Sanford Journal of Public Policy - Volume 1 No. 1

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Sanford Journal of P ublic Policy

Vol. 1, Iss. 1 Spring 2010

ARTICLESFrom Welfare-to-Work to Child Wellbeing:Shifting Focus in the Temporary Assistance forNeedy Families Program ................................................ 3Kristy Marynak

Crisis at the Polls: Restoring Democracy inZimbabwe .......................................................................19Daniel B. Kobayashi

Alternative Responses to Climate Change: An

Inquiry into Geoengineering ....................................... 35 Aaron Ray

Responding to Teacher Attrition: An Analysisof Risk Factors in the North Carolina Teaching Fellows Program ............................................................ 51

Alesha Daughtrey

INTERVIEWSBernice Friedlander, President of Chapter 282 of the National Treasury Employees Union ............................ 73

BOOK REVIEWS

Resilient Cities: Responding to Peak Oil & Climate Change ............................................................................... 81

The Next American Century: How the U.S. Can Thrive as Other Powers Rise .............................................. 85


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Sanford Journalof P ublic P olicy

Volume 1 Issue 1 Spring 2010

Mission

The Sanford Journal of Public Policy (SJPP) was created in 2009 as a forum forpublic policy students and professionals to contribute to the current policy

discourse through insightful analysis and innovative solutions.

About

The SJPP is run by the graduate students of the Sanford School of PublicPolicy at Duke University and is published online on an annual basis. The SJPPsolicits articles across the spectrum of public policy in a variety of formats,

including policy research and position papers, issue briefs, opinion pieces, reviews of recently published books, and interviews with policy professionals. The accompanying website is designed to be a place where public policy stu-dents and practitioners a can stay connected to current policy discussions and

express their own views on todays policy challenges.

Visit us online at: http://sjpp.sanford.duke.edu/

The Sanford Journal of Public Policy is a graduate student-run publication. The viand opinions expressed in the Journal are the authors own and do not necessarily reprthe views of the Sanford School of Public Policy or Duke University. Articles in

publication may not be reprinted, reproduced, or retransmitted, in whole or in part, witthe express written consent of the author or SJPP.


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Jason Lemons

Lauren Akers

Marjie Patterson

Sarah Cordes

Website ManagerSusan Wunderink

Website Staff Joel McFarland

Aroha Bahuguna Jeremy Block

Spencer Gilbert Jeanie Shattuck

Ben Thomas

Layout ManagerGwen Tobert

SubmissionsCoordinator Jill Fasching

Anna Birkenbach Anton Favorini-Csorba Jackson MillerGarrett StilesGray Wilson

Editors-in-Chief

Managing EditorGarth Weintraub

Senior Editors

Senior Online Editor6RD %DOLxR

Business Manager Justin Elswit

Business Staff Matthew JentgenLee Reiners

Staff Editors6RD %DOLxR

Jill Fasching Megan Kauffmann

Megan Stacy Gwen Tobert

Faculty AdvisorsElizabeth Frankenberg

Sarah Cohen

Sanford Journal of Public Policy


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Contents Volume 1 Issue 1 Spring 2010

LETTER FROM THE EDITORS .......................................................................iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................ vii

ARTICLESFrom Welfare-to-Work to Child Wellbeing: Shifting Focus inthe Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program .............................3Kristy Marynak

Crisis at the Polls: Restoring Democracy in Zimbabwe ........................... 19Daniel B. Kobayashi

Alternative Responses to Climate Change: An Inquiry IntoGeoengineering ............................................................................................... 35

Aaron Ray

Responding to Teacher Attrition: An Analysis of Risk Factorsin the North Carolina Teaching Fellows Program ..................................... 51

Alesha Daughtrey

INTERVIEWSBernice FriedlanderPresident, National Treasury Employees Union Chapter 282 ................. 73

Interviewed by Gwen M. Tobert

BOOK REVIEWS Resilient Cities: Responding to Peak Oil & Climate Change

by Peter Newman, Timothy Beatly, Heather Boyer ................................... 81 Reviewed by Trey Akers

The Next American Century: How the U.S. Can Thrive as Other Powers Rise by Nina Hachigian and Mona Sutphen ........................................................ 85

Reviewed by Meaghan Monfort


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Dear Readers:

We are pleased to present the inaugural edition of the Sanford Journal of Public Policy . The SJPP aims to provide a forum for public policy students andprofessionals to share their perspectives on a diverse range of current policy LVVXHV :H DUH SURXG RI WKLV UVW LVVXH DQG WKH DFF

we believe provide a unique venue to contribute to todays policy discourse.Establishing the SJPP has been an especially rewarding experience, and we areexcited to share with you the product of this yearlong endeavor.

We received 32 outstanding submissions from authors around the ZRUOG DGGUHVVLQJ D YDULHW\ RI LPSRUWDQW WRSLFV 7KUprocess, we narrowed the pool to four policy articles, one interview, and twobook reviews. The articles cover a range of policy topics including Child-Only cases of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program; democracy and elections in Zimbabwe; issues and challenges associated with geoengi-

neering; and factors affecting teacher attrition among graduates of the NorthCarolina Teaching Fellows Program. We follow these four policy articles with a discussion of policy in prac-

tice with Bernice Friedlander, the President of the National Treasury Employ-ees Union Chapter 282. The issue concludes with reviews of two new booksin policy, Resilient Cities: Responding to Peak Oil & Climate Change and The Next

American Century: How the US Can Thrive as Other Powers Rise .)URP VWDUW WR QLVK WKH HGLWRUV KDYH EHHQ L

development of the Journal, helping to select and edit articles and guiding au-thors through the sometimes cumbersome revision process. We want to thank them and the many other members of the staff who have been quietly butsteadfastly working behind the scenes to make this journal a reality. While ourbusiness team was busy developing budgets, registering our organization, andpublicizing this issue, our website team was developing our website, soliciting RSLQLRQ SLHFHV IRU SXEOLFDWLRQ DQG QGLQJ WKH ODWHV

Our layout manager formed the Journal from scratch on a tight deadline whiletrying to reconcile our wishes with reality. Through the hard work of all ourstaff, we believe we have created a comprehensive product that contributes tothe policy discourse and provides an additional outlet to highlight the skills of Sanford students.

Letter from the Editors


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We also want to express our immeasurable gratitude to Garth Wein-traub, our indispensable Managing Editor, for being a devoted teammate, ac-cepting extra responsibilities when needed, focusing on the big picture, and

never letting a challenge deter us. Without him, the Journal may not have comeWR IUXLWLRQ DQG GHQLWHO\ ZRXOG QRW EH DV VWURQJ DFinally, we are very grateful to the Sanford faculty, administration, and

students whose support helped make this endeavor possible. Our acknowledg-ments section on the following page is dedicated to those who have guided usthrough the process of creating this Journal.

We invite you to join us as we continue to develop the SJPP and web-site as places for thoughtful policy discussion and debate. Happy reading!

Sincerely, Jason Lemons & Marjie PattersonEditors-in-Chief


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Acknowledgements

W e owe a tremendous amount of gratitude to Elizabeth Franken-berg, our Director of Graduate Studies, whose amazing supportmade this project possible. Initially more aware than we were of

the commitment required, she has been an invaluable resource to us as ourprimary faculty advisor. We thank her for her time and gracious support andfor believing in us when others were skeptical.

We would also like to thank Sarah Cohen for her early and enduring VXSSRUW $V RXU ZHE IDFXOW\ DGYLVRU VKH KDV SURYLGHthe development of our website and online content.

Many thanks go to Jeremy Cluchey, MPP 09, as well. Creating a jour-nal was originally his idea, and he kindly connected us with other graduatejournals to jumpstart our progress. We are grateful to the editors of the Gold-man School of Public Policys PolicyMatters , the Cornell Institute for Public

Affairs The Current , and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hills North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation for helping

us overcome the steep learning curve of journal management. We would also like to express our gratitude to the many Duke Uni- versity faculty members who have provided guidance, reviewed and critiquedsubmissions, and connected us to critical resources: Charles Clotfelter, PhilipCook, David Guy, Timothy Johnson, Anirudh Krishna, Bruce Kuniholm, Mi-chael Munger, Jenni Owen, Joel Rosch, David Schanzer, Donald Taylor, Jr.,

Joseph Tham, and Jacob Vigdor.Many members of the Sanford Schools administration have addition-

ally provided assistance above and beyond their traditional duties. We wouldlike to thank the following Duke and Sanford staff members for their patienceand support: Adam Barnes, Sarah Danielson, Beth Gettys Sturkey, DeirdreGordon, Rita Keating, Karen Kemp, Roger Lewis, Jeff Mac, Helene McAd-ams, Cheryl Noga, Jackie Ogburn, and Stan Paskoff.

We would also like to thank the graduate students of the SanfordSchool who have been supportive of this new venture.

7KDQNV QDOO\ WR RXU H[FHOOHQW VWDII ZKR WRRN Ras the project evolved. All the members have played critical roles in creating DQG IRUPLQJ WKLV -RXUQDO :H DSSUHFLDWH WKHLU GHGLFDWRI ZRUN QR PDWWHU KRZ LQVXIFLHQW WKH GLUHFWLRQ RU

To all of you, thank you.


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Articles


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3

AbstractThis article examines child-only cases within the Temporary Assistance for Needy Fam

(TANF) Program, which currently comprise 47 percent of the overall TANF caseload. Child-oFDVHV H[FOXGH DGXOWV IURP WKH EHQHW FDOFXODWLRQ SURYLGLQ

from work requirements and time limits. This article reviews the narrow literature on childTANF populations, distinguishing between non-parental cases involving relative caregiverSDUHQWDO FDVHV LQYROYLQJ SDUHQWV ZKR DUH LQHOLJLEOH IRU Eor SSI receipt. The article then discusses the inadequate communication and collaboration be

TANF agencies and the child welfare system; describes unproven, though innovative, state effassist child-only populations; and concludes with the recommendation that Congress should ethe 2011 Presidents Budget request to include competitive grants for programs that addreschild-only populations needs and sponsor third-party studies to test the programs impacts onoutcomes.

Introduction

The years of debate that preceded the 1996 welfare reforms hinged ona concern for poor children. The ironic result of those child-centereddebates, however, was a welfare-to-work program focused on adult

outcomes such as employment and welfare dependency. 1 Fourteen years af-ter Congress created Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), westill know little about how the program impacts child wellbeing. Considering WKDW FKLOG RQO\ FDVHVZKHUHLQ RQO\ FKLOGUHQ UHFHLYH Dadults are excluded from the calculationnow constitute almost half of theRYHUDOO 7$1) FDVHORDG LW LV WLPH WR QG RXW KRZ WKHhow best we can address their needs.

F ROM WELFARE-TO- WORK TO CHILD WELLBEING

Shifting Focus in the Temporary Assistance for NeedyFamilies Program

Kristy Marynak

Kristy Marynak is a Master of Public Policy candidate at the Sanford School of Public PolDuke University. She earned her Bachelors degree from Davidson College. Marynaks experiwith public agencies at the federal, state, and local levels contribute to her understanding of TAand child welfare policy.


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This article begins with an overview of the politics and empirical re-search behind welfare reform. It then explains the various origins of child-only cases, summarizes what researchers know about child wellbeing in these cases,and outlines the relationship between TANF and the child welfare system.

The article concludes with a discussion of low-cost, politically feasible policy options to build a knowledge base about evidence-based intervention modelsthat could be expanded when the economy improves.

Welfare Reform: Introducing the debateThe contentious welfare reform debates of the mid-1990s led Con-

gress to replace Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with TANF. The old AFDC program became unsustainable for a number of political and

HYLGHQFH EDVHG UHDVRQV )LUVW LQXHQWLDO OLEHUDO U- wood, found that welfare reduced work incentives, that welfare dependency was rising, and that AFDC recipients were able to work or worked covertly.2 Second, conservatives successfully swayed public opinion so that the majority of Americans believed welfare was a source of, not a solution to, poverty. TwoRI WKH PRVW LQXHQWLDO FRQVHUYDWLYH DUJXPHQWV KHOGto human dignity and contributed to the rise in single-female headed house-holds.3,4 Third, a series of federally funded, independently conducted studies

GHPRQVWUDWHG WKDW DQ HGXFDWLRQ UVW DSSURDFK WRthe poor was more expensive, but less effective, than programs requiring im-mediate job search.5 Finally, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, states experi-mented with AFDC waiver programs which imposed a number of conditionsof welfare receipt, including work requirements and time limits. These waiverprograms increased states demand for autonomy in welfare program develop-ment and administration. Waivers also demonstrated the political feasibility of reform. For example, Wisconsin governor Tommy Thompson boosted hispopularity by piloting the time-limited, work-based Wisconsin Works programin 1987, which demonstrated success increasing work and reducing welfarereceipt.6 Responding to these factors, President Clintonand a Republican-dominated Congresspledged to end welfare as we know it.

As the 1996 welfare laws name suggests, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) ushered in a work-ori-ented approach to public assistance. Individuals were no longer automatically entitled to cash aid; instead, states received broad powers to create their own

welfare programs. States have the authority to set eligibility requirements andEHQHW OHYHOV EXW DOO 7$1) SURJUDPV PXVW LPSRVH ZRU60-month lifetime limit on cash assistance.

Although participants in the welfare reform debates predicted mildreductions in caseloads, no one anticipated that the caseloads would drop sosharply.7 Between 1996 and 2000, caseloads reduced by half, shrinking from


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4.6 million families in 1996 to 2.1 million families in 2002.8 The composition of the caseload also changed radically; whereas in

1994, more than 80 percent of families on welfare included at least one par-ent recipient, by 2008 nearly half of all TANF cases were child-only.9 (See)LJXUH ,Q FKLOG RQO\ FDVHV DGXOWV DUH H[FOXGHG IUand only children receive aid, which is not subject to work requirements ortime limits. While child-only cases are not growing in absolute numbers, they merit heightened attention from researchers and policymakers because they continue to grow as a proportion of all TANF cases. 10 Indeed, an enduring LURQ\ RI ZHOIDUH UHIRUP LV WKDW WKH SULPDU\ EHQHFLDUon personal responsibility and work opportunity are no longer parents caring for children, but children themselves.

Variations between states complicate task of describing child-onlycaseloads

Although both federal and state policy makers are aware of the relativeLQFUHDVH LQ FKLOG RQO\ FDVHV WKH\ ODFN GHQLWLYH LQFDVHV DW WKH QDWLRQDO OHYHO EHFDXVH VWDWH 7$1) UXO

widely.11 Indeed, the differences between states in terms of demographics and welfare policies necessitate state-level data collection and analysis. Variationsin child-only caseloads as a proportion of total TANF caseloads illustrate thispoint. In 2001, child-only cases constituted at least 45 percent of the TANFcaseload in 15 states.12 In four states, however, fewer than 20 percent of TANFcases were child-only.13


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Parental child-only cases involve disabled, immigrant, or sanctioned parents

There are two types of child-only TANF cases, parental and non-parental. Parental child-only cases involve children whose parents are ineligi-ble for TANF for three primary reasons. First, the parent may receive Supple-mental Security Income (SSI).14 SSI provides cash assistance to disabled, blind,or elderly individuals who earn little or no income, without imposing work requirements or time limits.15 Second, the parent may be an illegal immigrantor legal alien with a native-born child. Third, the state may sanction a parentfor failure to comply with TANF program rules such as work requirements,RU GLVFRQWLQXH WKH EHQHWV IRU SDUHQWV ZKR UHDFK Won assistance. It is important to note that not all states permit children whose

SDUHQWV DUH VDQFWLRQHG RU UHDFK WLPH OLPLWV WR FRQof 2002, 36 states employed full-family sanctions.16 In 2006, half of all child-only cases were parental. Of those, 41 percent

had a parent receiving SSI, 38 percent had a parent with unknown citizenshipstatus, and 11 percent had a sanctioned parent. 17 $JDLQ KRZHYHU VLJQL

variation exists between states. For example, 69 percent of Californias child-only cases are parental, the majority of which involve immigrant parents.18 New York and Texas also have substantial immigration-related child-only cas-

es. In contrast, over 98 percent of Mississippis parental child-only caseload in2000-2001a total of 5,117 familiesinvolved parents who received SSI. Pa-rental cases involving SSI parents are similarly predominant in Kentucky (91.5percent), Massachusetts (82.3 percent), Virginia (86.5 percent), and Wisconsin(93.7 percent).19

Non-parental child-only cases involve relative caregiversNon-parental child-only cases involve children who reside with a rela-

tive or other adult with legal guardianship or custody.20 Approximately half of the nations child-only caseload falls into the non-parental category, but state

variation remains considerable.21 These non-parent caregivers either choosenot to receive TANF assistance, or their income or assets exceed eligibility re-quirements.22 ,PSRUWDQWO\ VRPH NLQVKLS FDUHJLYHUV DUH LQFcalculation, but their cases do not fall into the child-only category.23

The Department of Health and Human Services does not publish na-tional data about the origins of, nor the outcomes generated by, non-parentalcaregiver arrangements. However, a limited amount of state-level data pro-

vides clues. Edelhoch, Liu, and Martin survey relative caretakers in SouthCarolina child-only cases, and Wood and Strong investigate child-only TANFcases in New Jersey.24,25

In South Carolina, non-parental cases compose 34 percent of theFKLOG RQO\ FDVHORDG (GHOKRFK HW DO QG WKDW SH


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are African American, and 62 percent are over the age of 50.26 When asked todisclose the primary reason for non-relative placement, caregivers cite parentalsubstance abuse (28 percent), parental desertion (20 percent), child maltreat-ment (16 percent), and parental incarceration (13 percent). Less common rea-sons include parent death, institutionalization, military service, minor status,and schooling. South Carolina administrative records reveal that some causesRI UHODWLYH SODFHPHQW RYHUODS )RU H[DPSOH WKH DXWpercent of relatives care for children who were previously involved with childprotective services, such as foster care.

Reasons for relative caregiver placement in New Jersey resemble thosein South Carolina. Parental substance abuse accounts for the formation of approximately 60 percent of non-parental child-only cases.27 Other causes in-

clude parental incarceration, child abuse or neglect, and mental health prob-lems.

Parental child-only children face fewer emotional needs, but greatermaterial needs, than non-parental counterparts

From the limited research available on child wellbeing in child-only TANF cases, we can infer that children in parental child-only cases experiencegreater poverty, but have fewer behavioral and emotional needs, than children

in non-parental cases.28

The New Jersey study provides useful insight with respect to SSI andimmigrant child-only households. SSI recipients who head child-only TANFhouseholds have poor health and/or disabilities. 29 These households also havehigher rates of food insecurity than regular TANF families, perhaps becauseSDUHQWV ZLWK GLVDELOLWLHV KDYH GLIFXOW\ VKRSSLQJ IRU30 Im-migrant parents who head child-only TANF households have low educationalattainment and little recent work history.31 Half of immigrant child-only fami-lies in New Jersey live in deep poverty, meaning that annual income for a family of four is below $10,000.32

Although we know little about childrens wellbeing in TANF families who are sanctioned or reach time limits, the news about their parents wellbe-ing is not encouraging. Sanctioned TANF families experience serious barriersto employment, including substance abuse, mental illness, domestic violence,KHDOWK GLIFXOWLHV OLPLWHG FRJQLWLYH DELOLW\ DQG33 $ 8 6 *RYHUQPHQW $FFRXQWDELOLW\ 2IFH VWXG\ DOVR IRXSDUHQWV PD\ KDYH PRUH GLIFXOW\ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ SURJUDpolicies.34 Sanctioned families also experience greater involvement with thechild welfare system, with higher rates of child placement in state custody.35 )DPLOLHV ZKR UHDFK 7$1) WLPH OLPLWV WHQG WR H[SHULHQFthose facing sanctioned parents; 92 percent of families who reach or are likely to reach time limits have one or more substantial barriers, including child


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welfare system involvement, a disability or poor health, and criminal justicesystem involvement.36

Unanswered questions about parental child-only families persist. First,how do children who continue to receive TANF payments after parents aresanctioned or reach time limits fare relative to children in states that employ full-family sanctions and time limits? Second, how are child-only TANF pay-ments used to meet childrens needs? For example, do families share child-only payments among all household members, regardless of whether members areLQFOXGHG LQ WKH EHQHW FDOFXODWLRQ" 3DUWLFXODUO\ L

where poverty appears to be deeper and material needs greater, a reasonableassumption is that heads of household, not children, decide how to use TANFcash assistance.

Non-parental child-only households generally receive more incomeand deal with fewer material hardships than other TANF households. 37,38 Thismay be because TANF agencies often disregard caregiver income in child-only FDVHV ZKHQ FDOFXODWLQJ EHQHWV 8QIRUWXQDWHO\ WUDXplacement with relatives, which creates additional service needs for both chil-dren and caregivers.39 *LEEV HW DO QG WKDW 7$1) GRHV QRW SUadditional service needs, which include assessment, case management, and col-laboration between TANF caseworkers and child welfare agencies.40 Despite

these unmet needs, Gibbs et al. assert that relative care is usually a more de-sirable option for these children than staying with parents or being placed innon-relative foster care.41 The South Carolina study also provides useful insight about what kindsof services non-parental TANF households demanda subject which shouldinterest policymakers. In a series of interviews, Edelhoch et al. ask relativecaregivers in South Carolina which services they would like to receive.42 Re-VSRQGHQWV FRQVLVWHQWO\ UHTXHVW KLJKHU 7$1) DQG IRRG V-aid coverage for adults in the household; mental health services for children inWKHLU FDUH FKLOG FDUH LQFOXGLQJ DIWHU VFKRRO DQG U

with school expenses.43

Child welfare and TANF systems inadequately communicate and col-laborate

Given that children in non-parental child-only cases have greater service needs, we should ask what kinds of services are currently available toWKHVH FKLOGUHQ ,Q RUGHU WR DQVZHU WKLV TXHVWLRQ

variety of non-relative caregiver arrangements that exist. Relative caregiverarrangements vary along a spectrum.44 Private kinship care is generally aninformal or temporary arrangement; the relative caregiver may contact the

TANF agency but has no contact with child welfare services.45 When parentsindependently place their children with a relative, but the family receives some


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child welfare services, the arrangement is called voluntary kinship care.46 Inkinship foster care (also called formal kinship care), the state maintainscustody of the child, and relatives receive TANF child-only assistance or for-mal foster care payments.

Ehrle, Geen, and Clark estimate that 72 percent of all children in rela-tive care (1.3 million children) receive private kinship care; 17 percent (300,000children) receive voluntary kinship care; and 11 percent (200,000 children)receive kinship foster care.47 Thus, the vast majority of relative caregiver ar-rangements avert child welfare involvement altogether. As a result, childrenand relative caregivers do not receive neededand availableservices. Gibbset al. observe that for a variety of reasons, including the stigma of child wel-fare involvement and a lack of knowledge about available services, relative

FDUHJLYHUV IRUIHLW DFFHVV WR D UDQJH RI UHVRXUFHV LQsupport, child-focused assessments and services, case management, and per-manency planning.48 Instead, caregivers seek assistance from TANF agencies,

which are not oriented towards child wellbeing and instead focus on adultHPSOR\PHQW DQG HFRQRPLF VHOI VXIFLHQF\49 TANF workers typically do notoffer assessments for children, and their high caseloads and lack of training inchildrens issues generate missed opportunities for service provision.

A lack of communication and collaboration between child welfare and

TANF agencies further complicates the situation for children, families, andcaseworkers. Respondents in studies of non-parental child-only case manage-ment in Washington, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Maryland reported little col-laboration between child welfare and TANF agencies.50 In interviews with Ad-ministration for Children and Families (ACF) regional administrators, Gibbset al. found that only eight state TANF agencies formally collaborate with thechild welfare system, 36 informally collaborate, and seven collaborate neitherformally nor informally.51 7KH UHSRUW GRHV QRW GHQH LQIRUPDO-laboration.

5RE *HHQ QGV WKDW FRPSDUHG WR WUDGLWLRQDO-ents, kinship foster parents tend to receive less information, training, and con-tact from child welfare workers.52 Indeed, says Geen, kinship caregivers areoften required to provide the same nurturance and support for children intheir care that non-kin foster parents provide, with fewer resources, greaterstressors, and limited preparation.53

State programs assist relative caregivers, but efforts are unproven andmay neglect children in parental child-only cases

Some states are addressing the needs of non-parental child-only house-KROGV WKURXJK FDVH PDQDJHPHQW LQFUHDVHG QDQFLDO VVXSSRUW SURJUDPV *LEEV HW DO QG WKDW VWDWH SURJUneeds of relative caregivers rather than children.54 However, several child wel-


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fare agencies view children in non-parental child-only TANF cases as at-risk and offer case management and services designed to keep them from needing to be placed in the states custody. 55

Innovative, though unproven, initiatives to better serve non-parentalchild-only households exist across the U.S. Efforts generally focus on threeareas: (1) enhancing collaboration between TANF and child welfare agencies;

SURYLGLQJ QDQFLDO VXSSRUW WR UHODWLYH FDUHJLYH-mation and case management to relative caregivers.

Several localities support collaboration between child welfare and TANF agencies.

x In most Wisconsin counties, the child welfare agency manages non-parental child-only TANF cases.56

x Oklahomas child welfare and TANF programs share a common di-rector. For child-only cases in formal kinship care, Oklahoma child welfare workers oversee child safety and services, while TANF case- ZRUNHUV DUH UHVSRQVLEOH IRU QDQFLDO DQG PHGLFD57

x El Paso County, Colorado, created the Family Support Team (FST),a special unit within its TANF agency to serve child-only cases. TheFST includes professional social workers, TANF case managers, and asupervisor.58

$W OHDVW WHQ VWDWHV RU ORFDOLWLHV SURYLGH DGrelative caregivers.

x California, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada,New Jersey, Oklahoma, Wisconsin, and Denver, Colorado, pro- YLGH PRQWKO\ QDQFLDO VXSSRUW WR UHODWLYH FDUchild-only cases.59 The states provide cash assistance similar to, butgenerally less than, the payments that traditional foster parents wouldreceive. Most states use TANF funds for these payments, and somestates (Kentucky and Nevada) make payments regardless of caregiverincome.

x Alabamas Kinship Care (KC) program targets non-parental child-on-O\ FDVHV H[SHULHQFLQJ GLIFXOWLHV WKDW SXW WKHPfoster care placement.60 KC provides tailored services, including coun-VHOLQJ UHVSLWH FDUH QDQFLDO DVVLVWDQFH IRU Fexpenses; and a basic needs payment for educational supplies, chil-drens clothing, and furniture.

x To those deemed income-eligible, New Jersey offers a child care sub-sidy and up to $1,000 to purchase school supplies or baby furniture.61


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Several states or localities provide information, referrals, and supportgroups for relative caregivers.

x New Jersey created a Kinship Navigator Program to help caregiversobtain services including TANF, the Supplemental Nutrition Assis-tance Program (SNAP, also known as Food Stamps), Medicaid, andchild care.62 The state also maintains a toll-free phone service staffedby social workers who provide as much case management as possibleby telephone.63

x Ohios Statewide Kinship Caregiver Services Program offers subsi-dized child care, respite care, legal assistance, parenting classes, and atoll-free phone service offering referrals and information to relativecaregivers.64

x El Paso County, Colorado, provides support groups and grandpar-ent advocates to assist caregivers as they navigate bureaucratic agen-cies.65

Although individual state efforts are encouraging, no states have rigor-ously evaluated the effects of these interventions on child outcomes. 66 How-ever, it is possible to comment on the implementation issues facing these pro-grams administrators. Charlesworth et al. list the challenges that states and

localities face when trying to develop strategies to assist their child-only case-load.67 )LUVW VWDWHV VWUXJJOH WR DIIRUG DGGLWLRQDO QFDUHJLYHUV 6HFRQG VWDWHV IDFH GLIFXOWLHV GHYHORpolicies and supportive services for parental child-only cases, especially alienand SSI cases. Third, they struggle to bridge communication and logisticalgaps between relevant agencies and partner organizations.

Policy recommendationsCongress must reauthorize TANF by September 30, 2010. Consider-

LQJ WKDW WKH SULPDU\ EHQHFLDULHV RI 7$1) DUH QRZ FKfocus federal resources on evaluating child outcomes and identifying effectivestrategies to serve poor children in both parental and non-parental child-only FDVHV 7KH FXUUHQW UHFHVVLRQ DQG GHFLW DYHUVH SR-sitates budget-neutral or low-cost policies. As such, the following strategiesare low-cost and politically feasible. Properly implemented, these strategies ZLOO HVWDEOLVK D UP IRXQGDWLRQ RI NQRZOHGJH DERXWCongress when the economy improves and TANF is again reauthorized.

Recommendation 1: Expand the 2011 Presidents Budget request to include competi grants for programs that address childrens needs in parental and non-parental child-cases

The Presidents FY2011 budget requests that Congress eliminate the


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$500 million Healthy Marriage and Responsible Fatherhood Grants and in-stead direct the money to state-initiated Responsible Fatherhood and Family 6HOI VXIFLHQF\ 'HPRQVWUDWLRQV 7KH 3UHVLGHQW UHTXHVthe grants and $20 million to evaluate grantees. The idea behind the grantprograms is to build a stronger evidence base about what service interven-tion models work that could be replicated within the TANF, Child SupportEnforcement (CSE), and other state and community-based programs. 68

:KLOH WKH LGHD EHKLQG WKH IDWKHUKRRG DQG VHOI-tions may be sound, the Presidents budget request fails to mention child-only

TANF populations, which now constitute almost half of the total TANF case-load. During budget appropriations, Congress should expand demonstrationsto support and evaluate the following initiatives: (1) child welfare and TANF

DJHQF\ FROODERUDWLRQ HQKDQFHG QDQFLDO DVVLVWDQ(3) case management and referral services for children and relatives in non-parental cases; and (4) assessments, case management, and other services forchildren in parental cases.

Congress should fully fund the Presidents $500 million demonstrationrequest, but also add $250 million to support child-only service model demon-strations, $20 million of which should fund rigorous evaluations of programs.See Recommendation 2 for a discussion of the evaluations.

Bipartisan political support exists for investment in child-only TANFFDVHV 'XULQJ WKH -XO\ FRQUPDWLRQ KHDULQJ IRU $&for Family Support Carmen Nazario, Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) voicedKLV FRQFHUQ DERXW WKH ULVH LQ FKLOG RQO\ 7$1) FDVHVasked whether childrens interests would be better served by a formal arrange-ment with the child welfare system.69 As such, grants that support child welfareand TANF agency collaboration and case management for children could en-joy political support during budget appropriations. Leading up to the budgetappropriations process, advocacy groups should target Senator Grassley andHouse Appropriations committee chair David Obey (D-WI) to request a $250million expansion of the Presidents request.

Recommendation 2: Conduct a series of third-party studies to test impacts of intervenon child outcomes

To address acute information gaps, Congress should fund third-party evaluations of interventions to serve parental and non-parental child-only pop-ulations. The studies should focus on dependent variables germane to quanti-tative evaluations of program impacts on child wellbeing, including academicprogress, cognitive development, behavioral and emotional adjustment, andhealth and safety.70 The studies should not only test child-only interventionmodels, but also investigate the effectiveness of traditional child-only TANFcash assistance.


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Parental Child-Only Study One study should examine the wellbeing of children whose parents

are ineligible for TANF because of sanctions, time limits, alien status, or SSIenrollment. The study should observe two treatment groups: one that receiveschild-only payments with no enhanced services such as case management, anda second that receives child-only payments with case management. The con-trol group would receive no TANF assistance. Both studies should seek tounderstand how TANF cash assistance is spent and shared between house-hold members, how that cash assistance impacts child wellbeing, and whetherenhanced services improve outcomes. In order to avoid ethical questions that

would arise when assigning children to different levels of service, this study could take advantage of the existing variation between states. Controlling for

GLIIHUHQFHV EHWZHHQ JURXSV DQG HPSOR\LQJ VWDWH [HG Hany variation in outcomes due to geographic differences.

Non-Parental Child-Only Study Another study should focus on children in relative care, using multiple

treatment groups to test the impacts of the various strategies that states cur-rently use to serve children and caregivers in non-parental cases. These treat-ment groups should include: (1) a group that receives basic child-only cash

assistance; (2) a group that receives enhanced payments with no case manage-ment; (3) a group that receives a combination of payments and case manage-ment by a child welfare agency; and (4) a group that receives a combinationof payments and case management by the TANF agency. The control groupshould include children in relative care who receive no TANF cash assistanceor other services.

The studies should each be implemented over multiple years, begin-ning with baseline data collection and two follow-up assessments. Third-party UHVHDUFKHUV VKRXOG EH UHTXLUHG WR UHSRUW RQ QGLQIROORZ XS DQG ZULWH D QDO UHSRUW WR $&) DQG &RQJUHV-thorized, presumably by 2015.

Social policy experts and advocates would greet these evaluations withHQWKXVLDVP ,QXHQWLDO DGYRFDWHV DW WKH %URRNLQJVBudget and Policy Priorities, and the Center for Law and Social Policy regularly request that TANF focus more on child outcomes. Gibbs et al. also favor thisW\SH RI UHVHDUFK DQG DVVHUW WKDW QGLQJV FRXOG KHO-oritize services for the most at-risk children.71

Alternative strategy Even if Congress does not fund a child-only demonstration project, itshould still support modest investment in evaluating child-only interventions.Rigorous analysis could be valuable in the absence of a new discretionary


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grant program because some infrastructure to support non-parental child-only households already exists in states. Should Congress fail to take action, phil-DQWKURSLF JURXSV LQWHUHVWHG LQ FKLOG RXWFRPHV FRXOGfull or matching funding for state-level research.

ConclusionGiven that child-only cases now constitute nearly half of the total

TANF caseload, our nations cash-assistance program must expand its work-oriented focus to include child wellbeing. Unless social service providers closecommunication gaps between child welfare and family assistance sectors, thesechildrens unmet material and service needs will persist. Congress should ad-dress these needs by funding demonstration projects to implement and test

initiatives to serve child-only populations. Building knowledge about what works today will facilitate cost-effective, thoughtful program expansions whenthe economy improves.

Endnotes

1 Martha J. Zaslow, Kristin A. Moore, Jennifer L. Brooks, Pamela A. Morris, Kathryn Tout, Zakia A. Redd, and Carol A. Emig, Experimental Studies of Welfare Reform andChildren. The Future of Children , Vol. 12, No. 1, 2002.

2 David T. Ellwood, Poor Support . (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1988).3 Ibid.4 Lawrence Mead, Beyond Entitlement . (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1986).5 Gayle Hamilton, Moving People from Welfare to Work: Findings from the National

Evaluation of Welfare to Work Strategies. U.S. Department of Health and Human6HUYLFHV 2IFH RI WKH $VVLVWDQW 6HFUHWDU\ IRU 3ODQQLQJ DQDevelopment Research Corporation. July 2002. http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/NEWWS/synthesis02/index.htm (accessed February 15, 2010).

6 Steven M. Teles, Whose Welfare? AFDC and Elite Politics . (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1998).

7 David Ellwood and Rebecca Blank, The Clinton Legacy for Americas Poor . (NBER Working Paper 8437, Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001).

8 The Urban Institute, A Decade of Welfare Reform: Facts and Figures. June 2006.http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/900980_welfarereform.pdf (accessed February

15, 2010).9 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and

Families, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Eighth Annual Report to Congress,2009. http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/data-reports/annualreport8/chapter01/chap01.html (accessed October 19, 2009).


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10 Deborah Gibbs, Jennifer Kasten, Anupa Bir, Sonja Hoover, Dean Duncan and JanetMitchell, Children in Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Child-only Cases withRelative Caregivers. Department of Health and Human Services Assistant Secretary forPlanning and Evaluation. June 2004. http://aspe.hhs.gov/HSP/child-only04/index.htm(accessed February 19, 2010).

11 Ibid.12 Ibid.13 Ibid.14 Leanne Charlesworth, Jenneate Mercick, and Courtney Kakuska, TANF child-only cases

trends and issues. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for&KLOGUHQ DQG )DPLOLHV 2IFH RI )DPLO\ $VVLWDQFH :HOIDUH 3HHNetwork. 2009. http://peerta.acf.hhs.gov/pdf/child_only.pdf (accessed October 12,

2009).15 Social Security Administration, What is Supplemental Security Income? http://www.

ssa.gov/ssi/ (accessed February 15, 2010).16 Rutledge Q. Hutson, Child Welfare and TANF Reauthorization. Center for Law and

Social Policy. February 2002. http://www.clasp.org/admin/site/publications_archive/OHV SGI DFFHVVHG )HEUXDU\

17 Deborah Gibbs, Jennifer Kasten, Anupa Bir, Dean Duncan, and Sonja Hoover, Betweentwo systems: Children in TANF child-only cases with relative caregivers. Children and

Youth Services Review , Vol. 28, Is. 4, (2006).18 Ibid.19 Ibid.20 Leanne Charlesworth, Jenneate Mercick, and Courtney Kakuska, TANF Child-Only

Cases Trends and Issues.21 Robert G. Strong and Debra A. Wood, The Status of Families on Child-Only TANF

Cases. Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. 2002.22 Mary Farrell, Michael Fishman, Stephanie Laud, and Vincena Allen, Understanding the

AFDC/TANF Child-Only Caseload: Policies, Composition, and Characteristics in ThreeStates. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. February 1, 2000. http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/child-only-caseload00/ (accessed February 15, 2010).

23 Rutledge Q. Hutson, Child Welfare and TANF Reauthorization.24 Marilyn Edelhoch, Qiduan Liu, and Linda S. Martin, Unsung Heroes: Relative Caretakers

in Child-only Cases. Policy & Practice of Public Human Services, 2002.25 Robert G.Strong and Debra A. Wood, The Status of Families on Child-Only TANF

Cases.26 Marilyn Edelhoch, Qiduan Liu, and Linda S. Martin, Unsung Heroes: Relative Caretakers

in Child-only Cases.27 Robert G. Strong and Debra A. Wood, The Status of Families on Child-Only TANF

Cases.28 Deborah Gibbs et al., Between Two Systems: Children in TANF Child-only Cases With

Relative Caregivers.


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29 Robert G. Strong and Debra A. Wood, The Status of Families on Child-Only TANFCases.

30 Ibid.31 Ibid.32 Ibid.33 Jan Kaplan, Sanction Policies and Practices - An Update. Welfare Information Network,

2004.*HQHUDO $FFRXQWLQJ 2IFH :HOIDUH 5HIRUP 6WDWHV DUH 5HVW

Reduce Welfare Dependence. Washington, DC, (1998).35 Jan Kaplan, Sanction Policies and Practices - An Update.

*HQHUDO $FFRXQWLQJ 2IFH :HOIDUH 5HIRUP 6WDWHV DUH 5HVWReduce Welfare Dependence.

37 Deborah Gibbs et al., Children in Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Child-only Cases with Relative Caregivers.

38 Robert G. Strong and Debra A. Wood. The Status of Families on Child-Only TANFCases.

39 Deborah Gibbs et al., Between Two Systems: Children in TANF Child-Only Cases WithRelative Caregivers.

40 Ibid.41 Ibid.

42 Marilyn Edelhoch, Qiduan Liu, and Linda S. Martin, Unsung Heroes: Relative Caretakersin Child-only Cases.43 Ibid.44 Shelley Waters Boots and Rob Geen, Family Care or Foster Care? How State Policies

Affect Kinship Caregivers. The Urban Institute. 1999. http://www.urban.org/publications/309166.html (accessed February 20, 2010).


46 Robert Geen, The Evolution of Kinship Care Policy and Practice. The Future of Children Vol. 14, No. 1, (2004).

47 Jennifer Ehrle Macomber, Rob Geen, and Rebecca L. Clark, Children Cared for by Relatives: Who are They and How are They Faring? The Urban Institute, Assessing theNew Federalism, Report No. 6. (2001). (Accessed February 20, 2010).

48 Deborah Gibbs et al., Children in Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Child-only Cases with Relative Caregivers. 5-4.

49 Ibid.50 Deborah Gibbs et al., Between Two Systems: Children in TANF Child-Only Cases with

Relative Caregivers.51 Deborah Gibbs et al., Children in Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Child-only

Cases with Relative Caregivers.52 Robert Geen, The Evolution of Kinship Care Policy and Practice.53 Ibid., 137.


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55 Ibid.56 Ibid.57 Ibid.58 Leanne Charlesworth, Jenneate Mercick, and Courtney Kakuska, TANF Child-Only

Cases Trends and Issues.59 Deborah Gibbs et al., Between Two Systems: Children in TANF Child-Only Cases with

Relative Caregivers.60 Leanne Charlesworth, Jenneate Mercick, and Courtney Kakuska, TANF Child-Only

Cases Trends and Issues.61 Ibid.

62 Deborah Gibbs et al., Between Two Systems: Children in TANF Child-Only Cases withRelative Caregivers.

63 Leanne Charlesworth, Jenneate Mercick, and Courtney Kakuska, TANF Child-Only Cases Trends and Issues.

64 Deborah Gibbs et al., Between Two Systems: Children in TANF Child-Only Cases withRelative Caregivers.

65 Leanne Charlesworth, Jenneate Mercick, and Courtney Kakuska, TANF Child-Only Cases Trends and Issues.

66 Deborah Gibbs et al., Between Two Systems: Children in TANF Child-Only Cases withRelative Caregivers.67 Leanne Charlesworth, Jenneate Mercick, and Courtney Kakuska, TANF Child-Only

Cases Trends and Issues.68 Department of Health and Human Services Administration for Children and Families.

-XVWLFDWLRQ RI (VWLPDWHV IRU $SSURSULDWLRQV &RPPLWWHHV 7Needy Families. (Washington, DC, 2010). 304. http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/RSUH DFIBSHUISODQ DQQBSHU BSHUIBSODQ BQDO SGI

69 Child Welfare League of America. Carmen Nazario Moves Closer to Final Approvalfor HHS Post. Childrens Monitor Online. June 2009. http://www.cwla.org/advocacy/monitoronline-issueHLasp?ISSUEID=243 (accessed October 1, 2009).

70 Martha J. Zaslow et al., Experimental Studies of Welfare Reform and Children. 81.71 Deborah Gibbs et al., Between Two Systems: Children in TANF Child-Only Cases with

Relative Caregivers.


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AbstractZimbabwes opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) carried the 2008 e

tion by using wireless telecommunications and an elaborate system of poll monitoring to es

an alternative political narrative. Zimbabwes ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-PatrioFront (ZANU-PF) party, whose complacence allowed MDC to establish this narrative, respondby violently rigging the presidential runoff. While Zimbabweans had challenged ZANU-PFs toral authoritarian regime largely without external assistance, ZANU-PFs monopoly on force ZLOOLQJQHVV WR XVH YLROHQFH DJDLQVW WKH SRSXODWLRQ NHSW 3Uinto a power sharing agreement that saw ZANU-PF retain control of state security organs, nelections are under discussion, and ZANU-PF will likely rig them violently. In order for Zimbabans votes to have any chance to trump ZANU-PFs guns, the international communityespec

the African communityand regional civil society must back free elections through a combiof targeted sanctions, African-led condemnation, and perhaps international criminal charges agthe regime.

Introduction: Votes and Guns, the Inseparable Twins

Our votes must go together with our guns. After all, any vote we shall have, shall have been the product of the gun. The gun ZKLFK SURGXFHV WKH YRWH VKRXOG UHPDLQ LWV VHFXguarantor. The peoples votes and the peoples guns are alwaysinseparable twins.

-Robert Gabriel Mugabe, 19761

I n March 2008, Zimbabwe held presidential and parliamentary electionsthat tested President Robert Mugabes hypothesis that votes are meaning-less without guns.2 The votes in 2008 belonged to the opposition Move-

CRISIS AT THE P OLLS

Restoring Democracy in Zimbabwe

Daniel B. Kobayashi

Daniel B. Kobayashi is a Master of Public Policy candidate at the Sanford School of PubPolicy, Duke University. He earned his Bachelors degree in Political Science and Public P

from Boston University in 1998. Kobayashi has also served as Director of the Workforce Solu*URXS DQ HFRQRPLF GHYHORSPHQW QRQ SURW +H FXUUHQWO\ VHUYH- ment in Africa.


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ment for Democratic Change (MDC), while the guns belonged to MugabesZimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). An 11-monthstalemate resulted. Today, more than a year after a power sharing cabinetWRRN RIFH WKH UHVXOWV RI WKH H[SHULPHQW DUH VWLOMDCs votes changed the nations political narrative and gave MDC the politi-cal leverage to take the premiership, the Ministry of Finance, and a number of other government ministries; from this perch in the government, MDC ended=LPEDEZHV UXLQRXV K\SHULQDWLRQ 2Q WKH RWKHU KDQGpresidency and a legal monopoly on the use of force, allowing them to main-tain control of most of the nations wealth and potentially win future powerstruggles through force of arms.

In his 2003 book Our Votes, Our Guns: Robert Mugabe and the Tragedy

of Zimbabwe 0DUWLQ 0HUHGLWK LGHQWLHG VWURQJ HYLGHQFH-torically trumped votes in Zimbabwe.3 This article will examine the tensionbetween Mugabes inseparable twins in the 2008 election and the responsesof the international community. This piece will then discuss recommendationsfor action for both Zimbabweans and the international community, as Mugabecalls for new elections in an effort to reassert his dominance.4

Dictatorship by another name

8QOLNH PDQ\ $IULFDQ FRXQWULHV =LPEDEZH KDV QHYHone-party state. Despite ZANU-PFs dominance, the opposition has alwaysheld some seats in parliament, and until 2001, there was a largely independentjudiciary.5 Instead, Zimbabwe was an electoral authoritarian regime, whereinthe ruling party desires the veneer of political legitimacy provided by man-aged elections and the appearance of rule of law.6 In every election, there wastechnically a choice of parties, but the ruling party rigged elections throughmedia manipulation, fraud, or even violence.

Mugabe has made a specialty of sham legality, lots of useless laws,phony rules that mean nothing, says Foster Dongozi, Secretary General of the Zimbabwe Union of Journalists. He knows how far to push us. He knowshow to distract us with a veneer of normalcy. He knows how to beat us way down, but not so far as to embarrass his African neighbors. 7

While opposition parties in electoral authoritarian regimes typically have little hope beyond gaining a few seats in parliament, occasionally a regimeFDQ JURZ RYHUFRQGHQW DQG ULJ D YRWH LQFRPSHWHQWO\-stances, an election can become competitive. This situation arose in Zimbabwein 2000, when a ZANU-PF referendum on a new constitution failed 55 per-cent to 45 percent. 8 7KH IDLOHG UHIHUHQGXP LQGLFDWHG D VXIFLelectoral system in Zimbabwe for the Journal of Democracy to reclassify Zimba-bwe as a competitive authoritarian state. Competitive authoritarianism dif-fers from electoral authoritarianism in that there is meaningful parliamentary


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opposition, even though the ruling party would not allow a transfer of power. 9 Following the 2000 referendum, ZANU-PF restored the electoral au-

thoritarian model by force. First, they encouraged mobs of war veterans toseize white-owned farms and conducted Operation Murambatsvina, a slum-clearing campaign that punished urbanites, who were among the new Constitu-tions strongest opponents. 10 Then, ZANU-PF rigged the presidential electionLQ E\ DUUHVWLQJ RSSRVLWLRQ JXUHV FORVLQJ SROOLQ-holds, and detaining international election observers.11 In 2005, they ended theera of competitive authoritarianism by denying as much as 30 percent of theelectorate the right to vote in parliamentary elections.12

By 2008 however, Mugabes government again began to assume that YLFWRU\ ZDV LQHYLWDEOH 'HVSLWH HLJKW \HDUV RI K\SHULQ

DQQXDOL]HG LQDWLRQ UDWH RI SHUFHQW EDUH Vhunger for many Zimbabweans, ZANU-PF leaders continued to believe intheir partys popularity and treated the upcoming election results as a foregoneconclusion.13

ZANU-PF began to be too relaxed about things, said Ben Moyo, along-time Mugabe supporter and former Member of Parliament. We thoughtthe people would vote for us, as they always do.14

Many MDC supporters and outside observers shared this expectation.

In December 2007, three months before the election, one Zimbabwean closeto the MDC, whose name has been withheld to protect his safety, told me thathis party was dead and that the opposition needed to be rebuilt completely from the grassroots. This general complacency, however, created a tiny op-portunity.

How Sham Elections Become Real Elections

An opposition party can turn a sham multi-party election of an elec-toral authoritarian state into a real vote if it can develop and disseminate analternative political narrativeif it can prove that the will of the people is not

what the ruling party claims. In order to create an alternative narrative, the op-position needs both facts that support its case and a means to communicate itsnarrative to the people and the outside world.

In the case of Zimbabwe, the facts emerged only because an overcon-GHQW =$18 3) DIWHU DUUHVWLQJ DQG EHDWLQJ 0'& SUHVLGH-gan Tsvangirai in March 2007, bowed to regional pressure and consented totalks on ensuring a fair election in 2008. While the talks eventually crumbled,ZANU-PF made one minor, seemingly symbolic concession: polling places

would post a tally of local results at the close of the polls.15 With this small concession, ZANU-PF opened the door to a compet-

ing electoral narrative: that MDC had carried the vote. When polls for theMarch 29, 2008, preliminary election closed, the Zimbabwe Election Support


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Network (ZESN), a consortium of Zimbabwean civil society organizations,launched an effort to duplicate an election-monitoring strategy called SampleBased Observation16 that had been effective in the 2007 election in Sierra Le-one.17 A network of 8,900 trained poll watchers tracked the results posted atHDFK RI D VWUDWLHG VDPSOH RI SROOLQJ SODFHV DQG-mon even in rural Zimbabwe, to transmit the data to ZESN headquarters inHarare. With the raw data secured, ZESN discovered that MDC had won amajority of parliament seats and possibly the presidency itself.18 Extrapolating from its sample, ZESN projected 49.4 percent of the vote for Tsvangirai to

SHUFHQW IRU 0XJDEH 7KH SHUFHQW FRQGHQFH LQWpercentage of the vote was 47.0 percent to 51.8 percent. While ZANU-PFhas never revealed a true tally, ZESNs sampling model suggests that there is

a credible chance that a full and proper count of the ballots might have given Tsvangirai the 50 percent majority required to claim victory.19 Before ZANU-PF intimidation could begin, ZESN had already used cell phones to send itsprojection throughout Zimbabwe and around the world. 20

This competing narrative stripped ZANU-PF of the ability to tidily rig the election. There are three options for rigging an election: controlling thenames on the ballot, forbidding or dissuading citizens from voting, and manip-ulating the tally. ZANU-PF had already allowed MDC candidates on the ballot,

and while it had intimidated voters, the large turnout for MDC suggests thatit had not done nearly enough to frighten away the masses angered by Zim-babwes economic disaster. Thus, vote counting presented the only remaining opportunity to rig the election, and with ZESNs projection, that corruptionpoint quickly evaporated.

Faced with the worldwide wireless distribution of ZESN data show-ing that it did not have public support, and having also lost its best chances tocleanly rig the election, ZANU-PF retreated for just over one month, refus-LQJ WR UHOHDVH RIFLDO SROO QXPEHUV :KHQ WKH =LPEDEZ-VLRQ =(& QDOO\ UHOHDVHG WKH UHVXOWV RQ 0D\ Wfraudulent, but were nevertheless extraordinary: MDC had won control of parliament. While ZEC did not award Morgan Tsvangirai the majority neededWR FODLP WKH SUHVLGHQF\ WKH =(61 DQDO\VLV DSSHDUV WR-FLDO WDOO\ =(& DZDUGHG 7VYDQJLUDL D SOXUDOLW\ RIERWWRP HQG RI =(61V SHUFHQW FRQGHQFH LQWHUYDOUXQRII HOHFWLRQ IRU WKH UVW WLPH LQ =LPEDEZHDQ KLV21 While MDC hadnot taken the presidency, and the true election tally remains unknown, ZESNsefforts had forced ZANU-PF to make major concessions. Election monitor-ing had worked. The votes power reached its peak, and then the guns cameinto play.


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How State Power Can Thwart Democracy With a Presidential runoff looming and MDC supporters exuberant,

Mugabe faced the prospect of losing power in an electoral revolution. How-ever, ZANU-PF retained a critical weapon: control over the organs of statepower and paramilitary organizations, and a willingness to use them to bru-WDOL]H 0'& VXSSRUWHUV DQG LQXHQFH WKH HOHFWLRQVSROLFH UHSHDWHGO\ DUUHVWHG DQG EHDW 7VYDQJLUDL DQGZANU-PF, war veterans, and the police murdered 180 MDC supporters andWRUWXUHG RU EHDW RWKHUV SHRSOH HG WK22

Five days before the runoff, ZANU-PF accomplished its objective:Morgan Tsvangirai, who had taken asylum in the Dutch Embassy, announcedhis withdrawal from the campaign, saying that he could no longer ask Zimba-

bweans to vote when that vote could cost them their lives. 23 Mugabe wonthe newly uncontested presidential election, yet still faced an MDC majority inparliament and the prospect of a Tsvangirai premiership.

A few African leaders, most notably Patrick Levy Mwanawasa of Zam-bia and Ian Khama of Botswana, joined Western leaders in condemning the

violence, but far more African leaders declined to condemn Mugabe. South African President Thabo Mbeki, asked by the South African DevelopmentCommunity (SADC) to mediate, appeared particularly quiet, ostensibly in the

service of diplomacy. Whatever the moral dimension of his silence, as the SADC mediatorand President of the regions dominant power, Mbeki was critical to negotiat-ing a power sharing agreement between Mugabe and Tsvangirai. Negotiatorsfaced formidable questions. Who would wield executive power, the presidentRU WKH SULPH PLQLVWHU" 0RUH VSHFLFDOO\ ZKR ZRXOG FRapparatus? Would MDC get the guns to accompany its votes?

MDC correctly discerned that without possession of at least oneof the ministries controlling the use of force, any power it gained would beephemeral. With the once independent judiciary full of ZANU-PF partisans,and television and radio still under ZANU-PF control, only MDC controlof the police or army could create the checks and balances needed for truepower sharing.24 Thus, control over at least some of the levers of force becameMDCs central demand.

Ultimately, Mbeki negotiated a deal, signed on September 15, 2008,that made Mugabe President and Tsvangirai Prime Minister. The deal also gave15 ministries to ZANU-PF, 13 to Tsvangirais faction of MDC, called MDC-T,and three to the dissident MDC-M faction controlled by Arthur Mutambara.Most importantly, while ZANU-PF retained control of the military, MDC

would control the Ministry of the Home Affairs, which includes the police. 25 Despite signing the agreement, Mugabe refused to actually relinquish

control of the police. For six months the agreement remained unimplemented,


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as ZANU-PF insisted that control of Home Affairs should be shared by ZANU-PF and MDC. MDC rejected this proposal and appealed to SADC fora resolution ordering the implementation of the signed agreement. Stunningly,SADC sided with ZANU-PF, ruling that there should be shared control of theMinistry of Home Affairs. This decision led MDC to call for the removal of

Thabo Mbeki from his role as mediator. In a heavily publicized spat, Tsvangiraicalled SADC leaders cowards, and MDC Secretary General Tendai Biti senta letter to Mbeki condemning the SADC ruling as a nullity. Mbeki responded

with a letter to Tsvangirai scolding MDC for its contempt for the decisionsof its immediate African neighbors and insisting that only shared control of the police could solve issues of violence and intimidation.26 In February 2009,

Tsvangirai swore in a new cabinet when MDC, under pressure from SADC,

relented and allowed joint control of the Ministry of Home Affairs. 27

What now? Advancing democracy after government violence As of early 2010, the power sharing government remains tenuously

in place. Votes have won MDC a seat at the table, but ZANU-PFs guns havekept Robert Mugabe at its head. While the MDC ministers have enjoyed somePDMRU HFRQRPLF VXFFHVVHV PRVW QRWDEO\ HQGLQJ K\SHULQunlikely to displace Mugabe as long as ZANU-PF controls the state security

organs. Even a new election may not improve MDCs position as long as ZA-NU-PF retains the ability to undermine the vote with state violence. Indeed,Mugabes recent call for a new election suggests that ZANU-PF believes they

would have the upper hand in a vote. 28 In an environment where organized violence will likely mar any election, a change of power at the ballot box isunlikely without support from outside actors. The question is whether theseactors have the will and the tools to bolster Zimbabwean democracy.

Speaking out: International condemnation of the Mugabe regime Western criticism can be counterproductive

For years, western governments have spoken out against the ZANU-PF regime. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and his predecessor Tony Blair have been particularly emphatic in their condemnations, and formerU.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice denounced the sham election andsham power-sharing talks.29

While condemnation appears tactically conservative, most Westerncriticism of ZANU-PF may be counterproductive. Mugabe uses his victory over colonialism to bolster his legitimacy. Therefore, when Western leaderssnub Mugabe, they provide fodder for state propaganda portraying him as thescourge of the colonizers. For instance, one brochure from the runoff asked,What do the Americans and British want from Zimbabwe? Our Minerals! 30

Inversely, MDCs support from western governments makes it suspect


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in the eyes of some Zimbabweans. The more vocal Western governmentssupport for MDC is, the more plausible appear Mugabes claims that MDCis a puppet of the Western world. Elias Mudzuri, MDCs national organizing VHFUHWDU\ EHOLHYHV WKH JRRG RXWZHLJKV WKH KDUP :H-ing for democracy, but we need the West to help us, said Mudzuri. I am notashamed to say this. I am not a puppet of the West. 31

A few Western countries have stronger ground from which to criticizeZANU-PF. In particular, the Nordic countries enjoy credibility with Zimba-EZHDQV EHFDXVH RI WKHLU QDQFLDO VXSSRUW IRU =$18 3)-tionary era.32 Thus, an EU strategy wherein Nordic countries take the lead incriticizing Mugabe might be more effective than a campaign led by Britain.

African criticism resonates with ZimbabweansCriticism from African leaders holds greater credibility because Mugabecannot dismiss it as neocolonial. After years of silence, a number of promi-nent African leaders spoke up when the election turned ugly and the economy deteriorated. Former South African President Nelson Mandela condemnedMugabes tragic failure of leadership,33 and retired Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town Desmond Tutu accused Mugabe of gross violations of humanrights and demanded that he step down. 34 Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odin-

ga was even more forceful, comparing Mugabe to Idi Amin, former dictator of Uganda.35 These condemnations, made by two Nobel-winning heroes of thestruggle against Apartheid and one modernizing prime minister, suggest that

African leaders are increasingly agitated with ZANU-PF. Western criticism, while generally ineffective on its own, can be valu-

able when linked to these African voices. By joining with credible Africanpartners, Western leaders can make their condemnations clear while limiting the taint of colonialism on their remarks. For example, in April 2008, GordonBrown issued a joint statement with African National Congress leader JacobZuma denouncing Mugabes sham reelection.36 Similarly, when MDC agreedto enter the unity government, the U.S. State Department linked its commentsto African criticisms by saying:

The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) has agreed tojoin a unity government with Robert Mugabe under the condi-tions called for in the Southern African Development Commu-nity (SADC) January 27 Communiqu. The success or failureof such a government will depend on credible and inclusivepower sharing by Robert Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party. 37

Human rights organizations call for condemnation and human rights monitorsLeading human rights organizations endorse speaking out, even by


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Western countries. In Amnesty Internationals report Time for Accountabil-ity, the only recommendation to the international community is that all na-tions, and particularly those in Africa, should condemn ZANU-PFs humanrights violations.38 Human Rights Watch (HRW) shares this perspective, butIRFXVHV LWV UH RQ 6$'& +5: DUJXHV WKDW 6$'& PXVW VSHto avoid losing credibility on human rights, and should even dispatch humanrights monitors to Zimbabwe. 39 Monitors might diminish abuses and would, atthe very least, amplify international condemnations of ZANU-PF.

Refusing to admit monitors would provide further evidence to Zimba-bweans and their neighbors that ZANU-PF has no intention of holding freeelections. Along these lines, ZANU-PF has been pilloried throughout south-ern Africa for its refusal to admit a delegation of elders consisting of former

8 6 3UHVLGHQW -LPP\ &DUWHU IRUPHU 81 6HFUHWDU\ *HQHUGraa Machel, the widow of late Mozambique President Samora Machel andcurrent wife of Nelson Mandela.

Sanctions: How to punish ZANU-PF without punishing Zimbabweans Broad sanctions are politically impractical and morally dubious

While broad sanctions are another option, few Zimbabweans at homeor abroad support them, as they would further strain the Zimbabwean people

by cutting off vital economic supplies. Moreover, little chance remains of get-ting sanctions through the UN Security Council. China, Russia, and South Africa have repeatedly blocked Security Council efforts to impose sanctions.40 In fact, Zimbabwe has viewed partnering with China and Russia as an alterna-tive to cooperation with the West, going so far as to launch an initiative calledLook East. 41

Targeted sanctions punish ZANU-PF Targeted sanctions aimed at ZANU-PF leadership are more promis-

ing. Individual Western countries have already frozen the assets of Mugabeand other top ZANU-PF leaders and banned the leaders from their territory.Former U.S. Ambassador James McGee expressed support for targeted sanc-tions, saying:

Our sanctions really do work. I meet, with some regularity, with one of the top leaders here in Zimbabwe. And he hasabout $7 million of his funding thats been frozen because of U.S. sanctions against Zimbabwe. And he starts out each andevery meeting with the same thing: Where is my money?42

A 2008 expansion of targeted sanctions has increased the pressure onZANU-PF. In early December 2008, the U.S. Treasury froze the assets of two


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white Zimbabwean businessmen, a Malaysian urologist, and a Thai business- ZRPDQDOO RI ZKRP SOD\HG PDMRU UROHV LQ QDQFLQJ WKH43 If businesspeople believe that working with the Mugabe regime may endangerWKHLU SHUVRQDO DVVHWV KHOG LQ :HVWHUQ EDQNV 0XJDEGLIFXOW WR QDQFH KLV UHJLPH

While one should not overstate the impact of targeted sanctions, theattention ZANU-PF has paid to getting them lifted indicates the sanctionshave had an impact. Additionally, sanctions have given MDC leverage. In re-cent negotiations concerning new elections and the future of the power shar-ing agreement, ZANU-PF negotiators demands have centered on getting MDC to persuade the European Union to lift sanctions on ZANU-PF of-FLDOV :KLOH LW LV QRW FOHDU WKDW 0'& KDV VXFK LQX

Western powers, and perhaps MDC, something tangible they can give ZANU-PF in return for major concessions. 44

Encirclement: An African solution to ZANU-PF intransigence A blockade may be effective but illegal

Zimbabwe is landlocked, so economically isolating it would require nei-ther Security Council approval of sanctions nor a SADC endorsement, thoughboth are desirable. Instead, an agreement among the four countries that bor-

der ZimbabweBotswana, Zambia, South Africa, and Mozambiquecouldstrangle the Mugabe regime. While closing borders to all trade might exert agreater impact on the hungry Zimbabwean population than the elites, closing ERUGHUV WR WUDIF LQ DUPV OX[XU\ LWHPV DQG QRQ HV-sure ZANU-PF without further devastating the population. Also, an allianceRI WKH IRXU ERUGHULQJ FRXQWULHV FRXOG HIIHFWLYHO\ IRUfrom leaving the country, forcing them to live to a greater extent with theeconomic consequences of their policies. Archbishop Tutu has endorsed ele-PHQWV RI WKLV SODQ E\ XUJLQJ WKH IRXU QHLJKERUV WR LP45

This approach faces two obstacles. First, a blockade of this sort may vi-olate the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which guarantees landlockedcountries access to the sea and to which all four bordering countries haveagreed.46 Second, at least one of Zimbabwes neighbors may refuse to close theborders. While Botswana, whom Zimbabwe has accused of harboring MDCmilitary training camps,47 and Zambia may support a blockade, South Africaand Mozambique likely will hesitate. Any effective action must have South $IULFDQ VXSSRUW EHFDXVH SHUFHQW RI =LPEDEZHV LPSRUBeitbridge crossing with South Africa.48 New South African President JacobZuma is far less sympathetic to Mugabe than Thabo Mbeki, saying, We can-not agree with ZANU-PF. We cannot agree with them on values. 49 However,Zuma is still unlikely to support a blockade, having recently urged Tsvangiraito make concessions in power sharing while relaxing pressure on Mugabe.50


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South African labor can close the border The powerful Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU),

which supports fellow trade unionist Tsvangirai, has contemplated forcibly closing the Beitbridge border for some time. 51 While COSATU could not im-SOHPHQW D LJKW EDQ DQG SUREDEO\ FRXOG QRW HQIRUFHfood but blocks nonessential items, it could close the border without approvalfrom the South African government. It is unclear, however, whether COSATU ZRXOG EH ZLOOLQJ WR DOLHQDWH =XPD D WUDGH XQLRQLVWthe pain of a blockade on average Zimbabweans.

Mozambiques porous border remains a challengeMozambique provides the greatest obstacle to an effective encircle-

ment policy. Zimbabwes 1,231 kilometer border with Mozambique is its lon-gest, and Mozambiques governing Frelimo party is a longtime ZANU-PF ally.However, Mozambique has taken modest measures against Zimbabwe in thepast. In July 2008, Mozambique put strict controls on exports of foodstuffsand goods to Zimbabwe; 52 DQG DV FKROHULF UHIXJHHV RRGHG RYfollowing the runoff election, Mozambique placed all border stations on maxi-mum alert.53 While Mozambique would not consider a blockade now that thecholera epidemic has ended and political violence in Zimbabwe has eased, its

actions in 2008 suggest that, in the event of a renewed crisis, a blockade is apossibility. However, regardless of will, Mozambiques capacity to seal its vastborder with Zimbabwe is unclear.

Trade union solidarity: Laboring for MDC In addition to the threatened blockade of Beitbridge, the African labor

movement led the regional civil society response to the Zimbabwean crisis.During the runoff, longshoremen in South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia, and $QJROD UHIXVHG WR RIRDG ZHDSRQV IURP D &KLQHVH VKLS-bwe. While some African leaders may have hesitated to challenge a fellow headRI VWDWH DQG KHUR RI WKH JKW DJDLQVW FRORQLDOLVP

workers appear to have no such qualms. The efforts of trade unionists inthe SADC region have emboldened Zimbabwes own labor movement. Evenas Tsvangirai, the former labor leader, struggled to get the regime to makeFRQFHVVLRQV WKH =LPEDEZH &RQJUHVV RI 7UDGH 8QLRQV =major civil society concession from the government. On November 27, 2008,ZCTU called for mass action in protest of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabweslimit on cash withdrawals to Z$500,000 (about one-half the cost of a loaf of bread). In an unprecedented move, bank Governor Gideon Gono bowed topressure and raised the caps.54

Trade unions from across Africa have held meetings to address theZimbabwean crisis and coordinate strategy. Because labor has had the greatest


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success in organizing against ZANU-PF both inside and outside of Zimba-bwe, President Obama should consider showing support by sending a U.S. del-HJDWLRQ WKDW LQFOXGHV SURPLQHQW $PHULFDQ ODERU RImeeting on the subject. One possible member of such a delegation would be

AFL-CIO President John Sweeney, who has already sent a letter to Mugabeprotesting his abuse of labor. 55

War crimes indictments: Criminalizing oppression Another tactic suggested by Archbishop Tutu is threatening Mugabe

DQG RWKHU =$18 3) RIFLDOV ZLWK ZDU FULPHV LQGLFWPHQWstep aside. An indictment could further restrict Mugabes movement and mightlead other African leaders to distance themselves from him. Recent experience

provides mixed evidence on this approach. When the International CriminalCourt indicted Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir for war crimes, the AfricanUnion condemned the move and refused to extradite al-Bashir or restrict hismovement. However, some African countries have broken with this policy and

vowed to arrest al-Bashir if given the chance. For example, al-Bashir cancelleda planned trip to Uganda after Uganda Internal Affairs Minister Henry OryemOkello stated that he would ensure that he [Bashir] is arrested. 56

While indicting Mugabe is tempting, it is also risky. The threat of an

indictment may be useful, but an actual indictment might increase the resolveof Mugabe and his allies to cling to power. Although ZANU-PF could con-ceivably win amnesty from an MDC government as part of a deal to concedepower, they could never win amnesty from the International Criminal Court.Moreover, little precedent exists for a sitting president to surrender willingly to an international tribunal. While Charles Taylor of Liberia left power uponLQGLFWPHQW IRU ZDU FULPHV KH RQO\ HG RQFH KLV SRVuntenable. Al-Bashir, who faces no imminent military threat, remains securely in power. Perhaps the only example of a head of state or government willingly turning himself over to an international tribunal is former Kosovo Prime Min-ister Ramush Haradinaj; he voluntarily left his post to face war crimes charges,of which he was later acquitted.57 However, Haradinaj is an unusual case, be-cause his territory was under UN Administration when he surrendered.

Conclusion: Without guns, votes need external backing Today, the Zimbabwean crisis has waned and settled onto an uneasy

SODWHDX K\SHULQDWLRQ KDV HQGHG DQG SROLWLFDO Y-ever, another crisis appears inevitable, though not imminent: the 86-year-old0XJDEH ZLOO HYHQWXDOO\ ERZ WR WLPH LI KH GRHV QRW

The events of 2008 offer valuable lessons as to how Zimbabweans, as well asthe Southern African and international communities, can increase the likeli-hood that the next crisis is less traumatic and the outcomes more promising.


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First, while democratic movements cannot peacefully overthrow a re-gime committed to retaining power, willing to use force, and indifferent to thefate of the people, they can force a regime to a decision point by creating anddisseminating an alternative political narrative. By gathering and communicat-ing real election numbers, ZESN revealed the will of the people and forcedZANU-PF leaders to decide whether they were willing to use large-scale forceagainst their own people to retain power. Even when ZANU-PF used massive

violence, it could not eliminate the alternative political narrative. Thanks toZESN and its text messages and phone calls, Zimbabweans know how they

voted. Despite maintaining control of the police and military, ZANU-PF suf-fered from a crisis of legitimacy that forced it to make concessions to MDC.

When the next election comes, perhaps the 86-year-old Mugabe will have died,

and the will of the people as revealed by a vote could bring an even marginally more empathetic regime to heel. Either way, polling station monitoring is es-sential for establishing an alternative narrative.

Second, when vetoes hamper the Security Council, regional organiza-tions and individual nations can take actions to shape political outcomes inQHLJKERULQJ FRXQWULHV $ XQLHG HIIRUW E\ 6$'& RU HY-tions that border Zimbabwe, would pressure the Mugabe regime and poten-WLDOO\ IRUFH =$18 3) RIFLDOV WR OLYH ZLWK WKH FRQVHTX

=$18 3) RIFLDOV PD\ EH PRUH ZLOOLQJ WR DOORZ WUXO\ IUHand accept their outcomes if faced with a choice between being trapped in acountry-sized prison or yielding power.

Third, governments and NGOs are not the only actors in internationalaffairs; regional civil society organizations, and even domestic organizationsLQ QHLJKERULQJ FRXQWULHV FDQ LQXHQFH D FRXQWU\V LQhas the ability, independent of the government of South Africa, to blockadeWKH %HLWEULGJH FURVVLQJ DQG LQLFW D VHYHUH HFRQRPregime.

)LQDOO\ ZKLOH WKH :HVW FDQQRW DOZD\V ZLHOG PXFKevents in distant parts of the world, it can support regional efforts to solvecrises by lending technical advice or support to civil society organizations, co-ordinating statements with regional leaders, and carefully selecting its spokes-men.

As both the Zimbabwean opposition and the international community prepare for the as yet unscheduled upcoming election, they would do well toOLVWHQ WR WKH ZRUGV RI 5REHUW 0XJDEH KLPVHOI 5HDI-PHQWV IROORZLQJ WKH UVW URXQG RI WKH HOHFWLRnot going to give up our country for a mere X on a ballot. How can a ballpointSHQ JKW ZLWK D JXQ"58 Perhaps the pen alone is not mightier than the sword.But when informed Zimbabwean voters wield that pen with the support of southern African civil society, targeted international sanctions, an observant


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international criminal court, and compassionate neighboring nations, the bat-WOH EHWZHHQ YRWHV DQG JXQV PD\ DW OHDVW EHFRPH D ID

Endnotes1 Martin Meredith, Our Votes, our Guns: Robert Mugabe and the Tragedy of Zimbabwe . (New York:

Public Affairs, 2008).2 Ibid.3 Ibid.4 Mugabe says Zimbabwe Power sharing has short life; signals new elections,CNN News ,

December 12, 2009. http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/12/12/zimbabwe.

mugabe.elections/index.html (accessed February 18, 2010).5 Michael Bratton and Eldred Masunungure, Zimbabwes Long Agony, Journal of Democracy

19:4 (2008): 41-55.6 Ibid., 52.7 Paul Salopek, Absence of Street Fury in Zimbabwe Puzzles Analysts, Chicago Tribune ,

May 1, 2008.8 Mugabe loses Zimbabwe referendum, CBC News , November 11, 2000, http://cbc.ca/

world/story/2000/02/15/zimbabwe000215.html (accessed December 8, 2008).

9 Larry Diamond. Thinking about Hybrid Regimes. Journal of Democracy 13:2 (2002): 32.10 Michael Bratton and Eldred Masunungure, Popular Reactions to State Repression:Operation Murabatsvina in Zimbabwe, Afrobarometer Working Paper no. 59, April2006, http://www.afrobarometer.org/papers/AfropaperNo59.pdf (accessed March 21,2010).

11 Election halted in Zimbabwe, BBC News , March 11, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1865829.stm (accessed February 18, 2010).

12 Straw condemns Zimbabwe elections, BBC News , April 5, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4412763.stm (accessed February 18, 2010).,QDWLRQ KLWV SHUFHQW Zimbabwe Independent , May 15, 2008, http://www.

zimbabwesituation.com/may17_2008.html#Z1 (accessed February 18, 2010).14 Jon Lee Anderson, The Destroyer, New Yorker , October 27, 2008.15 Sarah Childress, People Power: In Africa, Democracy Gains Amid Turmoil, Wall Street

Journal , June 18, 2008.16 Zimbabwe Election Support Network, ZESN poll projections on March 29 presidential

elections, March 31, 2008, http://www.kubatana.net/html/archive/elec/ 080331zesn.asp?sector=CACT&year=0&range_start=181 (accessed December 8, 2008).

17 Sarah Childress, People Power.18 Zimbabwe Election Support Network, ZESN poll projections on March 29 presidential

elections.19 Zimbabwe Election Support Network, ZESN poll projections on March 29 presidential

elections.


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20 Sarah Childress, People Power.21 Sarah Childress, People Power.22 Amnesty International, International Secretariat. Zimbabwe: Time for Accountability , (2008).23 An Election with Only One Candidate; Zimbabwe, The Economist , June 28, 2008.24 Human Rights Watch, A Call to Action: The Crisis in Zimbabwe, 2008, http://www.hrw.

org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/zimbabwe0807 (accessed December 8, 2008).25 Zimbabwe Deal: Key points, BBC News , September 15, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/

hi/africa/7617731.stm (accessed December 8, 2008).26 Mbeki and MDCs Explosive Exchange, The Star , November 2, 2008, http://www.iol.

co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=84&art_id=vn20081128052242195C129532 (accessed December 8, 2008).

27 Zimbabwe cabinet sworn in, Al-Jazeera , February 13, 2008, http://english.aljazeera. net/

news/africa/2009/02/2009213151548944420.html (accessed February 18, 2010).28 Mugabe says Zimbabwe Power sharing has short life.CNN News 29 Sonja Pace, US says well past time for Zimbabwes Mugabe to step down, Voice of

America News , December 6, 2008, http://www.voanews.com/english/2008-12-05-voa30.cfm (accessed December 8, 2008).

30 ZANU-PF Campaign Pamphlet, 100 Reasons to Vote for Cme. Robert Mugabe, (2008).31 Jon Lee Anderson, The Destroyer.

,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULVLV *URXS 1HJRWLDWLQJ =LPEDEZHV 7UDQVLW

51, May 21, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5446 (accessedDecember 8, 2008).33 Mandela condemns Mugabe failure, BBC News , June 25, 2008, http://news.bbc.

co.uk/2/hi/africa/7474561.stm (accessed December 8, 2008).34 Go Mugabe or face arrest - Tutu, BBC News , December 5, 2008, http://news.bbc.

co.uk/2/hi/africa/7766657.stm (accessed December 8, 2008).35 Foster Dongozi, Kenyan Premier Pessimistic about Outcome of Zimbabwes Power-

Sharing Talks, The Standard , November 30, 2008.36 Brown, Zuma unite on Zimbabwe, The Age , April 24, 2008, http://www.theage.com.

au/news/world/brown-zuma-unite-on-zimbabwe/2008/04/24/1208743150768.html(accessed December 8, 2008).

37 Robert Wood, Statement on the Zimbabwe unity government, February 3, 2009, http:// www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/02/115909.htm (accessed February 18, 2010).

38 Amnesty International, International Secretariat.39 Human Rights Watch Press Release, SADC: Take Action to End Zimbabwe Rights

Crisis, August 13, 2007, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/08/13/sadc-take-action-end-zimbabwe-rights-crisis (accessed December 8, 2008).

40 Paul Salopek, Absence of Street Fury in Zimbabwe Puzzles Analysts.41 Bayano Valy, Zimbabwe: Look East Policy Pays Dividends President, The Herald ,

March 27, 2008, http://allafrica.com/stories/200803270243.html (accessed November 2,2008).


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