world-

consciousness (Weltbewusstsein)—is pre-reflective, pre-thematic, and pre-intuitive

(p. 178; Hua XXXIX, p. 83). Weltbewusstsein is related to the world-horizon

understood as the wherefrom, while Welterfahrung accounts both for the wherein

and the whereto of experience. Geniusas further considers an ambiguity concerning

the expression ‘‘Welthorizont,’’ which can be interpreted either as a genitive,

‘‘horizon of the world’’ (Horizont der Welt), or as a nominative, ‘‘world-as-horizon’’

(Welt as Horizont) (p. 179). Now while the former calls for a core of presence

whereby it can be subsumed under the background/foreground schema, the latter

does not make itself present through horizons, but is itself a horizon. The world in

this sense is ‘‘a background without foreground, a halo without any kind of intuitive

core’’ (p. 181), and it can be characterized as unique (seiend in einer Einzigkeit),

since the plural makes no sense when applied to it (cf. Hua VI, p. 146/143). At stake

here is the essential difference between the being of objects and the being of the

world, which also implies that behind the life-world, which is bound to

Welterfahrung, there still lies the world as ground (Boden) of the universal passive

belief in being, i.e. as the correlate of Weltbewusstsein. The world in this sense is the

ground for all modalities (p. 185). In the final section, Geniusas addresses the

famous manuscript D 17, known as ‘‘The Earth does not move,’’ in order to

illustrate the point.

Chapter 11 approaches the question of the world as the wherein of experience. If

Weltbewusstsein provides us with a notion of the world as wherefrom or ground,

Welterfahrung lays bare a dimension of the world which is related to the implication

of potential horizons in actual ones, one for which the foreground/background-

schema makes good sense. Following Stephan Strasser, Geniusas calls this

dimension horizon of all horizons (p. 195) and emphasizes that these implications

express ‘‘unanimity’’ (Einstimmigkeit) within experience (p. 197; Hua XXXIX,

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p. 128). Now the expression ‘‘horizon of all horizons’’ is itself equivocal, since it

may refer either to the formal structure of implication, and thus to open possibility,

or to the concrete transformations of sense that ‘‘such an Ineinander’’ gives rise to.

Therefore the world can be seen either as the wherein or as the whereto of

experience (p. 197). Geniusas argues that the world as wherein is what Husserl calls

‘‘the absolute substrate in its pre-eminent sense’’ (p. 198; Husserl 1964, p. 159/139).

It is the where-in because it proves to be the absolute substrate for all absolute

substrates, i.e. for the bodies in nature, which turn out to be ‘‘relatively absolute’’

(p. 201). Addressing Jean Wahl’s objection that such a notion transgresses the

boundaries of phenomenologically justifiable claims, he introduces Husserl’s

distinction between problematic and open possibility, which refer to intuitive and to

empty consciousness respectively. Whereas the former is motivated by conflicting

intuitions, the latter is related to the expecting of a general style of possible

fulfillment, and thus to the general types of experiences. The world as wherein is

thus the ‘‘totality of typification’’ (p. 207).

The last thematic chapter focuses on the topic of the world as the whereto of

experience. Over against the world as Boden or wherefrom, and as absolute

substrate or wherein—both of which refer to unmodalized experience—the world as

whereto accounts for the enrichment of sense both through modalization and non-

sensuous experience. The features of the ‘‘doubling’’ of sense and of ‘‘backward

reference’’ that are dealt with in Husserl’s analyses of negation and disappointment

in Experience and Judgment indicate the productivity of modalization, its ability to

generate essentially new types of experiences (p. 212). Our author goes on to show

that the world as wherein already presupposes the world as whereto, which amounts

to saying that the world is inseparable from the historicity of subjectivity (p. 214).

The final section is devoted to outlining the bond between the world as the whereto

of experience and the life-world as contrasted with the world of science. After

highlighting the paradoxical situation of the life-world as both a partial problem of

the objective sciences and as universal problem that embraces them (p. 220;

references are to §§33 and 34 of the Crisis, respectively), Geniusas takes heed of the

‘‘gripping dialectic’’ that holds between them. Science-world and life-world belong

together: sciences stand on the ground of the world as the wherefrom and wherein of

experience, but they stream back into the world as the whereto of experience

(p. 222). This can also be said of the worldly character of objectivities: they have a

constitutive genesis that calls for the world as wherefrom, their being given in

intuitive fulfillment brings to self-giveness the world as the wherein, and finally, any

new mode of giveness refers back and enriches the world as the whereto of

experience.

The concluding chapter addresses the question of the unity of the horizon.

Geniusas mentions four reasons for doing so, the first two in connection with the

foregoing work and with the secondary literature on horizons, the third in

connection with the objection raised by post-Husserlian phenomenology, and the

fourth in connection with a specific task that arises from the problem itself. He

addresses first of all Roberto Walton’s analyses of the horizon (Walton 2003), and

especially his disclosing of a set of oppositions. He sees in Walton’s paper two

strategies at play that point to the question of unity. The first refers all sets back to a

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primary one (the set of potentiality/actuality), whereas the second is related to the

encasement and stratification of horizons. However, Geniusas rejects both

alternatives and suggests that while the latter is insufficient, the former begs the

question since the duality potentiality/actuality already presupposes the more

rudimentary opposition between the horizon of subjectivity and the world-horizon

(p. 228). The last section is devoted to the problem of the historical apriori as it is

presented by Husserl in Appendix III of the Crisis. The merit of this notion consists

in its indifference to the distinction between the subjective and the objective and

thus its two-sidedness (p. 230). This confirms the claim advanced at the very

beginning of the book, namely, that the correlation itself is ultimately horizonal and

irreducibly two-sided.

Saulius Geniusas’ essay on Husserl’s notion of the horizon is primarily not a

descriptive but rather a systematic work, in which the author attempts to reconstruct

the origins of the horizon on the basis of a compelling working hypothesis, namely,

that the horizon as a figure of intentionality is that which legitimates the

phenomenological inquiry into the origins of sense-formation. This implies the two-

sidedness of a subjectivity-oriented and a world-oriented dimension, and it entails a

far-reaching program that spans from the static noetic-noematic analysis of Ideas I

to the genetic disclosing of prepredicative experience and the life-world in the later

work. The volume is written in a precise, clear and didactic form, and the author’s

claims are profusely supported with Husserl’s texts. The work as a whole makes, in

my opinion, a meritorious and plausible case. As a pioneering research work, it is

comprehensive but does not intend to be exhaustive, and it has thus a strong

potential for further development in connection both with its strengths and its

weaknesses. Let me briefly mention a few salient ones.

(1) Geniusas’ attempt in Part I to reconstruct and solve the problem of occasional

expressions is very insightful. The reader may also want to consult Weigelt

(2008), who discusses the topic in a surprisingly converging way. Furthermore,

the claim as to the horizonal origin of the noema in Chap. 2 is itself

remarkable, and it issues a challenge to both the West-Coast and the East-

Coast interpretations, since the open character of the noema’s horizonality

rules out conceiving it either as a self-contained structure (a percept), or as an

abstract entity (a concept).2

(2) In his account of the horizon in Ideas, Geniusas valuably stresses its practical

origin and describes the essential connection it bears with the kinaesthetical

body. Granted that the guiding thread of the work calls for a selection of the

topics to be discussed, this arguably central issue is nevertheless downplayed

in the context of genesis, and the same holds for the examination of affective

and volitional horizonality, which are closely related to the body.

(3) Still with regard to the issue of genesis, active, active–passive and passive

genesis are clearly distinguished, and subjective horizonality is conceived in

terms of typical pre-acquaintance and self-centering. In this context a further

2 On this subject see Rabanaque (2003), where the noema’s temporal horizonality is discussed in the

context of hyletic constitution. Incidentally, ‘‘noematic intentionality’’ (p. 33) is itself a somewhat

puzzling issue, as Marbach (1992) shows.

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differentiation may be suggested between the temporal and associative primal-

syntheses in the living present, and the temporal and associative secondary-

syntheses in habitualization and sedimentation (cf. Hua IV, p. 12/14).

(4) Part III, devoted to the world-horizon, is probably the most innovative section

of the book, and its insights certainly merit further development. To begin with

a philological question, one may wonder whether Geniusas’ inspired

expressions (wherefrom, wherein, and whereto) are drawn from Husserl’s

texts quoted in the study.3 Further, Geniusas addresses R. Walton’s work on

the horizon and grants his pioneering labor. I would like to briefly draw

attention to the latter’s more recent papers on the topic, notably Walton

(2010). He works there on manuscripts from Hua XXXIX along six

characterizations that can be paired following three major features of the

world, which are also addressed by Geniusas’ essay: uniqueness (Einzigkeit),

unity (Einheit), and harmony (Einstimmigkeit). Uniqueness concerns the world

as universal horizon and its thematization in a world-representation. Unity is a

totality connected by a form. Harmony is related to temporality and shows the

world as ground and as idea. As to the issue of the unity of the world, Walton

stresses both the subjective and the worldly side of horizonality in terms of a

universal apperception and the world as the allness of realities (2010, p. 142).

It thus seems that the ‘‘rudimentary’’ manifestation of the world-horizon is still

an open question in need of further discussion.

(5) The exposition of the sense and the role of the historical apriori in the final

chapter does not seem to be clear enough. It addresses a far-reaching question

that involves taking up issues like historicity and primal historicity, i.e. the

temporal and social horizons that pertain to intersubjectivity and, correlatively,

to works and institutions, i.e. the horizons of culture, all of which actually goes

beyond the scope of the book. I think the potential of this chapter lies in its

capacity to provide an answer to the aforementioned post-Husserlian positions

(cf. p. 97). For these positions are indeed the true counterpoint to Geniusas’

own reflections throughout this essay.

References

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(Trans.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977.

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3 ‘‘Wherein’’ (worin) appears as a subheading: ‘‘Welt als worin alles Seiende (fur mich Seinsgewisse)

inexistiert’’ (Hua XXXIX, p. 73), further in Hua XV, pp. 325, 353, 596, 656 (related to the body), p. 684

(in a marginal note). ‘‘Wherefrom’’ (assuming that it renders the German ‘‘woher’’) is not documented in

Hua XXXIX.

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