e s

Lau

f New

form 1

(Department of Mineral Resources, 2000). Therefore, if

peopleTs behavior can be influenced to stop themment of Mineral Resources, 2000).

It needs to be stressed that many incidents on mines

have causal factors other than the involvement of

Journal of Safety Researcbreaking, ignoring, or not knowing about rules and1. Background

The issue of mine rules, procedures, and regulations is

a central focus of this paper, highlighted by this recent

comment bvery few people have accidents for whichthere is no procedure in place and we have a significant

degree of accidents as a result of people breaking rules,

ignoring rules, or simply not knowing about them. . .Q

regulations, then it should follow that it is possible to

eliminate many accidents and injuries. This will be a

challenging task. A recent study involving operators of

remote control continuous miners in underground coal

mining found that a large percentage of the workforce

believed that it was necessary to break the rules to get

the job done. bAny mine that operates 100% within therules will not produce a single tonne of coalQ (Depart-Abstract

Introduction: Many accidents and incidents on mine sites have a causal factor in the rules and regulations that supposedly are in

place to prevent the incident from occurring. The causes involve a lack of awareness or understanding, ignorance, or deliberate

violations. The issue of mine rules, procedures, and regulations is a central focus of this paper, highlighted by this recent comment

bvery few people have accidents for which there is no procedure in place. . .Q Method: An attitudinal survey was conducted at 33mines throughout NSW, Queensland and international mine sites involving almost 500 mineworkers. The survey was in the form of a

self-completing questionnaire, consisting of approximately 65 questions. It aimed to seek the opinions of the mining workforce on

safety rules and regulations generally, as well as how they apply to their specific jobs on a mine site. The research also aimed to

investigate: (a) the level of awareness and understanding of mine rules and procedures such as managers rules and safe work

procedures (SWPs); (b) the level of awareness and understanding of mine safety regulations and legislation; (c) the extent of

communication of and commitment to rules and regulations; (d) the extent of compliance with rules and regulations; and (e) attitudes

regarding errors, risk-taking, and accidents and their interaction with rules and regulations. The sample consisted of a random selection

of underground and open pit mines, extracting coal, metals, or industrial minerals. Results: The insights provided by the mineworkers

enabled a set of principles to be developed to guide mine management and regulators in the development of more effective rules and

regulations. Conclusions and Impact on the Mining Industry: (a) Management and regulators should not continue to producemore andmore

rules and regulations to cover every aspect of mining. (b) Detailed prescriptive regulations, detailed safe work procedures, and voluminous

safety management plans will not bconnectQ with a miner. (c) Achieving more effective rules and regulations is not the only answer to a saferworkplace.

D 2005 National Safety Council and Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Effective mine rules; Accident causation; Awareness; Compliance; Safety cultureSafety rules and regulations on min

David

School of Mining Engineering, University o

Received 3 August 2004; received in revised

www.elsevier.com/locate/jsr0022-4375/$ - see front matter D 2005 National Safety Council and Elsevier Ltd

doi:10.1016/j.jsr.2004.11.004

E-mail address: d.laurence@unsw.edu.au.ites The problem and a solution

rence

South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia

3 October 2004; accepted 3 November 2004

h 36 (2005) 3950

www.nsc.orgmineworkers. Failure on the part of management, forexample, is recognized in the various coronersT reports tohave contributed to multiple fatalities at a number of

. All rights reserved.

Table 1

Extracts from Significant Incident Reports 1998 to March, 2002 Queensland, NSW and WA (from Departmental web sites)

Incident Behavioural contribution to cause of incident

1. Queensland mines

HIGHWAY TRUCKS COLLIDE Local road rules not clearly understood and followed.

LIGHT VEHICLE DRIVES OFF HIGH WALL Operators should ensure that they are provided with clear work instructions

particularly where they are working in an area of the mine with which they are

not familiar.

CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF A DRAGLINE BOOM Unconfirmed reports indicate that draglines are now being loaded above their RSL

(rated suspended load), in a drive for greater productivity.

DUMP TRUCK WITH UNBALANCED LOAD

BECOMES UNSTABLE

A standing instruction that large rocks are not to be loaded but re-blasted was

ignored by the shovel operator.

DRILLER REPORTS FOR WORK IN AN INTOXICATED

STATE

The drillers offsider was disciplined and given a mine site reinduction where the

statutory requirement of not reporting for duty in an intoxicated state was stressed.

His workmate was also given the same mine site reinduction.

METHANE MONITORS WERE BRIDGED OUT OF

CIRCUIT IN TWO MINES WHILE PRODUCING COAL.

On each occasion the tail gate methane sensor was bridged out of circuit during

calibration checks and not recommissioned once these routine checks were completed

DUMPING OVERBURDEN NEAR COAL CREW

OPERATIONS

A dump truck operator dumped overburden outside of the allotted dump area without

knowledge or consideration of the potential consequences.

AN OPERATOR HAD TWO FINGERS PINNED AND A

THIRD SEVERELY LACERATED WHEN A BOLTING

RIG AUTO RETRACTED.

Operator was attempting to do multiple tasks consecutively and pinch points were

not guarded or identified.

COLLAPSE OF BRIDGED MATERIAL IN PUGMILL

FEED BIN

The plant operator walked along the edge of the top of the feed bin with no safety

belt/harness attached.

RIGGER STRUCK ON HEAD BY 500KG ASSEMBLY The crews dismantling the crusher did not understand the function of the component

parts or were unaware of the condition of the component parts.

DOZER RUNS OVER LIGHT VEHICLE The mine site procedure for entry into a work area was not followed.

TRUCK FALLS BACKWARDS OVER TIPPING EDGE Ignorance of safe work practices. The truck driver was not familiar with a safe

procedure for tipping over the edge of a stockpile.

ROLLOVER OF REAR DUMP TRUCK The height and size of the rill was inadequate and not identified as a risk by the

operators. Lack of handover between shifts led to hazards in the workplace not being

communicated. The dozer operator on the previous shift had not worked to the mines

standard for a dump area by allowing the dump face to become misaligned.

2. New South Wales Mines

TWO LARGE TRUCKS OUT OF CONTROL Maintenance, testing and inspection of the braking systems were inadequate.

Drivers had not been given training in emergency response procedures.

DANGER FROM A MISFIRE Communications were not clear between the day shift and the night shift about the

result of the refiring.

UNSTABLE STRUCTURE CRUSHES WORKMAN For some time before the accident, both the injured person and his supervisor had

worked more than eleven hours a day.

QUARRY WORKER KILLED BY FRONT END LOADER Management should have safe work procedures in place for people who need to

approach mobile equipment. Everyone at a mine, including contractors and visitors,

should be trained in the procedures.

OPERATOR CRUSHED BY OVERTURNED FORKLIFT No standard operating procedures were available. No formal training, refresher or

emergency training had been given. The vehicle appears to have been traveling too

fast for the conditions; The driver was not restrained by a seat belt.

ELECTRIC SHOCK FROM DAMAGED CIRCUIT

BREAKER

It was found that the Electrical Maintenance Engineer and the electrical staff generally

were not aware of this hazard, even though it was reported in previous safety alerts.

CONTINUOUS MINER DRILL RIG

FATALLY CRUSHES TRADESMAN

Managers should also address basic hazard recognition and control skills training as

a priority.

THE 415 VOLT CONDUCTORS SHORTED OUT AND

THE POWER TRIPPED OFF ON SHORT CIRCUIT

The electrical contractor was not aware of the site Electrical Management Handbook.

3. Western Australian Mines

FATALITY ON HEAVY-HAUL MINE RAILWAY The operator of the ballast regulator saw the grader approach the rail crossing but

was unable to stop when it became apparent that the grader was not going to stop at

the STOP sign governing right of way on the level crossing.

FATALITY IN REMOTE

CONTROLLED BOGGING OPERATION

Initial reports contain unconfirmed indications from an eyewitness that the deceased

may have inadvertently operated the wrong control and unintentionally precipitated

the incident which resulted in his death.

D. Laurence / Journal of Safety Research 36 (2005) 395040.

ioural contribution to cause of incident

mote control unit for the LHD was found placed in a cuddy next to the

oint with its controls locked in the manual position. It was subsequently

shed that (for reasons presently unknown) the operator was on the

nside the stope.

duction procedure adopted appears to suffer from two deficiencies:The volume

ten information made available was too great to enable the inductee to gain an

te understanding of the material before commencing work. It is clear that the

e of some underground workers is linked to production and that pressure has

pplied to increase production.

o recommend that a system be developed which formalises the procedure for

ent, both practical and theoretical, of an employees understanding of working

es, bearing in mind the dynamic nature of those safe working practices and the

o continually monitor and/or update them.

uction

g of

ssmen

iver w

se op

afety Research 36 (2005) 3950 41Incident Behav

3. Western Australian Mines

LOADER OPERATOR CRUSHED BY ROCK FALL IN

STOPE

The re

drawp

establi

LHD i

MINER STRUCK BY FACE BLAST The in

of writ

adequa

incom

been a

MINER STRUCK BY ROCK FALL We als

assessm

practic

need t

MINER STRUCK BY ROCK FALL An ind

standin

re-asse

A TOYOTA PERSONNEL CARRIER WAS REVERSED

INTO AN ORE DRIVE IN AN UNDERGROUND

MINE, WHERE IT WENT OVER THE BENCH EDGE

OFAN OPEN STOPE

The dr

OPERATOR TRAPPED BY SUCTION HOSE The ho

Table 1 (continued)

D. Laurence / Journal of SAustralian mines in recent years. Furthermore, there are a

number of other factors, including management commit-

ment, follow-up, enforcement, resource allocation, and so

forth that should also be considered, particularly when

developing and implementing a worker health and safety

program. However, these issues are not the focus of this

paper.

To better understand the reasons why mineworkers

break or ignore rules or why the rules are ineffective, it

is necessary to evaluate their attitudes and perceptions. In

the past, regulators and senior personnel in the mining

industry have had a major influence over the direction

and content of the regulatory framework. This is

exemplified in the following quotation by the author of

a number of analyses of industrial disasters, including the

Longford and Moura accidents, bUnfortunately the peopleat the top tend to go around giving lectures and saying

how important safety is, and how no accident is acceptable

and we must all pull together here. Unfortunately, no amount

of pep talk is going to alter the way things are done. If you

want to alter the way things are done, you have to go down to

the grass roots level and find out how things are actually

being done, and why they are being done, and why are these

PRESSURE VESSEL ENTRY - SCALDING INJURY The absence

to get autho

experienced

competency

LOADER OPERATOR CRUSHED BY ROCK FALL IN

STOPE

The safe wo

stipulated th

complying w

CRUSHED IN ARTICULATION POINT OF LHD The operato

accidentally

loader to theprocess should include a mechanism to evaluate the inductees under

the material covered. The process should include provision for regular

t of employees knowledge of induction material.

as unaware of the position of the bench edge in the drive.

erator had not been formally trained in the task.operators violating rules, as they often are. And there are

always good reasons why they are violating rules. In this way

you can find out what is needed to have them do the right

thing. Its about changing systems and changing procedures.

It is not about getting people to believe that safety is

important, which is, unfortunately, so often the message that

is conveyedQ (Safety On-line, 2001).

of a written procedure to perform this task. The failure by the operators

risation from supervisors to open the vessel. The absence of more

supervisors to approve and oversee the work. The lack of adequate

tested training in the performance of this task.

rking procedure for loading by the use of remote control equipment

at operators were not to go beyond the stope brow. The operator was not

ith the procedure at the time of the accident.

r had omitted to engage the manual lock prior to exiting the cab. He

hit the joystick which activated the steering control and articulated the

left, crushing the operator

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Disagreetotally

Disagree Not sure Agree Agree totally

Res

pons

es (%

)

Fig. 1. Rules and Regulations are Important for My Safety.

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

Yes No

Resp

onse

s (%

)

0%5%

10%15%20%25%30%35%40%

Disagreetotally

Disagree Agree Agreetotally

Res

pons

es (%

)

Not sure

Fig. 4. I am aware of people violating the rules and regulations.

D. Laurence / Journal of Safety Research 36 (2005) 395042It is also important for mineworkers to know when to

apply the rules or act appropriately in the situation where

no rules exist. The author of a study into the Challenger

space shuttle disaster encapsulated the issue in this

quotation: (The challenge is) bhow to instill a rulefollowing mentality that will assure coordination and

control in a crisis and at the same time teach people to

. . .. recognize the situation where no rules exist and forwhich the existing rules do not applyQ (Vaughn, 1997).

A body of evidence exists suggesting that many

accidents are caused by mineworkersT failing to followprocedures or rules. A senior group safety manager

(anonymity requested) of a large Australian gold mining

company indicated to the author in 2001 that the

principal causes of two recent fatalities within the

companyTs operations were deliberate violation of rules.The findings of a recent study of risky behaviors of

continuous miner operators in underground coalmines

provided another incentive to begin this research pro-

gram. For example, it was found that more than 90% of

employees interviewed bexpressed misgivingsQ aboutsafety rules and regulations. There was a clear distinction

between operating within the rules and operating nor-

mally, with the latter referring to the quickest possible

way to complete a task. bThe issue is not whether therules are practical or not, or whether the rules should be

simply followed or not. A more serious issue is that

Fig. 2. Do you deviate or allow deviation from rules and regulations.possibly the large majority of employees (including

deputies/supervisors) operate dangerous machinery every

0%5%

10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%50%

Disagreetotally

Disagree Not sure Agree Agree totally

Res

pons

es (%

)

Fig. 3. Is it necessary to break the rules to get the job done?day in underground mines with a basic disposition that

safety rules are dirrelevant, superfluous, non-essential orexcessive.T If this is the case, an important resource forlimiting the risky behavior of employees is critically

deficientQ (Department of Mineral Resources, 2000).A further study of 39, multiple-fatality coal mine

disasters, mainly from the USA, UK, and Australia, found

that serious violations of mining laws were discovered

among 33 (Braithwaite & Grabosky, 1985). It was found

that serious violations either caused the disaster, or were

components of the causes, or exacerbated the effect of the

disaster.

These findings are supported by a 1991 study,

commissioned by the NSW Department of Mineral

Resources, which found that 83% of fatal accidents from

strata movements in underground coal mines in the

period 1972-1990 were associated with breaches of rules

(Roylett, Russell, Ramon, & Blyth, 1991). Human error

was simultaneously present with breaches of rules in over

half the fatal accidents analyzed. It was concluded that

fatalities would continue to occur unless management

focused on strategies to focus on the development of

better support rules, compliance with rules, and improve-

ments in technology to bcounter against human error.Q Itshould be pointed out that subsequent investigations have

suggested that apart from rule breaches, a major contrib-

utory cause of these incidents was inadequate mine

design, including undersized pillars (Galvin, 2002).0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

Disagreetotally

Disagree Agree Agreetotally

Res

pons

es (%

)

Not sure

Fig. 5. Management and supervisors are aware of rule and regulation

violations.

! Inadequate training! Lack of familiarity with equipment! Fatigue

2. Problem to be evaluated

Another study of 25 accident investigations at mine sites

throughout the world have shown that many incidents occur

because mineworkers:

! were unaware of the rules! were aware but did not understand the rules

involving the workforce in the research, it was hoped that

insights previously overlooked by regulators and mine

0%5%

10%15%20%25%30%35%40%

It w

ould

save

tim

e

It w

ould

save

en

erg

y

It w

ould

low

er th

eris

k

Man

ager

com

mitm

ent

lack

ing

Prob

lem

with

rule

s an

dre

gs

Res

pons

es (%

)

Fig. 6. If you were to deviate (or allow deviation) from mine rules and

regulations would you do so because. . ..?

D. Laurence / Journal of Safety Research 36 (2005) 3950 43A supplementary study on roof and rib fall incidents

commissioned by the Department of Mineral Resources in

1999 (Pereira, 1999) updated the findings of the Roylett

study. It found that bto effectively minimize roof fall fatalitiesthe industry must control the behavioral causal factors in-

volved in these fatalities. In particular, miners going out

under unsupported roof and not working to the support

rules.QFurther confirmation of the extent of the contribution

of unsafe behaviors to accidents and incidents on mine

sites in Australia is illustrated by Table 1. The table shows

all published incidents over a four-year period where a

human factor can be identified. The incidents are listed on

the web pages of each government minesT inspectorate inNew South Wales, Queensland and Western Australia. The

behavioral issue in each has been underlined. It can be

seen that many of these accidents were caused, at least in

part, by:

! Lack of awareness of procedures or rules! Not complying with or ignoring rules! Lack of clear instructions! Poor communication generally

! Production taking precedence over safety! Overriding or bridging out safety barriers

0%2%4%6%8%

10%12%14%16%18%20%

Too

com

plex

Too

man

y to

rem

em

ber

Poor

con

tent

/co

nta

in e

rrors

Too

rigid

/in

flexib

le

Res

pons

es (%

)

Fig. 7. If there is a problem with rulesmanagement would be obtained.

3. Research methodology

An attitudinal survey was conducted at 33 mines

throughout NSW, Queensland and international mine sites

involving almost 500 mineworkers. The survey was in

the form of a self-completing questionnaire, consisting of

around 65 questions. It aimed to seek the opinions of the

mining workforce on safety rules and regulations

generally and as they apply to their specific jobs on a

mine site. The sample consisted of a random selection of

underground and open pit mines, extracting coal, metals,

Lack

real

world

unde

rsta

ndin

g

Not

writ

ten

inpl

ain

lang

uage

Sim

ply

bad

rule

s

Oth

er! mistakenly applied the rules! ignored the rules! deliberately violated the rules! took a risk! were unable to identify hazardous situations! were poorly trained or lacked sufficient educationalbackground (Joy, 1999).

Given this apparent linkage between rules, regulations,

and safety performance, and the involvement of the work-

force, the author undertook a research program to attempt to

improve the effectiveness of the rules and regulations. Byand regulations it is because. . .?

or industrial minerals. The research also aimed to

investigate:

! The level of awareness and understanding of mine rulesand procedures such as managers rules and safe work

procedures (SWPs)

! The level of awareness and understanding of mine safetyregulations and legislation

! The extent of communication of and commitment to rulesand regulations

! The extent of compliance with rules and regulations! Attitudes regarding errors, risk-taking, and accidents andtheir interaction with rules and regulations

! The level of awareness of mine rules and regulations inspecific competencies such as the operation and main-

tenance of continuous miners in underground coal mines,

loaders and haul trucks in underground metal mines, and

The workforce did not demonstrate any meaningful

awareness of the concepts of duty of care, risk assess-

actica

l

Comm

on-se

nse

Relev

ant

All of

the a

bove

Other

0%5%

10%15%20%25%30%35%40%

Disagreetotally

Disagree Agree Agreetotally

Res

pons

es (%

)

Not sure

Fig. 9. Acting with common sense is safer than acting within the rules and

regulations.

D. Laurence / Journal of Safety Research 36 (2005) 395044heavy earthmoving and haulage equipment in surface

coal and metal mines.

4. Knowledge and awareness of rules and regulations

The first question asked of the mineworkers in the survey

was if they agree that mine safety rules and regulations are

important. Fig. 1 illustrates that they strongly believe that

this is the case.

However, the research showed both in general terms and

in more detail in the analysis of rules governing the operation

of a specific piece of equipment, that knowledge and

awareness of rules and regulations is limited. This is despite

most of the workforce asserting that they have a good

knowledge and understanding. If the workforce mistakenly

believes it has a good knowledge and understanding of the

rules and regulations, it will be difficult for it to be receptive

to learning. The challenge is for regulators and workers to

acknowledge their knowledge gaps.

0%5%

10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%50%

Involv

emen

t of w

orkfor

ceSim

ple

Unde

rstan

dable

Pr

Res

pons

es (%

)Fig. 8. What makes a goodment, safety management systems, or any of the

promulgated legislation, which embodies these concepts.

The research has therefore shown that the developments

in occupational health and safety legislation that have

taken place in Australia since the Robens report of 1974,

have failed to engage those who are most at risk in the

workplace.

One of the most important rules in underground coal

mining is the bno standing zoneQ rule, which applies toremote-controlled continuous miners. Mineworkers had

difficulty in defining the rule as outlined in a government

guideline, MDG 5002. However many miners demon-

strated that they were aware of the practical implications

of the rule even if they could not define it exactly. The

descriptions given were generally simple, concise, in

plain language, practical, and relevant. The reason that

the workforce could not define the rule was that the rule

did not contain the elements necessary for the protection

of operators and other personnel working near the

machine. The potential for further training to improverule or regulation?

operator was deciding where to position himself to avoid

Automatic

CommunicationDirected

Systems

Learning Stage

Quanti

ty o

f R

ule

s

Fig. 12. The Quantity of Rules at Each Stage of the Learning Model

(adapted from Terrey, 2000).

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%

totallyDisagreeDisagree Agree Agree

totally

Res

pons

es (%

)

Not sure

Fig. 10. Being alert will reduce the chances of an accident occurring.

D. Laurence / Journal of Safety Research 36 (2005) 3950 45danger. The rule states that a bno standing zoneQ is ban areawhere people can not pass or work unless appropriatethe effectiveness of rules and regulations and their

implementation is clear.

5. Rule compliance

One of the questions asked of the mineworkers in the

survey is whether they deviate or allow deviation from mine

rules and regulations (Fig. 2). Almost one third indicated

that they do not always follow the rules. Approximately one

quarter believed or were unsure that it was necessary to

break the rules to get the job done (Fig. 3). In addition,

most indicated that they were aware of others breaking the

rules (Fig. 4). Disturbingly, they also indicated that

management was aware of rule breaking (Fig. 5).

When pressed as to the reason that they do deviate from

the rules, most indicated it was because it would lower the

risk or there was a problem with rules (Fig. 6).

A focus on a particular rule, such as the no standing zone

which applies to remote controlled continuous miner

operations in underground coal mining, confirmed that

mineworkers have a poor understanding of the rule as well

as an inability to define the rule. When the rule was

analyzed it was found that it did not bconnectQ with themineworker. The rule was also of limited or no use when the0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

Managerpressure

Peopletake risks

Machobehaviour

Peerpressure

Res

pons

es (%

)

Fig. 11. I believe risks arisolation procedures for the continuous miner have been

carried out Q.Possibly a better definition of the rule is the following:

bA dNo Standing ZoneT is any area surrounding acontinuous miner at a particular mine that is assessed,

through a risk assessment process, to be unsafe when

operating the machine in remote controlled mode. It should

take into account the potential for injury from:

! contact with the machine, in particular the cutting headand conveyor boom,

! unplanned movement of machine,! fall of ribs! fall of roof! electric shock or other causeQ

This alternative definition of the rule:

! uses risk assessment to involve the workforce and gatherthe mine-specific risks that can differ appreciably from

mine to mine

! incorporates the major risks with using the machine! allows mines with competent ribs to be able to operate itsremote controlled continuous miners safely in a similar

manner to another mine where the ribs are incompetent

and subject to spalling. In the latter case, management and

operators have more of a challenge to establish safe work

zones.Easiestway to do it

People gettired

Poor rules& regs

Other

e taken because. . .

Communication

Systems

Directed

Automatic

Learning Stage

Qualit

y of

Rule

s

Fig. 13. The Quality of Rules at Each Stage of the Learning Model (adapted

from Terrey, 2000).

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

Res

pons

es (%

)

Disagreetotally

Disagree Agree Agreetotally

Not sure

Fig. 15. I should be involved in making mine rules.

D. Laurence / Journal of Safety Research 36 (2005) 395046! aligns with a miners perception of bdangerQ! is simple, practical, relevant, and understandable

6. Rule content

When asked to comment on why they had problems with

rules and regulations, mineworkers indicated that there

were a number of bcontentQ issues such as (Fig. 7):

! lacking real world understanding! too many to remember! too complex! too rigid and not flexible enough.

The workforce believe that the content of effective rules

and regulations should:

! provide minimum standards! be simple, concise, understandable, practical, relevant,and easy to remember (see Fig. 8)

! be illustrated where appropriate! be flexible, well documented, up to date, clear, andavoids confusion

! reflect a common sense approach, although this is notunanimously supported (see Fig. 9)! make people think

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

Disagreetotally

Disagree Agree Agreetotally

Res

pons

es (%

)

Not sure

Fig. 14. Operating and maintaining a continuous miner/bogger/earthmoving

equipment/truck are risky tasks.! make people aware and alert (see Fig. 10)! make people foresee possibilities of incidents! make people responsible! make people react automatically! require miners to look after each other! be proactive! encourage communication and consultation! reduce fatigue (see Fig. 11)! be site specific rather than general! be easily applied! be aligned with the attitudes and perceptions of theworkforce.

7. Quantity and Quality of Rules

The mining workforce strongly believes that there are too

many rules and regulations. They are calling for fewer rules

but of a higher quality. The Swedish mining industry and its

regulator appears to have followed this philosophy where a

deliberate attempt to reduce the volume of rules has resulted

in a relatively brief mining regulation. This also confirms

the theorem of the safe behavior model where a mine, in the

automatic phase of safe behavior, is controlled by fewer

rules but of a higher quality than the earlier directed,

systems phases (Figs. 12, 13 and see Howell, 1982;

Laurence, 2002; Senge, 1990). Fig. 12 illustrates that the

volume of rules, regulations, and legislation reaches a peak0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%

Res

pons

es (%

)

Disagreetotally

Disagree Agree Agreetotally

Not sure

Fig. 16. Communication about rules and regulations is generally pretty

good around here.

in the systems stage of the model, decreasing to a minimal

amount in the automatic stage. The quality and effectiveness

of the rules, however, continue to increase throughout each

8. Risk assessment

Rules that are based around a risk assessment process

will be supported due to the recognition that many mining

tasks are inherently risky (Fig. 14). Good rules should

minimize/eliminate errors from becoming accidents and

injuries and should eliminate a risk of accident through

human error. In the words of an operator there should be

bmore emphasis on hazard awareness, identification ofcontrols, risk management training.Q And this bthe involve-ment of the workers in the M.S.M.S (mine safety manage-

ment system) has definitely made this place a much safer

environment to work in. With worker involvement in

performing SWP (safe work procedure), hazards and risks

have been identified and eliminated which otherwise would

still be there to cause possible serious accidents in the

encourage those who will be involved in a task to plan, act,

do, and check before and during that task.

as illustrated in Figs. 16 and 17. Most mineworkers

rely on personal communication through their supervisor

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

Res

pons

es (%

)

Disagreetotally

Disagree Agree Agreetotally

Not sure

Fig. 17. Managers explain why a rule or regulation is needed.

D. Laurence / Journal of Safety Research 36 (2005) 3950 47stage and reaches its peak in the automatic stage as

illustrated in Fig. 13. The automatic stage should thus be

the goal where there are minimal rules and regulations but

their quality is high. At this stage, a miner, supervisor and/or

manager:

! has developed safe working habits,! is able to detect hazardous situations, identify warningsigns, and is able to respond to them

! does not take risks/cut corners! cares for his fellow workers! reacts automatically and appropriately in crisis oremergency situations

! is not lumbered with onerous, complex rules andregulations to impede his safe work behaviors or conflict

with internalized safe habits.

Clearly, the primary emphasis should be on engineering

out the hazard so that the opportunity for an injury is

eliminated. If a bhardQ barrier is established, employers willnot have to rely on the softer barriers of procedures and

rules to protect the workforce.

30%0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

Mine

man

./und

erman

.

Depu

ty/tea

m lea

der

Safet

y offic

er

Mine

s insp

ector

Othe

Res

pons

es (%

)

Fig. 18. How are people informedor team leader, mine manager, or safety officer to

r govt

office

r

Check

inspe

ctor

Notice

board Oth

er10. Presentation and communication of Rules

Mine rules and regulations need to be well commu-

nicated. The reasons for their implementation need to be

explained. Most mineworkers believed that communica-

tion is good at their mine, and explanations are givenfutureQ and bgood risk assessment leads to good controls.Q

9. Formulation

The workforce wants to be involved in making rules and

regulations as shown in Fig. 15. This might involve, for

example, working with others having expertise in technol-

ogy or ergonomics and debugging a rule. This shouldabout rules and regulations?

provide that information, rather than the notice board

(Fig. 18).

Although Figs. 16 and 17 illustrate that most miners

thought communication was good at their mine, there were

many comments that did not support this finding. The

following is a selection of their comments:

! We are not kept up to date and we have to ask afterhearing from other workers;

! Safe work procedures and risk assessments should bereadily available to the workforce, not hidden in

computers;

These responses provide an interesting contrast with

identified that bnew regulatory approaches can be designed

0%5%

10%15%20%25%30%35%

repo

rt is m

ade

coun

sellin

g

retra

ining/r

eindu

ction

discip

linary

actio

n

no a

ction t

aken

other

Res

pons

es (%

)

Fig. 20. The action taken when a rule is broken.

0%5%

10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%

repo

rt is m

ade

coun

sellin

g

retra

ining/r

eindu

ction

discip

linary

actio

n

no a

ction t

aken

other

Res

pons

es (%

)

D. Laurence / Journal of Safety Research 36 (2005) 395048! Need to be in a language people can understand andreasons for them;

! Due to 4 on / 4 off roster, the crew on days off some timesmisses out on some crucial meetings and comments;

! Although communication is of a reasonable standard, Ithink the work force should have more of an under-

standing of rules and regulations imposed on it by

management;

! Generally the legislation is not well understood; Thisis a very difficult process (1) to communicate any

new rule / regulation to everybody effectively; (2) to

ensure that all personnel adopt the new rule and do

not inadvertently / unconsciously return to previous

rule;

! Communication is what builds a safety culture - withoutit the words are not worth the paper it is written on;

! Generally only given out when an induction or accidentoccurs;

! Information about hazards and risk assessment is notfreely available or the average worker has little or no

knowledge in acquiring this information. Most workers

have very little knowledge of WHMS (work health

management system).

11. Training and education

The survey respondents agreed that improved training,

including refresher training as well as inductions, will

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

Res

pons

es (%

)

Disagreetotally

Disagree Agree Agreetotally

Not sureFig. 19. Improved training and induction will assist in understanding and

application of rules and regulations.to foster high performance safety culture.Q A number ofmines are recognized for outstanding efforts in attaining theSwedish miners where disciplinary action is virtually ignored

and counseling is by far the favored means of dealing with

this type of undesirable behavior (Fig. 21). Counseling in this

context is a non-threatening discussion between a worker and

manager where punishment is not an expected outcome.

13. Safety culture

A positive safety culture will provide the platform on

which to build a greater awareness, understanding, and

compliance with rules and regulations. The work of Pitzer

(Minerals Council of Australia, 1999) has added to the

literature and understanding of culture on mine sites. Heassist in the better comprehension of rules and regulations

(Fig. 19).

12. Enforcement

The consensus seemed to be that if a rule is to be

implemented, it needs to be enforced. As far as sanctions

are concerned, if a rule is broken, Australian miners tended

to rely on disciplinary action and the writing of a report

(Fig. 20).Fig. 21. Response of Swedish miners to action taken when a rule is broken.

right culture and their safety records reflect these efforts.

25%es (%

afetyThe discussion has raised an important issue of mine safety

culture and its alignment with a continuous improvement

model a better regulatory framework will encourage a

positive safety culture which in turn will lead to better

attitudes and more desirable behaviors. This in turn will

provide the opportunity to formulate and implement more

effective rules and regulations by having the workforce

more actively involved.

A positive safety culture requires (Williamson, 2000):

! Higher management commitment to safety! Open communication channels! A stable, experienced workforce! High quality housekeeping! A safety emphasis in training! Full-time safety personnel reporting directly to topmanagement.

The field questionnaire deliberately did not focus on

safety culture but responses to some items did provide an

indication of this construct. For example, most mineworkers

responding to the survey indicated that money was the

major motivator to working at the mine (Fig. 22). However,

many also indicated that enjoyment of work and mateship or

friendship were important drivers. These are indicators of a

more positive culture than working for the money.0%5%

10%15%20%

I enjoy the work The money isgood

I enjoy themateship

Other

Res

pons

Fig. 22. Why do you work at this mine?30%35%40%

)D. Laurence / Journal of S14. Fitness for work

The workforce responses often mentioned the need to

regulate on the issue of fitness for work, particularly fatigue.

For example, bno more two night shifts (in a four shiftroster), I think operator fatigue runs hand in hand with

accidents or machine damageQ and bworking hours anddays worked are too long e.g. 12 hour shifts, 7 day weeks.Q

15. Continuous improvement

As with any management system, a continuous improve-

ment process should be implemented by monitoring and

no. 5004). In C.J. Pitzer (ed). Sydney, New South Wales, Australia:Department of Mineral Resources.

Galvin, J. (2002). Personal Communication.

Howell, W. C. (1982). The Empathic Communicator. Belmont CA7Wadsworth Publishing Company.

Joy, J. (1999), Learning from mistakes in mining. Australian Journal

of Mining, June. Available from http://www.qrc.org.au/_files/docs/

conferences/OHS_1999/Safety_Joy.doc

Laurence, D. C. (2002). Learning Safe Work Behavior A New Tool forupdating the rule and regulatory subsystem at a mine at

regular intervals. The advantage of having a mine-specific

package of SWPs, guidelines, codes, and rules enables the

mine to keep up with changing technology and changing

societal expectations more rapidly than relying on changing

legislation.

16. Conclusion

This paper presented the results of initial research into the

development of more effective mine safety rules and

regulations. Responses from almost 500 mineworkers were

analyzed and some simple guidelines established, in par-

ticular, regarding rule content. They can be summarized as:

(a) Management and regulators should not continue to

produce more and more rules and regulations to cover

every aspect of mining. Miners will not read nor

comprehend to this level of detail.

(b) Detailed prescriptive regulations, detailed safe work

procedures, and voluminous safety management plans

will not bconnectQ with a miner. The aim should be tooperate with a framework of fewer rules but of the

highest quality.

(c) Of course, achieving more effective rules and regu-

lations is not the only answer to a safer workplace.

Possibly less emphasis should be on content and more

about the process.

(d) In particular, ensuring that a positive safety culture

exists and that communication channels are open and

working well. This was confirmed in the survey when

the expressions bsimply bad rulesQ or bpoor rulesQwere rarely bblamedQ for accidents and incidents, risktaking or error-making.

(e) It was more the problems of implementation,

communication, and learning that were the main

causal factors.

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Dr. David Laurence is an Associate Professor at the School of Mining

Engineering, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia. David has

worked in and with the Australian and international mining industries for

the past 25 years in a variety of roles including a miner, general manager,

Chief Inspector of Mines and an academic. His passion for improving

safety outcomes on mines drives his research in the developed and

developing world.

D. Laurence / Journal of Safety Research 36 (2005) 395050

Safety rules and regulations on mine sites - The problem and a solutionBackgroundProblem to be evaluatedResearch methodologyKnowledge and awareness of rules and regulationsRule complianceRule contentQuantity and Quality of RulesRisk assessmentFormulationPresentation and communication of RulesTraining and educationEnforcementSafety cultureFitness for workContinuous improvementConclusionReferences