S A F E D O R · PDF fileThe HAZID report also provides a valuable input to the risk-based...

D4.3.1

S A F E D O R

D

Project No.: IP-516278 Project Acronym:

SAFEDOR

Project Title: Design, Operation and Regulation for Safety Instrument: Integrated Project Thematic Sustainable Surface Transport

HAZID for LNG Tankers D4.3.1 Document Id. SAFEDOR-D-4.3.1-2005-11-29-LMG-HAZID LNG Tankers–rev-03

Due date of Deliverable: 2005-10-31 Actual Submission Date: 2005-11-29

Priority:

Ivan Østvik LMG Marin -document author- -organization name of lead contractor for this deliverable-

Eirik Grønstøl Final report -document approved by- -revision type-

2005-11-29 PU -date of last update- -distribution level-

Project co-funded by the European Commission within the Sixths Framework Programme (2002-2006)

Dissemination level PU Public PP Restricted to Programme Participants (including Commission Services) RE Restricted to a group specified by the Consortium (including Commission

Services) CO Confidential, only for members of the consortium (including Commission

Services)

ocument Id. SAFEDOR-D-4.3.1-2005-11-29-LMG-HAZID LNG Tankers–rev-03 of 34

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Disclaimer The information contained in this report is subject to change without notice and should not be construed as a commitment by any members of the SAFEDOR Consortium or the authors. In the event of any software or algorithms being described in this report, the SAFEDOR Consortium assumes no responsibility for the use or inability to use any of its software or algorithms. The information is provided without any warranty of any kind and the SAFEDOR Consortium expressly disclaims all implied warranties, including but not limited to the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular use. (c) COPYRIGHT 2005 The SAFEDOR Consortium This document may be copied and reproduced without written permission from the SAFEDOR Consortium. Acknowledgement of the authors of the document shall be clearly referenced. All rights reserved.

Document History

Document ID. Date Description

SAFEDOR-D-4.3.1-2005-11-29-LMG-HAZID LNG Tankers–rev-03.doc

2005-11-29 Final report

Document Id. SAFEDOR-D-4.3.1-2005-11-29-LMG-HAZID LNG Tankers–rev-03 of 34

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Date 2005-11-29

Document Control Sheet Title: HAZID LNG Tankers Abstract: A HAZID report on LNG tankers has been developed based on a HAZID meeting, the resulting risk register from the meeting and the consequent follow-up work and discussions. The aim of the HAZID report (SP4.3.1) is to provide input to the subsequent risk analysis (SP4.3.2) to be conducted as part of the FSA for LNG tankers (SP4.3), as well as providing input to the design of a shortsea LNG vessel (SP6.7). The HAZID session is a small contribution to the overall aim of the SAFEDOR project, through being the initial step in the FSA work, which feeds into several WPs. No input from other SAFEDOR deliverables has been utilised. The value added of the HAZID work (Step 1) is that it facilitates a more focused risk analysis (Step 2) through providing an understanding of the existing hazards and their relevance/importance related to LNG vessel operation. State of the art techniques, in form of the SWIFT technique, have been utilised to identify the hazards based on studying the various operational phases of the tankers through: Identifying hazards, Describing their failure modes, Outlining risk reducing measures that can prevent or mitigate each hazard and Analyzing their frequencies and consequences, thus ranking the hazards. The operational phases studied were: Loading, Departing quay, Manoeuvring, Transit and navigation in coastal waters (without tug), Transit in open sea, Arriving in port, Mooring and preparing for unloading, Unloading, Operation in ice conditions, Maintenance and repairing on board, Training, Emergency situations, Docking and General hazards. The HAZID approach is illustrated through the risk register, which forms Section 3.5 of this report. State of the art knowledge has been captured through the HAZID work based on the HAZID team experience/background, which leads to the identification of hazards. As an introduction to the HAZID session, a general introduction was given on the FSA scope and the HAZID session, the LNG 138,000 m3 design, safety issues/incidents for LNG vessels and a background on regulations for LNG vessels. The HAZID has been conducted based on a membrane-type 138.000 m3 LNG carrier under construction by Navantia for an owner. Historically, there have been no spillages from LNG vessels, which have had a severe effect on safety or the environment. The main culprit for modern ships is occupational accidents onboard the ships. Focus when designing new LNG tankers must be to maintain the good safety record, as well as developing arrangements and technical solutions that minimises occupational hazards for the crew. The trend for accidents/incidents on LNG tankers seem to be positive for industry as more focus has been paid to both technical and operational improvements for this ship type. Focus when designing new LNG tankers must be to maintain the good safety record, as well as developing arrangements and technical solutions that minimises occupational hazards for the crew. There may be new challenges for the designers/builders of LNG vessels as the vessels both go large (220,000 m3) and small (5,000 m3), as well as being prepared for use in arctic conditions. The main findings from the HAZID session are that no separate hazard forms an immediate threat to the operation of LNG vessels. However, summarising the various risk contributions may indicate that there are a number of scenarios that should be further evaluated in the risk analysis. The preliminary


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conclusion on ranking of scenarios, based on the top-ranked hazards in Table 9 and the statistical background, seems to indicate that the scenarios “collision”, “grounding” and “occupational accidents” should be prioritised in the risk analysis work. The scenarios “fire onboard”, “gas leakage” and “LNG spills during loading/unloading” should also be investigated due to the large consequences of such incidents. The scenarios will be further treated and evaluated in the initial phase of the risk analysis work. The HAZID report also provides a valuable input to the risk-based design process to be conducted in SP6.7 for a shortsea LNG vessel, in terms of highlighting focus areas in the design process. More specific knowledge/data on the present hazards will be further developed through the subsequent risk analysis, and the FSA reporting, which can be utilised in the SP6.7 design project. The HAZID session was attended by a team being representative for the maritime industry that is involved with design/building/operation of LNG tankers. This team should be able to cover most of the hazards being present for such vessels, but the FSA process must be able to accommodate further hazards that may emerge from the further work in SP4.3, or as input from the other SAFEDOR SPs, such as SP6.7.

Work carried out by Approved by

Ivan Østvik, LMG Marin Eirik Grønstøl, LMG Marin

- name of internal reviewer -

Erik Vanem, DNV Research - signature of internal reviewer and date of acceptance -

Francisco Castello, Navantia Rolf Skjong, DNV

- name of external reviewer (WP-leader)-

- signature of external reviewer and date of acceptance -


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Date 2005-11-29

Contents

1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 6 1.1 The HAZID process.................................................................................................................... 6 1.2 HAZID team ............................................................................................................................... 6 1.3 Related SAFEDOR Tasks........................................................................................................... 7

2 HAZID of LNG Tankers ...................................................................................................................... 8 2.1 Objective ..................................................................................................................................... 8 2.2 Scope........................................................................................................................................... 8 2.3 Description of 138,000 m3 LNG tanker ...................................................................................... 8 2.4 Background on LNG safety incidents....................................................................................... 10 2.5 Main elements of the HAZID ................................................................................................... 18 2.6 HAZID technique...................................................................................................................... 18

3 Results ................................................................................................................................................ 20 3.1 General...................................................................................................................................... 20 3.2 Probability index....................................................................................................................... 20 3.3 Consequence index ................................................................................................................... 20 3.4 Risk matrix................................................................................................................................ 21 3.5 Risk register .............................................................................................................................. 21 3.6 Summary of resulting risk levels .............................................................................................. 29

4 Risk scenarios..................................................................................................................................... 30 5 Conclusions ........................................................................................................................................ 31 6 References .......................................................................................................................................... 32 7 Short CV’s of HAZID team members................................................................................................ 33


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Date 2005-11-29

1 Introduction

1.1 The HAZID process

The HAZID report on LNG tankers has been developed based on the HAZID meeting, the resulting risk register from the meeting and the consequent follow-up work and discussions. The HAZID report forms a part-deliverable for the FSA on LNG tankers (SP4.3), where the other deliverables are risk analysis and cost-benefit analysis, as well as an overall summary report. The main aim of the HAZID report (SP4.3.1) is to provide input to the subsequent risk analysis (SP4.3.2) A structured approach to identify hazards has been utilised based on studying the various operational phases of the tankers through:

i) Identifying hazards. ii) Describing their failure modes. iii) Suggesting risk reducing measures that can prevent or mitigate each hazard. iv) Estimating their frequencies and consequences, thus ranking the hazards. v) Develop risk scenarios based on the ranked hazards.

The operational phases studied were:

− Loading − Departing quay − Manoeuvring − Transit and navigation in coastal waters (without tug) − Transit in open sea − Arriving in port − Mooring and preparing for unloading − Unloading − Operation in ice conditions − Maintenance and repairing on board − Training − Emergency situations − Docking − General hazards

The risk register, which forms Section 3.5 of this report, provides a self-explanatory guide to the HAZID process and presents the results from the HAZID meeting. The hazard identification has been carried out in accordance with the IMO ‘Interim Guidelines for the Application of Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) to the IMO Rule Making Process’.

1.2 HAZID team

The team carried out the HAZID in a one day HAZID meeting at the DNV HQ in Oslo on 18 April 2005.


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The planning was carried out by the chairman and the facilitator prior to the meeting. Prior to the meeting an agenda was sent out. During the meeting a general introduction on the FSA scope and the HAZID session were given by the chairman. Thereafter a presentation of the LNG 138.000 m3 design was given by Navantia, which also included a review of safety issues/incidents for LNG vessels. DNV provided a presentation on regulations for LNG vessels. Finally, the hazard identification was conducted utilising the Risk Register that was structured into the various operational phases. Following the HAZID meeting, the risk register was further populated with text descriptions of the identified hazards. As agreed during the meeting, the risk register was further populated with hazards from various partners based on a further evaluation of the different operational phases and the use of statistical material. The latter resulted in some more hazards in the magnitude of 5-10 % additional hazards. This approach was adopted as it turned out difficult to gather the team for more than one day in the period the HAZID was conducted. On this basis, the risk register was sent to the HAZID team for defining the probability and consequence numbers for each hazard. The incoming numbers were thereafter averaged in order to provide the risk levels as utilised in the hazard ranking and scenario development. The HAZID has been conducted based on a membrane-type LNG tanker, namely a 138,000 m3 LNG carrier under construction by Navantia for an owner. The vessel is presented in Section 2. The members of HAZID team were selected to represent all competence areas relevant to the hazards for operation of LNG tankers. The team members were: Ivan Østvik LMG Marin Chairman, recorder, technical issues, operation Francisco Castillo Navantia Facilitator, technical issues, systems Karl-Helge Røyter Høegh LNG Operation, procedures, systems, human element Pedro Antao IST Human element Damien Feger Snecma Systems, technical issues Erik Vanem DNV Risk analysis Jørn Magnus Jonas DNV Rules, regulations Erling Fredriksen DNV Rules, regulations

1.3 Related SAFEDOR Tasks

The HAZID report is Deliverable 4.3.1, which forms part of SP4.3. The HAZID report will be utilised as direct input to the risk analysis work, Deliverable 4.3.2, as well as be communicated to the other FSAs in WP4 of the SAFEDOR project. The HAZID report forms a background reference for the on-going work in WP6 and more specifically SP6.7, which focuses on the design of a shortsea LNG vessel.


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2 HAZID of LNG Tankers

2.1 Objective

The objective of the study was to identify hazards that are present for LNG tankers in operation, so as to:

i) Provide a direct input to the subsequent risk analysis in SP4.3.2. ii) Assist the design of shortsea shipping LNG vessels in SP6.7.

2.2 Scope

The scope of the HAZID exercise has been to investigate the hazards associated to the operation of LNG tankers trading on the main routes across/in the Atlantic between Europe, Africa and South/North-America. This trade should provide a representative selection of hazards giving a background for the further work in the FSA/SAFEDOR. The HAZID focuses on the operation of the ships, thus hazards when at yard for repairs/docking are not included in the scope. Hazards that are LNG terminal-only related are neither considered, whilst the interface during loading and offloading at the terminal is considered. The HAZID session focuses on a membrane-type ship. This tank type seems to be dominant amongst the current new-buildings taking place at the expense of the Moss-type (spherical tanks). The participants in the HAZID session have combined experience with both tank types. Based on historic accident data it seems like the main difference in the safety level between the two tank types is that only membrane-type tanks have cargo tank leakages and thus needing to repair these. The two tank concepts have been subject to discussion regarding their respective safety level during the HAZID session and the results are reported upon.

2.3 Description of 138,000 m3 LNG tanker

A 138,000 m3 LNG tanker, as illustrated in Figure 1, under construction at Navantia has been utilised as input to the HAZID session in order to identify hazards. Length over all abt. 284.40 m Length between perpendiculars abt. 271.00 m Breadth (moulded) abt. 42.50 m Depth to main deck (moulded) abt. 25.40 m Depth to trunk deck (moulded) abt. 32.20 m Draft design (moulded) under keel (98,5% filling) abt. 11.40 m Draft scantling (moulded) abt. 12.30 m Total loaded displacement lower than 98.500 t The design draught is based upon departure condition with maximum allowable cargo tanks filling with a LNG cargo of 0.460 specific gravity, sufficient bunkers & consumables for abt. 10,200 miles plus 3 days’ reserve steaming at 19.50 knots at 90 % MCR even keel condition.


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Figure 1: 138,000 m3 LNG carrier under construction at Navantia. Source: Navantia

The cargo tank capacity when geometrically calculated at the operation condition (-163ºC, atm pressure):

• No.1 Cargo tank abt. 22.630 m3 • No.2 Cargo tank abt. 40.070 m3 • No.3 Cargo tank abt. 40.070 m3 • No.4 Cargo tank abt. 35.230 m3 • Total (Excluding dome space and internal structure and fittings) abt. 138.000 m3 • Total (Excluding dome space and internal structure and fitting at 98,5% abt. 135.930 m3

Service speed at design moulded draft (under keel) 11.40 m when running at NCR (90% MCR) of main propulsion machinery with 21% sea margin shall be 19.50 knots. Endurance on 19.5 knots at NCR of main propulsion machinery shall be abt. 20,000 sea miles, considering fuel oil tanks at 98% full and 2% unpumpable in departure condition.

Main turbine: Reversible geared, cross compound steam driven 28,000 kW x 83 RPM. Propeller: 5 blade fixed pitch type. The vessel shall accommodate a complement of forty (40) persons including 4 Suez Canal Workers. Notation: LR, + 100 A1, Liquefied Gas Tanker, Shiptype 2G, Methane in Membrane tanks, Max. pressure 0.25 bar, Min. Temperature –163ºC, + LMC, UMS, PORT, SDA, IWS, SCM, LI, FDA, NAV1, IBS, ES, TCM, CCS. The 138,000 m3 LNG carrier is a representative ship for the fleet. The ship capacity is within the main range for this ship trade, without exploring the hazards for the planned large LNG vessels of more than 200,000 m3. The containment type being of the membrane type seems to be dominating world-wide amongst the new-build fleet. The ship speed is about the standard speed for this ship type.


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2.4 Background on LNG safety incidents

Over the industry’s 60-year history of 40,000 voyages, there has never been a spill from a ship into the water from either a collision or grounding. LNG ships are well designed and well maintained, which reduces the chances and severity of incidents. LNG safety measures prevent breaching of cargo tanks and involvement of multiple tanks in accidents. LNG is a cryogenic liquid where physical contact or spillage constitutes a personnel and equipment hazard. LNG Natural Gas presents an asphyxiation hazard. LNG pool vaporizes rapidly (faster than an equal sized pool on land) when spilled on water, which means the spread of flammable vapor will be fare more extensive than in the case of a similar spillage of oil. LNG spill on or within hull can cause brittle fracture (carbon & low alloy steel). Repair work of Cargo Containment Systems (CCS) is carried out mainly for ships older than 25 years. Only membrane-type LNG ships seem to be in need of repairing cargo tank leakages. Cargo valves are one of the weak points of Cargo Handling Systems (CHS) independently of the type of CCS. Table 1: LNG incidents with spillage. Source: Navantia.

SHIP NAME INCIDENT DATE

VESSEL DELIVERY

ACTUAL STATUS SHIP STATUS COMMENT CAP. M3 TANKS DESIGN Tanks

Material Tanks Type Class 1

MOSTEFA BEN BOULAID 2002 1976 service Unloading

A sillage resulting a cracked deck. Thought to be human error as the alarm to should alerted personnel

had been isolated. No one was hurt

125,260 TECHNIGAZ

(CONCH OCEAN)

304Lss MEMBRANE BV

KHANNUR 2001 1977 service Unloading

Minor leak of cargo reported just before discharging; damage rported to dome; overpressurisation of tank

suspected

126,224 KVAERNER-MOSS AI INDEPENDENT NV

TELLIER 1989 1974 service Loading Broke moorings. Hull and deck fractures. 40,081

TECHNIGAZ (CONCH OCEAN)

304Lss MEMBRANE BV

ISABELLA (EX KENAI MULTINA)

1985 1975 service Unloading Cargo valve failure. Cargo overflow. Deck fractures. 35,491 NO-82

36% NICKEL STEEL (INVAR)

MEMBRANE LR

HOEGH GALLEON (EX CHALLENGER) 1979 1974 service Unloading Valve leakage. Tank cover plate

fractures. 88,052 KVAERNER-MOSS

9% NICKEL STEEL INDEPENDENT NV

MOSTEFA BEN BOULAID 1979 1976 service Unloading Valve leakage.

Deck fractures. 125,260 TECHNIGAZ

(CONCH OCEAN)

304Lss MEMBRANE BV

LNG AQUARIUS 1977 1977 service Loading Tank overfilled. 126,750 KVAERNER-MOSS AI INDEPENDENT AB

LNG DELTA (EX ARZEW) 1977 1978 service

Aluminum valve failure on contact with cryogenic temperatures.

LNG released, but no vapor ignition.126,541


STAINLESS STEEL MEMBRANE AB

LNG PALMARIA (EX ESSO BREGA) 1971 1969 service

Unloading LNG into the storage

tank

First documented LNG Rollover incident. Tank developed a sudden

increase in pressure. LNG Vapor discharged from the tank safety

valves and vents. Tank roof slightly damaged. No ignition

41,005 ESSO AI INDEPENDENT AB

METHANE PRINCESS 1965 1964 out Disconnecting

after discharge Valve leakage. Deck fractures. 27,400 CONCH AI INDEPENDENT LR/ABS

CINDERELLA (EX JULES VERNET) 1965 1965 service Loading Overfilling. Tank cover and deck

fractures. 25,500 GAZ DE FRANCE

9% NICKEL STEEL INDEPENDENT BV


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Table 2: LNG incidents without spillage. Source: Navantia.

SHIP NAME INCIDENT DATE

VESSEL DELIVERY

ACTUAL STATUS SHIP STATUS COMMENT CAP. M3 TANKS DESIGN Tanks

Material Tanks Type Class 1

NORMAN LADY 2002 1973 service At sea

Collision with a US Navy nuclear-powered attack submarine, the USS Oklahoma City. In ballast condition. Ship suffered a leakage of seawater

into the double bottom dry tank area.

87,994 KVAERNER-MOSS


HILLI 2002 1975 Repairing At sea Stopped at Pyeongtaek with several mechanical problems 126,277 KVAERNER-

MOSS AI INDEPENDENT NV

METHANE POLAR 2001 1969 service At seaCollision with the "Eastwind", 30 miles off Argelia, 1 seafarer died.

There was damage to the bow71,500 NO-82

36% NICKEL STEEL (INVAR)

MEMBRANE AB

RAMDANE ABANE 2001 1981 service At sea Engine break down 126,190 NO-8536% NICKEL

STEEL (INVAR)

MEMBRANE BV

HOEGH GALLEON 2000 1974 service In yardAn outbreak of fire, which caused

damage to part of the tank insulation. 1 ship builder died

88,052 KVAERNER-MOSS


HANJIN PYEONG TAEK 2000 1995 service At sea Collision with "Corali" near Busan.

Damage occurred to shell plating 130,636 NO-9636% NICKEL

STEEL (INVAR)

MEMBRANE BV

METHANE POLAR 1999 1969 service Arriving Port

Arriving at Atlantic LNG Jetty, had engine failure and hit pier. Damaged

was minimal but pier closed for 2 weeks

71,500 NO-8236% NICKEL

STEEL (INVAR)

MEMBRANE AB

LNG CAPRICORN 1997 1978 service Arriving PortContacting dolphin off pier at Senboku terminal. Damage to outside plating but no spillage

126,750 KVAERNER-MOSS AI INDEPENDENT AB

NORTHWEST SWIFT 1997 1989 service At seaCollision with fishing vessel; damage to port side and bulkward; no water

ingress127,580 KVAERNER-

MOSS AI INDEPENDENT NK

Table 3: Relevant LNG vessel repairs at IZAR Carenas Ferrol/Fene. Source: Navantia.

VESSEL DEL.YEAR YEAR ACTUAL

STATUS CAP. M3 TANKS DESIGN Class 1 WORK CARRIED OUT

LARBI BEN M'HIDI 1977 2003 service 129,500 NO-85 BVRenewal of the inert gas cooling plant,

detection and repair of leaklages in cargo tanks

HILLI 1975 2003 Repairing 126,277 KVAERNER-MOSS NV Major steel renewal in the hull,

renewal of steam and ballast lines

RAMDANE ABANE 1981 2003 service 126,190 NO-85 BV Renewal work in membranes of CCS

MOSTEFA BENBOULAID 1976 2003 service 125,260


BVMajor repairs in cargo tank 5 where more of the stainless steel bottom

plate was removed

HOEGH GALLEON 1974 2003 service 88,052 KVAERNER-MOSS NV Replacemenmt and adjustment of the

main gear

METHANE POLAR 1969 2003 service 71,500 NO-82 AB

Major repairs in cargo tanks (reaplication of INVER); renewal of INVAR membrane; leak detection in

primary and secondary barriers.

HASSI R'MEL 1971 2003 service 40,109 NO-82 BV

Cargo line renewal, complete renewal of hydraulic lines, repairs of winches,

detection and repair of cargo tank leaklages

BACHIR CHIHANI 1979 2002 service 129,500 NO-85 BV

Complete retubing of both port and stbd boilers and the main and

auxiliary condenser; the full renewal of LNG cargo line

LNG ABUJA 1980 2002 service 125,800 KVAERNER-MOSS AB Renewal of the reheated steam pipes


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Table 4: Combined statistical data for LNG vessel accidents. Source: DNV Research.

Date Ship name Activity Injuries /fatalities

LNG spill

Description Source

1965 Cinderella (Jules Verne) (b. 1965)

Loading No Yes Overfilling. Tank cover and deck fractures

Houston Law Center, IZAR, Colton

1965 Methane Princess (b. 1964)

Disconnecting after discharge

No Yes

Valve leakage. Deck fractures Houston Law Center, IZAR, Colton

1969 Polar Alaska (Methane Polar) (b. 1969)

Transportation Violent sloshing of LNG in refrigerated tank en route to Alaska caused cable tray to break loose. This in turn slashed thin membrane cargo tank wall releasing contents. No fire or explosion reported.

DNV Report

1971 Descartes (b. 1971)

Gas leak from tank, faulty connection between tank dome and membrane wall. Crew reportedly tried to conceal leak from authorities. Mechanical failure.

DNV Report

1971 Esso Brega (LNG Palmaria) (b. 1969)

Unloading LNG into storage tank

Yes Rollover. Tank developed a sudden increase in pressure. LNG vapour discharged from the tank safety valves and vents. Tank roof slightly damaged. No ignition. LNG held on ship for month before discharge. Boil off produced warmer denser material. Filling line was t base of 50000 m3 tank. Eighteen hours after filling rollover produced pressure surge to 1.42 times nominal maximum design pressure. LNG released from vent and relieved over three hours.

Houston Law Center, IZAR, Colton, DNV Report

1974 Methane Progress (b. 1964)

In port No No Touched bottom at Arzew Houston Law Center, Colton

1976 Guayaquil, Ecuador Unreliable data

Unloading > 50 people injured

Yes A short circuit on unloading tanker ignited LNG vapour. A series of explosions destroyed five natural gas tanks and wrecked “Sell Oil Co” jetty over three hours before fire fighters helped by light rain managed to keep fire under control.

DNV report

1977 Arzew (b. 1978)

On terminal 1 killed Yes A terminal worker on the LNG export terminal at Arzew was frozen to death during a ship-loading operation. A large-diameter valve ruptured, causing the worker to be sprayed by LNG. The death was caused by the low temperature of the LNG liquid, and the spilled LNG did not ignite. Thus, the fatality was not onboard the ship, but on shore. Aluminium valve failure on contact with cryogenic temperatures. Wrong aluminium alloy on replacement valve. LNG released but no vapour



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ignition. 1977 LNG

Aquarius (b. 1977)

Loading No Yes Tank overfilled Houston Law Center, IZAR, Colton

1979 Mostefa Ben Boulaid (b. 1976)

Unloading No Yes Valve leakage. Deck fractures. Houston Law Center, IZAR, Colton

1979 Pollenger (LNG Challenger) (Hoegh Galleon) (b. 1974)

Unloading No Yes Valve leakage. Tank cover plate fractures. Fractures in tank cover and deck Loaded with LNG when some cargo leaked onto steel plate tank cover during discharging

Houston Law Center, IZAR, Colton, DNV report

1979 El Paso Paul Kayser (b. 1975)

At sea No No Stranded. Severe damage to bottom, ballast tanks, motors water damaged, bottom of containment system set up. Stranded in straits of Gibraltar. Was subsequently re-floated and towed to harbour to discharge cargo. Vessel was dry-docked when survey revealed extensive damage.

Houston Law Center, Colton, DNV report

1980 LNG Libra (b. 1979)

At sea No No Shaft moved against rudder. Tail shaft fractured.

Houston Law Center, Colton

1980 LNG Taurus (b. 1979)

In port No No Stranded. Ballast tanks all flooded and listing. Extensive bottom damage.


1984 Melrose (b. 1971)

At sea No No Fire in engine room. No structural damage sustained – limited to engine room.

Houston Law Center

1985 Gadinia (Bebatik) (b. 1972)

In port No No Steering gear failure. No details of damage reported.


1985 Isabella (b. 1975)

Unloading No Yes Cargo valve failure. Cargo overflow. Deck Fractures.


1989 ? Unreliable data

Loading 27 fatalities?

Yes A chemical tanker broke away from its moorings and sank in heavy gales. During loading of 17,000 tonnes of liquefied natural gas (LNG), the vessel broke free in heavy weather damaging 4 loading arms. A small leakage of the product occurred. The vessel dragged its anchors in the early hours, and was battered by force 10 winds and smashed to the break water. Out of a crew of 29 only two survived the incident.


1989 Tellier (b. 1973)

Loading Several injuries

Yes Broke moorings. Hull and deck fractures. Leakage and thereafter explosion


1990 Bachir Chihani (b. 1979)

At sea No No Sustained structural cracks allegedly caused by stressing and fatigue in inner hull.


1995 Mourad In yard No No Lifting cable broke while turbine being LMIS


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Date 2005-11-29

Didouche (b. 1980)

lifted out of engine room, causing turbine to fall from great height at Marseilles shipyard.

1996 LNG FInima (B. 1983)

Anchored No No Piracy. Boarded by pirates while anchored. Stole paint and broached a lifeboat. Pirates fled after being discovered.

LMIS

1996 Bachir Chihani (b. 1979)

In port No No Reported due to carry out repairs at Marseilles to engines and two tanks.

LMIS


At quay, discharging

No Electrical fire in main engine room alongside Distrigas terminal. Crew extinguished fire. Cargo discharged at reduced rate. Had electrical fire in main engine-room while tied up alongside Distrigas LNG terminal, Boston, 05 Feb 1996. Lost power. Fire extinguished by crew. Cargo discharge continuing. Power restored and sailed 09 Feb

DNR report, LMIS

1996 LNG Portovenere (b. 1996)

At sea Empty

6 dead No Had fire break out in engine room about 13 nautical miles off Genoa. Fire quickly brought under control and extinguished. Damage minor. In tow.

LMIS

1997 LNG Capricorn (b. 1978)

In port No Sustained damage to shell plating on contact with mooring dolphin at a Hamasaki pier. No spillage or damage to cargo system.

IZAR, DNV report, LMIS

1997 Northwest Swift (b. 1989)

At sea No Collision with fishing vessel. Damage to port side and bulkward. No water ingress.

IZAR, DNV report


In port No No Reported at Boston with generator problems.

LMIS

1998 LNG Bonny (B. 1981)

At sea No No Had complete power failure and drifting 90 miles off Miyakoshima. Tug on scene, repair crew aboard vessel, repairs completed and resumed voyage.

LMIS

1999 Methane Polar (b. 1969)

In port Empty

No No Had engine breakdown and struck the Petrotrin jetty at Point Fortin, while being brought in empty for loading. No damage reported.

IZAR, LMIS, DNV report

1999 Matthew (b. 1979)

At sea No No Had tailshaft problem and overheated bearing and arrived Boston in tow.

LMIS

2000 Hanjin Pyeong Taek (b. 1995)

At sea No Collision with bulk carrier Corali near Busan. Damage occurred to shell plating.

IZAR, LMIS

2000 LNG Jamal (b. 2000)

At wharf No No Insulating materials & vinyl sheeting burnt out during welding operations on No 3 tank cover at wharf in Mitsubishi Dockyard. Fire controlled same day.

LMIS

2000 Hoegh Galleon (Pollenger) (b. 1974)

In yard 1 ship builder dead

No An outbreak of fire caused damage to part of the tank insulation. 1 ship builder died.

IZAR, LMIS

2001 Ramdane Abane (b. 1982)

At sea No No Engine break down. Towed away from the coast by tug Ria de Vigo. Engine restarted and proceeded same day.

IZAR, LMIS


SAFEDOR D4.3.1

Date 2005-11-29

2001 Methane Polar (b. 1969)

At sea In ballast

No Three injuries and one fatality of bulk carrier crew

No Collision with bulker. Minor hull damage. In collision with bulk carrier Eastwind off Algeria. Sustained holing to bow. Subsequently arrived Piraeus for repairs.

IZAR, Colton, LMIS

2001 Khannur (b. 1977)

Unloading Yes Product leak through a vent. Cracks in tank dome. Over-pressurisation of cargo in No 4 tank.

IZAR, Colton, LMIS

2002 Norman Lady (b. 1973)

At sea No No Collision with a U.S. Navy nuclear-powered attack submarine, the U.S.S. Oklahoma City. In ballast condition. Ship suffered a leakage of seawater into the double bottom dry tank area.

Houston Law Center, IZAR, Colton, LMIS


Unloading No Yes A spillage resulted in a cracked deck. Thought to be human error as the alarm that should alert personnel had been isolated. No one was hurt. Overfilling. Cracks on deck

IZAR, Colton

2003 Methane Princess (b. 2003)

Under construction

No No Had fire on board while under construction at Daewoo Shipbuilding. Fire under control five hours later after burning part of the cargo tanks. Damage fairly minor.

LMIS

2003 Century (b. 1974)

At sea No No Sustained main engine damage offshore Algeria. Under tow by two tugs to Syros Shipyards.

LMIS


At sea No No Gearbox problems. Being towed to Ferrol. Major repairs.

Colton, LMIS

2003 Hilli (b. 1975)

At Anchorage No No Boiler tube failure LMIS

2003 Gimi (b. 1976)

Approaching pier

No No Softly touched bottom approaching pier at Lake Charles. Preliminary survey indicated no damage.

LMIS

2003 Fuwairit (b. 2003)

In yard Under construction

No No Grounded during passage of typhoon “Maemi” while at Samsung Heavy Industries shipyard in Korea

LMIS

2003 Galicia Spirit (b. 2004)


No No Grounded at Pallangpo breakwater after mooring ropes released during typhoon “Maemi” while at Daewoo shipyard. Sustained damage to bottom and starboard shell plating.

LMIS

2003 LNG Berge Arzew (b. 2004)


No No Mooring ropes broke due typhoon "Maemi" and drifted away from berth at DaeWoo yard, Busan, touching bottom. Towed to shipyard. Bottom plating damage. Permanent repairs completed end Jan 2004.

LMIS

2004 British Trader (b. 2002)

At sea No No Minor electrical fire onboard, damaged one transformer, contained and underway

LMIS

2004 Methane Discharging No No Had minor fire break out after being LMIS


SAFEDOR D4.3.1

Date 2005-11-29

Arctic (b. 1969)

struck by lightning at Barcelona. Fire extinguished after an hour by vessel’s own means. Damage slight.

2004 Tenage Lima (b. 1981)

At sea No No Made contact with a submerged rock due to a strong southerly current. The starboard side shell plating in way of No 1 membrane tank was reportedly heavily damaged but did not require temporary repairs at Mokpo. Sailed for Yokohama for permanent repairs.

LMIS

2005 Hispania Spirit (b. 2002)

Berthing operations

No No Contact. Hull damage. Sustained hull damage during berthing operations, resulting in oil spill quickly isolated, contained and minimised.

LMIS

2005 Laieta (b. 1970)

In ballast No No Reported engine breakdown while in ballast. Vessel taken in tow for Barcelona. Salvage services rendered under LOF 2000.

LMIS

Sources: Houston Law Center: Report, LNG Safety and Security, October 2003, University of Houston Law Center, Institute for Energy, Law & Enterprise. IZAR, Presentation to HAZID workshop Colton Company: http://www.coltoncompany.com/shipbldg/worldsbldg/gas/lngaccidents.htm DNV Report: LNG Accident review, DNV report no. 2002-0789 LMIS: information obtained from www.seasearcher.com There are some accidents in the statistics (Table 4), which have resulted in fatalities, or multiple injuries, where LNG has been the cargo and presented in Table 5. Regarding the statistics in Table 5 there is a degree of uncertainties around this data as the sources of information that have been utilized are not consistent. Unreliable data is noted in column two in Table 5. Table 5: LNG vessel accidents involving fatalities or multiple injuries. Source: DNV Research.

Date Ship name Activity Injuries /fatalities

LNG spill

Description Source

1976 Guayaquil, Ecuador Unreliable data

Unloading > 50 people injured

Yes A short circuit on unloading tanker ignited LNG vapour. A series of explosions destroyed five natural gas tanks and wrecked “Sell Oil Co” jetty over three hours before fire fighters helped by light rain managed to keep fire under control.

DNV report

1977 Arzew

On terminal

1 killed Yes A terminal worker on the LNG export terminal at Arzew was frozen to death during a ship-loading operation. A large-diameter valve ruptured, causing the worker to be sprayed by LNG. The death was caused by the low temperature of the LNG liquid, and the spilled LNG did not ignite. Thus, the fatality was not onboard the ship, but on shore. Aluminium valve failure on contact with cryogenic temperatures. Wrong aluminium alloy on replacement valve. LNG released but no vapour ignition.


1989 ?

Loading 27 fatalities?

Yes A chemical tanker broke away from its moorings and sank in heavy gales. During

Houston Law Center,


http://www.coltoncompany.com/shipbldg/worldsbldg/gas/lngaccidents.htm

http://www.seasearcher.com/

SAFEDOR D4.3.1

Date 2005-11-29

Unreliable data

loading of 17,000 tonnes of liquefied natural gas (LNG), the vessel broke free in heavy weather damaging 4 loading arms. A small leakage of the product occurred. The vessel dragged its anchors in the early hours, and was battered by force 10 winds and smashed to the break water. Out of a crew of 29 only two survived the incident.

IZAR, Colton, DNV report

1989 Tellier Unreliable data

Loading Several injuries?

Yes Broke moorings. Hull and deck fractures. Leakage and thereafter explosion.


1996 LNG Portovenere (b. 1996)

At sea Empty

6 dead No Had fire break out in engine room about 13 nautical miles off Genoa. Fire quickly brought under control and extinguished. Damage minor. In tow.

LMIS


In yard 1 ship builder dead

No An outbreak of fire caused damage to part of the tank insulation. 1 ship builder died.

IZAR, LMIS

The type of accident that took place in 1976 will hardly occur today with the current regime (procedures, safety measures, safety focus, etc.) in place, both in ports and onboard. The accident in 1977 represents equipment failure, which has a positive risk trend and such incidents have become less in recent years. However, equipment failure is an issue that must be taken seriously onboard and in project development. The first accident that took place in 1989 seems to be for a chemical carrier loading LNG cargo in heavy weather conditions. The dedicated LNG ships is better suited for this job and there are operational weather restrictions related to cargo operation that may suggest that such an accident will not take place in the current LNG trades. The information regarding this accident is unreliable. The second accident that took place in 1989 seems to resemble much of the same characteristics as the accident in 1976. The accident in 1996 took place during sea trials (before commissioned to service) and might be regarded as out of scope. Moreover, this is a generic ship accident that may take place on any ship type and is not specifically related to LNG ships. The accident in 2000 is outside the scope of this HAZID as it is yard related. Through the safety history of LNG vessels there have been no environmental spillages, which have had a severe effect on safety or the environment. The main culprit is occupational accidents onboard the ships. From the accident statistics it seems like the main risk contributor is during loading and unloading. The trend for accidents/incidents on LNG tankers seem to be positive for industry as more focus has been paid to both technical and operational improvements for this ship type. Focus when designing new LNG tankers must be to maintain the good safety record, as well as developing arrangements and technical solutions that minimises occupational hazards for the crew.


SAFEDOR D4.3.1

Date 2005-11-29

2.5 Main elements of the HAZID

The main elements of the HAZID were:

• Select a representative LNG carrier. • Develop a risk register format to manage the HAZID session. • Identify hazards for the operation of LNG tankers world-wide. • Identify risk reducing measures that can prevent or mitigate each hazard. • Rank hazards and suggest risk reducing measures in order of priority for the later risk analysis. • Consider how representative the specific design is for the LNG carrier fleet as a whole. • Prepare a HAZID study report as an input to the further risk analysis work in SP4.3.

2.6 HAZID technique

2.6.1 General A structured approach to identify hazards has been utilised based on studying the various operational phases of the tankers as outlined in Section 1.1. The approach adopted in this work contains many similarities with the well-known SWIFT technique.

2.6.2 Structured What-If Checklist (SWIFT) Technique The description in this sub-chapter is based on the IMO report MEPC 45/2/1 [1]. Definition SWIFT is a systematic team-oriented technique for hazard identification (HAZID). It can be contrasted with other HAZID techniques as follows:

• SWIFT can be used to address systems and procedures at a high level. It considers deviations from normal operations identified by brainstorming, supported by checklists.

• Standard HAZOP (hazard and operability study) is usually applied to process flow at a detailed piping & instrumentation level, and identifies deviations from design intent by means of guide-words. It may be noted that in the marine industry the term HAZOP is often used loosely where the term HAZID (for an operation) would be more appropriate.

• FMEA (failure modes and effects analysis) addresses hardware at the level of detailed equipment items, and does not usually consider the human element.

SWIFT, like standard HAZOP, can be used to address operability issues as well as safety hazards. SWIFT may be used simply to identify hazards for subsequent quantitative evaluation, or alternatively to provide a qualitative evaluation of the hazards and to recommend further safeguards where appropriate. SWIFT, like any group-based HAZID technique, relies on expert input from the team to identify and evaluate hazards. The SWIFT facilitator’s function is to structure the discussion. The SWIFT recorder keeps an on-line record of the discussion on a standard log-sheet. There is no single standard approach to SWIFT - one of its strengths is that it is flexible, and can be modified to suit each individual application. Procedure utilized in HAZID

• Define LNG vessel operations. Consider each operation in sequence. • Brainstorm possible hazards, e.g. “What if...?”, “How could...?” • List but do not discuss hazards yet. Once ideas are exhausted, use previous accident experience to

check for completeness.


SAFEDOR D4.3.1

Date 2005-11-29

• Structure the hazards into a logical sequence for discussion, thus building hazard scenarios. Start with the major ones, so that escalation of initiating ones can be cross-referenced. Consider each hazard in turn.

• Consider possible consequences if the scenario occurs. • Consider safeguards that are in place to prevent the scenario occurring. • Consider whether additional safeguards are needed • Record discussion in a risk register/log. • Reconsider whether any hazards have been omitted.

Generic checklist for HAZID session

• Operating errors and other human factors, e.g. crew error, accidents (falls, trapping, trips, and access to dangerous areas), illness or injury, passenger error, abuse of equipment etc.

• Measurement errors, e.g. passenger numbers, cargo/vehicles, trim, GM, navigation etc. • Equipment/instrumentation malfunction, e.g. structural failures, equipment failure, control system

failure etc. • Maintenance, e.g. dangerous areas, permit systems, control of modifications, mechanical

handling, danger to passengers etc. • Utility failure, e.g. power, air, fire water, communication systems, lighting etc. • Integrity failure or loss of containment, e.g. fire, loss of containment. • Emergency operation, e.g. evacuation, fire etc. • External factors or influences, e.g. transport accidents, impact, other accidents on-board or near to

the ship, terrorism etc.


SAFEDOR D4.3.1

Date 2005-11-29

3 Results

3.1 General

The results from the HAZID session are presented in this Section. The main findings from the HAZID session are that no separate hazard forms an immediate threat to the operation of LNG vessels. However, summarising the various risk contributions may indicate that there are a number of scenarios that should be further evaluated in the risk analysis. This chapter provides notes for the risk ranking element of the hazards identified and listed in the risk register. The probability index in Table 6 and consequence index in Table 7 are used based on the guidelines from SAFEDOR meeting, Glasgow 10 June 2005.

3.2 Probability index

Table 6: Definition of probability index

3.3 Consequence index

Table 7: Definition of consequence index

CI Consequence Human safety Environment related

Cargo / Monetary

losses Effect on ship 3rd party

assets Equivalent fatalities

1 Minor Single or minor injuries

Negligible release - negligible pollution - no acute environmental or public health impact

30.000 US$

Local equipment damage (repair on board possible, downtime negligible)

Minor damage 0,01

2 Significant Multiple or severe injuries

Minor release - minimal acute environmental or public health impact - small, but detectable environmental consequences

300.000 US$

Non-severe ship damage - (port stay required, downtime 1 day)

Significant damage 0,1

3 Severe Single fatality or multiple severe injuries

Major release - effects on recipients - short term disruption of the ecosystem

3 mill. US$

Severe damage - (yard repair required, downtime < 1 week)

Severe damage in vicinity of ship

1

4 Catastrophic Multiple fatalities

Severe pollution - medium-term effect on recipients - medium-term disruption of the ecosystem

30 mill. US$ Total loss (of, e.g. a medium size merchant ship)

Extensive damage 10

5 Disastrous Large number of fatalities

Uncontrolled pollution - long-term effect on recipients - long-term disruption of the ecosystem

300 mill. US$

Total loss (of, e.g. a large merchant ship)

Major public interest 100

PI Probability Definition P (per ship

year) 8 Very frequent Likely to happen once or twice a week on one ship 100 7 Frequent Likely to occur once per month on one ship 10 6 Probable Likely to occur once per year on one ship 1

5 Reasonably probable Likely to occur once per year in a fleet of 10 ships, i.e. likely to occur a few times during a ship's life 0,1

4 Little probable Likely to occur once per year in a fleet of 100 ships, i.e. likely to occur in the total life of a ship's life 0,01

3 Remote Likely to occur once per year in a fleet of 1000 ships, i.e. likely to occur in the total life of several similar ships 0,001

2 Very remote Likely to occur once per year in a fleet of 10000 ships 0,0001

1 Extremely remote Likely to occur once in the lifetime (20 years) of a world fleet of 5000 ships 0,00001


SAFEDOR D4.3.1

Date 2005-11-29

3.4 Risk matrix

The risk matrix in Table 8 is used to assign risk levels to each of the combinations of probability of occurrence and consequence of events. The risk levels assigned in the table are effectively measured on a logarithmic scale: Risk = Probability * Consequence log (Risk) = log Probability + log (Consequence) Risk reduction/control measures/options affecting hazards with higher risk levels are considered most desirable. Table 8: Risk matrix

Consequence/Severity 1 2 3 4 5 PI Probability

Minor Significant Severe Catastrophic Disastrous 8 Very frequent 9 10 11 12 13 7 Frequent 8 9 10 11 12 6 Probable 7 8 9 10 11 5 Reasonably probable 6 7 8 9 10 4 Little probable 5 6 7 8 9 3 Remote 4 5 6 7 8 2 Very remote 3 4 5 6 7 1 Extremely remote 2 3 4 5 6

3.5 Risk register

The main hazards in the risk register are those related to operational/human errors, as there seems to be low occurrence of system and/or ship malfunctions. The main hazards identified are ranked (based on their risk index in the risk register) in Table 9. The ranking is based on gathering the independent scores from the participants at the HAZID meeting and thereafter utilise the average score in the risk register. The risk register contains a section 10 on “operation in ice conditions”. This issue is a special scenario, which is not representative for the main LNG trades and thus the risk level resulting from this scenario is not including in the summary in Table 9.


SAFEDOR D4.3.1

Date 2005-11-29

Table 9: Top-ranked hazards

No Hazard Risk index 4-5 Faults in navigation equipment (in coastal waters) 7.0 17-4 Crew falls or slips onboard 7.0 14-1 Shortage of crew when LNG trade is increasing 6.8 4-3 Rudder failure (in coastal waters) 6.8 3-4 Rudder failure (in manoeuvring) 6.8 5-4 Severe weather causing vessel to ground/collide (in transit) 6.6 3-3 Steering and propulsion failure (in manoeuvring) 6.6 3-5 Severe weather causing vessel to ground/collide (in manoeuvring) 6.6 3-7 Faults in navigation equipment (in manoeuvring) 6.6 4-2 Steering and propulsion failure (in coastal waters) 6.6 6-1 Collision with other ships or facilities (in port) 6.6 17-3 Terrorist attacks/intentional accidents 6.5

Abbreviations used in the risk register are provided in Table 10. Table 10: Abbreviations

Risk category – S Human Safety Risk category – E Environmental Risk category – C Costs and finance Risk category – T Ship safety and Technology Risk category – R Reputation / disruption Analysis – P Probability (frequency) Analysis – C Consequence Analysis – R Risk

RRM

Risk reduction measures. Risk Control Options (RCO) is an equivalent term used in FSA work.

RAC Risk acceptance criteria ALARP As Low As Reasonable Practicable SJA Safe Job Analysis PPE Personal Protective Equipment FMEA Failure Mode and Effect Analysis


SAFEDOR D4.3.1

Date 2005-11-29

The risk register is provided in Table 11. The colour coding is utilised to illustrate different risk levels categories. Table 11: Risk register LMG Marin on behalf of SAFEDOR SP4.3 Modified: 21.09.2005Risk Register for Navantia 138.000 m3 LNG vessel By: IØ

Risk category Analysis

No Hazard S E C T R Failure mode description Risk reducing measures P C R

1 - Loading

1 Overloading x x x xDanger of overloading cargo tanks with effects on structure/equipment and possibly creating gas pockets onboard

Operational procedures and alarm system. FMEA of bunkering system. 3,2 2,2 5,4

2 LNG spill on deck or to sea x Faults in connections or pipes leading to spill FMEA of system. Maintenance. Operational procedures. 3,4 1,6 5,0

3 Filling liquid into compressor and boiler areas x x

During overloading LNG is overflowing into neighbouring rooms causing damage to equipment/structure. Caused by malfunction of equipment and human failure.

Operational procedures and alarm system. 2,3 2,5 4,8

4 Fault in operational procedures x x

Tanks are being filled too high due to commercial pressure, calculating that the boil off rate will reduce the high level in the tanks after a while

Operational procedures. 2,6 2,6 5,2

5 High movements in LNG transfer system x

LNG transfer system is designed to withstand a certain movement and will break causing spillage if violated.

Operational restrictions related to weather and wave conditions. 3,4 1,8 5,2

6 Lack of communication with shore personell x Leading to overloading Crew awareness and training. 3,4 2,0 5,4

7 Personnel failing in adjusting the moorings during loading/unloading x

Vessel must be kept in the right position and moorings must be adjusted accordingly with the ship being loaded/unloaded

Alarm routines. Crew awareness. 3,0 2,2 5,2

8 External forces from wind, wave and tide x Causing high movements in LNG transfer

systemOperational restrictions related to weather and wave conditions. 2,8 2,0 4,8

9 Faults in ballast system or fault operation of ballast system x Causing high movements or displacement

movements in LNG transfer systemFMEA of system. Operational procedures. Alarm routines. 2,6 2,2 4,8

10 Being struck by passing vessels x May cause high rate spillage Radar watch. Collission alarm. 1,8 4,2 6,0

11 Lack of crew competence and training x Lack in this department may lead to all sorts of incidents Training. Motivation. Leadership. 3,0 2,6 5,6

12 Roll-over x Lack of stability during loading/unloading may lead to roll-over Alarm routines. Crew awareness. 1,4 3,8 5,2

2 - Departing quay

1 Tug assistance failing xThis may lead to damage to ship and structures and will be more dramatic in severe weather conditions

Emergency prepardness. 2,4 3,4 5,8

2 Weather being severe x Wind forces can be severe leading to tug assistance fails


3 Preparing and testing machinery and systems for sailing fails x

This operation is critical for a successful journey and any system problems should be discovered in this phase

Check lists. Dual fual test. Crew awareness. 3,6 2,8 6,4

4 Fault in sail away procedure x This may lead to all kind of hazards; grounding, collision, etc. Check lists. 2,8 3,4 6,2

5 Tug colliding with LNG vessel xThis may damage the ship hull, but it is unlikely that major consequences will result, i.e. tank rupture

Ship structure analysis. 3,0 2,6 5,6

6 Failure starting up boil-off system and arrangements for handling surplus gas x x

This may lead to pressure build up and gas venting, but this is a process that becomes critical after some time.

Check lists. FMEA of system. 3,4 2,0 5,4


SAFEDOR D4.3.1

Date 2005-11-29

3 - Manoeuvring

1 Collision with other ships or facilities x

This may lead to ship hull damages as speed is low and tug assistance is present to reduce probability. Being struck by other ship may result in higher consequences.

Collission alarm. Radar watch. 2,4 3,4 5,8

2 Tug assistance failing x This may lead to ship hull damages as speed is low. Ship structure analysis. 2,4 2,8 5,2

3 Steering and propulsion failure x Technical faults may lead to collision and secondary consequences

Ship structure analysis. Stability analysis. FMEA of steer/prop system. 2,8 3,8 6,6

4 Rudder failure x Technical faults may lead to collision and secondary consequences FMEA of rudder. Inspections. 3,0 3,8 6,8

5 Severe weather causing vessel to ground/collide x

This issue should not lead to severe consequences as tugs are present and speed is low.

Ship structure analysis. Stability analysis. Manoeuvring analysis. 3,0 3,6 6,6

6Personnel safety may be jeopardised due to special security issues in Boston port area

x The high security focus in Boston may lead to comprimising upon personnel safety Training. 2,2 2,6 4,8

7 Faults in navigation equipment x Technical faults may lead to collision and secondary consequences FMEA. Testing. 3,0 3,6 6,6


9 Pilot competence x Faults may lead to collision/grounding and secondary consequences 2,2 3,8 6,0

10 Interaction between vessel, pilot and tug failing x Communication problems due to language

differences may cause incidents and accidents Training. 2,2 3,2 5,4

4 - Transit and navigation in coastal waters (without tug)

1 Collision x

This may lead to high-powered collisions with small islands, coastal structures, ships, etc. having the potential for tank rupture and large scale consequences





4 Severe weather causing vessel to ground/collide

This issue may lead to severe consequences as speed could be at service speed.




7 Pilot competence x Faults may lead to collision/grounding and secondary consequences 2,2 4,0 6,2

8 Interaction between vessel and pilot x Communication problems due to language Training. 2,2 3,4 5,6


SAFEDOR D4.3.1

Date 2005-11-29

5 - Transit in open sea

1 Collision xThis may lead to high-powered collisions with ships, platforms, etc. having the potential for tank rupture and large scale consequences





4 Severe weather causing vessel to ground/collide x This issue may lead to severe consequences as

speed could be at service speed.Ship structure analysis. Stability analysis. Manoeuvring analysis. 1,8 4,8 6,6


6 Crew competence and training x Lack in this department may lead to all sorts of incidents Training. Motivation. Leadership. 1,8 3,8 5,6

7 Sloshing in tanks x This may lead to damage to membrane. Simulation of issue. Testing of equipment prior to installation. Operational restrictions. 2,4 2,8 5,2

8 Too low contents in tanks x

This may cause sloshing and secondary effects and could be resulting from too long voyages, operational error, faults in keeping the boil-off rate at an acceptable level.

Operational restrictions. Alarm system. 2,4 2,6 5,0

9 Loss of nitrogen supply system for the insulation space x This may lead to leakage of LNG in tank system Alarm system. FMEA of system. Inspection

and testing. 2,8 2,2 5,0

10 New trading patterns (milk runs) causing low level in tanks x This issue may cause sloshing as milk runs visit

several ports to deliver LNG. Operational restrictions. Alarm system. 2,6 2,8 5,4

11 Lose equipment (tower) in the tank x x This fault may lead to damage to tanks and being unable to load/unload that tank. Structural analysis. 2,6 2,8 5,4

12 Leakage in first barrier of membrane x This fault causes a loss of cargo. FMEA. Inspection and testing. 2,2 3,4 5,6

13 Failure of boil-off compressors x This may lead to having a too high boil-off rate causing pressure to rise

Alarm system. FMEA of system. Inspection and testing. 2,4 2,2 4,6

14 Loss of power in steam turbine/boiler system x This will lead to the ship being unable to sail. Alarm system. FMEA of system. Inspection

and testing. 2,2 3,2 5,4

15 Green water effects and transient vibrations x This may lead to structural problems and wear

and tear on the crew. Structural analysis. 1,8 3,2 5,0

16 Leakage causing damage to structure x x

Provided LNG leaks out of the tank and into other compartments or systems, this may cause damage to these arrangements/systems if they are not designed to absorb the cold LNG fluid.

Structural analysis. FMEA of LNG system. Inspection. 2,0 3,8 5,8

17 Loss of heaters in cofferdams x

The heaters use a heating system based on a glycol and water mix. Losing heaters may cause a too low temperature in the cofferdams and secondary effects of this.

FMEA of boiler system. Inspection. 2,0 3,4 5,4

18 Corrision in cofferdams x Due to the heat variations on both sides of the cofferdams this is a hot spot for corrosion. Inspection. Material and paint selection. 2,4 3,0 5,4

19 Corrosion in water ballast tanks x This problem is the same as on other ship types. Inspection. Material and paint selection. 2,6 3,0 5,6

20 Severe sea/weather x Severe sea/weather causing lack of structural integrity/longitudinal strength/foundering Operational restrictions. 2,0 3,8 5,8


SAFEDOR D4.3.1

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6 - Arriving in port

1 Collision with other ships or facilities x

This may lead to ship hull damages as speed is low and tug assistance is present to reduce probability. Being struck by other ship may result in higher consequences.


2 Tug assistance failing x This may lead to ship hull damages as speed is low. 2,2 2,8 5,0




5 Severe weather causing vessel to ground/collide x

This issue should not lead to severe consequences as tugs are present and speed is low.


6Personnel safety may be jeopardised due to special security issues in Boston port area

x The high security focus in Boston may lead to comprimising upon personnel safety Training. 2,2 3,4 5,6



9 Pilot competence x Faults may lead to collision/grounding and secondary consequences Training. Motivation. Leadership. 2,2 3,8 6,0

10 Interaction between vessel, pilot and tug failing x Communication problems due to language

differences may cause incidents and accidents Training. 2,2 3,0 5,2

11 Fault procedures/information from port agent x

Agent may having provided fault information regarding tugs, speed, etc. leading to possible secondary consequences.

2,2 2,6 4,8

7 - Mooring and preparing for unloading

1 Fault in procedure for discharging x xThis fault may lead to rates for discharge per time period is wrong that may have secondary consequences on costs, safety, etc.


2 Testing of systems used in discharging x x xFailing to carry out proper testing may lead to a fault operation of pumps, valves, pipes, etc. during discharging.

Operational procedures. Crew awareness. Training. 2,6 2,6 5,2

3 Contact with quay x x

Provided arrival procedure fails the ship may collide with quay causing damage to quay and ship. Effects on ship will be small, but may lead to repair, as well as cost claims from port for quay damages.


4 Failure in sensor system for mooring in port x x

This may lead to mooring being more difficult, takes more time, may result in small scale damages, etc.

Alarm system. FMEA and testing. 2,4 2,0 4,4

5 Failing in preparing arrangements for emergency situations, mainly fire x This may lead to ship being unprepared for a

fire scenario leading to secondary consequences. Procedures and traning. 1,6 3,8 5,4

6 Severe weather x xSevere weather (waves and wind) may cause problems in the mooring operation and abort the operation.

Operational restrictions. 2,4 3,4 5,8


SAFEDOR D4.3.1

Date 2005-11-29

8 - Unloading

1 Tank depressurising x x

Working the pumps when the tank is empty will depressurise the tank and it may collapse, membrane will be damaged, sphere structure may buckle (Moss type), etc.

Alarm system. Barriers. 2,8 3,6 6,4

2 Overfilling other tanks x xFault operation may pump LNG into other tanks leading to them overfilling with secondary effects.

Alarm system. Barriers. 2,4 2,8 5,2

3 Fault in operational procedures or failing to follow procedures x x

Tanks are being filled too high due to commercial pressure leading to damage to equipment and problems with the boil-off.

Operational procedures. Training. 2,4 2,6 5,0

4 High movements in LNG transfer system x

Transfer system designed for a certain movement and will break causing spillage if violated.


5 Lack of communication with shore personell x May lead to overloading and seconddary effects. Crew awareness and training. 2,4 2,6 5,0

6 Personnel failing in mooring the vessel during loading/unloading x

Vessel must be kept in right position and moorings must be adjusted. Failing to do this may lead to damaging the LNG transfer system.

Alarm routines. Crew awareness. 2,6 2,6 5,2

7 External forces from wind, wave and tide x x

This may cause high movements in LNG transfer system leading to damage or to a halt in transfer operation.


8 Faults in ballast system or operation of system x

This may cause high movements in LNG transfer system leading to damage or to a halt in transfer operation.

FMEA of system. Operational procedures. Alarm routines. 2,4 2,8 5,2

9 Being struck by passing vessels x May cause tank rupture and secondary a high rate spillage Radar watch. Collission alarm. 1,8 3,8 5,6


11 Debrise in tanks x xDuring the first discharge after docking may lead to damage to cargo pumps as debrise is left in tank or tank system following docking.

Inspection. Crew awareness. 3,4 2,4 5,8

12 Clogging up pumps with ice cubes x xIce clogging may result if water gets into system causing ice formation. This may damage pumps and cause operational failure.

System design. Crew awareness. 2,8 2,4 5,2

13 Clogging of filter x xThis fault is caused by different debrise (foam, etc.) resulting in clogging filters and causing operation to a halt.

System design. Crew awareness. 3,2 2,2 5,4

14 Situations on terminal causing back-fire on ship x x x This may result in various technical and safety

problems on this ship. Emergency prepardness. 1,8 4,0 5,8

15 Roll-over x Lack of stability during loading/unloading may lead to roll-over Alarm routines. Crew awareness. 1,4 4,0 5,4


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Date 2005-11-29

10 - Operation in ice conditions1 Fault in de-icing systems x This may result in ice formation on deck FMEA and testing. 3,2 3,0 6,2

2 Ice formation on deck xThis may lead to stability, structural and operation problems. This is also an issue when passing the North Atlantic on route to the US.

System specification. Inspection and maintenance. 3,2 3,2 6,4

3 Hydraulic systems freeze xThe cold climate may cause hydraulic systems to freeze resulting on loss of pressure on systems and secondary operational problems.

System specification. Inspection and maintenance. 3,6 2,8 6,4

4 Clogging valves and vents with ice x Valves and vents may be clogged by ice causing maloperation. DNV de-icing class should be applied. 2,8 2,8 5,6

5 Contact with icebergs xIceberg contact may result in loss of intact condition, i.e. water ingress and potential stability problems

Collission alarm and watch-keeping. 2,0 4,4 6,4

6 Pack ice around vessel xPack ice around vessel causing lack of maneuverability

Ice navigation system. 2,8 3,0 5,8

7 Buoy out of place due to ice xBuoy out of place due to ice causing navigational failure, grounding


8 Damage to pods/propellers xPods/propellers could be damaged causing loss of propulsion.

Operational restrictions. Design specification. 3,0 3,0 6,0

9 Collision with icebreaker xCollision with ahead icebreaker may cause leakages and stability problems.

Collission alarm and watch-keeping. 2,0 4,0 6,0

10 Running into ice ridges/multi-year ice xIce conditions lead to delays causing charter contract problems

Ice navigation system and watch-keeping. 5,0 3,0 8,0

11 Failure of emergency prepardness xIce conditions may lead to difficulties in deploying life boats, safety equipment, etc.

Emergency prepardness for this situation. 4,0 3,0 7,0

12 Operation in all-day darkness xIn the ice infested areas it is often little/no daylight leading to crew fatigue and secondary safety problems.

Training. 5,0 2,0 7,0

13 Running into new ice xUnexpected ice early in the season may come as a surprise and cause ship to ram ice with high speed causing structural problems.

Watch-keeping. Structural analysis. 4,0 3,0 7,0

13 - Maintenance and repairing on board

1 Failuring in keeping the hot work probabtion onboard x This may result in igniting any gas pockets that

may onboard rsulting in large scale accidents.Operational procedures. SJA. Work permit system. 2,6 3,2 5,8

2Inspection and access to void spaces allowed during voyage and this may lead to personnel safety issues.

xMaintanance of double bottom and void spaces can be hazardous operation and may lead to personnel injuries.

Operational procedures. SJA. Work permit system. 2,8 2,2 5,0

3 Risk of poisoning crew x

There are hazardous chemicals onboard and faults in systems may cause dangerous atmospheres onboard that may cause personnel injuries.

Procedures. PPE. 2,6 2,6 5,2

4 Gas freeing xThe gas freeing may lead to secondary effects such as gsa pockets onboard and hazardous atmospheres.

System design. Operational procedures. Alarm system. 2,2 3,0 5,2

14 - Training

1 Shortage of crew when LNG trade is increasing x

This issue is a concern for the continous growth in the LNG trade. The competence and awareness level on the LNG ships are demanding and need special training and competence. This issue may lead to safety problems.

4,0 2,8 6,8

2 Training system and procedures x x xFailing to have adequate procedures and training systems may lead to technical, safety and operational problems onboard.

3,5 2,5 6,0

3 Competition between ship owners to attract the best/competent crew x The market for Masters, Chief Officers, etc. is

tight and may lead to higher crew costs. 3,8 2,3 6,0 15 - Emergency situations

1 Failing in emergency situations x This may lead to secondary effects accelerating or worsing the emergency situation Regular training 2,0 3,8 5,8

2ESD operation - main valve to engine room, to close or to stay open - not covered by rules

x

It is not determined if the ESD shall shut down the valve leading gas to the engine in an ESD situation. Closing the valve will stop the engine and may worsen the situation.

Scenario analysis. 2,3 3,5 5,8

3 Assistance given to distress ships x

This operation may lead to secondary problems such as security issues when picking up refugees, etc. or assisting a ship in distress, collision, fire, etc.



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Date 2005-11-29

16 - Docking

1 Steam boiler misfires when it is ignited for the first time after docking x x This may lead to operational problems and

safety hazards in the engine room. Routines for start-up. Training. 3,0 2,3 5,3

2 Gas could be trapped in membrane barrier system

Vessel can be declared gas free, but have gas pockets due to leakage and faults Alarm system. Inspection. Testing. 2,8 3,0 5,8

3 A number of irregularities after docking

Little problems during loading, but more a problem at discharging due to debrises. Routines for start-up. Training. 2,8 2,3 5,0

4Failure in communication between crew members working at shipyard alongside yardworkers

x xThis fault may lead to extra work and costs, as well as safety issues (incidents) during work, as procedures are not kept or violated.

Training. 2,5 2,5 5,0

17 - General hazards

1 Fire on board x The vessel may have fires onboard in engine rooms, galley, accommodation area, etc. Emergency prepardness. Training. 3,0 3,3 6,3

2 Gas entry x Gas entering engine rooms/accommodation area/etc. via e.g. air intakes. Emergency prepardness. Training. 2,0 2,8 4,8

3 Terrorist attacks/intentional accidents x Terrorist attacks on vessel may cause safety and environmental concerns. Emergency prepardness. Training. 2,0 4,5 6,5

4 Crew falls or slips onboard x Crew falls or slips on deck/stairways causing broken leg/arm, back injuries, bruises, etc. Emergency prepardness. Training. 3,8 3,3 7,0

5 Fall overboard x Crew falls overboard. Emergency prepardness. Training. 2,0 2,0 4,0End of risk register

3.6 Summary of resulting risk levels

The resulting risk picture for the identified hazards in relation to the risk acceptance criteria is summarised in Figure 2. It should be noted that the total risk picture is the sum of all hazards and this aspect will be looked into during the risk analysis (SP4.3.2).

P - C

1

1,5

2

2,5

3

3,5

4

4,5

5

5,5

6

6,5

7

7,5

8

1,0 2,0 3,0 4,0 5,0 C

P

10. Contact w ith Ice 9. Escelating Incident from Quayside

8. Terrorist Atack 7. LNG pills Load/Unloading

6. Gas Leakage 5. Occupational Accidents

4. Intact Stability Failure 3. Fire on Board

2. Grounding 1. Collision

Figure 2: Summary of risk picture for hazards in the context of the risk acceptance criteria


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Date 2005-11-29

4 Risk scenarios The risk register is utilised to develop scenarios, which systematise the information/knowledge/data collected during the HAZID session. The scenarios are utilised as input to the further work in the FSA regarding risk analysis (Step 2). The scenarios resulting from the HAZID session are listed in Table 12. A systematic evaluation of every hazard in the risk register (Table 11) is conducted in order to develop the overall scenarios in Table 12. The preliminary conclusion on ranking of scenarios, based on the top-ranked hazards in Table 9 and the statistical background, seems to indicate that the scenarios “collision”, “grounding” and “occupational accidents” should be prioritised in the risk analysis work. The scenarios “fire onboard”, “gas leakage” and “LNG spills during loading/unloading” should also be investigated due to the large consequences of such incidents. The risk analysis to be conducted in FSA Step 2 will further analyse their importance, frequencies, consequences, etc. However, it is recommended that the risk analysis (SP4.3.2) starts with a re-evaluation of the identified hazards, the building of scenarios and the ranking of scenarios. Table 12: Scenarios and their main causes

Scenarios Main causes

Collision Navigation error, human failure, procedural faults, steering equipment failure, machinery failure, bad weather conditions,

Grounding Navigation error, human failure, procedural faults, steering equipment failure, machinery failure, bad weather conditions,

Fire onboard Failure in fire detection system, equipment malfunction, gas leakage, work conducted without SJA, procedural faults,

Intact stability failure Failure of loading/ballasting procedures, abnormal wave conditions, structural faults, tank leakage,

Occupational accidents Work conducted without SJA, human failure, wrong procedures, wrong use of procedures, abnormal weather conditions,

Gas leakage Damage to tank structure, valve faults, damage to piping, operational error of gas system, engine faults, overloading,

LNG spills during loading/unloading

Procedural faults, equipment failure, excessive forces, mooring system damage/fault, ballast system damage/fault, lack of stability, roll-over, lack of crew competence, collision with passing ship,

Terrorist attacks External factors

Escelating incidents from quayside Procedural faults, equipment failure, mooring system damage/fault, lack of crew competence

Contact damage - ice related High speed into ice, fatigue in ice operation, lack of ice management,


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Date 2005-11-29

5 Conclusions A HAZID report on LNG tankers has been developed based on a HAZID meeting, the resulting risk register from the meeting and the consequent follow-up work and discussions. The aim of the HAZID report is to provide input to the subsequent risk analysis to be conducted as part of the FSA for LNG tankers, as well as providing input to the design of a shortsea LNG vessel. A structured approach to identify hazards has been utilised based on studying the various operational phases. The HAZID has been conducted based on a membrane-type 138.000 m3 LNG carrier, which it is argued is a representative ship for the LNG fleet. A review of the safety history of LNG vessels has been conducted. There have been no environmental spillages, which have had a severe effect on safety or the environment. The main culprit is occupational accidents onboard the ships. From the accident statistics it seems like the main risk contributor is during loading and unloading. The trend for accidents/incidents on LNG tankers seem to be positive for industry as more focus has been paid to both technical and operational improvements for this ship type. Focus when designing new LNG tankers must be to maintain the good safety record, as well as developing arrangements and technical solutions that minimises occupational hazards for the crew. There are however fresh challenges for the designers and builders of LNG vessels in the future, as the LNG trade is expanding from its traditional bandwidth of 120-160,000 m3 capacity, to ships that are up to 220,000 m3, as well as small scale ships of 1-10.000 m3 capacity. Arctic operation of LNG ships also represents a new challenge. Safety and environmental studies must be an integral part of the project development for the new brand of LNG vessels, and the FSA process should be adopted for this work. The main findings from the HAZID session are that no separate hazard forms an immediate threat to the operation of LNG vessels. However, summarising the various risk contributions may indicate that there are a number of scenarios that should be further evaluated in the risk analysis. The preliminary conclusion on ranking of scenarios, based on the top-ranked hazards in Table 9 and the statistical background, seems to indicate that the scenarios “collision”, “grounding” and “occupational accidents” should be prioritised in the risk analysis work. The scenarios “fire onboard”, “gas leakage” and “LNG spills during loading/unloading” should also be investigated due to the large consequences of such incidents. The HAZID report provides a valuable input to the risk-based design process to be conducted in SP6.7 for a shortsea LNG vessel, in terms of highlighting focus areas in the design process. More specific knowledge/data on the present hazards will be further developed through the subsequent risk analysis, and the FSA reporting, which can be utilised in the SP6.7 design project.


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Date 2005-11-29

6 References [1] IMO report MEPC 45/2/1, Harmful Aquatic Organisms In Ballast Water, IACS Hazard Identification (HAZID) of Ballast Water Exchange at Sea - Bulk Carriers, Submitted by the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS). [2] Guidance on Risk Analysis and Safety Implications of a Large Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Spill Over Water, Prepared by Mike Hightower, Louis Gritzo, Anay Luketa-Hanlin, John Covan, Sheldon Tieszen, Gerry Wellman, Mike Irwin, Mike Kaneshige, Brian Melof, Charles Morrow, Don Ragland - Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185 and Livermore, California 94550, USA. [3] Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for use in the IMO rule-making process, MSC/Circ.1023, 5 April 2002, International Maritime Organization, 4 Albert Embankment, London SE1 7SR, UK. [4] Houston Law Center: Report, LNG Safety and Security, October 2003, University of Houston Law Center, Institute for Energy, Law & Enterprise. [5] IZAR, Presentation to HAZID workshop. [6] Colton Company: http://www.coltoncompany.com/shipbldg/worldsbldg/gas/lngaccidents.htm [7] DNV Report: LNG Accident review, DNV report no. 2002-0789. [8] LMIS: information obtained from www.seasearcher.com [9] Drawings and specification of 138,000 m3 LNG vessel, Navantia Shipyard, Spain.


http://www.coltoncompany.com/shipbldg/worldsbldg/gas/lngaccidents.htm

http://www.seasearcher.com/

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Date 2005-11-29

7 Short CV’s of HAZID team members Dr. Ivan Østvik B.Eng. in Naval Architecture and PhD in Design for Safety (Risk-based Design) from the University of Strathclyde. Østvik has worked at LMG Marin, a ship design consultants, since 1999 conducting projects within ship design, risk management, logistics and ship management. Østvik has worked with small LNG tankers (6,000 m3) and arctic LNG vessel in the past years, and topics have been basic design, operational/logistics studies and technical systems for such ships. Østvik has facilitated a number of HAZID meetings regarding drill ships, ice breakers, ferries, platform removal, FPSO, etc. Francisco del Castillo Francisco del Castillo is a M.S. Naval Architect, graduated from Madrid Polytechnic University. He is also Master in Shipping Business and Maritime Law by ICADE Comillas University of Madrid. He has been working for Astilleros Españoles, IZAR and now for Navantia in merchant and military vessels as a ship designer since 1997. Mr. del Castillo has over 8 years of engineering and management experience in the field of naval and commercial ship design and construction. He has been mainly involved in passenger and LNG ship projects, especially involved in general design and safety aspects. He has also been very active in the R&D area participating in several international projects regarding Safer Ship Design. Karl-Helge Røyter Naval Architect from Sunderland Polytechnic (University of Sunderland). 1969-1979 Aker Group / Akers Mek Verksted Oslo: Ship design, Ship Repair manager, Project manager, Department manager Steel / Class drawing office. 1979-present: Leif Höegh & Co AS / Höegh Fleet Services AS Oslo: Newbuilding Site manager, Germany, OBO Carriers and England Liner vessel. Superintendent OBO Vessels, Liner vessels, RoRo Vessels and LNG Vessels. Purchasing manager. Fleet manager, LNG Vessels, Liner vessels, Reefer Vessels Open hatch vessels. Present position: Senior Vice President, Technical project manager, LNG New building etc. Pedro Antão Eng. in Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering at IST, Lisbon, and MSc in Reliability Engineering and Safety Management from the University of Heriot-Watt, Edinburgh. Pedro Antão has worked since 1999 in IST Unit of Marine Technology and Engineering in projects of research related with Maritime Accidents, Human Factors and Human Reliability, Risk Analysis and Safety. Damien Feger Engineering degree from Ecole Centrale des Arts et Manufactures, France. Master of Science of in Naval & Offshore Engineering, University of California, Berkeley. Technically involved in numerous cryogenic development such as: liquefied hydrogen and oxygen tanks for the Ariane Space launcher, miniature cryocooler for military and earth observation satellites, freezers for the Internation Space Station laboratory. Since 2001, in charge of Snecma development of LNG activities as an equipment supplier for LNG carriers and terminals: cargo valves, low and high pressure pumps, gas combustion units, etc. Erik Vanem Has a Cand. Scient degree (Master of Science equivalent) in Physics from the University of Oslo. Has two years onboard experience from a seismic vessel, working with onboard seismic processing. Has been working with maritime risk analysis/FSA within DNV Research for about two years. Experience include FSA studies and risk assessment of passenger ships, bulk carriers and oil tankers. Topics such as fire and evacuation, damage stability, collision and grounding scenarios, navigation and environmental risk have been studied.


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Jørn Magnus Jonas Jørn M. Jonas graduated with a M.Sc. from the Norwegian Institute of Technology in 1990 and joined DNV in 1991. He is currently Senior Surveyor at DNV. He has been engaged in approval of machinery and cargo systems for LPG / LNG Carriers. Jonas has worked as gas tanker newbuilding project manager in Korea and China and has inspected various types of gas ships in world-wide trade. Erling Fredriksen Erling Fredriksen graduated with a M.Sc. from the Norwegian Institute of Technology in 1991 whereupon he joined DNV. He has worked 6 years with risk analysis, 3 years with classification of offshore vessel and 5 years with classification of ships whereupon he has 3 years experience with approbation of gas carriers with main emphasis on the cargo containment system (tanks and pipes).

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