TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONSPast, Present and Future

Editors

MUSTATAAYDIN CACRI ERHANAnkara Uniaersity

Foreword by Norman Stone

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5

Turkish-American Relations in the Post-Cold War Era: Issues of Convergence and DivergenceSABRI SAYARI

The international and domestic context oI Turksh-American relations underu'ent major changes during the course of the 1990s. The end of the Cold War and ihe global strategic dvalry between ihe US and the Soviet Union ladically altered the structure of the international system thai had been in existence since World War Il. For more than four decades, the close militaryand political tiesbetween the US and Turkev had largely been the product of the shategic rivahy between the two superpowers and iheblpolar confiEuration of the iniernalional system. Du ng the Cold War years, Washingion and Ankara shared similar perceptiolls regarding the nahrre and implications of the threat posed by the foimer SovietUnion andits Warsaw Pact allies. For the US,lbrkej' served as an important strategic outpost in close proximity to its superpower rival and a key ally in NATO's southern flank. For Tulkey, the {orting ofclose military and political ielations with the US thiough bilateral and multilateral ties represenied a critical dete ent against the perceived Soviei threat. Consequentlt the disintegation of the Soviet Union, the end ofthe bipolar intelnation al system, and the tlansformation of the political landscape of Eurasia marked a Iundamental change in the international and regional context of the Us-Turkey ielations. The domestic context of the bilateral relationship also expedenced important changes in the post-Cold War era. In the US, the 1990s saw a substantial military downsizing policy thai led to base closings at home and abroad, and that also reduced the number oI Anedcan miliiary installations and personnel in Turkey. US military assistance, whlch had made Turkey the third largest recipient of American {oreign aid after Israel and Egypt at the height of ihe Cold War, declined sharpl]' in the post-Cold \{ar period and came to an end in 1998. At the same tine, there was a marked increase of interest in ihe US Congress in human

rights issues as a result oi the emergence of sh.ong democracy and hulnan rights lobbies at1d constiiuencies. More importantly, ihe end of the Cold lvar and the disappearance of the Soviet threat emboldened the ef{orts of the powerful Gleek and Armenian ethnic lobbies in Washington. Both Iound Ereater roon to manoeuvre in the Congress and, in addition to their traditional arlti-Turkev agendas, also sought to exploitthe Kurdish issue and Turkey's human rights problems to undermi-e lhcbrlrr, -" L >-lu kr) .e.alio. . ,'p. On the lLlkish sid, the absence of sh-on& durable, and effective govenments {or nost oI the decade created pioblems in policV fornu latior, continuit]', and implementation. Unlil the late 1990s, in addition to governmental instability and political uncertainty, lLrkey also faced najor challenges to its secular consiitutional order and teritorial iniegrity r\ith the ascendancy ofpolitical Islam in electoral poliiics and the intensification of the PKK'S (Kurdish Workers' tarty) campaign o{ political violence and terorism. The rising tide ofnationalism in Turkey - ftlelled bv ethnonational conflicts jn the Balkans and the Caucasus, Europe's reluctance to adnit Turkey to the EU as a {ull member, and Popularbackiash against the PKK's actions -represented another nlajor trend with potentially important implications {or'Iirrkish foreign policy. Despite the signi{icant changes that tookplace in its intemational and domestic context, the bilateral relationship betrveen thc US and lirrkev hd- rern.rinHo.l'.-t. A- tre-i(lenrCl'nton -.feJ rr ni, hi.tnrir dJore-to the Turkish crand National Assembly in November 1999,'in the post Cold war era, our partne$hip has become even more impoftant Ithan beforel'.'The US considers Iiirkey to be a strate$cally inportant counhv and a key member of NATO r.ith the potential to influence military, political, and economic developrnents that are of US interestill the Middle East (containing lraq and han, support for the Palestinian Israli peace process), the Balkans (regional stabilitt peacekeeping operationsin Bosnia andKosovo), the Aegean and the EasternMediteiranean (Crek-Turkish relations, the Cyprus conflict), and the Caucasus and Central Asia (Cnspian energy der.elopment, the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, limiting the influence of Russia and Iran).. lor Turket the Ame can-Turkish alliance remains the most importantbilateral relationship in Turkish foreign policy. Due to ihe protracted tersions in its relations \^{th Europe, Turkey attached even greater importance to strngthening its iies with th US in the post Cold War era. Most Turkish observers believe that the US is the pr.e eminent player in global affairs

rnd thdl onl) ' ra- the p.(e' cdp.roitit)..rnd p.lilical v,ill ro pld) d maior role in strategic and security issues thai concem Turkelr. Despite these perceptions, however, the bilateral relationship

experienced its ups and do$'ns in ihe afteimath of the Cold War'The

decade began on a high note for bilateral ties following nrrkey's 1990-91 GulI War The close personal relationship that was esiablished between Presidents Bush and Ozal reflected the heightened cooperahon and understanding between Washin8ton and Ankara. However, in the t$'o years {ollowing the Culf Wat thebilateral relationship encountered difficuities, and the momen' tum that 'as achieved during Operation Desert Storm could not be maintained at the same ievel. According to a perceptive Ameican observer of US policy toward nrrkey, during the {irst ft\,o years of the Clinton administmtion,'Turkey rvas viewed by manyU.S. policymakers as a declining asset'.' This stemned p n1aiily from WashinBton's expectation that Saddam Hussein's rule would come to an end soon and ihat Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) would cease to exist. Consequently, the US tended to be generally unresponsive to Turke,y's requests for sironger NATO policy in Bosnia and Ankara's concern aboltt the reasse ion of Russian influence in the Caucasus. At the same trme, the intensification of the KurdishprobleminTurkeyled to grorving criticisms of Turkey's human rights rcord in the US Congress. On the Turkish side, the economic cost to Turkey of the sanctions regine that was imposed on Iraq by the Lt J became a source of c ticism among the policy makeis and in the media. However, by ihe mid-1990s, the bilateral relationship was on track more firmly, as Washington redefind its Bosnia policy and assumedthe leaderchjp in the fight against Serbian allgression.' The Clinton admin istration also became increasingly concerned about the Russian role in the Caucasus after the eruption of the war in Chechnl,a. urashington's changing view of Russia's near abroad' policy rvas instrumental in its support for the Baku Ceyhan project for the transportation of the Caspian oil and gas to Westem markets. The Amedcan support for Baku-Ceyhan made a major contdbution to the improvement of the bilateral relationship. In addition to regional developments in the Balkans and the Caucasus, the changing US approach to lLrkey was the product of the efforts of two ranking Amelican officials, Richard Holbrooke, assistant secretary of state {or European affairs, and Marc Grossman, US ambassador to Turkey. As champions oI Turkev's strate$c importance and value for the US, they 'eneigized US loreign policy on Turkey's behalf'.'Their efiorts created a much more favourable outlook on Turkel' in Washington and helped to strengthen the alliance ties. In ihe latter part of the decade, the level o{ cooperation between the two countries on a number of key strate$c issues increased significantly. President Clinton's lengthy visit to nlrkey during the Organization for

pa icipation and role in the

94

TURIC/ONW in nukey in the aftermath of the Gulf War to protect ihe northern lraqi Kurds from an assaultby Saddam Hussein's regime has been a controversial issu in Turke)'." The oppo sition to OPC/ONW stems from lLrkish concerns about its role in strengthening the Kurdish political autonomlr in northern ]raq. However, the operaliorl based in incirlik has also been ihe single most irnportantpart of the US'Tuikish military relationship in the 1990s, and ii has providedTurkey $,ith avaluable means to influenceUS policy. For example, Washington has officially continued io designate ihe I'KK as a terrorist ortanization, supported Turkey in its fight against the Kuidish

.eP,',h-t'. dno enF lcereJ tlle . dplu"e nl the IKK - le"oer

Moreo\'er, unlike Turkey's Western European NATO allies, the US has

O, " -rn.

generally reh'ained from criticizing the Turklsh military's periodic

98

TURKIsH-,\ivllRlcA^- REL,{TIoNS

of PKKmilitants Nevertheless' incursions into northern Iraq in search u ne Pd'l JeL roe hd"re'rled'r'cre I r'iu' li., -" rf-l"' '" ror' i.-"t tr,." "-Uerr tr-q 'nd 'rop'"b'' n' urr'nll) 'atrie' '"'t\;those relations"'r " "'r. roteniial for damage to *';; il";J *iu.h approaches to secudtv issues in tlle caucasus r d elenLnr' 'r' bo'h JJ ;" : " '"' ' a 'i"r'11'n "n\'r3'n' "n' " rLr{ll Lon'"ha', n p,rn';pre e-dor'ed rhe iJed J' 'ru"'pl' r\e ^ nr' ur- p-'ia"o ru"c) \^:'n ' rons bd'kj"R ror prrl ''1""1;;"-1, L'., ,-"rf,r." ornic.. w.r'hi'Blo" 'Lpo'-l f'r Brkt-'erhan'-

", ..iJ"i" i "io. -pc- lhrl uould prercnrI rr rr'lrbecomingd l',..','Ir"'i't,' "t "o'l"e:'" tr"-ll 'u* rni al'o L r'r 'np Ru"''n rol drd nf Len";n lhe ".,r"".*ff," U5 prererr..r ,or Bak-.Cernan d sn -ren' fion1 d '.ronq iJ". ourlry ' *i,r" ,o.rpp"i, -',t'-c\ J'd- arr\ a"d st-d egicd 'y Lnoo ldni CasPjan infor the US i; its bicl for a greater economic and Politicalrole encrw develuPmcnt '

eJsLr'L'r'o'riJor ror'hPe\Port'l

c"";;.';;" i C"-or.n rn"rs i"ue' ! ' Decn o'e o rhc mtun ,':,,;- ;ii , po i, \ rot'arJ l. rl.i; 'n ttse lao0- lurkey ur ,:" rnlp,n"r th' L> h"' olarcd i'tcr Proi'otio\oil;;-.";;;" nDpo{ron

lhe BJl. -LH\ndn proje'r dgarn'l 't'on! llu-'rdn hon.oL new oD-ra.i"n on C:'pr.n en. rgr, parn'u'arl\ r]'e con'hu 'aclor rn nioeline- tor the etporr o o: d'd e ' h I' been Jn inrPorlanl i,. -ur","nr"." +'.fo'- b r"re'al rie' betrn een nF I$nro rnrie'du-;nS p' nd H.,sP'crl we'rrrn o 'onprnie- n"\e b' ;;: ..',.r.;u *r' ."ir.t",1" ."le i".conmiL-re ' ro Br^Lr' Ce\ h'rn be' r' 'e o ir' rela

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niua"quut" tr"un'r"s bv counides involved in

il"p-ii,. r",aa,'i.n

tea ddd to LLp reluc drrce ri lhH orl nenoleum ro-e re- i_ lhe Ca'pian ooH' not -na errarize ' 'lrlr b' J maior :;;;""1.' lr B.^u (.\' Ji.""""i'..",. f.r lulke1 .'-d 'e"Ln wd'hi'tlo-' cr'orb" r 'n ncred\ed e\Pr!lJlion' -l *",f. t t 'uppo- lo r\e P'oei | 'd! ior Casplan energy m ^"il* that Turkey will emer8e as the main transii route the first decade of the new millennium develoPment ,tttt o.,gtt .oup"rution on CasPian energy and pipeline relationshiP' ihe vieu's ol has been ine oithe pillars of the bilateral g,itn have ten'led to diverge on two issues The {irst ,^,"i"an ft.t","" .."""t".""Jw*rlit Jecisiorl io Purchase naftLlal gas from llan ln th i,. growing demand for natural sas and divrsirv ;;;;;;; a$eement with ;;;;; s". j"mP".ts,'tukev sig"ed a $20 bjilion a new Pipeline iss6 i."" J ";;i; ittat aiio lrtuot.",es'ttre constructioll of countries Turkey's gas deal rvith lran fr"i*""t-t tft" t*" ""ighboudng of 'dual contain ,or'r .oor-tt", to the Cilnton adminisiration's shate8y Jdm;nr'lrJtrnn sJ' ..ni 'ftu,-."f. tu Fnlale lrdn and lrao Tre Lhould Leao ro .nnce _.d.Lal .n, aB_.ernenl b'rne rlr'n rtJrLrle\ b\ ol ( sr:or\ irl: dc.ppl.r'.c of lran r'. Pa_'n( r ln el.e e\ "ou'rrie' :-o"rr"" , rr-' "J rni-i-trdr:on dio not 80 a' f rf a':'nPn-int "t',rl,ri 'to

u-rerrarnric"on(r

r'i-gr' ed!tu'rrdr'untof

TIrR ha'. reoe"redl)" L n,tl,.i d rr. -lppor t t. o .1,, ". *.',,, " ", r"o.j* r_rr;rnrdl Inreqrir\ - nd rr- oppo-th"' ,] i n.'i - ;", "Fr ornc:drt\ :: iil,fil'::;T:'lil \';Al::T; ;,'', ;rganiz't"" 'n,'a' '"n. or ^rencc ':noj'r:e:,,b:.;: i,* ;";'ft :;";,;', *h?'bH.'1(on-roe'li'1"'" il,::;:,:: rine.ho ever .here . p,"0,"'f *r'-ii-, "-a 'n Anr Jrd,o ir'd a P''it'c"r''"" l,; ;;";;;";, girr. or elrlurirr r' rn or'ld

per;od ln P"rti("lar' lhe

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n rr'e to Jrdrp crrh-

tJJilt ''I-ls l:;;:j;:'::':;llT'xi lll;"''"iil".' :*ii l:'Jt :::i:t;!l s"-l:1" i:l;" *;:;,'*''t;"'""1;!'iil ll

TUI]KI5H-A\1IJI{IO{N I{LLA] I

Tu rkey with pariicular emPhasis on the problems related to ihe Kuidish issue. Turkey's shortcomings in human rights issues have also becone afavouite target of criticisms forvarious influential NGOS and the anti-Turkey ethnic lobbies in Washington. The mostimportant consequence of Turkey's human riShts problems on the Us-Turkish relatr ons conce rns the arns transfer and procurem ent process.:r Since the late 1940s, when Ankara and Washington began to {orge close ties, militaiy assistance and arms transfers to Turkey hale been a bindint factor in the bilateral relations. Over the years, most oI the rveapons systems and equipment usedby the Ttrkish militarycame hom the US. As noted earliet military aid to Turke), declined sharplyin the aftermath of the Cold War before coming to an end in 1998. Turkey continued to depend on the US as its p ncipal source of new weapons svsiems and military technology. Howeler, in the 1990s, the US Congress began to restrict arms transfers to Turkev to pressure Ankara toimprove its human rightsrecord and, in some instances,to modifyits position in the Creck Turkish disputes. The withholding oI militar), equipment, sometimes bought and paid for in advance by Turket was bitterly resented by Turkish olficials and especially by the Turkish military, which hasbeen a strongsupporter ofclose liesbehveen the two

coverage to the developments in

The ascendancy of political Islam in Turkel' in recent years has introducecl another potential irritant into the bilateral relationship. Turkcv's lslanist parties and politicians have trad itionally been voci{erous in their c ticisms of the West, the close lies between the US and lbrkey, and American policies in the Middle Easi.:iAs a result, the rise to power o{ the Islamist Welfare Partv (WP), as the senior partner of a coalition governmentin 1996,created iustlfiableconcernsinWashington. Durin8 its crisis-ddden tenure in lrovernment h 1996 92 the WP pursued relativeiy moderate policies and toned down its anti-Western rheto c. This shifiinpartystrategybecame even more pronounced after the WP's ouster from power {nder strong presslrre from the secularist {orces led blr the militarl,. The US refrained from taking a position on thatcrisis,butWashirlgton has if creasinglytended to vie$' the sanctions imposed on ihe lslamist paities and politicians largelv in the context of l'ruman rights and democratization issues. Aloigside the Kurdish question, Turkev's policytoward the Islamist parties hasbecome palt oi the agenda of human rithts issues in the bilateral agenda. With respectto Amerlcan domestic poljtics, the increased activism of ihe Greek American and Armenian Amedcan lobbies has posed the most seiious challenge to continued goodrelations between the US and Turkey. In addition to theil sizable electoral strength, ihe inlluence of

ITI4

IURKISH-AIVIERICT\N RLLAIIONS

these lobbies in Waslirrgton has increased significantly in the 1990s due to thei( success in forging coaliiions with the Powerful hrLman rights

lobbies and NGOs. l11 comparison, Turkish lobbying efforts sufler fiom the absence o{a significantly large Turkish tuneican diasporathatcould plav a role in US electoral polilics. lil rkey's growing ties with Jsraelhav led to increased support from the Je .ish lobby on a number o{ issues Ne\.ertheless, Turkey continues to face an uPhill battle in Washington in terms of counieiing the activities oI the anti-Tiukey lobbies The main focus of the Greek lobbi/ has been the Aegean and the Cyprus conllicts. On both of these issues, it has sought to crate a pro Greek tilt to Washingion's Policies. The Creek lobb]' has also been a sharp c tic ofthe sale o{arrnsand weapons systems to Turkey. In a rvellpublicized case, Senator Paul Serbanes, a prominent Creek-American legislaior, peisonally held Lrp the authorization of the transfr of two frigates to Turkey for mole than two years." The recent rapProchemellt behveen Greece and Turkey has not, so far; led io a discernible change of attitudes and policies anong the Greek American diaspora The aciiviiies ofthe Armenian tobby have created even greater problems for the Us-Turkish lelationship. The \{'e]l-organized and -financed eftorts oI the Armenian lobby to persuacle Con$ess to pass a resolution that officiallv recoBlizes the so-called Armenian genocide have periodically created crises beth'een Ankara and Washin$on, most recentl]rin autumn 2000. Had it not been for the last-ninute intervention bY President Clinton, H.R. 596 nould probably have been aPProved by the US Congress, 1\''ith potentially highly undesirabte consequences for the USTurkey bilateral relationship.

CONCLUS]ONS

Despite the exisience of divergent views on a number of issues and problems, the relations between the US and Turkey have gcnerally remained strong ihroughout the past decade. Clearly, with the Possible exceptiorl oi the question of Iraqr there is nore understanding and cooperation lhan conflict and disaFeemeni between the tu,'o allies on most of the k'i/ issues. Given the vast and radical changes ihat hav occurred in world politics since the end oi the Cold War, the ability of the bitateral alliance to wcather these changcs arrd even gain piound in the 1990s underscors the importance that the two countries attach to maintainint close strategic, political, and economic relations. tsaring radical ne ' developments in th inteinational or domesiic context o{ the Us-Turkish partnership, the relations between the two

countries are likely to remain stlongin the near {uture. ArecentRAND study su8gests that {our areas are likely to'form the basis of a solid,

coopelative lelationship'.r' The fust concerns cooPeration bctween Ankara and Washingon to ensure the security o{ energy supplies fiomihe Persian GL f region a nd the

Caspian basin. The second is

a

concerted

effort by the two counbies to counier thc proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapor-rs ofmass destruction. The third involves the formulation and irnplementation oI a common policy that would simultaneouslv seek to contain Russian expansionism in the Caspian region and Central Asia and also persuaclc Russia to foster a better clinate for political and economic coopratioi with its neighbolLrs and ihe West. Finatty, the stud)' notes that 'integrating Turkey into the EU should be an important objectrve o{ the {uture stiateiic coo}reration between the US, Eluope, and Turkey'." Pro$ess in ihese and related areas o{ common iitercst to the US and Turkey r,'ill be cdtical lor the continued strength of the partnerslip in the first decades of the twenty-first

NOTES

I Rr2

ZlignerBrern.k|Tn.Crr,d(-htil(ttl:A.ti.n Prnmnta"dlt:C sttntqiL|alttntiL.s (N!{ York: Bnsic Books, 1997), and l{obert S Chas, lnily B HiI atd Paui Kenr(d), 'Pn otal Sbtes and L S Skrt.gy', F n,U r, ,yldt!, 75, 1 0arua{ FebNary 1996), tt i}a l . : For r...nt a.allscs, see CeorEe S. Hads,'Lr.s -nukish Relatio , in Ald lvlalovs(t nnd SabLi Srlaj1 (cds), lirrt.trt \ica Wnrdr ahnn! n! Dvnd i.s,r T'rrknl n,?rg, /1tirr,, (t'adrngton, DC $inhin8l.n Inslilule l.r Nearlan folic],201111), pp.189 202, Morton Abranowitz, The CoDrplnde; ol Arnei.ar I'oli.y Vaking on Tur(y, in Mod.nAbmnowirz (.d.), frt*t)t s Tn i ,rnan nntt Arttnit Ptut.:! (Ncw YorL (:cn1$y Foundation Press,2000l, pp 15!81; and K.hal Ki.i!qi,'Turk.v ind thc Uninrd States Ambivalrt ,Allies', in Bnrry Rubin dnd T Kcr.cl l.!ls), US ,41/i.r irr r ('/rdrgrt l\\illd(l.ondon h.nkCa$,2!01).

arks blt thr hBide t nr A,litr rs r! t/k T!/l:isl (l/, d Niliotrdi ,4s.,,b1j/, the White Housc Ofice oi the lrss Secreta], 15 Nlvenb.r le9{r. Se Zalnay Khaltuad,'lvhy th. ['.st Nccds lr rky ,lvt]i Srr..i J,!titl,22 D.ember 19!7'

I Ah.7 8 9

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See Siiha BalnSee Sabri

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