Sabbatical Leave Programme 2014 - HR Portal Rights... · 2015-12-17 · Sabbatical Leave Programme...
Transcript of Sabbatical Leave Programme 2014 - HR Portal Rights... · 2015-12-17 · Sabbatical Leave Programme...
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Sabbatical Leave Programme 2014
A Human Rights- and Results-Based Management Approach
to United Nations Development Cooperation at the
Country Level
Name: Teresa Albero
Institution: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
Supervised by: UN System Staff College (USSC)/United Nations Development Group's Human Rights Working Group (UNDG-HRWG)
Date: March 2015
© United Nations Sabbatical Leave Programme
The views and recommendations expressed in this report are solely those of the original author and other contributors and do not necessarily reflect the official views of the United Nations, its agencies or its Member States. Textual material may be freely reproduced with proper citation as appropriate.
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Table of Contents
PARTI.Introduction
Scopeandmethodology
Conceptsandcomplementarities
PARTII.Potentialtensions
Tension1:Definingthegoalofdevelopmentcooperation
Theinternationallevel:AmissinglayerinUNprogrammingdocuments
Whatinternationalcommitments?MDGsorhumanrights
Tension2:Definingintermediateresults
IsRBMreallyneutral?WhathappenstoRelevantresultswhicharenotSMART?
Tension3:Definingthestrategy
SelectingthepartnersMovingawayfromtheprotection‐promotiondichotomy
Tension4:M&Eormakinginformeddecisions
Conclusions and Recommendations
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Executive Summary Results‐basedmanagement(RBM)andthehumanrights‐basedapproach(HRBA)aretwo
programmingprinciplesofUNcommondevelopmentcooperationatthecountrylevel.The
findingsofthisresearchseemtocorroboratetheassumptionthatwhilecomplementary,their
concurrentapplicationcangeneratetensionsthat,ifignored,threatentoreversethehierarchy,
turningRBM,intheoryanenablingtool,intotheultimaterulingprincipleofUNprogramming.
ThepaperexaminesthetoolsandwealthofexperienceaccumulatedbytheUNinimplementing
RBMandtheHRBAinlightofthetensionsidentifiedintheexistingliterature.Firsthanddata
hasbeengatheredthroughsemi‐structuredinterviewswithUNResidentCoordinatorsandan
onlinequestionnairefordevelopmentandhumanrightspractitionersofUnitedNationsCountry
Teams(UNCTs).Whilethesamplesarenotrepresentative,theevidencegatheredisenoughto
drawsomegeneralconclusionsandhelpstoillustratetheargumentsdevelopedinthepaper.
Thediscourseonthecomplementarityofbothprogrammingprincipleshighlightstheroleofthe
HRBAindefiningrelevantcontentandofRBMinensuringaneffectiveprocessforUNcommon
developmentcooperation.Inimplementingtheseprinciples,however,theUNplacesthe
emphasisontheroleofhumanrightsasameans,ratherthanasanend,anditisthe
accountability,ratherthantheeffectivenessperspectiveofRBM,thatprevails.Theroleofthe
HRBAasabroadframeworkforaUNtheoryofchangefordevelopmentcooperationhasnotyet
permeatedUNprogrammingguidelinesanddiscourseoutsidethehumanrightsworld.AnRBM
modelthatemphasizesaccountabilityandexternalreporting,ratherthaneffectivenessand
internallearning,ismorelikelytoleadtotensionswiththeHRBA,asitincreasesthepressure
forattribution,numbersandlow‐hangingfruits.
TheUnitedNationshasdevelopedseparateguidelinesandmethodologiesfortheapplicationof
bothRBMandtheHRBA.InordertofullyimplementtheHRBA,theUNneedstogobeyondthe
separateapproachesthatarecurrentlyemployedandmoveinsteadtowardsacomprehensive
programmingframework:“AHuman‐RightsandResults‐BasedManagementApproachto
UnitedNationsDevelopmentCooperationattheCountryLevel.”Suchaframeworkshould
addressthepotentialtensionstoensurethatRBMremainstheenablingtoolthatitismeantto
beandprogrammingcontributestotheeffectivenessandtherelevanceoftheUNatthecountry
level.
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Summaryofrecommendations
1. DeveloponesingleUNProgrammingManualthatprovidesguidanceonthebasisofall
programmingprinciples.
2. EnsuretheHRBA,asthebasicframeworkforatheoryofchangeforUNdevelopment
cooperation,permeatesallUNprogrammingguidelinesanddocuments.Thisimplies
identifyinghumanrightsasconstitutiveofthegoalofdevelopmentcooperationandhaving
bothduty‐bearersandrights‐holdersasthesubjectsoftheoutcomes.
3. Clearlyreflecttheinternationalcommitmentswhichconstitutethemandateofthe
organizationatthetopoftheresultschainoftheUNprogrammingdocuments.Those
internationalcommitmentsshouldnotbelimitedtotherelevantSDGs,butalsoincludethe
relevantinternationalhumanrightsrecommendations,whichcouldthenbemonitoredwith
theUNDAF.
4. ExposethepossibleperverseeffectsofRBMandclearlydelimititsroletoensurenotonly
theeffectiveness,butalsotherelevanceofUNdevelopmentcooperation.
5. EnsureUNprogrammingframeworksprovidethespaceforUNCTstodefineadvocacy
resultsandbetterintegrateadvocacyaspartoftheirstrategiestoattainspecificoutcomes.
6. Weighresourcesusedinfundraisingeffortsagainstthepotentialbenefitsofthosefunds,
recognizingthatsomeofthemosttransformativechangestowhichtheUNmightcontribute
requirefewfinancialresourcesandinsteaddemandadequateexpertiseandaninvestment
oftime.
7. FurtherexplorewaystoworkwithpartnerswhomaybeunabletocomplywithRBM
requirementsbutmighthavetheappropriatemandateorrepresentgroupswithwhichthe
organizationneedstoengagetoachievehumanrightsdevelopmentgoals.
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PART I. Introduction
Thefieldsofdevelopmentandhumanrightshavetraditionallyevolvedalongparalleltracks.
Afterthetwofieldsfinallymetinthe1990s,thehumanrights‐basedapproach(HRBA)was
forgedasanattempttobringbothworldsclosertogether.Sincethedevelopmentworldfocused
onprogrammingandspoketheresults‐basedmanagement(RBM)language,thehumanrights‐
basedapproachwasessentiallyconceptualizedasaprogrammingtool.WhentheUnited
Nations(UN)tookstepsatthebeginningofthiscenturytoimprovethecoordinationofits
developmentactivitiesatthecountrylevel,itadoptedanewsetofcommonprogrammingtools
andidentifiedboththehumanrights‐basedapproachandresults‐basedmanagementasamong
itsfivecommonprogrammingprinciples.1Threeoftheseprinciples,whichincludethehuman
rights‐basedapproach,genderequalityandenvironmentalsustainability,aredefinedas
“normativeprinciples,”whiletheothertwo,namelyresults‐basedmanagementandcapacity‐
building,aredescribedas“enablingprinciples.”AccordingtotheUNguidelines,allfive
principlesarecomplementaryand“necessaryfortheeffectivenessofUN‐supportedcountry
programming.”2Anincreasingnumberofvoices,however,arehighlightingtensionsinthe
simultaneousapplicationoftheHRBAandRBM,andsomeareevenarguingtheir
incompatibility.
ThispaperexaminesthetoolsgeneratedandthewealthofexperienceaccumulatedbytheUNin
operationalizingboththehumanrights‐basedapproachandresults‐basedmanagementinlight
ofthetensionsidentifiedintheexistingliterature.Althoughthispaperdoesnotfindevidenceof
anunresolvablecontradictionbetweentheHRBAandRBM,itdoesconcludethattheir
concurrentapplicationgeneratestensionsthat,ifignored,threatentoreversethehierarchyand
transformresults‐basedmanagement,whichistheoreticallyanenablingtool,intotheultimate
rulingprincipleofUNprogramming.Therefore,inordertofullyoperationalizetheHRBA,the
UNneedstomovebeyondthecurrentseparatedapproachtowardsacomprehensive
programmingframework:“AHumanRights‐andResults‐BasedManagementApproachto
UnitedNationsDevelopmentCooperationattheCountryLevel.”3Suchaframeworkmust
addressthesepotentialtensionstoensurethatRBMremainstheenablingtoolitismeanttobe
andthatprogrammingcontributestoimprovingtheeffectivenessaswellastherelevanceofthe
UNatthecountrylevel.
1 UNDG(2007).GuidelinesforUnitedNationsCountryTeamsonPreparingCommonCountryAssessments(CCA)andUnitedNationsDevelopmentAssistanceFrameworks(UNDAF). InadditiontoHRBAandRBM,theUNhasidentifiedthreeotherprogrammingprincipleswhicharebeyondthescopeofthispaper,namelycapacity‐building(anenablingprinciple),genderequalityandenvironmentalsustainability(normativeprinciples).
2UNDG(2010).ApplicationoftheProgrammingPrinciplestotheUNDAF,GuidanceNote.3Notethatwhileananalysisoftheotherprogrammingprinciplesisbeyondthescopeofthispaper,theultimategoalshouldbetohaveonesingleprogrammingframeworkencompassingallfiveprinciples.
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Scopeandmethodology
ThescopeofthispaperisanexplorationoftheinterplaybetweentheHRBAandRBMas
strategicprogrammingprinciplesoftheUnitedNationsCountryTeams(UNCTs),orinother
words,withinthecontextofUNeffortstocoordinateitsdevelopmentactivitiesthroughthe
UnitedNationsDevelopmentGroup(UNDG).Athoroughreviewofthestrategicprogrammingof
thespecificUNentitiesisthereforebeyondthescopeofthisstudy.Moreover,itshouldbenoted
thatthispaperdoesnotseektoprovideacomprehensiveoverviewoftheHRBAorRBM
conceptsandmethodologies,butinsteadprovidesananalysisoftheirinteraction.Consequently,
onlythoseaspectsoftheHRBAandRBMthatarerelevanttothisspecificpurposeare
considered.
Finally,therich,complexandfascinatingdebateregardingwhetherandtowhatextenthuman
rightsanddevelopmentconvergeorcontinueinparalleltracksisbeyondthescopeofthis
study.Referencestoon‐goingdiscussionsinthatareawillonlybemadetotheextentthatthey
providethecontexttobetterunderstandtheinteractionbetweentheHRBAandRBM.
ThereislittletonoliteratureontheinterplaybetweentheHRBAandRBMindevelopment
cooperation.Worthyofmention,however,isthe2012UNICEFglobalevaluationonthe
applicationoftheHRBA4,thewritingsofP.Gready5andtheresearchpublishedbytheLeuven
CentreforGlobalGovernanceStudiesontheintegrationofhumanrightsindevelopment
cooperation.6Whileeachofthesetextsincludesinterestingandexplicitreferencestothe
subject,nonefocusexclusivelyontherelationshipbetweentheHRBAandRBM.Anumberof
humanrightsworkersanddevelopmentpractitionershavecriticizedthenegativeimpactof
RBMontheirrespectivefieldsofwork.Formostoftheseauthors,humanrightsand
developmentstillconstitutetwodistinctiveareasofwork,sotheirtextsdonotspecificallyrefer
totheHRBA.
Onthehumanrightsside,theliteratureissomewhatlimited,yetthereportoftheInternational
CouncilonHumanRightsPolicyonassessingtheimpactofhumanrightsworkdeservesspecial
mention.7Onthedevelopmentside,theliteratureisextensiveandgrowing.Manydevelopment
practitionersandresearchersarecriticalofRBMandareexposingitslimitationsfor
4UNICEF(2012).GlobalEvaluationoftheApplicationoftheHumanRights‐BasedApproachtoUNICEFProgramming.5SeeP.GreadyandW.Vandenhole(2012).“HumanRightsandDevelopmentintheNewMillennium:TowardsaTheoryofChange,”London:Routledge.6SeeD.D’Hollander,A.MarxandJ.Wouters(2014).“IntegratingHumanRightsinEUDevelopmentCooperationPolicy:AchievementsandChallenges.”WorkingPaperNo.134.LeuvenCentreforGlobalGovernanceStudies;D.D’Hollander,A.MarxandJ.Wouters(2013).“IntegratingHumanRightsinDevelopmentPolicy:MappingDonorStrategiesAndPractices.”WorkingPaperNo.108.LeuvenCentreforGlobalGovernanceStudies.7ICHRP(2012).“NoPerfectMeasure:RethinkingEvaluationandAssessmentofHumanRightsWork”(Report).
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developmentcooperation.AlthoughnotformulatedonthebasisoftheHRBA,thesecritiques
seemespeciallypertinentwhenconsideredfromahumanrightsperspective.Variouscritical
reviewsareofparticularrelevanceforthispaper,includingthoseofJ.Vähämäki,M.Schmidt
andM.Molander,8thewritingsofA.Natsios,9formerheadoftheU.S.AgencyforInternational
Development(USAID)andthoseofRosalindEyben,10formerChiefSocialDevelopmentAdvisor
oftheUnitedKingdom’sDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DFID).Acompletelistof
theliteraturereviewedcanbefoundunderthereferenceschapter.
Inadditiontotheabovementionedliterature,Ihavedrawnuponmyownexperiencesgained
duringmorethantwentyyearsofworkwiththeUnitedNationsOfficeoftheHigh
CommissionerforHumanRights(OHCHR)asanimportantsourceofinformationforthispaper.
Asaresultofmycareerpath,Ihavenbeeninaprivilegedpositiontoobservetheevolvingand
complexinterplaybetweentheHRBAandRBM.Ontheonehand,asahumanrightsofficer,I
havedevotedasubstantialamountofmyprofessionaltimetopromotingthemainstreamingof
humanrightsintotheworkofUNCTs.11Thishasrequiredmetoconfrontandaddressmanyof
thequestionsandconcernsofUnitedNationsdevelopmentpractitionersseekingtoapplythe
HRBAtotheirwork.Ontheotherhand,inmyroleasOHCHR’splanningofficeroverthelastsix
years,withincreasinglevelsofresponsibility,Ihavebeentaskedwithtransformingahuman
rightsinstitutionintoafullyresults‐basedmanagementorganization.12Hence,itisalsointhis
capacitythatIhavebeenworkingtoaddressthequestionsandconcernsofUnitedNations
humanrightsofficerswhoareattemptingtoapplyRBMtotheirwork.
Thetensionsbetweenthetwoprogrammingprinciplesthathavebeenhighlightedbythe
existingliteratureand/oridentifiedthroughmyownexperiencesconstitutethestartingpoint
ofthisresearch.Morespecifically,theyprovideacriticallensforthereviewofUNcommon
programmingdocuments13andserveasthebasisfortheformulationoftwoinformation
8J.Vähämäki,M.SchmidtandM.Molander(2011).“Review–Results‐BasedManagementinDevelopmentCooperation.”9A.Natsios(2010).“TheClashofCounter‐BureaucracyandDevelopment.”Washington:CenterforGlobalDevelopment.10R.Eyben(2013).“UncoveringthePoliticsofEvidenceandResults.AFramingPaperforDevelopmentPractitioners.”Publishedonthewebpageof‘TheBigPushForward’(2011).“StuffHappens:’TheRisksofaResultsAgenda,FromPovertytoPower”–OxfamBlog,editedbyDuncanGreen(2010).“HidingRelations:TheIronyof‘Effective’Aid.”EuropeanJournalofDevelopmentResearch,Vol22.11ThisexperienceincludesthedeliveryofnumerousHRBAtrainingsforUNCTs,bothforOHCHRandfortheUnitedNationsSystemStaffCollege,includinginthecontextofUnitedNationsDevelopmentAssistanceFrameworkretreats;assessingtheHRBAinUruguayasa“OneUN”pilotcountryforAction2;andworkingwiththeUnitedNationsSystemStaffCollegeontherevisionoftheUNDG’sHRBAcommonlearningpackage.12AccordingtothelastJointInspectionUnitreviewofOHCHR:“ManyintervieweesfromtheSecretariat,MemberStatesandoversightbodiesindicatedthatOHCHRhasmadeprogressinrecentyearstowardsimprovingResults‐BasedManagementandincorporatingaresults‐basedapproachintoitspoliciesandworkprocesses.”JointInspectionUnit(2014),ReviewofmanagementandadministrationoftheOfficeoftheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforHumanRights,JIU/REP/2014/7.13 AmongtheUNDGpolicydocuments,guidelinesandtrainingpackagesonstrategicprogrammingreviewed,thefollowinghavebeenespeciallyrelevantforthisresearch:theCommonUnderstandingamongUNagenciesontheHumanRights‐BasedApproachtoDevelopmentCooperation(2003);UNDAFGuidelines(2010);theGuidanceNoteontheApplicationoftheProgrammingPrinciplestotheUNDAF(2010);theResults‐BasedManagementHandbook(2011);theHumanRights‐BasedApproachCommonLearningPackage(2011);andtheStandardOperatingProceduresforCountriesAdoptingthe“DeliveringasOne”Approach(2014).
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gatheringtools,namelysemi‐structuredinterviewswithUnitedNationsResidentCoordinators
andanonlinequestionnaireforUNCT’sdevelopmentandhumanrightspractitioners.
InconsultationwiththeUnitedNationsSystemStaffCollege(UNSSC)andtheUNDG’sHuman
RightsWorkingGroup(UNDG‐HRWG),atotalof40RCswereselectedasaresultoftheir
knowledgeandexperienceinapplyingbothRBMandtheHRBA,withgeographicdiversitytaken
intoaccount.Ofthe40individualswhowereapproached,13respondedpositivelyandagreed
tobeinginterviewed.Interviewslastedapproximatelyonehourandwereprimarilyconducted
viaSkypeandappliedaqualitativesemi‐structuredinterviewtechnique.Manyofthequestions
wereformulatedinanopenandbroadmannertoprovidespaceformultipleavenuesofenquiry
andtoensureintervieweeshadagreatdealofleewayinrespondingandpursuingtopicsin
accordancewiththeirownexperiences.
TheonlinequestionnairewasdistributedthroughtheUNHumanRightsPolicyNetwork
(HuriTALK)andtheUNCoordinationPracticeNetwork(CPN).Atotalof42UNcolleagues
respondedtothequestionnaire,88percentofwhomhadhadatleast5yearsofprofessional
experiencewiththeUN.Therewasawell‐balancedknowledgeoftheHRBAandRBMamong
respondents,with57percentreportingtheyfeltequallypreparedonbothprinciples,andan
equalpercentage(19percent)whofeltmorepreparedwithoneoftwoprinciples.Allregions
werefairlywellrepresented,withtheexceptionofWesternAfrica.Themajorityofrespondents
heldpositionswiththeRC’sOffice(29percent),UNDP(26percent),OHCHR(18percent)and
UNICEF(13percent).
Annex1includesthelistofquestionsusedforthesemi‐structuredinterviewswithRCsand
Annex2reproducestheresultsoftheonlinequestionnaire.
Asafinalcaveat,itshouldbenotedthatwhilethispaperisfoundedonmorethan20yearsof
professionalexperienceinthisparticularfieldofwork,theresearchwasconductedwithinthe
contextofafourmonthsabbaticalproject,whichclearlylimitedtheextentofthereviewof
existingliterature.Furthermore,theresponsesoftheinterviewswiththeRCsandtheonline
questionnairedonotconstitutearepresentativesampleandthereforecannotbeextrapolated
toUNCTsasawhole.Instead,thefirsthanddatagatheredthroughthesetoolsservestoillustrate
theargumentsoutlined.
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cooperationemerged.Sincethedevelopmentworldfocusedonprogrammingandspokethe
results‐basedmanagementlanguage,theHRBAwassubsequentlydefinedinprogramming
terms.
ConsensusaroundthecommonUNprogrammingprinciplesfirstemergedin2006duringthe
inter‐agencydiscussionsrelatedtorevisingtheguidelinesforthepreparationoftheUnited
NationsDevelopmentAssistanceFramework(UNDAF).The2007guidelinesthatgrewoutof
thosediscussionsidentifiedfiveguidingprinciples,16namelyahumanrights‐basedapproach;
genderequality;environmentalsustainability;results‐basedmanagement;andcapacity
development.
TheHumanRights‐BasedApproach–theUNCommonUnderstanding
Theintegrationofhumanrightsanddevelopmenthastakendifferentshapesatdifferenttimes.
TheOrganisationforEconomicCo‐operationandDevelopment/WorldBankhasundertakena
thoroughreviewandcategorizationofthedifferentapproachestohumanrightsindevelopment
programming.17Accordingtothatcategorization,summarizedonthetablebelow,thehuman
rightsbased‐approachcanbedifferentiatedfromotherformsofintegrationofhumanrights
intodevelopmentbecauseitconsidershumanrightstobemorethanjustameanvalue,butalso
aconstitutivegoalofdevelopment.Inotherwords,fortheHRBA,humanrightsarebothanew
wayofdoingdevelopment(instrumentalapproach)andanewvisionfordevelopment
(normativeapproach).
Figure2.Approachestointegratinghumanrightsanddevelopment
16 UNDG(2007).“Guidelines.”
17OECD/WorldBank(2013).IntegratingHumanRightsintoDevelopment.SecondEdition:DonorApproaches,ExperiencesandChallenges.WorldBankPublications.
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In2003,UNagenciesmeetinginStamford,ConnecticutinthecontextofwidespreadUNreform,
adoptedacommonunderstandingofthehumanrights‐basedapproachtodevelopment
cooperationandprogramming.TheStamfordAgreementhasthreemainpillars:18
1. “Allprogrammesofdevelopment cooperation,policiesand technicalassistanceshould
further the realization of human rights as laid down in the Universal Declaration of
HumanRightsandotherinternationalhumanrightsinstruments.”
2. “Human rights standards contained in, and principles derived from, the Universal
DeclarationofHumanRightsandotherinternationalhumanrightsinstrumentsguideall
development cooperation and programming in all sectors and in all phases of the
programmingprocess.”
3. Development cooperation contributes to the development of the capacities of ‘duty‐
bearers’tomeettheirobligationsand/orof‘rights‐holders’toclaimtheirrights.”
Inshort,contrarytothepurelyinstrumentaldiscourseoftheaideffectivenessagenda,19which
seeshumanrightsascontributingtotheeffectivenessofdevelopmentcooperation,theHRBA
conceiveshumanrightsasbothaconstitutivegoalofdevelopment(Stamford’sfirstandsecond
pillars)andameansofundertakingdevelopmentcooperation(thirdpillar).
Results‐BasedManagement:TheUNdefinition
Theprimarypurposeofresults‐basedmanagementistwofold.Ontheonehand,RBMaimsto
improvetheeffectivenessofprogrammesbyshiftingthefocustowardsdesiredresultsand
gatheringrelevantdatatoinformdecision‐making.Ontheotherhand,thedefinitionofexpected
resultsandthereportingagainstthoseresultsincreasestransparencyandservesasan
importantaccountabilitytool.
TheUNDG’sResults‐BasedManagementHandbookof2011definesresults‐basedmanagement
as“amanagementstrategybywhichallactors,contributingdirectlyorindirectlytoachievinga
setofresults,ensurethattheirprocesses,productsandservicescontributetotheachievement
ofdesiredresults(outputs,outcomesandhigherlevelgoalsorimpact).Theactorsinturnuse
informationandevidenceonactualresultstoinformdecisionmakingonthedesign,resourcing
18UnitedNations(2003).“ReportoftheSecondInter‐AgencyWorkshoponImplementingaHumanRights‐BasedApproachintheContextofUNReform,,Stamford,USA.Inaddition,theStamfordAgreementnotesthatprogrammingshouldbeinformedbytherecommendationsofinternationalhumanrightsbodiesandmechanisms;andfurtherspecifiesthefollowinghumanrightsprinciples:universalityandinalienability;indivisibility;interdependenceandinterrelatedness;non‐discriminationandequality;participationandinclusion;accountabilityandtheruleoflaw. 19 High‐LevelForumsonAidEffectiveness:Rome(2003),Paris(2005),Accra(2008)andBusan(2011).
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anddeliveryofprogrammesandactivitiesaswellasforaccountabilityandreporting.”20
Theitalicshavebeenaddedtohighlightanimportantelementofthisdefinition.Indeed,
emphasisisplacedontheroleofRBMtoimprovebotheffectivenessthroughlearningand
accountabilitythroughperformancereporting.ThiswasnotthecasewithpreviousUN
programmingdocuments21whichprivilegedtheaccountabilityaspectsofRBMoverthoseof
effectiveness.Theissueisnotinnocuoussince,aswillbefurtherexploredinfollowingchapters,
thereisevidenceoffrictionbetweenthesetwostatedpurposesofRBM.22
ComplementaritiesbetweentheHRBAandRBM
AccordingtotheUNDG“GuidanceNoteontheApplicationoftheProgrammingPrinciples,”23the
UNfivecommonprogrammingprinciples,whichincludetheHRBAandRBM,areinterrelated,
complementaryandnecessaryforeffectiveUNprogrammingatthecountrylevel.TheUNDG
GuidanceNotecharacterizestheHRBAasa“normativeprincipleandRBMasan“enabling
principle.”Normativeprinciplesprovide“waystoconnectinternationalnormsandstandards
andagreeddevelopmentgoalstothedevelopmentprocess,”whileRBMisdescribedasa
“meanstomakethenormativeprinciplesoperational,”includingby“helpingtodemonstrate
effectivenessandaccountabilityfortheuseofUNsystemresources.”24TheRBMHandbook
furthernotesthat“[w]hileRBMisamanagementtooltohelpreachadesiredresult;ahuman
rights‐basedapproachisaframeworkthathelpsdefinetheresultsandtheprocessbywhich
resultsareachieved.”25Ingeneralterms,UNprogrammingdocumentspresenttheHRBAas
valuechargedandRBMasaneutraltool.
Thecomplementarityofthetwoapproachesisgenerallydescribedasfollows:theHRBA
providesguidanceonthecontentoftheresults‐thewhat–contributingtotheirrelevance,
whileRBMensuresthatthoseresultsareachieved‐thehow–inaneffectiveway.An
overwhelmingmajorityoftheRCsinterviewedandquestionnairerespondentssharedthis
understanding.Infact,onlytworespondentstothequestionnaireconsideredthetwoprinciples
tobeincompatibleandmostRCsexpressedinitialsurpriseatthesuggestion.
20UNDG(2011).Results‐BasedManagementHandbook.21See,forexample,theUNDG‐Results‐BasedManagementTerminology(2003).22 SeeJ.Vähämäkietal.“Results‐BasedManagementinDevelopmentCooperation.”
23 UNDG(2010).“ApplicationoftheProgrammingPrinciples.”
24Ibid.UNDG(2010).EnablingprinciplesarebasedontheTriennialComprehensivePolicyReviews(TCPR)oftheUNsystem,theoutcomeofthe2005WorldSummitandtheaideffectivenessagenda(2005ParisDeclaration;2008DohaDeclarationonFinancingforDevelopment;2008AccraAgendaforAction;and2011BusanPartnershipforEffectiveDevelopmentCooperation)withtheirfocusonnationalownershipandaccountability.25UNDG(2011).“Handbook
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nt,andof
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for
ftingthe
14
Part II. Potential tensions
Aspreviouslystated,theoverwhelmingmajorityofUNstaffconsultedthroughthisresearch
notedthattheyconsiderthehumanrights‐basedapproachandresults‐basedmanagementtobe
complementaryframeworks.Wearethereforefarfromtheresultsofacademicresearchwhich
haveidentifieda“rights‐andresults‐basedframework”as“acontradictioninterms”or
suggestedthatRBMisa“spoilerratherthanafacilitationofchange,”inparticularwithregards
tohumanrights.26However,whileagreeingwiththeircomplimentarynature,halfofthe
respondentstothequestionnaireacknowledgedtheexistenceoftensionsbetweenthetwo
approachesandapproximately43percentnotedthatRBMneedstoberefinedtobetterserve
theHRBA.
AmongRCs,therecognitionoftensionsbetweenthetwoapproacheswaslessevident.Many
expressedsurprisewhenconfrontedwiththequestion.TheprevalentdiscoursewasthatRBM
shouldnotgoverntheimplementationoftheHRBAandthattensionscouldonlyexistiftheUN
“didnothavetherightpeopleinplace.”SinceRCswereself‐reportingandwereselectedonthe
basisoftheirknowledgeoftheHRBAandRBM,apositivebiastowardsacommitmenttothe
organization’smandatewastobeexpected.Nevertheless,itbecameclearduringtheinterviews
thateven“havingtherightpeople”withthe“rightcommitments”totheorganization’smandate
mightnotbeenoughwhenstaffarepressuredbyspecificUNorganizationsanddonorstoapply
asimplisticandquantitativeversionoftheRBMapproach.Furthermore,theinterviews
demonstratedtheimportanceofprovidingclearguidelines,incentivesandaccountability
mechanismstoensurethattheapplicationofthesetwoapproachesisnotlefttothediscretion
ofindividuals.
HRBAasabroadframeworkfortheUNtheoryofchangefordevelopmentcooperation
TheHRBAconstitutesabroadframeworkfortheUN’stheoryofchangefordevelopment
cooperation.Thistheoryofchange,whichisbasedontheUN’scommonunderstandingofan
agreedUNcommonprogrammingprinciple,hasnotyetpermeatedtheUN’sprogramming
guidelines,manualsanddiscourseoutsidethehumanrightsworld.Thefollowingslides,which
showtheUNchainofresults,exemplifythisstatement.Figure4reproducesaslidefromthe
updatedversionoftheUNDGcommonlearningpackageonaHRBA27andFigure5istakenfrom
theUNDGHandbookonResults‐BasedManagement.28BothwerepublishedbyUNDGin2011.
26W.Vandenhole,“OvercomingthePromotion‐ProtectionDichotomy,HumanRights‐BasedApproachestoDevelopmentandOrganizationalChangewithintheUNatCountryLevel,”inP.GreadyandW.Vandenhole(2012),HumanRightsandDevelopmentintheNewMillennium:TowardsaTheoryofChange,Routledge. 27UNDG(2011).“UpdatedUNInter‐AgencyCommonLearningPackageonaHumanRights‐BasedApproachtoProgramming.”SeealsoOHCHR’sTheoryofChangein“OHCHR’sManagementPlan2014‐2017.” 28 UNDG(2011).“RBMHandbook.”
15
OnlytheUNDGcommonlearningpackagetranslatestheStamfordagreementontheHRBAinto
achainofresults.
TheresultschainoftheUNRBMHandbook(Figure4),places“changesinconditions”atthe
leveloftheimpact/goalratherthan“changesintherealizationofhumanrights”or“changesin
thequalityoflife”whichwouldhaveatleastsituatedthepersonatthecentreofdevelopment.
Theintermediateresult,otherwiseknownas“outcome,”isdefinedasa“changeincapacityand
performanceoftheprimaryduty‐bearer.”Thereferenceto“duty‐bearers”showsanattemptto
applythelanguageoftheHRBAandtocontextualizetheRBMmanualwithinthecontextofthe
UN’swork.Yet,thereisnoreferencetothe“capacitiesofrights‐holders”,clearlymentioned
withtheduty‐bearersasfundamentalactorsinthethirdpillaroftheStamfordagreement.
TheseomissionsfromtheRBMHandbookarenotaccidental.TheHandbookisratherreflecting
andreinforcingtwoimportantgapsintheimplementationoftheHRBAbyUNCTs.
ThefollowingpageswillhighlightthetensionsbetweentheHRBAandRBMinrelationtothe
keyelementsofatheoryofchange,thatis,intermsofthedefinitionof:1)thegoaltobe
pursued;2)theintermediateresultsthatareneededtoachievethatgoal;and3)thepartners
andtypesofinterventionsthatareessentialtoachievingthoseintermediateresults.
Fig
Figure4.Sli
gure 5. Table f
idefromtheU
from the UND
UNHRBAcom
DG, Results‐ba
mmonlearnin
sed Managem
ngpackage.
ment Handboo
ok.
16
17
TENSION1:DEFININGTHEGOALOFDEVELOPMENTCOOPERATION
Theinternationallevel:amissinglayerinUNprogrammingdocuments
ThetopofthetheoryofchangeisdefinedbytheUNcommonunderstandingontheHRBAasthe
“realizationofhumanrightsaslaiddownintheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsand
otherinternationalhumanrightsinstruments.”TheUNprogrammingguidelinesand
documents,however,placenationaldevelopmentprioritiesatthetopoftheresultschain,
definetherolesofUNCTsintermsoftheirsupporttogovernmentstoimplementthosenational
prioritiesandprimarilyestablishtheaccountabilityofUNCTsvis‐à‐visnationalgovernments.
ThereseemstobealayerofresultsthatismissingfromtheUnitedNationsprogramming
documentsatthecountrylevel:theinternationalcommitments,amongthemhumanrights,
whichareatthecoreofthemandateoftheorganization.
Oneelementthatalldevelopmentschoolshaveincommonistherecognitionoftheimportance
ofnationalownershipasasounddevelopmentprinciple.Nationalownershiphasbeenstrongly
emphasizedintheTriennialComprehensivePolicyReviews(TCPR)oftheUNsystemandinthe
aideffectivenessagenda,includingthroughtheParisDeclaration(2005),theAccraAgendafor
ActionandtheDohaDeclarationonFinancingforDevelopment(2008)andtheBusan
PartnershipforEffectiveDevelopmentCooperation(2011).Infact,theemphasisofthese
processesontheimportanceofRBMhasbroughttheconceptsofRBMandnationalownership
closertogether.
Similarly,theHRBA’semphasisonparticipationandaccountabilityplacessignificant
importanceonnationalownershipindevelopmentprocesses.FromtheHRBAperspective,
however,nationalownershipcanneverprevailoverinternationalhumanrightsstandardsorbe
usedasanexcusetorelinquishresponsibilitiestoimplementtheUN’sinternationalmandate.
UNprogrammingguidelinesandtoolsarefarfromclearinthisregardanddepictan
organizationthatappearstohavenoparticularagendaandisabletosupportgovernmentswith
whateverdevelopmentprioritiestheydeemmostappropriate.Andyet,theUNhasanagenda
thatisdefinedbytheinternationalcommunityandformsthebasisofitsmandate.Failureto
makethatroleevidentnotonlymakestheimplementationoftheHRBAdifficult,ithasthe
potentialtocompromisetheworkoftheUNforfuturegenerations.AsoneResident
Coordinatorputit,“itisimportantthatcivilsocietyactorsunderstandthatwecansaynotoa
governmentifwhatitisrequestedofusdoesnotfitwithintheUNparameters.”Thispointmay
seemobvioustomany,butthefactthatsuchanimportantaspectoftheUNworkisnotclearly
statedonitsprincipalprogrammatictoolsraisesseriousconcerns.
18
AUnitedNationsDevelopmentAssistanceFrameworkresultsmatrixwhichhasatitstopthe
nationaldevelopmentprioritiessendsthewrongmessagetoUNstaff,governmentsand
populationsatlarge.AUNDAF,whichplacesrelevantinternationalcommitmentsatthetopof
itsresultsmatrix,wouldhelptoclarifytoGovernmentstheUN’srole,asapartner,butwithin
thecontextofanagreedinternationalagenda.ItwouldalsohelptoexplaintheroleoftheUNto
localpopulations,notjustasanallyofgovernments,butalsoasanobjectiveguardianof
internationallyagreedstandards.Finally,itwouldhelpUNstafftobetterunderstandtheirroles
andwhatisexpectedofthem.SeveraloftheinterviewedRCsemphasizedtheimportanceof
hiringstaffmemberswhoarenot“value‐neutral,”butarecommittedtothemandatesofthe
organization.Itisdifficulttoaskthisofstaffmembersiftheprogrammingguidelinesdonot
clearlyoutlinethemandatetheyaresupposedtohelpimplement.
ItmustbenotedthatthereisavastdifferencebetweendefiningtheroleofUNCTsas
“supportinggovernmentstoimplementtheirnationaldevelopmentpriorities,”and“supporting
governmentsintheimplementationoftheinternationalcommitmentsatthecountrylevel.”As
depictedinFigure6below,thedifferencebetweenthetwostatementsisextremelyimportant
fromtheHRBAperspective.
Figure6.TheRoleofUnitedNationsCountryTeams.
AsFigure6shows,ensuringthattheinternationalcommitmentsarevisibleatthetopoftheUN
commoncountryprogrammeswouldevidencetoall:
1. ThattherecouldbenationaldevelopmentprioritieswhichtheUNshouldnotsupport
becausetheyarecontrarytointernationalagreedstandardsandcommitments.Thisisa
International commitments
National priorities
Not a UN priority and maybe NOT UN’s role at allUN has a role to
stretch this boundary
Possible priority
19
fundamentalprincipleoftheHRBAwhichstatesthathumanrightsstandardsand
principlesshouldguideUNprogrammingatallstages.TherecentUnitedNationsDue
DiligencePolicyandtheRightsUpFrontInitiativeindicatethatinthehumanrights
context,overstatingisessential.
2. ThattheUNhasanimportantroletoplayinengaginggovernmentsinadiscussionon
therealizationofinternationallyagreedstandardsandcommitmentsatthenational
level,independentlyofwhetherornotthosecommitmentshavebeenidentifiedasa
prioritybythecurrentgovernmentofaspecificcountry.
DespitetheimportantstepstakenbytheUNsystemtosecurethepositionofhumanrightsasa
centralpillarofitswork,thisfactdoesnotcomeacrossclearlyintheUNDAFguidelines.For
instance,thefirstparagraphoftheguidelinesregardingtheselectionofoutcomesreads:“[a]fter
reviewingallnationaldevelopmentpriorities,andthenagreeingonwhichnational
developmentprioritiesareappropriateforUNaction,theUNCT,inconsultationwithall
relevantstakeholders,mustagreeonasetofoutcomestosupporteachnationaldevelopment
priority.”
Inaddition,theRBMHandbookcontinuallyreferstotheneedto“balance(s)thepursuitof
internationalnormsandstandardswiththeachievementofnationaldevelopmentpriorities.”Is
“balance”reallytheappropriateverbhere?AccordingtothedefinitionoftheOxforddictionary,
thiswouldmean“offsettingthevalueof”internationalnormswiththeachievementofnational
developmentprioritiesor“equallingtheeffectorimportance”ofboth.Balancingthepursuitof
internationalnormsandstandardswiththeachievementofnationaldevelopmentpriorities
seemstoplacethemandateoftheorganizationandthecriteriaforeffectivenessonthesame
levelofimportance.
BoththeHRBAandRBMemphasizetheroleofaccountabilityindevelopmentcooperation,but
accountabilitytowhomandaccordingtowhatstandards?Whenrespondentstothe
questionnairewereaskedtoorganizetheaccountabilitiesofUNCTsinorderofimportance,the
responseswereequallydistributedbetweenaprioritizationofrights‐holders(40percent),
nationalgovernments(31percent)andtheorganization(governingbodies,UNDG)(30per
cent).SimilarresponsesweregivenbytheinterviewedResidentCoordinators.
TheRBMHandbookclearlystatesthatUNCTs“areaccountabletogovernmentsforoverall
contributiontothenationaldevelopmentobjectives”(page4).Inthiscontext,accountabilityis
understoodasaneffectiveandefficientuseofresources.Theconceptofaccountabilityas
20
definedintheUNcommonunderstanding,however,referstoStatesandotherduty‐bearersas
“answerablefortheobservanceofhumanrights.”ItcouldbearguedthattheUnitedNationsis
thepersonificationofthecollectivesubjectintheUnitedNationsCharter(“wethepeoples”)and
thattheinternationalagreementsarethemanifestationofitsvoice.TheHRBAtodevelopment
requiresfirstandutmostaclearcommitmentandaccountabilitytowardsthatcollectivesubject.
TheUnitedNationsisfirstandforemostaccountabletothatinternationalsubject(“wethe
peoples”)andmustholdStatesresponsiblefortheirinternationalcommitments.
Whatinternationalcommitments?MDGsorHumanRights?
Asshownabove,UNprogrammingdocumentsplacenationaldevelopmentprioritiesatthetop
oftheresultschainanddonotclearlyreflecttheinternationalcommitmentswhichconstitute
themandateoftheorganization.Havingthosecommitmentsreflectedintheresultsmatrixof
UNcountryprogrammeswouldindeedbefundamentaltofosteringtheapplicationoftheHRBA,
butitmaynotbeenough.Itisonethingtosaythatasaninternationalorganizationwithan
internationalmandate,UNcommonprogrammingatthecountrylevelshouldplacetheagreed
internationalcommitmentsatthetopofitsresultschain.Itisyetanotherthingtoassertthat
thoseinternationalcommitmentsmustbehumanrightsnorms.WhiletheHRBAestablishesthe
furtheringofhumanrightsasagoalforallUNdevelopmentprogammes,theonedominant
agendaforUNdevelopmentactorsistheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals(MDGs),orthe
SustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs),astheywillbecalledinthepost‐2015world.
DespitetheclearstatementthatcameoutofStamford,theideathathumanrightsarea
constitutivegoaloftheUnitedNationsdevelopmentframeworkisfarfromgenerallyaccepted.
TheinterviewswithResidentCoordinatorsrevealedthepervasivepersistenceoftheconceptual
divisionbetweenthedevelopmentandhumanrightsworlds.Humanrightsworkcontinuesto
beseenasaparallelfield,identifiedwithacertainsetofrights,namelycivilandpoliticalrights,
andacertaintypeofintervention,namely,namingandshaming.EvenifallRCsagreedthat
humanrightsconstituteanimportantpartoftheworkoftheUN,severalquestionedifUNCTs,
which“needtofocusonthedevelopmentwork,”werethebestsuitedtodealwithhumanrights
issues.
ThefactthattheHRBAisdefinedasbothameansandanendhasunquestionablycontributedto
theconfusion.ThecurrentUNDAFguidelinesdonotclearlydistinguishbetweentheenabling
andnormativeprinciples.“TheCountryTeamsarerequiredtoapplythefiveprogramming
21
principles…Together,theseprogrammingprinciplesconstituteastartingpointandguidefor
thecountryanalysis,aswellasforallstagesoftheUNDAF...”29
TheUNDGRBMHandbookpresentstheachievementofMDGsamongthepossibleimpactof
countryprogrammes,whiletheprogrammingprinciples,includingtheHRBA,aredescribedas
meansfortheachievementoftheMDGs.ThisisalsothewayitisrepresentedontheUNDAF
guidelineswhichnote:“[u]singRBM,theUNCTensuresthatitsresourcescontributetoalogical
chainofresultsthatincreaseincomplexityandambitionhigherupthelogicalchainfrom
outputstooutcomesandthenimpacts,whichareMD/MDG‐relatednationalpriorities.”30
Duringaninterview,oneoftheRCswhohadrepeatedlyassertedandgivenexamplesofhis
commitmenttotheHRBAstated,“Iamcurrentlytryingtoensurethatthenationaldevelopment
planreflectsthedraftSDGs,butwhatdoIdonowwithhumanrights?”Alessonlearnedfrom
therecentexperienceofMDGsisthattheseareglobaltargetswhichneedtobecontextualized
anddisaggregatedforeachspecificcountry.TheUNcommonunderstandingontheHRBAstates
thattherecommendationsoftheinternationalhumanrightsinstrumentsshouldinformthe
programmingofUNCTs.Theserecommendationsprovideanessentialstartingpointfor
contextualizingtheMDGs,butifthisisnotobvioustoacommittedRC,theircentralityneedsto
befurtheremphasizedandrelevantquestionsandanswersneedtobeincludedintheUNDAF
preparationguidelines.
TheUNCTofGuatemalaisputtinginplaceasystemwhichcouldbecomeagoodpracticeinthis
regard.TheirsystemensuresthelinkageofeachUNDAFoutcome,andevenlowerlevelsof
results,withtherelevantSDGaswellaswiththespecificrecommendationsofinternational
humanrightsinstruments.Thisnotonlyensuresthevisibilityoftheinternationallevel,butalso
entailsthatthemonitoringoftheUNDAFincludesthemonitoringoftheimplementationofthe
recommendationsissuedbytheinternationalhumanrightsmechanisms.Suchasystemcould
additionallyfacilitatethereportingoftheUNCTandthegovernmenttothosemechanisms.A
similarsystemisalreadyinplaceatOHCHR.Theclassificationoftherecommendationsofthe
internationalhumanrightsmechanismsinaccordancewiththeSDGscouldfurtherfacilitatethis
task.ThiscouldbedonethroughtheUniversalHumanRightsIndex,anonlinedatabase
providingeasyaccesstocountry‐specifichumanrightsinformationemanatingfromthe
internationalhumanrightsmechanisms.
29 Interestingly,the2004UNDAFguidelines,whichdidnotyetrecognizetheHRBAasaprincipleperse,clearlystated:“[f]ortheUnitedNationssystem,thismeansthatcooperationprogrammesfocusontherealizationoftherightsofallcitizens,andthathumanrightsprinciplesareappliedincooperationprogrammes.” 30 UNDG(2010).“UNDAFGuidelines.”
22
TENSION2:DEFININGINTERMEDIATERESULTS
IsRBMreallyneutral?
Results‐basedmanagementisgenerallydescribedasaneutralframeworkofferingaprocess
andastructuretoachieveresultsbyproviding,amongotherthings,objectiveinformationfor
decision‐making.AsdefinedintheGuidanceNoteontheApplicationoftheProgramming
Principles,“RBMdoesnotprescribethesubstanceofresults,overwhichtheotherfour
principleswillhavegreaterinfluence.”31Differentdevelopmentschoolshavestartedtoquestion
thisneutrality,arguingthatthepolitics,thetoolsand/ortheactualapplicationofRBMaffects
thecontentandthenatureofthedevelopmentresultsprioritized.
Accordingtothe2010GuidelinesforUNCTstopreparetheirUNDAFs,UNCTsshouldprioritize
thoseoutcomesthat“[a]respecific,realisticallyachievableandmeasurable,sothattheUNis
accountablefortheirachievements.”32Somedevelopmentpractitionersarguethat,by
prioritizingresultswhichareSpecific,Measurable,AttainableandTime‐bound,(usingthe
famousSMARTacronym),wemightbeprioritizingresultswhicharenotRelevant,orfromthe
HRBApointofview,rights‐based.TheseauthorsarguethatthestrictapplicationofRBMcan
leadtodecisionswhichwouldbecontrarytogooddevelopmentpractices,leadingorganizations
toprioritizeresultswhichcanbeeasilydeliveredinashorttimeframeandcanbeeasily
quantified,butattheexpensesofthosekeytransformationalchangesthatdevelopment
cooperationshouldbeaimingfor,thetypeofchangesthataHRBAtodevelopmentwouldlikely
prioritizeandwhichrequiretimetoshow.
MorethanhalfofthoseansweringthequestionnaireindicatedthatRBMaffectsUNCT’sresults
andthatpriorityisoftengiventothoseprogrammesthatareeasiertomeasureandcanbe
deliveredwithinashorttimeframe.ManyoftheRCsinterviewedspontaneouslydescribedRBM
asaneutraltoolthatdoesnotaffecttheUNCTspriorities.Duringthecourseoftheinterviews,
however,manyrevealedthattheyareunderincreasinginternalandexternalpressurefor
informationonRBM‐related“resultswhichcanbeattributedandcounted”andseveralprovided
examplesofhowhumanrightsresultshadbeende‐prioritizedasaconsequenceofthis
pressure.OneRCprovidedanexampleinwhichthepressuretodeliveraconcreteresult,
namelythepassingofalaw,tookprecedenceovertheneedtofurtheradvocateforcertain
changesortoensuretheappropriateparticipationofstakeholders.
SeveralRCsalsoindirectlyreportedontheimpactofRBMontheformulationoftheUNCTs
31UNDG(2010).“ApplicationoftheProgrammingPrinciples.”32UNDG(2010).”UNDAFGuidelines.”
23
prioritiesasaresultofpressurefromdonors.Inaveryinterestingandwell‐illustratedpaper,A.
Natsios,formerheadofUSAID,arguesthatfundingfordemocracyandgovernanceprogrammes
hasdecreasedbecause“developmentofficersfocusonwhattheycanmeasure”33inorderto
complywiththedemandsofwhathecallsthe“counter‐bureaucracies.”34Indeed,RCs
highlightedalackoffundingasoneofthemainobstaclestoUNCTprioritization.OneRC
reportedthatimportanthumanrightsoutcomesoutlinedintheirUNDAFcouldnotbe
implementedduetoaninabilitytosecureresources,whileanothersimilarlynotedthatan
absenceofresourcesmadeitimpossibletoputinplaceprogrammestoaddressgapstheyhad
identifiedthroughavulnerabilityatlas.Theseexamplesseemtoconfirmthefearswithinthe
humanrightssectorthatthe‘valueformoney’evaluationsconductedbydonorsare
increasinglydrivingresourcestowards‘whatismeasureable’insteadof‘whatmatters.’35
ThefocusonRBM’saccountabilityperspectivemightnotbehelping
OneofRBM’sprimarypracticalchallengeslaysinthetradeoffsbetweenthetwousesofresults
information,namelyaccountabilityandmanagement.36Thetwoperspectivesaretosomeextent
directedtowarddifferenttypesofdataorresults.AnRBMmodelthatemphasizesaccountability
andexternalreportingratherthaneffectivenessandinternallearningwouldseemmorelikely
togeneratetensionwiththeHRBA,asitincreasesthepressureforattribution,numbersand
low‐hangingfruits.
Bynomeansshouldthisbereadasanattempttodiminishtheimportanceofaccountability.In
reality,itcouldbearguedthatmanagementimprovementandaccountabilityaretwosidesof
thesamecoin,butwhiletheformeremphasizestheaccountabilitytowardsrights‐holders
(learning),thelatteremphasizesaccountabilitytointermediaries,thatis,thedonors
(reporting).
IfthereissomethingthatcharacterizestheoriginsofRBM,itistheemphasisonlearning.As
earlyasthe1950s,PeterDruckernotedthatwhenmanagersanalyzeasituationandactonthe
basisofresults,theyaresignificantlymoresuccessfulthanwhentheymakedecisionsbasedon
budgetsandoperationprogrammes.Theprogrammeapproachesdevelopedinthelate1960s,
1970sand1980s,includingtheLogicalFrameworkApproach,emphasizedtheimplementation
ofactivitiesaccordingtoaplannedschedule,aswellasfinancial,planningandcostaccounting.
33 Natsios,A.(2010).
34 "Arelativelydurablegovernmentagencywhoseprincipalmissionistomonitor,criticize,andimprovetheperformanceofother
governmentagencies…throughasetofbudgeting,oversight,accountability,andmeasurementsystems.“W.T.Gormley(1996).Counter‐Counter‐bureaucraciesinTheoryandPractice.Administration&Society,28(3),276. 35 ICHRP(2012).
36 SeeFlint,M.(2003),EasierSaidThanDone:AReviewofResults‐BasedManagementinMultilateralDevelopmentInstitutions.Herefordshire:MichaelFlint&Partners;andBinnendijk,A.(2000),“Results‐BasedManagementintheDevelopmentCooperationAgencies:AReviewofExperience.”DACWorkingPartyonAidEvaluation.
24
AsdescribedbyJ.Vähämäki,“RBMrepresentsareturntothenotionsofDruckerandhis
insistenceonsuccessfulresultorientationasamind‐setandaperspectiveonmanagement,
ratherthanaprecisesetofinstructions.”37Paradoxically,anRBMaccountabilitymodelcan
easilydefeatthepurposethatRBMwasmeanttofulfilandcaninsteadcauseorganizationsto
countandattributefundsandactivitiesinsteadofresults.
TheUN’sprioritizationofaccountabilityvis‐a‐vismanagementimprovementinthe
implementationofRBMisnotnew.Asindicatedina2008RBMevaluation:“[o]verall,the
literaturedemonstratesthatmostorganizationsaresucceedingtoinstitutionalizeRBP(results‐
basedplanning),andthattheyaremovingquicklytowardsresults‐basedreporting.But
agenciesarehavingamoredifficulttimewiththeuseofresultsinformationformanagement
decision‐makingatcountrylevel.”38AstudyoftheUnitedNationsEvaluationGroupontherole
ofevaluationinRBM39foundthatRBMhasnotdevelopedintoamanagementtool,butis
perceivedbymanagementandprogrammemanagersasatechnicalreportingexercise.While
the2010UNDAFguidelinesaretryingtomovetheorganizationtowardsthe“managementfor
results”model,whichusesinformationgatheredfordecision‐makingandlearning,40much
moreneedstobedonetocounterbalancetheexternalpressure.
AmajorityoftherespondentstotheonlinequestionnairenotedthattheUNadoptedRBM
mainlytoimprovetheeffectivenessofitswork.Whenaskedabouttheactualcontributionof
RBMtotheUN’swork,however,amajorityofrespondentsinsteadreferredtoimproved
accountability.Infact,70percentand60percentoftherespondentsstressedthatnotenough
timeisallocatedforlearningandevaluation,respectively,while40percentstatedthatthetime
devotedtoreportingisexcessive.
Duringtheinterviews,manyRCsalsoconfirmedtheyhadexperiencedpressuretoreporton
“results”thatcanbequantifiedandattributed.AsdescribedbyoneoftheRCs,thereisacurrent
push“tomovedowntheladderofresultstowardsmorequantifiable,tangible,verifiableand
short‐termresults,”reflectinganongoing“debatebetweenthepoliticians,pushingforverifiable
results,andthedevelopmentauthoritiesandpractitionerswhichinsistonkeepingthematthe
outcomelevel.”Theissuehasbecomemorecomplicatedasitappearsthatpoliticiansseemtobe
winningthebattle.AccordingtoA.Natsios,thetensionbetween“accountabilityandcontrol
versusgooddevelopmentpracticehasnowbeenskewedtosuchadegreeintheU.S.aidsystem
37J.Vähämäki,etal,(2011).“Review.”38OIOS(2008).ReviewofResults‐basedManagementattheUN.Washington,DC:OIOS.39UNEG(2007).TheRoleofEvaluationinResults‐BasedManagement.40SeeUNDG(2010).HowtoPrepareanUNDAF:GuidelinesforUNCTs,andUNDG(2014).StandardOperatingProceduresforCountriesAdoptingthe“DeliveringAsOne”Approach.40Natsios,A.(2010).TheClashofCounter‐BureaucracyandDevelopment.Washington:CenterforGlobalDevelopment.
25
(andintheWorldBank)thattheimbalancethreatensprogrammeintegrity.”41
InthewordsofanotherRC,“Iammoreoftenrequestedfinancialinformationandinformation
ondeliverablesthanaboutresults.”Furthermore,asseveralRCshighlighted,theallocationof
resourcesisoftenbasedonpurelyfinancialdata,suchasexpendituresratesorthemeetingof
fundraisingtargets.Andyet,theyargue,someofthemosttransformativeoutcomestowhich
UNCTshavecontributedrequirelittlefinancial,butlong‐term,investments.Interestingly,one
RCnotedthatthemosttransformativechangetowhichtheUNCThadcontributedinthe
country‐thepassingofatransparencylaw‐wasinvisibleforthesuccessiveUNCT
programmes.
UNguidelinesreflectthefactthatthecomplexnatureofdevelopmentmakesitimpossibleto
attributetheachievementofoutcomestoonesinglespecificactor.However,inthecontextof
financialcompetitionforlimitedresources,developmentagenciesareincreasingthepressure
forresultsthatcanbeattributed(“valueformoney”).RCsreportedthepushfromtheirown
agenciestoreportonresultsthatcouldbeclearlyattributedtothem.Thiskindofdemandis
shiftingthefocusfromreportsonresults(outcomesandoutputs)toreportsonactivitiesand
expenditures,whicharemucheasiertoattribute.
Inadditiontotheproblemofattribution,whichisacerbatedinthecaseofhumanrightsresults,
claiminghumanrightsresultscanbepoliticallysensitiveandproblematic.Whiledonorsmight
wanttobeabletoattributeahumanrightsresulttoaspecificUNprogrammewhichtheyhave
funded,nationalgovernmentsareunlikelytowanttoseetheirUNcounterpartsclaimingthese
resultsasaconsequenceoftheirwork.AgoodexampleofthisistheHumanRights
ProgrammeoftheUNSecretary‐General’sStrategicFramework.42TheFramework
primarilyincludesindicatorsofactivities,ratherthanindicatorsofoutputsandoutcomes
(calledexpectedaccomplishments),duetothereluctanceofMemberStatestoacceptoutcome
indicatorswhichtheyoftenseeasinfringementsontheirnationalsovereignty.
Thefocusonactivities,outputsandfinancialreportingisnottheoriginalpurposeofRBM,
however,thistendencyseemstobeunfoldingundertheRBMumbrella,asreportedbyseveral
reviewsofdevelopmentagencies.Asreportedbyoneindividualinterviewedduringarecent
reviewoftheCanadianInternationalDevelopmentAgency,“we’vehadtospendhoursgoing
throughwithCIDAofficialsiftheworkdayinMalawishouldbe7.5hoursor7.75hoursand
whatshouldgoonthetimesheet.Tomethat’ssupplymanagement.It’senormouslytime
consuminganditmakesnodifferencetothelivesof[ourbeneficiaries]andruralcommunities
41Natsios,A.(2010).42SeeA/C.3/67/L.73*andA/69/16.
26
atall.Ifindthatthisnittygrittyfocusonlittlethingslikecountingminutesandinputs,although
CIDAsaysitsinterestisinresults,theoppositeisthecase.Theyareinputobsessedanddetail
accountingobsessed…”43
TheroleoftheUNinmiddle‐incomecountries,whichhavenowbecomeamajorityofStates,is
underdebate.Inthecontextofthesedebates,theUNshouldassessthecostopportunityof
pursuingfundraisingeffortswhichmightdivertitslimitedtimeandresourcesfromtheareas
whereithasacomparativeadvantageandspecificmandate,ascouldbethecaseofhuman
rights.
WhathappenswithRelevantresultswhicharenotSMART?
Humanrightsofficersarguethatacrucialpartofthehumanrightsworkiskeepingthe“flame
burning,”particularlyduringthe“rainyseasons”whenitisclearthatresultsareunlikelyand
whilewaitingfortherightmomentforthe“fire”tospread.Thisisindeedamajorroleofthe
internationalhumanrightsprogramme,whichprovidestheumbrellaortheshelterunder
which,duringdifficultperiods,nationalhumanrightsinitiativescanhibernateandgrow.
WhenconfrontedwithRBM,humanrightsofficersfrequentlyarguethatUNinterventionscan
bejustifiedinessentialareaswheretheorganizationhasacomparativeadvantage,duetoits
mandateandinternationalcommitments,evenifitisdifficultfortheUNtodeliveraresultat
theoutcomelevelwithintheprogrammingcycle.Forexample,aspecificgroupmightbesubject
tostructuralandsystematicdiscriminationandexposedtocertainvulnerabilities,makingita
criticalhumanrightsissuewhichmustbeaddressedtofosterdevelopmentofthecounty.But
thesituationofthisgrouporitsmereexistencemightbeignoredordeniedbythegovernment.
ThesituationmightbehighlightedthroughtheHRBAassessmentoftheUNCT,yetwillnotbe
includedintheUNDAFifitisunlikelythattheUNcouldcontributetoanymajorbreakthroughs
attheoutcomelevelwithinthelimitedtimeframeofaprogrammingcycle.
Tothesearguments,RBMexperts,includingmanyoftheRCsinterviewed,wouldrespondthatit
shouldalwaysbepossibletodefinerealisticintermediateresults.ItendtoagreewithRBMand
developmentpractitionersthat“workingfortherightcause”isnotenoughandthatinordernot
toloseperspectiveandensurethatprogressisreallybeingmade,theUNmustbeabletodefine
thechangesitispursuing“bymaintainingtheburningflame.”
43Nazarko,N.(2014).“TheHandthatFeeds:NGOs’changingrelationshipwiththeCanadianInternationalDevelopmentAgencyundertheCompetitiveFundingMechanism.”Thesissubmitted.SchoolofInternationalDevelopmentandGlobalStudies.FacultyofSocialSciences.UniversityofOttawa.
27
Inordertopracticallyaddresstheseconcerns,twotypesofintermediateresultscanbe
envisagedfordifficultareaswhereinstitutional,legislativeorbehaviouralchangesareunlikely
toberealizedwithinthetimeframeofaUNprogrammingcycle:
1. “Theincreasedinvolvement/awarenessofcivilsocietyactorsontheissue”,thatis
outcomeshavingrightsholdersasthesubject;and/or
2. “Theincreasedrecognitionoftheproblembythegovernmentortheinclusionofthe
issueonthepoliticaldebate/agenda,”thatis,outcomesresultingfromadvocacy
work.
However,aswillbeexplainedinmoredetailbelow,itisunlikelythatcurrentUNCT’s
programmingdocumentsintegratethesekindsof“intermediate”results.
a. Thecapacitiesofduty‐bearers,butalsorights‐holders!
ThethirdpillaroftheUNcommonunderstandingontheHRBAstatesthatdevelopment
cooperationshouldcontributetoenhancingthecapacitiesof“duty‐bearers”tomeettheir
obligationsandof“rights‐holders”toclaimtheirrights.InRBMandprogrammingterms,thisis
adescriptionoftheintermediateresultstowhichtheUNprogrammesshouldcontributein
ordertopursuethedesiredgoal.Theemphasisonresultsfrombothtypesofactorsisoneofthe
contributionsoftheHRBA,asitforcesdevelopmentpractitionerstofocusonbothsidesofthe
coin.InthewordsofoneoftheinterviewedRCs,“[w]hileRBMissomethingweuseonadaily
basis,theHRBAissomethingwedoattheanalysisstageandthenforget.”Indeed,different
reviewsdemonstratethattheHRBAhasinfluencedthewayUNCTsundertaketheircountry
analyses,includingbyidentifyingthosethatareespeciallyvulnerableorsufferdiscriminationin
relationtoaspecificissue(rights‐holders)andthosethathavearesponsibilitytodosomething
aboutit(theduty‐bearers),andbyanalyzingexistinggapsthatareimpedingtheabilityofsome
toclaimtheirrightsandofotherstofulfiltheirobligations.Itwouldseem,however,that
translatingtheseassessmentsintoconcreteoutcomesintheUNCTprogrammeshasproved
muchmoredifficult.
ArecentrevisionoftheUNDAFsbytheUNDG’sHumanRightsWorkingGroupshowedthat“[a]
strongemphasisis(also)oftenplacedwithinthisoutcomeareaonsupportingthecapacityof
duty‐bearers,throughsupporttoparliamentarians,thejudiciaryandnationalandlocal
governmentalinstitutionstobetterpromoteandprotecthumanrights.However,onlyafew
UNDAFssimultaneouslyaddressthecapacityofrights‐holderstoclaimtheirrights.”
28
WhydosofewUNDAFsincludeoutcomesaimedatincreasingthecapacityofrights‐holdersto
claimtheirrights?OnepossibleexplanationisthattheUNDAFsaresignedbynational
governmentsandsomegovernmentsarereluctanttoseeanincreaseinthecapacityofrights‐
holderstoclaimtheirrightsasapriorityobjectiveofUNprogrammes.Althoughquestioningthe
importanceofnationalownershipasacriterionforeffectivedevelopmentcooperationis
beyondthescopeofthisstudy,itisworthnotingthatastrongemphasisonthatcriterion,and
thenarrowinterpretationof“nationalownership”as“governmentownership,”couldbe
hinderingtheUN’simplementationofoneofthemostcharacteristicaspectsoftheHRBA.
AnotherreasonforthatUNDAFoutcomesdonotidentifyrights‐holdersasprimaryactorsmight
bebecausetheMDGs,whichhavehadamajorinfluenceontheUNDAFs,failedtocapturethe
civilandpoliticalrightsaspectsofdevelopment.Ifthisistrue,thedraftSustainable
DevelopmentGoals,whichincludeagoalongovernanceandparticipation,couldopenupnew
opportunitiesforUNCTstoincludeoutcomesrelatingtorights‐holders.
Forthattohappen,however,itiscrucialthattheexistingprogrammingguidelinesclearly
reflecttheimportanceofbothduty‐bearersandrights‐holdersasoutcomesubjects.Thisisnot
currentlythecase.TheresultschainoftheUNDG’sRBMHandbookreproducedinFigure5
definesoutcomesas“changesinthecapacityandperformanceofduty‐bearers,”withno
referencemadetorights‐holders.Interestinglyenough,theHandbookreproducesthecommon
understandingoftheHRBA,withreferencestoright‐holdersandduty‐bearers,butonlyfor
informationpurposes.Thereisnoreferencetorights‐holdersunderchapter6oftheUNDAF
guidelines,whichoutlinesthestepsthatUNCTsneedtotaketopreparetheUNDAF.44Insteadof
usingtheprogrammingprinciplestoprovideguidanceforthepreparationoftheUNDAF,the
guidanceisprovidedinRBMterms,whiletheotherprogrammingprinciplesarelistedoneafter
another,primarilyforinformationpurposes,enablingauthorstopickandchooseastheywish.
Thedifficultiesinreflectingtheresultsofadvocacy
IfitisraretoseeUNDAFoutcomeswhichidentifyrights‐holdersasasubject,itisevenmore
unlikelytofindUNDAFoutcomesthatreflecttheintendedresultofadvocacywork.Theseare
resultswhichcorrespondtoprioritygapsthathavebeenidentifiedbytheinternationalhuman
rightsmechanismsandtheassessmentsofUNCTs,butarenotanationalpriority.Aspreviously
stated,advocacyworkcanandshouldbetranslatedintoresults‐basedlanguageinorderto
enabletheUNtodevelopclearstrategies,monitorprogressandlearnfromtheexperience.Such
resultscouldbephrasedinsuchtermsas“[t]herighttoreproductivehealthispartofthe
politicaldebateinthecontextoftheupcomingelections;”or“[t]henegativeconsequencesof
44Paradoxically,theonlyreferencetorights‐holdersintheUNDAFguidelinesisunderthecapacity‐developmentprinciple.
29
traditionalharmfulpracticesarementionedinpublicmedia;”or“[t]heGovernmentdiscusses
withotherstakeholdersthesituationofminoritygroupY,”agroupwhoseexistencehadbeen
previouslydenied.ThereiscurrentlynoplaceinUNprogrammedocuments,however,toreflect
thesekindsofresults.HowthencanUNCTsbeheldfullyaccountablefortheirroleintranslating
theinternationalcommitmentsatthecountrylevel?AsoneRCexpressedit,“thereareenough
checksandbalancesregardingtheaccountabilityoftheorganizationvisavisitsmission,but
therearenotenoughchecksandbalancesregardingtheaccountabilityoftheUNCTsvisavis
governmentsandthissituationcandeteriorateiffundsincreasinglycomefromgovernments,as
thefirstaccountabilityistothosethatpaythebill.”
Theresultsofadvocacyworkaredifficulttoreportonandalmostimpossibletoattribute.But
theseareresultswhichcanbehighlytransformativeandanareainwhichtheUNcouldhavea
majorcomparativeadvantage.InthewordsofoneRC,“competitionforfundshindersall
attemptsoftheUNtoworkasOne.Moneyspoilsitall.IfthereisoneareainwhichtheOneUN
couldreallymakeadifferenceiswherefundingisnotthatimportant,thatiswheretheUNtries
tomovetheagendafurther.”
ThecurrentCommunicatingasOneagendacouldprovetobeawindowofopportunity.Within
thiscontext,UNCTscouldbeaskedtodefine“advocacyresults.”Theideawouldnotbeto
developnewconstrainingandworkintensivemandatorytoolsorprocesses,butrathertocreate
thespaceforUNCTsandtheUNasawholetoidentifykeyadvocacyresults.Theidentificationof
“advocacyresults,”definedinaccordancewiththerecommendationsissuedbytheinternational
humanrightsmechanisms,wouldenabletheorganization,bothwithinandoutsidethecountry,
toworktowardsacommonpurpose.AlmostallRCsreferredtothedifficultiesthateventhe
mostcommittedRCsfaceincarryingoutthistypeofadvocacyroleandmanycalledforamore
integratedUNstrategythatwouldhelpUNCTstofeelthebackingandsupportofthe
organizationasawhole.Indeed,aslongasthegoaldefinedintheUNcommonunderstandingof
theHRBA‐therealizationofhumanrights‐issharedacrossthewholeorganization,strategies
androlescanvaryfromcountrytocountry.
30
TENSION3:DEFININGTHESTRATEGY
Selectingthepartners
ConcernshavebeenraisedthattheapplicationofRBMcouldbehavinganinfluenceonthe
selectionoftheactorswithwhichdevelopmentcooperationengage.Beingabletoprepare
projectproposalsthatapplyRBMconceptsandlogichasbecomeapreconditionoffunding.In
addition,undertheRBMumbrella,developmentcooperationagencieshaveestablished
sophisticatedsystemstoensureaccountabilityandanappropriateuseofresourcesbypartners.
Thesesystemsareusuallysensitivetoeconomiesofscale.Forexample,transactioncoststend
tobestandardinmechanismsthatareusedtoallocategrants,sothelargerthegrantthemore
cost‐effectivetheprocessis.TheproblemisthatnotallorganizationsspeaktheRBMjargon,
havethecapacitytocomplywiththecontrolproceduresinplaceorareabletomanageand
spendlargesumsofmoneywithinashortperiodoftime.
Thefirst‐handinformationgatheredthroughthisresearch,however,doesnotbackupsomeof
theseassumptions.ThemajorityofthequestionnairerespondentsandtheinterviewedRCsdo
notthinkthatRBMisaffectingthetypeofactorswithwhichtheUNengagesindevelopment
cooperation.OnlyacoupleoftheRCsspokeofapossibleperverseeffectwith“atrade‐off
betweenthosepartnerscapableofpreparinggoodprogrammesvisavisthosethathavethe
rightcompetenciesand/ormandate.”
Despitethelittleevidencefoundthatthisisaproblem,remainingawareofthepossibleeffects
ofRBMintheselectionofpartnersisthebestwaytoavoidproblems.Thisisespecially
importantfromtheHRBAperspective,ashumanrightsorganizationsarelesslikelytospeakthe
RBMjargon.Furthermore,onewouldexpectlocalorganizationsrepresentingdiscriminated
groupsandthosewhoaremostvulnerabletoexperiencemoredifficultiesinmanaginglarge
grantsorincomplyingwithsophisticatedaccountabilitysystemsandreportingrequirements.
OneRCacknowledgedtheyhadtodevelopagrantsystemoutsidetheUNDAFinordertowork
withthosepartnersthat”theUNshouldbereallyworkingwith,thosesmallorganizationswhich
aremakingadifference.”Furtherresearchmightbeneededtolookintothisissuetodetermine
ifthereisarealneedtoputinplacealternativesystemstoenabletheUNtoengagewiththese
kindsofpartners.
31
Movingawayfromtheprotection‐promotiondichotomy
RBMaimstoensurethatprogrammedinterventionsleadtothedesiredchangesorresults.
“Outputs”areakeylinkintheresultschainthatconstitutestheRBMstrategytoachievethose
desiredresults.AsdefinedintheUNRBMHandbook,outputsare“changesinskillsorabilities
andcapacitiesofindividualsorinstitutions,ortheavailabilityofnewproductsandservicesthat
resultfromthecompletionofactivities.”Thedefinitionputstheemphasisoncapacitychanges,
whichtherebybecomesthebackboneofUNdevelopmentprogrammesatthecountrylevel.
Indeed,capacity‐developmentisatthecoreoftheaideffectivenessagendaandtraditional
developmentwork.45Yet,asW.Vandenholeargues,empiricalevidencedoesnotcorroboratethe
assumptionthatonlycapacity‐buildinganddialogue,ratherthanshamingandnaming,worksto
bringaboutoperationalchange.AccordingtoVandenhole,thepromotion‐protectiondichotomy
reflectsthetraditionaldivisionoflabourand“maywellbeafundamentalobstacleto
organizationalchange,asthecorrespondingdefinitionstendtolockupthehumanrightsand
developmentactorsintheirtraditionalroles.”46WhileRBMinitselfwouldsupportanytypeof
interventioncontributingtothedesiredresult,thechainofresultsthathasbeendeveloped
undertheRBMumbrellamakesitdifficulttothinkintermsotherthanthoseofcapacity‐
development.
AllRCsinterviewedassertedthecentralityofhumanrightsfortheUN’swork.Manyofthem
alsoaddedthathavinghumanrightsatthecoreoftheorganization’smandatedoesnot
necessarilyentailthat“allUNstaffshouldnowbecomehumanrightsworkers.”WhentheRCs
referredtohumanrightsinthatcontext,theyseemedtobereferringtoaparticularconception
ofhumanrights:asetofrights,namelycivilandpoliticalrightsandatypeofwork,namely
advocacy.Toagreatextent,thediscourseofUNdevelopmentpractitionerscontinuesto
characterizedevelopmentasthecarrotandhumanrightsasthestick.
Andyet,theHRBAaimsatbringingthesetwoworldsclosertogether.TheHRBAtodevelopment
supposesthatthewholespectrumofrights‐civil,economic,politicalandsocialrights–isan
integralpartofthedevelopmentgoal.Inaddition,theHRBAtodevelopmentpresumesthatthe
broadspectrumofinterventionsavailabletoUNstaff,includingawareness‐raising,advisory
services,advocacy,capacity‐building,monitoringandreporting,isusedinthepursuitofthat
goal.
Infact,itisperhapsduetotheirruptionofRBMinthehumanrightsfieldandtheinceptionof
theHRBAthatmosthumanrightsorganizationsunderstandtheneedtoexpandtheirstrategies 45 NotethattogetherwithRBMandtheHRBA,theUNhasidentified”capacity‐development”asanotherofitsfiveprogrammingprinciples. 46W.Vandenhole(2012).OvercomingthePromotion‐ProtectionDichotomy.
32
beyondnaming,shamingandmonitoring.Evenifhumanrightsworkerstraditionallybelieved
thatworkingforthe“rightcause”wasenough,mosthumanrightsorganizationshavenow
movedbeyondthislogicandarequestioningtheirstrategiesinlightofthechangestheyintend
tobringabout.47
ManyoftheRCsinterviewedarguedforaclearerdivisionofwork,withUNactorsoutsidethe
country,preferablyOHCHR,takingtheleadandhavingthemainresponsibilityforsensitiveand
potentiallycontroversialhumanrightsissues/interventionswhichcouldendangerUN
cooperationwiththenationalgovernmentinquestion.Indeed,whileclearlycommittedto
humanrights,RCsexpressedacertainleveloffrustrationwiththeapparentlackof
understandingbyUNHeadquartersaboutthedifficultandcomplextasksassignedtothem.In
thewordsofoneRC,“Ihavealwaysbeenahumanrightschampion,butonlywhenIgotheredid
Irealizehowdifficultthetaskis.”Theinterviewsrevealedademandforanorganizational
strategythatwouldenabletheinstitutiontofulfillitshumanrightsmandate,whilelettingthem
playtheroletheythinktheyarebettersuitedfor,thatofconfidence‐buildingandengagement
withnationalauthorities.
ThroughtheOneUNandtheHumanRightsUpFrontinitiatives,thesystemisslowlymoving
towardsacommoncountrystrategybyhelpingtodefinetherolestobeplayedbyeachactorin
everycontextinordertopursuetheHRBAtodevelopment.Itwouldbedifficult,however,to
imaginethoserolesdefinedpurelyalongtheclassicalhumanrights‐developmentdivide.Inthe
long‐term,noorganization,notevenapurelyhumanrights‐basedorganizationsuchasOHCHR,
cansurvivebyusingonlythestick.Inthelong‐term,noUNCTwillbeabletomaintainits
legitimacyandcredibilityifitisperceivedasonlyusingthecarrotandhavingtorelinquishits
mandate.
47 AccordingtoOHCHR’sTheoryofChange:“OHCHRsupportsstandard‐setting;monitorsandreportsonhumanrights;provides
advisoryservicesandimplementstechnicalcooperationprogrammesincollaborationwitharangeofstakeholdersatthenationallevel;andundertakesglobalandnational‐leveladvocacytopromoteadoptionofandadherencetohumanrightsnormsandstandards.OHCHRseekstoensurethattheseelementscomplementandreinforceeachotherinpursuingtherealizationofitsmandate.”
33
TENSION4:M&EORMAKINGINFORMEDDECISIONSManywillarguethatitisonlywhenmanagementusesthedatacollectedthroughRBM
processestoinformitsdecisionsthatRBMcanproveitsrealvalue.Paradoxically,oneofthe
mostperverseeffectsthatRBMcanhaveinrelationtotheHRBAisitsuseasatoolto
“objectively”informdecisionsrelatedtotheallocationofresources.Datagatheredand
aggregatedthroughRBMprocessesconstitutesimportantinformationfordecision‐making,but
onlyiftakenwithextremecautionandasfoodforthoughtforthediscussionofdevelopment
andhumanrightspractitionerswithasolidunderstandingofthespecificcontext.Successesare
asimportantasfailuresforlearning,buttheuseofdataextractedfromM&Efortheallocation
ofresourcesislimitingreportingonresultstoreportingonsuccesses.
Recentresearchshowsatendencyofcertaindevelopmentagenciestomoveawayfromthe
mosttransformativeandlong‐termprojectsonthebasisofRBMargumentsorinformation
gatheredunderanRBMumbrella.Referencehasalreadybeenmadeinthispapertothestudyof
A.Natsios,formerheadofUSAID,inwhichhearguesthatfundingfordemocracyand
governanceprogrammeshasdecreasedduetothetendencyof“developmentofficers[to]focus
onwhattheycanmeasure.”48Anotheroft‐quotedexampleisthedecisionofDFIDtodissolvethe
“CivilSocietyFund”duetoitsinabilitytoshow“valueformoney.”Otherresearchershavefound
similarfindingsregardingtheCanadianInternationalDevelopmentAgency49andtheSwedishdevelopmentcooperation.50
Inhispaper,Natsioswarnsagainstthedangerofleavingdecisionsregardingdevelopment
programmesinthehandsofcounter‐bureaucraciesorprogrammemanagers.UNstaffmembers
seemtosharehisconcerns.Morethanhalfofthosewhoansweredthequestionnairenotedthat
UNCTshavetoomanyprogrammemanagersandnotenoughsubstantiveofficers.Whenasked
aboutthecompetenciesofidealUNCTsinthenearfuture,RCsmentionedsolidsubstantive
expertise,soundpoliticaljudgementandacommitmenttothevaluesoftheorganization.None
ofthemspontaneouslyreferredtoprogrammemanagement.
Inthecontextofstrongcompetitionforlimitedfunds,oneRCnotedwithsadnessthetendency
ofUNstaffofbecomingdeskilledduetotheneedtodevotetheirtimetopreparefundraising
proposalsorreportonthem.ThisisparticularlyworrisomeinacontextinwhichtheUNismore
48 Natsios,A.(2010).
49 See Nazarko,N.(2014).“TheHandthatFeeds:NGOs’ChangingRelationshipwiththeCanadianInternationalDevelopmentAgencyundertheCompetitiveFundingMechanism.”Thesissubmitted.SchoolofInternationalDevelopmentandGlobalStudies.FacultyofSocialSciences.UniversityofOttawa.50 Samuelsson,A.(2013).“ManagingAidRelationshipsintheContextofResults‐BasedManagement:ACaseStudyofSupporttoCivilSocietywithinSwedishDevelopmentCooperation.”Adissertationsubmittedinpartialfulfillmentforthedegree:MasterinHumanRightsPracticeSchoolofGlobalStudies,UniversityofGothenburg,SchoolofBusinessandSocialSciences,RoehamptonUniversity,DepartmentofArchaeologyandSocialAnthropology,UniversityofTromsø.
34
frequentlyworkinginmiddle‐incomecountries,whichaswasnotedbytheRCsthemselves,are
increasinglyexigentaboutthekindofsupporttheyexpectfromtheUN.Whatisatstakeisthe
typeoforganizationtheUNwantstobecome:whetheritwantstopursuethefundraisingrace
andmeasureitssuccessintermsofthefundsmanaged‐anareawhereitisalreadyclearly
disadvantagedvisavisotheractors‐orwhetheritchoosestopreserveitscomparative
advantagebyimprovingitspursuitofandfocusonitsinternationalmandates.Theorganization
shouldnothesitatetoquestioniftheUNDAFisthebesttypeofdocumenttodefineandpresent
theUNcommonprogrammeinmiddle‐incomecountries.SomeoftheRCsinterviewedwere
incrediblybluntinthisregard:“itisdefinitelynotintheUNDAFthatonefindstherealUN
prioritiesinthecountry.”
Contrarytowhatitisnormallyargued,closingaprogrammeonthebasisofdatagathered
againstasetofdefinedindicatorstomeasuretheachievementofaparticularresultmightbe
moreirrationalthanrational.Ifindicatorsarenotshowingprogress,furtherassessmentsmight
beneededandadiscussionmightneedtotakeplacetounderstandwhatishappening.The
indicatorsmightnotbethemostrelevant;prevalencecouldhavebeengiventowhatcanbe
countedinsteadofwhatisimportant.Evaluationsshowsuccessescanrarelybelimitedtothe
kindofresultscapturedbytheindicatorsincorporatedinthedesignofaprogramme.The
indicatorsmighthavebeenassessedatthewrongtimefortheprogramme.AsNatsiosargues,
transformativeprogrammeshavinganimpactongovernancestructureshavea“lageffect,”that
is,theirresultsareonlymeasurableyearsaftertheclosingoftheprogramme.Finally,alackof
progresscouldrevealtheneedtoadjustthestrategy,withoutnecessarilyhavingtoquestionthe
relevanceoftheprogramme.
Sshort‐termsuccessesmighthidelong‐termfailures.Failuresandsuccessesneedtobeseenin
lightofthewidermissionoftheorganizationandnotonlyonthebasisofindividualprojectsor
programmes.Properlystudyingandlearningfromthefailuresofoneprojectsorprogrammes
cancontributetooverallimprovements.Onedoesnotexpecttoseeagovernmentdrastically
cutitsbudgetoneducationasaresultofverypooracademicresults.Itwouldinsteadbe
anticipatedthatanassessmentofthesituationwouldbeundertakentotrytounderstandwhat
ishappening,followedbyachangeofstrategywhichcouldincludeanincreaseintheallocated
resources.Andyet,thisiswhatseemstobehappeninginkeyareasofdevelopment,namely
thosewhicharecrucialfromtheperspectiveoftheHRBA.
35
Conclusions and Recommendations
Results‐basedmanagementandthehumanrights‐basedapproacharetwooftheUN
programmingprinciplesfordevelopmentcooperation.Thefindingsofthisresearchseemto
corroboratetheassumptionthatwhilecomplementary,theconcurrentapplicationofthesetwo
principlescangeneratetensionsthat,ifignored,threatentoreversethehierarchy,turningRBM,
intheoryanenablingtool,intotheactual“master.”Whiletheevidenceislimitedandthe
samplesarenotrepresentative,thesefindingscouldserveasthebasisforfutureresearchand
provideenoughinformationtodrawsomepreliminaryconclusionsandoutlinesome
recommendations.
Thediscourseonthecomplementarityofbothprogrammingprincipleshighlightstheroleofthe
HRBAindefiningrelevantcontentandtheroleofRBMinensuringaneffectiveprocessfor
developmentcooperation.WhentheUNoperationalizestheseprinciples,however,itistherole
ofhumanrightsasameans,ratherthanasanend,andtheaccountability,ratherthanthe
effectivenessperspectiveofRBM,thatprevail.AnRBMmodelthatemphasizesaccountability
andexternalreportingratherthaneffectivenessandinternallearningismorelikelytoenter
intotensionwiththeHRBA,asitincreasesthepressureforattribution,numbersandlow‐
hangingfruits.TheroleoftheHRBAasabroadframeworkforaUNtheoryofchangefor
developmentcooperationhasnotyetpermeatedUNprogrammingguidelinesordiscourse
outsidethehumanrightsworld.
TheUnitedNationshasdevelopedseparateguidelinesandmethodologiesfortheapplicationof
RBMandtheHRBA.Atearlierstages,thisprobablyenabledtheHRBAtogrowandestablish
itselfasaconsolidatedmethodology.NowitistimefortheUNtomovebeyondthispiecemeal
approachtowardsa“humanrightsandresults‐basedmanagement”programmaticframework,a
newbusinessmodelwhichcorrespondstothenewdevelopment‐humanrightsconceptual
framework.RatherthanahandbookonRBMandguidelinesandtrainingpackagesforthe
implementationoftheHRBA,whatisneededisaUNProgrammingManual,informedbyRBM,
theHRBAandotherprogrammaticprinciples.Continuingtoidentifythespecificaddedvalueof
eachoftheseapproachesmightbeinterestingforacademicpurposes,butitisirrelevantfor
practitioners,whosimplyneedclearguidancethatcanbeeasilytranslatedintoaction.What
couldbethevalueofhavingthedifferentprogrammingprinciplescompetefortheownershipof
conceptssuchasparticipationorgenderequity?
ThecurrentmultiplicationofmethodologiesthatneedtobeknownandappliedbyUNstaff
complicatesandhinderstheirimplementation,mostlikelyattheexpenseoftheHRBA.A
36
majorityofUNstaffthatrespondedtothequestionnairedevelopedforthisresearchstatedthat
whileexistingincentivestoapplyRBMareadequate(67percent)orevenexcessive(7per
cent),incentivestoapplytheHRBAareinadequate(70percent).RBMguidelinesarethemain
reference.Possibletensionsbetweenthetwoprogrammingprinciplesarelikelytoberesolved
bygivingpreferencetoRBMconcepts.Furthermore,separatemanualsandguidelinesforthe
twoprogrammingprinciplesareonlylikelytoperpetuatemisconceptionsand
misunderstandingsbetweenthedevelopmentandhumanrightsworlds.
Summaryofrecommendations
1. DeveloponesingleUNProgrammingManualthatprovidesguidanceonthebasisofall
programmingprinciples.
2. EnsuretheHRBA,asthebasicframeworkforatheoryofchangeforUNdevelopment
cooperation,permeatesallUNprogrammingguidelinesanddocuments.Thisimplies
identifyinghumanrightsasconstitutiveofthegoalofdevelopmentcooperationand
havingbothduty‐bearersandrights‐holdersasthesubjectsoftheoutcomes.
3. Clearlyreflecttheinternationalcommitmentswhichconstitutethemandateofthe
organizationatthetopoftheresultschainoftheUNprogrammingdocuments.Those
internationalcommitmentsshouldnotbelimitedtotherelevantSDGs,butalsoinclude
therelevantinternationalhumanrightsrecommendations,whichcouldthenbe
monitoredwiththeUNDAF.
4. ExposethepossibleperverseeffectsofRBMandclearlydelimititsroleoensureits
effectivenessandtherelevanceofUNdevelopmentcooperation.
5. EnsureUNprogrammingframeworksprovidethespaceforUNCTstodefineadvocacy
resultsandbetterintegrateadvocacyaspartoftheirstrategiestoattainspecific
outcomes.
6. Weighresourcesusedinfundraisingeffortsagainstthepotentialbenefitsofthosefunds,
recognizingthatsomeofthemosttransformativechangestowhichtheUNmight
contributerequirefewfinancialresourcesandinsteaddemandadequateexpertiseand
aninvestmentoftime.
7. FurtherexplorewaystoworkwithpartnerswhichmaybeunabletocomplywithRBM
requirementsbutmighthavetheappropriatemandateorrepresentgroupswithwhich
theorganizationneedstoengagetoachievehumanrightsdevelopmentgoals.
37
Annex 1
Semi‐structuredInterviewforResidentCoordinators
1. Pleaseexplainbrieflytheextenttowhichyouhavebeenexposedtoresultsbasedmanagement(RBM)andthehumanrightsbasedapproach(HRBA),bothintermsoftrainingandapplication.(Doyoufeelequallypreparedtoimplementbothofthem?)
2. Basedonyourexperience,whathasbeenRBM’smaincontribution(s)totheworkoftheUNatthecountrylevel?AndHRBAmaincontribution(s)?Couldyouprovideexamples?
3. Basedonyourexperience,whatarethebasicelementsonthebasisofwhichUNCTsandUNpresencesatthecountrylevelmakedecisionsonpriorities?
4. Inyouropinion,towhomistheUNCTaccountable?
5. HowdoyouthinkRBMandHRBAcomplementeachother?
6. HastheUNCTexperiencedtensionsintryingtoapplybothprinciples?SituationsinwhichRBMandtheHRBAseemedtoprovidecontradictingguidance?Pleaseprovideexamples.
7. TowhatextentareUNCTsmakinguseoftherecommendationsofinternationalhumanrightsmechanisms?(i.e.,framing,shaping,monitoring,advocacy…).Whataretheincentivesand/ortheobstacles?Pleaseprovideexamples.
8. ThinkingoftheevolvingroleoftheUNatthecountrylevel:whatwouldtheprofessionalsofanidealUNCTlooklike(intermsofcompetencies,knowledge,skills…)?Howdothoseidealizedcompetenciescomparetothecurrentsituation?
38
Annex2
OnlinesurveyforUNHumanRightsPolicy(HuriTALK)andUNCoordinationPractice(CPN)networks
(SeePowerPointslidesattached)
39
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