Satisfaction for Whom - Freedom for What

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Satisfaction for Whom? Freedom for What? Theology and the Economic Theory of theConsumerAuthor(s): Mark G. NixonSource: Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 70, No. 1, Today's Ethical Issues: Perspectives fromthe Business Academic Community (Jan., 2007), pp. 39-60Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25075270.

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Journal of Business Ethics (2007) 70:39-60DOI 10.1007A10551-006-9078-5? Springer2006

Satisfaction forWhom? FreedomforWhat? Theology and the EconomicTheory of the Consumer Mark G. Nixon

ABSTRACT. The economic theory of the consumer,which assumes individual satisfaction as its goal and

individual freedom to pursue satisfaction as its sine quanon, has become an important ideological element inpolitical economy. Some have argued that the politicaldimension of economics has evolved into a kind of

secular theology that legitimates free market capitalism, which has become a kind of religion in theUnited States [Nelson: 1991, Reaching for Heaven onEarth: The TheologicalMeaning ofEconomics. (Rowman &Littlefield Publishers, Inc, Savage, Maryland); 2001,

Economics as Religion: From Samuelson to Chicago and Beyond (The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, Pennsylvania); Thurow: 1983, DangerousCurrents: The State of Economics (Random House, New

York); Milbank: 1990, Theology and Social Theory, BeyondSecular Reason (Basil Blackwell, Cambridge, Massachusetts)]. Consumer theory in its ideological form providesan important base for this religion and is no longer

merely a positive framework for understanding consumerchoice or estimating market demand. The paper exploresthe view of the human being, the anthropology, that isimplicit in the economic theory of the consumer andcompares its theological implications with the corresponding theological anthropologies in the Judaeo

Mark Nixon ([email protected]) is a doctoral student intheologyand coordinatorof theMaster ofArts inHumanities& Sciences Program at Fordham University, with research

interests in postmodern theology, social theory, and ethics. Hereceived his B.A. (Religion) from Oberlin College, hisM.B.A. and M.A. (Political Economy) from StanfordUniversity, and hisM.A. (Theology) from Fordham University. He has also completed the course requirements for thePh.D. (Economics) at The George Washington University.His business career includedmore than 20 years with IBM

where he held staff, management and executive positions,including several years as director of IBM's Advanced Busi

ness Institute.

Christian tradition. The paper outlines the assumptionsof consumer theory and then focuses on three aspects ofthe theory from a critical theological perspective: theindividual in community, property ownership, and hu

man destiny (or eschatology in theological terminology). The principal conclusion is that consumer theory,viewed from this perspective, leads to a reductionist andexistentially harmful view of human beings. The maxi

mization of individual satisfaction raises genuine ethicalissues when viewed as a political and religious value. The

paper argues that the issues could be ameliorated ifeconomists would include more explicit treatment of asocial dimension and ethical alternatives in consumertheory and if theologians would give greater attention toeconomic theory.

KEY WOPDS: community, consumer, economics,individual, Milbank, ownership, religion, social ethics,theology, utility

IntroductionDiscussions between business people, economistsand political leaders on one hand and religiousleaders, theologians and ethicists on the other handabout the justice and morality of specific businessand economic practices and policies can often befrustrating. Arguing from different starting pointsand on the basis of different assumptions, the participants often express themselves in terms that seemforeign to one another, feel as if they are talking pasteach other, and conclude by wondering why theother party cannot see clearly what appears to beobvious to all. Accusations of greed and uncaring arecountered by charges of impracticality or unreasonableness.

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40Mark G. Nixon

One source of the difficulty is that these conversations rarely address the assumptions and thetheories that inform the participants' positions on thespecific issues. These underlying convictions aboutthe world and specific issues are often embodied intheological doctrines, economic theories, and political philosophies that are deeply rooted in the conversation partners' personal and cultural formationand development. They do not lend themselves tocasual discussion. However, without an understanding, or at least a clarification, of differences atthis level, the debates about the goals of economicsystems, or advocacy of specific practices and policiesare problematic and unresolvable.This paper provides an analysis at this deepertheoretical level of one area of fundamental beliefsthat frequently informs these discussions: theunderstanding of how human beings conceive of andpursue happiness through the consumption choicesthat they make. Specifically, it compares and contrasts the axioms of the neoclassical economic theoryof the consumer, which constitute the anthropologyor view of the human being that is implicit in free

market economics, with the theological or religiousanthropologies that inform Christianity and Judaism.It identifies and explores principles that usuallyremain tacit with the hope that clarifying differencesin these basic ideas can lead to more fruitful policydiscussions, to changes in how economists andtheologians approach the intersection of theirrespective disciplines, and perhaps even to a more

humane world.

Why focus on the consumer?

The American economy in the aggregate continuesto grow at a steady rate and many people in the U.S.currently enjoy a high level of economic prosperity,especially relative to the rest of the world. Yet, thereis increasing concern that something is not right.Individual and household uncertainty persists aboutemployment, the ability to make ends meet, theaffordability of health care, and the adequacy ofsavings for retirement. There is dissatisfaction withthe political system and a longing for a deeper set ofvalues than can often be found in normal work andpopular culture. In the United States, communitiesand families are weakened by the stresses of long

hours at work and an almost frantic pursuit ofindividual activity and achievement that is viewed asa significant life's goal. Life itself is devalued byviewing it as ameans to an end rather than an end initself.

Worldwide, there is growing disparity betweenthe rich and the poor, with the wealthy defining theproduction priorities of the world economy whileintense poverty persists globally. As one example,the average U.S. household consumption expenditure for pets is greater than the per capita annualincomes of roughly 20% of the world's people, who

make the equivalent of less than $1 per day. In aneven more extreme example, high-wealth consumers hire luxury yachts, complete with on-boardheliports and staffs that provide meticulous individual attention around the clock, for hundreds ofthousands of dollars a week, while adults and children in many poor countries die of starvation ordiseases for which inexpensive vaccines are availablebut outside these populations' financial reach.Each of these concerns and examples involvesconsumption choices that have serious consequencesfor both the consumer and for others who areaffected. They are also of particular religious andethical concern to those who advocate a significantlydifferent set of priorities together with the redistribution of wealth and resources and changes ineconomic policies that may be required to achievethem.

Consumer theory and theologicalanthropology: four theses

The relationship between economic theory andtheology was a close one until the late 18th century.Schumpeter (1980) traces the early evolution ofeconomics as a field of study from its origins inscholastic theology (Schumpeter notes that most ofthe economic theory of the 17th century could havebeen taken from the 16th century Spanish Jesuittheologian Luis de Molina1) through its consideration as a topic within natural theology (Locke's

Essay Concerning Human Understanding influenced thelater empirical tradition but Locke also wrote aworkon the Reasonableness of Christianity; and AdamSmith taught natural theology at Glasgow Collegewhere he also wrote his Theory ofMoral Sentiments), toits eventual separation from theology during the 18th



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Satisfaction for Whom? Freedom for What? 41

century as secular philosophies of individual rights(e.g., Rousseau), utilitarianism (e.g., Bentham), and

philosophical empiricism (e.g., Hume) prevailed.In recent decades, there has been renewed attention to the relationship between theology and economics as church leaders have asserted the moralresponsibilities of economic systems to the development of the human person (e.g., Pope John Paul II,1981, 1987, 1991) and economic philosophers haveraised concerns about the ethical implications ofconsumer theory (Hodgson, 1983, 2001; McMurtry,1999). My intention in this paper is to contribute tothis ongoing debate by developing the following fourtheses that address the relationship between the economic theory of the consumer and the theologicalanthropologies inherent in Judaism and Christianity.Thesis 1: Consumer theory embodies an anthropology orunderstanding of the human being that is theoretically

problematic even as an economics of human choice.A significant source of contention about theseissues is the view of the human being, the

anthropology, that is embodied in and deeplyreinforced by an economic system that asserts themaximization of immediate individual satisfaction asan ultimate value and individual freedom to pursuethis satisfaction as its sine qua non. This system is

variously referred to as the free market system orcapitalism; and itsmetanarrative or story of whatconstitutes human thriving is articulated in theneoclassical economic theory of the consumer. Thistheory is problematic as an anthropology even froma purely economic theoretical point of view.Thesis 2: Consumer theory, with its anthropologicalassumptions, has come to constitute an ideology or even adoctrine in a secular economic theology.

In spite of these economic theoretical issues, theanthropology that is inherent in consumer theory'sassumptions is nevertheless often advanced ideologically as a normative prescription and even at times asan element of a secular theology to support andjustify the overall economic system.Thesis 3: The anthropology inherent in consumer theory isat odds with Jewish and Christian understandings of thehuman being, which offer, in theirjudgment, amore hopefulview of theperson in community and of human destiny.

Viewed theologically, free market anthropologicalassumptions differ fundamentally from and are atodds with Jewish and Christian anthropologies inthree main ways. First, they are rigorously asocial - incontrast with the strongly social understanding of theindividual in the Judaeo-Christian anthropologies.Second, their view of the individual's right toownership and unilateral disposition of initialresource endowments and acquired possessions forpurely personal satisfaction conflicts with JudaeoChristian views, which understand individualownership as stewardship of resources for the benefitof the community aswell as the individual. A radicalview of ownership for personal satisfaction may evenamount to a kind of heresy from a Christian perspective. Third, their lack of a historical timedimension and their application of the consequentialist decision criterion of achieving current, evenimmediate, satisfaction implies a view of humandestiny and happiness that is short-sighted andamoral in the perspective of Christianity andJudaism, which view decisions within a history thatextends from the creation of the world to its ultimatefulfillment at the end of time.Thesis 4: There is an opportunity to develop a richereconomic theory as a basisfor dialogue on economic issuesusing theological insights from Judaism and Christianity.There is also an opportunity for new directions in theologybased on a deeper reflection on economic theory and practice.

There is benefit in a more vigorous and ongoingdialogue between economics and theology - at a theoretical level - concerning a deeper understanding ofhuman behavior with regard to economic choice. Sucha dialogue will lead both theologians and economists toa clarification of the real human issues involved ineconomic activity and how economic activity is boththeorized and theologized, a clarification that couldlead to amore just and hopeful world.

Thesis 1 :Consumer theory embodies an anthropologyor understanding of the human being that is theoretically problematic even as an economics ofhuman choice.

The heart of the neoclassical theory of the consumer may be summarized briefly as follows: Aperson maximizes his utility when he distributes his



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42Mark G. Nixon

available money among the various goods so that heobtains the same amount of satisfaction from the lastunit of money spent upon each commodity(emphasis added). This formulation, known asGossen's Law, dates back to the mid-19thcentury. It acquired greater analytical developmentand mathematical formulation in subsequent workby Jevons, Marshall and Hicks, which also increasingly emphasized the abstract principle of individualsatisfaction, the enjoyment or pleasure derived fromconsumption, rather than the utility or usefulbenefits derived from consumption of commoditiesas the consumer's goal. In Samuelson's (1947) concept of revealed preferences, which has become thecornerstone of recent research and contemporarytextbook formulations (e.g., Nicholson 1978;

Koutsoyiannis 1979; Baum?l and Blinder 1997;Varian, 1990), the theory lost any need to deal withthe usefulness of goods, focused instead on theconsumer's simply wanting more or less of a good atthe margin within budget constraints, and assumedaxiomatically that the preferred basket of goodsmaximized the consumer's utility.

While the theory is applied most often tomaterialgoods, certain economists (e.g., Nicholson 1978;Koutsoyiannis 1979; Becker, 1971, 1975, 1981;Becker andMurphy, 2001) have extended the rangeof consumable commodities to include suchthings as family relationships, crime, racial discrimination, pollution, and even life itself.

The problematic anthropological assumptionsof consumer theory

Consumer theory rests on the following set of fivenecessary assumptions or axioms that collectivelydelineate a secular metanarrative of human satisfaction. These assumptions are generally so simple andappear so plausible that they receive little attentionand are rarely debated. Then, once they are agreed asa starting point for further analysis, they quietlyslip into the background and the theory can bedeveloped without much further attention to them.Yet each of them has moral implications. At thispoint, we will simply list the assumptions and provide brief examples of the implicit moral issues thatthey raise. Subsequent sections of this paper willexamine broader theoretical and moral concerns.

1. People know what they want and need in order tomaximize their satisfaction or utilityPeople generate demand for goods and services bymaking consumption choices based on their wantsand needs, and firms respond by producing goodsand services to satisfy the demand. This is referred toas consumer sovereignty.One ethical consequence of this assumption iseffectively to push questions about the morality ofwhat is produced back to consumers' decisions andbehavior and to hold the economic system itselfand the community that sustains the system ?harmless from moral responsibility and evaluation.For example, the principle is used by market advocates to exonerate gun producers and retailers fromany responsibility for injuries and deaths from gunshot wounds because Guns don't kill people,people kill people. The same principle could beapplied to the manufacture of nuclear, chemical andbiological weapons or international trade in armaments. It is the purchaser/consumer who isresponsible for any moral consequences.2. People act individually inmaking choices and arefree tomake their choices without constraints imposed by othersIndividual autonomy and liberty are not simplyideals that are given expression in the theory; theyare logically required for the theory to be true. Thisindividual freedom is a cornerstone of the theory andthere is no theoretical space for consideration ofeither social or moral constraints that might be imposed by custom, tradition, or values. In particular,serious theoretical issues arise if people make choicesbased on a social welfare function thatwould includeother people (Arrow, 1951; Sen, 1995, 1999).4 Themarket demand for goods (i.e., the quantities of eachgood that would be purchased at all possible prices)is calculated

by summingall of the individual choi

ces, not by integrating them into a social demandcurve that involves tradeoffs among consumers.

Individual choice does not, of course, rule outconsideration of others, and Sen cautions againstthe 'low-minded sentimentalism' of assuming thateveryone is constantly motivated entirely by personal self-interest. But, incorporating altruism inthe neoclassical model is problematic. Becker (1981),for example, has developed what he describes as atheory of altruism and a corresponding familyutility function, by including in the utility



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calculations of each family member the utility ofother family members. Altruism here consists ofindividual sacrifice in the interest of maximizingfamily utility, such that the individual's overall utilityis also increased. For example, a husband might giveup his job and sacrifice the related income byaccepting a family household move that enables hiswife to take a position with a salary increase thatmore than compensates the family's loss of his income, so that both he and she can enjoy a higherlevel of consumption. Nonetheless, this theoreticalconstruction remains rooted in the maximization ofindividual satisfaction.

3. People have perfect information about all of the attributesof the available goods and services available to them andrationally evaluate them in terms of the satisfaction thatthey will bringIf people did not have perfect information, then,among other things, the choices that are made exante on the basis of imperfect information might notresult ex post in the expected satisfaction. Economistsrecognize the heroic implausibility of assuming thatconsumers have perfect information but accept it asan initial assumption, while the literature on decision-making under imperfect information continuesto grow.

4. The consumer is endowed with owned resources thatallow choices to be consummated

This assumption is required because the principalobjective of the theory is to arrive at a demand curvefor goods, and economic demand is always effectivedemand that can be exercised, not simply a wishlist of wants. Further, these endowments are at thedisposal of the consumers who own them and havethe freedom to exercise their own volition in howthey

are used. This ownership and freedom of use,essential to the economic theory and protected bylaw in the United States and other societies, is acritical component of the value system that enablesfree markets to exist.

The magnitude of the endowments, where theycome from, and their distribution among consumers,however, are simply ignored by consumer theory;people just have whatever they have. The practicalmoral concern is that the current distribution of

wealth and resources, including observed extremedisparities among consumer participants across local,

national and worldwide economies, is implicitlyaccepted and perpetuated. This results in a set ofglobal consumption ? and hence production ? priorities that favor wealthy countries and individuals.This unequal distribution of initial endowmentsis central to understanding how economic development can expand consumption, especially inpoor countries; and it is a basic issue in international policy debates over the inequity of resourceover consumption in wealthy countries giventhe abysmal poverty of the majority of humanbeings. With few resources beyond their own timeand labor, poor people do not generate effectivedemand. But this lack of effective consumer de

mand in developing economies limits the growthof firms that would respond to the demand andthereby create employment opportunities for thepoor. It becomes a vicious cycle. The neoclassicalview might be characterized succinctly as: thepoor are poor because they are poor and they willremain poor because they are poor. Thus, a critical first step in developing economies is often toincrease and reallocate the existing endowments(e.g., through external aid or land reform); but the

basic theory tends to reify the status quo.5. People's preferences and choices arefor now. There isno tomorrow, no historical time dimensionThe impacts of choices made at one time (e.g.,concerning the consumption of fossil fuels) on a latertime (e.g., the degradation of the environment) arenot relevant in the theory. The consumer's allocation of resource endowments for consumption todayversus tomorrow is treated in a separate theory ofcapital formation or saving and investment.Consumer theory's assumption of perfect knowledgeobviates the need to consider historical time, since, ifthe future consequences of decisions are known (oraddressed in the form of a probability distribution),then economic analyses can treat time as a purelylogical variable and independent of historicalcircumstances (Vickers 1994). The theory supportsonly static analysis.It can be demonstrated logically that if these fiveconditions are met, then goods and services will beproduced and distributed in a way that optimallysatisfies consumer preferences, subject to the overallconstraint of the available resources at a givenpoint.



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44Mark G. NixonSome theoretical economic issues with consumer theoryIn the context of a positive economics, the theory ofconsumer choice constitutes a source of testable

hypotheses that could conceptually prove useful as aframework for making and testing empirical predictions about consumer activity in a free market andidentifying possible remedies for any marketimperfections or failures. However, there are severalproblems in using it this way.

First, the economic concept of consumer satisfaction or utility makes hypotheses about whetherindividuals are, in fact, maximizing satisfaction andutility unfalsifiable. It is, of course, both possible anduseful for many reasons to investigate individual andgroup satisfaction with products, services andexperiences; and levels of consumer satisfaction thatare measured through responses inmarketing studies

may provide useful information for business decisions. However, the measures are at best a proxy forthe actual satisfaction that the consumer experiences.

Utility and satisfaction are subjective characteristicsof individuals that become self-fulfilling in anyempirical test. They are whatever a person means bythem, and there are no objective and independentunits for measuring them across consumers (Harsanyi 1955).

This subjective aspect has led some economists toconsider if the theory of the consumer is evennecessary or useful. The economist's primary focus ison aggregate, not individual, demand for goods andservices and on the estimation of price and incomeelasticities; and there are theoretical and empiricalapproaches for deriving these without the use ofconsumer utility or preference functions. Nonetheless, an economic science that had no theory ofconsumer choice would, to put it metaphorically,always

remain at the molecular level of analysisand never get to the atomic or sub-atomiclevels. More importantly, free market economicswould lack a personal face. It would be moredifficult to tie the workings of an impersonal marketto individuals and it would be harder, if notimpossible, to draw on the concepts of human reason, personal freedom, and consumer choice thatmake the free market so ideologically powerful.

Second, while the concept of utility maximizationallows economists to apply certain mathematicaloptimization techniques (e.g., calculus, linear

programming) to the theoretical analysis ofconsumer preferences, the concept of maximizationhas little meaning to most people who live their livesand make choices on the basis of rules of thumbthat usually enable them to get by in away that issatisfactory to them

-what Herbert Simon andothers have called satisficing (March and Simon,

1958; Simon, 1976) ? and would not know if theywere or could be maximally or optimally satisfied within their budget constraint by any givencombinations of goods.Third, the assumption of perfect information is not

merely heroic, it is logically untenable both from aneconomic, analytical perspective and epistemologically. Analytically, as Vickers (1994) points out, forevery individual in amarket system to have perfectknowledge simultaneously each would need to know

what every other individual will do or chooseunder different contemplated conditions inresponse to one's own projected action. Thetortured problems that duopoly theory encountered on that level are well known. When everyindividual's proposed action depends on everyother individual's action, it is simply not possibleto say that there are sufficient degrees of freedomin the system for all market participants to haveperfect knowledge.

Epistemologically, the problem of perfect knowledge is compounded when real consumers makethese decisions in real historical time as opposed tothe logical time in the economic theory:

To ask an individual in real time what he or shewould do if the price were to change is to ask, ineffect, what the individual would do if his or herentire knowledge environment and epistemicstatus were different. It is to ask, what the individual would do if he or she were different. Howcan one say what one would do if one weredifferent when ...epistemologically, it is impossible to know what one would be if one weredifferent.

This is not to say that surveying consumers onhow changes in the prices of goods and serviceswould affect their consumption levels, would yieldmeaningless or useless information; but the



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responses would inevitably be speculative and theirreliability uncertain. Moreover, the more distantthe time for which the survey question is posed,the more difficult would be the consumer's abilityto deal in real terms with the ceteris paribus conditions. The theoretical problem rests in theassumption of logical time and the presumption ofconsumer knowledge, not just speculation.

Finally, fundamental analytical issues have beenraised about what constitutes rational choice. Sen(1973) has evaluated the rationality of utility-maximizing individual choice within the context of thewell-known prisoners' dilemma where, if each ofthe individuals maximizes his own self-interest

based on expected outcomes and without regard forthe other party, both parties are worse off. Sen(1977) also questions why the consequentialist, actbased criterion of maximizing individual self-interest that we have described so far is really required asthe basis for rationality in consumer theory when:(1) there is evidence that commitment or a sense of

obligation rather than immediate consequences is acommon decision criterion for people; (2) peopleoften base their decisions on rules of behavior ratherthan individual acts; and (3) there is evidencein experiments with the prisoners' dilemma (not tomention everyday observation) that people doconsider the interests of others and choose to do theunselfish thing. He argues that commitment, inparticular, needs to be incorporated as an element ofrationality in the economic theory of consumerchoice along with a social dimension that recognizesthat groups (e.g., class, community) provide thecontext and basis of many actions involving com

mitment.

Thesis 2: Consumer theory, with its anthropologicalassumptions, has come to constitute an ideologyor even a doctrine in a secular economictheology.

In light of these conceptual and practical issues, itis reasonable to question why the theory persists as afocus for economic analysis. The most compellinganswer is that economics is not just a positive science. It is a normative social philosophy - even asecular theology ? as well. Lester Thurow, aneconomist, comments that

The equilibrium price-auction view of the world isa traditional view with a history as old as that ofeconomics itself: the individual is asserted to be amaximizing consumer or producer within free

supply-demand markets that establish an equilibrium price for any kind of goods or service. This isan economics blessed with an intellectual consistency, and one having implications that extend farbeyond the realm of conventional economic theory. It is, in short, also a political philosophy, oftenbecoming something approaching a religion.

Robert H. Nelson, also an economist, goes further.In the preface of his book, Economics as Religion, he

begins: Economists think of themselves as scientists,but as Iwill be arguing in this book, they are morelike theologians (Nelson 2001). 12 He then proceedsto offer a theological exegesis of the contents ofmodern economic thought and to evaluate thecurrent schools of economic thought in terms oftheir contributions to the tenets of a new, secularreligion whose economic prophesy has not depended on the necessary existence of any God in thehereafter but which draws many of its themesfrom the biblical tradition, now typically reworkingthem in a less direct and mostly implicit fashion.This builds on an earlier book (Nelson, 1991) in

which he provided more of the rationale:Material scarcity and the resulting competition forlimited resources have been widely seen as thefundamental cause of human misbehavior ? the

real source of human sinfulness .... For manyfaithful of modern economic theologies, economic progress has represented the route of salvation to a new heaven on earth, the means ofbanishing evil from the affairs of mankind.

Those who are ideologically committed to freemarket economics do not view the theoreticalobjections that were addressed in the preceding section as cautions against using a positive economictheory as an ethical standard. Rather they view themas hindrances to be overcome so that the market may

work to its fullest extent. In short, consumers may notbehave rationally inmaking choices, but they shouldbehave that way. Individuals may be constrained inhow they use their resource endowments to achievepersonal satisfaction, but they should not be. Society



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46Mark G. Nixon

may deny or limit consumer access to certain consumables (e.g., prostitution, drugs, guns), but it shouldnot. These statements articulate a strong libertarianview that constitutes the limit situation for derivingthe theoretical benefits of the free market system,

which the theory of the consumer supports. Themore general and moderate normative argument isthat the free market system is, at least in theory, themost effective system for achieving consumer satisfaction and well-being as long as these conditions aremet - and therefore they should be met.From a pragmatic social and ideological perspective, the theory of consumer choice is essential to thesocio-political system founded on the free market. Itserves to legitimate the economic system in the

minds of individuals. The idea that the free marketsystem is based on consumer sovereignty gives thesystem experiential weight and validates consumption to achieve individual satisfaction as sociallydesirable and important. The theory's axioms ofindividual choice, economic freedom and rationalitybecome social values and make the economic system

worth preserving and defending (with people's lives,if necessary), even if the economic consequences ofthe system may be harmful to particular individualsor segments of society at a given point. An alternative system that was irrational (e.g., based onadmittedly subjective values) and in which individuals were constrained by others (i.e. unfree ) in thechoices that they could make using their income andwealth would hardly find such acceptance, at leastcurrently in the United States.Thesis 3: The anthropology inherent in consumer

theory is at odds with Jewish and Christianunderstandings of the human being, which offer,in their judgment, a more hopeful view of theperson in community and of human destiny.

The secular anthropology that is inherent in thetheory of consumer choice provides a critical focusfor theological study because of its axiomatic character, its strong social and value dimensions, theideological role that it plays in legitimating the free

market system, and the often adverse consequencesof the system for those it encompasses, especiallythose who are seriously disadvantaged with regard to

initial endowments. The theory's assumptions raiseissues for a Judaeo-Christian view of the humanbeing. As a secular ideology, the consumer theoryand the free market system that it supports may beunderstood as a competing religion.

Perhaps the greatest objection to consumer theoryfrom a Judaeo-Christian, theological perspective isthat it is asocial (exclusive focus on the individual),amoral (a purely consequentialist decision criterionof satisfaction maximization), and ahistorical (thetheory treats time only as logical ). From thistheological perspective, the axioms violate thecommunal nature of the human being, lead to avalorization of individual ownership rights andcommand or dominion over possessions to theselfish exclusion and detriment of other people.

Ultimately, they lead to a loss of a reason to hope inthe human prospect as human destiny is reduced tothe present maximization of satisfaction with goodsthat cannot, in the end, satisfy, but as violence isnevertheless wreaked on people and nature to preserve the right to try and achieve that satisfaction. AsBritton and Sedgwick (2003) have summarized thesituation: the anthropology of the theory of consumer choice is individualist, value-free and a-historical .... The Christian account could not be moredifferent. It presupposes a different understanding ofrationality and of history. It turns on the memory ofcertain events, but the primary focus is not one of

memory. Rather participation in communalpractices engenders a sense of hope for thefuture ....

In short, consumer theory constitutes a metanarrative that is at odds with Judaism and Christianityand betrays a deficient anthropology that is moreradical than mere carping about the realism of specificeconomic assumptions. The fundamental theologicalobjections to free market consumer theory identifiedabove can be elaborated in three broad areas:? The communal nature of the human being;? Ownership and the exercise of dominion over

creation; and? The destructive character of the human destiny( eschatology in theological terminology) thatis inherent in an ahistorical concept of consumersatisfaction.



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The communal nature of the human beingThe modern economic view of the consumer beginswith the individual alone whereas the JudaeoChristian view begins with the individual in community, specifically, a community in which God isboth present and of ultimate concern as creator andsource of meaning and value. For both Jews andChristians, this governing theological and ethicalparadigm originates in the two stories of creation inthe biblical Book of Genesis. In both creation stories,the human being is God-made with specificresponsibilities that devolve from the relationshipwith God, but each story has distinctive elements ofhow human beings relate to God and to oneanother. The first story in Genesis 1 views thehuman being as made in the image of God (imagoDei) and given dominion/lordship over the earth.The second account in Genesis 2-3 establishes thecommunal dimension of personhood with itsreflection on the human being as living creature(nephesh) in community. Both stories must be takentogether in order to provide a satisfactory Jewish or

Christian theological anthropology. Their respectivecontributions are addressed in turn below.

Genesis I: The human being made in the image ofGod (imago Dei) with dominion/lordship overthe earth

Those who argue for the compatibility, or evencongruence, between the biblical tradition and thefree market are quick to correlate the economicview of the individual with the account of humankind's creation in the image of God in Genesis 1and with God's command to human beings to subdue the earth and exercise dominion over all livingthings (Gen. 1:27-28). A theological reading of

humanity as created in the image of God has beenused constructively as the basis for the defense anddignity of all human life and of the intrinsic value ofeach individual no matter what race, ethnicity, orsocial status. Taken alone, however, it is insufficientto address the issues involved in economic activity.

Rather, an exclusive focus on the concept of theimage of God, even when extended, as some havedone, to include the Christian doctrine of theTrinity, results in an ambiguous and potentially

harmful anthropology that treats the communaldimension of human activity abstractly.Britton and Sedgwick (2003) use the concept ofthe image of God to understand the theologicalsignificance of the consumer in economics. Theypoint out that thismust be understood in the contextof the relational emphasis that is integral to Judaism.They argue that when the concept of the image ofGod is used in Christianity, it does not consist primarily of the exercise of rational thought and deci

sion, which can become vain, but rather calls peopleto imitate God's love, which must be reciprocatedand exercised within community. That is, not allforms of individual satisfaction are legitimate in aChristian view. Insofar as creation in the image ofGod does include individual reason as God-like, it isnever reason as a value in itself but only as it servesjustice, righteousness and love within the community. But this communal aspect is not clearly represented in Genesis 1. The relationship between thehuman being and God is unidirectional; God creates,blesses, commands and provides sustenance as a gift.It is a relationship of grateful subservience to God.The relationship between man and woman is specifically described only with regard to a command tobe fruitful and multiply (Gen. 1:28) and eventheir cooperation with one another in filling theearth and subduing it is unclear. The broader relational, communal and ethical implications thatBritton and Sedgwick draw must be found outside ofGenesis 1.

One Christian theological approach for introducing a communal dimension into a theologicaleconomic analysis within the context of Genesis 1 isto understand God as Trinity. Robert G. Simons(1995), for example, begins his understanding of theeconomic person based on the idea of person in the

Trinity which he summarizes as a loving community of persons: the Father gives himself totally tothe Son, the Son gives himself totally to the Father,and the Spirit, proceeding from both, is the bond ofthat pure self-giving love. By analogy, homoeconomicus is also understood as a related person.Simons considers the Christian doctrine of theTrinity, which affirms the necessary relationalground of all human life, as a challenge to theindividualistic bias in economic theory and itsunderstanding of society as merely an aggregate ofindividuals.



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However, there is still ambiguity, and an alternative reading of Genesis 1 that minimizes thecommunal element is also possible. This less communal view of the human being as the image of Godis found in an alternative personalist apologetic forthe free market. This apologetic focuses on theeconomic anthropology in the works of Hayek andvon Mises and draws its theological support from aselective reading of the philosophy of Karol Wojtyla(Pope John Paul II) who underlines [the] two

qualities of creatureliness and God-likeness as fundamental to the human person. 21 While this apologetic acknowledges the social dimension of theperson, the emphasis in the material drawn from

Wojtyla's (1979) work is on

Self-determination, which is the proper dynamicbasis for the development of the person .... Onlythe one who has possession of himself and issimultaneously his own sole and exclusive possession can be a person .... It is not without reasonthen that medieval philosophers expressed thisrelationship in the phrase, persona est sui juris.

In this context, homo economicus, here conceived asperson in command of himself or herself, appears tohave ontological priority over community. But,

while the apologetic may address self-determinationas a necessary condition for human fulfillment, itdoes not address the interaction of people in a socialor economic context. It champions individual libertyas paramount and then tends to view market participation independently of personal moral considerations. In the marketplace, one operates in arational and pragmatic way to satisfy personal needs.There is clearly some correlation between a philosophy of individual liberty and the Christian personalist philosophy of Wojtyla. But fairness to

Wojtyla requires the recognition that his views (JohnPaul II, 1991 Wojtyla (1993)) of personal selfdetermination and self-possession are situated in abroader view that is critical of the free market's effects on the poor and disadvantaged:

It would appear that, on the level of individualnations and of international relations, the free

market is themost efficient instrument for utilizingresources and effectively responding to needs. Butthis is true only

for those needs which are

solvent, insofar as they are endowed with purchasing power, and for those resources which are

marketable, insofar as they are capable ofobtaining a satisfactory price. But there are manyhuman needs which find no place on the market. Itis a strict duty of justice and truth not to allowfundamental human needs to remain unsatisfied,and not to allow those burdened by such needs toperish.

And again,The historical experience of theWest, for its part,shows that even if the Marxist analysis and itsfoundation of alienation are false, neverthelessalienation - and the loss of the authentic meaningof life ? is a reality inWestern societies too. Thishappens in consumerism, when people are ensnared in aweb of false and superficial gratifications rather than being helped to experience theirpersonhood in an authentic and concrete way.

This analysis indicates that Genesis 1 as a standalonebasis for understanding homo economicus in his or herrole as individual consumer can lead to ambiguity.Each theological anthropology that references itholds that human beings are created in the image ofGod and that the human person is relational; but thiscan lead either to a strong view of the communaldimension, as in Simons, or to exaltation of theprimacy of individual freedom and choice. Theseanalyses point to important elements in a theologicalanthropology that are relevant for understandingeconomic activity, but additional elements are needed in order to avoid the idolization of the human asself-determined, self-possessed and as having

dominion over all creation.

Genesis 2-3: the human being as living creature(nephesh) in community

The second account of creation in Genesis 2?3,which includes the story of Adam and Eve and theresults of their disobedience to God, provides anecessary balance to Genesis 1 and a richer view ofthe human person that is actually more relevant toconsumer theory and useful as a corrective to it. Thissecond account has played a prominent role in

Christian theology throughits

developmentin the



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doctrine of the Mystical Body, which views allhuman beings as integrally related to Christ throughthe community of the Church. Jewish and Christiananthropologies that view Genesis 1?3 together arriveat different conclusions from those that rely on

Genesis 1 alone.Genesis 2 describes human beings as created fromearth and God's breath: The Lord God formed

man/'adam from the dust of the earth. He blew intohis nostrils the breath of life, and man became aliving being/nephesh (Tanakh, Gen. 2:7). In theaccount of God's creation of human beings fromGenesis 2 we have amuch richer characterization of

what a human being is than adam alone with thestrong overtones of kingship and power in Genesis1:26-27. Von Rad (1962) has called nephesh the

most important concept in [Old Testament]anthropology. The nephesh feels hunger, itloathes, it hates, it feels anger, it loves, weeps and,

most important of all, can die. The nephesh dwells inthe 'flesh,' though it is clearly distinguished fromit. It is an animating force. A nephesh has intellectual capabilities but these do not have the strongrational aspects that are often assigned to man asimago Dei'9 in Genesis 1. In short, nephesh includes

aspects that correlate more nearly with real personsmaking economic decisions. It eschews the abstraction that characterizes homo economicus viewed as arational, God-like decision maker, exercising controlover creation. The understanding of the humanbeing's creation in Genesis 2 and the story of Adamand Eve that develops from it address elements ofcommunity and responsibility that are essential toboth Jewish and Christian anthropologies.29These dimensions become clearer as the story of

Adam and Eve unfolds. In Genesis 2?3, the humanbeing as nephesh ? literally a bundle of appetites -is clearly dependent

on the earth. Unlike adam inGenesis 1who is simply created male and female byGod's fiat, Adam the nephesh is formed out of thedust of the ground, and comes to life when Godbreathes God's own breath into him (2:7). Thisnephesh in Genesis 2 needs community in the form ofa companion who is created from him as bone of

my bones (2:23). The community here is not theabstract theological analogue of a God/Trinity butthe intimate community of flesh and blood humanbeings living in God's presence who are givenresources by God to cultivate and care for as stewards

rather than owners (2:15); who have constraintsplaced on their consumption (2:16?17), who formfamilies (2:24), who make ethical choices (3:6), who

work for their livelihood (3:19), and who bearchildren with the help of the Lord (3:16, 4:1).

This concept of nephesh also leads to a consideration of how appetites might be disciplined andpractical life can be ordered. In the Hebrew culturethat the Scriptures describe, this was accomplishedthrough Torah/law, which was always directed tothe community and defined the interrelationshipsamong individuals within the community in termsof their relationship with God. In fact, as H.Wheeler Robinson (1964) has pointed out, eachindividual's moral judgment represented andimplicated the entire community through the ideaof corporate personality and communal guilt. Hoff(2005) adds that, in the context of that status

which typified nephesh, this term [i.e., corporatepersonality] meant individuals were mutually boundtogether in the same 'nephesh experience'. Such a

group could even cover more than a generation.The economic implications of Torah are spelled outin an evolving set of principles (e.g., economicexchanges and damages, lending, debt forgivenessand restoration of property, manumission), but theyare all focused on the community, with the individual always acting within a strong communalstructure.

In Christian theology, this understanding of thehuman being as nephesh was integrated with theGreek concept of psyche/soul and subsequently withthe corresponding Latin concept of anima/soul. Inthis development, it became central to the Catholicdoctrine (Pius XII 1943) of the Mystical Body ofChrist. In this body, each member keeps his or heridentity and performs a vital and integral role. Theindividual is always individual-in-community, and allpeople are essential. No one is expendable. It iswithinthis body that people are nourished, and if onemember of the body hurts, all suffer. The body isrational and well ordered, but, as in the Hebrewtradition, its intellect is centered in its heart, alwaysreaching out in love and compassion. And what thesoul/psyche is in the body, Christians are called to bein the world. The Hebrew nephesh, the Greek

psyche, and the Latin anima come together inthe Christian doctrine of the Mystical Bodyand constitute a deeply communal theological



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anthropology that challenges the strong individualismof consumer theory and provides a fuller theologicalperspective on human economic behavior than doesan exclusive focus on the imago dei and the doctrine ofthe Trinity.

Having reviewed the ideas of the individual andcommunity in Christianity and Judaism, we can nowask: what is the individual's responsibility within thecommunity? This leads to a consideration of ownership and dominion.

Ownership and the exercise of dominion over creationand possessionsIn Jewish and Christian anthropologies, the treat

ment of the given resources available to the individual and of the ownership, acquisition and use ofmaterial goods must always be understood in thecontext of God's sovereignty over the earth and allof humanity. The earth is the Lord's, and thefullness thereof; the world, and they that dwelltherein (Tanakh, Psalm 24:1). Under God's sover

eignty, people necessarily make consumption decisions concerning the resources within their care, butthey make these decisions as stewards of creation andwithin a community. Human dominion is God-given (Gen. 1:27-28), but it is also God-constrained

within a biblical world-view that focuses on communal obligations together with individual rights.Jewish ethical perspectives on ownershipWith nephesh and corporate personality as a base,Judaism developed a practical and largely non-theological approach to the relationships between individual and community in economic affairs that retainsa strong, communitarian focus. Within Judaism,ownership and obligation are situated within Torah,

which is always the history of God's relationship withthe people of Israel and not merely a body of religiouslaw. Personal consumption is a natural and routinematter, but God has a right to limit it to meet theneeds of the poor. So tithes are paid to God as ownerof the land and laws ensure that the poor will receivewhat they need and be treated in a dignified way.Similarly, the purchase, ownership and cultivation ofland are essential and even the voluntary indenture of

members of Israelite family members who areotherwise unable tomake ends meet is permitted to

carry this out, but this indenture is revoked every7 years and land is returned to its original owneramong the people of Israel every 50 years.Private property and self-interest are not inherently problematic in Judaism. In fact, the moral ofthe rabbinic Fable of the Yetzer-Ha-Rah (EvilImpulse) is that elimination of self-interested human behavior would result in chaos and that humanappetites, whether good or bad, serve God's purposes. However, whereas Adam Smith endorsesallowing the market's conceptually similar invisiblehand to function autonomously in driving production and distribution of goods and services, therabbis insist that people must strive to overcome theevil impulse, to be consciously focused on the needsof others, beginning with their own household andextending to all people, and to respect God's sovereignty in managing wealth.

Jacob Neusner (1999) has argued that theMishnah, the core of the Jewish Talmud, containsone of only two systematic economic theoriesfrom antiquity, the other being Aristotle's. TheMishnah, dating from around 200 C.E., was thefirst written recording of the Jewish oral law thatGod, according to Jewish tradition, gave to Mosesat the same time as Torah. Neusner has characterized the economic system that the Mishnahcontains as addressing the problem of man'slivelihood within a system of sanctification of aholy people and posing the question of the

critical, indeed definitive place occupied by theeconomy in society under God's rule. Absoluteindividual dominion over land and resources isalien to this system.

Christian perspectives on ownershipChristian thought takes more serious issue withprivate ownership and the individual exercise ofownership rights or dominion. Charles Avila in hisstudy of ownership in the early Christian Church(Avila, 1983) establishes that for the early churchfathers ownership was always communal, that peopleare not self-made but God-made, and that the initialendowments of each human being are communalendowments, including the world itself. St.

Ambrose, the 4th century church father and Bishopof Milan, argues further that ownership of privateproperty is not a natural right,



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for nature has brought forth all things for all incommon .... Nature therefore is the mother ofcommon right, usurpation [in the sense of privateappropriation] of private right (Ambrose, DeOfficiis Ministrorum, 1, 28).34

St. John Chrysostom went so far as to assert thatprivate ownership was not even natural:

When one attempts to possess himself of anything,tomake it his own, then contention is introduced,as if nature herself were indignant (John Chrysostom, In Epistolam ad Timotheum, 12, 4).

This clearly contravenes the idea prevalent amongthe economic philosophers of the 18th century,Say, Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Smith, that the rightto property is a natural right. While Schumpeter(1980) traces the natural rights theory of property tothe natural law tradition, Avila points out that theantecedents are the Roman stoic tradition of naturallaw rather than the church fathers, for whom theidea of individual rights was secondary to the idea ofcommunal welfare as most consistent with naturali 36

For the church fathers, the idea of individualdominion in the use and disposition of privateproperty was a form of idolatry:

It was private ownership, in the view of thefathers of the Christian Church, that was 'atheistic' or 'idolatrous.' These early social critics neverforgot the perfect disjunction that Jesus had setbefore his own followers: You cannot giveyourself to God and money (Luke 16:13).Property was a false god. Property and moneyhad become an object of worship, enslaving boththe possessor and the dispossessed. The hoardingof wealth had become a passion that could not besatisfied, an unending process, which alwaysdemanded more after each new acquisition.

Augustine had a distinctive understanding of ownership and dominion that specifically addressed theidea of individual satisfaction, what Augustine called

enjoyment (fru?).He clearly saw the dangers thatcould result from private ownership and consideredprivate possessions a diminishment or burden of thepossessor:

The Latin language has wisely called [one's ownproperty] private, for it connotes more a lossthan an increase. For all privation is a diminution(Augustine, De Genesi, 11, 15).

Moreover, he recognized how private possessions andpride in possession could cause social conflict andwork to the detriment of others, especially the poor:On account of the things which each one of uspossesses singly, wars exist, hatreds, discords,strifes among human beings, tumults, dissensions,scandals, sins, injustices, and murders .... Let ustherefore abstain from the possession of privateproperty .... In property which each possessesprivately, each necessarily becomes proud .... Theflesh of the rich person pushes out against the fleshof the poor ... (Augustine, Ennarratio in PsalmumCXXXI, 5).39

But for Augustine, the real danger was that peoplewould try to find happiness in the misguided enjoyment (fru?)of temporal goods rather than merely using(utt) temporal goods as themeans to find the way backto God, who alone is to be enjoyed (frui). In On

Christian Teaching, Augustine, who viewed his ownroad to God as one that had been full of pitfalls andwrong turns, distinguished between two kinds oflove. Only love of God, the first kind, can yieldhappiness. The second kind, love of anything temporal, even other people or our own lives, can neverbring us happiness, but if used properly for the love ofGod and of one's neighbor, temporal things can stillbe ordered toward happiness with God.

Augustine was clear in viewing the human being'sgoal as happiness, but this happiness is far removedfrom the individual satisfaction intended by consumer theory. Happiness for Augustine is the beatificvision of God and life is a journey in which therestless human heart, frequently and foolishly willingto squander life's energy on seeking satisfaction fromtemporal things, can only find rest and happiness inGod:

So in this mortal life we are like travelers awayfrom our Lord (2 Cor. 5:6): ifwe wish to returnto the homeland where we can be happy we mustuse (uti) this world (1 Cor. 7:31), not enjoy it(frut), in order to discern 'the invisible attributes



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52Mark G. Nixon

of God, which are understood through what hasbeen made (Rom. 1:20)' or, in other words, toderive eternal and spiritual value from corporealand temporal things.The things which are to be enjoyed (fru?), then,are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit,and the Trinity that consists of them, which is akind of single, supreme thing, shared by all whoenjoy {fru?) it ... but perhaps the Trinity is bettercalled the one God from whom, through whom,and in whom everything is (Rom. 11:36).

Thus, in Augustine's conception, consumption ofmaterial things does not bring satisfaction or happiness (fru?), and to view maximization of mere utility(utile) as the individual's goal would be irrational ?sheer folly. Further, only double charity, the love ofGod and love of neighbor, is the source of the usevalue of temporal, particularly material, things. Alluse value is therefore relational and never individualistic.

St. Thomas Aquinas, similarly, understooddominion as ownership for use (dominium utile) in acommunal way. In response to the questionwhether it is lawful for a man to possess a thing ashis own, Aquinas maintains that natural law does

support the right of human beings to procure anddispense goods for three reasons. First, people willtake greater care for those things that they own rather than things held in common. Second, ownership contributes to social order. Third, there will beless contention over goods if ownership is clearlyassigned. However, with respect to the use of thingsin a person's possession, Aquinas holds that manought to possess external things, not as his own, butas common, so that, to wit, he is ready to communicate them to others in their need.

In light of this Christian tradition, and based onhis own detailed historical and theological analysis ofthe development of the idea of dominion inwesternthought, John Milbank, the contemporary theologian and social-critical theorist, contends that maximizing satisfaction, conceived in free market terms,is a Christian heresy (Milbank, 1990). In a comparative review of theological analyses of economicsystems, D. Stephen Long (2000), characterizes

Milbank's position concerning free marketcapitalism: capitalism is a heresy because it celebrates and extends a formal, and manipulative,

power of the will separately from any account ofwhat is true, good or beautiful. 44 Long adds thatMilbank considers it a Christian heresybecause of the loss of the orthodox doctrine of theTrinity according to which the world is createdthrough, in, and for participation with God, who isnot some bare divine unity defined in terms primarily of will, but is a gift who can be given and yetnever alienated in his givenness. Once the doctrineof the Trinity is reduced to bare divine simplicity, anew 'secular' politics emerges from within Christianity that makes capitalism possible.45

Milbank rests his argument on an analysis that thissecular politics:first of all ensured that men, when enjoyingunrestricted, unimpeded property rights and evenmore when exercising the rights of a sovereigntythat 'cannot bind itself,' come closest to the imagodei. Secondly, by abandoning participation in

Being and Unity for a 'covenantal bond' betweenGod and men, it provided a model for humaninterrelationships as 'contractual' ones.

In short, the human implementation of a marketsystem came to be viewed asGod's invisible hand,justly allocating to each what each deserves. The freemarket in this view becomes the mechanism fordispensing God's grace, and at the free market's rootis an anthropology that is characterized by whatMilbank calls dominium, which in Milbank's conception is a nearly mythicized form of dominion thatincludes not only ownership of property rights butindividual human lordship over ourselves, our labor,our ability to work, land or the means of producinggoods and services, and the endowments that wehave to acquire and consume goods and services. Inthis free market framework, dominium is given to usto satisfy our own purposes rather than being basedon any particular understanding of the commongood and community.As we have seen, Milbank's negative view ofdominium is congruent with the Hebrew andChristian traditions. God's command in Genesis tosubdue the earth was understood in the Hebrewtradition and in Christian theology until the 17thcentury as amatter of responsibility and stewardship



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and not merely the exercise of power to achieveindividual satisfaction. Itwas clearly bound up withthe rational and ethical management of a person'sproperty.

Milbank asserts that in the 17th century, dominiumbecame rooted in an individualistic account of the

will, oblivious to questions of its providential purpose in the hands of God. 7Milbank notes that

'unrestricted private property,' 'absolute sovereignty' and 'active rights,' which compose the'pure-power' object of the new politics, are all theemanations of a new anthropology which beginswith human persons and individuals and yet

defines their individuality essentialistically, as 'will'or 'capacity' or 'impulse to self-preservation.'

But if the consumer is sovereign to this extent, thereis little room for God. If individual satisfaction becomes the ultimate goal, there is little room forcommunity. Both God and community becomesecondary, perhaps useful as the context, but not asthe source and motivating factors for what consumertheory now conceives in secular terms as the indi

vidual's project of achieving satisfaction in lifethrough the exercise of dominium and the consumption of whatever dominium can procure.

The destructive character of the eschatology inherentin ahistorical consumer satisfactionAs we have seen, there is no concept of historical

time in consumer theory, where consumer choiceand the effects of any changes in economic variables such as prices or consumer income are theorized as occurring in abstract, logical time. AsMiller (2004) describes time relative to consumption: the future is merely the present continuedwithout end, and end here means not simply cessation but telos or goal .... Consumption frommoment to moment embodies no future prospectexcept more of the same. The human purposeimplicit in consumer theory is simple: to maximizeindividual satisfaction, subject to income constraints, in each moment; and this, in economictheory, also determines the economy's overalldirection, because it is consumer sovereignty thatmotivates production priorities.

In the context of a positive economics, analystscan simply bracket the ethical implications that thisraises and proceed to test whether the theory canhelp to explain or predict observed behavior.However, if the theory is viewed normatively orideologically, the idea that human well-being isbest served through a free market that operateswithout a larger historical purpose must be challenged from a Jewish or Christian perspective. Thetheory's lack of a concept of historical time andpurpose is theologically significant for these traditions, because it is precisely in historical time thatGod has been encountered and that human beingsmust answer God's call in working out their salvation. It is historical experience that compelshuman beings to raise the eschatological questionsabout what constitutes human destiny both individually and socially. Specifically, what in life cantranscend the historical reality of death? Or howcan the human community, in global solidarity,sustain and advance society and all of creationtoward its ultimate fulfillment in a new heavenand a new earth (Isa. 65:17, Rev. 21:1) or inanticipation of the Kingdom of God which hasalready come (Mk. 1:15) and is to be fulfilled atthe end of time (Mt. 25:34). While Judaism and

Christianity address these questions in differentways, they conclude in basic agreement that each

individual's historical life and death has meaningand that history has a purpose and a hopeful fulfillment. In the Christian conception, death is notthe end. Instead, faith frees a person to overcomeit through love of God and neighbor as a discipleof Christ. In Judaism, the recognition that theindividual is part of a larger historical communityfosters the transcendence of death through faithfulness to Torah in solidarity with past and future

generations.One consequence of the consumer theory'sahistorical concept of consumption is that such

questions of human destiny are not raised. Thetheory does not consider death, because death is onlyrelevant in historical time. And yet the reality ofdeath becomes a source of dread and fear for any realhuman being whose preoccupation is consumption.J?rgen Moltmann (1996) describes the situationcogently. It is the awareness of death that leads theperson to desire immortality and overcome thefrailty of the human situation. He writes:



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54Mark G. NixonIt is the awareness of death which first creates fearfor life, the fear of not getting one's fair share, ofnot having enough from life, the fear that life willbe cut short. This leads to a craving for life and togreed. The person who senses death in the midstof life wants to live, and if not to be alreadyimmortal, at least to be invulnerable while living.People like this look at the immortal gods andwant to be like them. ...They want to be rich,healthy, invulnerable and immortal.

This leads, in Moltmann's view, to an anthropocentricism that reduces human nature and destroysboth community and creation:The modern separation between person andnature ... or between covenant and creation ...does justice neither to human nature, norto the community of creation. It is an expressionof the anthropocentricism of the modern world,anthropocentricism destructive of nature.

It also leads to the creation of sinful structures,political and economic, that aim to overcome vulnerability but in fact destroy community by perpetuating human violence. The modern termstructural sin includes those:

political and economic structures which areunjust because they are used to enforce thedomination of human beings over humanbeings, the exploitation of human beings byhuman beings, and the alienation of humanbeings from one another. Within these structures, violence is practiced not directly andpersonally but indirectly by way of laws andprices. Through structures of this kind, violenceis legitimated.

The result is that the expectation of salvation is reduced to religious and moral personality and thisconstitutes a deadly declaration of doom for the restof the world.

Consumer theory caters to this fear of vulnerability and desire to be God's equal. In its timelessness and its implicit view of salvation as thepresent maximization of satisfaction, it implies thatsatisfaction short of God is possible. A way totranscend death appears to present itself for those

who are blessed with substantial resource endow

ments. At the same time, however, those who lackthese resource endowments face death in an even

more dire way. Again Moltmann:death through the indirect violence issuing fromthe wealthy countries is an everyday affair ....Because in the wealthy countries and richer classesof society personal possessions are more valuablethan a shared life, violent death inAfrica and Latin

America and in India is going to claim more andmore victims.

Moltmann might have changed the phrase personalpossessions to personal satisfaction' in keeping withthe more current view of consumer theory. Possessions, after all, have some use value; but in the economic theory possessions take a back seat to asubjective satisfaction, the personal enjoyment orsense of well being that the possessions afford a person.So we can see in this theory of consumer choice acertain existential power which may for some offer

hope to transcend death through living well but whichitself constitutes death for others. It is no surprise thatfree markets are defended most strongly by those whoare well off.Can this denial of death, and the resulting humanviolence and loss of humanity in the public sphere ofthe free market be compensated by a countervailing

public sphere of religious and cultural institutionsthat redeem the human prospect and mitigate theeconomy's harsh effects by proclaiming an eschatology of hope? This is at least part of how MichaelNovak (1983) sees the Christian faith addressing themoral indifference of what is otherwise a stronglybeneficial free market system in his view. But ifthis hope is to be realized, those who have it and are

materially well off must resist the economic ideologyand live lives that are to some extent existentiallycontradictory. We cannot serve both God by

working for the fulfillment of the whole humancommunity and Mammon, which ignores community except as amarketplace inwhich all participantsaim to maximize individual satisfaction. Those whoattempt to make their peace with Mammon, soonfind themselves overwhelmed ? either by absorptionin the transient material satisfactions that the marketaffords or by the struggle to achieve that satisfaction,with fear of the real poverty that could result in theevent of failure.



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Satisfaction for Whom? Freedom for What? 55Thesis 4: There is an opportunity to develop a richereconomic theory as a basis for dialogue on eco

nomic issues using theological insights from Judaism and Christianity. There is also an opportunityfor new directions in theology based on a deeperreflection on economic theory and practice.

As positive economics, the theory of consumerchoice and the free market economic system that itundergirds merely constitute a model that helps toexplain certain phenomena of economic behaviorand may be useful in guiding economic activity. Butas we have seen, the theory has also become anormative prescription for individual behavior, apolitical ideology and even a kind of secular theology with potentially harmful repercussions.In this concluding section, I will examine theimplications for economics and theology as disciplines in the hope that renewed efforts to address theissues that are raised here from a theoretical viewpoint can lead to both a more informed andthoughtful debate and a greater awareness and self

understanding for all who are concerned.

Implications for economic theoryGiven the strongly critical evaluation of consumertheory in this paper, based largely on challenges to itsassumptions, we might well ask two questions. First,how might consumer theory benefit from thetheological analysis presented here? Second, whatwould constitute an acceptable economic theory ofthe consumer from a theological perspective?With regard to the first question, perhaps thefirst benefit is in entertaining respectful challengesbased on a different way of thinking about the

world, a different episteme. The orthogonal perspective and findings from a theological approachto anthropology, community, ownership of createdgoods, and human destiny should move economists and economic institutions like business firmsto reflect on their own way of viewing these aspects of human experience. Regular andthoughtful debate sharpens perspectives and challenges accepted ways of thinking by introducingthese new perspectives.More specifically, the theological focus hasheightened the salience of certain aspects of the

economic theory as subjects for further economicresearch. To take one example, how could consumer theory modify its axioms to view the individual as a communal creature and what would bethe effects of doing so?What new insights might beforthcoming if the theory posited the individual notas an autonomous decision maker acting in a purelyconsequentialist way to maximize his or her ownsatisfaction, but rather as an agent within the com

munity who is guided by the particular way ofknowing embodied in the community's tradition.Significant and interesting new understandings ofthe theory of the firm have resulted from the specific consideration of institutional factors, such asorganizational structure, contracts and agency. Whatfactors would be analogous to these for the theory ofthe consumer?

Turning to the second question of what wouldconstitute an acceptable economic theoreticalstandpoint from a theological perspective, the mostpressing concern is a need for the theory to for

mulate a view of the individual in community andnot simply the individual on his or her own. Thesecond requirement would be to move beyond theconsequentialist ethic of maximizing satisfaction asthe objective to consider a broader range of ethicalalternatives. One of these, a utilitarian framework,is already deeply embedded in welfare economicsand additional deontological or rules-based frameworks could be considered. The Torah providesseveral such frameworks and others would include

Kant's categorical imperative, which has alreadyreceived philosophical elaboration by John Rawlsin his book A Theory of Justice (1971). It wouldalso be interesting to see how virtue ethics, whichhas received strong philosophical as well as theological development, might be modeled as adecision criterion in economic

theory.The third,

and probably most difficult, requirement would beto determine how economic theory could incorporate historical, rather than logical, time in consumer choice.

Beyond these specific requirements, itwould besalutary for economists to recognize the theoreticalas well as ethical objections to consumer theorysuch as those presented in this paper, and refrainfrom championing consumer theory's assumptionsas a normative ethical basis for economic and socialpolicy.



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56Mark G. Nixon

Implications for theological consideration of economic theory

Although the focus here has been a critique of theeconomic theory, there are also serious practical andtheoretical challenges for theology. James Cone, inThe God of the Oppressed (1997), has described thetheologian as an exegete of Scripture and existence, and there are few areas of life that are more

pervasive in our existence than economic activity.Yet the quality of theological exegesis on economicissues leaves much to be desired. Perhaps the greatestdifficulty is for the theologian to find opportunitiesto hear and understand the lived experience ofthoughtful people who are actively involved inleading economic enterprises and participating ineconomic activity so that the exegesis is wellinformed and reality based.It is also important to exercise theologicalreflection and comment on economic affairs atseveral levels. Many, if not most, theological treatments consider economic activity at the level ofeconomic systems (e.g., social and economic benefitsof market-based versus planned economies), to useMichael Novak's (1983) typology.58 At this level,theological commentaries address such topics asdisparities in income and wealth on a national orglobal scale, the injustice of degrading poverty andunfair practices, and the inability of the poor and

marginalized to provide adequately for themselvesand their families. Papal encyclicals on economicsubjects are typically focused at this level. The second level includes the ethical implications of particular economic practices (e.g., private property,taxation, the just wage) or particular economicpolicies and programs (e.g., social welfare programs,

Medicaid, Social Security). These often have as theirprimary concern how well these policies or practicesprovide for society generally and for particular segments that participate or are deprived of participation in the economy.

The third level of analysis - this paper is oneexample ? focuses on relationships between theologyand economic thought at a theoretical level. At thislevel, the analysis applies what Paul Tillich (1951) hascharacterized as a method of correlation betweenconcepts denoting the human and those denoting thedivine. Works at this level reveal the fundamentalsimilarities that can enable dialogue at the other twolevels aswell as the fundamental differences that can

lead to confusion and a breakdown in dialogue. Todate, this level is still relatively unexplored and thislack of informed theological attention is of seriousconcern. If theology is to fulfill its responsibility asexegete of existence in the economic sphere, itmustunderstand that sphere at all levels. This will requirethat theologians become more knowledgeable aboutother social disciplines, understand their theory andpractical application, and engage in dialogue withscholars from those disciplines to discern points ofagreement and disagreement aswell asways, if possible, to bridge the differences.

Summary and conclusions

The economic theory of the consumer grew out ofChristian theology with the foundational works ofJohn Locke and Adam Smith in the 18th century,and this syncretism makes the theory of consumerchoice, as a secular ideology, particularly perniciousfor Christians. While Christianity provided and stillshares the concepts of creation, individual freedom,and rational choice, their specific meanings in thesecular doctrine oppose Christian understandings inimportant ways. Novak's idea that political andmoral deficiencies in the market system can beameliorated through the countervailing powers ofdemocratic government and religious and culturalinstitutions only works if government is sufficientlyindependent of the market and religion plays astrong prophetic role. Neither condition is adequately satisfied today.The elements in the secular ideology of theconsumer that oppose both Jewish and Christiananthropologies include a radical individualism thatis destructive of community, sovereignty anddominion that are conceived (in Milbank's terms)as the pure power to pursue individual satisfaction,and an eschatology that equates salvation withoptimized moment-to-moment consumption. Thegrace of the consumer's endowments is taken forgranted - as is the lack of resource endowments for

many people in the world. Milbank's comment thatthis constitutes a form of heresy has merit, and ifso, not only Christians and Jews, but all whosubscribe to the secular economic doctrine in areligious or ideological way are also in significantmoral peril.



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I conclude with the questions from the title of thispaper. For whom should there be satisfaction and to

what end do we seek freedom? Consumer theoryresponds simply: satisfaction is for the individualconsumer with the resources to commit in obtaininggoods and services, and freedom

is the individual'sability to pursue that material satisfaction. As wehave seen, this is an appropriate answer within thecontext of a positive economics but it is still theoretically problematic even in that context. It is evenmore problematic - even destructive - if adopted asa social and political ideology.The Jewish and Christian answer is that theindividual can only achieve satisfaction withincommunity, since all resources come from God andownership is always stewardship for social benefit

with particular concern for the poor. In the words ofRabbi Hillel: If I am not for myself, who is for me?If I am for myself alone, what good am I?And if notnow, when? And, freedom is the exercise ofchoice in the journey to God in whom alone satisfaction is possible. In the words of Augustine: Youhave made us for yourself, and our heart is restless, O

God, until it rests in you.Understanding these differences should

Satisfaction for Whom - Freedom for What

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