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Current Trends in Philosophical Research The aim of this report is to identify a current hot-topic in Philosophy by assessing recent research trends in well-regarded academic journals. I. Methodology I have primarily focussed my search on the top-philosophical journals identified in a recent Research Methods exercise (see separate exercise: "Top Ten Philosophy Journals"). These journals include, but are not exclusive to: Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical

Review, Nos, Mind, Analysis and Philosophical Studies. I have also utilised Google Scholar to give a quantitative metric by which I can judge the influence and academic relevance of the research. It must be noted that I have restricted my search to the beginning of 2007. Furthermore,

my criterion of selection for a top-journal is restricted to Anglophonic, generalist journals that primarily focus on analytical Philosophy. II. Existing Trend in Philosophy A broad overview suggests that the majority of research falls under metaphysics, epistemology, logic, language and mind. There are, for instance, noticeably fewer papers in ethics, aesthetics, politics and religion. Closer inspection reveals research trends in modal epistemology, propositional attitudes and philosophical issues around the natural sciences (fictionalism in biology and microessentialism in chemistry). The focus of this report will be on a different research trend: a reappraisal of monism (materialism) of the natural world; the idea that all of reality is composed of one substance. This can be contrasted with a pluralist view that reality is composed of many different individual things. Monism has a long history in philosophy. The pre-Socratics, Leibniz (the Monadology), Spinoza (substance monism) all held central monist views about reality. Such views have fallen out of favour with contemporary philosophy (although, it is taken more seriously in Philosophy of Mind). This is one reason why this trend is worthy of analysis. Why should such a view suddenly become popular again? What are the motivations for pursuing such an argument? Can any useful research result? Understanding the re-emergence of a relatively derided philosophical view is not the only reason to give this trend attention. It is also worth noting that the literature displays satisfying research progression over a five-year period, some interesting related research and highly-cited papers in top-ranked journals. III. Monism This current research trend appears to begin with a paper by Jonathan Schaffer, From Nihilism to Monism (2007a). Schaffer argues that mereological nihilism, a view that all

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concrete objects are simple, can lead to existence monism. This is the view that the only concrete object is reality itself. It is worth noting at this point that Schaffer, who also wrote the entry on Monism for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2007b), is a self-proclaimed monist.

Theodore Sider directly addresses Schaffers argument in his paper Against Monism (2007). Sider argues that two-forms of monism, existence monism and priority monism are poor models for explaining statespace, arguing that pluralism is the only suitable model. It is clear that Sider approaches this argument from a commonsense standpoint. He declares himself to be an avowed pluralist and, in a follow up paper, Monism and statespace structure (2008), openly laments the fashion for exotic ontologies. In this paper Sider further argues that monism (particularly priority monism) is more than likely false as it is incompatible with our best account of intrinsicality. Kelly Trogdon (2009) sides with Monism (and Schaffer) by arguing, in her paper Monism and Intrinsicalities, that the form of intrinsicality Sider uses is fundamentally flawed. Instead, she attempts to postulate a new form of intrinsicality that is both compatible with

priority monism and priority pluralism; thus undermining Siders argument by making monism as plausible as pluralism. It is at this point that the literature starts to show research that is not directly concerned

with the central thesis. For instance, Shamik Dasguptas Arguments Against the Existence of Material Individuals (2009) argues, as the title suggests, that there are no material

individuals. Citing Schaffer, he proposes an individual-less view called generalism. This is not strictly monism but, as Dasgupta acknowledges, generalism does share similar properties. Ultimately, Dasgupta uses the monism argument as a jumping off point to discuss other revisionist metaphysics, mereology, mereological nihilism and his notion of generalism.

Schaffers paper Monism: The Priority of the Whole (2010) carries on from his original argument regarding monism. However, Schaffer now shifts his focus towards priority monism and the notion that there are physical and modal considerations for the monistic view. He argues that that the cosmos forms an entangled system, which should be treated as an irreducible whole. From a modal perspective, mereology allows for the

possibility of atomless gunk something that can be divided infinitely. For Schaffer, this undermines the pluralist argument of being (2010). Monism: The Priority of the Whole is the most cited paper in this discourse: 85 (source:

GoogleScholar.com). A quick overview shows Schaffers paper has also been cited in subsequent books, such as The Universe as We Find It by John Heil (2012) and Re-Emergence: Locating Conscious Properties in a Material World by Gerald Vision (2011). Although, from the citations, there appears to be no direct attempt in any of the journals to address his argument. This may suggest that the central thesis, in its purist form, is somewhat exhausted. However, there are a few papers that begin to discuss related issues. One such example is Being and Almost Nothingness by Kris McDaniel (2010). McDaniel, a pluralist, partly

cites Schaffers argument when addressing the problem monism has with the

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deontological status of entities of nothingness (gaps, holes, spaces etc). For the monist,

there either is or is not. Nothing entities should not exist; instead they would be considered continuations of the whole.

Another argument that appears to use Schaffer as a jumping off point is Karen Bennetts (2011) Construction area (no hard hat required). She states that Schaffers argument is too extreme. Bennett acknowledges that she is not a monist but does intend to use

Schaffers conceptual framework in understanding the building relations of objects. For Bennett, building relations are a class of things that include composition, constitution,

realisation, micro-basing and emergence. Bennetts central argument is that building relations may be monistic as they are determinates of a common determinable. To put it simply, there is only one building relation.

There is also an apparent movement to a more scientific view of monism. Alyssa Neys (2012) paper The Status of our Ordinary Three Dimensions in a Quantum Universe is a prime example of this. Ney attempts to give an ontological framework to three-dimensional space through a quantum mechanical model. This paper is concerned with our understanding of how traditional philosophical issues may be changed by recent scientific understandings. Ney acknowledges the role monism plays in our conception of reality. Within her framework she tries to subsume it under quantum mechanics as an expression of a wave function. By this point, monism has ceased to be the central thesis. However, the literature does give some clues as to where this research is capable of proceeding in the future. Firstly, there are still plenty of traditional areas of philosophy that could applied to monism. The

high number of citations of Schaffers Monism: The priority of the whole is an indication that his thesis is being seriously considered by the philosophical community at large.

Schaffers paper may represent a peak in a pure argument for monism but that does not mean its influence will not be found in other related areas of philosophy, such as mereology, composition, constitution, dependence, fundamentality, grounding and supervenience. However, the main observation I wish to make concerns the relationship between metaphysics and the natural sciences. Schaffer, Sider and Bennett all make reference to the natural sciences in their papers. It is

clear that related research has started to move into this domain. Of course, theres the danger that the original argument will be watered-down so much as to be merely a footnote in future proceedings. However, even if this were the case, there will remain opportunity for Schaffer et al, in the future, to incorporate some of this research into a more traditional philosophical debate. I acknowledge the difficulty in combining scientific and philosophical methodology. Identifying a clear demarcation between metaphysics and empirical science, whilst still retaining your original philosophical argument, is a difficult one. However, I do believe, historically, science and philosophy have positively influenced each other in our understanding the natural world. If the current trend continued, I would hope to see future debates in monism and pluralism that incorporate such scientific areas of study as quantum mechanics and particle physics. It would be interesting, for instance, to hear what Schaffer, Sider and Togden would make

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of the conclusions coming out of CERN. In particular, how would knowledge of an elementary particle as fundamentally different as a Higgs Boson (a waveform that gives mass to the universe) sit in this debate? Mereologically, can one divide a Higgs Boson wave form infinitely? Would this add extra weight to the atomless gunk argument? I imagine this would be an argument Sider would pick up in light of his appeal to a scientific common-sense framework. IV. Conclusion A monistic view of reality may be an unpopular and difficult position to hold but it is interesting to see how such a position can still develop today. This particular argument appears to be the pursuit of a rather small number of philosophers, and mostly instigated by Jonathan Schaffer. I hope I have shown how the trend has evolved since 2007. How mereological nihilism has been argued to be a form of monism (existence and priority); whether monism can be explained in terms of statespace and intrinsicality; the monism inspired development of generalism; the relationship between monism, deontology and building relations; and, finally, explaining monism in terms of quantum mechanics and other advanced physics. I also hope that my prediction will come to pass: that a fruitful future avenue of research will embrace current research in the natural sciences. References Bennett, Karen. "Construction area (no hard hat required)." Philosophical studies 154.1 (2011): 79-104. Dasgupta, Shamik. "Individuals: An essay in revisionary metaphysics." Philosophical studies 145.1 (2009): 35-67. Heil, John. The Universe as We Find It. OUP Oxford, 2012.

McDaniel, Kris. "Being and Almost Nothingness." Nos 44.4 (2010): 628-649. Ney, Alyssa. "The Status of our Ordinary Three Dimensions in a Quantum Universe."

Nous (2012).

Schaffer, Jonathan. "From nihilism to monism." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85.2 (2007a): 175-191.

Schaffer, Jonathan. (2007b). Monism. Available online at http://plato.stanford. edu/entries/monism/.. Schaffer, Jonathan. "Spacetime the one substance." Philosophical Studies 145.1 (2009): 131-148. Schaffer, Jonathan. "Monism: The priority of the whole." Philosophical Review 119.1 (2010): 31-76. Sider, Theodore. "Against monism." Analysis 67.1 (2007): 1-7.

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Sider, Theodore. "Monism and statespace structure." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62.1 (2008): 129-150. Skiles, Alexander. "Trogdon on monism and intrinsicality." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87.1 (2009): 149-154. Trogdon, Kelly. "Monism and intrinsicality." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87.1 (2009b): 127-148. Vision, Gerald. Re-Emergence: Locating Conscious Properties in a Material World. MIT Press, 2011.