Safety Digest · The Safety Digestis only available from the Department for Transport, and can be...
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This Safety Digest draws the attention of the leisure community to some of the lessons arising from investigations into recent accidents. It contains facts which have been determined up to the time of issue, and is published to provide information about the general circumstances of marine accidents and to draw out the lessons to be learned. The sole purpose of the Safety Digest is to prevent similar accidents happening again. The content must necessarily be regarded as tentative and subject to alteration or correction if additional evidence becomes available. The articles do not assign fault or blame nor do they determine liability. The lessons often extend beyond the events of the incidents themselves to ensure the maximum value can be achieved. This Safety Digest is comprised of 25 articles written in the past 8 years. For some of that time it was the MAIB’s policy to name vessels. In 2002 the decision was taken to dis-identify all Safety Digest articles so that vessel names are not included. This is intended to encourage more people to report accidents. Extracts can be published without specific permission, providing the source is duly acknowledged. The Safety Digest is only available from the Department for Transport, and can be obtained by applying to the MAIB. Other publications are available from the MAIB.
Transcript of Safety Digest · The Safety Digestis only available from the Department for Transport, and can be...
This Safety Digest draws the attention of the leisure community to some ofthe lessons arising from investigations into recent accidents. It contains facts
which have been determined up to the time of issue, and is published toprovide information about the general circumstances of marine accidents and
to draw out the lessons to be learned.
The sole purpose of the Safety Digest is to prevent similar accidentshappening again. The content must necessarily be regarded as tentative andsubject to alteration or correction if additional evidence becomes available.
The articles do not assign fault or blame nor do they determine liability.The lessons often extend beyond the events of the incidents themselves
to ensure the maximum value can be achieved.
This Safety Digest is comprised of 25 articles written in the past 8 years.For some of that time it was the MAIB’s policy to name vessels.
In 2002 the decision was taken to dis-identify all Safety Digest articlesso that vessel names are not included. This is intended to encourage
more people to report accidents.
Extracts can be published without specific permission, providing the source is duly acknowledged.
The Safety Digest is only available from the Department for Transport, and can be obtained by applying to the MAIB. Other publications are available from the MAIB.
Extract from The Merchant Shipping(Accident Reporting and Investigation
Regulations 1999)
Marine Accident Investigation Branch
The Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) is an independent part of the Department for Transport. The Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents is
responsible to the Secretary of State for Transport.
If you wish to report an accident or incident please call our24 hour reporting line on 023 8023 2527.
The telephone number for general use is 023 8039 5500.
The Branch fax number is 023 8023 2459.The e.mail address is [email protected]
Safety Digests are also available on the Internet: www.maib.gov.uk
The fundamental purpose of investigating an accident under theseRegulations is to determine its circumstances and the cause with the aim
of improving the safety of life at sea and the avoidance of accidents in thefuture. It is not the purpose to apportion liability, nor, except so far as is
necessary to achieve the fundamental purpose, to apportion blame.
Index
Chief Inspector’s Foreword 5
Sail craft
Case 1 Three rescued from sinking sailing yacht in Solent 8
Case 2 Yacht founders in Needles Channel in severe gale – Three killed 10
Case 3 Yacht owner loses life after failing to wear safety harness 12
Case 4 Yacht knocked down in Bay of Biscay – One man lost 14
Case 5 Young woman killed when day-boat capsizes 17
Case 6 Catamarans capsize in Weymouth Bay – Everybody saved 19
Case 7 So close to home and yet so far 22
Case 8 Tynemouth tragedy – Two killed 26
Case 9 Even Maxis capsize 31
Case 10 Vigilance, ARPA and relative speed 38
Case 11 Tragic end to a Twister 40
Case 12 Two persons lost overboard from sailing yacht 43
Case 13 Differing perspectives! 44
Case 14 Yachtswoman dragged under chain ferry 46
Case 15 Helmsman dies after recovery attempts fail 48
Case 16 Watchleader falls from bowsprit and loses consciousness in harness 50
Case 17 Vessel drying out falls over, away from Quay 52
Power craft
Case 18 Capsize of a RIB 55
Case 19 RIB – Be prepared! 58
Case 20 RIB – Kill-cord conduct 60
Case 21 Sightseeing on a bend invites trouble 62
Case 22 Flooding caused by faulty hull fittings 63
Case 23 Two drown in speedboat sinking 65
Case 24 Four die after dinghy capsizes in Sound of Iona 67
Case 25 School trip tragedy 69
List of leisure craft accident reports published since 1999 71
CASE X
4
Foreword
5
Leisure craft accident reports have appeared regularly in the MAIB Safety Digestover the past eight years. As with all MAIB reports, the objective has been to describethe basic facts, and to highlight the lessons to be learned. The Digest, of which threeissues are produced each year, is distributed widely in printed form and is also availableonline at www.maib.gov.uk.
Much of MAIB‘s work is involved with investigating accidents to merchant ships andfishing vessels, and these appear in their own sections in each Safety Digest. The thirdsection in each issue contains, typically, three or four reports relating to leisure craft,sail and power.
This compendium contains 25 of these articles in one, easy to refer to, volume. It hasbeen produced in response to many requests from sailing schools and establishments,Yachtmaster instructors, and individual sailors and powerboat owners.
I very much hope that it will become an important resource for all those who taketo the water in small boats, enabling more people to learn important safety lessons.
Stephen MeyerChief Inspector of Marine Accidents
If you find this interesting and instructive, think about putting your name on the distribution list for ourregular Safety Digests – it is free!
S A F E T Y D I G E S T 2 0 0 3
Sailcraft
CASE 1
8
Narrative
A small sailing yacht was chartered for a weekendin early April by a group of three men who intendedmaking passage from Portsmouth to Hythe, nearSouthampton. The weather forecast was for westerlywinds of Force 5 to 6 increasing to 7 later in theWestern Solent.
The yacht was a small fractional rigged sloop with alifting keel – 6.4 metres overall length. The chartercompany had a fleet of these craft which were usedeither for individual "bareboat" charter or for groupactivities, including racing. In the winter monthsthey were permitted to operate only withinPortsmouth Harbour.
The voyage within the harbour passed withoutincident but there was then a noticeable increasein wind strength as they continued, close-hauled,to the Isle of Wight shore which provided someshelter in its lee as they began to close tackwestwards. A longer tack NW to enter SouthamptonWater was then begun and it was only at this pointthat the crew donned lifejackets.
Larger seas were experienced in mid-Solent and thewind increased to Force 7. A decision was takento lower the jib. Shortly after going about on tothe starboard tack, the yacht was knocked downby a gust and lay at 90º for a short time beforecompletely inverting.
The crew were thrown into the water but wereable to climb onto the upturned hull. The liftingkeel, which in normal operation is kept in placeonly by gravity, had fallen back into its housingand was only retrieved with extreme difficulty bythe crew who then managed to right the yacht.
Narrative
However, so much flooding had taken place,because the washboards and hatch had fallen outin the initial knockdown, that the yacht sank bythe stern leaving only about four feet of the bowfloating above the water, almost certainly due totrapped air.
It was extremely fortunate that the accident waswitnessed by those onboard other, larger, craftsailing in the area and who called for help. Thecrew were recovered by the rescue services andthe yacht, which did not completely sink, wastaken in tow. The crew were examined in hospitaland later discharged.
Three rescued from sinking
sailing yacht in Solent
9
The Lessons
1 The accident occurred becausethe yacht was being operated inmarginal conditions. The decisionto extend beyond the confinesof Portsmouth Harbour in theprevailing and forecast weatherconditions was unwise andfurthermore, they should havebeen advised against it by thecharter organisation.
2 The yacht was not designedwith the intention of being ableto survive a 90º knockdown in amoderate swell.
3 The crew survived because theincident took place in busy watersand other yachts happened to beclose by. They also very sensiblyremained with the upturned hull.
If it had happened at that timeof year when the water was stillvery cold and in some less popularpart of the UK coast, the outcomewould probably have been farmore serious, had there beendelays in rescuing them.
4 Yachts of this size do noteasily fall into a category. By somethey are regarded as smalloffshore-type craft – as witnessedin this case by the fact thatlifejackets were not worn untilseveral miles into the passage.Others regard them as “bigdinghies”; – a dangerousassumption as an importantproperty of nearly all sailingdinghies is their unsinkability.This yacht had no buoyancy
compartments or other buoyancyarrangements, relying solely uponthe integrity of the hull. Onceseriously flooded it was likely tosink. It did.
5 Washboards and hatchesshould be properly secured so asto prevent flooding in the eventof a capsize.
6 A lifting keel which cannot befixed in the down position willhinder attempts to recover froma capsize. It increases invertedstability if it falls back into itshousing, and cannot provide aneffective lever for the crew unlessit can be easily retrieved.
CASE 2
10
Narrative
A group of work colleagues chartered a seaworthyand well equipped yacht for five days’ coastalsailing on the south coast of England in February.Their experience varied but was adequate for whatthey planned.
They sailed from the Solent to Poole and had hopedto extend westwards to Weymouth but forecastbad weather led to a change of plan. After a periodalongside in Poole, they prepared for the returnpassage to the Solent. The forecast wind wassouth-west Force 7 to 9. On leaving Poole fairwaythe skipper reduced sail for the prevailing conditionsand headed east with the intention of approachingthe Solent via the Needles Channel which heknew well. No passage plan had been filed withthe coastguard.
It was a rough passage but the crew were confidentthey were in control until they confronted the firststeep-sided seas at the seaward end of the NeedlesChannel. These were typical of those encounteredin this area when either the west setting ebb tidemeets strong south-westerly winds or, as in this case,heavy seas build up in the vicinity of the Shinglesand the Bridge bank.
Because some difficulty was encountered inidentifying their precise position, the skipper alteredcourse to the south as he feared he was too closeto the Shingles. Moments later a particularly vicioussea capsized the yacht throwing all four crewoverboard. Three who were clipped on by safetyharnesses managed to climb back aboard, but theskipper, who had unclipped to go below to thechart table, was lost. A great deal of water hadfound its way below during the capsize through
Narrative
the open companionway and was over one metredeep in the cabin. One of the crew went belowto make a “Mayday” call and during this time theyacht capsized again, this time being dismasted.The two crew on deck were washed overboard,one being swept away, the other being trappedupside down with his head below the water. By thetime he was found by the one survivor, he was dead.
Only a fragment of the “Mayday” transmission wasreceived. It is most likely that the radio had beendamaged in the capsize and was only transmittingintermittently. The “Mayday” was received by HMCoastguard and by another vessel in the Solent butno position was received – just an urgent requestas to whether anyone could hear the signal. Forwant of any further information and lack of detailas to the origin or location of the vessel makingthe distress call, no search and rescue operationwas mounted.
The yacht was eventually washed up on an Isle ofWight beach with the one survivor on board. The threeremaining members of the crew were recovered butall had been killed through drowning or hypothermia.
Yacht founders in Needles
Channel in severe gale –
Three killed
11
The Lessons
1 Winter sailing with galesforecast demands a high degreeof responsibility by skippers. Theyacht on this occasion was wellfound. The experience of thecrew appeared adequate for theconditions and the skipper haddemonstrated sound judgementby abandoning an ambitiousplan to sail further westwards.
2 In accordance with theMSA Code of Practice for SmallCommercial Sailing Vessels, yachtcharter firms are strongly advisedto give appropriate guidance tocharterers on the use of the craft,bearing in mind the declaredexperience of the skipper andcrew, their knowledge of theboat and the weather forecast.
3 No matter how short thepassage, proper planning isessential. Given wind forecastsof Force 7 to 9 the skipper hadthe choice of remaining in Poole,taking the long route to hiseventual destination by sailingsouth of the Isle of Wight, ormaking for the Solent via eitherthe Needles Channel or theNorth Channel.
4 The indications are thatbecause the tide was flooding, ie,setting north-east and with thewind, the skipper decided thatthe Needles Channel option wasa safe choice. The choice of whichpassage to adopt must always bethe skipper's but the responsibility
must be taken after very careful consideration of the dangers and,if lacking in local knowledge,having taken the advice of others.In this instance the skipper, havingtaken the decision to proceed tosea, appeared unaware of thegrave dangers associated withentering the Needles Channel instrong SSW winds, and especiallyin the early stages of the flood.
5 In bad weather conditionssafety harnesses should be attachedto properly tested securing pointsat all times, and when fitted, thecrotch strap of lifejackets mustbe correctly fastened.
6 Conventional foul weatherclothing offers little protectionfrom winter water temperatures(in this case 6 – 8oC) and inbreaking seas once the body isfully immersed. Survival timesare measured in minutes.
7 One set of flares for emergencyuse must be kept readily availableand separate from the mainsupply. It is recommended thatthe ready-to-use set is placedunder cover and easily accessibleby the companionway.
8 Yachtsmen are encouraged toreport their passage plans to HMCoastguard especially in winterwhen bad weather is forecast.
9 Retroflective tape on liferafts,lifejackets and foul weatherclothing stands a very good chanceof being sighted at night when itis picked up by searchlight beamssuch as those used on RNLI lifeboats.
10 Publishers of sailing directionswhich offer advice on using theNeedles Channel should highlightthe dangers of breaking seas inthe vicinity of the SW Shinglesand the Bridge bank especiallyin strong winds from the southround to west. The swell in suchconditions tends to build up oncethe west-setting ebb has stopped.Around low water the seas at theseaward end of the NeedlesChannel can be particularly vicious.
11 Despite having to sail closeto a lee shore, the NorthChannel offers a viable andusually safer alternative to theNeedles Channel when enteringand leaving the Solent inadverse weather conditions evenwhen the tide is favourable.
Acknowledgement to Hampshire Policeand HM Coroner, Isle of Wight
CASE 3
12
Narrative
The 8.5m bilge keel sailing cruiser Zoe-Anne was tobe delivered from Chichester Harbour to Dartmouthfor a refit. The owners sailing experience was limitedso a professional yachtmaster was used to carryout the delivery accompanied by the owner.
The yacht was checked before departure in the lateafternoon in November and judged to be seaworthyfor the proposed passage. The necessary safetyequipment was on board. The weather forecastwas for SW winds 5 to 6 increasing to 8 to 9 thefollowing afternoon. A passage plan was completedand although the yachtmaster realised bad weatherwas forecast he was confident there were a numberof safe havens available en-route should they be needed.
The passage from Chichester Harbour and throughthe Solent was uneventful in a SW wind force 4 to5, but when they reached the western end of theSolent near Hurst Point at 2230, weather forecastwarned of imminent gales so they decided to turnback. Rather than make for shelter in Lymington,Yarmouth or Southampton, all of which were closeby, the owner preferred to return to the yacht’s homeport of Chichester. The return trip passed withoutincident although the yachtmaster suggested to theowner he should don a lifejacket and harness onseveral occasions. The advice was ignored.
Zoe-Anne approached Chichester Bar between 0430and 0500 the following morning. It was very shortlyafter high water and the south-going ebb had juststarted. The wind had increased noticeably and thecrew, particularly the owner, were tired. The windspeedwas recorded at Solent Coastguard at 0500 as SW38 knots with gusts to 47 knots. Neither man showed
Narrative
signs of seasickness. Once again the yachtmasteradvised the owner to put on a harness. He wentbelow but emerged several minutes later notwearing any safety equipment.
Two to three boat lengths north of Chichester Barbeacon, the boat was struck on the port quarter bya large wave estimated to be 6 metres high. Theyacht was knocked down, to almost 90°, and theowner thrown overboard. The yachtmaster threw adan-buoy towards him and tried, unsuccessfully, tostart the engine. The owner could not be recovered.A “Mayday” call was made at 0514 and theemergency services were alerted. The yacht ranaground on a groyne at Eastoke Point at theentrance to Chichester Harbour and the yachtmasterwas able to scramble ashore. The owner’s bodywas found an hour later. He could not be revived.
When the yacht was examined later, five lifejacketsand harnesses were found stowed on board.
Yacht owner loses life after
failing to wear safety harness
13
The Lessons
1 The most significant feature ofthis incident was the lack of clarityas to who was in charge. Only oneperson can be the skipper. Hemust take full responsibility forthe safety of vessel and crew andmust have authority over all thoseon board regardless of status.
2 The owner committed aserious error of judgement inchoosing not to wear a lifejacketor safety harness. The owner’sinexperience and an incompleteawareness of the hazards were
probably contributory factors.When sailing at night, in November,in a small yacht, in a gale, safetyequipment and the need tosecure oneself to the vessel areessential necessities.
3 Conditions at the entranceto Chichester Harbour or indeedany other shallow harbourapproach can be extremelyhazardous in gale conditions.
4 Seeking a safe haven in aSolent port or even remaining at sea until conditions hadimproved would have been amore sensible and safer option.
CASE 4
14
Narrative
The Beneteau Oceanis 390 Ocean Madam was on thefinal leg of a delivery voyage from Malta to Plymouth,UK, when she was knocked down twice in a severegale while sailing across the Bay of Biscay in a force 9severe gale. She recovered from the first knockdownbut remained inverted after the second. Her skipperand one of the two crew members survived but thesecond was swept away and never recovered.
Ocean Madam was skippered by an experiencedyachtmaster but her two crew had little previoussailing experience.
Before leaving her last port of call, La Coruña,weather forecasts had been received indicatingstrong to gale force winds, up to force 8 from the south-west in the Bay of Biscay. Once Ocean Madamwas at sea BBC Radio shipping forecasts were taken.Winds up to severe gale force 9 were forecast inthe northern part of the Bay of Biscay.
Narrative
On their second evening at sea and when about 110miles south-west of Brittany, conditions developedas forecast. Steep seas with wave heights of 7 – 9mwere encountered with a south-westerly force 9blowing. Occasional waves were observed to becoming from the east which created a confused sea.
With one of the crew at the helm, and undershortened sail in the dark, the yacht was laid flat by awave. She righted immediately but the event alarmedboth skipper and crew. The skipper took over the helmand retained one of the crew on deck to help him.An hour later the yacht was knocked down again butthis time she inverted and failed to recover. Once herealised she was not going to right itself, the skipperextricated himself from the submerged cockpit andfound his way to the surface where he managedto cling to the transom-mounted boarding ladder.
After an indeterminate period the yacht rightedherself and this enabled the skipper to climb backon board. On regaining the cockpit he discoveredthat the yacht had been dismasted and that he wasalone. There was no sign of the crewman who hadbeen on watch with him. When last seen he beenwearing a lifejacket and safety harness and hadbeen clipped on. There was no indication of harnessfailure so it is assumed he had unclipped himselfwhen trapped under water.
The off-watch crewman came on deck after seeingwater pouring into the cabin through the open hatch.The situation was aggravated by the washboardsfalling out.
The two survivors could hear shouts from the manoverboard but were confronted with an inflatedliferaft that was flailing around in the wind andrequired securing. This became their immediatepriority. In the meantime the crewman activated theyacht’s EPIRB while the skipper donned his lifejacket.
Yacht knocked down in Bay
of Biscay – One man lost
15
The only way to secure the liferaft in the extremelydifficult conditions was for the two men to climbinto it and make it fast. With both men in the liferaftanother wave broke over them and the painterparted before it could be secured. Within secondsthey were being swept away. Although any realisticchance of saving the missing man had now passed,they hoped it could still be achieved. Before anythingfurther happened another wave broke over themand capsized the raft. Attention then turned tosurvival. They had great difficulty trying to right thecapsized liferaft and were finally forced to climbonto it with it upside down. It capsized again.
They managed to get back on board and spent thenext few hours trying to keep warm. They also setoff several flares to try and attract the attention ofwhat they thought were passing ships. Meanwhilethe EPIRB had successfully operated to alert the FrenchSAR authorities. In the early hours of the morninga fixed wing aircraft found them and at 0530 theywere rescued by a French air-sea rescue helicopter.
The missing crewman was never found.
Any death at sea prompts questions as to whetherit could have been avoided. Such questions becomemore pointed when the events are associated witha leisure activity. Sailing involves many risks and avoyage in bad weather attracts more risks thanmost. The cause of this accident was bad weatherbut there were many underlying factors whichcontributed to the final outcome. As in all accidentsthere are several lessons to be learned both in thelead up to the capsize and in the hours that followed.The Lessons
The Lessons
1 The ability to survive in heavyweather is dependent on threefactors, a suitable boat, thoroughpreparation and an experiencedand well worked up crew. Providingall three criteria can be met, thereare no overwhelming reasons whysailors should not confront theseconditions. But as soon as any oneof these requirements is ignored,overlooked or underestimated,the risks escalate. If all three aredisregarded then the attemptbecomes dangerous and theconsequences potentially tragic.
2 In deciding whether a boatis capable of standing up to badweather, there is little to replacepractical experience of the actualcraft and a sensible appraisal of
what it is capable of. This must besupported by an understandingand knowledge of equipmentcarried and the boat’s handlingcharacteristics. Once the shelter ofthe land is left behind, a skipperis placing great trust in the boat’sdesign, her rigging, maintenanceand watertight integrity. Any smallboat is subjected to immenseforces in heavy weather and ifanything unexpected gives,disaster can follow.
3 Ocean Madam’s skipper knewthe boat and had already sailedseveral hundred miles in varyingweather conditions on this voyagewithout cause for concern. Hedid not, however, know enoughabout her stability to predict her
performance in the heavy weatherlikely to be encountered in anautumn gale in the Bay of Biscay.Yachts are designed for particularconditions and should not bedeliberately placed in situationsfor which they are unsuitable.There is a world of differencebetween a craft suitable forsummer cruising and one designedto cross oceans in all weathers.
4 If the stability characteristicsof a modern high displacementsailing yacht are unknown, err onthe side of caution. Breakingwaves in high sea states can beextremely dangerous to this typeof craft.
CASE 4Continued
16
5 The decision to sail is alwaysthe skipper’s. He should not beinfluenced by perceived peer grouppressures but must make a realisticjudgement based on soundknowledge. If there is no need tosail when bad weather is forecast,there is nothing to be lost bydelaying the departure untilconditions improve.
6 Weather forecasting continuesto improve but skippers have,ultimately, to make their ownjudgement based on the bestpossible data. This includes ananalysis of a series of weatherreports, in depth study of thesailing directions and localinformation. Many yachtsmenthink of weather in terms of windstrength and the Beaufort Scale.The very experienced sailor goesone further and thinks of it in termsof sea state. A force 9 severe galein the Solent is one thing; it issomething completely differentin the shallow seas of the NorthSea or the open wastes of theSouthern Ocean. High seas cancome from different directions;not just the one forecast. Thisunpredictability is one of the factorsthat makes them so dangerous.Significant wave height is one thing,the maximum height is another;it can be substantially higher.
7 The skipper’s greatest asset isa good crew. A well worked upteam who get on well together isa pearl beyond price. Leading sucha crew is a great challenge and veryrewarding. It is as important afunction as an in-depth knowledgeof the sea and sailing and can beoverlooked. Once mutual trustbegins to break down, orinexperience creeps in and tirednesstakes a hand, the problems
escalate. Handling a yacht in roughweather makes huge demandson a crew, especially when theirexperience of such conditions iseither very limited or non-existent.If too much is expected of them,they are unlikely to be sufficientlyeffective. The problems can alsoescalate if the crew is short handedor they succumb to sea sickness.
8 Handling a boat well in heavyweather can only come withexperience. It is not somethingyou acquire from books, but thereis a mass of available literaturewith some extremely good advicethat should not be overlooked.Skippers will devise their ownsystems and check lists to preparefor, and conduct, heavy weathersailing. Such checks will have twounderlying themes; keeping seawater out of the boat and the crewin it. The fitting of washboards fallsinto one category, the wearing oflifejackets and safety harnessesis in the other.
9 EPIRBs should be registeredcorrectly with the Maritime andCoastguard Agency, and a doublecheck made to ensure it has beendone if someone else is doing itfor you.
10 The two survivors in thisaccident had a reason to climbinto the liferaft. Under normalcircumstances it is invariably moresensible to stay on board. Yachthulls usually survive the worst theweather can do.
11 Among the most importantitems of kit carried on board anyvessel, including yachts, are thoserelating to lifesaving. It is too easyto assume that because they areon board they will work when
required. Every owner should havea system for ensuring that alllifesaving equipment is thoroughlychecked and any requisite servicingis meticulously carried out by thedates due. They should checkthat flares are in date and keptdry, that jackstays are maintainedin good working order, thatlifejackets are in good conditionand that the effects of UV light donot weaken the fabric of equipmentcarried on the upper deck.Danbuoys should not disintegratewhen removed from their stowage.
12 When planning the contentsof a grab or panic bag, give carefulthought to the circumstancesunder which it might be opened.It won’t be on the kitchen tableat home or the skipper’s bunk inharbour. It is much more likely tooccur in a tossing liferaft in roughweather in the middle of the night,when you are almost certainlyfeeling distraught, shaken andvery distressed. You might evenbe injured or even very ill. Thequestion to be answered is: whatwill I need and what am I likelyto want first?
13 The skipper of OceanMadam had attended a seasurvival course. The MAIB isseeing evidence that attendanceon this course is proving to be alife saver – literally. It is veryhighly recommended.
14 Keep the registration detailsof EPIRBs up to date with HMCoastguard. This can be achievedvia a simple fax.
CASE 5
17
Narrative
A group of 15 people were on a week long activitybased team-building course organised by the Prince’sTrust, Slough. As part of the course, the group of12 volunteers and three team leaders/assistants,undertook a day of sailing in Milford Haven led byfive instructors employed by the Trust.
The group left Neyland Marina at about 1230 on3 February in four 6.1m Explorer II ketch riggedopen day-boats. Each had five people on board,at least one of whom was an instructor. The boatswere rigged and equipped with an outboard motor,crutches and oars. The weather was fine with amoderate westerly breeze. The outboard motorswere used for the first part of the day to enablethe volunteers to gain experience in boat handling.After a picnic lunch the crews in two of the boatsmotored across the Haven to Carr Flats where theyprepared to sail back to the marina.
The mizzen sail was hoisted on one of the boats asshe motored slowly into wind. While preparing toset the jib some water lopped over the port gunwale,prompting the crew to move quickly to starboardto avoid getting wet. The boat heeled to starboardand started to ship water. The situation was possiblyaggravated by wind filling the mizzen sail. Theboat capsized.
Narrative
The instructor and volunteers were thrown into thewater. The instructor attempted to right the boatbut, after lying on its side for a few moments, itinverted. As it did so one of the crutches possiblysnagged the buoyancy aid of one of the volunteers,a young woman, who had found herself betweenthe two masts. She was pulled down and held underwater beneath the upturned hull. As the boat invertedthe centerboard slid into its housing, frustratingfurther attempts to right it.
Despite strenuous and prolonged attempts bytwo instructors (the other boat had come to theirassistance) they were unable to free the victim.
The accident was witnessed from the beach by twofishermen who ran to their boat where they set offa distress rocket. A harbour authority launch cameto assist and managed to attach a line to the riggingand right the boat. As it came upright the unconsciouswoman slipped out of her buoyancy aid and beganto float away. One of the instructors began in-watermouth-to-mouth resuscitation. She was recoveredto an inflatable boat which had also come to theirassistance and resuscitation attempts continuedas she was taken ashore to a waiting ambulance.Despite their efforts they were unable to save her;she was later pronounced dead.
Young woman killedwhen day-boat capsizes
CASE 5Continued
18
The Lessons
1 The boats had been modifiedto enable them to be rowed. Thecrutches were mounted throughthe gunwale capping outboard ofthe hull and were secured withsplit pins. This made their shippingand removal slow and awkwardand it had become the acceptedpractice to leave them permanentlyin place. By leaving them in situthey had become a snagginghazard for mooring lines, sheetsand other rigging; were vulnerablewhen coming alongside pontoonsor other craft and provided ameans whereby people couldfall or trip over them. They couldalso snag clothing or lifejackets inthe event of a capsize. Crutchesshould always be unshipped whennot in use.
2 Explorer II, like many openday-boats of similar size, is neithera very stable keel boat nor a lightbuoyant dinghy. Such boats canand will, on occasions, capsize.
3 Open day-boats are unlikelighter dinghies, difficult to rightby the crew if they capsize. Somehave a tendency to invert whichmakes righting them even moreawkward without assistance fromanother craft.
4 Distributing weight evenly forthe conditions is part of sailingand novices must be briefed aboutwhat to expect and what to avoid.From time to time water will beshipped and people will get wet.They must expect this.
5 As part of the investigationan Explorer II was capsizedintentionally. When inverted shesank slowly by the stern. Thiswas because the after stowagelockers were not watertight. Whenshe was righted the water level inthe cockpit was above the top ofthe outboard engine well and madebailing impossible. Other openday-boats share this characteristic
and appropriate measures shouldbe taken to provide additionalbuoyancy. Such measures shouldalso include providing a means ofbuoyancy on the mast to preventinversion in the event of a capsize
6 Before purchasing a boat, lookfor the European Standards platemarked CE which will provideinformation on loading andpower limitations.
CASE 6
19
Narrative
While competing in the International Dart 18Championships in Weymouth Bay on 2 June 1999,many catamarans were hit by a line squall andcapsized within a short space of time. 77 boats hadset out for the race but several had retired beforethe squall struck. A sizeable rescue operation hadto be mounted but at least 25 boats were able toreturn to shore without assistance. By the end ofthe day all 156 competitors were safe and only oneperson, a volunteer in one of the rescue boats, wasadmitted to hospital suffering from sea sicknessand possible hypothermia.
The forecast for the event was for freshening southwest winds force 4 to 5 and strengthening to 30 knotslater in the day but, although the weather patternhad been unstable over the preceding days, therewere no signs of thunderstorms prior to the event.
As part of the championship safety preparations,each boat was issued with a clear identification(tally) number that was stuck prominently on bothport and starboard hulls. Each boat had a set‘parking space’ on the beach with this same numberand had to use the tally system when checking inand out with the beachmaster for each race. Allcompetitors were required to wear lifejackets. Theywere, as a matter of course, wearing suitable andsensible clothing.
Narrative
The race organisers briefed the emergency servicesbefore the event. This included the coastguard,ambulance service and the Weymouth police, but theinformation was not relayed to Police Headquarters.
Although not a requirement to carry flares, manyboats did so and this helped to raise the alarm.Flares were successfully used by one competitorwhen his crew became separated from the boat.
A major problem was that some of the catamaranscould not tack back towards the shore in theprevailing conditions and became scattered over avery wide area before capsizing.
Five safety boats were in attendance, in addition toa committee boat and five keelboats. Although therace organisers were confident they had providedsufficient numbers of craft for normal circumstances(the RYA recommends one rescue boat for every15 boats competing), they very rapidly assessed thatthe magnitude of the incident was beyond theirimmediate resources and did not hesitate to callfor additional assistance.
The coastguard came to the same conclusion andnot only dispatched the local lifeboats and thecoastguard helicopter, but also broadcast a “Mayday”to ensure as many rescue assets could be deployedin the minimum of time. The response to the situationand the rescue was successful.
Catamarans capsizein Weymouth Bay –Everybody saved
CASE 6Continued
20
There was no hesitation on the part of thoseresponsible for organising the race that the overridingpriority was the safety of personnel, with boatrecovery taking second place. Although many ofthe capsized craft were towed to safety by theircrews, local fishermen and other craft, some drifteddown tide to be washed ashore. Several sustainedextensive damage before they could be recovered.Survivors were prepared to leave their boats whenasked to do so by the lifeboat crews and this greatlyaided the success of the rescue operation.
The smallest of the rescue craft, a 4m RIB, wasfound to be unsuitable in the prevailing conditions.
The ‘tally’ system provided a simple and effectivemeans of accounting for people even though manyof them landed up far from the regatta headquarterson Weymouth Beach. All competitors were returnedto the same landing place so they could be processedand accounted for. The coastguard and policeworked in conjunction with the race organisers toprocess and account for all the competitors.Ambulance teams were also present to check theconditions of those recovered.
The presence and requirements of the mediapresented difficulties to the organisers trying tocope with a very difficult situation.
The Lessons
1 Although this entire incidentwas unforeseen, the existingcontingency plans that hadbeen prepared to cope with anemergency, were in place andensured a successful outcome towhat might have been a tragedy.
2 Those planning to race inanything other than ‘normal’weather conditions should bemindful of the limitations of thecraft involved. This includes theeffects of line squalls associatedwith thunderstorms. Raceofficers will be the best judgesof local weather conditions, butthunderstorms can create verysevere local winds as the down-rush of air ahead of the squall hitsthe sea surface and is deflectedahead of the advancing thunderclouds. There should be no qualmsabout postponing, or shorteninga race if wind speeds are likely toexceed the capability of competingcraft to handle.
3 The outstanding feature ofthis race was the tally system forkeeping track of competing craft.It worked and is recommended.The essential requirement was toensure that details of whoeverwas rescued were reported backto the race control. If anybody istaken to hospital it is essentialthat his or her name is reportedto the race control at the earliestpossible opportunity.
4 The race organisers insisted onthe wearing of suitable clothingand lifejackets. The only person to suffer any ill effects was oneof the crew of a rescue craft.Although she was wearing awetsuit, she showed signs ofpossible hypothermia. Everyoneafloat should be suitably dressedand equipped for the taskdemanded of them. Failure towear suitable clothing can oftenlead to hypothermia, while aneffective lifejacket will ensure an
unconscious survivor’s head is keptabove water. It is often forgottenthat death from cold shock canoccur soon after immersion inthe sea, and within a few feetof safety.
5 Rescue boats should becapable of being handled in theroughest sea conditions likely tobe encountered.
6 Before a major event such asthis takes place, it pays dividendsto alert the coastguard, police andambulance service that it is takingplace. Discussion with theseorganisations before the eventwill identify potential problemsand propose appropriate solutions.
7 Flares were used effectivelyto alert organisers to the scaleof the problem.
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8 The prompt andcomprehensive reaction by theemergency services and othersto the call for assistance ensureda successful outcome.
9 RNLI crews found theco-operation of crews to leavetheir upturned craft a great help.
10 Whenever a good ‘story’ isbreaking, the media will bepresent. Their agenda will beentirely different to those copingwith the incident. It is very easyto become frustrated or distractedby reporters’ inevitable quest forsomething sensational to report,and their perception thatsomeone must be ‘to blame’.The appointment of a dedicatedmedia liaison officer can do muchto make the problem manageableand will ensure there is a reliablesource on which reporters candraw. Good press liaison payshandsome dividends; a lack of
it will often result in anuncomfortable outcome thatcan be very distressing to familiesand friends of those involved inthe event.
11 Planning for the unexpectedpays.
Footnotes
It is common practice for safetyboat crews to tie coloured ribbon(or marker) to an abandoneddinghy after its occupants havebeen rescued and taken ashore.This practice prevents other rescueboat crews or safety agenciesbecoming concerned when findinga capsized boat with no-one inor near it.
Those involved in yacht race rescueoperations should be aware thatmost race organisers use M2(channel 80) and channel 37 to
conduct on-the-water operations.The monitoring of these channelsby rescue craft should preventthe duplication of radio trafficduring any incident.
This article has been preparedwith the co-operation of therace organisers, the coastguard,the RNLI and the Royal YachtingAssociation (RYA).
The RYA has produced a usefullist of lessons learned in its RYARace Management Newsletter.
CASE 7
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Narrative
At the end of October 1999 five schoolteacherssailed across the English Channel in the 28ft bilgekeel Westerly Konsort Kishmul of Ayr. Setting offfrom Plymouth on a Wednesday evening they crossedthe Channel to spend a night at St Peter Port,Guernsey, before moving on to Cherbourg. Afteran evening spent ashore, and with bad weatherforecast, they decided to curtail their visit and headfor home. Conditions deteriorated during thereturn passage and by the time they sighted thebreakwater at Plymouth on the Saturday eveningand in the dark, the wind was blowing force SSW7 to 8 with a high sea running. As the yacht headedtowards the eastern entrance of Plymouth Sound,she grounded on rocks, subsequently broke up andsank. Four of the crew survived but the owner/skipperdid not. His body was recovered from the sea thefollowing morning.
The skipper was an experienced yachtsman and hadowned his boat for 9 years. He held a yachtmaster’scertificate and had crossed the Channel severaltimes before. He knew the approaches to Plymouthwell, and had a reputation for putting the safetyof his crew first. His crew were less experienced.Two had sailed a number of times before, but theother two were novices. One had no experienceat all. All four had total confidence in the skipper.
Kishmul of Ayr was well equipped for the intendedpassage. She carried adequate navigation equipmentincluding a Garmin GPS navigator. A full range oflifesaving equipment was also held on board.
The prime purposes of the voyage were to have anenjoyable time and to provide sailing experiencefor the crew. One of them was studying for aYachtmaster’s qualification.
Narrative
The passage had been uneventful until a weatherforecast was received on the Friday evening toindicate the conditions were going to deterioratemore than expected. The collective decision wastaken to return across the Channel some 12 hoursearlier than planned and sail from Cherbourg atmidnight. Mindful of the tides prevailing over theweekend the selected destination was to beSalcombe. On departing Cherbourg, a fresheningsoutherly breeze was forecast with an Atlanticdepression expected on the Sunday.
During the passage the four crew members sharedthe watchkeeping, with the skipper coming on deckwhen required. Lifejackets were not worn. Thecourse selected was towards Start Point so thatone of several options for the final destination couldbe considered once the landfall had been made.Navigation was conducted using the GPS and byplotting the positions on the chart. With thegenerally unpleasant conditions, there is evidencethat towards the end of the passage the crew hadbecome wet and tired, and at least one of themwas suffering from sea sickness.
Once Start Point had been raised, and with a fairtide under them, the skipper decided to head forPlymouth. The track selected involved keepingabout 10 miles off the coast initially but comingclose inshore for the final approach.
The skipper took the helm himself for the last fourhours of the passage, and was navigating by eye.He knew the waters well and visibility was goodas he approached Plymouth Sound from the east.
So close to home
and yet so far
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It isn’t possible to know exactly what plan theskipper had in mind as he headed for the shelterof the Sound, but it involved keeping to seawardof a number of yellow firing range buoys lying offthe Great Mew Stone. There are seven such buoysin almost a straight line; three of which were litwith flashing yellow lights. The two end buoys flashevery 5 seconds and the centre one every 10. Heclearly anticipated following them until he thoughtit was safe to alter course to starboard. As theypassed close down the line, the skipper and theone member of the crew who was with him in thecockpit realised they had not been counting them.
As they passed what they thought was either thethird or fourth buoy, course was altered to starboardto round up for the Eastern Channel. It is possiblethe skipper thought he had reached the most westerlybuoy in the line and had clear water to run up tothe Eastern Channel.
For the approach he used the Eastern Breakwatersectored light as the head mark. It was identifiedas ‘a red light’. He did not take a bearing of it orcheck his position by any means. He continued tonavigate by eye.
Throughout this period the GPS was functioningcorrectly but was not being used. The other threemembers of the crew were below in the cabin, andthe echo sounder was switched off. No positionswere being plotted on the chart.
Soon afterwards there was what one of the crewdescribed as an ‘almighty bang’. A few momentsearlier the skipper had seen something in the darkahead and thought it might have been a buoy.
Almost immediately the ‘something’ was identifiedas a rock. Kishmul of Ayr grounded on the RennyRocks ledge off Renny Point and just to the east ofthe unlit Shag Stone. It was shortly before 1950.The wind was SSW to SW near gale and the seaassessed as moderate to rough. It was very confusedin the immediate vicinity of the rocks.
The yacht did not appear to have been badlydamaged on first impact, but subsequent wavesswept her back on to the ledge and holed her.She started to fill with water and the skipper wentbelow and transmitted a “Mayday” which wasacknowledged immediately. The skipper was alreadywearing a jacket with built-in buoyancy, but told theothers to don lifejackets and come on deck. Withthe boat moving about so much, at least one of thecrew found putting on the lifejacket very difficult.He needed two hands to don it but also neededto steady himself.
With waves continually sweeping over her, the yachtshowed signs of breaking up as she was buffetedagainst the rocks. The liferaft was prepared forlaunching but was swept away and not used. Thesurvivors subsequently felt that it would have beenof limited value given the proximity of the breakingwaves on the nearby rocks. The skipper returnedbelow to locate the flares but couldn’t find them.With all the gear floating around in the half-filledcabin it was chaos.
Soon afterwards, the Plymouth lifeboat was seenapproaching but, because of the yacht’s proximityto the rocks, it couldn’t get sufficiently close torescue anyone. The time was 2017. About 20-30minutes after the first impact it was clear the yachtwas about to capsize and the skipper ordered hiscrew “to get off the boat”. They found themselvesin the water and trying to survive. One man foundthat one of his training shoes had caught in one ofthe halyards. They found that by swimming awayfrom the rocks they were in slightly better conditions.
CASE 7Continued
24
Three men were winched from the sea by ahelicopter between 2040 and 2052, while a fourthmanaged to swim ashore after spending about anhour in the water. The fifth, the skipper, was lastseen near the wreckage of the yacht. An exhaustive
search was made for him but without success. Whenhis body was recovered the next day, the jacket andbuoyancy aid he had been wearing the previousevening was no longer on him.
The Lessons
1 It is very easy to attribute thistragic accident to navigation error.As in all accidents, it happenedbecause a number of events, nonein themselves particularly serious,occurred one after another. Inthis case they eventually led tothe loss of a yacht and the lifeof her skipper.
2 Although it was late in theyear, the yacht, her skipper andcrew were fully capable ofundertaking the planned passage.Bad weather was both forecastand experienced, but there wereno overwhelming reasons whyKishmul of Ayr could not havemade a successful crossing inthe conditions encountered. Thedecision to curtail the weekendcruise while in Cherbourg wasreasonable, but it was probablythere that the first link in thecausal chain occurred.
3 With bad weather forecast askipper is faced with four basicchoices. He can abandon thepassage altogether, delay sailinguntil conditions improve, advancethe time of sailing to try and beatit, or batten down completelyand go when planned. If the thirdchoice is selected, a skipper mustthink through what needs to bedone before setting out. By thetime the yacht is approaching
her destination it is highly likelythe conditions on board will beuncomfortable, and there is everyprospect the crew will be verytired. The more that can be donebefore departure the better.Preparations not only involvesecuring everything for sea andplanning the port entries, butthinking through the effects offatigue. A skipper should alsobear in mind the implications ofhaving a crew with relatively littleexperience. Such considerationsmight have a bearing on theplanned conduct of the passage.
4 If the final approach is likelyto be made at night and in foulweather, it pays to think throughthe height and effects of the tide,unmarked dangers, the availabilityof navigation marks and thechances of seeing them. Aboveall, the skipper must plan on givinghimself the maximum amount ofsea room. A few minutes spentthinking through the optionsbefore sailing, and sharing yourthoughts with your crew beforesetting off, will be time wellspent. A key component of suchplanning is to think through theconsequences of not having GPS available when at yourmost vulnerable
5 The all weather yachtsmen willknow only too well that thosewho make up the crew will performbest if they are warm and dry.Anyone who is cold, wet andalmost certainly tired, is unlikelyto be fully effective. If they areseasick as well, the situation is aggravated further. Any plannedpassage must take account ofthe experience and knowledgeof the crew, with an allowancebeing made for the toll thatmight be taken if bad weather isencountered.
6 A check frequently overlookedis to ensure that everyone onboard, particularly anyone withoutprevious experience, is properlyequipped with effective foulweather gear. Time should betaken to ensure lifejackets andharnesses fit properly.
7 The greatest enemy to thesmall boat sailor in rough weatheris fatigue. Lack of sleep, orprolonged periods without it,can have a devastating effect onthe ability to think straight orexercise cool judgment. Anyonewho is very tired will start to dothings that would be very unlikelyin normal circumstances, or makemistakes. Recognising the state,and making allowances for it,will do much to offset the
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effects. Ensure that everyone, andespecially the skipper, gets as muchsleep as possible before closingthe coast at the end of a tiringpassage. Even a short catnapcan pay handsome dividends.
8 The Sailing Directions containsound advice; if they adviseagainst using a particular channelin certain wind conditions, heedit. The Channel Pilot embracingPlymouth Sound specifically warnsagainst use of the eastern channelin strong westerly winds.
9 All skippers, even the mostexperienced, will benefit from helpin a potentially difficult situation.In the closing stages of thisparticular voyage the skipper was,in essence, handling everythinghimself. At the very least thereshould, if at all possible, be twopeople involved. One should beconcerned with navigating. Askipper might well choose todelegate steering to one of theothers and handle the conninghimself. And the fourth could bestanding by to handle the sails.A team approach works.
10 Although the GPS wasfunctioning correctly, no fixeswere being plotted and no plannedtrack for the approach had beenprepared. The actual approachto Plymouth was the shortestavailable and involved skirting theeastern, and lee, shore as the yachtshaped up towards the shelteredwaters of the Sound. Whenentering a harbour at night giveyourself plenty of sea room andhave a plan prepared. Deviatefrom it if necessary, but know byhow much. Pre-planned clearinglines on known dangers will domuch to ensure you remain insafe water. And you won’t go
far wrong if you remember theold adage of good seamanship:log, lead and lookout. Hadsomeone been looking at Kishmulof Ayr’s echo sounder, and ensuredshe kept outside the 20m contourline on her approach to harbour,she would have been safe.
11 If your safe navigationdepends on counting buoys, doso but make sure you identifythem correctly. A miscount or amisidentification (so very easilydone when you are very tired)can lead to a course alterationbeing made in the wrong place.Such a technique must be verifiedby other means such as GPS, andby calculating the DR.
12 Not all buoys are laid fornavigation. While gunnery rangebuoys should be where chartedand lit as stated, they serve adifferent purpose. The sensiblenavigator should be aware ofthis and go to even greater lengthsto ensure he or she has aneffective alternative method ofestablishing his or her position.
13 Use the available navigationaids to advantage. Leading lightsor natural transits are the easiestto use, but a sectored light canbe relied upon to indicate safewater. Kishmul of Ayr could havemade a safe approach to theEastern Channel had she identified,and remained within, the whitesector of the eastern breakwaterlight. This would have ensured shekept to seaward of the unlit RennyLedge rocks and the Shag StoneRock, and would have alertedthe skipper to any leeward set.
14 Making out lights of buoys,and other navigation aids againsta well-lit background of street
lights and buildings can be difficult.Don’t rely on them alone.
15 When approaching a harbourentrance in bad weather, andmost especially at night, the crewmay have to work on deck togo about, hand sails, or act aslookouts. There is always theprospect of something goingwrong. Lifejackets should beworn and donned well inadvance. Trying to put them onafter going aground is likely tobe extremely difficult.
16 Fitting strobe lights to alifejacket as well as having afixed light makes the task oflocating you infinitely easier.
17 Don’t forget it is notdrowning that becomes themost likely cause of death onceyou are in the water, it’s thecold. Survival suits are not sucha silly idea. Nor are personallocator beacons (PLBs).
Footnote
After the accident the GPS wasrecovered from the wreckage.Using the data contained, it waspossible to reconstruct theyacht’s track during the finalfew minutes of its passage. Thetrack on the attached chart hasbeen reproduced using thisinformation but makes noattempt to speculate on exactlywhere the skipper altered courseto starboard, or what the set toleeward would have been. Usingthis data alone it shows thatKishmul of Ayr altered course tostarboard after passing one ofthe middle buoys in the line.
CASE 8
26
Narrative
During the night of 2 – 3 April 1998 an easterlygale had been blowing in sea area Tyne to createa heavy onshore swell along the Northumberlandcoast. A frontal system passed through during themorning and the wind veered so that, by 0900,it was a force 4 from the south. A gale warningremained, nonetheless, in force. The conditionssome 11 miles up the River Tyne at St Peter’s Marinahad, meanwhile, improved significantly with brightsunshine, blue skies and a force 3 to 4 wind. TheBavaria 46 yacht Signature was secured to one ofthe pontoons, and her skipper was preparing totake nine guests to sea for the day.
Within three hours of sailing, however, the yachthad virtually pitchpoled and three of the guests hadbeen swept overboard. One was recovered alive,the other two drowned.
The day before the accident Signature had put tosea on the first of two days planned hospitalitycharters aimed at raising funds to enable the skipperto participate in the 1998/99 ‘Around Alone’circumnavigation race. During the day the wind hadbeen blowing force 6 to 7 with an 8-10 ft swell, theboat behaved impeccably and the nine guests hadenjoyed their sail. No problems were encounteredand Signature returned to the marina in the lateafternoon to disembark her guests and spend a wetand windy night alongside.
In the shipping forecasts issued at 2358 the nightbefore and at 0505 that morning, gale warningsfor sea area Tyne on 3 April had been issued.Easterly 7 or gale 8 had been forecast and this wasreflected in the Tyne Tees Coastguard broadcasttransmitted at 0750. The skipper wasn’t able to
receive any of these, but had watched the weatherforecast on TV the evening before. He was expectinga force 2 to 3 with conditions set to improve further.
Shortly before 0930 on 3 April, the day’s guestsarrived onboard and were given a 20 – 30 minutesafety talk by the skipper. In addition to telling hisvisitors about his plans for the day, he briefed themon what to do in certain emergencies including manoverboard. He also showed them where the liferaftwas stowed and how to use it, and where to findthe lifejackets and harnesses. Because Signaturewas not going offshore, it was the skipper’s practiceto provide his guests with waistcoat type 100N(Newton) lifejackets as they were easier to put onwith a zip and were warmer. He did not showanyone how to put them on. The policy he adoptedfor wearing foul weather clothing, lifejackets andharnesses was that unless he directed they shouldbe worn, the decision to do so was left to individuals.
Tynemouth tragedy –
Two killed
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On slipping from the marina, Signature made herway down river on the strong ebb tide of about1.5 knots. The wind was light, and using her engineshe made good progress. It was sunny and everyoneon board was relaxed and enjoying themselves.
The only experienced yachtsman onboard was theskipper. Although he held no formal qualificationshe had extensive sailing experience, knew his boatwell and had visited the Tyne before. He was familiarwith single-handed sailing and often took newcomersto sea without another experienced sailor on boardto assist him. He wore glasses.
The sailing experience of his guests varied from thevery limited to the complete novice. At least onewas a non-swimmer.
When some three miles from the harbour entranceand still unable to see it himself, the skipper calledTyne Harbour Radio, reported his position and asked,“Is it all right to go seabound through the port?” Itwas just before 1100. The officer on watch at theHarbour Master’s office (Tyne Harbour Radio) couldsee the harbour entrance and replied, “Yes, butyou’ve got an awfully big swell and sea running.”This was acknowledged by Signature’s skipper whoadded, “We’ll see what it’s like out there and maywell come back in earlier.”
Having been warned about the conditions, theskipper instructed his guests to don foul weathergear. He continued under power heading seawardswith two reefs in the main. Two guests chose towear lifejackets, but removed them later when theybegan to get too hot. Nobody else wore them atany stage and the skipper did not think it necessaryfor anyone to put on harnesses or clip on.
Seen from Signature’s cockpit, the sea conditionsahead were dominated by a heavy swell, but thewind was light and the surface water was calm.None of the waves were breaking and the skipperwas totally confident of his, and the boat’s, abilityto handle the situation. Signature was prepared towithstand heavy weather in the Southern Oceansand the skipper had experienced far worse conditionswithout any untoward effects. Nevertheless he drewhis guests’ attention to what lay ahead and askedif they were happy to keep going. There was
unanimous agreement that they wanted to presson; they had every confidence in the skipper’sjudgment and ability.
Seen from ashore however, Signature looked extremelyvulnerable as she set out in what appeared to bevery rough seas. Preceding her out of harbour byabout a mile was a small car carrier, also outwardbound and seen to be pitching very heavily.
A feature of the Tyne is the strong ebb, especiallyat springs and after heavy rains. This discharge offresh water on top of the outgoing tide is magnifiedwhen water is released from Kielder water somemiles inland. The outgoing stream is stated to run toa maximum of 2.5 knots at springs, but in practicecan reach 4 knots. It is channelled as it reaches thebar, or the area between the pier arms. Althoughthere is no longer any shallowing at the riverentrance the term bar is still used locally. It is ahangover from the days when a bar did exist at theentrance of the river and before the piers were built.
Heavy seas form at the entrance during the ebband are particularly pronounced in north-easterlygales. They persist so long as the residual swellcontinues to feature and do not occur during theflood. The phenomenon of very steep seas is wellknown locally and is avoided by the locals. On 3April, high water was at 0857 and low water at1519. It was two days before neaps.
CASE 8Continued
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The skipper was aware of the effects of an ebb tidemeeting an incoming swell, and knew there hadbeen an easterly gale the night before. He could seethe seas ahead were not breaking so, not wishingto disappoint his guests, and with total confidencethat all was well, he decided to head on out.Signature began to pitch heavily as she made herway seawards and began to slam but, with theebb under her, she made good progress and cameabeam the pier end lighthouses at 1145. She wassoon in open water and found the conditions easier.The skipper believed he had left the shelter of theTyne at the most difficult time but there had beennothing to unduly trouble him and he had comethrough the heavy swell without difficulty.
Once about a mile clear of the harbour entrance heset about preparing to sail. The wind had reducedsubstantially so the main, with the reefs shaken out,was fully hoisted. A working jib was set.
It soon became clear, however, that with almost noheadway in the dying wind and heavy swell, thewallowing motion was distinctly uncomfortable andsome of the guests began to be seasick. As the daywas supposed to be a fun occasion the skipperasked whether they had actually had enough andprefer to return to harbour. They did. Course wasshaped for the harbour entrance, the jib handedand the main was reefed again. Signature beganher homeward passage under power. The skipperknew that low water was predicted shortly after1500, and with only two hours left of the outgoingstream still to run, believed the worst of the seaconditions would be over by the time he reachedthe entrance. He had no doubts that returningwould be straightforward, and did not anticipaterough conditions. Nobody was told to wearlifejackets or harnesses and clip on.
The skipper furled the main as Signature headedback towards the harbour entrance and clippedhimself on while doing so. On his return to thecockpit he once again clipped himself on.
Back in the cockpit, and when about a mile fromthe harbour entrance, he called Tyne Harbour Radioand reported his position. He then asked, “Is it allright to come on in, and up to the marina?” Thereply was, “Yes, you are all clear.” He headed forthe harbour entrance.
As he approached it was obvious waves werebreaking over the piers and the two lighthousesmarking the seaward ends but, apart from this,the actual conditions could not be seen from thelow height of eye in the cockpit until they weremuch closer. Once again the sea surface was calm.
The skipper had little inkling, or foreboding oftrouble, but was aware his full attention would benecessary to bring the yacht into harbour. The crewwas briefed and one of them, known to have dinghysailing experience, was given instructions for handlingthe main sheet. Signature was under full controlwith minimal sail set, and those onboard werehappy that all was well.
Apart from the skipper who was steering andstanding abaft the wheel, nearly everyone elsewas sitting in the cockpit. At least one other wasalso standing and another was filming events with a video camera. Everyone had begun toenjoy the experience.
As the yacht entered the river and passed betweenthe pier ends it became obvious the seas were muchheavier than expected. Once inside, the skipper,given the following seas, was giving his full attentionto steering. The time was shortly before 1300.
When about 2-3 cables inside the entrance, thoseon board looked astern and saw large wavesbeginning to build. They began to break, and oneof these lifted the stern so much that the yachtadopted a steep bow down angle as she slid downits face. With the bow now digging in, her forwardmovement was arrested and she virtually pitchpoled.Almost immediately she twisted to port and wasknocked down to starboard.
29
Signature went over to about 120°, remained therefor an indeterminate number of seconds and thencame upright. The engine was still running. It wasa difficult moment; the skipper had been pressed sohard against the wheel by the force of the waterthat he had bent the spokes of the wheel and hefound he couldn’t steer. He had also lost his glassesand couldn’t see properly for a few moments. Atthe same time it became very obvious that threepeople had been swept overboard. The yacht had,in the meantime, been turned through 180° andwas heading seawards once again.
Rescuing those in the water became the first priority,and various measures were taken including deployingthe horseshoe buoy. At the same time and usinghis hand-held VHF radio, the skipper transmitteda call for assistance. The event was also seen bywatchers ashore and some of these took immediatesteps to alert the rescue services including the localRNLI lifeboats and the RAF search and rescuehelicopter. Other local craft also went to assist.
One of the victims was seen floating face downvery shortly afterwards. While attempting to carryout the rescue, and with one of the victims holdingon to a deployed lifesling, the yacht was hit byanother wave that pushed her well over to starboard.Signature recovered a second time and the enginewas still running, but the victim at the end of thelifesling had not been able to put it on and had letgo. Together with the other two, he was now beingswept out to sea.
Assistance, however, soon came with the promptarrival of the Tynemouth lifeboat. Although all threevictims were recovered only one survived; the othertwo died from drowning. None of those washedoverboard were wearing lifejackets.
Some time later the skipper was arrested on amanslaughter charge and for failing to register avessel under the Merchant Shipping Act.
The Lessons
1 Although the Safety of SmallSailing Vessel Code of Practice(The Blue Code Book) lays downcertain requirements for thecarriage of lifejackets, skipperscannot go far wrong if they planon always having 150 N lifejacketsonboard regardless of how faroffshore they intend going. Asthe correct fitting of lifejacketsand harnesses is so crucial, theconscientious skipper will ensurehis guests know how to put themon before going to sea. It is farbetter to sort out problems at thisstage than when the emergencydictates. One of the key featuresof the lifejacket is its ability to
turn and support the wearer’shead so the face is uppermostwhen the victim is exhausted,injured or unconscious. Experienceshows that any of these threeconditions can apply withinseconds of falling overboard.
2 When taking guests orindeed anyone you don’t knowto sea, ask if anyone is a non-swimmer, and whether they havebeen afloat before. If they can’tswim, and are new to sailing,think through the implications. Ifsuch a person falls overboardthrough unfamiliarity with eitherthe motion or the environment,they are unlikely to stay afloatsufficiently long for you to pickthem up. But if they werewearing a lifejacket …!
3 The Blue Code does not insiston having a second experiencedmember of the crew in certaincircumstances when close to asafe haven. A skipper workingon his own and without havinganyone adequately experiencedto help him, cannot doeverything himself whenanything goes wrong.Conditions can be just as bad100m offshore as 1000 miles, andsometimes worse. The nature ofan unexpected problem cannotbe foreseen but when it happens,having someone else on boardwho knows what to do may makeall the difference between anadventure and a disaster.
CASE 8Continued
30
4 Few mariners would disputethat having the best possibleweather forecast before settingout is good seamanship. If for anyreason you cannot receive theconventional shipping forecastsbroadcast on BBC Radio 4 orVHF, look to the alternativesnow available. For those with acomputer and onboard Internetaccess, there are several usefulwebsites giving up to date weatherinformation, while Navtex andthe faithful telephone still enableskippers to receive an accurateshipping forecast. Once received,there are two further actions. Readthe weather signs yourself, andthink through the implicationsof what both the forecast andyour own interpretation mayhave on your intentions. Anovernight onshore gale on theNorthumberland coast, forinstance, will leave a swell thatwill create a heavy sea when itmeets a strong outgoing streamfrom the Tyne.
5 When using a commercial porta yacht skipper calling the localauthority on VHF may find he orshe is treated in the same way asif calling from a merchant vessel.The shoreside operator may not bea yachtsman with an instinctivefeel for the type of information askipper would find useful. Harbourauthorities and the coastguardwill have no objection to beingasked for factual information.
6 Rough seas and heavyweather are unlikely to trouble thewell-handled, well-found, yacht.Breaking seas are the danger.Waves break in well-formed stormsor when the bottom of the wave
trips in shallow water – such ason a shoaling beach or at a bar.Or when the tide goes downsufficiently far to create the sameconditions in a harbour entranceand the outgoing stream is running.
7 Notwithstanding anyimperatives that might requireyou to enter harbour at shortnotice, you are advised to heedlocal advice. If the directions say itis better to enter on the in-goingstream, there are likely to be verygood reasons for saying so. Theexperienced sailor will understandthis and amend his entry timeaccordingly.
8 The policy to clip, or hank,on is usually established by theskipper. Few insist on clipping onat all times but whatever systemis adopted, a skipper should beprepared to change it at shortnotice if the circumstances dictate.Signature’s skipper didn’t see aneed to tell his guests to clip onduring this particular trip. Withthe benefit of hindsight hewished he had. Other skippershave Signature’s experiences toreflect on.
9 One of the hardest decisionsa charter skipper must takesometimes is to call off or amenda planned trip on safety grounds.Signature’s skipper had done thisbefore but such a prospect mustbe clearly drawn to charterers’attention at the outset. It is farbetter to leave guestsdisappointed than have anavoidable accident. The decisionto change a plan on safety groundsmust be the skipper’s and not theguests. It is reasonable to seek
their views, but a skipper mustappreciate that many will bereluctant to reveal their truefeelings in the company of others.Never underestimate the effectsof seasickness on those embarked,or how little a novice crew willbe able to do if things go wrong.
10 If an accident at sea results infatalities, there is an increasingpossibility the police may start acriminal investigation with a viewto bringing manslaughter charges.Should this happen skippers canexpect the inquiry to probe everyaspect of their operation withgreat thoroughness.
Footnote
The skipper was tried, twice, onmanslaughter charges. The juryfailed to reach a verdict at thefirst trial so a retrial was ordered.At the second one, the judgedirected the jury to return a verdictof not guilty on the grounds thatthe prosecution was unable tocall expert opinion evidence tosupport a gross negligence charge.The skipper was also charged forfailing to register a vessel underthe Merchant Shipping Act. Hewas found not guilty.
One of the issues to arise afterthis incident was a dispute aboutthe insurance cover at the time ofthe incident. The MAIB does notbecome involved in such mattersbut very strongly advises skippersto ensure they have documentaryevidence of the cover providedbefore putting to sea.
CASE 9
31
Narrative
One of the entrants for the 2000 Atlantic Rally forCruisers (ARC) from Las Palmas to St Lucia was the24m ex-Whitbread maxi sloop, Creightons Naturally.She is now operated commercially for corporateentertainment, as well as providing more adventurouspassages for paying guests. The passage to the startof the ARC from the United Kingdom offered suchan experience to a number of paying guests.
According to the brochure, her original departuredate was 1 November but, in the event, she left theHamble River 2 days later with a crew of 18. Theaim was to arrive in adequate time for the start ofthe rally on 19 November. She never made it.
Three days later, this thoroughly tested and capablecraft capsized in bad weather while crossing the Bayof Biscay. The decision was taken to abandon her,and a few hours later search and rescue helicopterssuccessfully rescued all on board. Some of the crewwere injured.
In 2000, Creightons Naturally was being used toprovide both maxi sailing, and adventure trainingopportunities, to individual and corporate clients.She had a permanent crew of six and, in November2000, was skippered by a 35 year old man holdingan RYA Yachtmasters’ Ocean certificate. He hadaccumulated some 12,000 miles on boardCreightons, most of it as mate, and had been withthe boat since 1999. He had been the skippersince September 2000.
The rest of the permanent crew had a variety ofexperience and qualifications. The mate held anRYA Yachtmasters’ Offshore certificate and hadprevious onboard experience, while the othersoffered a range of experience.
The passage crew, known as paying guests, mustereda range of experience from extensive to total novice.Some made only a nominal contribution towards the
Narrative
cost of their food, since they were there to strengthenthe professional crew on board. They were all awareof the potential challenge they might face for anopen sea passage at that time of the year.
Creightons Naturally had been surveyed for a SmallCommercial Vessel Certificate in October 1995, andthis was due for renewal by 6 November 2000. Onsailing, neither owner nor skipper had realised itwas about to expire. The yacht was surveyedannually by the MCA for the Passenger VesselCertificate she carries.
With the corporate season behind her, she spentthe month of October at a marina on the Hamble,being prepared for her voyage. Much needed tobe done, including resealing a cracked diesel tankand, at the last moment, repairing the engine. Therewere also problems with the external communicationssystems, which required remedial work. MAIBinspectors were told that several deck hatches wereknown to leak, including one situated immediatelyabove the navigators’ station, where water hadbeen entering electrical equipment, and whichhad been repaired.
The plan had been to embark the guests at OceanVillage, Southampton, on 1 November and sail thefollowing day.
In the event, the yacht was not ready for sea at theexpected time, and it was necessary to transportthe guests from Southampton to Swanwick, wherethey found the crew fully occupied making lastminute preparations.
The joining guests were mainly left to their owndevices in the hours prior to departure. There wereno introductory or pre-sailing safety briefs, althoughthe skipper talked to each crew member individuallyto assess their sailing experience and strengths toenable him to allocate crew to the separate watches.
Even Maxis capsize
CASE 9Continued
32
A tide delayed departure, and Creightons Naturallyfinally departed at 0230 on 3 November. In orderto embark fuel, the skipper planned to stop brieflyat the fuelling pontoon at Port Hamble. However,a combination of weather, and tidal conditions,prevented her from doing so, and the decision wastaken to press on westwards to Weymouth to topup with fuel.
She made Weymouth safely, but the refuellingprocess was interrupted when diesel started topour into part of the accommodation. The fuellingcap to the diesel tanks had been disconnectedduring the pre-sailing preparations in the Hamble,and had never been replaced. The resultant messand smell of diesel were not welcome.
Fully fuelled, Creightons Naturally finally set off at about 1400 and made good progress towardsUshant and the Bay of Biscay to follow a passageplan prepared by the skipper. The forecast for Biscaywas west or north-westerly 6 or 7 decreasing 4 or5 with thundery showers.
The sailing conditions were good, and the skipperfelt that in view of the predicted weather he wouldbe best placed to make adequate ground to thesouth, and avoid any developing depressions. Hejudged they would pass well to the north. As theyadjusted to the routine of sea watches, both thecrew and guests began to settle in and enjoy thepassage, even though the latter were never informedof the planned track, the expected weather or theconditions they might expect.
By dawn the following day, the wind was blowinga steady north-westerly 5, only to ease as Ushantwas passed at around midday. The skies had cleared,the sun was shining and, by sunset, the wind haddropped to 9 knots from the west-south-west. Asdarkness fell the wind began to back and increaseand by the early hours of 5 November it was blowingfrom the south 4 to 5. The forecast issued at 2100on the 4th had predicted southerly 4 increasing 6to gale 8. It also referred to an Atlantic low 998moving steadily eastward, expected Sole 968 by1800 on 5 November. The barometer at 2000 waslogged as 1013.5mb. She pressed on.
Conditions on 5 November slowly deteriorated. Theskipper considered his options and took the decisionto remain at sea. He contemplated seeking sheltersomewhere in Brittany, but rejected this in view ofthe dangers involved in closing a lee shore in badweather. He was in a well-found and tested boat,and was confident of its ability to withstand theseverest of weather.
He was also aware that he had to make Las Palmasin time to prepare for the start of the ARC, and forsome of the paying guests to fly home. In additionhe never forgot that one of the main thrusts of theCreightons ethos, so strongly advocated by the owner,was ‘adventure’. Rough weather provided it.
The broadcast surface analysis for midday on 5November and received on board, showed a complexsituation in the vicinity of the yacht, with two coldfronts forming what was likely to be a secondarydepression. The close spacing of the isobars alsoindicated the likelihood of high winds in the orderof force 8 to 9.
By sunset, sail had been shortened to the main withthree reefs and the No. 3 genoa. The headsail waslater taken in. The wind had veered to the south-south-west, and by midnight had gone round tothe north-west 7 to 9. It was a dark night and theseas had begun to build. When the skies were clearthere was adequate natural light to at least beaware of the sea state and its direction, but whena number of line squalls came through the visibilitydropped dramatically. The skipper remained on deckas the wind increased and the seas built up.
By the early hours of 6 November conditions haddeteriorated further. From midnight the skipper andmate remained on watch to handle the situation,while the paying guests remained below. One ortwo people were suffering from seasickness. Thesea state became confused, and when squalls hitthe boat it was very dark indeed.
The skipper was uneasy with the amount of sail hewas carrying, but judged it too dangerous to lowerthe main and hoist the storm tri-sail. His selectedcourse of action was to run down sea. This gavethe impression of relatively comfortable sailing, butthe conditions were such that a preventer could notbe rigged safely.
33
At an indeterminate time (accounts differ), butpossibly shortly after 0100, Creightons Naturallygybed and her mainsail blew out. She was nowrunning in a south-south-easterly direction underbare poles before the seas. An attempt was madeto secure the main. Meanwhile the crew were tryingto start the engine but were thwarted by water inthe fuel system. Seawater had contaminated thefuel tanks from down-flooding through the fuelvents in the sail pit.
The generator was started but this, too, failedafter a few minutes. And then the instrumentlights failed. The skipper on the helm had no ideain which direction he was pointing and had to relyon feel as he attempted to maintain hisdownwind heading.
At about 0530 Creightons Naturally broached andwas knocked down to starboard to an angle judgedto be somewhere between 90° and 130°. Oneaccount suggested it might have been as much as160°. Several people were injured, including theskipper when he was thrown against the wheel.The conditions below were chaotic; most peoplewere thrown from their bunks and a number ofheavy items, which had not been properly secured,broke loose including the kedge anchor, the sparemainsail, tools and a range of domestic items. Dieselfrom the earlier spill made the decks slippery andadded to the stench and sense of chaos.
Accounts of what happened next vary, and notwo versions agree, but it appears the skipper wascompletely exhausted and stunned by what hadhappened. Injured when he was thrown againstthe wheel, he played relatively little part in theevents that followed. The last thing he did beforecoming below was to activate the EPIRB. A decisionto initiate a “Mayday” was taken relatively soonafter the knockdown.
The professional permanent crew down below,meanwhile, demonstrated complete composure.Despite his apparent condition, the skipper was ableto restore sufficient 12v power to enable, amongother things, the VHF radio to function. It was thenmanned by one of the permanent crew, who havingbeen on board for 3 months, was sufficiently familiar
with the radio and radio procedures, to be responsiblefor textbook handling of the “Mayday” transmission,and dealing with other shipping and the helicopters.
The decision to initiate the “Mayday”, and abandonthe vessel once rescue became possible, appears tohave been based on a number of factors: the lack ofpower, the blown out main, a continuing forecastof bad weather, the damaged steering, injuries, theloss of a liferaft and pushpit-mounted lifebelts, thestate of the skipper and the general chaos below.
The factor that caused the most anxiety in the earlystages of the post-knockdown phase was the lackof knowing whether anyone had received either theEPIRB transmission or the “Mayday”. In the event, andunknown to those onboard, the EPIRB transmissionhad been received. Once the VHF became operable,communications were established with a nearbyRussian vessel that indicated it was on its way torender what assistance it could. This contact withthe outside world lifted everyone’s morale.
Although it became clear that those on board werein no imminent danger, and the craft itself was moreor less watertight, it was accepted there was nogoing back on the original decision to seek help.Early thoughts that a tow might be possible weredismissed, and following the loss of a second liferaft,the SAR authorities were informed that a helicopterevacuation was required.
With two-way communications established, therewas some discussion as to the best way to evacuate18 people. Because of the range at which a helicopterwould have to operate to carry out a rescue, andthe time it could remain on station, it was eventuallyagreed that two aircraft would be needed, andthat each would attempt to lift nine people fromthe liferafts. Priority would be given to evacuatingthe injured first, including the skipper.
The evacuation went well once an attempt tolaunch a liferaft forward, as advocated by the SARhelicopter crew, had been abandoned. A secondvessel, a tanker, had also arrived on the scene andwas providing a lee. The first helicopter successfullyevacuated the first nine members of the crew, andthe second aircraft arrived 15 minutes later.
CASE 9Continued
34
Accounts of the evacuation demonstrated thedifficulties involved in trying to launch, and thenboard, a liferaft in severe weather conditions. The10-man liferafts were found to be very much heavierthan expected, and the lack of suitable handlescreated unwelcome problems. Once launched, atleast one of the liferafts inflated upside down, butone of the crew jumped into the sea and was ableto right it. The safety harness of a second personcaught in the pushpit. One man, weighing 101Kgjumped on to a liferaft from a height of 2.42m, torethe floor, and caused the raft to flood.
When reflecting on their experiences after the event,those who had received survival training commentedon the stark differences between handling a liferaftin a swimming pool for training, and the conditionsprevailing in a high sea state. They did, however, feel
that this training and a modicum of understandingabout what they could expect, helped their self-confidence enormously.
Everyone agreed that the mate handled theevacuation very competently. He was ably assistedby one of the permanent crew who maintained theVHF communication link with the search and rescueaircraft. The mate had recently attended an RYAsea survival course.
All 18 souls on board were successfully evacuated,albeit to different landing sites. Nine went to France,the others to Spain.
Creightons Naturally survived the storm and waseventually salvaged.
The Lessons
A large yacht capsized in severesea conditions. The decision toabandon her was taken andeveryone onboard survived a veryharrowing experience, leading toa satisfactory conclusion. Thereare, nonetheless, some valuablelessons to be learned, and certainaspects will no doubt providemuch food for thought anddiscussion in sailing circles.
The lessons fall into severaldistinct areas:
• readiness for sea;• planning and executing
the passage;• leadership style;• storm tactics;• the decision to abandon
ship; and• the actual rescue.
There is always a great temptationto criticise people for the waythey handle an emergency andCreightons Naturally is unlikely tobe an exception. So that as manylessons as possible can be learnedfrom this particular incident, someof the issues have been expandedto draw them out.
Readiness for sea
1 Everyone who has everplanned a long distance passagewill recognise the seeminglyimpossible task of being ready ontime. The success of any voyagewill, ultimately, depend on howwell the vessel and her crew areprepared. Planning what needs tobe done, managing the workload,applying quality assurance checks,and delegating responsibility in
a sensible way, demandsmanagerial and organisationalskills. A sense of humour helps.Failure in any one of these areaswill mean that somethingimportant will not be ready ontime and will return to hauntskipper and crew at the mostinconvenient moment.
2 Not only must the vessel beprepared for sea, but also the crew.Failure to welcome newcomersproperly, to show them whereeverything is, how to operate basicsafety equipment and where tostow everything, will mean theskipper’s greatest asset, his crew,will not be well-prepared for whatlies ahead. An untried crew isalways an unknown quantity andthe more time spent getting toknow them, and for them gettingto know the skipper is time well
35
spent. Time spent in a shakedownbefore undertaking the plannedpassage is time well spent.
3 A feature of the ARC is themeticulous programme of briefingsand safety checks made beforedeparture. The passage to thestart at Las Palmas is, if anything,even more of a challenge anddemands the same high qualitypreparation.
4 Use a checklist for the safetybrief to ensure nothing is omitted.The MAIB has noticed time andtime again that one of the mostfrequently made observations insmall craft accident investigationsis the number of times the crewwas not briefed at the outset on safety procedures or wherelifesaving equipment was stowed.Many people are left unaware howto use the lifesaving equipmentand do not try on the lifejacketsor harnesses.
5 Check that all electricalequipment is functioningsatisfactorily and that all pipe runsfor water, waste, hydraulics andfuel have been connected correctly.Having diesel pouring into theaccommodation spaces is not onlya total pain, but very smelly andultimately dangerous. It is alsoextremely difficult to eradicatecompletely.
6 Stow everything away carefully,and make sure it cannot breakfree in severe weather. The kedgeanchor alone on Creightonsweighed 57kg and was simplyresting in a cradle: it could easilyhave killed someone. Deep lockers,with only gravity keeping stores inplace, are fine – until the capsize!Of all the things that can make
life difficult for the crew of a yachtin heavy weather, loose gear flyingall over the place is guaranteedto be the most frustrating.
7 Break out severe weatherequipment and check it for bothcondition and accessibility. Whendid anyone last check the trisailand storm jib stowed in somemusty locker? Is the stitchingintact? Do the hanks move freely?
Planning and executionof the passage
8 Ensure you have plenty oftime to reach your planneddestination. The Bay of Biscay inNovember is notorious for badweather, and a passage to theCanary Islands involves having tocross the edge of the ContinentalShelf. Plan on allowing severalextra days for such a passage.This will ensure that any decisionto do anything other than makefor the chosen destination directcan be accommodated withoutincurring unnecessary risks.
9 The success of any passagedepends on three key factors:the state of the boat and herequipment, the competence,experience, knowledge andleadership qualities of the skipper,and the crew. Don’t expect a freshand untried crew to settle in immediately. Plan the passageaccordingly. It takes about 3 to 5days for people to adjust to livingon board, and considerably longerto be familiar with all essentialequipment. Do not expect a newcrew to be in the same leagueas one that has been workingtogether for some time. Theskipper should keep the crew
informed about the plans for thevoyage and the expected weatherconditions. They will be bettermotivated as a result.
10 Competent helmsmen are vitalto safe sailing in bad weather. Doyou have the number requiredand are you confident of theircompetence? If the answer is no,a change in the basic passage planmay well become necessary. Thecombination of a well-foundyacht and a good skipper can beseverely undermined if the crewlack the necessary experienceand competence.
11 Start taking weather forecastsseveral days in advance. Plan whichforecasts you expect to read andwhen, and study all the availableinformation on weather patterns.
12 Plan and prepare your badweather sailing tactics. What doyou propose to do if faced witha storm 3 days out and beforethe crew has completely settleddown? Do you have the chartsyou may need for a diversion?Do you have warps available, asea anchor or a drogue, and ifso are you confident you knowhow to stream and secure them?
13 Do not underestimate the seasthat can develop in the vicinity ofthe Continental Shelf in the Bayof Biscay in bad weather. Cross-seas were forecast at the time ofthis accident, caused in part by therapidly changing wind direction.Anticipate such conditions.
14 Check your barometer. Itremains one of your best friendseven if it doesn’t tell you what todo. The crucial factor is the rateof change of pressure.
CASE 9Continued
36
15 Maintain the ship’s log up todate. This may not be easy, butexperience shows that a recordof what has happened can beinvaluable.
Leadership style
16 Few things make such ademand on a yacht skipper asproviding effective leadership inbad weather. He has oneoverriding priority: the safety ofhis craft and all on board her. Hisability to provide it will almostcertainly be the result of hard-wonexperience and careful study ofhow other skippers have respondedto heavy weather conditions. Toan inexperienced and possiblyfrightened crew, nothing breedsconfidence quite so effectivelyas demonstrable competence,cool judgment, decisive actionand a smile.
17 The skipper, above all, musthave the determination to surviveno matter how bad the conditions.Fear, apprehension and a negativeattitude convey themselves toothers very rapidly and couldcontribute to a tragic, rather thana happy ending.
18 A yacht in bad weather makesgreat demands on a skipper. If heallows himself to become too tiredhe cannot give of his best. Askipper must rest no matter howgreat the temptation to keep going.Failure to do so could mean thatwhen his experience, skill andknowledge is most needed, he maynot be able to function as well ashe would wish or his crew deserve.
Storm tactics
19 Never allow yourself to beover canvassed. Reduce sail early,while you still can, and before itbecomes too dangerous for peopleto work on deck. Whenever in thecockpit or on deck, clip on anddo so before leaving the cabin.
20 A seaworthy yacht can copewith virtually every type of waveexcept in extreme conditions. Evenrelatively small craft can cope withthe large, but very long, seas ofthe deep Southern Ocean, but theshorter waves encountered whendeep water gives way to shallowin the vicinity of a continental shelf,present a formidable challenge.
21 Seeking shelter might be theright solution if the approach isstraightforward and can beguaranteed to offer the quality ofshelter sought. It is an attractiveoption if it can be reached beforethe onset of the bad weatherbut, if the severe conditions arealready present, the choice maybe fraught with danger if thereis any uncertainty about one’snavigation, or it involves havingto cross a bar. A number of peoplehave lost their lives by trying toseek shelter in bad weather. Manyothers have ridden it out at seaand have survived.
22 Given a choice, manyexperienced seamen will opt tostay at sea providing there isadequate sea room. Skippers willhave their preferred solution forhow to handle severe conditionsbased on personal and otherpeople’s experience.
23 Riding out bad weather caninvolve a variety of techniques,all of which require, in an idealworld, practice. Qualified skippersmay not have a vast amount ofextreme weather experience. Twobasic factors prevail. The bow isthe most suitable part of a boatto face very heavy seas, and amplesea room is an enormous asset.
24 Heaving to with minimum sailset is appropriate in the early stagesof a blow, or if the sea state isnot too severe. It is not for usein very severe conditions with ahigh sea state.
25 A skipper should aim to placehis vessel on a heading that willminimise a broach, capsize,knockdown or pitchpole. Acombination of storm jib andtrisail might provide the meansof achieving this until such timethe wind and sea state becomeunmanageable.
26 If conditions are so severethat it becomes necessary tohand all sail, yachts manage tosurvive very satisfactorily underbare poles providing they do notlie beam to sea. Parachute seaanchors have proved to be verysuccessful providing they arelarge enough, well secured to asecure part of the boat and therecommended length of parachuteline is deployed. The length isdebatable, but 120m has been usedwith success and the line must beprotected against chafe where itleads outboard. One overwhelmingadvantage of a well-deployedparachute sea anchor is that itenables the crew to rest. Badweather is very, very tiring.
37
27 And don’t forget the crew.Having available food and hotdrinks ready in thermos flaskscan make all the difference.
Abandoning ship
28 Any decision to abandon ship,which results in everyone beingrescued without further harm, mustbe judged a success.
29 There are no hard and fastrules about abandoning ship, butpast experience shows that unlessit is absolutely essential to dootherwise because the vessel issinking rapidly, the best and safestsolution is to remain on board. Ifthere is no means of propulsion,evacuation may be necessary,especially if there are other factorspresent such as drifting on to a leeshore. In general terms, however,your craft is your best lifeboat.
30 If you do have a majorproblem, do not hesitate to letpeople know about it. The rescueco-ordination centre watchkeeperscan often provide valuable advice,and would always seek to haveas much notice as possible. Theywill not criticise you for sendingout a genuine “Pan Pan” or evena “Mayday” when you first realiseyou are in trouble, but may finda delayed call very difficult torespond to in time.
31 VHF transmissions on channel16 can be used as a source fordirection finding.
Rescue at sea
32 The value of attending a seasurvival course cannot be sufficientlyover-emphasised. CreightonsNaturally’s skipper and mate had,and it stood them in good stead.
33 Launch liferafts to leewardand keep them away from anystanchions. Anticipate the liferaftbeing much heavier than expected,and ensure the painter isproperly secured.
34 If at all possible, keep dry.The cold is just as likely to killas drowning.
35 In severe conditions it issensible to clip your harness onto the liferaft painter when youare boarding. The wearing oflifejackets should be mandatory.
36 Try and avoid jumping on toa liferaft canopy feet-first. If youcan’t get on board by moreconventional means, a spread-eagled approach is better. Theperson underneath it might resentyour sudden arrival, but you shouldat least arrive, rather than gostraight through.
37 If being rescued by ahelicopter, never forget it will be burning valuable fuel all thetime it is airborne. Don’t keep itwaiting unnecessarily.
38 Establish VHF communicationsearly with the aircraft (or otherrescue vehicle), but do notunderestimate the noise a rescuehelicopter makes when overhead.
Footnote
This is an unusually long reportto appear in a Safety Digest, butevery one of the lessons is worthlearning, or relearning.
Lessons on the heavy weathertactics alone could fill severalvolumes of the Safety Digest.This article strays beyond theexperiences of CreightonsNaturally, but confines itself to some principles.
Above all, it aims to provokediscussion on how you wouldhandle a similar situation.
CASE 10
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Narrative
The skipper of a 13m steel ketch told the MAIB oftwo separate close-quarters incidents that occurredin the Dover Strait and the Thames Estuary. His yachtwas equipped with radar with ARPA, and a highspecification radar reflector.
To encourage others to report near miss incidents,the names of the vessels involved are not included.
Incident 1:
The yacht was heading in a north-westerly directionto cross the west-going Dover Strait TSS at rightangles to pass south of the Goodwin Sands. Thetide was setting SW so, at a speed of 6 knots, theyacht was heading 320°T while making good about300°T. A ship was spotted to starboard headingsouth, outside the Goodwins, but to the west ofthe traffic lane. It was assumed she was intendingto join the TSS. The yacht’s ARPA predicted the shipwould pass safely astern, but when the range wasrelatively close she made an alteration of course tostarboard. This instantly created a collision situation.The yacht had to make a late alteration to starboardto avoid a collision, and the two vessels passedabout 1.5 cables apart.
Narrative
Incident 2:
The yacht was making passage on a course ofapproximately 290°T in the Thames Estuary to thenorth-east of the East Swin, at a speed of about 6knots. A ship was detected on the yacht’s starboardquarter making at least 12 knots on a course ofbetween 240-260°T. She was on a steady bearing,and the ARPA indicated that a risk of collision existed.As the range closed, the overtaking vessel made noattempt to alter course. When the vessels were 3cables apart, the yacht had to do something to avoidbeing run down, and made a 360° turn to portwhile the merchant vessel passed by.
Vigilance, ARPA and
relative speed
39
The Lessons
Many yachtsmen can associatethemselves with such incidents.Their overriding concern is alwaysto know whether the approachingvessel has seen them and, if so, arethey going to do anything aboutit? Such encounters tend to ageyacht skippers prematurely. In thisinstance the yacht was made ofsteel, had an effective radarreflector and was, unusually, fittedwith ARPA. Her skipper couldreasonably expect to be seenboth visually and on radar.
1 The overwhelming lesson toarise from these incidents is forall bridge/cockpit watchkeepers tokeep a good lookout. Merchantship OOWs should be constantlyalert to the likely presence ofyachts and other small craft incoastal waters. In taking actionto avoid close quarter situationsthey should leave no doubt in theyacht watchkeeper’s mind whattheir intentions are.
2 In both cases the yacht wasforced to take avoiding actionowing to the questionable actions(or inactions) of a much larger andfaster vessel. The yacht skipper’svigilance prevented what mighthave been worse than a ‘near-miss’. Anyone in charge of a vesselat sea must be mentally preparedfor the give-way vessel not to takethe necessary action to avoid aclose quarters situation. Thealternative nightmare is for the‘other’ ship to do something veryodd at the last moment. Collisioncan sometimes only be avoidedby the ‘stand on’ vessel “takingsuch action as will best aid toavoid collision.”
3 Where two vessels areconverging at differing speeds,the importance of taking regularcompass bearings is paramount.What might appear to the casualeye as a vessel passing well asternor ahead because of its relativeposition, could be passing muchcloser – it is very difficult to assessthe speed of another vessel witha quick glance.
4 In a strong current, theaspect of a slow vessel might bevery different to its track overthe ground.
5 In confined waters, yachtsmenshould be very alert to the variousconstraints that can prevent largervessels taking the textbook actionto manoeuvre freely to avoid acollision. A nearby sandbank, othertraffic, deep water channels, anearby fishing vessel or evenconfusion as to your intentions,can make life very difficult for theother watchkeeper. Good seamanners, a good lookout, a soundknowledge of the Rule of the Road,and the importance of makingyour intentions clear, will do muchto ensure a safe passage.
CASE 11
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Narrative
Towards the end of July 2000, a 9 metre (28ft) sloop,with a crew of four set off from the Netherlandsport of Ijmuiden to sail across the North Sea toHarwich and the River Orwell. She never arrived.The alarm for this Twister class yacht was raisedthree days after she could reasonably have beenexpected to arrive and one of the most extensiveair and sea searches ever made was mountedwithout, sadly, any success.
Three bodies were recovered from the sea off theNetherlands coast about three weeks after the yachtwas reported missing, and a fourth was found inOctober. They were identified as the crew. Part ofthe wreck was trawled from the sea in November,and showed signs of catastrophic damage. A searchfor further wreckage by the Royal Netherlands Navyfailed to find any.
The owner, described as an experienced yachtsman,was immensely proud of his boat and had donemuch of the fitting out himself. He sometimes sailedalone, but on other occasions offered berths topeople who wanted to sail but had no craft of theirown. She was adequately equipped for coastalwater sailing, carried a manually operated EPIRB,automatic steering, GPS and basic lifesavingequipment. She did not carry a liferaft, but did havean inflatable tender. It is not known if the flarescarried were in date.
In mid July the skipper planned to sail the yachtacross to the Netherlands and had earlier approachedthe Cambridge Cruising Club to offer berths foranyone wanting to sail across the North Sea. Theoffer was taken up by two groups of young people,most of whom were students at Cambridge University.
Narrative
One group would do the outbound passage, thesecond the homebound, with a crew change inAmsterdam. No money changed hands and therewas no formal contract between skipper andcrew. The students were there for the experienceand enjoyment.
The first crew of four joined at Pin Mill on 7 Julyand sailed the next day for the Netherlands. Theexperience of those on board, apart from the skipper,was varied and embraced everything from almostnone at all, to fairly extensive in coastal waters.
The crew later described the skipper as beingmeticulous about where everything was stowed.The newcomers were shown where lifejackets wereand how to use the safety harnesses. The pre sailingbriefing included directions on how to use domesticequipment, the radio and some safety equipment.The safety policy onboard involved wearing lifejacketsand harnesses at night, but these measures werevoluntary during the day. The outward passagecrew cannot recall having been told what to do inan emergency.
Watches were mounted on a 4 hours on 4 offbasis with the skipper making himself available asrequired and, in practice, being in the cockpit forextensive periods. He chose to be up and aboutwhen the two with the least experience were onwatch together. None of the two ‘experienced’watchkeepers had ever kept a night watch before.
There were times when the skipper rested, leaving thewatchkeeping in the hands of the relatively untriedand inexperienced crew. There was one recordedincident of the yacht veering off course by, perhaps
Tragic end to a Twister
41
90° and another whereby an overtaking vessel closedto short range without anyone being aware of it.The weather deteriorated during the passage.
She arrived at Ijmuiden at about 1800 on Sunday 9July and spent some time motoring along the NordzeeCanal before finally arriving at Sixhaven, Amsterdam.On arrival, the four temporary crew disembarked.
They were replaced some time later by three otherstudents, all from Cambridge University. They joinedon the evening of 24 July, and by all accounts theyacht sailed early the next morning for the 11-milelong westbound transit of the Nordzee Canal. Thereis no record of anyone having sighted the yacht onthis transit, or having passed through the locks atIjmuiden to the tidal waters of the North Sea.
At this juncture in the narrative, speculation takesover. Nothing is known about her homeboundpassage, except that a reasonable assumption canbe made that her general direction of sailing wouldhave been towards Harwich. Her speed made goodwould have been in the order of 4 to 5 knots
depending on wind and tide. The weather at thetime was north-westerly force 4 to 5, and the visibilityis reported to have been good. She was expectedto have arrived off Harwich no later than 27 July.She didn’t.
The investigation into her loss flagged up manyquestions and few answers, but some facts havebeen established. No “Mayday” or other distresssignals were sent. The manually operated EPIRB wasnot activated. No other vessel reported a collisionor any indication of a yacht in distress. Inspectionof the recovered wreckage, confirmed as the yacht,showed no sign of fire or explosion. A black substanceon both sails and hull was identified as crude oil.None of the bodies showed any sign of trauma andnone were wearing lifejackets. The cause of her loss,and a satisfactory explanation for the deaths of fourpeople, is a mystery.
The balance of probability supports the hypothesishowever that she was probably in collision withanother vessel for reasons that cannot, at present,be explained.
The Lessons
It is impossible to determine theprecise cause of the yacht’s loss.However, if any good is to comeout of this tragedy, it will be iffellow sailors take on board thefollowing important lessons, someof which extend beyond theactual incident:
1 There is no reason why anexperienced skipper should notsail with a novice crew, providingcertain ground rules are observed.The first requirement is to gaugethe crew’s actual, rather than thestated, experience. If they are allnew to the sea, the skipper isadvised to tailor his or her
aspirations accordingly. Undernormal circumstances, nothing too ambitious should becontemplated unless there is atleast one other person on boardwho can demonstratereasonable competence.
2 Any member of the crewwith knowledge and experiencewill be a great help, but thosewhose experience is confined todinghy or estuarine sailing willfind offshore work strange atfirst. Human nature being whatit is, they may be very reluctantto admit they are on unfamiliarterritory. Maintaining an all
round lookout at sea, especiallyat night, is far from straightforwardand is likely to be very taxing forthe inexperienced.
3 Before embarking on anypassage with an unknown crew,a shakedown cruise is stronglyrecommended. This is particularlyrelevant before embarking on anovernight passage.
4 Safety equipment should meetthe highest standards and besuitable for the intended passage.For a vessel going offshore, aliferaft capable of carrying everyoneon board is strongly recommended.
CASE 11Continued
42
5 The crew must be thoroughlybriefed, and instructed on how tohandle the lifesaving equipmentprovided. Each member of thecrew should not only be shownwhere the lifejackets are stowedbefore going to sea, but they musttry them on as well. Everyoneshould be briefed about what todo in an emergency and how toreact in the event of the skipperbecoming incapacitated.
6 Carry an EPIRB and ensure ithas been correctly registered. Withso many choices available for usein a small sailing vessel, the mostpractical option is, in the MAIB’sopinion, a manually operated406Mhz beacon.
7 It can be surprisingly difficultfor other vessels to ‘see’ yachtsin certain sea states and lightingconditions. Never assume the‘other’ ship has detected you,especially in fog, rain or a high seastate. Not only must you makesure your watchkeepers keep avery good lookout, but also equalattention must be given to makingyour craft as ‘visible’ as possible.Unless big ship watchkeepersdetect you at about 5 miles, thespeed and size of their ships couldmean they have very little timeand sea room to take avoidingaction. If the ship is approachingfrom down sea, your radar echoruns the additional risk of beingswallowed in the clutter atrelatively close range.
8 Make sure you are carrying aneffective radar reflector and thatit is rigged correctly. As from 1 July2002, all ships under 150gt arerequired to have a radar reflector
(see footnotes). To be effective,such a reflector should, at thevery least, comply with ISO 8729:1987, RORC or ORC specifications.An acknowledged problem facingthe small boat skipper is thedifficulty in fitting a radar reflectorthat has a good capability toreflect radar transmissions in theS Band (3Ghz) with its superiorability to penetrate precipitation.
9 And also check that thenavigation lights are functioningcorrectly. Small boat lights canbe difficult to see at night.
10 Have a white flare availableto alert oncoming shipping toyour presence.
11 Join the MCA’s CG66Voluntary Safety IdentificationScheme. By filling in form CG66,and sending it off to your nearestCoastguard Co-ordination Centre,it ensures the coastguard has thelatest information on your craftshould an emergency arise. Theform can be downloaded fromthe MCA’s websitehttp://www.mcga.gov.uk/publications/cg66/index.htm
12 The southern North Sea isamong the busiest stretches ofwaters in the world and a challengefor the inexperienced. Payparticular attention to teachingwatchkeepers how to keep alookout and assess whether riskof collision exists. Rehearse theRule of the Road. You are likely tosee every possible combination oflights and shapes in the watersbetween East Anglia and theNetherlands coast.
13 And don’t ever forget Rule17(b): “When, from any cause, thevessel required to keep her courseand speed finds herself so closethat collision cannot be avoidedby the action of the give-way vesselalone, she shall take such actionas will best aid to avoid collision.”
14 If you are the skipper, chooseyour time for rest with great care.You cannot afford to be fatiguedwhen you are most needed to giveadvice. The problem of managingone’s own sleep when acting asskipper is one of the most difficulttasks facing the average personin charge of a vessel at sea.
15 Nobody on board the yachtwas wearing a lifejacket. It isimpossible to speculate on theoutcome had they been wearingthem, but…
Footnote
At the inquest held in July 2002,an open verdict was returned onthe victims of this tragic accident.The new Chapter V of the Safetyof Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS)states in Regulation 19.2.1.7 that“All ships irrespective of size shallhave: if less than 150gt and ifpracticable, a radar reflector orother means to enable detectionby ships navigating by radar atboth 9Ghz and 3hz.”
CASE 12
43
Narrative
A 10.15 metre sailing yacht was bareboat charteredfor an intended voyage across the English Channeland back. She carried a crew of seven including theSkipper. The last weather forecast obtained beforesailing was for north-easterly winds of force 5 to 7.It was considered that the wind would be comingfrom a favourable direction for the proposed cruiseacross the Channel.
The yacht sailed in the afternoon but during thenight some difficulty was experienced in steeringher and she made a number of uncontrolled gybes.As dawn broke it started raining and the visibilitybecame poor, the crew were cold and miserableand some were sea-sick. It was decided that thebest course of action was not to carry on to theproposed destination but to make for the nearestharbour. During the subsequent manoeuvre thesheets which had been snap-shackled to the jibbroke loose; the jib was furled and not used again.However, while making the presumed approach tothe harbour, a west cardinal buoy marking shallowswas seen very close to on the port bow and it wasrealised that the tidal stream had been setting tothe east and not to the west as had been assumed.
The yacht remained on course while one personchecked the navigational chart. The eventual gybeback on to a westerly heading was not properlycontrolled because of the increasing wave heights.The mainsail boom swung over very quickly, themainsheet went taut and came away from theboom end.
While attempting to drop the mainsail, the yachtwas struck by a huge wave which washed four crewmembers overboard. All were attached to the yachtby harnesses and two managed to get back onboard. One of the other two remained attachedbut it was not possible to pull him back on boardand he did not survive. He was not wearing a life-
Narrative
jacket. The other person either slipped through hisharness or removed it himself and was unable toget back on board; his body has not been found.
The remainder of the crew were rescued by ahelicopter. The abandoned yacht eventually ranaground on the coast.
Observations
1 A proper handover, in accordance with the “Codeof Practice for the Safety of Small CommercialSailing Vessels”, was not made at the commencementof the bareboat charter.
2 No proper passage plan was prepared beforethe start of the cruising voyage.
3 The yacht’s track was not monitored after alteringcourse for the nearest harbour.
Comment
1 Because only one mainsail reef of the threeavailable was reeved, the Skipper had insufficientcontrol of the yacht’s sail area in the worseningweather conditions.
2 Sheets with snap shackles should not be usedfor foresails; bowlines are preferable.
3 A boom preventer may have proved beneficialin this case.
4 On sighting the west cardinal buoy and knowingthat the danger lay to the east, the yacht shouldhave gybed to the west immediately. It is possiblethat, if this had been done, the heavy breaking seasmight have been avoided.
Two persons lost overboardfrom sailing yacht
CASE 13
44
Narrative
A ro-ro passenger ferry was on her regular passagefrom Southampton to Cowes, it was daylight andthe visibility was good. The wind was south-easterlyforce 4 and the tidal stream was easterly.
The ferry left the Thorn Channel and headedsouth-south-westerly across the western part of theBramble Bank towards the West Knoll buoy withthe intention of leaving it to port. She would thenhead towards the South Bramble buoy. She wasmaking good between 12 and 13 knots.
A sailing yacht, the closest of four yachts crossingthe Bramble Bank ahead of the ferry, was makingabout 6 knots on a close reach and, although ona more westerly heading than the ferry, was makinggood a similar track. The other three yachts weremaking similar tracks but further to the west.
Assuming the yacht would maintain her heading,the ferry’s master considered he would be able toovertake her on her port side soon after she hadpassed the West Knoll buoy. There was only justenough sea room for this manoeuvre, but the ferrymaster knew that he could stop or slow downrapidly if necessary. Staying clear of the main areaof congested leisure traffic further to the west wasanother consideration.
The skipper of the yacht was watching the approachof the ferry with some alarm. He was aware thatunless the ferry altered her course or speed very soonhis vessel would be run down. He could not be surethat the watchkeeper on the ferry had seen him.
Narrative
When the yacht was about 1 cable ahead, the ferrybegan to alter course to port as planned. However,by this time, the skipper of the yacht had becomeso concerned that he also had begun to alter courseto port. The skipper considered that his own vessel’sclose proximity to the West Knoll Buoy ruled outthe possibility that the ferry would pass down hisport side. With this in mind, his intention had beento tuck up closer to the buoy to give the ferry moreroom to pass him on his starboard side.
The combined effect of the two actions was tomaintain both vessels on their collision course. Theferry’s master sounded two short blasts, with theintention of altering course further to port, butimmediately decided that it would be better to passdown the starboard side of the yacht. He stoppedhis vessel swinging further to port accordingly.
The ferry passed only a few metres clear of the yachtwhen she was just over half a cable south of WestKnoll Buoy about 1 minute after beginning hisanti-collision manoeuvre.
Differing perspectives!
45
The Lessons
Anyone who has sailed in theSolent, or been on passagethrough it in a larger vessel, will know that it can get quiteexciting; especially in summer. Itdemands a very high degree ofconcentration and nowhere moreso than in the area to the northof Cowes. Its limited area, andsimultaneous use by merchantvessels, ferry operators, warshipsand leisure craft effectively restrictsthe available sea room in whichto comply with the CollisionRegulations, and vessels havediffering perspectives of therequirements.
1 The action taken by the ferry
In accordance with Rule 13 of theCollision Regulations, the ferrywas required to keep out of theway of the yacht. In accordancewith Rule 17, the yacht wasrequired to maintain her courseand speed until it became apparentthat the ferry was not takingappropriate avoiding action.
The Collision Rules variously callfor the action of the give-wayvessel to be:
• positive, made in ample timeand with the observance ofgood seamanship;
• large enough to be readilyapparent to another vessel;
• such as to result in passingat a safe distance; and
• early and substantial.
Appropriate avoiding actioncan be measured against theserequirements.
The master of the ferry’s plannedanti-collision action did not fulfilmany, if any, of the aboverequirements. Bearing in mind theferry’s ability to slow down andstop very rapidly, more appropriateavoiding action in thesecircumstances might have beento have slowed down until bothvessels were well past West KnollBuoy where greater sea roomwould have enabled a saferpassing manoeuvre.
2 The action taken by the yacht
Compliance with Rule 17(maintaining her course and speeduntil it became apparent that theferry was not taking appropriateavoiding action) can place theyacht, or any other slow speedstand-on vessel, in a verydifficult position.
At what stage can the skipperof a stand-on yacht legitimatelydecide that the give-way vesselis not taking appropriate avoidingaction? In this case, with thetwo vessels only a cable apart,and therefore within a minute ofcolliding, and the give-way vesselhaving shown no sign that he hadthe situation under control, theskipper was justified in takingaction. As the yacht was alreadyclose to West Knoll buoy, an
alteration of course to port towardsthe buoy was the most obviouschoice, but any alter course actionstood the risk of making mattersworse. Rule 34 contains soundsignals for this situation and it isimportant to make every effort tocommunicate intentions to theother party.
3 The importance of communication
Early use of the sound signal oftwo short blasts would haveindicated the ferry’s intentionsunder Rule 34 of the CollisionRegulations.
In the absence of a positive earlyindication of the intentions of thegive-way vessel, the skipper of thestand-on yacht needs re-assurancethat the watchkeeper of thegive-way vessel has seen him.Under Rule 34, the skipper maytry to attract the attention of thegive way vessel by sounding fiveor more short blasts using theboat’s sound signalling equipmentand/or flashing a signal light. Thissignal indicates that you are indoubt as to whether sufficientaction is being taken. Becausethe ferry had an enclosed bridge,flashing the light might havebeen the more effective signalon this occasion.
CASE 14
46
Narrative
Poole Harbour is an important yachting centre, withmarinas and moorings for more than 5,000 yachtsand other pleasure craft. A passenger chain ferry,which spans the mouth of the harbour, operates every20 minutes from Sandbanks to South Haven Point.
Many recreational craft, including a fleet of 15 xOD-class yachts, were enjoying a particularly balmyspring afternoon.
The fleet of yachts had set out on a 10-mile race.As the fleet approached the harbour entrance, theyunexpectedly encountered an inward-bound fastferry, which was late arriving. The fleet moved outof the channel to avoid it.
The ferry passed and, seeing a gap between theleading three yachts and the rest of the fleet, thechain ferry’s skipper manoeuvred his vessel awayfrom the Sandbanks slipway. As some of the fleetapproached the chain ferry, they lost the wind andtheir steerage. They were close to the Sandbanksside, and the north-easterly wind had created a lee.The chain ferry’s skipper had not realised the lee ofSandbanks would affect the yachts’ steerage, leavingthem no effective alternative means of steerage.
Under an obligation to keep out of the way of alltraffic, the skipper reversed the chain ferry to allowthe leading group to pass to the south of it. However,a strong ebb tide swept the next four XODs into theside of the ferry.
Two of the yacht club’s safety/rescue boats attemptedto rescue them but one damaged her propeller, andthe crew of the other boat felt that the tide wastoo strong. Fortunately, RNLI lifeboats were nearby
and were able to quickly tow away three of theXODs from the side of the chain ferry. One yachtremained, pinned to the side of the ferry. Its owner,his 72 year old wife, and one other crew memberwere on board.
The yacht was buffeted and pounded into theferry. She was in danger of capsizing. Water wasquickly being taken on board, there was a greatdeal of turbulence and a very strong ebb tide.Within minutes, the boat was drawn under thechain ferry, together with the owner’s wife. Thelady was swept under the ferry but, less than 2minutes later, emerged on the other side, consciousand, miraculously, unscathed. She was quicklyrecovered by one of the RNLI lifeboats.
Meanwhile, the owner and his other crew memberclung to the grab lines which hung from the ferry’sside. Both men were rescued, unhurt.
Yachtswoman dragged
under chain ferry
The Lessons
The MAIB investigation highlighteda number of contributing factorspertaining to various parties.However, the following lessonsfocus mainly on those to belearned by yacht club race officers.
1 In a busy harbour, yachtclubs’ race officers should obtainnot only the scheduled shippingmovements before the start ofthe race, but also the latestmovements. Arrival and leavingtimes are often changed at shortnotice for operational reasons.
2 Effective communicationbetween port control, the raceofficer, safety/rescue boats andracing craft, is essential. This willensure that everyone is aware ofunexpected situations which maybe developing.
3 When planning a racecourse,race officers should consider winddirection and force. Yachts sailingdownwind tend to keep together,and can bunch-up in positions ofnavigational importance. Shortstart-elapse times between differentclasses of craft will exacerbatethe situation.
4 When different operators or interests are working within a harbour area withoutcomprehensive lines ofcommunication existing betweenthem, accidents happen. Allparties should meet regularly, todiscuss their different needs andoperational limits. Potentialproblems can then be resolvedquickly and easily.
5 Safety/rescue boats shouldbe adequately designed andequipped, and should be mannedby properly trained crew.
This incident had a satisfactoryoutcome and all crew wererescued unhurt, having suffered anextremely harrowing experience.However, a keelhauling is notnormally on the agenda thesedays when one sets out for anexciting afternoon of sailing!
47
CASE 15
48
Narrative
A 10.1m sailing yacht, with a crew of four, lefttheir home port early one Sunday morning withthe intention of sailing to Ireland. The wind wassouth-westerly force 5 and they motorsailed forabout two hours, with the wind on the port bow,without incident. A new weather forecast wasreceived that alerted them to very rough conditionslater in their planned passage. The decision wasmade to turn round and head for home.
The double-reefed mainsail was left up and sheetedin, and the yacht was motorsailed back on areciprocal course. When within sight of the portentrance, a large wave caught the yacht’s starboardquarter, and pitched the helmsman forward againstthe wheel and automatic steering equipment. Thiscaused the yacht to broach, whereupon she washit by a second wave which flooded the cockpitand caused substantial damage to the spray dodger.The yacht was heeled to 70–80°, during which timethe water that was in the cockpit poured over theside, carrying the helmsman overboard. The yachtquickly righted herself, and the owner immediatelyinitiated manoverboard procedures.
A dan buoy was launched, together with an ‘Oscar’type life sling on a long floating line. One of thecrew made a “Mayday” call. The man in the waterwas conscious and responded to calls from the yacht.He had not been wearing a safety harness, but waswearing a waterproof jacket with built-in buoyancy.The yacht circled the man towing the life sling.
The man reached the floating line, but instead offollowing it back to the sling, he tried to haulhimself towards the yacht. He found the line toothin and slippery for this purpose but, in time, the
Nerrative
yacht managed to manoeuvre alongside him. Hemade his way to the transom, where attempts weremade to bring him back on board. The skipper andcrew were unable to lift him bodily, and with noharness or other mechanism for attaching a line,they could not winch him on board.
By this time, the wind had increased to force 6 to 7and the yacht had been set north-west on a strongspring tide into a well-known tidal race. Sea conditionsbecame substantially worse, with steep confusedwaves of 6–7 metres. This hindered the attempts torecover the man, and the motion of the yacht inthese conditions meant that his head was frequentlybeing ducked under the water. The skipper orderedthe liferaft to be launched so that they might beable to support the lower part of the man’s bodyand aid his recovery.
The liferaft was successfully deployed with anothercrew member on board. However, it is thought thatat this point the man in the water suffered a heartattack, because his condition changed rapidly and helet go of the yacht. The same recovery manoeuvrewas tried again, this time with the assistance of theliferaft in the water. However, the liferaft brokeaway and drifted free.
A coastguard helicopter recovered the man, and hewas evacuated to hospital, where he was confirmeddead. The lifeboat crew, who had come to assist,found the crew member in the liferaft to besuffering from hypothermia. He, too, was airliftedto hospital. He made a full recovery.
The yacht’s owner and his wife were able to returnto port under their own power.
Helmsman dies after
recovery attempt fails
49
The Lessons
1 This tragic accident emphasisesonce again the importance ofwearing a safety harness andclipping on. The crew had notperceived any significant risk asthey returned to their home porton a brisk but sunny morning.The fact that the helmsman hadnot been wearing a harness orconventional lifejacket made thejob of those trying to recover himfar more difficult because therewere no lifting rings, webbing, orstraps on which to secure a line.
2 The instinct of the manoverboard when he reached thelife sling line might have been touse it to haul himself back to theyacht as soon as possible. Hemight have been better served tohave followed the line back to the
sling, which, once placed over hishead and shoulders, would havemade his recovery easier.
3 Recovering a man overboardto a vessel with even a relativelysmall freeboard is very difficultin the most benign conditions.The attempts at recovery werehindered by the sea state andlow water temperature, whichwould have quickly reduced theextent to which the man in thewater could help himself.
All yachtsmen need to work outhow they would recover a manoverboard in adverse conditions.There is now simple, light andrelatively cheap equipment onthe market to recover peoplefrom the water.
Footnote
The owner was particularly struckby the difficulties he experiencedrecovering the man overboard,and is taking steps to promote a simple retrieval device of hisown design.
CASE 16
50
Narrative
The sail training vessel Morning Star Of Revelationwas on passage from Scheveningen, Netherlandsto the River Orwell on the UK’s east coast. Therewere thirteen on board, split into three watches.
At 0100 the wind was south-west force 4 and thesails were set accordingly. If anything she was slightlyundercanvassed. By 0540 the wind had freshenedto south-west force 6 and at 0630 it was decidedto shorten sail. The skipper was called on deck totake the helm while the watch on duty performedthe sail change.
The vessel was beam on to the wind with seasbreaking across the bowsprit. The foresail waslowered but as it was being detached from theforestay the watchleader, working on the bowsprit,was washed off. She was attached to the jackstayrunning along the bowsprit and found herselfhanging in the water. She tried to climb back onboard with the help of others but, because herclothing had absorbed so much water and increasedher weight, it proved extremely difficult to recover her.
Narrative
The casualty lost consciousness. The skipper, made a“Pan Pan” call which was acknowledged by ThamesCoastguard, and then supervised her retrieval bypassing a line through her harness. She was hauledback on board by several other members of thecrew. She vomited as she came back on boardand bleeding through her nose and mouth. Herbreathing was short and her pulse was rapid. Theskipper provided effective first aid treatment andattempted to establish the extent of her injurieswhich were then passed to the coastguard. Ahelicopter evacuation was arranged.
The patient was successfully evacuated by hi-linetransfer and treated in hospital for hypothermia,cuts, and bruises. Most of the injuries were causedby the safety harness but some seawater was alsofound in her lungs. She was discharged from hospitaltwo days later.
Watchleader falls
from bowsprit and
loses consciousness
in harness
51
The Lessons
1 Single point life-harnesses arenot suited for work on bowsprits.The length of line needed fornormal working means that in theevent of a fall, the wearer will dropto the full extent of the harnessline. This means they are likely toland up in, and being draggedthrough, the water withoutanything to hold on to. Climbingback on board is virtuallyimpossible. A harness line with ashort and long attachment wouldbe more suitable.
2 In rising wind conditions, sailchanges should be made as soonas they are thought necessary. Itwas admitted in this case that thedecision was made late and thatconditions for the sail change hadbecome difficult.
3 When bowsprit work isrequired in heavy weather, andthere is no pressing need to dootherwise, the vessel should behove to or turned downwind.
4 Recovering people from thewater is always extremely difficultespecially when still making way.Not every sailing vessel has theluxury of a large crew to providemanpower and skippers must havea contingency plan for recoveringanyone in the water. There are nohard and fast rules but it must bedone as rapidly as possible and, sofar as possible, the lifting pointmust be above deck level. Aboveall nobody else should fall induring the recovery process. Inthinking through the best methodto adopt, skippers should reflect
on the effectiveness of any systemthat involves passing a strop aroundthe body and under the arms.
5 Anybody in charge of avessel at sea must be preparedto administer first aid. SomeCertificates of Competency requirecertain standards of proficiency.In practice skippers need to ensurethat their first aid kit is properlymaintained and fully stocked. Theyshould be capable of handlingmost common injuries andsituations including hypothermia.They must know how to handlea patient without injuring him or her further and be able tocommunicate the symptomsaccurately over the radio. Finallythey should know how to preparea casualty for evacuation.
CASE 17
52
The Lessons
1 There have been a number ofreported instances where vesselshave fallen away from the quaywhen drying out. There isconsiderable potential for damageto the vessel or injury to personnel;especially if the vessel is a deepkeel sailing craft. The process ofsafely drying out alongside a wallshould present no problems,providing some simple precautionsare taken.
2 If it is intended that the vesselwill take the ground as the tidefalls, she should be tended at alltimes until she has safely driedout. The aim is to make sure thekeel touches bottom sufficiently
far out from the wall so she canlean towards it once the tide is out.
3 Sufficient weights should beplaced on the inboard side toassist the heel as she takes theground. The main halyard shouldbe unclipped, or unshackled, fromits normal harbour securing point,and led ashore to a point wellback from the edge of the walland made fast. A line should alsobe passed around the main mast,and both ends made fast ashorein such a way that the mast canslide up and down inside the bight.
4 As the tide begins to fall, itis strongly recommended that at
least two people are onboardattending to the warps, fendersand – most especially – the mainhalyard, to ensure a steady heeltowards the quay is maintained.Once the vessel is firmly on theground, warps should betightened, the rope round themast pulled tight and the mainhalyard tensioned and made fast.
5 If the owner is not personallysupervising the process he shouldmake sure that those entrustedwith the task are in no doubt aboutwhat to do. If the vessel is beingused commercially with a paidcrew, it is strongly recommendedthe instructions are in writing.
Narrative
While drying out alongside a quay wall in Brixhamharbour, the 100 tonne displacement, 25m longsailing vessel, Leader fell away from the quay.
Leader, an ex-trawler fitted out as a gaff-riggedketch, is normally used for adventure holidays. Sheusually berths at a pontoon in Brixham harbour, buton this occasion had been alongside a quay wall fortwo or three days to enable repairs to be carriedout. To allow her to dry out safely at low tide, shehad been heeled slightly towards the quay usingdrums filled with water, and the main halyard takenashore and made fast to a ring on the quayside.
Narrative
On this particular occasion the crew memberlooking after Leader had gone to another vesselto carry out some work, and left her unattendedas the tide fell. There was nobody around to noticethat she was upright on taking the ground, andthe halyard made fast to the ring on the quaysidehad been released as the tide rose and had notbeen made fast again.
She remained on an even keel until, with only 1mof water remaining, she fell away from the quay.Although the ground slopes away from the quay,the remaining water cushioned the fall and littledamage was done. Nobody was on board Leaderat the time.
Vessel drying out falls over,
away from Quay
Powercraft
CASE 18
55
Narrative
Towards the end of a ‘white-water’ adventure tripto the Bitches, a ledge on the south east ofRamsay Island off the Pembrokeshire coast, twoRIBs, Atlantic Eagle and Storm Raven, werereturning to the lifeboat slip at St Justinians todisembark their passengers. It was late September2000. Because the coxswain of one of the RIBsknew there would be a delay before he could goalongside the slip, he decided to carry out onefurther ‘white-water’ run. In the process the craftcapsized. All on board were rescued.
On completion of the scheduled programme, andwith both RIBs returning to the slip, Storm Ravenwas in the lead. As there was only sufficient spaceat the slip for one boat, Atlantic Eagle’s coxswainrealised he would have to wait several minutes todisembark his passengers. Rather than loiter, hedecided to extend the ‘white-water’ trip by carryingout some further manoeuvres in turbulent water.He chose the vicinity of Horse Rock, about 1100metres off St Justinians, and not normally visited.
The tide was setting to the north at its maximumrate of about 6 knots, making the waters aroundthe rock resemble a ‘witches cauldron’. Whileapproaching the rock from the north at full throttle,the RIB began to surf on the front of a wave.Moments later the bows entered a whirlpool, oreddy, and sheered to port. The boat deceleratedrapidly, the port quarter lifted to an irrecoverableangle and she capsized.
The coxswain and several passengers were thrownclear, but a crewman and two passengers wereinitially trapped under the overturned boat. Thecrewman had snagged on a loose mooring linewhile the two passengers had difficulty extricatingthemselves from under the boat due to the buoyancyin their lifejackets.
Narrative
Many of the occupants were wearing several layersof clothing and heavy footwear, and experienceddifficulty in staying afloat. Several experiencedproblems inflating their lifejackets by mouth.
Seconds after the capsize, Storm Raven’s coxswainsaw the overturned boat as he approached thelifeboat slip. He immediately turned around, withhis 12 passengers still embarked, and was able torecover Atlantic Eagle’s passengers and crew from thewater without any delay. Although a head countrevealed one passenger missing, he was seen andrecovered.
The coastguard was alerted by a companyemployee who was watching from St Justinianswhile awaiting their return.
Capsize of a RIB
CASE 18Continued
56
The Lessons
1 By definition ‘adventureexperiences’ involve risk. It is anaccepted part of the process, butsafeguards must exist to ensurethat every aspect of the operationhas been thought through, andthat contingency arrangementsare in place to cater for theunexpected. A bad accident canhave serious, if not terminal,implications for the future viabilityof a venture. A key feature of anysuch risk assessment is that thoseresponsible for carrying out the operation must remain within thedeclared limits.
2 Although the RIB Atlantic Eaglewas well designed and built, andwas handled by an experiencedcoxswain familiar with operating in‘white-water’, she was no match forthe strength and unpredictabilityof the conditions encountered inthe vicinity of Horse Rock that day.The effects of a strong tide canbe extreme and, in the vicinity ofhazards such as Horse Rock, arecapable of turning tranquil watersinto ‘cauldrons’. Such conditionsare hazardous to small craftincluding high-powered RIBs,especially when carrying payingpassengers. The lessons for generalsmall boat users will be differentto those who organise adventuretrips, but for the majority ofpeople, tide rips, overfalls, eddiesand whirlpools should be avoided.For the adventure trip organiser,each location must be verycarefully studied, the risks identifiedand operating parameters laiddown. Coxswains must thenoperate within those limits andnot be tempted to take anunassessed risk.
3 When operating small boatsin potentially hazardous pursuits,there is safety in numbers. Withanother RIB close by in thisinstance, assistance was readilyavailable and a prolonged searchand rescue avoided. Always beaware of the additional risks ofbeing at sea with no other vesselsnearby to render assistance.
4 Capsize and foundering canoccur without warning. Unlesssomeone else has seen what hashappened it is probable yourpredicament will go unnoticed.If, however, there is somebodyashore who is aware of whereyou have gone and knows whenyou expect to return, he or sheis well placed to raise the alarmwhen you fail to return at theexpected time.
5 Selecting the right type oflifejacket for any type of activityafloat requires care and attention.What might be suitable for awindsurfer will be very differentto the needs of blue water sailoror the member of the lifeboatcrew. Whatever type is selectedit has three aims: to work whenneeded, to keep one’s head abovewater and it must not aggravatethe situation further. To work whenneeded it must be robust, andhave a system of inflation thatrequires the minimum of effortat the right time. To keep one’shead above water it must fit
57
correctly, have the correct inflationproperties and must not ride upover the ears. And to not aggravatethe situation further, it mustinflate at the opportune momentand by reliable means. Inflatinga lifejacket manually when youare cold, exhausted and in roughseas is not sensible. Having anautomatic system when you mightbe trapped beneath an upturnedboat is equally unhelpful. Ownersmust make up their own mindabout the best system, and it maynot be possible to cater for everyeventuality. Whatever type isadopted, it must be reliable, andin date.
6 Securing mooring lines etc in lockers when not at sea is notonly sound husbandry, it is alsoa sensible safety precaution. Ifequipment is not needed, stowit away.
7 If people who are taken in aboat are unfamiliar with the safetyequipment or environment, theymust be given a detailed safetybrief. Where possible this shouldbe conducted clear of distractionsand before putting to sea. Safetybriefs can be monotonous andboring for the crew, but they are essential for passengers.(Examination of a number ofaccidents where passengers havebeen embarked, reveals that afterthe event many of them havecomplained about the quality ofthe safety brief. Very often it wassuperficial, inaudible, unintelligibleor inadequate for what theyactually experienced.)
8 The importance of conductinga head count following capsizeor foundering cannot be over-emphasised. Without it, theabsence of passengers or crew
may go undetected, and valuabletime in which to find them maybe lost. The knowledge that ‘allpersonnel are accounted for’ isnot only a morale booster forsurvivors, it is also vital informationrequired by lifeboats and thecoastguard.
CASE 19
58
Narrative
In May 2001, a Morayshire club was running a numberof activities including sailing and a two-day RYApowerboat course. The club had insufficient resourcesof its own for all the activities, and was using lentboats and equipment to meet the requirement.
The powerboat course had nine trainees. Followingclassroom sessions on the first day, practical on-watersessions, using rigid hulled inflatable boats (RIBs),was scheduled for the second day.
Having nearly completed the initial practical sessionsby late morning, the decision was taken to carry outfurther training in more open water. The weatherwas good, there was no noticeable sea state andlittle wind.
At about midday, two of the three RIBs, completewith instructor and three trainees, were offshorewaiting for the remaining boat to join them.
The instructors took the opportunity to demonstratemedium speed pacing techniques, and were holdingtheir respective positions while moving at about 15knots. Part of the demonstration was the “breakout”,where one of the RIBs peels away from its companionwhen at speed. The first try was aborted as thedesignated RIB failed to break away. On the secondtry, just as separation began, one of the RIBs suffereda power-drive failure.
The disabled RIB slowed immediately, and foundherself rolling violently in the wake of the otherboat to such an extent that one of the traineeswas thrown overboard. Another trainee, meanwhile,was thrown against the centre line driving rack,and was injured.
Narrative
The trainee thrown overboard was then hit by thetrailing propeller of the disabled RIB and injuredhis left hand.
The other RIB turned and rescued the injured traineefrom the sea and attempted to provide first-aid. Itwas only then that the occupants discovered thatthe first-aid box did not contain any dressings. Thefirst-aid box in the disabled RIB was not much betterequipped, but did have some limited dressings. Theinstructor on board the disabled RIB was also thecourse director. He transferred to this RIB, andinstructed the third RIB which had, by that time,arrived on scene to take the disabled RIB back tobase. Attempts were then made to make a “PanPan” call on channel 16 using the hand-held VHFradio, but when this failed, the decision was takento return direct to base.
On arrival, the emergency services were calledusing a mobile telephone, while the two injuredcrew members were brought ashore. At that point,another instructor collapsed and needed treatmentfor a diabetic coma. This was possibly brought onby heat exhaustion. Both he and the student weresubsequently taken to hospital by ambulance.
The cause of the power-drive failure was the fractureof the coupling between the selector lever and thegear selector cable. With the gear train spring-loaded to neutral, the drive immediately shifted intoneutral, and propulsion was lost.
RIB – Be prepared!
59
The Lessons
1 As a member of a powerboatcrew, ALWAYS make sure that youare firmly “anchored” to the boatusing either foot or hand-holds.Vibration and violent movements ofthe boat are constant companions,and should be expected at alltimes – it is the UNEXPECTEDthat will catch you out.
2 For all training coursesorganised by a club, each boat –whether club owned or on loan –MUST carry a recognised first-aidkit at all times, and ensure that thekit is both adequate and in date.
3 Good radio communication isessential at all times. Check for“black spots” and if found, providea radio capable of makingimmediate and reliable contacteither with the emergency services,or the club base.
4 Some medical conditions areaggravated by sea going activities.If you think yours could be soaffected, seek medical adviceBEFORE starting. It is yourresponsibility to ensure that youare both fit and capable ofmeeting the requirements of the activities.
It is important to realise that anyorganisation, whether voluntaryor not, is required to comply withhealth and safety regulations;particularly when under-agepersons are involved. Nothingshould be taken for granted; ifthe regulations say it is required,check that it is both there, in dateand functional.
CASE 20
60
Narrative
On 7 November, three RIBS, Kestrel, Eagle, andLanner had been involved in a corporate seachallenge event with guests embarked. The dayfinished at Lymington, and once the guests haddisembarked, the driver of each boat prepared toreturn to Southampton. The three RIBs left Lymingtonat 1730, having called the company engineer toadvise him of their ETA. About 10 minutes later,and as they were leaving the Lymington River, theRIB drivers were told over the radio that it was “allclear” to head home in formation. As they were lowon fuel, and it was now dark, this would ensurethey would remain in company by transiting threeabreast or in-line astern.
They headed east along the Solent at between 20 and 25 knots and more or less in-line abreast,with Eagle slightly ahead of the others. As theyapproached Calshot, it became obvious that Eaglewas accelerating away. Despite radio calls for herto rejoin the formation, and the other two RIBSincreasing speed, she continued to pull away. Bythe time Kestrel and Lanner had rounded CalshotSpit to the west of the main shipping channel,and were approaching the Fawley jetties, Eaglehad pulled away. She was in the middle of thechannel and travelling fast. Although displayingthe correct navigational lights, her rear light hadbecome indistinguishable from the backgroundlights of Southampton.
By now, wake from large vessels was causingdifficulties to both Kestrel and Lanner, promptingthem to slow down and alter course to remain safe.They also lost sight of Eagle, and subsequentattempts to contact her driver by radio, or mobilephone, failed. Concerned for his safety, they crossed
the shipping channel at 90° to see if he was on theother side, possibly having “stalled.” They did notfind him, so began a search down to the River Itchen,and back up Southampton Water; maintainingcontact with their base by radio.
They were then informed that a RIB had goneaground at Hamble Point, so headed in thatdirection. They found a coastguard helicoptermonitoring the situation, while a coastguard RIBwas pulling a casualty out of the water some 400meters from where the grounding had occurred.
When a search was made for the RIB, it was foundin the Hamble Point car park after it had hit theboulder sea defences at speed and launched itselfinto the air. The throttle arm was at half to twothirds power, with the ignition key (and kill-cord)still in place and in the “on” position.
Eagle’s driver knew the Solent well, and the trackhe had taken on this occasion was done in the bestinterests of safety. He had, however, become caughtin the wash from commercial traffic in SouthamptonWater. Although he had slowed down to 30 knots,his craft pitched so violently that it threw himoverboard and into the middle of the shipping lane.He inflated his lifejacket, but the weight of his clothesand boots made flotation difficult. Wash frompassing traffic made swimming difficult, and it wasonly when a sailing vessel, coming up SouthamptonWater, noticed him that he was rescued. After abrief check-up in hospital, he was released – shakenbut unharmed.
RIB – Kill-cord conduct
CASE X
61
The Lessons
Eagle’s driver was experiencedand well qualified. He was anRYA Powerboat instructor with anadvanced driver ability, an RYAYachtmaster Ocean in Sail andPower, and an RYA Yachtmasterinstructor in Sail. As the MAIBhas noticed on many previousoccasions, small craft accidentsoften involve people who wouldappear to satisfy all criteria forqualification and experience. Wealso notice how often somethinggoes wrong right at the end. Sowhat can be learned?
1 Qualifications and experiencedo NOT guarantee a SAFE andSENSIBLE approach to boatoperations.
2 Travelling in company insuch conditions is both sensibleand seamanlike but, to be reallyeffective, coxswains or driversshould be constantly aware ofwhat the others are doing.
3 No matter who or what youare, you MUST follow standardagreed procedures andinstructions. If you do not, younot only place yourself at riskbut also everybody else involved.
4 SPEED at sea, like on theroads, can be a killer – your speedMUST be judged according tothe conditions.
5 The loading and condition ofthe boat must be checked beforeyou set out, and a JUDGMENTmade as to what effect this willhave on its operating characteristics.
6 Above all else, the KILL CORDmust be firmly and correctlyattached to the driver’s harness.The whole point of this is to STOPTHE ENGINE in the event thedriver falls out or becomes thrownbackwards. If you do not do this,there is a strong possibility thatthe boat will circle and run youdown. High-speed propellers cando an awful lot of damage to skinand bone!
7 Give very careful thought to your choice of lifejacket andclothing. Heavy boots and othergear can create enormousproblems to people trying to keeptheir heads above water, especiallyin rough conditions. To survive,you need equipment which willkeep you afloat, is warm, andlets people find you easily.
Footnote
Tiredness might also have had aninfluence in this accident. After along and demanding day, a tripback through busy shipping lanes,particularly at night, can be verydemanding. The natural tendencyis to want to get home as quicklyas possible, but judgment at nightis a totally different thing to thatexperienced during the day.
Planning an adventure exercisefor the clients is one thing,considering the effects on theboat operators is another.
CASE 21
62
Narrative
After a day at sea in the English Channel a frigatewas returning to Devonport, and was shaping upto enter harbour via the west entrance to PlymouthSound. She was on track, all was normal and shehad Plymouth Breakwater Light on her starboardbow. The navigating officer had the con, and waswaiting for his wheel over bearing to come on beforealtering course to starboard to enter the Sound.
In accordance with established procedures, someonechecked to see that everything was clear to starboardbefore course was altered. There was another handon the port bridge wing keeping a lookout.
Just before course was altered, the man on theport bridge wing looked aft and saw that a fastmotor cruise had taken station very close on theport quarter and was following the frigate in. Theoccupants looked extremely happy, and were wavingto the matelots on the flight deck aft.
Narrative
The commanding officer was informed straightaway, and realised that a potentially dangeroussituation had arisen. If he were to alter course tostarboard as planned, his stern would swing outand, very likely, strike the cruiser only feet awayfrom his port quarter. He slowed right down andtold the officer in charge of the aft mooring stationto tell the powerboat to keep clear.
An attempt to convey the message was made. Theoccupants waved back with even more enthusiasm.This was followed by more emphatic, and nauticallyembellished, instructions to keep clear. The pennyeventually dropped, and the motor cruiser veeredoff just in time to allow the frigate to come roundsafely to starboard, having already overshot thewheel over bearing.
Sightseeing on a bend invites trouble
The Lessons
1 Many merchant ships havesigns aft saying KEEP CLEAR OFPROPELLERS. Warships don’t,but it shouldn’t be necessary towarn any skipper of the dangerof manoeuvring too close toanother ship’s stern.
2 There are occasions whensmall craft deliberately accompanylarge vessels while under way. Awelcome home after a longdeployment is a typical example.But skippers of small vesselsshould be alert to the potentialdangers involved. They shouldnever, for example, impede thelarge vessel’s progress.
3 It is just as important toappreciate the dangers of beingtoo close to the stern, and mostespecially when the large vesselis about to alter course. This can happen at any time, andnot only when following apredetermined track.
4 When a vessel alters courseshe pivots about a point roughlyone third of her length from herbow. This means her stern willswing away from the directionshe is turning. Never, ever, putyourself in such a position thatyou are so close that the swingingstern will hit you. Putting thesame predicament another way,never come so close that the ship
has to delay her course alterationso that she too places herself inan embarrassing position.
5 In short, keep well clear oflarge vessels.
6 This is another example ofthe benefits of keeping a goodlookout, especially before alteringcourse. A glance aft is just asimportant as the more conventionallookout ahead.
Footnote
This is another near miss reportand is produced without namingthe vessels involved.
63
Narrative
Random Harvest, a 9.86m GRP boat was returningfrom an angling trip in the English Channel witheight people on board, including six anglers. Fourmiles south-west of Brighton the bilge alarmsounded briefly. The skipper lifted the hatch in thewheelhouse and saw the bilges filling with water.He could not identify the source, but started theelectric bilge pump and diverted the engine coolingwater intake to direct bilge suction. The deckhandoperated the manual bilge pump.
The skipper tried to call other vessels in the vicinity,but found the VHF had failed because the batterieshad already been covered by floodwater. He usedhis mobile phone to contact another fishing vessel,Morning Breeze, whose skipper relayed the distressto Solent Coastguard.
Fortunately, Random Harvest’s bilge pumpingarrangement was able to contain the flooding, andshe made her own way towards Brighton, escortedby Morning Star and an RNLI lifeboat. Once alongside
Narrative
she was pumped dry and the cause of the leak wasdiscovered: a brass, through-hull, 25mm diameterfitting to the toilet seawater inlet had failed.
In turn, this failure was caused by de-zincification.The fitting had been installed new only 16 monthsbefore, so the de-zincification was probablyaccelerated by stray electrical currents from thevessel’s batteries.
Brass is not accepted for use in underwater,through-hull fittings, either by classification societiesor by the MCA because of its susceptibility tode-zincification.
During the course of the investigation it was foundthat some suppliers were unwittingly selling brassfittings incorrectly labelled as bronze. This wasbrought to their attention.
Flooding caused byfaulty hull fittings
CASE 22
CASE 22Continued
64
The Lessons
1 Always ensure that through-hull fittings and seacocks are ofan approved material such assilicon bronze, gunmetal or de-zincification resistant (DZR) brass.Be wary of purchasing fittingsmade from a material that isdescribed by a trade name andnot a recognisable metal alloy –ask for details of its constituentmetals. Rather than lose yourboat, and possibly lives, it isbetter to pay a few pounds morefor an approved fitting.
2 Reduce the likelihood of strayelectrical currents and thepossibility of rapid electrolyticcorrosion of underwater metalfittings by following goodelectrical installation practicesuch as isolating the positivepole of the battery when thevessel is left at her moorings.
3 The battery supplyingelectricity to the VHF radio andother emergency equipmentshould be placed in a positionwhere it is less likely to beaffected by flooding.
4 The bilge alarm gave earlywarning, and alerted those onboard to the flooding. The outcomemight have been very differenthad the flooding continuedundetected – especially as theVHF was disabled before it was discovered.
5 Although the use of mobiletelephones as a means of alertingothers to incidents and emergenciesat sea creates genuine difficulties,it is an invaluable tool when allelse fails.
Footnote
Dezincification was firstidentified as the cause of failureof condenser tubes on navalvessels in the 1920s. It is a formof corrosion in salt water (orfresh water containing otherimpurities), confined to brass,where the zinc is leached fromthe metal. The copper shell thatremains is porous and fragile.
65
Two drown inspeedboat sinking
CASE 23
Narrative
Four men left a Scottish harbour in June in a 5mSabre-plane speedboat fitted with an 85 horsepoweroutboard. The boat had been purchased the weekbefore, and this was the first time its new ownerhad used it. He had been on the water once before,in another speedboat the week before.
The owner was wearing a lifejacket and a wet suit;the others were dressed in normal clothes. The windwas south-westerly force 5.
The speedboat had not been properly prepared forsea, and neither battery nor fuel tank was securedat the after end. No sooner had the craft cleared
Narrative
the harbour entrance when the fuel line came awayfrom the engine; the clip securing it was inadequate.The boat stopped in the confused sea state asattempts were made to resecure the fuel line.
Meanwhile she started to ship water. The enginewas restarted, but died almost immediately, mostprobably because of water contamination of thefuel. More water was shipped, and the boat sank,throwing all four men into the water. Two wereable to swim to shore, one of which was the ownerand the only one wearing a lifejacket. The bodiesof the other two were recovered later.
The Lessons
Buying and going to sea in apowerboat is, to some people,a very straightforward business.All that needs to be done is:
• complete the purchase• board the boat• start the engine• let go the mooring lines• open the throttle, and• steer it like a car.
This very simplistic approach isfraught with danger and can have,as this accident demonstrated,very tragic consequences.
1 If you are thinking of buyinga powerboat, seek advice aboutthe craft most suitable for yourrequirements. Resist the temptation,for instance, to buy somethingthat may well be overpoweredfor your needs.
2 Before going out in it for the first time, get someone withthe appropriate knowledge andexperience to advise you on howthe craft should be preparedand equipped.
3 Taking a boat to sea for thefirst time is not as straightforwardas it might seem. If you have no,or very limited experience, you arevery strongly recommended toseek appropriate training. Ideallythis should be a Practical MotorCruising Course run by the RoyalYachting Association, andnewcomers are strongly advisedto contact one of the RYA-recognised motor cruising schoolsfor advice. The alternative is to goto sea with someone responsiblewho can show you how to dothings correctly and sensibly.
CASE 23Continued
66
4 Care must be taken to ensurevital equipment crucial to the boatsoperation, such as fuel tanks andbatteries, are secured in place, andthat fuel lines are properly secured.
5 It is always advisable to carrya means of communication withthe shore, such as a hand-heldVHF radio. A skipper should also know the range of signalsavailable to him to alert othersto an emergency.
6 Reference should be madeto the guidelines contained inSafety Afloat, a voluntary codeof best and safe practice forleisure craft users.
7 If going afloat, wear theappropriate clothing. Anyonedoing so for the first time inBritish waters may be unawarehow cold it can get, or howquickly insulation breaks down if clothing becomes wet.
8 The one essential item thatmust always, always be carried inany craft is a lifejacket for everyoneembarked. If a non-swimmer, orthe conditions are a bit on therough side, or you are unsureabout whether or not to wearone, put it on before going tosea. They must be on board andeasily accessible for all others.The decision to wear them is leftto the discretion of individuals,or the requirement of the skipper.But everyone should (a) knowwhere they are (b) how to putthem on and (c) put them on sothey know how to, and to ensurethey fit properly. To ignore thisadvice could cost you your life.
Footnote
The Royal Yachting Associationcan be contacted at RYA House,Ensign Way, Hamble,Southampton SO31 4YA.
Telephone: 0845 345 0400
67
CASE 24
Four die after dinghycapsizes in Sound of Iona
Narrative
Five young men were returning to the Isle of Ionaafter a Christmas ceilidh in a hotel on Mull. Thedinghy they were using to take them across theSound of Mull capsized and threw them into thewater. Only one of those on board survived; theremaining four lost their lives.
Generations of Ionians have crossed the 1.4 km wideSound of Iona in open boats without incident overmany, many years. The early hours of Sunday 13December 1998 were little different to many others.
It was dark, the wind was from the south westforce 5 against the remains of the ebbing tide anda moderate swell was running. Five young men,great friends and living life to the full, decided toattend a ceilidh in the nearby village of Bunnessanon Mull. They left Iona at about 2100 and crossedthe Sound in their 4.27m [14ft] dinghy to enjoy avery happy evening with friends until about 0200when they set off on the return journey. One hadnot drunk alcohol all evening, the others were ‘happy’.
They re-embarked in their dinghy from the jetty at Fionnphort at about 0215 and set off for whatshould have been no more than a 10 minute crossing.The seating configuration on board meant that mostof the weight was concentrated forward despitethe 6hp outboard engine clamped to the transom.The dinghy did not contain any additional buoyancyand nobody was wearing a lifejacket. They werewearing normal clothing and shoes. In varying degreeseach of them had extensive experience in smallboats and knew the waters of the Sound intimately.
About two to three minutes into their crossing thedinghy nosed into a wave and shipped an extensiveamount of water. Although they started to bailalmost immediately the freeboard had been reduced
Narrative
to such an extent that the gunwale dipped belowthe waves and the dinghy capsized. They were allthrown into the water. Although two of them werenot good swimmers there was no panic. Each lookedfor something to hang onto and found fenders orthe floating fuel canister. The boat itself hadinverted and was floating bow up but was inclinedto roll if too many hung onto it. One man, theeventual survivor and wearing boots rather thanshoes, found himself, clinging to a bottom board.After a while he became separated from the otherswho were talking among themselves. He driftedfor a while until he became aware of the shore lineclose by and decided to swim for it.
He made the rocks and managed to pull himselfashore. Having been in the water for about 45minutes, he was very very cold but was able toclimb the rise to reach a track some 200 metresinland. It was about 0400. He then walked backto nearby Fionnphort where he woke some friendswho lived there. Although in an advanced stageof hypothermia he managed to convey what hadhappened. His friends did three things, raise thealarm, did all they could to restore body heat andinitiate a search for the others.
Using a local fishing boat, they found the upturneddinghy within an hour and the body of one manshortly afterwards. There was no sign of the others.The Oban lifeboat arrived shortly after 0600 andwas joined by both Royal Navy and coastguardhelicopters, the Tobermory lifeboat and many ofthe local community who searched along the shorefor more survivors.
There were none. The community was devastated.
CASE 24Continued
68
The Lessons
1 This accident could havehappened anywhere in the worldwhere embarking in a small openboat for a short journey is aneveryday occurrence. As manycar accidents are said to happenwithin one mile of home, so toodo many boating accidents occurin that short distance betweenshore and shore or whentransferring by tender betweenlarger vessel and the jetty. Thatno accident had occurred on theshort crossing from Iona to Mullpersuaded people over many yearsto take what they thought was anacceptable risk. Familiarity with aparticular course of action is oftenthe prelude to a tragic accident.
2 This accident, as in so manyothers was not the result of onecatastrophic event but rather theaccumulation of many smallerones. Even the decision to crossthe Sound of Iona in the earlyhours of the morning is worthanalysing. There was an optionto stay put on Mull until themorning when it least it couldbe attempted by daylight.
3 Being alert is the hall mark ofthe true seaman. Many things canadversely affect alertness such astrying to do things at the end ofa long day, or having to makeaccurate decisions between 0100and 0600 when body temperaturedrops in the self sustainedbiological rhythm synchronised tothe 24 hour clock. Drink, even insmall quantities, affects judgment.It also exaggerates self confidence.
4 Placing five people in an open4.27m dinghy might be safe incalm weather and in daylight –providing nothing goes wrong noradditional weight added. Water orspray being shipped adds to theweight and reduces freeboard. Anopen dinghy is designed to rise tothe sea and swell but it is limitedin its ability to do so if heavilyladen, especially forward. Thisdinghy failed to rise to anoncoming sea, shipped asubstantial amount of water andlost all it stability. From thatmoment the capsize was inevitable
5 The weather was notparticularly bad. Had it been so itis generally thought inconceivablethe five men would have takenthe actual route adopted andheaded across the sound into theweather. The alternative trackusually adopted in bad weatherentailed taking a slightly differentpassage that lay further to thenorth. Recognising the limitsimposed by sea states was anatural process to all on board –providing they could see it.Although they knew the windhad freshened since their outwardtrip it was very dark on theirreturn journey and it was veryhard to see. The man on the helmgave no warning of a large wavenor did he slow down. It is veryunlikely he could see the wavesahead of him and take appropriateaction to ride them. Handling asmall boat in potentially roughconditions requires special skillsand an ability to see what iscoming next. The middle of thenight is not the best time to betrying it, especially when heavilyladen and no reserves of buoyancy.
6 Even if all the right precautionsare taken, a capsize or some otherdisaster is always a possibility andmeasures taken to anticipate beingin the water. There are four basicrequirements to consider beforesetting out in any small boat atany time no matter what the timeof the day or night, or for howshort a journey. The considerationsare prompted by the questionwhat shall I do if I find myself inthe water. The first is personalbuoyancy. Those without it are atan instant disadvantage and willfind it difficult to keep afloat. Thesecond is an instinctive need tohold onto something that will keepyou from sinking. The third is toattract attention and the fourthis to stay warm. The sea can bevery chilly, especially in winter.
7 The well prepared man willbe wearing a lifejacket before hesets out. His boat will have someform of additional buoyancy init. He will have some means ofattracting attention which will beanything from flares in a waterproofcontainer to a personal locatorbeacon and finally he will bewearing clothing to help himsurvive. Everyday clothes, lightjackets and heavy shoes are idealfor many occasions but swimmingaround at night is not one of them.
8 Before embarking in that opendinghy for that journey you havedone many times before withoutincident, just pause for a momentand think of Iona. And put onthat lifejacket.
69
Narrative
As part of an organised term-time activity, anindependent school decided to give nine of itspupils practical experience afloat using a 4.27mdory-type open boat, in the sheltered waters ofPortsmouth Harbour. There was only one teacheron board, in charge of the nine pupils.
Because the conditions had been judged unsuitablefor sailing, the decision was taken to use the dory forsome very basic manoeuvring in a relatively shelteredarea where the wind strength was force 2 to 3.
Shortly after leaving the pontoon, the outboardmotor stalled, but was successfully restarted. Variousevents followed, all of which generated a sense ofexcitement among the children:
• a large plastic sheet found floating in theharbour, was pulled on board;
• a jellyfish fell out of a bailer and stung one ofthe pupils;
• a boy fell into the water but was recoveredsafely; and
• while making way at 3 to 4 knots, spray camein over the bow.
Throughout this time water and spray began toaccumulate in the boat.
The outboard engine then stalled a second timebut could not be restarted. The teacher told fourof the pupils to start paddling but, when only 75mfrom the pontoon, the boat capsized and inverted.All 10 occupants were pitched into the water.
Buoyed by their lifejackets, some children managedto climb on to the upturned boat while others,including the teacher, clung to the hull. The crewof a local boat saw what had happened and gaveimmediate assistance. They recovered all the pupilsthey could see and the teacher, but when the rescuewas complete, one of the children was found to bemissing. The crew lifted the upturned boat and founda young girl underneath. She was pulled from thewater and given first-aid, but died later in hospital.
Following the accident, the boat was examined toreveal a substantial amount of water trapped in thevoid between the inner and outer hulls under thefloor. The investigation revealed that uncontrolledmovement of seawater in both the boat, and thevoid beneath the floor, combined to make it sounstable that she would eventually capsize. It wasfound that seawater had entered the void throughtwo small holes in the bows where a towing bolthad been fastened, but had at some stagebecome detached.
School trip tragedy
CASE 25
CASE 25Continued
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The Lessons
1 Sailing or boating activities area wonderful way of introducingchildren to a sense of adventure,respect for the elements, individualresponsibility, realistic disciplineand, in controlled conditions, anelement of risk. It is also great funand supremely rewarding. But itneeds to be carefully planned,sensibly supervised and sufficientlywell thought through to ensurethat risks have been identified,and measures to ameliorate themare in place.
2 Those approving andauthorising such activities musthave access to the best adviceand guidelines available. Suchadvice has been drawn up as aresult of others’ experience,sometimes tragic.
3 Everyone involved in youthprojects afloat should heed theadvice available on the level ofsupervision, replacement ofoutboard motors, fitting of killswitch cords, fuel tank securing,and many other safetyconsiderations.
4 Any person placed in charge ofactivities afloat, should be trainedto the standard recommended bythe Adventure Activity LicensingAuthority.
5 Any youth organisation(including schools) buying asecond-hand craft, should ensureit is professionally surveyedbefore it is purchased, and anydeficiencies revealed should bemade good before use.
6 Any craft likely to be usedafloat must be properly maintained,regularly checked and inspectedcarefully before it is used. Bynoticing something important thata bolt is missing to leave two smallholes just above the waterline,could be the difference betweena few minutes delay rectifying it,and a very tragic accident.
7 Many young children intoday’s safety conscious and riskaversion world may be totallyunaware of potential dangers,and have little feel for certainkinds of hazard. This puts anadded weight of responsibility onthose supervising them. It alsorequires a degree of firmness intaking charge of excitable andimpressionable youngsters. Havingresponsibility for nine children ismaking unrealistic demands ona single adult. Four, possibly five,is a general working maximumwhen afloat.
8 Lifejackets are essential. Butremember what might happen if the boat completely inverts;someone could be trappedunderneath it. Anyone caught insuch a predicament could findthe inflated lifejacket actuallyinhibits an escape. Once survivorsfind themselves in the water andin the open, it becomes essentialto carry out an immediate checkto make sure everyone isaccounted for.
9 If someone is missing, thechances are that he or she iseither inside, or beneath theinverted craft. There are no hardand fast rules about what should
be done because there is a realprospect the missing person isalive and well. The important thingis to get help as soon as possible.
10 Always have some means ofalerting people to an emergency.A VHF radio, suitably containedin some form of a waterproofmaterial, mini flares, whistles oreven a mobile telephone, mightsuffice. Offshore, a personallocator beacon could payhandsome dividends.
The dory in this accident wasfitted with lifelines. They greatlyhelped those in the water byproviding them with somethingto hang on to. The rigging ofsuch equipment is stronglyrecommended.
Footnote
This incident was the subject of a full MAIB investigation. Acomprehensive report, givingdetails of the causes, an analysis,and recommendations waspublished in March 2001. It canbe obtained free of charge bycontacting the MAIB.
71
Atlantic Eagle – capsize ofvessel off St Justinians, RamseySound, 28 September 2000.
Bluebell of Warsash – collisionbetween the yacht and anunidentified ship 23 miles southof the Needles, IOW.
Bramble Bush Bay(Sandbanks ferry) – collisionbetween chain ferry and fourXOD class yachts at the entranceto Poole Harbour on 5 May 2001.
Chapter Two – intake ofexhaust gas fumes into cabinspaces of motor cruiser whiletransiting the River Medway on31 December 1999.
Dinghy (Unnamed) – whichcapsized in The Sound of Ionawith the loss of four lives on13 December 1998.
Dory (Unnamed) – which sankon Loch Awe with the loss ofthree lives on 29 May 1999.
Drum Major – foundering ofnarrow boat with the loss offour lives at Steg Neck lock nearGargrave, North Yorkshire, on19 August 1998.
Grand Turk – injury sustainedduring the firing of cannon onsv Grand Turk while alongside atPortsmouth on 24 August 2001.
Lord Trenchard – explosion onboard vessel in Poole Harbouron 30 June 1999.
Ocean Madam – capsize ofyacht with the loss of onelife in the Bay of Biscay on8 October 1997.
Portsmouth Dory – capsize ofschool boat on Fountain Lake,Portsmouth with the loss of onelife on 16 September 1999.
Samphire of Wells –foundering of dinghy off northNorfolk coast with loss of twolives on 16 December 1999.
Southampton Boat Show RIB– report of 3 persons fallingoverboard from RIB in River Teston 22 September 2000 withone fatality.
Wahkuna – collision betweenthe container ship P&O NedlloydVespucci and the yacht Wahkuna.
Wahoo – a man overboardfatality from an Etchells 22keelboat off Yarmouth, Isle ofWight on 14 May 1999.
Wightstone/Rose Ryal –collision between Wightstoneand the moored yacht Rose Ryalin River Medina, Isle of Wighton 9 November 2000.
Safety Digest 1/2003:Published April 2003.
Safety Digest 2/2003:Published July 2003.
Safety Digest 3/2003:Published December 2003.
Copies of these reports andSafety Digests are availablefree of charge on requestfrom the MAIB.Tel: 023 8039 5500www.maib.gov.uk
List of Reports
List of leisure craft accident reports published since 1999
