Thurs. 21 Apr. 2011

FAST COMPANY Behind The Mystery Of Spam Tweets Clogging Syrian

Protesters' Streams ……………………………………….…1THE STAR

Tough to determine who’s winning in Syrian uprising ….......4ATLANTIC SENTINEL

Why Concessions Hasten a Regime’s Demise ……………....6GUARDIAN

Syria: States of emergency …………………………..………8 Vagueness of the law keeps MidEastern protests in check ...10

NYTIMES Amid Crackdown, Big Protest Is Planned in Syria ………...12

FINANCIAL TIMES Assad olive branch fails to halt Syria revolt ……………….16 Assad cousin accused of favouring family …………………18 Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian charade ………………………….21

WASHINGTON TIMES The end for Strong Assad …………………………………..23

JERUSALEM POST '‘Bloodbath’ would follow overthrow of Assad in Syria' …..25 Pay attention to Syria ……………………………………....27 Washington Watch: Obama needs a Syria policy ……….....30

FOREIGN POLICY What grade will the West get in applied Middle Eastern

studies this semester?............................................................32CHOMSKY PERSONAL BLOG

Noam Chomsky on The Arab Revolt ……………………....35 Noam Chomsky On Libya and the Unfolding Crises …...…42

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HOME PAGEBehind The Mystery Of Spam Tweets Clogging Syrian Protesters' Streams Syrian democracy activists on Twitter have found themselves threatened and spammed by mystery accounts. Now one prominent opposition figure claims the Syrian government may be involved. BY Neal UngerleiderFast Company (American business media brand, with a unique editorial focus on innovation in technology, ethonomics)Wed Apr 20, 2011

Protests in Syria are getting intense. So has social media use by those seeking the latest news. But a more sinister brand of Twitter user has also taken to posting furiously under the same topic protesters have used.

A well-organized campaign with possible traces to the Syrian government has been drowning the #syria hashtag in spam--forcing Twitter to intervene and to block the spam accounts from appearing in searches. Shortly thereafter, at least one of accounts began threatening a well-known Syrian free speech activist.

The story broke when Anas Qteish, a Syrian expatriate “blogger, translator [and] tech enthusiast” based in the United States, noted at the GlobalVoices site that a number of Twitter spam accounts had popped up after the beginning of the Syrian protests. The accounts Qteish mentioned posted primarily in Arabic. These spam accounts, with names such as @thelovelysyria, @syriabeauty, @syleague, @karamahclub, @syhumor, @dnnnews and @mbking13 all regularly posted automated tweets full of nonsense unrelated to happenings in Syria with the #syria hashtag appended. One account, for example only posted old sports scores.

All of the accounts were set to post on a frequent automated loop--in most cases, new tweets were posted every two to five minutes. However, the content was puzzling to most outside observers. All the Twitter accounts named above posted a combination of old sports scores, links to Flickr pictures of Syria, links to Syrian television sitcoms online and--most puzzling--pro-regime news

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reports and threats against Syrian opposition figures and opposition sympathizers on Twitter. In many cases, the Twitter accounts appeared to have been hastily created; the accounts used no profile pictures at all or stock pictures (with watermarks) instead.

As of April 20, 2011, all of these accounts were still regularly posting to Twitter on a reduced schedule.

To an outside observer, this brings to mind Foreign Policy's perfectly nuanced prediction that social media could confuse protesters just as easily as it informs them. A less sophisticated version of this operation was just tried in Uganda this week.

According to Qteish, these Twitter accounts were variants of a less sophisticated spam account operation that he believes to have been run by the Syrian secret police:

First was the proliferation of what tweeps dubbed as the “twitter eggs, a group of newly created and mostly image-less twitter accounts that cussed out, verbally assaulted, and threatened anyone tweeting favorably about the ongoing protests, or criticizing the regime. Those accounts were believed to be manned by Syrian Mokhabarat [intelligence] agents with poor command of both written Arabic and English, and an endless arsenal of bile and insults. Several twitter users created lists to make it easier for the rest to track and reports those accounts for spam. [..]Second, which is more damaging, is the creation of various spam accounts that mainly target #Syria hash tag; flooding it with predetermined set of tweets–-every few minutes--about varied topics such as photography, old Syrian sport scores, links to Syrian comedy shows, pro-regime news, and threats against a long list of tweeps who expressed their support of the protests.

Shortly after Qteish posted his findings, threats against him and insults were tweeted by one of the accounts, @thelovelysyria. Before his posting, the account only posted links to pictures of Syria on Flickr.

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It appears that at least one of the spam accounts has links to a Bahrain-based company. Eghna Development and Support, which offers “political campaign solutions,” lists both @dnnnews and @thelovelysyria as clients. Here is Eghna's description of their work for The Lovely Syria:

LovelySyria is using EGHNA Media Server to promote intersting photography about Syria using their twitter accounts. EGHNA Media Server helped Lovely Syria get attention to the beauty of Syria, and build a community of people who love the country and admire its beauty. Some of their network members started translating photo descriptions and rebroadcasting them to give the Syrian beauty more exposure. Lovely Syria is using their own installation of EGHNA Ad Center to generate the twitter messages, their current schedule is 2 messages every 5 minutes.Eghna describes @dnnnews as “a citizen media news network operating in Syria.” However, the Arabic-language content available on DNNNews' site, dearsyria.com, is exclusively pro-regime and paints the protesters as armed insurgents. The news presented on the site frequently contradicts portrayals of the same event on Al Jazeera and Al Arabiyya.

Radio Free Europe's Luke Allnutt, meanwhile, is strongly implying that the mystery Syria Twitter accounts are linked to the regime:

The Syrian authorities have thus far been fairly sophisticated in their attempts to manage the discourse. After the first calls for a "day of rage" in early February, the government lifted the firewall on Facebook (previously users inside Syria had to access through a proxy). This might have been simply a concession, or something more nefarious, which could actually aid the government crackdown by helping to identify activists.At press time, Twitter appears to be blocking the sites from showing up in searches for the #syria hashtag.

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Hint: there's an important article in "The Times" by The British anchor Dan Snow titled "Syria’s uprising will not be a rerun of Tunisia', but this article needs subscription..

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Tough to determine who’s winning in Syrian uprising Olivia Ward,The Star (Canadian newspaper)April 20, 2011

It’s tough to know who has the upper hand in the conflict between Syria’s regime and its opponents.

Protests against President Bashar al Assad and his Baathist government have been building for nearly three months, with mounting casualties for the demonstrators and a smaller number of security forces.

But Assad has also given way on one of their main demands, to repeal 50 years of draconian emergency rule.

Now, as both sides regroup awaiting Friday protests — dubbed “Great Friday” by the opposition and predicted to be the largest yet — each is looking at its prospects for victory and finding no answers, while facing off for a possible confrontation with no exit strategy in sight.

“Everyone is licking their wounds and wondering what to do next,” said Joshua Landis of the University of Oklahoma, a Syria expert and blogger who is in close touch with the country.

“The protesters aren’t prepared to deal with the military, and the government has many more tools for using force. But Assad has drawn a line in the sand and said he’s made concessions and that’s it. He considers them an uprising, and radicals out to destroy the country.”

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The possibility of a new bloodbath in a strategically important Middle Eastern country has rung alarm bells in Washington, which until recently has diplomatically snubbed Syria, and has little pull there.

On Wednesday, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton criticized what she called the regime’s repression of peaceful protests and torture of people who were detained. But she also warned the protesters against violence and said demands for reform must begin through a political process.

Clinton expressed concern about events in Homs, where weekend clashes were followed by a pre-dawn raid on hundreds of anti-government demonstrators, using live ammunition and tear gas and killing several people. The death toll in Syria has so far topped 200, and student protests have spread from Daraa in the southwest to the largest city, Aleppo.

But how far the protesters are prepared to go — and how far the regime would go to halt a revolution — is still moot.

Like neighbouring Iraq and Lebanon, Syria is divided among a number of religious groups. And like Iraq under Saddam Hussein, it is ruled by a minority who are resented by other groups. The ruling Assad family are Alawites, a sect linked with Shiites, while the majority of Syrians are Sunnis. And like Saddam’s Iraq, the Syrian regime has cracked down on any hint of sectarian unrest.

That has made many Syrians wary of destabilizing the religious fault line.

“They have opted for reform and not regime change,” writes Elias Samo, a professor of international relations at Syrian and American universities, in bitterlemons-international.org.

“They want less emergency law and more freedom, less corruption and more transparency, less security and more liberty, less of one

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party and more of multi-party, less nepotism and more competency.”

That’s unlikely to happen, however, under Assad — whose wife Asma was recently featured in Vogue magazine as a promoter of democratic change.

“He’s not a reformer,” says Rime Allaf, an associate fellow of London-based Chatham House. “Too much has been made of the year and a half he spent in the West. I don’t think we should have expected so much. (His regime) may be willing to make a few changes, but they would lose money and power if they made real change.”

“If there were elections, they would dismantle the Baath Party, the army and the intelligence community,” says Landis. “Hundreds of thousands would lose their jobs. For the president, it’s not just taking the wife and kids to Ougadougou.”

But he adds, the protests aren’t going away anytime soon.

“Syria is a poor country, and it doesn’t have a big cushion. The banking system has come to a stop and the stock market is effectively closed. Lack of tourism and foreign investment has taken a devastating toll on the government’s credibility, and its ability to dig its way out of this. That’s where its real vulnerability lies: in its economic failure.”

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Why Concessions Hasten a Regime’s Demise By Nick OttensAtlantics Sentinel,April 20, 2011

For the second time in two weeks, the Syrian Government said that it would end decades of emergency rule and consider the sort

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of political reforms that protesters were calling for. So why didn’t the people go home?

In Syria, the regime has attempted to suppress dissent with heavy force. In Egypt earlier this year, the authoritarian government of longtime President Hosni Mubarak similarly answered protests with intimidation and violence until the military made clear that it would not shoot at demonstrators. Thus began Egypt’s lame attempt at reconciliation.

Mubarak appointed a vice president for the first time during his thirty year reign who met with members of the opposition and promised the very reforms they had taken to the streets for—changes to the constitution designed to weaken executive power; the release of political prisoners; the liberalization of the media; anti-corruption efforts. All to no avail. Tens of thousands continued to pour into Cairo’s central Tahrir Square to force Mubarak out of office. He resigned after weeks of unrest, paving the way for a military interim government that scheduled elections for the summer.

The outcome in Syria may be less predictable. Security services there appear to have the stomach for ruthless suppression while people are more fearful of their government than Egyptians were. All the same, the mere occurrence of demonstrations coupled with the regime’s professed willingness to concede to some of their demands has reminded Syrians that their government is not invulnerable.

While President Bashar al-Assad appointed a new cabinet and promised the release of political prisoners in an effort to disarm the protests, the moves suggested a weakness on the part of his government. The overtures may have been largely symbolic—the cabinet has little actual power in Syria while the release of detainees excluded activists who had supposedly committed crimes “against the nation and the citizens”—but they implicitly acknowledged that the people had reason to be dissatisfied.

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By suggesting the possibility of reform in the face of mounting civil unrest, the president implicitly acknowledged the very illegitimacy of his regime. Naturally, people did not tone down their demands. Instead, the protests spread.

Assad may still able to avoid the inevitable in the short run but his police state has started to come apart at its seams. The illusion of its power has been crushed. The seemingly omnipotent security apparatus has started showing its human weaknesses. And as the world is watching, the military may think twice about rolling tanks into the streets of Syria’s cities to sustain a dictatorship that certainly has its best days behind it.

If Assad had learned from Mubarak, he would have known that the only way to keep a people oppressed in a time when information spreads so rapidly is with brutal force. The trouble is that in most nations, the people who are supposed to execute such force don’t like to kill and torture and prosecute other people they identify with, at least not for too long.

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Syria: States of emergency It is tempting to see regional opportunities in Syria's turmoil – but no Arab spring has yet been nurtured by foreign interventionEditorial,Guardian,21 Apr. 2011,

Weeks of demonstrations in Syria reached a turning point this week. In the country's third city, Homs, a Tahrir-style sit-in was broken up when police fired into the crowd. More than 20 pro-democracy demonstrators have been killed in the town since Monday. But the switch in many minds happened earlier. It was when President Bashar al-Assad announced he would end nearly half a century of emergency rule. Far from being placatory, he patronised. It was all a problem of communication, he explained. There was a conspiracy (the demonstrations), there were reforms,

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and there were "needs" of the citizens, not only economic ones. He was sure his citizens understood, but how could they appreciate what was going on when the government did not explain to them what was happening?

President Assad's audience understood only too well. Accused by the regime of being Salafist infiltrators, Muslim Brotherhood stooges, saboteurs supported by Lebanon's Saad Hariri and Saudi Arabia's Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, or agents of the Mossad and the CIA, the protesters demanded to be heard as Syrians. Chants for reform gave way to chants for regime change. "From alleyway to alleyway, from house to house, we want to overthrow you, Bashar", mourners chanted at one funeral. Ever since, they have been attempting, at great cost, to recreate a Syrian Tahrir Square, a physical epicentre of revolt in any major city.

The Assad family (there is Bashar's brother Maher al-Assad, commander of the Republican Guard, and his cousin Rami Makhlouf) now find themselves with fewer political levers to pull, although there are plenty of military ones. Interior Ministry statements go unheeded. Protests continued overnight in Zabadani, Jabla and Aleppo. In Homs, the shops stayed closed, a sign that the urban Sunni population is starting to join in. They will not be mollified by sacking the governor in Homs or the chief of security in Banias. What started with a brutal, but routine, local incident, when police beat up and tortured a group of graffiti artists in Deraa, has become a nationwide protest.

It is tempting to see regional opportunities in Syria's turmoil. This is not just paralysing the Arab League, which postponed a summit scheduled for May, but also encouraging the belief that Assad's rejectionist allies, Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas, would stand to lose with his departure. Some may be tempted to conclude that fomenting dissent in Syria is a risk worth taking. This is folly in any part of the Middle East but particularly for a country with Syria's borders. No Arab spring has yet been nurtured by foreign intervention. It could yet be killed off by one.

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The vagueness of the law keeps Middle Eastern protests in checkIn Syria and most other Arab countries demonstrations are legal – but there is always a clause that prevents serious subversionBrian Whitaker,Guardian,20 Apr. 2011,

The news that Bahrain's government has withdrawn its financial support from students who attended a peaceful anti-regime demonstration in Britain highlights differing attitudes towards protest between western countries and most of those in the Middle East.

Though the Bahraini regime's action has enraged the British government, few Arabs would find it surprising: reprisals against those who step out of line are almost par for the course.

One important reason why repressive regimes have survived for so long is that vast numbers of people depend on them economically – sometimes as students with scholarships, but more often as employees in a vast and under-worked government bureaucracy.

In Syria, for example, it has been estimated that as many as half the country's citizens depend to some extent on government pay cheques which could be in jeopardy if their loyalty to the regime was called into question. In theory, of course, they have as much right to demonstrate and speak their mind as anyone else.

The Syrian constitution (article 38) says: "Every citizen has the right to freely and openly express his views in words, in writing, and through all other means of expression ..." Article 39 adds: "Citizens have the right to meet and demonstrate peacefully within the principles of the constitution."

Virtually all Arab countries – even the most dictatorial ones – have similar things in their constitution, but there is invariably a

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get-out clause saying such rights are to be exercised "in accordance with the law".

The law in this area can be very restrictive and it can also be overridden by a state of emergency – lasting for decades in the case of Syria and Egypt – which imposes even more stringent constraints, sometimes bordering on the absurd. In theory, any meeting of more than five people in Egypt would be breaking the law.

In Zaat, Sonallah Ibrahim's novel of Egyptian life, residents of an apartment block call a meeting to discuss filth on the staircase, only to realise that this will be "an illegal gathering" under the emergency law. For reassurance, the meeting eventually convenes in a flat belonging to a police officer, in the hope that this will "provide sufficient immunity".

On the whole, what the law actually says is less important than the arbitrary way in which it is often applied. Most regimes take a flexible view of the rule of law – meaning that they may choose to enforce it or not, depending on who is involved and whatever they think will best serve the regime's interests.

This discretionary use of the law is sometimes seen as a deliberate tactic, since people will be less willing to demonstrate if they are uncertain where they stand legally. The same principle is used to control the media in various Arab countries: encouraging self-censorship by keeping the law menacing but vague.Officially, of course, none of this has anything to do with preventing people from criticising the regime – it's supposedly all about the public good. In Tunisia, for example, under Ben Ali's dictatorial rule free expression could only be limited "by a law enacted for the protection of others, respect for public order, national defence, development of the economy, and social progress" (Article 7 of the constitution).

In Syria, where the regime is preparing to lift the state of emergency and replace it with a law "which regulates the process

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of demonstrating", the authorities keep emphasising that one of the law's main purposes will be to "protect demonstrators".

This seems to hinge on what in many countries would be regarded as a strange notion: that anyone who demonstrates against the government is liable to be set upon immediately by outraged citizens. The Egyptian regime of Hosni Mubarak went to some lengths to prove the truth of this, by employing plainclothes thugs – the baltagiyya – to beat up demonstrators, and several other regimes use similar tactics.

While the Syrian regime now seems willing to allow demonstrations calling for reform, it draws the line at "sabotage". "There are clear differences between the demands for reform and the intentions of creating chaos and sabotage," President Bashar al-Assad said at the weekend.

Maybe Assad thinks the differences are clear, but until he spells them out we cannot be sure. What one person regards as legitimate protest another may regard as dangerous subversion.

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Amid Crackdown, Big Protest Is Planned in Syria By ANTHONY SHADIDNYTIMES,20 Apr. 2011,

BEIRUT, Lebanon — Protests erupted Wednesday in the town that unleashed Syria’s five-week uprising, and security forces detained a prominent organizer in the restive city of Homs, casting into doubt government pledges to repeal the harsh emergency laws and grant civil rights in one of the Arab world’s most repressive countries.

Though the demonstrations in Dara’a and elsewhere paled before those of past days, organizers vowed to turn out their largest numbers yet on what protesters have begun to call “Great Friday.”

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Some residents said security forces were already deploying in the hopes of dampening the turnout, and organizers across Syria called the day potentially decisive for the uprising’s momentum.

The demonstrations may serve as a referendum of sorts on the declaration by President Bashar al-Assad’s government that it would repeal the emergency laws in place since 1963 and institute a series of reforms like allowing civil liberties and abolishing draconian courts. Some have called the promises a hard-won gain of an uprising that has shaken the Assad family’s 40 years of control, while others have been dismissive of initiatives that may prove elusive and that seemed aimed at blunting the demonstrations’ momentum.

“People don’t trust the regime anymore,” said Haitham Maleh, a former judge and an often imprisoned human rights activist in Damascus, Syria’s capital. “I don’t think that the Syrian people are going to stop before they bring down this regime.”

But Syria is a complicated country, with sizable minorities of Christians and heterodox Muslim sects that have looked with trepidation to the example offered by Iraq’s civil war. The prospect that Mr. Maleh raised — the government’s fall — has alarmed some, particularly among the minorities, who worry about society’s lack of independent institutions to navigate a transition and the fearsome prospect of score-settling in chaos.

“Everything is possible today,” said Michel Kilo, another government critic in Damascus. “If the regime believes that with security they can handle everything, then they will be turning Syria into a breeding ground for all kinds of extremist movements.”

Residents said that thousands turned out for a protest in Dara’a, a city in southwestern Syria where the uprising was galvanized last month. Demonstrators headed toward the Omari Mosque, which has served as a rallying point. Sheik Ahmed Siasna, a cleric at the mosque, said the march ended peacefully.

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Human rights groups said that other protests occurred at the University of Damascus, Aleppo University and Baniyas, a town near the coastal city of Latakia, where Syrian state television said the head of political security had been dismissed, apparently to mollify angry residents. Though the protests were relatively small, they defied an Interior Ministry warning, issued a day earlier, that the government would tolerate no protests.

In Homs, more funerals were organized for demonstrators killed Tuesday in a government crackdown on one of the country’s largest gatherings so far, in which organizers sought to replicate a Cairo-style sit-in.

“It’s O.K., don’t worry, we will finish it on Friday,” an organizer who gave his name as Abu Haydar quoted people as chanting at the funerals on Wednesday.

“There are security forces everywhere, in every corner of the city, and it is not clear what is going to happen,” he said by telephone from Homs, Syria’s third largest city.

Mr. Assad’s government, which seems to have staggered amid the breadth and persistence of the protests, has hewed to a policy of crackdown and promised compromise, with Tuesday’s decrees the latest to suggest it is willing to end decades of authoritarianism. One of its newspapers, Al Watan, called those decrees “a strategic program of political reforms aimed at strengthening the democratic process.”

But human rights advocates said arrests had continued. Wissam Tarif, the executive director of Insan, a Syrian human rights group, said 14 people had been detained since the declaration, seven of them in Homs. Among them was Mahmoud Issa, an opposition figure who was arrested at his house after giving an interview to Al Jazeera television.

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“The emergency law might have been erased from the papers, but practically speaking, nothing has changed,” said a protester in Homs who gave his name as Mohammed. “It’s just talk and talk, promises and more promises. And it’s all untrue.”

The question of credibility may prove to be one of the state’s greatest challenges. Had the reforms been announced weeks before, they would probably have been a turning point in Syria’s modern history, or at least a pivotal fissure in the facade of an enduring dictatorship. Some intellectuals in Syria have already deemed it as such.

“Is this enough to satisfy the protesters? I think we have to wait and see,” said Sami Moubayed, a professor of international relations at the University of Kalamoon, Syria’s first private university. “But they’ve really accelerated the pace of reform.”

“An unpopular cabinet was sacked,” Mr. Moubayed added. “Unpopular governors were sacked. Wages were raised. There will be citizenship for the stateless. All the demands that were spoken on Day 1 of the protests are coming into effect.”

But the very timing may prove the reforms’ undoing. While the government has insisted that the uprising is led by militant Islamists and supported from abroad, the protesters themselves seem to have a momentum that force has so far failed to blunt.

“They can’t go forward, and they can’t go backward,” said Amr al-Azm, a professor of Middle Eastern history at Shawnee State University in Ohio. “They can’t really escalate the pace of reform because that will mean dismantling the regime, and they can’t escalate the violence without bringing on other serious problems.”

“They’re contradicting themselves,” he added.

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Assad olive branch fails to halt Syria revolt By Michael Peel in Abu Dhabi Financial Times,April 20 2011

Thousands of Syrians protested on Wednesday despite government efforts to quell the uprising by scrapping emergency laws and reportedly sacking a police chief in a city where demonstrators have been killed.

Big crowds of students gathered in the southern city of Deraa, where the revolt started a month ago, while small protests were staged in Damascus, the capital, and the second city of Aleppo, news agencies reported.

The demonstrations set the stage for more protests promised after Friday prayers, the rallying point for dissent in the uprisings against authoritarian regimes and their hated security forces that have swept the Middle East.

Nadim Houry, a senior researcher for Human Rights Watch, said: “The activists I have spoken to indicate that people feel the reforms announced will not be implemented and the regime is trying to gain time.

“The real test of whether these reforms are real or not is whether the president is prepared to hold the security services to account.”

About 4,000 university students from Deraa and surrounding areas protested near al-Omari mosque in the city, Associated Press news agency reported.It quoted activists as saying that dozens of students demonstrating at the University of Aleppo had clashed with pro-government counterparts.

Protests took place overnight in the Damascus suburb of Zabadani, where activists called for freedom and for the “downfall of the

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regime”, the rallying cry of uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, Reuters reported.

The news agency said there were also sit-ins in Jabla on the coast, and a women’s rally in Barzeh in Damascus.

The events were a combative response to the government’s moves on Tuesday to scrap 48-year-old emergency laws, under which Bashar al-Assad, president, and his late father Hafez have run a highly repressive regime for the past four decades.

Mr Assad has promised reforms to address what he describes as the gap between the government and the people. Meanwhile, his security forces have cracked down violently during a month that activists say has left more than 200 people dead.

This week, the government warned protesters to stop and branded the demonstrations an armed insurrection.

In another apparent sign of the regime’s mixed response, the chief of security police in the north-western city of Banias was dismissed after five civilians were killed in a crackdown against protests last week, Reuters reported, citing activists.

Opponents of the regime have vowed to hold more protests on Friday.

Analysts see this as a crucial test of whether the protests can bring people out on to the streets in large numbers in Damascus and Aleppo.

One politically engaged Syrian said: “This [reform] will not be enough. People need to keep the pressure to get what they want.”

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Assad cousin accused of favouring family By Lina Saigol Fianacial Times,Published: April 20 2011

When World Finance magazine presented Rami Makhlouf with an award for his visionary leadership and contribution to the Syrian economy earlier this year, the London-based journal declared that the businessman had acted as a symbol of positive change within his country.

But as Syrian pro-democracy protests grow, the 41-year-old maternal first cousin of President Bashar al-Assad is emerging as a different sort of symbol.

Arguably Syria’s most powerful businessman, Mr Makhlouf has been a focus of popular wrath and a lightning rod for criticism of the concentration of economic as well as political power in the hands of the Assad family.

“Makhlouf, you thief!” dozens of protesters have chanted at recent demonstrations in the southern city of Deraa.

The son of the former commander of the Syrian Republican Guard, Mr Makhlouf controls as much as 60 per cent of the country’s economy through a complex web of holding companies.

His business empire spans industries ranging from telecommunications, oil, gas and construction, to banking, airlines and retail. He even owns several private schools.

This concentration of power, say bankers and economists, has made it almost impossible for outsiders to conduct business in Syria without his consent.

When the US Treasury levied sanctions against Mr Makhlouf in 2008, forbidding US citizens or entities from doing business with

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him, it dubbed him “a powerful Syrian businessman who amassed his commercial empire by exploiting his relationships with Syrian regime members”, and went on to describe him as a regime insider who allegedly “benefits from and aids the public corruption” of officials.

Mr Makhlouf did not respond to repeated email requests from the Financial Times for comment. However, in 2008, after the US imposed the sanctions, he told Reuters news agency: “I should thank George W. Bush [then US president] because the sanctions have raised the level of my support in Syria. I am no hit-and-run businessman.”

Analysts say Mr Makhlouf and his immediate family have been branching out even into small businesses, fuelling discontent among the business community and tarnishing the image of the regime.One business expert said that disgruntlement over the family’s economic involvement had grown since Mr Assad succeeded his late father Hafez as president in 2000.

Under the elder Assad, the spoils were distributed more widely, with various groups linked to the regime running businesses and winning state favours.

“Now it has become all family and the circle has narrowed,” said the expert, who asked not to be named.

In 2006, Mr Makhlouf established his main holding company, Cham Holdings, as part of the Syrian government’s efforts to create private sector “champions” as it moved towards economic liberalisation.

Founded with $365m of capital, Cham is now Syria’s largest private company and is focused on multiple industries.

A subsidiary, BENA, oversees the hospitality and property development business. The Cham Capital Group runs the finance,

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banking and insurance wing of the empire, while SANA is responsible for the energy and power generation sector.

The Cham group also operates health, education, and duty-free businesses, and was recently granted a licence to operate Pearl Airlines, a new private carrier.

But Mr Makhlouf’s best-known investment is the mobile network operator Syriatel, of which he is the deputy chairman.

In 2000, the government in Damascus awarded a 15-year build, operate and transfer licence to Syriatel, which was 25 per cent owned by Orascom Telecom, the Egyptian company, and 75 per cent held by Drex Technologies, one of Mr Makhlouf’s companies registered in the British Virgin Islands.

Orascom, which had agreed to contribute 50 per cent of start-up costs, was responsible for technical management of the licence.

But a year later, an acrimonious dispute broke out between the two partners after Orascom accused Mr Makhlouf of “persistent attempts” to assume management control of Syriatel, according to legal papers lodged at the time. The dispute was finally settled in 2003, after 15 months of claims and counter-claims, with Orascom agreeing to sell its stake in exchange for payment for its initial investment, plus running costs.

“Mr Makhlouf expects companies to pay for the whole five-course dinner but then only allows them to sip the soup,” says one person familiar with the dispute.

Critics say the many joint ventures that Cham has established have allegedly allowed him to benefit from preferential access to government infrastructure contracts.

But the company has always insisted it operates fairly. In a 2009 presentation at the Syrian Public Private Partnership conference, Mahmoud al-Khoshman, the chief executive of Marafeq and

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SANA – both subsidiaries of Cham – said in order for public-private projects to succeed in Syria they had to be based on the highest standards of integrity and fair play.

“The government should treat all developers and investors equally,” he said.

Still, the recent unrest has caused some to take another look at Mr Makhlouf and his empire.

Last week, World Finance magazine said that, in light of the recent events in Syria, it considered it “appropriate to factor in the wider political agenda”. Therefore, it said, it had reconsidered its awards to Mr Makhlouf and other prominent Syrians.

Other enterprises associated with Mr Makhlouf include Gulfsands Petroleum in which he owns a 6.5 per cent stake, according to the oil company’s website, through his Al Mashreq Investment fund, which is also a shareholder in Cham Holding.

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Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian charade Editorial,Financial Times,April 20 2011,

The repeal of the draconian emergency laws that have oppressed Syrians for 48 years ought to have been a cause for celebration. But Tuesday’s move was nothing more than a meaningless gesture. Even as Bashar al-Assad, Syria’s president, proposed draft legislation to scrap the hated laws, Syrians discovered that they were to be replaced by regulations requiring demonstrations to be licensed by the interior ministry. There is little doubt that the emergency laws’ other restrictions will live on in anti-terror legislation being drawn up by the Syrian leadership.

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This charade is just the latest instalment in the depressing series of token gestures with which Mr Assad has responded to the unrest that has swept the country in the past month. At the end of March, Mr Assad accepted his government’s resignation. However, when the new cabinet convened on April 14, the most significant change was the absence of Abdullah Dardari, the former deputy prime minister, and one of the few reformist voices within the regime. Most of Mr Assad’s acolytes remained.

This attempt to pull the wool over his people’s eyes was matched by a delusional speech – complete with choreographed interruptions from fawning deputies – that Mr Assad gave to the Syrian parliament blaming the unrest on nebulous armed gangs and Israel. Mr Assad has also sought to stifle opposition by raising the spectre of sectarian conflict. Fears of an Iraq-like descent into internecine violence have long restrained Syrians, who sit on similar ethno-religious faultlines, from challenging the status quo.

Such diversions may appeal to an increasingly embattled autocrat. But they are self-defeating. By repeatedly raising and dashing his people’s hopes for greater freedom through insincere and unfulfilled promises of reform, Mr Assad has merely inflamed protesters’ passions. Demonstrations that started with comparatively benign calls for greater economic freedom have escalated into demands for the end of the regime. For this, Syria’s president has only himself to blame.

Mr Assad seems to be putting his faith in violence as a means of securing the continuance of his regime. At least 200 Syrians have been killed since the protests began. Mr Assad’s intransigence means that a peaceful way out of the crisis is now unlikely. Had political and economic reforms been enacted swiftly enough, they might, perhaps, have placated the protesters. Any serious concessions Mr Assad makes now would be seen as a sign of weakness and spur demands for more change and, ultimately, his ousting.

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In these circumstances, the temptation for Mr Assad and his cronies from the minority Alawite sect who make up the ruling elite is to cling to power by whatever means necessary. The world’s leaders must make it clear that this is unacceptable, and that Mr Assad will be held accountable for his actions. If Mr Assad has indeed missed the chance for peaceful change, he must not drag all Syria down with him.

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EDITORIAL: The end for Assad Clock is ticking on Syria’s Ba’athist dictatorshipWashington Times,21 Apr. 2011,

Syrian strongman Bashar al-Assad is caving in to demands to reform his dictatorship. In that dark and oppressed part of the world, compromise can only mean that the end is near.

Authoritarian regimes faced with mass uprisings have basically two choices: Attempt to placate the people in the streets or unleash their security forces and brutally put down the rebellion. Historically, the crackdown strategy is the most reliable. It’s a regrettable fact that a dictator with loyal security forces can impose his will on people yearning to breathe free. Sometimes, regimes want to go the crackdown route but can’t because security forces sympathize with the rebellion. If this is the case, the dictator should hop the next plane to a cushy exile. But when the army and police - and, of course, secret police - are loyal and ruthless, overwhelming force rarely fails. The revolutions that did not happen in China in 1989 and in Iran in 2009 are cases in point.

Occasionally, regime violence leads to further instability. Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali attempted to quell demonstrators but lost his nerve after 28 days and fled to Saudi Arabia. In Egypt, Hosni Mubarak’s Central Security Forces killed upwards of 800 protesters, but eventually the army - which had maintained the good will of the people - turned on Mr. Mubarak.

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The generals ended his regime but preserved military rule, at least temporarily.

In Yemen, President Ali Abdullah Saleh is engaged in a failing carrot-and-stick negotiation with the growing opposition. In February, he promised to step down in 2013, which turned 20,000 people into the streets of the capital of Sana’a to denounce him. By the end of March, after a series of shootings, high-level defections and contentious negotiations, Mr. Saleh pledged to hand power to a “national unity government” by the end of 2011. It’s likely he will be out of power in a matter of months.

Mr. Assad and his Ba’athist cronies have been trying to silence dissent by force, for example killing 14 demonstrators in the town of Homs over the weekend. As in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen, each incident turns more people out into the streets. Syria’s Interior Ministry warned that “armed mutiny” would not be tolerated and asked citizens “to refrain from any mass rallies or demonstrations or sit-ins,” pledging to enforce the laws “serving the citizens’ security and stability.” Syrian dissidents, however, already know they are taking their lives into their hands by standing up to the Ba’athists. If the hundreds of people killed over the last six weeks hasn’t stopped them, a press release from the Mukhabarat won’t make any difference.

Mr. Assad has tried to placate protesters with the usual gestures, such as releasing political prisoners, reshuffling his cabinet and pledging to “keep up with the aspirations of the people.” The government lifted an emergency law that had been in effect since a 1963 coup and abolished secret courts. The strongman even closed a casino that had been the focus of Islamist outrage. To regime opponents, these gestures demonstrate the effectiveness of mass protest. When dictators show this type of weakness, demonstrators are emboldened, protests intensify and key members of the regime’s power base begin to calculate the best time to jump ship.

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Regime change in Damascus has the potential of giving the Syrian people their first taste of democracy since their republic was overthrown in 1949. It also would remove a key Iranian ally from the “Shiite Crescent.” Growing numbers of Syrians are seizing the opportunity to throw off Ba’athist rule, and Mr. Assad’s options are rapidly dwindling to a choice between exile or imprisonment.

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'‘Bloodbath’ would follow overthrow of Assad in Syria' Observers tell the 'Post' that like Iraq, Syria’s diverse sects could turn on each other once the regime is goneBy YAAKOV LAPPIN Jerusalem Post,21 Apr. 2011,

The overthrow of Syrian dictator Basher Assad is not yet imminent, but should it occur, a bloodbath between Syria’s various sects would likely follow, leading Israeli experts on Syria told The Jerusalem Post on Wednesday.

As in neighboring Iraq, Syria’s diverse population – made up of Sunni Muslims, Druse, Kurds and other groups, who are ruled by the minority Alawites – could, upon the collapse of the Assad regime, turn on each other in a bloody civil conflict.

“I think there would be a bloodbath if Assad falls. The Iraqi situation is relevant,” said Eyal Zisser, a professor of Middle Eastern and African History at Tel Aviv University.

Zisser, who formerly headed the university’s Moshe Dayan Center Middle East think tank added, “We’re not there yet. The protests are however getting bigger, and more and more forces are joining in. They are spreading to other parts of the country.”

At the same time, around half of the Syrian population, concentrated in the major urban centers of Damascus and Aleppo,

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are “sitting on the fence” and not taking an active part in protests calling for Assad to leave.

“They are frightened of the unknown, and of the anarchy that could follow,” Zisser added.

Asked how important a role Islamist groups were playing in recent events, Zisser said, “We must remember that 40 percent of Syrians are members of minority groups. This means it is not easy for Islamists to take over. They are there as a political force, but they don’t have exclusive control.”

From an Israeli perspective, decision-makers have grown accustomed to “the Satan that we know,” Zisser said, referring to Assad.

Assad “gave us stability in the Golan – but he also tightened relations with Hezbollah and Iran,” he noted.

Dr. Mordechai Kedar, of Bar Ilan University’s Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, said that “everything we knew” about Syria has become outdated due to recent events.

Kedar, who served for 25 years in military intelligence, and specialized in Syria, added that the Muslim Brotherhood “are in the background, not as an organized group... but as an idea.”

Kedar agreed with Zisser’s evaluation that a collapse of the Assad regime would result in large-scale violence, adding that Syria could split up into smaller states following civil strife.

In such a scenario, “many Muslims will chase Alawites with knives – who would in turn have to flee to the Ansariya mountains in western Syria, their traditional lands,” Kedar said. “In such a case, Syria could be divided into six parts: an Alawite state in the West; a Kurdish state in the North, as in Iraq; a Druse state in the South; and a Beduin state in the east, in the Dir al-Zur region. A

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Sunni Muslim state in Damascus and another in Aleppo could also rise” he added.

“Six homogenous states could appear on the ruins of Syria,” Kedar said.

The analyst has described Assad’s move to cancel longstanding emergency laws, which have been in place for 50 years, as “late, small, and unsatisfactory.”

“The Syrians are jealous of their brothers in Egypt and Tunisia – but fear that the regime will act as Gaddafi has, and slaughter its citizens, if his back is against the wall,” said Kedar.

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Editorial: Pay attention to Syria Wikileaks fully deserves our consideration, regardless of the process by which the documents have become publicJerusalem Post,20 Apr. 2011,

Much of what WikiLeaks has been leaking from classified US diplomatic material is of little import, despite the attendant hype and sensation- mongering. Yet, here and there, enveloped in the sheer quantity of minutiae, are indicators that should instill a great deal of worry in all Israelis. The danger is that not enough people pay attention to the truly noteworthy leaks amid the deluge of material.

In the last few days, for instance, there was a great deal of public discourse surrounding the bigoted, derogatory and furiously denied comments about party rivals attributed to Labor MK Isaac Herzog.

Amid that ridiculous hubbub, significant disclosures were overlooked.

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Whether or not WikiLeaks is pursing a tendentious and calculated agenda, it is troubling that our public opinion could hardly be bothered with leaked reports of the Mossad’s assessments regarding Hezbollah’s massive missile caches.

And similar relative indifference has been manifested toward leaked documents showing that Syria contemplated attacking Israel with chemical warheads following the destruction of its nuclear facility in 2007 (purportedly carried out by the IAF).

These leaks fully deserve our consideration, regardless of the process by which they have become public.

According to these documents, Israeli and American intelligence analysts met here in November 2009 and their deliberations produced four separate debriefings from the US Embassy to Washington.

From these it emerges that the Mossad is convinced that Syrian- and Iranian-backed Hezbollah is determined to fire as many as 400-600 rockets daily in the next round of hostilities with Israel, 100 of which will be aimed each day at Tel Aviv.

That war, estimate Mossad experts, could last for as long as two months, meaning that as many as 24,000- 36,000 missiles – 6,000 targeting Tel Aviv specifically – could be rained upon Israel from the north alone.

How the Hamas Iranian proxy would behave during that conflict is an unaddressed complication in the deeply worrying equation.

These are not speculative doomsday predictions which we can afford to repress in the far recesses of our collective consciousness. They become all the more relevant in the face of Syrian President Bashar Assad’s teetering position as he strives to hang on to power.

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For one thing, the leaked information consistently reinforces allegations that, contrary to its international undertakings, Syria has continued supplying Hezbollah with ballistic missiles, including Scuds. The leaks further indicate that North Korea is stoking the regional arms build-up by providing missile systems to both Syria and Iran, which in turn sustain Hezbollah and Hamas.

The bottom line, in the Syrian context, is that Assad sits on a particularly large and nasty arsenal. Both his late father and he had practiced self-control, making their border with Israel exceedingly quiet to date, while transferring the confrontational brunt to the Lebanese and Gazan fronts. In other words, while the Assad regime had itself avoided open warfare with Israel, it was the nefarious catalyst actively fomenting trouble elsewhere.

It is in part because of his capacity for trouble-making, indeed, that the US has thus far refrained from openly calling for Assad’s removal. The conventional wisdom in Washington is that a relatively stable Syria will help facilitate the American exit from Iraq.

Yet assuming, for argument’s sake, that Assad does not survive the mounting challenges to his rule, into whose hands would his formidable weapons and rocket stockpiles fall? One may disbelieve certain details and incidentals in individual WikiLeaks texts, but their entirety eminently accords with what had been evident from Damascus for too long. Assad has amassed and controls particularly deadly weaponry. For Israel, Assad is a cunning enemy. The danger is that he may well be supplanted by even more malicious, yet lessrestrained enemies.

OF ALL the regime changes and uprisings-in-progress the Mideast has been witnessing, the Syrian one potentially harbors the greatest existential hazard.

There is not much Israel can – or should – do about Syria’s internal power struggle. But it is essential that Israel gear up for its

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alarmingly destabilizing potential consequences. The very least we ought to do is pay attention.

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Washington Watch: Obama needs a Syria policy Douglas M. Bloomfield,Jerusalem Post,20 Apr. 2011,

Bashar Assad has been playing arsonist and fireman simultaneously as the fires of revolution break out around his country, said Michael Doran, a former senior National Security Council Mideast official.

The Obama administration’s initial response was to urge both the Syrian dictatorship and the pro-democracy activists to show restraint. Weeks went by before Washington condemned the slaughter of demonstrators and put the blame squarely on the Assad regime.

Even now, after more than 200 have been killed and hundreds arrested, the administration still hasn’t shifted from rhetoric to action.

Many on Capitol Hill are questioning whether Obama really has a Syria policy. Why is an administration so anxious to see Hosni Mubarak and Muammar Gadaffi leave so hesitant to tell Assad it’s time to go? “Is our policy ‘passive consistency’ or ‘consistent passivity?’ Or don’t we have any Syria policy at all,” asked Rep. Gary Ackerman (D-NY), second ranking Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Syrian intelligence officials planted snipers among protesters with orders to shoot security officials and soldiers, thereby “provoking” the army to fire on the protesters, according to a document posted on Facebook by opposition sources. While not authenticated, it is

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consistent with other reports that demonstrators were infiltrated in order to justify Assad’s brutal crackdown.

Assad has publicly blamed the violence on “Zionists” and other foreign provocateurs, and warned demonstrators that since he has promised reforms all protests will be considered “sabotage.” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has been taking a drubbing for calling Assad a reformer; actually, she said that’s what she’s been told by members of Congress from both parties, particularly Sen. John Kerry (D-MA), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Many Republicans and Democrats think, in the words of one Congressional source who has made several trips to Damascus, that Kerry was “played for a fool.” Assad keeps telling Kerry what he wants to hear – that he’s ready for peace with Israel, and can be weaned from Iran – but after years of this courtship the senator keeps returning empty handed.

THE ISRAELI government can’t seem to decide whether it wants Assad to stay or go. A big reason to keep him on is fear of what might come next. A prolonged power struggle could destabilize the region, and there is an exaggerated fear that the Muslim Brotherhood could take over.Israel, however, has many better reasons to want the Ba’athist regime dumped. Assad is a close ally of Iran, he is arming Hezbollah and Hamas with missiles to strike Israel, he has his own bulging arsenal of missiles and chemical warheads, he gives sanctuary and aid to numerous anti-Israel terror groups, he is actively destabilizing Lebanon and possibly Jordan, and he has proven nuclear ambitions.

His demise could be a serious blow – depending on what comes next – to Iranian influence and weaken both Hezbollah and Hamas. Dayenu. Syria is Iran’s gateway to the Mediterranean, and shares borders with five countries important to the United States: Israel, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey and Lebanon.

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An Israeli journalist who knows the Arab world intimately said Assad’s days are numbered: “He cannot avoid the tornado sweeping through the Middle East.”

Assad’s promise to end the emergency law is meaningless, because nothing will change as long as he remains in power. A sure sign of that was his decision to name the head of his hated military police, which has a reputation for brutality, as his new interior minister. “This regime is going to hell, and that’s good for Israel; those Israelis who prefer the devil you know are wrong,” he said.

Andrew Tabler, a Syria expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, agreed. Assad has been promising reform since he took office 11 years ago, and done nothing.

It’s time for some “focus and creativity” in US-Syria policy and to show Assad he will pay dearly for this crackdown, he said.

The administration has to stop complaining it has no leverage and begin tightening economic sanctions to deter foreign banks and companies from doing business in Syria, use authority under the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act to suspend all US investment in Syria, work closely with European allies to establish effective economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation, freeze the accounts of individuals responsible for human-rights violations,and take Syrian rights violations to the UN Human Rights Council.

When Congress returns from spring break next month, look for legislation further tightening sanctions on Syria and Iran. It’s time to put real pressure on Assad, beyond Secretary Clinton telling Assad he should “stop repressing [Syrian] citizens and start responding to their aspirations” and “refrain” from further violence.

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What grade will the West get in applied Middle Eastern studies this semester?David Rothkopf,Foreign Policy Magazine,20 Apr. 2011,

Certainly, Bashar Al Assad feels tested these days. So presumably, does Muammar Qaddafi. So to do rulers and their cronies in Bahrain and Yemen. Deposed elites in Egypt and Tunisia certainly seem to have failed the test of this Arab Spring and the jury is still out as to their successors.

But the leaders in the region are clearly not the only ones being tested. The leaders of the international community have been too and the results so far for them have been no better than those of the embattled regional chieftans ... and indeed, they may be worse.

On the Libyan portion of the test, the answers provided have been as hard to decipher as they have been of dubious merit. As the British announced they will be sending 20 military officers and civilian advisers to Benghazi to advise Libyan rebels and the French did similarly, the U.S. had the vice president delivering to the Financial Times the W.C. Fieldsian message that on the whole, we'd rather be in Egypt.

Facing public concerns that stepping up their involvement may be the first step toward an escalation, the British have bent over backwards to assure their new measures are carefully compliant with the U.N. resolution that blessed the Libya involvement. They are focusing, they say, on "communications and logistics, including how best to distribute humanitarian aid and deliver medical assistance." This comment was apparently written for them by newly out-of-favor author Greg Mortenson given that it is just as implausible as apparently are some sections of his best-seller Three Cups of Tea.

Thus, at this point, even with Qaddafi reportedly feeling the heat and the West floating stories about him considering exile, the

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reality is we're weeks into an undertaking that was supposed to take "days not weeks" and the only resolution anywhere in sight is the one from the security council that is fading in our rearview mirror.

So, the Libya part of the test is not going so well. But frankly, in retrospect, it may look it was passed with flying colors compared to many of the other elements of this spring's challenges. Because while the West did eventually send a clear message to Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak that his time was up and that it would not prop him up, since that high water mark of support for reformers and the Libya response that followed, the message has been "we'll sit this one out." This has been due in part to the complex geopolitical problems posed when facing choices between democracy advocates and the vital allies they are seeking to depose. It has also been due to the fact that the Libya muddle has sapped whatever political will existed to get involved from the few governments with any inclination at all to do so. Consequently, the noble sentiments expressed by the U.N. and NATO leaders that led to an effort to protect Libya's citizens from its despotic rulers has been followed by utter silence and precious little action at all when it came to protecting the citizens of Bahrain, Yemen, or Syria. In fact, in the case of Bahrain, we can only assume that the position of the U.S. at least has been slightly worse than just inaction ... it has involved wink-and-a-nod acceptance since the crackdown has come from close U.S. allies who continue to depend heavily on the United States for security support.

The inaction in the face of the brutal targeting of Shiites in Bahrain may be partially explained by concerns about Iran's role in stirring up the Shiite majority in Bahrain, but even here, the response can't be viewed as part of a consistently effective policy given recent gains made by the Iranians in taking advantage of changes in Egypt to strengthen their relationship with Cairo and via supporting the Assad government in Syria thus strengthening their ties with that regime. And none of this speaks to the time the

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Iranians have gained for their nuclear efforts while the world's attention has been drawn elsewhere in the region.

In fact, judged on humanitarian grounds the score the West will get on this test is at best an incomplete and could well be far more dismal than that. Strategically, it looks like this Arab Spring may actually strengthen the west's enemies more than it does the West or Western ideals or interests. Operationally, it has revealed troubling cracks in key alliances.

The test is not over for anyone other than Egypt's Mubarak and Tunisia's Ben Ali. But right now it seems far more likely that the region's despots will score better in the near-term than will the United States or its allies. With the eventual disposition of Egypt's transition, Libya's civil war, and uprisings in key countries across the region still uncertain, this could change and there is every reason to remain hopeful. However, if the real message behind the tortured diplobabble offered up to explain the Libya situation is that -- thanks to Qaddafi's resilience, the rebels' limited capacity, NATO's ill-structured mission, and our general strategic befuddlement about balancing our aspirations and historical relationships -- the region's autocrats will be getting essentially a free pass from here on out ... then the West may well end up with a big fat "F" on its Mideast report card this semester, with only more complex tests ahead.

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Noam Chomsky on The Arab Revolt Noam Chomsky interviewed by Saswat PattanayakKindle Magazine, March 2011

SP- Prof Chomsky, where do you locate the contours of the current crisis in Egypt, Tunisia and rest of the Middle East? NC- The source of the crisis in the Arab world goes back very far and it’s similar to what we find in the formerly colonized world. Actually it was expressed rather clearly in the 1950’s by President Eisenhower and his staff. He was holding an internal discussion

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which has been declassified since. Eisenhower asked his staff why there is, what he called a “campaign of hatred” against us in the Arab world. Not among the governments, which are more or less docile, but among the people. And the National Security Council, which is the major planning body, produced a memorandum on this topic. It said that there is a perception in the Arab world that the United States supports harsh vicious dictators, blocks democracy and development; and we do this because we want to maintain control over their resources - in this case, energy. And went on to say that the perception is fairly accurate and furthermore that, that’s what we should be doing.

The basic principle holds not just for the Arab world. It was expressed rather succinctly during the period of the recent spectacular uprising in Egypt by Marwan Muasher. He is a former high Jordanian official who is now the head of research in the Middle East for the Carnegie Endowment. He said there is a prevailing doctrine which is that as long as people are quiet, passive, controlled, there is no problem. We do whatever we like. Maybe they hate us, but it doesn’t matter, because we can do what we like. That’s a principle that holds in Arab world, in India, it holds domestically in the United States; its a standard principle of domination. Of course, sometimes the people break the chains and then you have to make adjustments. What’s happening in Egypt right now is a dramatic, but not untypical example. There has been case after case where the United States and other imperial powers before have been compelled to abandon support for the favored dictator because he could no longer be sustained. So there is a standard gameplan now being applied in Egypt. You support the dictator as long as possible by adopting the Muasher Doctrine. Everything is quiet, so no problem. When the dictator can no longer be sustained, you sort of push him aside, issue Reagan proclamations of your love for democracy and freedom and proceed to try to reestablish as much as you can of the former system. And that’s what we see happening right now in Egypt, and as I said, it happens over and over again.

SP - Do you foresee a similar uprising in India? Or, what in your views is holding India back?

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NC - Let’s take India. First of all, there is a major uprising. Large parts of India are in flames. The tribal areas are essentially in revolt. Large part of Indian Army is involved trying to suppress them.

SP - So you see a parallel between the insurgencies?

NC - hmm.. I think the real question in India would be ... I mean there has been, you know, this famous shining India. Its true for a segment of population. India is so huge, so its a substantial sector. On the other hand, probably three-quarters of the population are left out. The number of billionaires is rising about as fast as the number of peasant suicides. And the analogous question to Egypt would be not so much what’s happening in the tribal areas, I think, as what about the hundreds of millions of people who are suffering severely.

SP - Absolutely. There’s a huge class gap.

NC - There is an enormous class gap. India’s dramatic, in fact. If suffering in South Asia is...

SP - The gap is growing now...

NC - Its growing and its the worst in the world. Has been for a long time. If you look at the Human Development Index of the United Nations, the last time I looked, India was about 120th or something like that at the beginning of the so-called reforms 20 years ago.

SP - Now the quality has fallen further down.

NC - Well, now the question is how long will these huge numbers of people be passive and apathetic so their concerns can be dismissed.

SP - Prof Chomsky, Arundhati Roy was pressed with sedition charges for speaking on Kashmiri people’s right to self-

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determination. What is your take on self-determination, especially in the context of Kashmir?

NC - First I should say that Arundhati Roy should be greatly honored in India as a symbol of what could be great about the country. The fact that she is being charged with Sedition is utter outrage. And the anger and hatred that’s being organized against her is a real disgrace. But that’s Arundhati Roy, a marvelous person.

With regard to Kashmir, problems go back to the Partition. And there is plenty of responsibility on all sides. Keeping to India, India, of course refused to allow the referendum that was a condition on partition. (Thus, India) essentially took over the territory and (subsequent) conflict led to a Line of Control. There has been plenty of repression and violence. In late 1980’s there was an election but it was totally fraudulent. It led to an uprising which was put down with extreme violence. Tens of thousands of people have been killed in the Indian controlled areas of Kashmir. Tortures, atrocities have been pretty horrible. Roy points out in her recent article that this is the most militarized region in the world. There’s since been other controlled elections attempting to institute Indian control and anyone who looks at it can see that there is strong pressure for one or another form of autonomy or self-rule. It could take many forms. Exactly how it should be worked out is not a trivial problem. But you can think of ways in which a reasonably sensible outcome could be managed through the various parts of Kashmir, (since) different regions of Kashmir have different interests and goals.

SP - How do you perceive the Maoist movement in India? Do you see it as the battle of an indigenous people’s right to self-determination or do you see in it, a communist, revolutionary struggle to gain control of a political economy?

NC - Well, first I should not make any pretense of having any deep knowledge with this. I don’t. But as far as I understand, it is both. There are Maoist revolutionaries. So-called. They call themselves Maoists, whatever that’s supposed to mean. But there

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is a basis in the population. These are substantially tribal areas and they are among the most repressed people in India. They have lives, they have a society, a functioning society; in the forests, in the tribal regions. There is an effort by the Government, essentially to invade those regions to destroy the basis for their life and society by resource extraction, mining and so on. And they are resisting. They wanna preserve their lives. Its going on all over the world.

Now, this Summer, for example, I was in Southern Columbia visiting endangered villages subjected to severe repression. Actually, Columbia has the largest internally displaced population in the world after Sudan, mostly from attacks on the indigenous areas. The villagers are trying to do the same thing. They are trying to find ways to...one village I visited is trying to preserve nearby mountain and virgin forests from mining which will destroy their communities, destroy their lives, take away the water supplies. They are poor, but they have a functioning life. They want that life and they have every reason to have it. And that’s happening all over the world. Its happening in the United States. In Appalachia, mountain top removal happens to be a very cheap way of coal mining, but it destroys the valleys, destroys the rivers, destroys the ecology, destroys the communities and people resist. I presume that, what’s happening in the tribal areas (in India) is in substantial part an instance of this global phenomenon of the feverish surge for resources, whatever be the effect on environment and the people.

SP - Yes. And also, it has a continuation in terms of historical understanding of India’s indigenous peoples. From 1960s onwards, there have been organized revolutionary movements among the oppressed...

NC - Oh yeah, from the Naxalite movements. That was, of course, very serious. In some places like West Bengal, it was a major factor that led to significant land reforms, to establishment of peasant communes and so on. Again, I don’t claim to know much about it but I have visited some of them together with an agricultural economist friend and actually a Finance Minister with

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the Government who I happened to know when he was a student here. We went to visit a panchayat in West Bengal and there were a lot of impressive things happening. These are the outcomes of the Naxalite revolt...other outcomes have been vicious and brutal.

SP - Nation states are increasingly resembling larger corporations. Is it a trend to stay or do you think even globalization will have its necessary backlash and a historical meltdown?

I think many complicated things are happening around the world. I don’t think thats true of all nation-states. For example, rather dramatically in Latin America, there has been in the past 10 years or so, significant moves towards integration, towards independence, towards bringing the mass of the population into the political process, dealing with severe internal problems, not like India, which has enormous poverty and misery in an island of wealth. That’s in the opposite direction. If you take the rich, developed, some of the Asian countries, they are going in their own ways. Take a country like the United States, England and much of Europe - what you described...what’s happening could be described that way but little differently. I mean what’s actually been happening in much of the world, this incidentally includes China and India too - is a global shift of power - away from working people and into the hands of owners, managers, investors, the elite elements, highly paid professionals, and so on. There is a very sharp class split. You see it everywhere.

SP - Absolutely.

NC - In the United States, its the highest inequality since the 1920’s. And if we look closely, its the highest ever, because the inequality largely results from the super enrichment of a tiny sector of the population. A fraction of one percent (comprising) managers, owners, hedge fund managers, and so on. And this concentration of economic power in the sector of corporate system, increasingly the financial sector, carries with it a political power. Concentrated economic power has overwhelming effect on the global process. And in fact, the state corporate policies for the past 30 years, running from fiscal policies like taxation to

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government rules on corporate governance and so on, have been designed in order to create this kind of system of sharply class divided oppression. And this is real and there is plenty of discontentment and anger. Its not like the Third World but the people in the rich countries have seen their incomes stagnate for 30 years while there is enormous wealth. Life is not miserable, but it is difficult. Unemployment for much of the population is still at the level of depression with no prospect of anything changing. This is kind of extreme in the United States. But its similar in England and to some extent, elsewhere. In places like China, let’s say you also have extreme disparity of wealth, some of the worst in the world. India is of course a class by itself...

SP - Do most people recognize there is a class society in existence or is there a denial?

NC - The business class of, say in the United States, are highly class conscious. In fact, they are essentially Marxists. If you read the business literature, it reads like a little Red Book. They mention the hazards of the organized masses, the hazards they pose to industrialists and so on. And they fight a bitter class war. And in the last years its been dramatic. Among the rest of the population, its a mixed story. So again, take the United States. The word class is almost unmentionable. The United States is one of the few countries where...

SP - ...Class is a taboo word.

NC - ....It is a taboo word. Everyone is middle class. I have a friend who teaches History in a state college. On the first day of the semesters, she often asks students how they identify themselves in class terms. The answers are, ‘basically if my father is in jail, I am underclass. If my father is a janitor I am middle class, if my father is a stock broker, I am upper class. But the idea of the class in its traditional sense is essentially driven out of peoples’ heads. But whether they have a terminology for it or not, they know it. People know whether they are giving orders or taking orders. They know whether they have a role in decision making or they don’t. And those are class distinctions.

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SP – Your message for the readers of Kindle?

NC - The message...one message is not to take that description too seriously. In fact, take a look at what’s happening right now in Tahrir Square in Egypt. One of the most spectacular demonstrations of popular activism of courage and determination that I can remember. They are not following leaders. In fact, what’s striking, dramatically striking is how self organized it is. People are forming defense communities to protect themselves against Government thugs, they are forming groups to develop policies, to reach out to others. That’s the way things happen. Sometimes, you know, popular movements develop and leaders appear. Usually it’s a bad thing. No one should be looking to anyone for guidance and advice. Basically, you can figure out the answers. The important ones will come from the people themselves.

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On Libya and the Unfolding Crises Noam Chomsky interviewed by Stephen Shalom and Michael AlbertZNet, March 30, 2011

1. What are US motives in international relations most broadly? That is, what are the over arching motives and themes one can pretty much always find informing US policy choices, no matter where in the world we are discussing? What are the somewhat more specific but still over arching motives and themes for US policy in Middle East and the Arab world? Finally, what do you think are the more proximate aims of US policy in the current situation in Libya?

A useful way to approach the question is to ask what US motives are not. There are some good ways to find out. One is to read the professional literature on international relations: quite commonly,

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its account of policy is what policy is not, an interesting topic that I won't pursue.

Another method, quite relevant now, is to listen to political leaders and commentators. Suppose they say that the motive for a military action is humanitarian. In itself, that carries no information: virtually every resort to force is justified in those terms, even by the worst monsters -- who may, irrelevantly, even convince themselves of the truth of what they are saying. Hitler, for example, may have believed that he was taking over parts of Czechoslovakia to end ethnic conflict and bring its people the benefits of an advanced civilization, and that he invaded Poland to end the "wild terror" of the Poles. Japanese fascists rampaging in China probably did believe that they were selflessly laboring to create an "earthly paradise" and to protect the suffering population from "Chinese bandits." Even Obama may have believed what he said in his presidential address on March 28 about the humanitarian motives for the Libyan intervention. Same holds of commentators.

There is, however, a very simple test to determine whether the professions of noble intent can be taken seriously: do the authors call for humanitarian intervention and "responsibility to protect" to defend the victims of their own crimes, or those of their clients? Did Obama, for example, call for a no-fly zone during the murderous and destructive US-backed Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006, with no credible pretext? Or did he, rather, boast proudly during his presidential campaign that he had co-sponsored a Senate resolution supporting the invasion and calling for punishment of Iran and Syria for impeding it? End of discussion. In fact, virtually the entire literature of humanitarian intervention and right to protect, written and spoken, disappears under this simple and appropriate test.

In contrast, what motives actually are is rarely discussed, and one has to look at the documentary and historical record to unearth them, in the case of any state.

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What then are US motives? At a very general level, the evidence seems to me to show that they have not changed much since the high-level planning studies undertaken during World War II. Wartime planners took for granted that the US would emerge from the war in a position of overwhelming dominance, and called for the establishment of a Grand Area in which the US would maintain "unquestioned power," with "military and economic supremacy," while ensuring the "limitation of any exercise of sovereignty" by states that might interfere with its global designs. The Grand Area was to include the Western hemisphere, the Far East, the British empire (which included the Middle East energy reserves), and as much of Eurasia as possible, at least its industrial and commercial center in Western Europe. It is quite clear from the documentary record that "President Roosevelt was aiming at United States hegemony in the postwar world," to quote the accurate assessment of the (justly) respected British diplomatic historian Geoffrey Warner. And more significant, the careful wartime plans were soon implemented, as we read in declassified documents of the following years, and observe in practice. Circumstances of course have changed, and tactics adjusted accordingly, but basic principles are quite stable, to the present.

With regard to the Middle East -- the "most strategically important region of the world," in Eisenhower's phrase -- the primary concern has been, and remains, its incomparable energy reserves. Control of these would yield "substantial control of the world," as observed early on by the influential liberal adviser A. A. Berle. These concerns are rarely far in the background in affairs concerning this region.

In Iraq, for example, as the dimensions of the US defeat could no longer be concealed, pretty rhetoric was displaced by honest announcement of policy goals. In November 2007 the White House issued a Declaration of Principles insisting that Iraq must grant US military forces indefinite access and must privilege American investors. Two months later the president informed Congress that he would ignore legislation that might limit the permanent stationing of US Armed Forces in Iraq or "United

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States control of the oil resources of Iraq" -- demands that the US had to abandon shortly after in the face of Iraqi resistance, just as it had to abandon earlier goals.

While control over oil is not the sole factor in Middle East policy, it provides fairly good guidelines, right now as well. In an oil-rich country, a reliable dictator is granted virtual free rein. In recent weeks, for example, there was no reaction when the Saudi dictatorship used massive force to prevent any sign of protest. Same in Kuwait, when small demonstrations were instantly crushed. And in Bahrain, when Saudi-led forces intervened to protect the minority Sunni monarch from calls for reform on the part of the repressed Shiite population. Government forces not only smashed the tent city in Pearl Square -- Bahrain's Tahrir Square -- but even demolished the Pearl statue that was Bahrain's symbol, and had been appropriated by the protestors. Bahrain is a particularly sensitive case because it hosts the US Fifth fleet, by far the most powerful military force in the region, and because eastern Saudi Arabia, right across the causeway, is also largely Shiite, and has most of the Kingdom's oil reserves. By a curious accident of geography and history, the world's largest hydrocarbon concentrations surround the northern Gulf, in mostly Shiite regions. The possibility of a tacit Shiite alliance has been a nightmare for planners for a long time.

In states lacking major hydrocarbon reserves, tactics vary, typically keeping to a standard game plan when a favored dictator is in trouble: support him as long as possible, and when that cannot be done, issue ringing declarations of love of democracy and human rights -- and then try to salvage as much of the regime as possible.

The scenario is boringly familiar: Marcos, Duvalier, Chun, Ceau?escu, Mobutu, Suharto, and many others. And today, Tunisia and Egypt. Syria is a tough nut to crack and there is no clear alternative to the dictatorship that would support US goals. Yemen is a morass where direct intervention would probably create even

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greater problems for Washington. So there state violence elicits only pious declarations.

Libya is a different case. Libya is rich in oil, and though the US and UK have often given quite remarkable support to its cruel dictator, right to the present, he is not reliable. They would much prefer a more obedient client. Furthermore, the vast territory of Libya is mostly unexplored, and oil specialists believe it may have rich untapped resources, which a more dependable government might open to Western exploitation.

When a non-violent uprising began, Qaddafi crushed it violently, and a rebellion broke out that liberated Benghazi, Libya's second largest city, and seemed about to move on to Qaddafi's stronghold in the West. His forces, however, reversed the course of the conflict and were at the gates of Benghazi. A slaughter in Benghazi was likely, and as Obama's Middle East adviser Dennis Ross pointed out, "everyone would blame us for it." That would be unacceptable, as would a Qaddafi military victory enhancing his power and independence. The US then joined in UN Security Council resolution 1973 calling for a no-fly zone, to be implemented by France, the UK, and the US, with the US supposed to move to a supporting role.

There was no effort to institute a no-fly zone. The triumvirate at once interpreted the resolution as authorizing direct participation on the side of the rebels. A ceasefire was imposed by force on Qaddafi's forces, but not on the rebels. On the contrary, they were given military support as they advanced to the West, soon securing the major sources of Libya's oil production, and poised to move on.

The blatant disregard of UN 1973, from the start began to cause some difficulties for the press as it became too glaring to ignore. In the New York Times, for example, Karim Fahim and David Kirkpatrick (March 29) wondered "how the allies could justify airstrikes on Colonel Qaddafi's forces around [his tribal center] Surt if, as seems to be the case, they enjoy widespread support in

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the city and pose no threat to civilians." Another technical difficulty is that UNSC 1973 "called for an arms embargo that applies to the entire territory of Libya, which means that any outside supply of arms to the opposition would have to be covert" (but otherwise unproblematic).

Some argue that oil cannot be a motive because Western companies were granted access to the prize under Qaddafi. That misconstrues US concerns. The same could have been said about Iraq under Saddam, or Iran and Cuba for many years, still today. What Washington seeks is what Bush announced: control, or at least dependable clients. US and British internal documents stress that "the virus of nationalism" is their greatest fear, not just in the Middle East but everywhere. Nationalist regimes might conduct illegitimate exercises of sovereignty, violating Grand Area principles. And they might seek to direct resources to popular needs, as Nasser sometimes threatened.

It is worth noting that the three traditional imperial powers -- France, UK, US -- are almost isolated in carrying out these operations. The two major states in the region, Turkey and Egypt, could probably have imposed a no-fly zone but are at most offering tepid support to the triumvirate military campaign. The Gulf dictatorships would be happy to see the erratic Libyan dictator disappear, but although loaded with advanced military hardware (poured in by the US and UK to recycle petrodollars and ensure obedience), they are willing to offer no more than token participation (by Qatar).

While supporting UNSC 1973, Africa -- apart from US ally Rwanda -- is generally opposed to the way it was instantly interpreted by the triumvirate, in some cases strongly so. For review of policies of individual states, see Charles Onyango-Obbo in the Kenyan journal East African (http://allafrica.com/stories/201103280142.html).

Beyond the region there is little support. Like Russia and China, Brazil abstained from UNSC 1973, calling instead for a full cease-

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fire and dialogue. India too abstained from the UN resolution on grounds that the proposed measures were likely to "exacerbate an already difficult situation for the people of Libya," and also called for political measures rather than use of force. Even Germany abstained from the resolution.

Italy too was reluctant, in part presumably because it is highly dependent on its oil contracts with Qaddafi -- and we may recall that the first post-World War I genocide was conducted by Italy, in Eastern Libya, now liberated, and perhaps retaining some memories.

2. 2. Can an anti-interventionist who believes in self determination of nations and people ever legitimately support an intervention, either by the UN or particular countries?

There are two cases to consider: (1) UN intervention and (2) intervention without UN authorization. Unless we believe that states are sacrosanct in the form that has been established in the modern world (typically by extreme violence), with rights that override all other imaginable considerations, then the answer is the same in both cases: Yes, in principle at least. I see no point in discussing that belief, so will dismiss it.

With regard to the first case, the Charter and subsequent resolutions grant the Security Council considerable latitude for intervention, and it has been undertaken, with regard to South Africa, for example. That of course does not entail that every Security Council decision should be approved by "an anti-interventionist who believes in self-determination"; other considerations enter in individual cases, but again, unless contemporary states are assigned the status of virtually holy entities, the principle is the same.

As for the second case -- the one that arises with regard to the triumvirate interpretation of UN 1973, and many other examples -- then the answer is again Yes, in principle at least, unless we take the global state system to be sacrosanct in the form established in the UN Charter and other treaties.

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There is, of course, always a very heavy burden of proof that must be met to justify forceful intervention, or any use of force. The burden is particularly high in case (2), in violation of the Charter, at least for states that profess to be law-abiding. We should bear in mind, however, that the global hegemon rejects that stance, and is self-exempted from the UN and OAS Charters, and other international treaties. In accepting ICJ jurisdiction when the Court was established (under US initiative) in 1946, Washington excluded itself from charges of violation of international treaties, and later ratified the Genocide Convention with similar reservations -- all positions that have been upheld by international tribunals, since their procedures require acceptance of jurisdiction. More generally, US practice is to add crucial reservations to the international treaties it ratifies, effectively exempting itself.

Can the burden of proof be met? There is little point in abstract discussion, but there are some real cases that might qualify. In the post-World War II period, there are two cases of resort to force which -- though not qualifying as humanitarian intervention -- might legitimately be supported: India's invasion of East Pakistan in 1971, and Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, in both cases, ending massive atrocities. These examples, however, do not enter the Western canon of "humanitarian intervention" because they suffer from the fallacy of wrong agency: they were not carried out by the West. What is more, the US bitterly opposed them and severely punished the miscreants who ended the slaughters in today's Bangladesh and who drove Pol Pot out of Cambodia just as his atrocities were peaking. Vietnam was not only bitterly condemned but also punished by a US-supported Chinese invasion, and by US-UK military and diplomatic support for the Khmer Rouge attacking Cambodia from Thai bases.

While the burden of proof might be met in these cases, it is not easy to think of others. In the case of intervention by the triumvirate of imperial powers that are currently violating UN 1973 in Libya, the burden is particularly heavy, given their

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horrifying records. Nonetheless, it would be too strong to hold that it can never be satisfied in principle -- unless, of course, we regard nation-states in their current form as essentially holy. Preventing a likely massacre in Benghazi is no small matter, whatever one thinks of the motives.

3. 3. Can a person concerned that a country's dissidents not be massacred so they remain able to seek self determination ever legitimately oppose an intervention that is intended, whatever else it intends, to avert such a massacre?

Even accepting, for the sake of argument, that the intent is genuine, meeting the simple criterion I mentioned at the outset, I don't see how to answer at this level of abstraction: it depends on circumstances. Intervention might be opposed, for example, if it is likely to lead to a much worse massacre. Suppose, for example, that US leaders genuinely and honestly intended to avert a slaughter in Hungary in 1956 by bombing Moscow. Or that the Kremlin genuinely and honestly intended to avert a slaughter in El Salvador in the 1980s by bombing the US. Given the predictable consequences, we would all agree that those (inconceivable) actions could be legitimately opposed.

4. 4. Many people see an analogy between the Kosovo intervention of 1999 and the current intervention in Libya. Can you explain both the significant similarities, first, and then the major differences, second?

Many people do indeed see such an analogy, a tribute to the incredible power of the Western propaganda systems. The background for the Kosovo intervention happens to be unusually well documented. That includes two detailed State Department compilations, extensive reports from the ground by Kosovo Verification Mission (Western) monitors, rich sources from NATO and the UN, a British Parliamentary Inquiry, and much else. The reports and studies coincide very closely on the facts.

In brief, there had been no substantial change on the ground in the months prior to the bombing. Atrocities were committed both by

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Serbian forces and by the KLA guerrillas mostly attacking from neighboring Albania -- primarily the latter during the relevant period, at least according to high British authorities (Britain was the most hawkish member of the alliance). The major atrocities in Kosovo were not the cause of the NATO bombing of Serbia, but rather its consequence, and a fully anticipated consequence. NATO commander General Wesley Clark had informed the White House weeks before the bombing that it would elicit a brutal response by Serbian forces on the ground, and as the bombing began, told the press that such a response was "predictable."

The first UN-registered refugees outside Kosovo were well after the bombing began. The indictment of Milosevic during the bombing, based largely on US-UK intelligence, confined itself to crimes after the bombing, with one exception, which we know could not be taken seriously by US-UK leaders, who at the same moment were actively supporting even worse crimes. Furthermore, there was good reason to believe that a diplomatic solution might have been in reach: in fact, the UN resolution imposed after 78 days of bombing was pretty much a compromise between the Serbian and NATO position as it began.

All of this, including these impeccable western sources, is reviewed in some detail in my book A New Generation Draws the Line. Corroborating information has appeared since. Thus Diana Johnstone reports a letter to German Chancellor Angela Merkel on October 26, 2007 by Dietmar Hartwig, who had been head of the European mission in Kosovo before it was withdrawn on March 20 as the bombing was announced, and was in a very good position to know what was happening. He wrote:

"Not a single report submitted in the period from late November 1998 up to the evacuation on the eve of the war mentioned that Serbs had committed any major or systematic crimes against Albanians, nor there was a single case referring to genocide or genocide-like incidents or crimes. Quite the opposite, in my reports I have repeatedly informed that, considering the increasingly more frequent KLA attacks against the Serbian

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executive, their law enforcement demonstrated remarkable restraint and discipline. The clear and often cited goal of the Serbian administration was to observe the Milosevic-Holbrooke Agreement [of October 1998] to the letter so not to provide any excuse to the international community to intervene. ... There were huge 'discrepancies in perception' between what the missions in Kosovo have been reporting to their respective governments and capitals, and what the latter thereafter released to the media and the public. This discrepancy can only be viewed as input to long-term preparation for war against Yugoslavia. Until the time I left Kosovo, there never happened what the media and, with no less intensity the politicians, were relentlessly claiming. Accordingly, until 20 March 1999 there was no reason for military intervention, which renders illegitimate measures undertaken thereafter by the international community. The collective behavior of EU Member States prior to, and after the war broke out, gives rise to serious concerns, because the truth was killed, and the EU lost reliability."

History is not quantum physics, and there is always ample room for doubt. But it is rare for conclusions to be so firmly backed as they are in this case. Very revealingly, it is all totally irrelevant. The prevailing doctrine is that NATO intervened to stop ethnic cleansing -- though supporters of the bombing who tolerate at least a nod to the rich factual evidence qualify their support by saying the bombing was necessary to stop potential atrocities: we must therefore act to elicit large-scale atrocities to stop ones that might occur if we do not bomb. And there are even more shocking justifications.

The reasons for this virtual unanimity and passion are fairly clear. The bombing came after a virtual orgy of self-glorification and awe of power that might have impressed Kim Il-Sung. I've reviewed it elsewhere, and this remarkable moment of intellectual history should not be allowed to remain in the oblivion to which it has been consigned. After this performance, there simply had to be a glorious denouement. The noble Kosovo intervention provided it, and the fiction must be zealously guarded.

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Returning to the question, there is an analogy between the self-serving depictions of Kosovo and Libya, both interventions animated by noble intent in the fictionalized version. The unacceptable real world suggests rather different analogies. 5. Similarly, many people see an analogy between the ongoing Iraq intervention and the current intervention in Libya. In this case too, can you explain both the similarities, and differences?

I don't see meaningful analogies here either, except that two of the same states are involved. In the case of Iraq, the goals were those that were finally conceded. In the case of Libya, it is likely that the goal is similar in at least one respect: the hope that a reliable client regime will reliably supported Western goals and provide Western investors with privileged access to Libya's rich oil wealth -- which, as noted, may go well beyond what is currently known.

5. 5. What do you expect, in coming weeks, to see happening in Libya and, in that context, what do you think ought to be the aims of an anti-interventionist and antiwar movement in the US regarding US policies?

It is of course uncertain, but the likely prospects now (March 29) are either a break-up of Libya into an oil-rich Eastern region heavily dependent on the Western imperial powers and an impoverished West under the control of a brutal tyrant with fading capacity, or a victory by the Western-backed forces. In either case, so the triumvirate presumably hopes, a less troublesome and more dependent regime will be in place. The likely outcome is described fairly accurately, I think by the London-based Arab journal al-Quds al-Arabi (March 28). While recognizing the uncertainty of prediction, it anticipates that the intervention may leave Libya with "two states, a rebel-held oil-rich East and a poverty-stricken, Qadhafi-led West ... Given that the oil wells have been secured, we may find ourselves facing a new Libyan oil emirate, sparsely inhabited, protected by the West and very similar to the Gulf's emirate states." Or the Western-backed rebellion might proceed all the way to eliminate the irritating dictator.

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Those concerned for peace, justice, freedom and democracy should try to find ways to lend support and assistance to Libyans who seek to shape their own future, free from constraints imposed by external powers. We can have hopes about the directions they should pursue, but their future should be in their hands.

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Haaretz: 'Haaretz WikiLeaks exclusive / Netanyahu urged Olmert to initiate Israeli attack on Iran'..

Haaretz: 'Haaretz WikiLeaks exclusive / Chinese company selling nuclear equipment to Iran'..

Guardian: 'Omar al-Bashir: conflict in Darfur is my responsibility'..

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