THE COLLEGE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

Student Name: SSgt James P. Sankey, U.S. Air Force

Joint Special Operations Master of Arts Class of 2014

Thesis Title: Policy Recommendations for Commercially Operated Unmanned

Aerial Vehicles in the United States

Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the

Master of Arts in Strategic Security Studies

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE

INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT

THE VIEWS OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, THE DEPARTMENT

OF DEFENSE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY. REFERENCES TO

THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

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ABSTRACT

Most of what the general public knows about Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) is

related to the use of these vehicles overseas by the United States military in the Global War on

Terror. The effectiveness, morality, and legality of UAVs (specifically the weaponized versions)

are matters of continuing controversy. This paper does not address UAVs that are being operated

outside the continental United States (OCONUS). Rather, it focuses on the role of UAVs within

the United States and the possible negative consequences from their use domestically before

proper Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) guidelines have been put in place. There is today

a lack of regulation addressing the capability and potential misuse of small, commercially

operated UAVs operating anonymously and autonomously within the National Airspace

(NAS).This would include those owned and operated by individuals or groups intending to

commit terrorist acts. Without FAA regulation of small UAV operations in the NAS, malicious

individuals or groups could achieve the capability to quickly exploit weaknesses in the system

and create havoc on a national scale. Before laws are written and passed, the FAA must

designate an aerial law enforcement entity to identify UAV violations and ensure that all

forthcoming rules and regulations are complied with.

Table of Contents

CHAPTER 1 ....................................................................................................................................1

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 1

Policy Options ......................................................................................................................... 2

Preferred Policy Option .......................................................................................................... 2

Research Design...................................................................................................................... 3

Method of Analysis ................................................................................................................. 4

Discussion and Analysis of Cases......................................................................................... 10

CHAPTER 2 ..................................................................................................................................12

DESCRIPTION OF POLICY PROBLEM ............................................................................................ 12

Why Non-Regulation is a Problem ....................................................................................... 20

Who the UAV Policy Would Affect ..................................................................................... 26

CHAPTER 3 ..................................................................................................................................30

DISCUSSION OF POLICY OPTIONS ............................................................................................... 30

UAV Equipment ................................................................................................................... 33

UAV Operators ..................................................................................................................... 36

UAV Enforcement ................................................................................................................ 37

Current Policy and Law ........................................................................................................ 40

Policy Option ........................................................................................................................ 46

CHAPTER 4 ..................................................................................................................................47

EVALUATION OF POLICY OPTIONS ............................................................................................. 47

Enforcement Options ............................................................................................................ 48

Insurance ............................................................................................................................... 49

Serial Number and Tracking ................................................................................................. 51

No-Fly Areas ......................................................................................................................... 52

Advancement in Anti-Jamming and Hacking ....................................................................... 53

CHAPTER 5 ..................................................................................................................................54

POLICY RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 54

Resulting Problems and continuing ambiguities................................................................... 55

Summary ............................................................................................................................... 56

WORKS CITED ............................................................................................................................57

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The lack of regulation for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) flying in US airspace

constitutes a major problem that affects US civil aviation and, potentially, US national security.

As early as 2002, it was reported that some 43 cases had been uncovered in which the use of

remote control delivery systems was "either threatened, developed, or actually utilized" by

terrorist groups (Gips 2002). This problem has created significant debate within the American

government and business community over UAVs operating in US national airspace (NAS), with

a special focus on the ability of UAVs to operate both anonymously and autonomously. Scholars

have addressed privacy issues such as the potential for both government and private UAVs to

violate 4th

Amendment rights – particularly the danger that, at least on the government side, they

could facilitate warrantless searches. However, little has been said about the threat UAVs could

pose if they were to be used by malicious state or non-state actors wishing to do harm to the

United States and its citizens. UAVs guided by Global Positioning System (GPS) technology can

be preprogramed, leaving humans completely out of the command-and-control loop after launch.

Those with preprogramed flight profiles – complete with aerial waypoints, airspeed, altitude, and

landing coordinates – are of interest to companies such as Amazon and Domino’s Pizza who

could potentially benefit from cheaper costs in delivering goods to the customer. Once airborne,

however, this type of UAV could potentially pose a danger to US citizens and installations. This

potential danger needs to be addressed through a transparent policy process designed to prevent

misuse and achieve best outcomes for business, government, and the nation generally. This paper

will seek to elucidate the policy framework necessary for the creation of the regulatory

guidelines that will govern the use of UAVs in American air space.

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Policy Options

For commercial UAVs in the NAS, the following areas should be focused upon when

considering policy options and requirements for safe operation: UAV equipment, UAV

operators, and UAV policy enforcement.

The UAV equipment section will explore different types of equipment that could aid in

the identification and tracking of the UAV itself.

The UAV operators section will lay out requirements for the licensing of a commercial

(and possibly individually operated) UAV. These requirements should be mandatory before the

hiring of pilots or actual UAV operations occur.

UAV enforcement is a new concept for policymakers in the United States. While the

skies over major US cities have been meticulously monitored for suspicious aircraft activity

since 9/11, there is nothing in place to detect and track UAVs, due largely to their small

signature and radar cross section (Baker 2013) Additionally, this paper will investigate ways to

cease the operation of or remove a UAV from the sky safely without putting individuals on the

ground at risk.

Preferred Policy Option

Policies must be created and implemented to establish the necessary regulatory

framework to govern the use of UAVs in American air space. Regulations should include proper

registration and the insuring of all commercially employed UAVs, combined with licensing of all

commercial UAV operators. Additionally, an air monitoring agency should be established with

proper jurisdiction to strictly enforce these regulations once they have become law. The FAA is

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expected to come forward with the guidelines governing the commercial use of UAVs in

domestic airspace by late 2015 (FAA 2007). What will probably remain lacking is the aerial

enforcement piece, as it has not appeared in any of the FAA roadmaps or proposals to date (US

Department of Transportation 2013).Without the capability to enforce the regulations passed by

Washington, these regulations will remain only words on paper. The FAA must work in tandem

with the Department of Homeland Security to initiate discussions on how the skies will be

patrolled, how rule breakers will be identified and dealt with, and whether and to what extent

violators should be prosecuted. The key, again, is enforcement.

Research Design

Scholarly journals, law reviews, defense intelligence reports, and previous theses have

been examined while investigating appropriate resources to guide the writing of this paper with

the goal of addressing the issues surrounding commercial UAVs operating in the United States.

The terrorist UAV threat and the extent to which that threat is increasing has gone largely

unaddressed. In order to counter this potential threat, I have discovered several existing aviation

policies as well as tools (both existing and in development) that could be adapted to regulate

UAV use. Chapter three considers these options and explores them at length.

The FAA has increasingly handed out cease and desist warnings and even fined some

companies and organizations that have tried to employ UAVs for other than strictly personal use

on the grounds that any public or private use must be vetted through the Agency (Goglia 2014).

My research revealed several Department of Transportation (DOT) and FAA documents

pertaining to general aviation, but almost nothing concerning civilian/commercial UAVs. It was,

however, fascinating to discover how some existing regulations are being interpreted. For

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example, Peter Sachs, an attorney in Connecticut, has gone so far as to state that the FAA has

been claiming an authority over domestic UAV operations which it does not in fact possess. His

claims will be evaluated in chapter four to determine their validity.

Additionally, chapter four will look at ways in which persons and companies can be held

accountable for the UAV operations they conduct. Some UAV companies are even leaning

forward in the quest to achieve safe operations and are developing innovative ways to assist the

FAA, as well as other global aviation regulators (including the International Civil Aviation

Organization, or ICAO). Chapter four will also look at counter-UAV options and attempt to look

for ways to enforce the rules once these have been handed down by the FAA.

Method of Analysis

Qualitative Historical Analysis

The primary analytical method employed in this paper will follow the logic of a qualitative

review and evaluation of primary and secondary documents and select cases that inform the

recent evolution of UAV operation in the United States as they interface with a mature and yet

evolving FAA regulatory mechanism for the control of American air space.

The problem being addressed is the fact that UAV technology is moving faster than anyone

initially anticipated it would, and there now exists the possibility (indeed, likelihood) that UAVs

will soon be flying through the skies of the United States. Congress has ordered that this problem

be solved through legislation by the end of 2015, and agencies like the FAA have been

scrambling to organize and get passed policies that will ensure both aerial and ground safety.

This problem includes initially unforeseen obstacles that must be addressed before an effective

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policy can be implemented. Not only are they concerned with flight safety of UAVs, but also that

of other aircraft sharing the NAS with UAVs, not to mention people are on the ground. The case

study below will cover establishing workable regulations to integrate UAVs into the NAS.

Three years ago, US Army Lieutenant Colonel Cory Mendenhall wrote a thesis on a topic

similar to this one. At that time, he was attending the National Defense University’s Joint Forces

Staff Collage at the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in Norfolk, VA. Although he dealt with

UAV integration into the NAS, his thesis was primarily concerned with the integration of United

States Department of Defense (DOD) UAVs. In his report, he concluded that UAVs must be held

to the same and possibly higher standards than manned aircraft, in order to ensure that people

and property (both in the air and on the ground) are not placed at risk (Mendenhall 2011). The

problems he identified were, first, lack of data available to successfully establish a target level of

safety (TLS) for UAVs operating in the NAS. Second, the lack of reliability demonstrated by

UAVs as compared to manned aircraft. Third, he pointed out that a requirement for DOD UAVs

to meet FAA airworthiness standards for civilian aircraft was lacking.

In attempting to elucidate a solution to the TLS problem, Mendenhall pointed out that the

only flight data available were from the wars being fought in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the

experience gained in these two conflicts provided a starting point for what would be required to

satisfy both FAA order 8040.41 of June, 1998, and the Acquisition Management System (AMS)

2.

This FAA order and the AMS rules require FAA-wide implementation of safety risk

1 8040.4 has been updated with 8040.4A and establishes the Safety Risk Management (SRM) policy for the FAA. It

also establishes common terms and processes used to analyze, assess, and accept safety risk. The policy is designed

to prescribe common SRM language and communication standards to be applied throughout the FAA (FAA 2012).

2 “The Acquisition Management System (AMS) establishes policy and guidance for all aspects of lifecycle

acquisition management for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). It defines how the FAA manages its

resources - money / people / assets - to fulfill its mission” (FAA 2014).

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management in a “formalized, disciplined, and documented manner for all high-consequence

decisions” (FAA 2012).

The reliability issue was highlighted by the fact that, as least historically, UAVs have had a

mishap rate twice as high as their manned counterparts (Mendenhall 2011, 32). Mishaps included

the tendency to lose navigational links and fly off course. This problem was further highlighted

on August 2, 2010, when a small, windowless helicopter (the MQ-8B Fire Scout) operated by the

U.S. Navy flew within 40 miles of Washington D.C.’s restricted airspace before its operators

could stop it (CIKR Monthly Open Source Cyber Digest 2010). On the other hand, six years

before Mendenhall wrote his thesis, the 311th Performance Enhancement Directorate at Brooks

AFB released a study3 that defended the UAV and put much more blame on human factors as

opposed to the aircraft itself (Tvaryanas, Thompson and Constable 2005). However, in order to

see full UAV integration into the NAS, mishap numbers must decline to a point where they at

least match the reliability numbers for manned aircraft (Mendenhall 2011).

The final obstacle to be overcome is air worthiness. DOD has the authority to certify and

release its aircraft on the basis of DOD handbook MIL-HDBK-516B4, Airworthiness

Certification Criteria. The handbook

…establishes the airworthiness certification criteria to be used in the

determination of airworthiness of all manned and unmanned, fixed and rotary

wing air vehicle systems. It is a foundational document to be used by the system

program manager, chief/lead systems engineer, and contractors to define their air

system’s airworthiness certification basis” (FAA 2004).

3 “A comprehensive 10-year review of human factors in Department of Defense (DOD) UAV mishaps was

conducted using DOD’s new Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS). HFACS is a model of

accident causation based on the premise latent failures at the levels of organizational influences, unsafe supervision,

and unsafe preconditions predispose to active failures (e.g., UAV operator error).” (Tvaryanas, Thompson and

Constable 2005).

4 This 2004 document is approved for use by all Departments and Agencies of the Department of Defense.

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DOD’s airworthiness process comprises three separate levels based on safety of flight (SOF)

risks:

Level I – Certifies to standards equivalent to manned systems with catastrophic failure

rates no worse than one loss per 100,000 flight hours.

Level II – Authorizes standards less stringent for unmanned aircraft with catastrophic

failure rates no worse than one per 10,000 flight hours.

Level III – Minimizes catastrophic failed rates to less than 1,000 flight hours (Ibid).

Mendenhall points out that there are two gaps revealed within the certification process. The

first gap is that UAVs cannot fully comply with manned aircraft rules and standards. Safety of

Flight (SOF) measures currently account only for loss of aircrew and are not directed at

governing actual UAV flight. Furthermore, SOF risks pertaining to personnel, damage to

equipment, property, and the environment must be considered when establishing certification

standards (Ibid).

Narrative

This section contains a specific scenario concerning a plausible domestic UAV threat, and

provides an example of how this problem could be dealt with. For starters, anyone is free to

purchase a UAV. As with manned aircraft, UAVs can be separated into two types: fixed-wing

(FW) and rotary wing (RW), also known as vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL). Model

airplanes will typically fall into the FW category, with a few exceptions.5 Most RW/VTOL

5 Arcturus UAV recently introduced a new vertical takeoff and landing system they call

JUMP™. Jump can be fitted to FW UAVs and consist of booms fitted with vertical lift motors

and rotors mounted to each wing to provide vertical lift for takeoff and landing. Vertical lift

motors are shut off for winged flight and rotors are feathered longitudinally for minimum drag.

Seamless transition to winged flight is achieved by the Piccolo autopilot using Latitude

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UAVs seen today are either classified as helicopters, quadcoptors, or octocopters (the amount of

rotors will determine the naming convention). The intended use and payload requirement will

determine which UAV is best suited for a particular task. For example, a FW UAV would not be

ideal for overhead imagery of a property or farm field. On the other hand, if airspeed was a

requirement, it may prove to be the better option, as opposed to a RW platform. Once someone

decides on the type of UAV to purchase, they have many options available that allow them to

acquire one. He or she can shop at a nearby hobby shop or toy store, or order one online from an

out-of-state or overseas vendor. FW model airplanes typically use a propeller-type engine

mounted either to the front or back of the body that generates forward thrust. UAVs currently

range in price from a few hundred US dollars up to a few thousand dollars, depending on several

factors that include: materials, equipment, sensors, size, and payload capacity. Some kits contain

several pieces or parts, requiring the operator to follow a detailed set of instructions and

assemble them (rather like Lego); others come ready to fly right out of the box. There are also

homemade UAVs which are normally built by professionals and require the assembling of

several independent parts. Choosing to go this route requires a deeper understanding of UAV

flight operations (similar to Information Technology experts building a desktop computer from

the ground up).

Once a UAV is ready for flight, the operator with either preprogram waypoints (using a

laptop and GPS coordinates into the navigation profile), or, alternatively, learn how to manually

control it. GPS control can be as easy as entering waypoints into available computer software

Engineering’s Hybrid-Quadrotor technology. All flight control is fully autonomous (Arcturus-

UAV 2011).

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such as ArduPilot, APM 2.6, and Pixhawk (DIY Drones 2014). The software interface may allow

the user to manually type in coordinates or merely tap areas on a map which tell the UAV where

to navigate. Software has recently been developed to prevent UAVs from interfering with airport

traffic; this will be explained in more detail in chapter four.

Most UAVs operate on an unencrypted frequency. As such, they are susceptible to hacking.

Chapter four will cover this in detail, but essentially, the “drone interceptor” flies near the UAV

and electronically forces it to disconnect its signal to the operator. It then broadcasts its own Wi-

Fi signal, which the UAV recognizes and connects to. With the UAV now no longer connected

to the operator, the drone interceptor has hijacked it with its own signal, and the UAV will

operate in whatever way the drone interceptor tells it to.

In this case study, consider the scenario of a UAV hijacked by a by a terrorist. This

technology removes the need for terrorists to purchase any of their own UAVs and bypass

national security organizations from monitoring and tracking shipments from supplier to

customer. The terrorists could repeat the hijacking process several times until they acquire a

fleet. The terrorist who hijacked the UAV is now able to use it in any of the malicious ways to be

described in chapter three: delivering contraband, weapons, explosives, or conducting aerial

surveillance of a potential target). This type of threat is real and has already been thought of by

terrorist organizations, as highlighted in this paper. It’s time to start thinking about UAV

countermeasures against potential threats – from the use of UAVs to attack buildings with

explosives, to transporting weapons into prison yards to facilitate escapes.

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Discussion and Analysis of Cases

In the three years since Mendenhall completed his thesis, there has been considerable

discussion about UAVs in the United States. This section looks at how, and in some cases if, the

policy and procedure gaps described in his thesis have been filled. First to be considered is the

TLS for UAVs operating in the NAS. As very few UAVs have been allowed to fly in the NAS,

there is still very little data on this. However, even if there were copious amounts of data

available, it is difficult to say how many crashes should be considered too many (inevitably, of

course, some crashes will occur). It would be necessary to weigh each situation independently

and ask a series of questions:

What was the UAV doing when it crashed?

Why was it chosen over a manned asset?

Could a manned airframe have safely achieved the same results?

What was the opportunity and financial cost of the damage caused to the airframe? To

others?

How would the use of a manned asset affect the overall mishap numbers?

As these are only some of the questions that should be asked, it is apparent how

complicated tracking down some of this information will become. Additionally, the information

gaps identified by Mendenhall concerned only US military UAVs, and not those operated by

civilians. The required collection of relevant data (aircraft performance, mishap reports,

mechanical records, etc.) to determine TLS information has yet to be identified, collected, or

accurately presented, and therefore those information gaps still exist.

Mendenhall next looks at UAV reliability and mishap rates. He noted they had a

tendency to lose the navigation link and fly off-course. Many military UAVs have a lost-link

orbit to which they default to in the event they do fly off course. For example, if a UAV

somehow loses contact with its operator, it either finds its preprogrammed orbit via onboard

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GPS, or returns back to home base or original launch location. As far as the mishap rate is

concerned, Dyke Weatherington, who manages UAV programs for the DOD, has said that, “…

the accident trends for the MQ-1 and MQ-9 [military grade UAVs] are the same as the historic

trends of manned aircraft” (Lee, IHS Jane's Defence Weekly 2013). Once again, however, these

numbers only refer to DOD UAVs, and not to the smaller commercial or hobby UAVs

considered in this paper.

This thesis presents a unique scenario that has been little written about, that is, terrorists

hijacking a UAV and using it to cause death and destruction. Currently, the detection and

tracking of airborne UAVs, other than visually, is a daunting task. Even done successfully, there

is no way to apprehend the UAV once it is identified as a potential threat. Air Traffic Control

(ATC) and US military early warning (EW) radars are not capable of seeing an object of this

size. Until the technology to satisfy this requirement is distributed, installed and implemented,

the ability to halt illegal UAV operation simply does not exist.

If the United States continues along the path it is currently following, and does not

address the problems put forth in this paper, the skies will quickly fill with unregulated UAV

operations and untraceable airborne UAVs. Additionally, in the absence of an aerial enforcement

department, the US faces the possibility of losing control over its airspace. This problem can be

solved by taking some of the lessons learned in the US military’s integration of manned and

unmanned aircraft and combining them with current domestic rules and regulations. In this case,

the main difference between military UAVs and domestic private UAVs (other than military

UAVs use of mostly encrypted navigation signals), is that the military and its members adhere to

strict protocols in carrying out their duties. Servicemen and women follow a set of rules,

knowing that any deviations could result in catastrophe.

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Terrorist ready to die for their beliefs are not likely to act in a lawful manner when using

a UAV to carry out an attack. Additionally, a law-abiding US citizen flying a UAV could be

following all rules and regulations, but have his UAV hijacked and used for terrorist operations

against his will. Future research must involve the complex task of how to use encrypted

navigation unique to the navigator of each UAV. This research must also include ways to

monitor small aerial devices without relying on ATC or EW radar. And research should begin to

focus on non-lethal tools that an aerial enforcement agency could use to safely land a UAV

found to be in violation of law. This course of action is safer than shooting down the UAV and

would generally avoid damage to persons or objects in the air and on the ground.

CHAPTER 2

Description of Policy Problem

According to a 2013 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, the FAA has been

issuing Certificate of Waiver or Authorizations (COAs) since January, 2007. As of 2012, the

total COAs issued numbered 1,428. These are issued for specific timeframes (usually 12 to 24

months), locations, and operations. In 2012 alone, the FAA issued 391 COAs to 121 federal,

state, and local government entities, including law enforcement and academic institutions. Of

note is the fact that the “Insitu”, ScanEagle X200 and AeroVironment’s PUMA are the only two

commercial UAVs that, so far, have been given clearance by the FAA to operate.

ConocoPhillips, Alaska's largest oil producer and the holder of oil leases in the remote Chukchi

Sea off the state's northwest coast, is the first company in the United States to be given this

authority. According to FAA spokesman Les Dorr, “The Arctic is a good place to do that

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because air traffic is limited” (DeMarban 2013). The flights occurred in September 2013 and

have been going on ever since without incident.

Figure 1: Entities with COAs Approved from January 1, 2012, through December 31, 2012

Source: GAO analysis of FAA data (Dillingham 2013)

The same GAO report expects that small UAVs will improve technologically while

decreasing in price (Dillingham 2013). Although Congress has tasked the FAA to lead the effort

for safety, other federal agencies – such as the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of

Homeland Security (DHS), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) –

are likely to have a role as well, although at this time it is not exactly clear what their roles will

be.

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Table 1: Key Federal UAV Stakeholders and Their Roles Integrating UAVs into the National Airspace

Source: GAO analysis of FAA data (Dillingham 2013)

The FAA has a mechanism in place to prepare for the safe integration of all aircraft

operating within the NAS, called the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen).

According to the FAA website, NextGen is:

A series of inter-linked programs, systems, and policies that implement

advanced technologies and capabilities to dramatically change the way the current

aviation system is operated. NextGen is satellite-based and relies on a network to

share information and digital communications so all users of the system are aware

of other users’ precise locations (FAA 2013).

In other words, as Dillingham puts it, the goal of NextGen is to integrate existing air traffic

control systems; develop new flight procedures, standards, and regulations; and create and

maintain supporting infrastructure in order to create increased situational awareness (Dillingham

2013).

Additionally, the FAA’s Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) has been tasked

by the Office of Management and Budget to develop, in conjunction with partner agencies, a

strategic interagency UAS/UAV research, development, and demonstration roadmap (FAA 2013,

28). As it now stands, according to the most recent FAA UAV roadmap, NextGen will include

all UAVs (US Department of Transportation 2013). JPDO exists to oversee and coordinate

NextGen research activities within the federal government and aims to use technologies to their

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fullest potential, both in aircraft and throughout the air traffic control system. Reports on efforts

to speed up the process have been released, although other reports suggest that the process is

falling behind schedule. (W. C. Bennett 2012) The FAA only recently confirmed choices for

United States UAV testing grounds. The testing will be done under the auspices of the following

organizations, colleges, or government departments: The University of Alaska, Drone America

(a Reno, Nevada company), New York State’s Griffiss International Airport, the North Dakota

Department of Commerce (working from North Dakota State University’s Carrington Research

Extension Center located in Carrington), Texas A&M University at Corpus Christi, and Virginia

Polytechnic Institute and State University (Duquette and Dorr Jr. 2013). These testing sites will

have four objectives: 1) developing plans for integrating UAS into the national airspace; 2)

changing the COA process; 3) integrating UAS at six test ranges; and 4) developing, revising, or

finalizing regulations and policies related to UAS. A December 2013 FAA press release defines

the responsibilities of each location (See Table 3).

Table 2: Chosen UAV Test Site Locations and Justification for Selection

University of Alaska The University of Alaska proposal contained a

diverse set of test site range locations in seven

climatic zones as well as geographic diversity

with test site range locations in Hawaii and

Oregon. The research plan includes the

development of a set of standards for unmanned

aircraft categories, state monitoring and

navigation. Alaska also plans to work on safety

standards for UAV operations.

State of Nevada Nevada’s project objectives concentrate on

UAV standards and operations as well as

operator standards and certification

requirements. Research will also include a

concentrated look at how ATC procedures will

evolve with the introduction of UAV into the

civil environment and how these aircraft will be

integrated with NextGen. Nevada’s selection

contributes to geographic and climatic diversity.

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New York’s Griffiss

International Airport

Griffiss International plans to work on

developing test and evaluation as well as

verification and validation processes under FAA

safety oversight. The applicant also plans to

focus its research on sense and avoid

capabilities for UAS and its sites will aid in

researching the complexities of integrating UAS

into the congested, northeast airspace.

North Dakota

Department of Commerce

North Dakota plans to develop UAV

airworthiness essential data and validate high

reliability link technology. This applicant will

also conduct human factors research. North

Dakota’s application was the only one to offer a

test range in the Temperate (continental)

climate zone and included a variety of different

airspace which will benefit multiple users.

Texas A&M University –

Corpus Christi

Texas A&M plans to develop system safety

requirements for UAV vehicles and operations

with a goal of protocols and procedures for

airworthiness testing. The selection of Texas

A&M contributes to geographic and climactic

diversity.

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and

State University (Virginia Tech)

Virginia Tech plans to conduct UAV failure

mode testing and identify and evaluate

operational and technical risks areas. This

proposal includes test site range locations in

both Virginia and New Jersey. Source: (FAA 2013)

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Picture 1: Selected UAV Test Site Locations

Source: (FAA 2014)

Although the first testing site was expected to launch no later than August of 2014, the FAA

issued a press release on April 21, 2014 announcing that the North Dakota Department of

Commerce team was the first on their testing list to be issued a COA. They were now authorized

to begin testing their Dragonflyer X4ES small UAS at its Northern Plains Unmanned Aircraft

Systems Test Site (FAA 2014).

As mentioned previously, US Army LTC Mendenhall recently completed a master’s

thesis on how the United States plans to integrate military UAVs into the NAS. In his thesis, he

takes the reader through a brief history of the UAV and how it has evolved through the past two

decades. He describes the different classes of UAVs and provides a short description of each. He

also discusses the various elements that make up the NAS, from airports and ATC towers to

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flight service stations (FSS) and the Air Traffic Control System Command Center. Being able to

determine the differences in FAA airspace classifications (see figure 2) is critical to

understanding the complexity and operational challenges of how the FAA controls various

airspace in terms of proximity to airfields and aircraft altitudes. UAVs primarily operate within

what is known as segregated airspace. Segregated airspace consists of three categories of special

use airspace: restricted, warning, and prohibited areas (FAA 2014).

A restricted area comprises airspace identified by an area above the surface of the earth

within which the flight of aircraft, while not wholly prohibited, is subject to restrictions.

Activities within these areas must be confined due to the nature of ground activities and

operations that the aircraft is either involved with or unaware of. To clarify, restricted areas

denote the existence of unusual and often invisible hazards to aircraft such as the firing of

artillery, aerial gunnery, or guided missile launches.

A warning area is airspace of defined dimensions, extending from three nautical miles

outward from the coast of the US, which contains activity that may be hazardous to

nonparticipating aircraft. The purpose of an area so designated is to warn nonparticipating pilots

of the potential danger.

A prohibited area contains airspace of defined dimensions identified by an area above the

surface of the earth in which the flight of aircraft is forbidden. Such areas are established for

security or other reasons associated with national security. These areas are published in the

Federal Register and are depicted on aeronautical charts (FAA 2014).

Additionally, within the NAS there are four other defined airspace types: controlled,

uncontrolled, special use, and other airspace. Uncontrolled airspace sees less traffic than

controlled airspace and therefore does not require the services of an air traffic control tower. The

19

only other airspace type relevant to this paper is controlled airspace. Controlled airspace is under

the control of the FAA. As such, ATC is essentially responsible for directing air traffic in the

controlled airspace, and carries the burden of preventing aerial collisions. Mendenhall, in his

thesis, broke out the different controlled airspace classifications and showed how each fits into

the NAS. Figure 2 displays the different classes of controlled and uncontrolled airspace within

which air traffic control service is provided.

Figure 2: Visual Chart of the FAA Airspace Classification

Source: (Mendenhall 2011)

In each class of airspace – A, B, C, D, and E – there are specific requirements that must

be adhered to before aircraft are allowed to enter or leave them. Where the volume of air traffic

is relatively low (class G airspace) the area is designated as uncontrolled and therefore does not

require the operator to check in with the FAA or ATC. FAA guidelines that normally only

pertain to DoD UAVs mandate that any UAVs operating at 18,000 feet above ground level

20

(AGL) must abide by the following: 1) the operator must file and submit a flight plan to operate

under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR); 2) he must obtain a clearance from Air Traffic Control

(ATC); 3) he must be equipped with an operational Mode C transponder; 4) he must operate with

navigation or collision avoidance lights; 5) he must maintain communications between the

operator and ATC.

Why Non-Regulation is a Problem

Other countries are facing some of the same issues that the United States is expected to

encounter with respect to non-regulated UAV use. For example, in South Africa in 2013, the

South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA), became the first such authority to allow

UAVs as a beer delivery vehicle6; but is now attempting to crack down on UAVs flying in civil

airspace (AFP RELAXNEWS 2013). According to Poppy Khoza, South Africa’s Director of

Civil Aviation,

…the SACAA has not given any concession or approval to any organization,

individual, institution or government entity to operate [UAVs] within the civil

aviation airspace. Those that are flying any type of unmanned aircraft are doing so

illegally; and as the regulator we cannot condone any form of blatant disregard of

applicable rules” (Commercial Aviation Association of South Africa 2014).

As a result, the SACAA may consider imposing regulations to cover UAVs flying in

civilian airspace. South African law on aviation is found in Section 72 of the Civil Aviation Act,

2009 (Act No. 13 of 2009) and specifically references the control and regulation of civil aviation

safety and security (Gazette 2009). The South African example demonstrates the difficulties that

6 In 2013, concertgoers in South Africa were able to order beer with their smartphones and have it delivered to their

GPS location. The UAV flew approximately 50 feet above the coordinates given before dropping the beverage -

attached to a parachute – to the customer down below (AFP RELAXNEWS 2013).

21

can arise when there is a regulatory vacuum concerning UAVs. This should serve as a reminder

to the United States of the importance of developing policies for aerial safety, particularly with

respect to UAVs.

Unregistered airborne objects that are not being tracked are unsafe. An object flying

freely and without any identifying features, while other UAVs or MAVs are sharing the same

airspace, is inherently dangerous. Combine this with the possibility of malicious state or non-

state actors obtaining access to UAVs, and the risk increases. A UAV could be used as a weapon

delivery platform, or the UAV itself could be weaponized. In a paper he wrote while attending

the Air War College at Maxwell AFB in Alabama, Lt Col Michael Dickey explored the

possibility of using UAVs as a weapon delivery platform for biological warfare (Dickey 2000).

In his paper, Dickey stated that, assuming favorable weather conditions, “a properly sized

aerosol dispersal system, an aircraft, cruise missile, or UAV could deliver BW weapons and

cause mass casualties in densely populated areas” (Dickey 2000, 12). He provides specific

examples involving anthrax, and describes how the agent could be dispersed over a large area to

cause multiple casualties. He further cites a 1993 Congressional Office of Technology

Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, which stated

100kg of an agent like anthrax, if sprayed over a 300 square kilometer area, could possibly cause

up to 3 million deaths, given a targeted population density of 3,000 to 10,000 people per square

kilometer (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment 1993).

Dickey goes on to write that, “Presuming a nation wanted to inflict major damage upon

the United States or U.S. forces and escape a retaliatory attack, they would need to find a way to

deliver the attack without leaving [any] evidence of from whence it came” (Dickey 2000, 24). He

considers UAVs ideal for this situation. He argues they could be launched from boats or

22

merchant ships lying just off the coast of the United States, and fly below radar to a preselected

target. A UAV could either be navigated manually onto a target, or a preprogramed flight route

with GPS coordinates could be followed. The worst case scenario would involve a tactic which

uses a swarm, or multiple UAVs, to attack a target autonomously. Peter Singer is the director of

the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy

program at the Brookings Institute. Singer published an article in 2009 about robots and military

doctrine in which he also referred to swarming (Singer 2009). He discusses swarming as a part of

military conflict and combat as far back as the time of the Parthians (the Parthian Empire existed

from about 200 BCE to 200 CE) and other armies of massed horsemen:

They would spread out over vast areas until they found the foe, and then encircle them,

usually wiping them out by firing huge numbers of arrows into the foe’s huddled army.

Similarly, the Germans organized their U-boats into “wolfpacks” during the Battle of the

Atlantic in World War II. Each submarine would individually scour the ocean for convoys of

merchant ships to attack. Once one U-boat found the convoy, all the others would converge

on the site, first pecking away at the defenses (Singer 2009). In fact, according to a RAND

study of historic battles dating back to Alexander the Great, whichever side engaged in

swarming tactics normally (61% of the time) won the battle (Ibid).

Dr. Timothy Chung, is an assistant professor of systems engineering and Director of

Research and Education for the Consortium for Robotics and Unmanned Systems Education and

Research (CRUSER) at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, CA. During his time

at NPS, he has worked on “defensive swarming” techniques which involve launching hundreds

of UAVs at one time in order to disrupt enemy systems. He has concluded that swarms could

potentially confuse an enemy radar defense system by overwhelming it with targets. With the

defender’s radar operators busy trying to figure out what was happening, each attacking UAV

would potentially be free to fly to and engage preprogrammed targets. The defenders’ radars may

23

even lack the capability to see such small objects flying that low to the ground and at slow

speeds.

George Jagels is an editor for Tactical Defense Media, and has written several articles on

military affairs, homeland security, and border protection. On September 26, 2013 he published

an article titled Securing the Skies: How Will the U.S. Military Fend Off Unmanned Systems? In

this article he points out three difficulties in pursuing the swarming option (Jagels 2013):

1. Logistics and Manning – In order to deploy and recover such a quantity of UAVs, new

logistic support and manpower requirements would be needed.

2. Command and Control – interfacing to a single UAV are currently not scalable to larger

swarms; new methods for interacting with multiple agents would be necessary.

3. Networking – While normal architecture requires that all assets communicate directly

with base stations, this would be inefficient for large swarms; new intra-swarm

networking would be necessary to allow updates to be sent back to headquarters (Jagels

2013).

Despite these difficulties, Iran provided a real world example of how swarming can be

extremely effective at confusing radar and defense systems. In 2013 the Whitehead Journal of

Diplomacy and International Relations published a report about a 2012 event in which Iranian

UAVs harassed the ground-based air defenses of the US Army and its regional allies through the

employment of swarms of UAVs. According to the report, Iran deployed a swarm of UAVs,

which by flying low and slow, largely evaded radar coverage7. (Gormley 2013).

A Hungarian research team demonstrated swarm technology using a group of 10

quadcopters. The quadcopters were able to communicate with each other and perform tasks

autonomously. The Hungarians claim this is the first truly “autonomous drone flock” using

7 “The aircraft, which appear to be of Chinese design or origin, are typically launched to exploit the operating

pattern of U.S. radars. They can fly beneath or around the limited coverage area of radars currently deployed in

neighboring states, and their flight characteristics make them difficult to classify. On at least one occasion, they

were mistaken for birds because of their slow speed and small radar cross section.” (Thompson 2012).

24

quadcopters. A similar demonstration was carried out in 2011 by researcher Dario Floreano at

the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Lausanne, but he used FW flyers (United Nations

University 2014). A simple Google search of “drone”, “swarm”, and “cooperate” provides an

excellent visual that can be seen on YouTube:

“https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UQzuL60V9ng” (Vallejo 2012) or TED.com

(http://www.ted.com/talks/vijay_kumar_robots_that_fly_and_cooperate) (TED 2012).

Most UAVs are capable of being jammed or “spoofed,” thus altering UAV performance and

making the UAV do what the operator running the interference wants it to do, rather than what

its original operator intended. Counterfeiting a false GPS signal and thus overpowering the

legitimate satellite GPS signal will cause a UAV’s instruments to misinterpret the vehicle’s

location – this has already proved to be an effective method of altering UAV flight as described

below. (McCarthy 2012)

Marc Goodman is the founder of the Future Crimes Institute, an advisor on global security

issues at Singularity University, and is their chairman for Policy, Law and Ethics. He claims that

all drones are vulnerable to hacking (Goodman 2013). “In a world where all things connected to

the Internet are hackable, so too are drones” (Goodman, Criminals and Terrorists Can Fly Drones

Too 2013).

In 2012, his claim received confirmation in an experiment carried out by Professor Todd

Humphreys and his students at the University of Texas in Austin. Humphreys and his team

demonstrated, at the US government’s request, how to hack into a DHS drone using GPS

spoofing (Cockrell School of Engineering 2012).

During a DHS test of one of their small UAV helicopters, conducted at White Sands Missile

Range, NM, researchers spoofed a UAV into believing that it was at an altitude different from

25

the actual one, causing it to dive toward earth. The demonstration was stopped just before the

UAV crashed, allowing it to successfully recover, but proved a point nonetheless. According to

the DHS researchers, this was an intermediate-level spoofing attack. They added that a more

sophisticated attack would be considerably more difficult and expensive to carry out. They

recommended that spoof-resistant navigation systems be required on UAVs exceeding 18 pounds

(Dillingham 2013).

GPS jamming is a very real threat to UAVs (Dillingham 2013).When the GPS signal being

transmitted is interrupted, and if the system was operating solely on that form of navigation, the

UAV could lose its ability to determine location, altitude, and the direction in which it was

traveling. The only UAVs currently fitted with redundant or multiple UAV navigation controls

are in use by DOD and DHS. According to Humphreys, when it comes to UAV hacking, "It is

not within the capability of the average person on the street, or even the average anonymous

hacker…” (McCarthy 2012). However, he went on to say that “. . . the emerging tools of

software-defined radio and the availability of GPS signal simulators are putting [spoofing] within

reach of ordinary malefactors" (Ibid).

Many commercial companies are eager to begin using UAVs, something the US Congress

has said they will be allowed to do by 2015 (FAA 2007). UAVs would then almost inevitably

become a common feature in US airspace. This could prove to be problematic if observers are

unable to positively identify what a UAV is doing, who it is working for, where it is going, and

when its job will be completed. Malicious actors could take advantage of this ambiguity and use

it to their advantage.

26

Who the UAV Policy Would Affect

There are three widely accepted types of UAV operators. Model airplane enthusiasts are

considered amateurs or hobbyists by the FAA, and are permitted to fly UAVs for entertainment,

sport, and recreation. Strictly speaking, civil UAV operators are those with industry or academic

ties who wish to pursue UAV research and development, testing, and operator training, or

undertake market research surveys in accordance with 14 CFR Part 21.191. (FAA 2014). A

public UAV operator is by definition governmental in nature (i.e., federal, state, or other local

agency). There remains, however, a third possible class of UAV operator: state or non-state

actors seeking to use UAVs as weapons both in the United States and around the world. It should

be noted that whatever category a UAV operator falls into, his vehicle, once airborne, could

potentially present a dangerous threat. Outside of the military, no countermeasures exist or are in

place to stop, shut down, or remove a threatening UAV from the sky. In the US, largely due to

the dedication and countless man-hours worked by intelligence and law enforcement, plans to

use UAVs maliciously have been identified and stopped before they could be carried out as

explained later in this chapter (Clayton 2011, FBI 2011, Gips 2002).

According to John Villasenor, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center for

Technology and Innovation, "There's been so much awareness of the way drones are changing

warfare that it's inevitable that terrorist groups are also keenly aware of drones' potential"

(Clayton 2011). Philip Finnegan, Teal Group's director of corporate analysis, has provided

strategic and market analysis for clients in commercial aerospace and defense, and has stated:

Inevitably this technology is going to spread and the US can't really stop that . . .

non-state actors will try to get control of it. There are threats, not just that someone would

get a drone on their own, but that they might take control of others' drones (Clayton

2011)

27

Dennis Gormley, a senior lecturer on international security and intelligence studies at the

University of Pittsburgh, has stated that "There's a growing realization that UAVs are spreading

globally, and that certain state and non-state actors might want to use them against us” (Ibid.).

Gormley then mentions an FBI sting operation8 in which plans to use UAVs as weapons were

located and stopped before any crime was committed.

In his book Target USA: The Inside Story of the New Terrorist War, Louis Mizell, a

former US intelligence officer and private security expert, uncovered 43 cases involving 14

terrorist groups in which remotely controlled delivery systems were "either threatened,

developed, or actually utilized" (Mizell 1998). In response to critics who downplay the threat of

UAVs being used as weapons, Mizell provided some examples of UAVs capable of carrying a

hefty payload. A Mississippi company, for example, markets Bergen remote-controlled (RC)

Helicopters over the internet. These small five-foot RC helicopters cost $4,000 each and capable

of carrying a 44-lb payload for 30 minutes without refueling. Mizell also mentions a Yamaha

Motor Company UAV helicopter advertising a 20-kg payload.

These types of UAVs are proliferated around the world and readily available to anybody

with the means to buy them. In 2001Yamaha sold well over 1,000 units of this model to

Japanese companies for crop-dusting purposes (Sato 2003). Of note, the relatively small payload

size does not provide assurance that such vehicles will not be used in terrorism. Mizell says that

heavy payloads are not always necessary and that terrorists could employ many UAVs with

8 “The FBI alleges that Rezwan Ferdaus, an Al Qaeda sympathizer, planned to buy, for $3,000, a 68-inch long,

1/10th-scale McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II. The plane, he allegedly told informants, could carry 10 to 12

pounds of plastic explosives at up to 160 miles per hour. It could come equipped with a GPS system to automatically

guide the plane, he allegedly said. He also planned to buy two F-86s, one of which he already possessed at the time

of his arrest, which have similar capabilities” (Clayton 2011).

28

small payloads dispersed over a larger distance to create an effect similar to one UAV carrying a

large payload covering a short distance (Mizell 1998).

Singer claims that terrorist groups have been obtaining or procuring UAVs for the

purpose of evaluating platform attack options and experimentation (P. Singer 2009). His claim

was supported in 2008 when two advanced US made UAVs were discovered in an Iraqi cache by

US soldiers. At four pounds, able to fly close to one hour up to 1000 feet at a cruise speed of

roughly 60 knots before requiring a refueling, the RQ-l IB Raven is the smallest operational

UAV used by the US military (US Army 2010). This trend has also been seen in other parts of

the world. In 2005 an Institute for Defense Analyses report mentioned that nine remotely

controlled, unmanned aircraft were discovered in Columbia when one of that country’s military

units overran a Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)9 rebel camp

(Terroristgroups.org 2013). Although merely having this technology stashed somewhere does not

guarantee that it will become weaponized, or is even capable of effective operation, the potential

still exists for it to become a true threat. This was seen in 2002 when model planes were

purchased in Europe and sent to Palestinian shopkeepers, ostensibly for recreational purposes10

.

In a turn of events, the planes wound up being converted into miniature aerial bombers with

explosive payloads (Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at MIPT

2005).This report, together with a handful of others listed by the Center for Arms Control,

9 The FARC is classified as a terrorist organization by the governments of Colombia, the United States, Canada,

Chile, New Zealand, and the European Union (Terroristgroups.org 2013).

10“In December 2002, Palestinian toy importers in Jerusalem and Ramallah were told to order hundreds of model

airplanes for distribution to Palestinian children in hospitals. Subsidies from European Union member-governments

could legitimately be allocated to this humanitarian purpose. The model airplanes were purchased in Europe and

shipped openly to Palestinian shopkeepers. The model planes were sent to Palestinian workshops for conversion into

miniature air bombers with explosive payloads. Tanzim militiamen from Arafat's Fatah, sent out to open areas near

Jericho to test the new weapons, discovered they could fly to a distance of 1 kilometer and an altitude of 300

meters” (Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at MIPT 2005).

29

Energy, and Environment Studies at MIPT, indicate that terrorists and other groups are aware of

and are exploring the use of this technology (Ibid). Historically, new technologies have at times

been deliberately converted from peaceful to deadly purposes. For example, cell phones and

other two-way communication devices have been used to detonate explosives along roadsides in

Iraq and Afghanistan; when the US military found ways to counter this tactic by jamming

frequencies, garage door IR safety triggers and outdoor lighting motion detectors began to be

used as backup triggers (Caldwell 2011, 2).With respect to UAV technology in US domestic

airspace, policies must be identified, implemented, and enforced to prevent conversion to deadly

use.

Legitimate, non-threatening hobbyist and recreational UAV operators in the USA are

found in parks and other open areas where they enjoy the freedom of flying their UAVs

unimpeded. Currently, operators of small UAVs are not required to comply with most of the

rules and regulations to which their manned-aircraft counterparts are held. In many cases manned

aircraft rules simply don’t apply. There are, for example, no cockpit doors to be locked or

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) transponders to turn on. At the present time no pilot’s

license is required. In fact, current FAA UAV guidelines require only that operators maintain

flight profiles below 400 feet, operate during daylight hours, avoid airports and/or densely

populated areas (FAA 1981).

Currently, civilian UAV operators are not required to register or identify their UAVs. Nor

are they required to disclose UAV launch locations or what they intend to use them for (FAA

1981). This may not constitute a problem when UAVs are operated away from populated, but

once an operator begins to fly his vehicle over a busy city, highway, or school playground, the

potential for harm arises. Needless to say, worst case scenarios resulting from failure to deal with

30

these issues can end in damage, injuries, or even loss of life. A set of regulations should be

developed and implemented to ensure that civilian UAV operations are safe, law-abiding, and

immune from terrorist exploitation.

CHAPTER 3

Discussion of Policy Options

Peter Singer, author of Wired for War, believes that the USA is currently ahead of other

powers in the area of robotics, but that its advantage will not last much longer (P. W. Singer

2009). The US has led the world in developing and producing UAVs, and currently has an

advantage in autonomous (or GPS) guidance technology. Singer makes a comparison with the

tank: although the British and French invented it, it was the Germans who perfected its use.

Regarding UAVs, the terrorist group Hezbollah found ways to use them to successfully engage

and attack their Israeli enemies. Israel, too, found UAVs useful as early as the 1980s. In 1982 the

Israelis used UAVs to gather radar data in the Beqaa Valley by having UAVs swarm over the

border to attract Syrian radar and missiles. When Syrian air defense radars were left on, their

location was highlighted and subsequently attacked by follow-on strike aircraft (Singer 2013).

Another example of this type of technological adaptation occurred during Operation Iraqi

Freedom (2003). Though in a slightly different context, militants were able to link up certain

websites to IEDs which people could log onto and then personally detonate them (Ibid).

Marc Goodman agrees with Singer and believes that rapidly advancing technology is

opening up an entirely new era of potential UAV crime (Goodman 2013). Advanced technology

(such as UAVs) was once restricted to elite military forces for logistical reasons and, most

31

importantly, because of the high research and development costs. Today many of the benefits

offered by UAV technology can be reaped at low cost; what once cost millions is now available

for thousands of dollars or even less. As a result criminals and terrorists can adopt and reap gains

from now relatively cheap and accessible modern technology. For example, in Mexico criminals

have found a way to build and create their own secure cell towers and networks. “We have to

both understand and appreciate the fact that criminals and terrorists are often early adopters of

technology, and the latest global trends in robotics have not been lost on them.” (Goodman

2013). Goodman talks about arming UAVs with weapons ranging from paintball guns to .45

caliber handguns. While these adaptations would undoubtedly be rather inaccurate, their

psychological effect might be enough to consider the mere launching of the mission a success, at

least from the point of view of the attackers. A UAV needn’t expend any rounds to elicit a major

public response. Merely being in close proximity to a hovering UAV with a mounted weapon

could be terrorizing enough by itself. Arming an aircraft with an explosive device and

programming it to crash into an office building (or a crowd of people) is by definition a lethal

weapon. In fact, this type of attack has - on more than one occasion - been attempted by

terrorists. In 2011, the FBI thwarted a plan by al Qaeda operatives to attack the US Capitol and

Pentagon with UAVs (FBI 2011). In 2009, Tamil Tiger rebels packed two light weight aircraft

with explosives and flew them towards Colombo in Sri Lanka. In this case, the aircraft were

successfully shot down by military forces before they were able to execute a kamikaze-style

attack on the capital (Economist 2014).

With technologically advanced UAVs coming to the United States, the potential for their

malicious use is causing increasing concern. UAV countermeasures are being developed by

private companies, academic organizations, and the US military (Lee, Annual ‘Black Dart’

32

exercise tests UAV countermeasures 2013). This type of research is very important to the US

because of the increased proliferation and availability of UAV systems. In 2005 the Institute for

Defense Analysis published a report titled Terrorist Use of Improvised or Commercially

Available Precision-Guided UAVs at Stand-Off Ranges: An Approach for Formulating

Mitigation Considerations. This report makes the point that even if a UAV is located while in

flight, it would be difficult to prevent it from continuing on its mission. Shooting it down would

be difficult, absent a robust local missile defense capability or, alternatively, the ability to jam its

guidance system. The IDA report does not discuss the implications of shooting a projectile at a

UAV (i.e., the possible damage that could be caused when one or both objects fell to earth). Nor

does it mention certain technologies already developed to accomplish the very task of engaging

or shooting small projectiles out of the sky. Additionally, GPS jamming would be effective only

if the UAV is GPS guided (McCarthy 2012). To ensure the UAV is prevented from receiving

navigation commands, the frequency sending the commands would also need to be jammed. The

report discusses how Hezbollah’s increasing proficiency in UAV operations has resulted in

several occasions on which they have flown their UAVs over Israel. After one of these overflight

operations (which occurred on November 7, 2004), the Center for Arms Control, Energy and

Environment Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology reported11

that UAVs

had become a very attractive option for terrorists, perhaps even more than the traditional suicide

belt (Mandelbaum and Ralston 2005).

11

Eugene Miasnikov, Threat of Terrorism Using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Technical Aspects, Center for

Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at MIPT, Dolgoprudny, June 2004, 26 pages. Translated into

English - March 2005. PDF file (0.54 Mb)

33

Based on the facts presented thus far in this paper, the following should be addressed

before framing a policy proposal: 1) UAV equipment and how it is constructed and

manufactured before it leaves the factory; 2) UAV operators and how to determine whether or

not they possess the necessary qualifications to operate these vehicles; 3) UAV enforcement,

including who will be in charge of patrolling the sky for UAVs that are operating in violation of

the law.

UAV Equipment

1. UAVs should be required to have serial numbers engraved into critical parts before

leaving the factory (control arms, motors, processors, GPS receivers). This would follow

the same guidelines as other aircraft, automobiles, farm equipment, etc., Serial number

tracking would aid in assessing faulty parts to determine an accident if the operator were

to blame versus a mechanical failure. Additionally, it would assist in crime fighting

during forensics testing as a result of any criminal investigation. Detectives would use

this data to identify the persons or companies who purchased the equipment, as well as

narrow down when the equipment was purchased and where it was delivered.

34

2. All UAVs should be installed with a NextGen

transponders and trackers. These kits are now

available through Sagetech Corporation and use

ADS-B location broadcasts interfaced with iPads

(Unmanned Systems Technology 2014). The kit

includes Sagetech’s new XPG-TR micro transponder,

Clarity ADS-B receiver, and an iPad with zero

interface connections, all of which can be fully

installed and made operational within minutes. The transponders should automatically

activate once the UAV is airborne. This type of product would increase the safety of

UAV operations by allowing ATC, nearby aircraft, and third party personnel to track

UAVs with standard commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment.

3. UAVs should be required to come with a standard sense and avoid (SAA) suite installed

at the factory. As with many other technological innovations, the US military is heading

up this project and expects to complete development on UAV sense-and-avoid systems

by FY 201712

(Malenic 2014). Giving the UAV this self-awareness feature combined

with the ability to maneuver and thus avoid striking another airborne device or ground

12

The DOD has divided its SAA activities into GBSAA and ABSAA (airborne sense-and-avoid). The US Army is

leading the GBSAA effort, while the US Air Force (USAF) is overseeing development of a common ABSAA, with

the US Navy (USN) contributing heavily to the latter. The US Marine Corps (USMC) currently has a DOD-

approved ground-based sense-and-avoid (GBSAA) system operating at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point,

North Carolina, according to the "Report to Congress on the progress of research aimed at integrating unmanned

aircraft into national air space", dated December 2013 and signed by Pentagon acquisition chief Frank Kendall. "A

fully developed common GBSAA capability is scheduled to be in use in fiscal year 2014-2015 [FY 2014-15] when

the army certifies and fields a system at five Gray Eagle operating locations", said the report. According to the

report, development of a common ABSAA is to be completed by mid-FY 2016, and "the navy is committed to

developing an ABSAA for [Triton] by…FY 2017", its scheduled deployment date (Malenic 2014).

Picture 2: Sagetech Corporation

identification transponders

35

object is already underway, and is covered later in this paper. This requirement would

help reduce collisions in the air and on the ground. Those hobbyists who chose to build

their own UAV would be required to include and install this hardware and software prior

to any flight time. As of the date of this paper, no suitable technology had been approved

enabling UAVs to autonomously sense and avoid other airborne obstacles in compliance

with all current FAA regulatory requirements. The US Army has been working on a

ground based system to satisfy this requirement (SRC 2014). Other airborne, automatic

dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) technologies have also been tested by NASA

researchers at the Dryden Flight Research Center, but these technologies have yet to be

approved for public release (Dillingham 2013).

4. UAVs should be required to install software that would prevent them from crashing in the

event of a lost link. Lost links can occur for a variety of reasons. For example, temporary

loss of a satellite downlink for GPS guided UAVs can occur when the line-of-sight

between operator and target is temporarily obstructed by a manmade or geological

feature. Some UAVs are pre-programed with GPS coordinates, while others are given

command and control signals. A situation could arise in which a UAV is no longer able

to receive commands or a usable GPS signal, thus making it impossible for the vehicle to

maneuver to a safe area or altitude, hover, or receive new instructions (Dillingham 2013,

Mendenhall 2011).

5. UAVs should be granted a larger dedicated portion of the radio-frequency spectrum to

ensure that sufficiently secure and continuous communications are available to the UAV

operators. In the GAO report on Dr. Gerald Dillingham’s testimony to Congress dated

February 15, 2013, it was stated that many UAVs are controlled by specific radio

36

frequencies that have traditionally been assigned for this type of work. Additional radio

frequencies have been obtained to enable the increased operation of UAVs, and efforts

are underway to secure an even wider spectrum. The next hurdle, according to

Dillingham, will be obtaining dedicated satellite links to ensure secure and continuous

communications for both large and small UAV operations. Leaving unsecured/

unprotected/undedicated spectrum frequencies increases the chance that a UAV pilot

could lose command and control of the vehicle. This could be unintentional, or caused by

outside interference – by terrorists, for example. (Ibid).

6. UAVs used for commercial purposes should be required to have insurance against bodily

injury and property damage before becoming operational.

UAV Operators

1. UAV operators should be held to similar if not the same standards required of MAV

pilots. For example, they should be required to file a detailed flight plan with the FAA

prior to departure. The form for operators could be almost identical to the one currently

used by MAV pilots (FAA Form 7233-1), and include much of the same information

(FAA 2014). UAV operators would not be allowed to take off until they have received

FAA approval.

2. Other UAV operator responsibilities should include a requirement to enroll in and

graduate from a UAV operator instructional class prior to employment with a commercial

business seeking to conduct UAV operations. The operator would only be considered

capable of safe UAV airborne operations after obtaining a license to operate UAVs in the

NAS.

37

UAV Enforcement

Goodman does not think the FAA can be the sole or final authority on this technology, as

he feels it is already too busy with its current aviation responsibilities and challenges. He points

to a 2012 GAO audit that found that “no federal agency has been statutorily designated with

specific responsibility to regulate privacy matters relating to Unmanned Aerial Systems within

the entire federal government”. If no agency has not be named to deal with a far more publicized

issue like privacy, then it is highly unlikely that one has been designated for enforcement. But,

he says, UAV utilization and testing by law enforcement and academic institutions is occurring

more and more, with states like Texas, Florida, Washington, and Mississippi all authorized by

the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to fly small UAVs in federal airspace.

One key missing feature is whether or not a means of detection exists. Many current Air

Traffic Control (ATC) and United States military Early Warning (EW) radar receivers cannot

detect an ultralight aircraft crossing from Mexico into the United States along the southern

border (Jagels 2013). Dr. Timothy Chung, Assistant Professor of Systems Engineering and

Director of Research and Education for the Consortium for Robotics and Unmanned Systems

Education and Research (CRUSER) at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey,

California, has stated that the small UAV threat is related to the these becoming cheaper and

more widely available, and as a result of the expansion of UAV technologies through military,

commercial, and consumer use. Problems now lie in the ability to detect and identify smaller and

slower UAVs flying as lower altitudes (Jagels 2013). Both the US government and the private

sector are well aware of this and have been working to develop radars to solve this problem.

38

More on these radars (their capabilities and where they fall short), will be covered in later

sections.

A UAV detected on radar but not registered as having filed any documentation with the

FAA should be flagged and investigated. If it does not have a working transmitter, did not

coordinate with the FAA prior to launch, and/or is operating inside restricted airspace, it should

be considered malicious until proven otherwise. Once a UAV has been identified as malicious, or

potentially so, the proper authorities would be directed to respond to its location. Ideally, the

authorities would have radar either installed on their vehicle, or they would have access to the

same real-time FAA UAV feed. An unregistered UAV could be removed from the sky using

electronic means, to include hacking the controls (covered below). If the operator were found

guilty of breaking the law (assuming the operator was known or later discovered), a range of

penalties could be imposed, including suspending their operator’s license (as with drivers of

automobiles who fail to obey vehicular laws).

Preventing damage to important buildings, structures, or areas could involve installing

counter-UAV equipment in the vicinity of these high value locations. These areas could include,

but not limited to: airports, government office buildings, power stations, and prisons.

Additionally, there could be several ways in which to counter and engage potentially dangerous

UAVs, either kinetically or non-kinetically. Kinetic engagements might include launching

projectiles at or somehow ‘netting’ the UAV. Non-kinetic means would include jamming,

hacking, or otherwise taking over the UAV’s control systems (Jagels 2013). One concept for

removing UAVs from the sky kinetically has already been tested and is described in press reports

as RAP-CAP: a gun-launched projectile using an infrared proximity sensor to burst out foam and

netting around the UAV. In doing so, a conductive carbon would disable the electronics and

39

communications suite (Grant 2012). More lethal means have also been explored. Several

countries including the USA have access to a type of radar called an AN/MPQ-64A1 Sentinel,

which is able to detect, acquire, classify and – if the situation warrants – direct nearby weapons

systems against more than 50 malicious unmanned aircraft simultaneously (Judson 2012). Other

kinetic options include fast-firing solid-state laser weapons like Boeing’s Laser Avenger, which

successfully shot down a UAV in 2009 (Grant 2012). The US Navy utilized this close-in weapon

system with a modified 32-kilowatt power laser to successfully bring down four UAVs in a 2010

exercise (Ibid). It has even been reported that the US Navy has plans to deploy this system to the

Persian Gulf sometime in 2014 (Jagels 2013). While the methods described above appear

effective, there is an obvious problem in employing them over domestic territory; if UAVs are

engaged and destroyed while airborne, they may damage property, as well as injure or kill people

below when they crash-land.

Over the past few years, big companies such as SRC and Raytheon have developed and

tested various static UAV countermeasure systems, including the Vigilant Falcon (VF) and

Vigilant Eagle (VE). VF is a low-cost, lightweight mobile system comprised of high tech radar

with the means to employ electronic countermeasures. Whereas many large ATC radars have

difficulty locating and identifying small aerial systems – such as ultra-light aircraft and UAVs –

the VF radar has proven capable. VF is designed to counter small UAVs by analyzing their

signatures and kinematics for classification and identification. According to Tom Wilson, Vice

President for Product Accounts at SRC, once a UAV is positively identified, the system is

designed to track and disable its operating system (Jagels 2013).

One way in which the military has tested UAV countermeasures is through an annual,

week-long joint exercise called “Black Dart” (Lee 2013). Black Dart (BD) first started in 2010

40

and has only been held at two different locations – China Lake, CA in 2010, and the rest in Point

Mugu, CA in 2011, 2012 and 2013 The exercise attempts to assess counter-UAV systems across

various military air and missile defense kill chains by using some of the newest technology

available, some of which remains classified. Throughout the exercise, ground operators and

commanders concentrate on detecting, tracking, identifying, and sometimes engaging UAVs.

Current Policy and Law

The research design section of chapter 1 mentioned that there are existing aviation

documents and policy memorandums released by the US Congress, the DOT, and the FAA. The

documents below are the same documents the FAA refers to when they try to enforce laws and

forbids public or civil UAV operations without an approved COA. This section compares how

the documents read, to how an attorney, Peter Sachs, interprets those documents. Sachs studied

public interest law and graduated from the University of Bridgeport (Quinnipiac University

School of Law) in Hamden, Connecticut (Sachs 2013). He is well versed in aviation law and the

shortcomings of current UAV regulation. In addition, he is a licensed helicopter pilot who agrees

completely with the necessity to regulate UAVs in domestic airspace. Sachs has been engaged in

ongoing disputes with the FAA for more than two years now. Forbes Magazine, a well-known

business publication, weighed in on this dispute in early March, 2014, when it published an

article, “Listen Up Drone Operators: FAA Has 7 Myths To Bust” (Goglia 2014). This initial

story appeared to support the FAA’s position on small UAV enforcement authority. It also

appeared that the article was an attempt by the FAA to prevent - or stop - public and private

organizations from using small UAVs without first gaining proper FAA approval (Ibid).

However, this article backfired on the FAA. Sachs commented at the bottom of the article and

41

defended his statements with concrete evidence spelled out by the FAA’s own publications; as

described below. The editors at Forbes Magazine were apparently convinced by Sachs’

arguments, since every follow-up article pertaining to the FAA and UAVs in the weeks since has

supported Sachs’ claims and arguments. Several articles have highlighted the lack of enforceable

UAV guidelines, and even criticized the FAA directly for attempting to insinuate

otherwise13

,14

,15

,16

. Forbes has also provided a link to Sachs’ internet page for reference

purposes.

This section describes current federal statues, regulations, and case law surrounding

general aviation and supports the claim that no laws currently exist to regulate UAV use. Sachs

believes that “The federal government has no authority whatsoever to regulate the operation of

remote-controlled model aircraft [RCMA].” (Sachs 2013). Regulations do not have the force of

law. On his website Sachs discusses current laws and regulations, his interpretation of them, and

his opinion as to whether they actually apply to aviation (the body of law in question includes

federal case law). He further states that if those guidelines do not appear in the aforementioned

body of laws, they self-evidently cannot be law and therefore do not need to be followed (Ibid).

In regard to the United States Code, Subtitle VII, he states:

13

It's Time to Halt The FAA's Arbitrary and Expanding Domestic "Drone" Ban. Sean Lawson. 4/08/2014.

http://www.forbes.com/sites/seanlawson/2014/04/08/its-time-to-halt-the-faas-arbitrary-and-expanding-domestic-

drone-ban/ accessed 23 April 2014

14 Drone Wars (Of The Legal Variety). Kashmir Hill. 3/17/2014.

http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/03/17/drone-wars-of-the-legal-kind/ accessed 23 April 2014

15 Next Moves in the Battle Over Domestic Drones. Sean Lawson. 4/22/2014.

http://www.forbes.com/sites/seanlawson/2014/04/22/next-moves-in-the-battle-over-domestic-drones/ accessed 23

April 2014

16 Drones: 1, FAA: 0. Ryan Calo. 3/07/2014. http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryancalo/2014/03/07/drones-1-faa-0/

accessed 23 April 2014

42

Federal statutory law is enacted by Congress and found in the United States

Code. The federal statutes that govern aviation are found in Title 49 USC Sec.

44101, et seq., and have the force of law. Current federal aviation statutes find

their roots in the Federal Aviation Act in 1958, as revised. The Act basically

provides the big picture with regard to aviation. Most importantly, it established

the FAA, and granted it power to oversee and regulate matters relating to the

safety and use of American airspace though the promulgation of regulations. As

such, although the US Code addresses aviation law in broad terms, the details of

aviation laws are actually found in the FAA regulations (Sachs 2013).

According to Sachs, this definition only appears to be straightforward and indisputable. In fact,

the statute only mentions “unmanned aircraft” once and only in reference to integration goals

(Sachs 2013). The next statutory area Sachs considers is the Federal Aviation Regulations, about

which he states:

Federal regulations are promulgated by the FAA and found in the Code of

Federal Regulations. The federal regulations that pertain to aviation, (the

“FARs”), are found in 14 CFR 1.1, et seq., and have the force of law. There is

nothing in the FARs that concerns RCMA. The FAA cannot just make

up regulations as it goes along, to enforce activities that it simply wishes to

enforce. There must exist an actual statute or regulation for the FAA to

enforce. The FARs are the only federal regulations that exist pertaining

to aviation, and are the only regulations that are legally

enforceable. You’ll not find any that concern RCMA. You will see regulations

that apply to other craft, such as balloons, rockets and even kites. So the FAA

clearly contemplated flight-capable craft other than airplanes and helicopters

when it adopted the current regulations. If the FAA had intended to regulate

RCMA as well, it would have done so. It didn’t.

Once again, Sachs is pointing out potential gaps in the FAA regulations that were not addressed

when they became law. His last point concerns federal case law, that is, the body of past court

decisions regarding FAA enforcement actions. Cases are heard by a National Transportation

Safety Board (NTSB) administrative judge, and then may go on appeal to an appellate court.

Recently, NTSB judge Patrick Geraghty dismissed a case against one Raphael Pirker, who had

been fined $10,000 by the FAA for using a UAV to shoot a promotional video over the

43

University of Virginia. Additionally, in this case the judge threw out the federal ban on

commercial drone use saying "There was no enforceable FAA rule" concerning Mr. Pirker's

aircraft. He said that the government's claim that laws had been broken due to the FAA having

authority over anything that moves through the air would include "a paper aircraft, or a toy balsa

wood glider" (Feith 2014).

Another recent event, which occurred in Texas, has the potential to cause significant

controversy. On April 21, 2014 a Texas non-profit search-and-rescue organization, Texas

EquuSearch, announced that it was filing a lawsuit against the FAA for the cease-and-desist

order the latter had issued on March 17, 2014 (NICAS 2014). In its lawsuit, Texas EquuSearch

argues that UAVs used for humanitarian purposes fall outside the current ban on businesses

using them (NICAS 2014).

The next point Sachs shifts focus to is what he calls “non-law” or “non-enforceable law”,

which he states might sound or appear to be law, bur really is not law at all. Many interested

parties, including the FAA, refer to most of the FAA publications considered in this section as

regulations prohibiting commercial use of RCMA. Sachs claims this is far from true, rather, he

believes none of them carries any weight; therefore, “none are legally enforceable” (Sachs 2013).

Another publication commonly referred to is Advisory Circular 91-57, published in 1981, and

titled “Model Aircraft Operating Standards” (FAA 1981). This document clearly states that

adherence is purely voluntary and, again, therefore cannot be enforced. Sachs describes it as

“merely a list of common sense suggestions, and is not legally enforceable.” This became

evident in the Pirker case previously discussed” (Sachs 2013).

In 2007 the FAA issued an updated document intended to clarify its policy concerning

unmanned aircraft operations in the NAS. Sachs claims that although this update does state that

44

remote controlled model aircraft may not be used commercially, it is only an Agency policy

statement, and therefore not legally enforceable (Ibid). Upon further investigation, it spells out

guidance for public use of unmanned aircraft by defining a process for evaluating applications

for Certificate(s) of Waiver or Authorization (COA’s), but not private or civilian RCMA.

The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 is law, but once again, Sachs found a

loophole is this document. He states:

. . . specifically Title III, Subtitle B is an Act of Congress and is a law, but it’s one

that is simply a list of directives to the FAA. In and of itself it does not compel

any person (other than those employed by the FAA whose duties include the

promulgation of regulations) to do or not do anything. The Act contains a number

of directives to the FAA to develop regulations concerning the integration of

unmanned aircraft into the national airspace system. By definition, Congress

having directed the FAA to develop regulations means none currently exist.

Moreover, these directives apply to the FAA only, not the general public. They

are not themselves regulations, and are not legally enforceable.

The next publication could cause confusion, as both sides have a compelling argument

regarding the wording. The Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Operational Approval is the

definitive guide to the COA process. Sachs points out the top of the document where it states it

is merely a statement of “National Policy”, and again states that a policy statement is not legally

enforceable. He even goes one step further and highlights paragraph five that reads ít ís “not

meant as a substitute for any regulatory process” (FAA, 2013). However, reading further into

the document, paragraph eight reads:

…the applicability and process to be used in UAS operational approval are

dependent on whether the proposed UAS operation within the territorial airspace

of the United States (the airspace above the contiguous United States, Alaska,

Hawaii, U.S. territories, and U.S. territorial waters) is defined as public or civil

(refer to 14 CFR part 1, § 1.1 and Public Law 110-181, “The National Defense

Authorization Act of 2008”) (FAA, 2013).

45

The US DOT Unmanned Aircraft Systems Comprehensive Plan, published in September,

2013, is described by Sachs as a five year roadmap. The document itself describes itself as a list

of goals and objectives to be revised annually to successfully further the FAA Modernization and

Reform Act of 2012 plan to integrate UAVs into the NAS. Once again, not law, and

unenforceable.

The final document mentioned by Sachs pertains to the COA mentioned earlier. While

the FAA maintains that COAs are authorizations issued by the Air Traffic Organization to a

public operator for a specific UA activity, Sachs says the following:

Most people think that obtaining a “certificate of waiver or authorization”

(“COA”) is required to fly a drone. That’s what the FAA has been claiming for

years. However, it’s not required at all. In fact, with respect to public aircraft,

(government operated aircraft, such as those operated by police and fire

departments), the FAA is not even permitted to regulate Airworthiness or pilot

qualifications. The FAA can only regulate public aircraft insofar as they interact

with all other aircraft, whether civil and public. In other words, the FAA can only

legally regulate that public aircraft to the extent that they comply with Part 91

regulations17

17

While USC 49 § 44711 states, “[a] person may not— (1) operate a civil aircraft in air

commerce without an airworthiness certificate in effect…” and “(2) serve in any capacity as an

airman with respect to a civil aircraft,” the same is not true for public aircraft. The FAA cannot

require operators of public aircraft to have airworthiness certificates or be operated by certified

airmen. And as absurd as it might sound, a police department helicopter need not be airworthy,

and it may be flown by a non-pilot (Sachs 2013).

46

Policy Option

Ensuring the safety of US airspace and assisting in the protection of US national security

have much in common. Controlling airspace is perhaps the biggest challenge ahead, based on

the introduction of a new technology potentially operating in and crowding the airspace. To

accomplish this task, anyone who wishes to purchase a UAV should be required to complete an

FAA designed beginner’s course on airspace and aerial safety. This course would educate UAV

owners on different types of airspace, areas of operation restricted by UAVs, and UAV basic

care and maintenance. The operator would be required to present a graduation certification

before launching a UAV of any type, for any company, for any reason. Once graduated, the

operator would be entered into a national database to track the UAV they purchased and what

their motivations were for the purchase (recreation, sport, research, commercial employment,

etc). Once signed into law, a person found possessing or operating a UAV without certification

would be considered in violation of the policy and potentially subject to a penalty or fines.

Additionally, all UAVs manufactured in the United States or shipped into the United

States from other countries should be required to meet specific engineering standards. No-fly

zone software, sense and avoid technology, lost-link/return-to-base, and installed location

transmitters – would constitute minimum standards for UAVs. Any person found in possession

of a UAV who is unable to demonstrate these features in full operation could be grounded and

considered in violation of policy, subject to penalty and fines.

47

CHAPTER 4

Evaluation of Policy Options

In trying to evaluate how best to regulate UAV operators, several question arise. First, do we

put an age limit on UAV operators? If so, what should it be? In the US, teenagers begin driving

a motor vehicle as early as age 16 (15 with a learner’s permit). If we put regulations on motor

vehicles for safety reasons, shouldn’t we mirror that policy for UAVs? The next logical step is

for the US government to clearly define limitations and boundaries and turn it into law. If one is

unable to purchase a UAV until after they completed their class, they would be limited to

teaching themselves standards of UAV maintenance via books, user manuals, or online

resources. However, it would seem to make more sense for operators to order and practice their

own UAV during the training course. On the other hand, that could result in people failing to

show up for instruction, thinking perhaps that they would be able to figure out operational

maintenance on their own (through reading, online instruction, etc.) As shown above, variables

and exceptions must be considered in order to strike an acceptable balance of operator age limits,

mandated safety classes, and UAV maintenance standards to ensure equipment stays airworthy.

With manufacturing regulations in place, companies will begin building UAVs with most

of the minimum standard features; although usually these parts are purchased by a manufacturer

from another company who turns out to be the lowest bidder and at the lowest possible cost.

This can possibly result in a lower quality piece of equipment being built. Nonetheless, UAV

manufacturing companies selling their products to US consumers should include standard safety

features (similar to automobiles) if they plan to stay competitive in the markets. If a transmitter

suddenly quit working while the UAV was in flight and an air enforcement officer were to

48

identify that failure before the vehicle were able to land, should that be grounds for a penalty or

fine, or simply a citation followed by a friendly reminder to get that transmitter fixed? As with

traffic violations, law enforcement officers could use discretion in assessing penalties. On the

other hand, some may argue for more objective standards of enforcement.

Enforcement Options

UAV law enforcement technology has already become globalized. Countries such as

South Africa, Kenya, Italy, and Australia have taken steps to integrate UAVs into civilian law

enforcement, though not in the same way as advocated in this paper (Goodman 2013). Law

enforcement entities in these countries use UAVs to hunt down criminals and terrorists, not to

actively monitor or defend against terrorists using UAVs as weapons. This type of domestic use

is outside the scope of this paper, and will not be discussed in detail, as many US citizens believe

US law enforcement’s use of UAVs in tracking US citizens will (and has already) meet with

harsh criticism. While this tactic could also prove useful, the US also needs to concentrate on the

employment of UAVs in an aerial monitoring or patrolling mode. Hacker and entrepreneur Samy

Kamkar may have a feasible suggestion as to how to integrate UAVs into securing the airspace

in a non-kinetic way. In late 2013, he made headlines by introducing the world to his SkyJack

UAV. Essentially, he uses a quadcopter that is equipped to hijack other nearby airborne

quadcopters by autonomously hacking into their navigation control center (UAVs hacking

UAVs). On his website, Kamkar explains the process in detail:

I developed a drone that flies around, seeks the wireless signal of any other drone

in the area, forcefully disconnects the wireless connection of the true owner of the

target drone, then authenticates with the target drone pretending to be its owner,

then feeds commands to it and all other possessed zombie drones navigate at my

will (Kamkar 2013).

49

This tactic could prove a double-edged sword if it were to fall into the wrong hands. For

this reason, it is important for the designated air enforcement agency to begin researching ways

to improve upon technology first, and with government funding, develop countermeasures.

Insurance

According to Poms & Associates Insurance Brokers, Inc., risk modeling for a UAV

terrorist attack has not yet been done. While it proved impossible to locate any risk modeling on

potential terrorist UAV events, there were companies willing to insure UAVs against negligent

operations. However, the coverage offered by the companies, outlined in the paragraph below,

would not be sufficient to cover a mass casualty attack in which many people required medical

care. On the other hand, having this type of insurance may be enough to cover any potential

damages resulting from a UAV malfunction or accidental impact on a more limited scale.

UAV operators have the option of purchasing insurance to cover damages in the event

that something goes wrong with their UAV. There are several types of aviation insurance

available, but this paper will only address UAV types. For instance, the types of UAVs discussed

in this thesis are not capable of transporting people (yet), so there is no need for passenger

liability insurance – which is often sold on a “per-seat” basis with a specified limit for each

passenger. Instead, this paper will focus on public liability insurance (also referred to as third

party liability insurance) This type of insurance is concerned with what might happen if the

airframe collided with houses, cars, crop fields, airport facilities or other aircraft (The Canadian

Owners & Pilots Association 2011). Companies offering to insure UAVs only cover liability,

which includes bodily injury to a person (as well as objects) on the ground (T. Miller 2013). An

online search found an insurance company called Transportrisk.com offering up to $100,000,000

50

in coverage for negligent operation of both owned and leased UAVs. This coverage was offered

to private parties as well as government and public organizations, and covers damage to or a

complete loss of the UAV (Miller 2013).Terry Miller, president and founder of Transport Risk

Management, services customers in all aspects of aviation, including UAVs. He has stated that

normally several factors are considered and run against a model when trying to quote a rate for a

customer (Ibid). UAVs have proven to be challenging in this area. Miller points out that, “There

is no useable actuarial data [for UAVs] because the market is too small” (Miller 2013). In

comparison, most policy requirements for manned aircraft typically depend on a myriad of

factors, including: accident data, area of operation, airworthiness, and certification of the

individuals involved. Additionally, in order to stay current with coverage, these aircraft must

take off and land at least three times in 90 days. Finally, pilots are required to undergo simulator-

based training every 6-12 months.

It is notable that there are other companies whose websites offer much lower coverage

options. Aviationi.com, for example, also offers UAV coverage, albeit only up to $1,000,000,

and it does not cover damage to the UAV itself. Aviationi does cover UAVs employed for both

pleasure and business (Costello 2014). Back to Transport Risk Management, Miller points out

that, just with most services, while there is no federal requirement for aviation insurance, many

people tend to manage personal risks by hiring insured companies. Aviators, however, are an

exception and must meet requirements concerning both airworthiness and pilot training.

Because UAVs are relatively new to the insurance world, Miller had to create his own

requirements nearly two years ago when he began offering UAV policies. One requirement, for

example, requires UAV operators without a valid FAA pilot certificate to complete an FAA

private pilot ground school course, in order to learn the rules of operating in the NAS. This is

51

done specifically to ensure that UAV operators know how other airborne vehicles (manned or

otherwise) will react in certain situations.

Serial Number and Tracking

While there is no universally accepted definition for “airworthiness,” the FAA Interim

Operational Approval Guidance 08-01 defines it as follows:

“Both the aircraft and all of the other associated support equipment of the UAS

must be in a condition for safe operation. If any element of the systems is not in

condition for safe operation, then the UA would not be considered airworthy”

(Federal Aviation Administration 2008).

Miller explains that airworthiness relies heavily on accurate inspection and maintenance

records. Nearly every component of an airframe has a serial number attached to it. These serial

numbers are critical when it comes to swapping out parts that are nearing the end of their

lifespan (T. Miller 2013). According to Miller, if the UAV lacks a serial number on a part, he

simply gives it one (Ibid). This data is essential when analyzing claims and checking

airworthiness of UAVs. Miller uses a company called Robotic Skies to “summariz[e] the service

network’s aviation-compliant inspection, maintenance, and record-keeping capabilities”

(Spangler 2014). To date, Miller has had no drone claims for liability, bodily injury, or third-

party property damage, which he attributes to the required pre-insurance ground school

certificate requirement. Although Miller currently does not make any profit on those he does

insure, he foresees a bright future for the business of insuring UAVs (Miller 2013).

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No-Fly Areas

One leading seller of UAVs, Dronefly.com, advertises on their website two unique safety

features contained on one of their newest UAVs, the Phantom 2. In order to increase flight safety

and prevent UAV pilots of wandering into restricted airspace, the software for this particular

model comes with a No-Fly Zone feature. Zones are divided into two categories, A and B, which

correlate to International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Category Bravo airports and

airspace The flight limitation system works by downloading a global GPS database containing a

list of airports, as well as other restricted areas, and their locations, so they are already installed

when delivered to the customer. (DJI 2014) Category A airports include large international

airports such as Heathrow, O’hare, and Miami and have a five mile (8km) safety zones

established from the center of the airport. If the UAV is within 1.5miles of the center point of

the airport (inside the zone safety buffer), and it has a clear line-of-sight for GPS locating, it will

be unable to take off. If already airborne, and the GPS signal for some reason was not acquired

previously but all of a sudden found a good signal, the UAV will land immediately. An elevation

restriction has also been put into the software. At 1.5 miles to 5 miles from the airport center-

point, the UAV will not be able to take off. This feature only allows a 35 foot ceiling at 1.5miles,

which increases to 400 foot at 5miles distance. The navigational application provides

forewarning if approaching a category “A” safety zone out to 330 feet. (100 meters). For

category “B” airports – much smaller in size – the no take-off radius shrinks to 6 miles (10 km)

and has the same type of notification when the UAV approaches the restricted airspace.

Additionally, the user is prevented from entering or preprogramming waypoints whose

coordinates fall within 8 km of restricted airspace. When flying the UAV without a GPS signal,

53

there is also an altitude ceiling of 394 feet, just below the current FAA 400 foot guideline. This

feature is restricted and only works with a good GPS signal, so that the UAV will know where it

is located at any point in time, and where the restricted area is.

Advancement in Anti-Jamming and Hacking

As the threat of UAVs being hacked out of the sky increases, the quest to prevent this

from happening is underway. Now that GPS jamming devices are available via the internet and

have proliferated globally, there is a distinct possibility this technology could end up in enemy

hands. This obviously would constitute a problem, especially within the United States, where

UAVs are on the cusp of being authorized to fly within the NAS. For example, if a UAV is

performing autonomously and relying on Global Positioning System (GPS) signals for its

navigation commands, it relies solely on what the GPS is telling it for location purposes. If a

GPS signal is being manipulated, it may be indicating to the UAV that it is flying at 400 feet

above the ground, when it may only be at 50 feet. Secondly, a UAV operator receiving GPS

feedback could also believe his equipment is at one altitude rather than another, and manually

attempt to correct and direct its flight path. This could be extremely dangerous because the

operator is liable for any damages or injuries caused by his UAV.

To counter the GPS jamming threat, products are now being developed to either

overcome jamming or attempt to locate the source of it. Expectations are that this counter-

technology will be a significant driver for the global military GPS and Global Navigation

Satellite System (GNSS) market well into the next decade. (Drubin 2014). While overcoming the

jamming signal would be useful to the operator and his UAV, the jamming locator could prove

54

useful for the law enforcement entity dedicated to monitoring the active sky over the United

States.

CHAPTER 5

Policy Recommendation and Conclusion

In light of the evidence covered by this paper, and the expected concerns regarding

UAVs operating in the United States, the following recommendations are provided. First, in

terms of the UAV operators, the FAA should mandate that that all public and private UAV

operators must complete and graduate from a course on safe UAV operations and UAV

maintenance. The operator would be granted a UAV operator’s license, which would be good for

2 years. Any UAV they operate would have to be insured by the sponsored or contracted

company being flown for. All flight plans have to be filled out, submitted, and approved by the

FAA prior to launch. These steps would ensure that the operator is a registered user authorized to

fly to and from specified areas during a specific period of time, at a specific altitude and speed,

while adhering to the guidelines set forth by the FAA.

Second, in order to accurately identify what is flying above, low-level radars must be

installed throughout the United States to detect UAV traffic. This paper recommends, as a start,

co-locating low-level radars with cellphone towers, as these towers are predominately located

within populated areas. These radars would monitor, display, and compare all active UAVs via

the identification transponder and correlate the observed flight path with pre-approved registered

flight plans. This UAV monitoring feed would be available to a law enforcement entity to

positively identify what UAVs are doing and where they are going.

55

Third, the FAA needs to create the mentioned mobile law enforcement entity capable of

responding to malicious or illegitimate UAVs in the air. UAVs would be considered illegitimate

if they do not have a transponder, are not registered with the FAA, or if they are operating inside

restricted airspace. Once determined to be illegitimate, law enforcement would be authorized to

take the next approved steps to safely and non-kinetically remove the UAV from the sky; to

include hacking into its navigation and landing it in a safe place. Forensic labs will then be able

to check the equipment for signs of serial numbers, registration tags, and other evidence as to

who is responsible for violations. If the owner is identified, fines will be imposed and/or his

license suspended. This step could also solve other UAV issues by holding companies and

operators accountable for their operating locations and actions. As a result, it may reduce the

likelihood of the amount of UAVs that could be used illegally for spying on civilians or

otherwise violating the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

Resulting Problems and continuing ambiguities

As of the date of this paper, a major unsolved problem that will only continue concerns

people who feel their privacy may be violated by the US government by the use of UAVs. This

hurdle will be challenging. US citizens taking matters into their own hands and attempting to

shoot down UAVs flying overhead will be both illegal and inherently dangerous. Should this

problem go unaddressed, and as we see an increase in weapon engagements on UAVs, the US

government may have to undertake stricter steps to strengthen laws and punish violators.

56

Summary

No one seems to be contesting the idea or the need for UAV regulation in the NAS. This

paper has outlined what constitutes small UAV such as (quadcopters) and the airspace in which

they currently operate. The types of toy UAVs addressed in this paper do not necessarily require

the same communication with nearby ATC as do larger and passenger-carrying aircraft,

especially when the operator is a hobbyist operating the UAV below 400 feet and away from

populated areas. Once UAVs are cleared by the FAA to begin delivering packages, observing

traffic patterns, monitoring vegetation, and even responding to emergencies, it is more likely

they will begin using a portion of the FAA controlled NAS. Before that can happen, UAVs must

be insured, outfitted with the proper safety equipment, and have their serial numbers on file with

government agencies as well as their respective companies. UAV operators must be properly

trained in the rules of the sky and maintain currency in that training. NextGen radar systems will

help aid in aerial monitoring for UAVs, but they will not be good enough to monitor low-level

areas (only dedicated low-level radars can provide that coverage). Overall, by combining the

above considerations, the United States will be prepared and safer from terrorist organizations

seeking to use UAVs as attack delivery platforms.

57

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