Double TruthContents

Acknowledgments ix

JOI IN SA LLIS 1 Doublings l

2 Flight of Spirit 19 -

3 The Question of Origin 37

4 The Truth That Is Not of Knowledge 57

5 Interrupting Truth 71

6 Deformatives: Essentially Other Than Truth 85

7 Spacing Imagination 107

8 Intentionality and Imagination 137

9 The Truth of Tragedy 157

(10 Mimesis and the End of Art 171 Ö

1 1 The Place of Wonder 19]

Index 211

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PlŒSS ti

Vll

he contrary, it was Platocond of the three long dis-ue. What Timaeus intro-1 (the intelligible) and theosed to the first kind dou- 10ing the simple opposition1e third kind-called, for -

y, untranslatably, XtoP- Mimesis and theogs of the second kind to

generated things. Only by End of Artngs to hold to being evenven though they are not.of bastard reckoning-as

md yet to be. ConsideredEble book, the XLopa can be r.,

I he Greek view of art as essentially mimetic remained ef-her of opposites, of oppo-fective throughout much of the history of metaphysics. Yet, at leasttal if such language couldby the time of Kant, of romanticism, and of German idealism, this clas-s possible is the yoking to-sical concept seems to have lost much of its force and to have given wayto remain determinative ofto an approach that focuses on the creativity of the artist. on the naturalthe entire generated,sen-

. poetic genius, rather than on the talent for fashioning mimetic reproduc-ontological contradiction.tions öf nature. Thus Kant draws the contrast in the Critique ofJudgment:like the truth of tragedy,"Everyone is agreed that genius is to be wholly opposed to the spirit ofeus the truth of tragedy is

. mimesis [thus I translate, back in the direction of Greek. Kant's wordologically.Nachahmungsgeist]."' In romanticism the corresponding contrast be-claim voiced in the Lawstween genius and talent becomes virtually a commonplace.-bring the discourse on the

óxu;. of its vokrda, then 84evaluation of mimesis there is also a dou-bling by which another, superior form of mimesis is both opposed to theaim to compose a tragedy,

--

devalued form and put forth as essential to art. Thus, with Kant, despiteare his words:the opposition of genius to the spirit of mimesis. there occurs a certain

best of our power, are reinstatement of mimesis: "art can only be called beautiful if we are con-ast beautiful and best; at scious of it as art while yet it looks likey [als Natur aussieht]."timesis of the most beau- Similarly, in discussing the role of classical models in art. Kant notes thatto be actually the truest they are to serve as "models not to be copied but to_heJmitateil [thus I

translate, in the spirit of English romanticism: Muster nicht der Nach-

1. I. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1974), 161.2. See John Spencer Hill, ed., Imagination in Coleridge (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield,

1978), 133f.3. KritikderUrteilskraft, 159. Coa.t LL Le

171

172 MIMESIS AND THE END OF ART MIMESIS AND TllE END UE AKl I la

nachung, sondern der Nachahmung]."* Coleridge is explicit regarding First, then, I shall want to consider how the conceptof mimesis comes

this hierarchical opposition within mime$ ÛÍis doubling of mimesis: into play in the Greek determination of the essence of art. In this deter-

"Now an Imitation differs from a copy in this, that it of necessity implies mination the word mimesis comes to be taken as that which says what

and demands difference-whereas a copy aims at identity."' In Schopen- art jtself is. And yet, at th¾ it comes also to signify a certain

hauer the doubling is even more explicit: a false, concept-bound mime- reproduction that almost the entire history of metaphysics denounces as

sis is rejected precisely in order to reinstate mimesis in its genuine form, sham, as a mere phantom of genuine art, if not indeed of truth as such.

as repetition (Wiederholung) of the eternal ideas apprehended through I rom I lato to Nietzsche it will be said again and again: the poets lie.

purecontemplation.6 The delennination of mimesis as the essence of art is governed by

B_ut _wjth Igit would seem to be otherwise. Almost at the 1 egin- metaphysics as it opens in the thought of Plato and Aristotle. And yet, it

ning of the Aesthetics one finds an extended critique of the view of art as is not as though metaphysics is itself first determined and then simply

essentially mimetic. This critique one might easily take as definitively brought to hear on the determination of mimesis; for the opening of

excluding mimesis from the Hegelian view of art, in which case Hegel's metaphysics is itself inextricably bound up with mimesis, most notably

Aesthetics would, in this regard at least, constitute a decisive break with by way of such oppositions as that betweenimage and original. Precisely

the history of metaphysics rather than a completion, rather than the mo- because a concept of mimesis will already have been in play in the for-

ment in which the metaphysics of art is thought through to the end. mation of the very means, of the conceptual resources, by which it will

And yet-as I shall undertake to show-there is nalreak. Not then come to be determined, the concept of mimesis will neverhavebeen

on pieReil of mimesis come simply determined. It will neverhavebeen delimited once and for all be-

to be matched by a reinstatementof another, transformed mimesis, one yond all possibility of slippagebut will retain a certain indetermination,

so transformed that it goes unnamedas mimesis; but also, by reclaiming a certain play, outlining the space in which the reiterated determination

at a motTiiTTèTèTilTOTe¯eTTeiationof art as essentially of mimesis will be carried out, most notably the doublings in which an

mimetic, Hegel thinks this determination, the metaphysical determina- inferior mimesis is devaluedand opposed to a superior form of munesis.

tion of art, through to its end. In the end, thinking the metaphysics of art It is just such slippage that will prove to be in play when Hegel, having

through to its announces the end of art. excluded an inipoverised concept of mimesis, recoversanother mimesis

My concern is, then, with mimesis: with the word, with the concept, at a more profound level.I shall want to show, then, that through this re-

and with the thing itself. With the word-that is, with the Greek word covery Hegel thinks the Greek determinationof art through to its end and

that has been both transliterated into the modern European languages that he does so precisely in thinking through the end of art, in announc-

and translated into those languages, for instance, as Nachahmung and ing that art is at an end.

as imitation. With the concept-that is, with the meaning of the word, In the Afterword to "The Origin of the Work of Art" Heidegger dis-

or, rather, the configuration of meaning corresponding to the history of cusses a series of passages from Hegel's Aesthetics in which the end of

the transliteration and translation of the word. With mimesis itself, with art is declared. He refers to the Aesthetics as "the most comprehensive

the thing itself-if indeed onc can speak of the thing itself in the case reflection on art that the West possesses," explaining that its,compre-

of the operation that, reproducing the thing, setting alongside it an im- hensiveness derives, not (as one might suppose) from the wealth of ma-

age, opens the very opposition by which the itself of the thing itself terial discussed, but from the metaphysical basis on which the reflection

would be determined. proceeds. Then Heideggerconcludes: "A decision has not yet been made

regarding Hegel's declaration, for behind this declaration there stands

Western thought since the Greeks."' Heidegger's point is that Hegel's

4. Ibid., 163.

5. Imaginati<m in Coleridge, 91.

6. A. Schopenhauer, I)ie Welt als Wille und Vorstellwig (CottwVerlag/Insel-Verlag). vol. I, 7. M. Heidegger, ilolarege, vol. 5 of Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostennann,

§§ 36, 52.19¡7), 68.

174 MIMESIS AND THE END OF ART MIMESlS AND THE END OF ART 175

declaration of the end of art issues from the completion of the meta- must be banished from the philosophic city, at least as long as he is not

physical determination of art originating with the Greeks. What has not able to give an apology for poetry:

yet been decided is whether Hegel's declaration is to remain in force; or But as long as it is not able to make its apology, when we listen towhether there are means by which to rethink art outside the end an-

it, we shall chant these words to ourselves as a countercharm, tak-nouncedby Hegel. Can mimesis, the essence of art, be reconstituted out-

. . . ing care against falling back again into this love, which is childishside the closure of the metaphysics of art? and belongs to the many. We are;at all events, awiire that such po-

I shall deal, thus, with three themes: (I) the Greek determination etry must not be taken seriously as a serious thing laying hold ofof art as essentially mimetic; (2) liegel's recovery of mimesis at a level

truth, but that the man who hears it must be careful, fearing for the

that allows him to think the Greek determination ol art through to that .regime I wohulujm himself, and must hold what we have saidend at which the end of art can be declared; (3) the question of rethink- about poetry. (608a)ing art outside the metaphysical end.

But then-most ynaarkably---haville banished the..poet, having posed in

(a) the discourse on mimesis the opposition betweenphilosophy.andpoetry,having posed it as the opposition between truth and phantom, then the

Let me begin by recalling the familiar scene in Book 10 of the Repub- Republic itself ends in a way that tends to efface in deed that very oppo-

lic where Socrates, resuming what he calls "the old quarrel betweenphi- sition. Socrates tells a.story, that of Er's visit to the underworld It is a

losophy and poetry" (607b), poses to Glaucon the question: What is story not unlike those told by the poets, not unlike the story of Odysseus'

mimesis? Taking the example of a couch, Socrates distinguishes be- visit to the dead, to the phantoms in Hades, the story told by Homer in

tween the couch itself, that is, the el6og, and the many couches that are Book 11 of the Odyssey. It is as though, in orderlo_complete his strug-

fabricated by craftsmen. Then Socrates mentions another, a different sort gle against the poets, Socrates had himself_taJ1ecome..akiltd_oipoet. It is

of craftsman, one who "is not only able to make all implements but also as though, even after the philosophic denunciation of poetry, even after

makes everything that grows naturally from the earth." Socrates contin- it is set outside the truth and the poet banished from the city-it is as

ues: "And he produces all animals--the others and himself too-and, in though poetry continued 11aunt philmaphy as though philosophy

addition to that, produces earth and heavenand gods and everything in could neverquiiEgdone with the phantom of mimesis,

heavenand everything in Hades under the earth." Glaucon is amazed at Aristolle's discussion of mimesis is quiteúÜfiint. Ìt is set much more

this marvelous craftsman and even more so when told by Socrates that within predetermined limits, within a discourse on poetry as such that

he, Glaucon, could make all these things. Socrates explains: "You could does not open so directly upon ontology and politics. Precisely for this

fabricate them quickly in many way's and most quickly, of course, if you reason Aristotle's discussion has been, from the point of view of art, the

were willing to take a mirror and carry it around everywhere." Glaucon more effective, and indeed the Poetics has served as the paradigmatic

answers: "Yes, appearances but not beings in truth" (596c-e). statement, the classical formulation, of the mimetic characterof art.

Such appearances, such images cast in this craftsman's mirror, con- Let me review a few points of that formulation, taking it up at the level

slitute a third order, the order of mimesis. The ordering is ontological: where the question is that of mimesis as such and not yet specifically of

still further from the couch itself than the couches made by other crafts- the form assumed by mimesis in tragedy. The first point pertains to a pas-

men, the image produced by mimesis is an image only of the looks of a sage in which Aristotle asks about the origin of poetry. How is it, he asks,

couch-of its ¢úvmaµa, its phantom, if you will-not of its truth, that there came to be poetry? He answers that it arose from natural causes;

Socrates concludes: "Therefore, mimesis is surely far from the truth" hence, what later thought whϾgiÃÃn15ppifÏúiw d

(598b). It is because of this remoteness from the truth and because of the nature is thought by Aristotle as an openingwithin nature. Here is the pas-

corruptive power of the phantoms produced by mimesis that the poet sage in which he describes the first of the two natural origins of poetry:

176 MIMESIS AND THE END OF ARTMlMESIS AND THE END OF ART I / /

Mimesis is natural to man from childhood, one of his advantages cause of the cause: one takes delight in seeing images because one learns

over the lower animals being this, that he is the most mimetic and by looking at them and learning is naturally a source of pleasure for all

learns at first by mimesis. (1448b2) men. By looking at works of mimesis, one learns, with delight, aboutthings that, if looked upon directly, would be painful to see. Both the de-

So, mimesis belongs naturally to man from childhood, and poetry grows .. . light and the learning are constituted in the difference between the im-

out of the naturally mimetic activities. Aristotle notes that especially m , ,age and the thing itsell: instead of turning away in pain, one looks at the

childhood one learns by mimesis. llut, it one can learn by numesis, then. . . Image, with delight, and learns of the thing. The difference, the remote-

mimesis must have a capacity to disclose tlungs-that is, mimesis of . .ness of Ilie image f rom the truth, is no longer just a source of decep-

something must serve to bring that thing into view in such a way thal .. tion but rather is the very condition of the possibility of a certain kind

one comes to know it, that is, learns about it. One thinks, for example, of learning.of the way in which a child learns about things by drawing pictures of . . .

Yet only of a certain kmd of learnmg, one subject to a certam precon-

them; also.of the way in which children learn about doing certain things. ,

dition. Thus, Aristotle continues:

by playing mimetically at doing them. This connection between mime-

sis and disclosure is of utmost importance; for it indicates that mimesis If one lias not happened to see the thing before,one's pleasure is not

is not simply remote from the truth, that it does not merely produce due to the mimesis as such but to the technique or the color or some

phantoms that would mislead and hence corrupt the regime within the other cause. (1048b6)

soul; but rather that it produces images of the truth, images opening dis-.

This says: in order to be able to take delight in an image produced by

closively upon things in such a way that one can, through mimesis, learn .

.mimesis, in order to be capable of that delight that.arises in learnmg of

of those thmgs. . . the thing imaged, one must already haveseen the thing itself. Otherwise,

Let me refer next to the passage in which Aristotle goes on to iden- .whatever delight one may take m the image has a different source, has

tify the second cause of poetry: . .no connection with learmng. For-though Aristotle leaves it unsaid-

And it is also naturallor all to gt in works of mimesis. This is one can learn through the iinage only if it is recognized as an image of

shown by expenence:Though the thmgs themselves may be pamful the thing itsell; and such recognition requires that somehowone has seen

to see, we take delight in seeing the most perfect images [eixo'w) of the thing itself already, in advance,that one has already caught a glimpse

them, the forms for exampleof obscene beasts and corpses. The rea- of those obscene beasts and corpses themselves, even if only in turning,

son is this. Learning things gives great pleasure not only to philoso- in pain, away from them to their images. Poetry, arising in mimesis,

phers but also to the rest of mankind, however small their capa- would be subordinate to a prior vision of the truth.

city for it. The reason that we enjtfy necing images is that one is at The more radical import of this subordination is broached when, a bit

the same time learning and gathering what each thing is. . . . Further in the l'oetics, Aristotle focuses on the difference between poet

(1448b2-6)and historian:

The second cause of poetry is thus the delight, the pleasure, alTordedby The difTerencebetween a historian and a poet is this, that one tells

products of mimesis." Yet, again, it is the connection with learning that what happened and the other what might happen. Hence poetry is

is most significant, that is even the cause of the delight in imitation, the something more philosophic and serious than history, since its

statements are of the nature rather of universals, whereas those of

- ---

history are singulars. (1451b2-3)

8. In Aristotle's text it is not entirely clear whether the delght in númesis is to be considered

the second cause of poetry or whether it is to be taken together with the first-mentioned cause (that The differentiation turns on the difference between the things addressed

mimesis is natural) so that the second cause would then be the naturally possessed sense of har- by historian and poet, respectively. Whereas the historian speaks of the

mony and rhythm of which Aristotle goes on to speak. This ambiguily is noted by the edhorof the

Loeb edition of the Poetics.singular, of what has happened, the poet refersmimetically to what might

178 MIMESIS AND THE END OF ARTMlMESIS AND THE END OF ART 179

happen, to what is possible, to the umversal. Unlike those things of which that, according to the story he has just been telling, are gazed upon when

Herodotus tells in his history, the things of which the poet would bring the soul, prior to birth, follows in the train of the gods up through the

forth images are not things that one can simply see, as the historian may heavens. Whereas subsequently, after embodiment, none of the other

have seen the events of which he tells. But, if these things of which the eï8p can be seen by that sight provided through the body, the beautiful

poet speaks are not to be seen as such, then poetic mimesis, bringing forth is an exception: "For the beautiful alone this has been ordained, to be

an image, would not simply allow one to see better-for instance, with the most shining-forth and the most lovely [h‡arigsm10V E PCR KGÌ

delight rather than with pain-something that could also he seen with- pmrµúrnerovj" (250d). To l«Aóv names, then, the shining forth of be-

out the intervention of mimesis. On the contrary, mimesis would make ing, of what will be called the universal, its way of shining forth amidst

visible something that otherwise could not be seen at all, a thing itself the visible and the singular. If art is a matter of beauty, of bringing forth

withdrawn as such from sight.works that are beautiful, it is because the work of art is a privileged site

Now the questions begin to accumulate, open questions, left open by for the shining forth of being amidst the visible and the singular.

Aristotle, opening the very space in which subsequent thinking about art Through the Platonic and Aristotelian discussions of mimesis, there

will be played out,is established a certain axiomatics that will remain in force throughout

What of the subordination of poetic mimesis to a prior vision of the the history of metaphysics. This axiomatics is such as to assign to mime-

truth? What of the requirement that one must have seen the thing itself sis contrary values. These values may be taken as corresponding to the

in order to be able to recognize and to learn from the image? How is one two standpoints from which the mimetic relation between the thing it-

to have seen the thing if the thing cannot as such be seen? Is the prior self (i.e., the original) and its image may be considered. If one takes the

vision to be entrusted, as it were, to the mind's eye? Must art be preceded standpoint of theonginal en the image will represen wg'

by an intellectual vision of the universal? Would this not amount to sub- a derivativeness, a certain decline-in short, remoteness from truth, as

ordinating art to philosophy-at least in the sense that philosophy would in the discussions in Book 10 of the Republic. But if, on the other hand,

always need to be called upon to give art its ratification, to demonstrate one takes the standpointoLthe image and look_ a ithe

that the images producedby artistic mimesis are not deceptivephantoms image will have the positive value of being disclogve of tlye original.

but rather open upon the true things themselves? In this case philosophy It is an open question--and I shall leave it open--whether and how

and not poetry would be called upon to give the apology for poetry and these two contrary valuations of mimesis come to be thought together in

to recall to the city those poets thus ratified. Greek thought. However this may be, they do come eventually, in the

But even if subordinateto a prior vision and subject thus to such philo. history of metaphysics, to be thought together, within a certain unity.

sophic ratification, poetry remains distinct. For the poet does not tell of Such thinking reaches its culmination in Hegel's Aesthetics, where such

what might happen in general, simply'translating in his discoulse a v¡. unity is thought as the end of art.

sion of universality, but rather tells, for example, the story of Odysseus,

of Agamemnon, or of Oedipus. In a singular image the poet-some-how-constitutes a mimesis of the universal. Somehow, the poet lets the

(b)

universal shine forth in the singular images evoked by his words or, in

the case of the dramatic poet, brought upon the stage to voice those words Let me tum now to Hegel's Aesthetics, focusing, first of all, on Hegel's

and to enact what is bespoken.extended critique of the view that would identify mimesis as the aim, the

For all that is said in the Republic about the remoteness of the artistic end, of art. In Hegel's text mimesis, the word, has been translated into \

image from the truth, it is in another Platonic dialogue that this shining Nachahmung; and the mimesis in question is oriented to nature. Both \

forth of truth in the image is named. In the course of the Phaedrus, which the translation and the orientation mark, if they do not indeed produce,

takes place not at the limit of the city but entirely outside, in the coun- such a divergence from the Greek determination that it is little wonder

tryside, Socrates contrasts To Kuxóv (the beautiful) with the othef EÏÔT] that when Elegel addresses das Prinzip von der Nachahmung der Natur

180 MIMESIS AND THE END OF ART\l1\ŒSLS AND THE END UP AKI to i

his tone is utterly critical. Hegel's formulation of the principle marks the and whom one coubl imitate by carrying a mirror around everywhere;

divergence even more clearly: "According to this view, Nachahmung, in particular, it is not far from what Socrates said about the images pro-

as facility in copying)mchbilden] natural forms just as they are, in a duced by such a third-order craltsman. And yet, in declaring such images

way that correspo ds to them cõiilpletely, is supposed to constitute the i remote from truth. Socrates was attentive to their power, their power to

essential end [or: aim-Zweck] of art."*deceive md hence to coirupt: and it was because of this dangerous power

Th of the three criticisms that Hegel offers of this view begins of the products of mimesis that the poets had to be expelled from the

by indicating, still further, how impoverished the concept of mimesis philosophic cily. For I legel, on the other hand, there is no dangerat this

here employed really is. This determination of art as mimetic involves level. llegel's examples illustrate deception exercised, not on human

a purely formal en_d,namely, that whatever exists in the world is to be beings, but on monkeys and loves; and what for Socrates was a decep-

riiãdánd time, made over again. But such mere repetition. Hegel live power capable even of corrupting the soul becomes with Hegel a

observes, is superfluou_s labor, for whatever might be displayed by such matter of mere conjuring tricks, in which one might take a certain brief

mimesis-flowers, natural scenes, animals-we possess already in our pleasure but by which one would not for long be deceived.This differ-

gardens or in the countryside beyond. And those originals will always ence again indicates the divergence between such Nachahmung and

be superior, for mimetic art can only produceone-sided deceptions, the mimesis, the impoverishment that mimesis has undergone in the trans-

mere-Schein der Wirklichkeit-that is, the mere "look," a phantom of lation. One might thus expect that a certain doubling is to come into play,

what truly is, not the reality of life but only a pretence of life. Hegel a return of mimesis at a more profound level, in a more powerful form.

retells some stories about such deceptivecopying: the story of the grapes But not yet.

painted by Zeuxis and declared a triumph of art because living doves Hegel proceeds to the ( criticism: since the principle of Nachah-

pecked at them; and the story of Büttner's monkey, which ate away a mung is purely formal-prescribing simply that things be made over

picture of a beetle in Rösel's book Amusements ofInsects but then was again, copied-no place is given in art for objective beauty. For if this

pardonedby its master because it had proved how excellent the pictures principle is made the end of art, then there will be no question of the char-

in the book really were. Hegel summarizes by way of a bizarre compar- acter of what is supposed to be copied, but only a demand for the cor-

ison: "In sum, however, it must be said that, by mere Nachahmung, art rectness of the copy. As for the choice of objects and their beauty or

cannot stand in competition with nature, and, if it tries, it looks like augliness, everything will depend on merely subjective taste; that is, even

worrn trying to crawl after an elephant" (52/43). if art remains oriented to the beautiful, bound to produce copies only of

Despite the exotic examples, none of this is very far from what beautiful objects, the depisi n regarding which objects are beautiful will

Socrates said of that marvelous craftsman who could make everything be purely.subjective.'

*Yet, even aside fr o the question of objectivity, this principle of

9. G. W.F. Hegel,Ästhetik, ed.Friedrich Bassenge (West Berlin: Verlag das Europäische Buch,Nachalunung of nature is not to be accepted, says Hegel, "at least in this

1985), 1:51. English translation by T. M. Knox: Hegel's Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Ari (Oxford: general, wholly abstract form" (54/44). For though painting and sculp-

Oxford University Press, 1975), 1:41. Subsequent references to this work (all to voL 1) will be M'e toresent objects that appear similar to natural ones, such is not at

given by page number within the text, the first number referring to the German edition, the second ,

to the English translation. This text is based on the second edition published in 1842 by Negersal the case with works of architecture or even with works of poetry in-

student H. G. Hotho, which, in turn, was a slightly revised version of the 1835 edition that Hotho sofar as they are not confined to mere description. This is, then, the crux

put togetheron the basis of Hegel's notebook and several sets of student notes. Recently Hotho's of the third criticism: the principle is not universally applicable, if in-

editorial work-and indeed not only his failure to differentiale the various versions of the lectures, . .deed it is apphcable to any of the arts.

which Hegel presented four times m Berlin-has come under considerable criticism, most notably

from Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert (see "Ästhetik oder Philosophic der Kunst: Die Nachschriften Hegel's conclusion, delimiting succinctly the form of mimesis thus

undZeugnissezuHegelsBerlinerVoricsungen,"Ilegel-Studien26|l991):92-1]D).Inihepresent brought under criticism, differentiates it decisively from the end of art:

context it is important to note her abservation, based on the relevant student notes stil available' "The end [or: aim-Zweck] of art must therefore lie in something still

that Hegel's thesis concerning the end of art was considerably sharpened in the last version of the

lectures (1828-29), corresponding to systematie changes that liegel made in the relevant sectionsother than the nierely formal Nachahnwng of what is present, which in (

of the 1827 version of the Encyclopedia.

1

182 MIMESIS AND THE END OF ARTIvinvic313 tuNu ine ciav w mm

every case can bring to birth only technical tricks but not works of art recovers the positive value assigned to mimesis by the axiomatics con-

[Kunststücke, nicht aber Kunstwerke]" (55/45). stituted in Greek thought; second, the way in which, beyond the nega-

despite all the criticism, Hegel's formulations betray that his tivity that led him to reject the impoverished concept of mimesis, he also

rejection of mimesis is qualified, is limited to mimesis "in this general, recoversa negativevalue for mimesis as redetermined, a negative value

wholly abstract form," to mimesis as formal Nachahmung of what is that parallels up to a point at least that assigned by the ancient axiomat-

merely present, of particular things in nature. Indeed, in the sentence im- ics; and third, the way in which Hegel thinks both values together, in a

mediately following the just cited conclusion he broaches the doubling unity, precisely by thinking the end of art. In this thinking even the ap-

thus prepared, the transition to what, though he will not name it as such, parent polysemy of end-that it would mean aim, also fulfillment of the

will prove to be anotherform of mimesis, one that is not a matter of mere aim, as well as a certain termination--will be surmounted in the direc-

form, that is not merely formal, one to which a certain content is essen- tion of unity.

tial. Here is the sentence that follows the conclusion: "Certainly it is an The positive value is evident in Hegel's formulation of the redeter-

essential moment of a work of art to have a natural shape as its basis, be- mination. It is a matter of a mimesis that would consist in presenting the

cause what it presents is presented in the form of an external and there- truth, unveiling it, disclosing it, just as those images of which Aristotle

fore also natural appearance."The work of art is thus to be conceived as tells disclose the things themselves in such a way that one learns, with

a natural appearance that presents something else, as a natural appear- delight, of those things. Also, as with Aristotle, that which art sensu-

ance through which some content distinct from the work is presented. ously presents, which it discloses, is the universal, even if thought con-

The word that I am translating as present, the word that names the more cretely, not the particular things of nature that would be copied by that

profound, more powerful form of mimesis is darstellen. form of mimesis that Hegel has rejected.

The question that arises at once is that of the content presented by the Though Hegel himself passes quickly over the Platonic ideaof the beau-

wik of art. Hegel dGsiv Ï s alternatives, for example, that the i tiful, criticizing its abstractness, insisting that it must now be thought

content is everything that has a place in the human spirit, an alternative more concretely (32/22), there is, in fact, a profound affinity between

whose inclusiveness makes it, in the end, no specification of content at Hegel's discussions of beauty and that discussion that I have recalled

all, only something purely formal; or, again, that it is a matter o a cer- from the Phaedrus as expressing, in contrast to the Republic, the posi-

tain spiritual content by which moral improvement would be accom- tive value accorded to art. From the very outset Hegel's Aesthetics is ori-

plished, art thus being reduced to a means to an end other than itself. ented to the idea of beauty, essentially to the idea of artistic beauty; and

Recalling the need to supersede the rigid oppositions especialy charac- the beauty of art is taken to lie in its sensuously presenting (the word is,

teristic of what he calls the modern moralistic view, Hegel asserts, fi- again, darstellen) the most comprehensive truths of spirit (19/7). Hegel

nully, "that the vocation of art is-to unveil the truth in the form of addresses an objection that might be raised concerning the worthiness

sensuous artistic configuration and to present the reconciled opposition, of art, thus determined, to be treated philosophically. The objection is

and so to have its end [Endzweck] in itself, in this very presentation and aimed at the character of art as shining and as deception (Schein und

unveiling [Darstellung und Enthüllen]" (64/55).Artisjie_niuo_uspresen- 72iuschung--I merely transliterate the German in hopes of re-

tation of the truth and as such remains, in a profound sense, mimetic. taining somethmg of its broad range of meanings: shipe, look, appear-

$iinh^iš Tieri,~iii~the~inost general terms, Hegel's fëdeterinination ance, semblance, illusion). Hegel's response is that the objection would

of mimesis.be justified if shining could be considered something that, in principle,

In order to gauge the profound import of this redetermination, it is ought not to be. But, he continues:

necessary to consider the way in which it constitutes a recovery of the

Greek determination of art as essentially mimetic; indeed, not only a re- Shining itself is essential to essence. Truth would not be truth if it

covery but a fulfillment of the Greek view, carrying it through to the did not shine and appear [scheinen und erscheinen], if it were not

end. Let me consider, then, three points: first, the way in which Hegel truth for someone, for itself as well as for spirit in general too. (19/8)

184 MIMESIS AND THE END OF ARTMIMESIS AND THE END OF ART I 53

Art presents sensuously the truth, the truth of spirit. But it belongs to cate the shining of art but has said nothing directly regarding the charge

the essence of spirit to be for itself, to be not only essence but also ac- of deception.

tual appearance, to appear to itself, Thus, the appearing,the shining, that Let me turn, then, to the second point, the negativevalue of mimesis,

is characteristic of art has its justification in the very essence of truth, in which in the ancient axiomatics was constituted primarily by the de-

the very determination of spirit as for itself. Or, rather, the shining has ceptive and corruptive power of art. For Hegel, on the other hand, the

its full justification in the determination of spirit as in and for itself (an negative value lies in the inadequacy of art with respect to the higher

und fiir sich), for it is as such that the shining has its proper a priori, the phases of the content to be presented. Hegel outlines this negativity in

prior vision of truth that Aristotle required for mimesis; for as in itself the following passage near the beginning of the Aesthefics, just after the

spirit is always already implicitly what it comes to be explicitly, for it- vindication of shining:

self, namely, self-present. Not only does the shining of art have its jus- But while, on the one hand, we give this high position to art, it is,

tification, but indeed it constitutes the very beauty of the work of art: on the other hand, just as necessary to remember that neither in

when, later in the Aesthetics, Hegel develops a rigorous determination. content nor in form is art the highest and absolute mode of brino-

of beauty, he defines it as "te sensgo_ulshining of the idea" (I 17/l l I).3

ing to consciousness the true interests of the spirit. For precisely on

\Virtually a translation of Plato: To KŒÀÓU 3S the shining forth of the account of its form, art is limited to a specific content. Only one

ideas, as the idea that most shines forth, TO EK()GUE(TTUTOV. sphere and stage of truth is capable of being presented in the ele-

Still further in the Aesthetics, when he comes to discuss specifically. ment of art. In order to be a genuinecontent for art, such truth must

the beauty of art, Hegel--in a move comparable to the classical form of in virtue of its own determination be able to go forth into [the

art-illustrates artistic shining, i.e., beauty, by referring to the human sphere of J sense and remain adequate to itself there. This is the

body and to the prijilege of the eve. Let me cite some excerpts from this . .case, for example, with the gods of Greece. On the other hand,

remarkable passage:- .

there is a deeper comprehensionof truth which is no longer so akin

But if we ask in which particular organ the whole soul appears as and friendly to sense as to be capable of being taken up and ex-

soul, we will at once name the eye; for in the eye the soul is con- pressed in this medium. (21/9-10)

centrated and the soul does not merely see through it but is also seen That deeper comprehensionof truth belongs to those two forms that su-

in it. . . . It is to be asserted of art that it has to convert every shape.

persede art, namely, religion, in which the content is linked to the in-

in all points of its visible surface into an eye, which is the seat of the .wardness of the subject; and philosophy, in which the same content

soul arid brings the spirit into appearance. . . . So, art makes every. comes to have the form, not of representation(Vorstellung), as in reli-

one of its productions into a thousagd-cyedArgus, whereby the m- .gion, but of conceptual thought. Hegel is outspoken about the subordi-

ner soul and spirit is seen at every point. And it is not only the bod- nation of art to philosophy, about the authority of philosophy, from

ily form, the look of the eyes, the countenance and posture, but also. .

which art, he says, must receive its genuine ratification.

actions and events, speech and tones of voice, and the series of their And yet, that ratification cannot but also declare that art, however

course through all conditions of appearance that art has everywhere .. much it may let truth shme forth, falls short of the truth as it has now

to make into an eye, in which the irec soul is revealed in its inner.

come to be comprehended.The end of art, its aim, falls short of the in-

infinity. (155-56/153-54) trinsically highest end, namely, the self-presentationof spirit in its true

Art would bring spirit to shine forth in pure transparency, in a trans- form and content. Because art falls short of that end, as it is now com-

parency as pure as that of the eye, or, rather, in as pure a transparency prehended,art is at an end.

as is possible in a presentation that is sensuous. And yet, one carmot but Hence the third point: precisely by thinking art in reference to its end,

wonder about this limit. Especially since Hegel, having posed the ob- the sensuous presentation of spirit, Hegel thinks together the positive

jection that art involves shining and deception, has proceeded te vindi- and the negative values to be attributed to art--that is, he thinks the ax-

186 MIMESlS AND THE END OF ARTIviimaaia miso t oo si

iomatics of mimesis in its unity. But, in turn, to think thus the end of this higliest stage, art now transcends itself, in that it forsakes the ele-

art is also to be led to declare that art is at an end. Hegel's Aesthetics rnent of a reconciled embodiment of the spirit in sensuous form and

abounds in such declarations.passes over from the poetry of representation to the prose of thought"

Art is now at an end. Hegel declares that it "no longer fills our high- (89/94). But there has always been poetry, just as there has been, at

est needs . . . , no longer affords that satisfaction of spiritual needs that least for a long time, stern denunciation of art, of its claim to present

earlier ages and nations sought in it and found in it alone" (21-22/10), the truth: Hegel mentions the Jews, the Mohammedans,Plato, and the

He continues: "In all these respects art, considered in its highest desti- Reformation (110/103).

nation, is and remains for us a thing of the past" (22/1 l). Not that art will Not only now is art at an end. Nol only with the end ofelassical Greek

now simply cease to be; not that there will no longer be artists produc. art was it at an end. Art was always already at an end.

ing works of art. Hegel says: "We may well hope that art will always

rise higher and come to perfection." And yet, as he continues, "the form

of art has ceased to be the supreme need of the spirit. . . . We bow the(

(c)

knee no longer" (110/103). Art is at an end precisely in the sense that it

is aufgehoben; and the polysemy of ends is submitted to the complex According to the determination that is in play from Plato to HegeL

unity of Aufheben.numesis is a matter of imaginal presentation, of presentation in and

And yet, this Aufhebung of art was prepared loniago, preparest by art through an image. In mimesis something is presented, made present,

itself, by the very limitation of its end in comparison with the liighest brought to presence, while also remaining to a degree withdrawn, absent,

eiWöf spirit. TrEis nötgowitt'äliiiiiTIiut was already at an end with neverbeing quite captured in the image. Through its presence the image

the end of classical Greek art. For in Greek art, the classical form of art, makes present an original while also, by its very character as an image,

the human body counts as the natural shape of spirit; the presentation of leaving the original withdrawn, keeping open the difference. Mimesis,

spirit that is thus given, most notably in Greek sculpture, is the most ad- thus determined, aims at making present; it is governed by a certain de-

equate presentation that art can achieve. In Hegel's words: mand for presence, eventhough the very structure of mimesis is such as

to preclude the possibility of full presence. Correspondingly, the ancient

The classical form of art has attained the pinnacle of what illustra-. tixtomalies of mimesis is governed by a privileging of presence: the pos-

tion [Versinnlichung] by art could achieve,and if there is somethmg itive value of mimesis lies in its capacity to present, to bring the original

defective in it, the defect is just art itself and the restrictedness of the to presence; its negative value derives from its incapacity to bring that

sphere of art. (85/79) original illy to presence, from the necessity of leaving the original also

When romantic art, attentive to the inwardness of self-consciousness, withdrawn, to some extent concealed.

cancels the undivided unity achievedby classical art, it becomes, Flegel The privileging of presence operative in this axiomatics is not merely

says, "the self-transcendenceof art but within its own sphere and in the a gratuitous presupposition; it is not an unmotivated assumption with

form of art itself" (87/80).which one can simply dispense with impunity. On the contrary, the Pla-

And yet, if one refers to the individual arts, the self-transcendence tonic discussions show unmistakably that the demand for presence, the

will prove not to have waited for the accomplishment of the classical privileging of it, is linked to a certain need, a need that one might even

art of the Greeks. For in poetry the very last remaining sensuous ele- venture to call ethical, namely, the need for vigilance in the face of the

ment, sound, becomes merely a sign of an idea; and thus poetry is not possibility of deception and of the corruption that can be spawned by de-

dependent on external sensuous material for its realization, as are the ception. It is because of the deceptive and corruptive power of the

other arts. Or, rather, poetry is precisely in the movement of passing mimetic phantoms that one must safeguardthe regime within oneself; it

over from such dependence into freedom from the sensuous--that is, is thus that Socrates and Glaucon require the poets to deliver an apology

poetry too is as such the self-transcendenceof art: "Yet, precisely, at before the tribunal of philosophy with its demand for presence.

188 MIMESIS AND THE END OF ART MlMESIS AND THE END OF ART 189

And yet, from the side of the poets, this is a demand that is improper, Traces of such a rethinking of mimesis can be found in the work ofnot to say unjust. For the axiomatics that philosophy brings to bear upon Nietzsche and of Elcidegger. In The Birth of Tragedy, for instance,mimesis serves only to disguise an instability within the very concept of where with the familiar double gesture Nietzsche dismisses the deter-mimesis. The instability lies in the conflict between two moments con- mination of art as mere imitation of nature only to restore to art a morestitutive of the philosophical concept of mimesis: on the one hand, .nime- profound sense of mimesis as supplement. Most notable is Nietzsche'ssis is subject to the demand for presence, is determined by an orientation delerniinalion of Dionysian arl -hence also, of tragedy---as involving ato full presence; yet, on the other hand, its very structure, Ilie dilTerence) forni of inimesis in whicli no ilnages are operative, a fi>rm of mimesisbetween image and original, prechides the possibility of full presence. A which is thus sueli as to preclude the demand for presence. With Hei-mimetic presentation that succeeded in bringing the original fully to degger, on the utlier hand, one finds only the negative gesture, the dis-presence would thereby-by an essential, structural necessity- -have missal of mimesis as presentationof natural things.or of universals.Andceased to be a mimetic presentation.The instability is thus a tendency to yet, despite Eleidegger'ssilence regarding any reconstitution of mime-self-effacement, self-annulment. sis heyond these determinations, onc could read the entire analysis inIt is precisely this tendency, inherent in the very determination of "The Origin of the Work of Arl" as elaborating a mimetic relation be-mimesis, that allows Hegel to reinscribe mimesis within the logic of tween the work o art_ittuLthe_lygredetermined as strife of world andAufhebung. Passing over that power of deception and corruption that cifrth) ifffft WfiliTil be set into the work, that would be constituted only inmarked the negative value of mimesis in the ancient axiomatics, Hegel being set into the work, that would thus not precede its mimesis."'regards the negativity of mimetic presentationas merely its incomplete- If one can gather these traces into a rethinking of mimesis outside theness, its inadequacy for presenting its content; he regards it, in short, as privilege of presence, one will disrupt the unity of end enforced by the-

a determinate negation, which, even if harboring deception and he pos- Hegelian Aq/hebung. Then a decision will have been made regardingsibility of corruption, is to be overturned into revelation and perfection. Hegers declaration that art is at an end. Then one will have to think dif-Thus, it is by releasing the tendency to self-c1Tacement inherent in the ferently the end of art, to think it from difference, to think its relation tovery concept of mimesis that Hegel comes to declare the end of art. Thus the limit of presence, to that which, delimiting presence, remains itselfit is too that he settles the old quarrel between philosophy and poetry, in- withheld, concealed.deed so decisively that it hardly matters anymore whether the poets re- And yet, one will necd-perhaps more than ever--to recall the So-main in exile or return to the city. cratic warnings about the deceptive and corruptive power of the phan-Under the reign of the demand for presence, mimesis cannot but toms produced by art. One will need to renew--at the limit-the oldbe effaced and art declared to be at an end, the very determination of quarrel belweenphilosophy and poetry. Without reinvoking the demandend, the unity of its senses, being governed by the logic of Aufheinmg. lor presence, one will need nonetheless to resume Socratic vigilance, toAnd yet, one might venture with justification a break with thai logic. learn the vigilance of questioning al the liniit, at the end.One might venture to set the demand for presence out of action so as to

reconstitute and rethink mimesis within the field thus opened. Onemight so venture in the interest of justice to art, in behalf of art itself, art

proper, which one would then want to distinguish from the impropor de-

termination brought to bear upon it in the history of metaphysics. Butalso one might so venture still in the name of philosophy, justifying thebreak by appeal to the necessity of questioning the privilege of presence.Even though neither the venture nor its justification will be able to es-

cape the continual risk of falling back into the very system that would A l PAe the libeny of referring to Ilic analyses given in Crossings and in Ec/wes: er Hei-be suspended. <iew, mloonunµon: Indiana University Press, 1990), cliap.7.