Ruvalcaba - Understanding Iraq's Insurgency

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The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Spring 2004, Article 7

UnderstandingIraqsInsurgencyJimRuvalcabaIntroduction

Many questions have been posited as to

whichtactics,

strategies,

and

policies,

are

best

and

should be employed to counter the insurgent

threat in Iraq. Many argue that the military

should be the primary instrument involved

whereasothersarguethatmoreemphasisshould

be placed on the diplomatic and economic

instruments to resolve this threat. However,

before anyone can attempt to argue in favor of

any recommendation, option, or policy, it is

important to understand the problem. The

purpose of this article is to provide an

understanding of Iraqs insurgency using the

detailedframeworkforanalysisdevelopedbyDr.

BardONeillanddescribedinhisbook,Insurgencyand Terrorism. This broad framework analyzesinsurgencies by examining the international

system,domestic context, goals, purpose,means

utilized, and strategies. From this analysis, the

natureoftheinsurgency,type,theproblemsthey

pose, and the requirements they place on

respective actors canbe determined.1

Therefore,

with such anunderstanding, individualswillbe

better prepared to assess the tactics, strategies,

andpolicies that are recommended andpossibly

employedinaddressingthisthreat.

Insurgency Definition

Acomprehensivedefinitionof insurgency is

providedbythepamphletGuidetotheAnalysisofInsurgency,publishedby theCentral Intelligence

Agency. It states: Insurgency is a protracted

politicalmilitary activity directed toward

completely or partially controlling the resources

ofacountrythroughtheuseofirregularmilitary

forcesand

illegal

political

organizations.

Insurgent activityincluding guerrilla warfare,

terrorism, and political mobilization (such as

propaganda, recruitment, front and covert party

organization, and international activity) is

designed to weaken government control and

legitimacywhileincreasinginsurgentcontroland

legitimacy. The common denominator of most

insurgent groups is their desire to control a

particular area. This objective differentiates

insurgent groups from purely terrorist

organizations,whoseobjectivesdonotincludethe

creationofanalternativegovernment capableof

controlling a given area or country.2

Several

aspects of this definition are particularly

importanttonote.First,itisaprotractedpolitical

military activity that includes guerrilla warfare

and terrorism aimed at the weakening

government control. Second, terrorism in this

contextisanauxiliarytacticthatinsurgentsuseas

partofabroaderstrategyratherthananexclusive

one.

International System

The end of the Cold War undoubtedly

changed the international system. The

international system is no longer abipolar one

thatisdividedbetweeneasternandwesternblocs

andledbytwomajorpowers.Sincethedemiseof

theSovietUnion, theUnitedStateshasemerged

as the world leader in military, economic and

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Al Nakhlah2

arguably, in political aspects. Additionally, the

attacks on theWorldTradeCenter,Washington

D.C., and Pennsylvania, have also dramatically

changedtheinternationalsystem.

In the short term,just after the September

11

th

terroristattacks,

the

international

community

unifiedagainst thenewlyperceived international

threatbydisplayingunconditionalsupportforthe

United States in its efforts tobring the terrorist

perpetrators tojustice. Evidence supporting this

was the adoption of United Nations Security

CouncilResolution1373,condemningtheterrorist

actions,andineffect,passingbindinglegislation.3

One need only look at the clear and directive

language that is found inparagraphs1,2,and6

that stipulates that all states shall prevent and

suppressthe

financing

of

terrorists

acts,

refrain

fromprovidingany formofsupport toterrorists,

takenecessarystepstopreventthecommissionof

terroristsacts,preventthemovementofterrorists

andterroristsgroupsbyeffectingbordercontrols,

andestablishaCommitteeoftheSecurityCouncil

to monitor the implementation of this

resolution.4

Furthermore,theUnitedStatestook

unprecedented unilateral action against the

TalibanregimeinAfghanistanforsupportingthe

AlQaeda terrorist group and invoked article 51

(selfdefense)of theUNCharter.5

Although thissparked some debate, the international system

acquiesced to this action. Even fiveweeks later

whentheUNpassedSecurityCouncilResolution

1378, itdidnot reprimand theUnited States for

thisunilateraluseofforceandpreemptiveaction.

Instead, it criticized the Taliban Regime for not

taking measures to stop its support to the Al

Qaeda terrorists and it expressed its support for

the new Afghanistan transitional administration

supportedbytheUnitedStates.6

ThesupportgiventotheUnitedStatesinthelongterm,however,isnotasvastasitwasinthe

immediateaftermathof the attacks, especially in

light of the international controversy leading to

U.S.led coalition preemptive attacks on Iraq

(Operation Iraqi Freedom). Hereafter, it can be

argued that the international communitywould

no longeracquiesce to thepreemptiveactionsof

the United States. Thus the actions of the only

remaining superpower would no longer be

unchallenged. It became clear that the

international community, (through theUN)was

not going to endorse theUnited States desired

combat operations under the aforementioned

Article 51 of theUNCharter. Subsequently, the

United States, understanding that it could not

garner this international support forjustification

ofpreemptiveselfdefense,pursued theapproval

ofUNSecurityCouncil resolution (SC1441) that

focusedongivingIraqone lastchance tocomply

withthepreviousSecurityCouncilresolutions,in

which itwas found tobe in materialbreach.7

Thisresolutionoutlinedthefollowing:

SpecificallyrecalledSCResolution678

(use of UN Charter Chapter VII

enforcement action) and asserted that,

failingcompliance,SCResolution678is

reaffirmed.

Asserted Iraq was in material

breach of obligations under SC

Resolution687.

Gave Iraq a final opportunity to

complywithdisarmamentobligations.

Ordered Iraq to provideUNMOVIC

with unrestricted access to all sites,

includingPresidentialsites. Granted UNMOVIC and IAEA sole

discretion over removing, destroying

weapons.8

Thus, it came topass that theUnitedStates

andUnitedKingdomengaged inoperation Iraqi

Freedom under authorization of the United

NationsspecifiedinSecurityCouncilResolution

1441 and because of Iraqs continued material

breaches of Security Council Resolution 687.9

However,thisactiondidnotcomewithoutharsh

criticism:FranceGermany,andRussiaexpressed

theirconcerns,statingthereisnobasisintheUN

Charter for a regime change with military

means.10

Although this article is not focused on the

international system, the examples above were

discussed indetailtoprovethatthe international

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Spring 2004, Article 7 3

systemdoesnotcurrentlypossessastandardlens

throughwhichitviewstheinternationalthreats.It

can be argued that in the in the wake of the

September11thattacks,theUnitedStatesreceived

overwhelmingsupportanditwasabletoprovide

astandard

universal

lens

through

which

most

nations viewed terrorists, as evidenced by the

overwhelming support for Security Council

Resolution 1373.However, as the United States

and theUnitedKingdomexpanded this threat to

includeSaddamHusseinsregime,theshortlived

universal lens shattered and the international

security environment is once again perceived

quite differently throughout the world: a view

substantiatedbyHelgaHaftendorn inherarticle,

The Security Puzzle.11

Subsequently, recent

eventshave

proven

that

even

though

the

United

States is the only major remaining superpower

enjoying unmatched military and economic

strength,itspoliticalinfluencewillbeaffectedand

perhaps limitedby themanner inwhich the rest

of the international community perceives the

internationalsecuritysetting.

Iraqi Domestic System: Background

It is equally important to understand the

natureanddynamicsoftheIraqidomesticsetting

and

political

system.

While

insightful

analysis

on

Iraqs political and social dynamics in the pre

Saddam period exists, the closed nature of the

former autocratic state makes it challenging to

assessSaddamHusseinsformerpoliticalsystem.

Nonetheless, it is possible tomake a number of

observations.WhiletheBritishandtheHashemite

monarchysoughttoundertakethebuildingofthe

state, it was never fully realized. Saddam

Husseins autocratic regime, under the guise of

the Baathist party purporting to represent the

willof thepeoplecontinued tomakeprogress in

building the Iraqi state in terms of the

organizational and physical infrastructure of a

modern, unitary state, until the 1990s. Iraqwas

able todevelop formaladministrative structures.

Thesecoveredallaspectsofsociety, fromcentral

to local government, from education through

public works to the oil industry, which were

staffedbyrelativelywelleducatedandcompetent

technocrats. However, in terms of building a

unified nation, whether in a monarchist, Arab

nationalist, or revolutionary Baathist guise, it

proceededsporadicallysincethe1920s.12

Arecent

andoversimplifiedobservation is thatSaddams

Sunniledgovernment,buttressedby themilitary

andtheintelligenceservices(mukhabarat),which

werebureaucraciesofrepression for theKurds

andShiites,contributedtoIraqscurrentdaylack

ofnationalidentity.13

Table 1.1 summarizes the political systems

utilizedbyONeill.A simplifiedanalysis reveals

that Saddam Husseins regime possessed

characteristicsofboththemodernizingautocracy

as well as the totalitarian system. These two

political systems are in sharp contrast to the

pluralistic system that the United States is

attempting to emplace and in which the Iraqis

have no previous experience with. Thus, it is

evident that this transition to a new political

systemwillnotbe timely and cannotbe rushed

given the lack of democratic experience. Steven

Metz also supported this argument when he

stated, Moving from the psychology of

totalitarianism to the psychology of an open

society,withitsfoundationsinpoliticalinitiative,

consensus building, and compromise, is a long

and tortuous journey.14



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Table 1.1

PoliticalSystems:SourcesofSupport,MethodsControl&RoleofthePublic.15

Political

System

SourcesofSupport MethodofControl RoleofPublic

Traditional

Autocracy Military,

Landowners,

Clergyprovidesupport

inexchangeforsocio

economicprivileges.

Elites

maintain

tight

control

on

right

torule.Reinforcetheimportanceof

birthright,andpersonalismaskey

valuestorule.

Expected

to

be

apathetic

andloyal.Oppositionwill

beoppressedand

controlled.

Modernizing

Autocracy

Bureaucrats,Military,

Landowners,and

Clergyprovidesupport

inexchangeforsocio

economicprivileges.

Birthright,personalismandreligion

alsostressedasrighttorulebut

emphasisplacedonbuildingstate

powertoremaininhandsoffew

elites.Hierarchicalstructureevolves

withpatronsdispensingfavorsfor

support.

Massesdonotactively

participateinpolitical

process.Someregulated

privateactivityis

permittedinwidelystate

ownedenterprises.

Totalitarian Tightlycontrolled

vanguardpartyand

societalgroups.

Partyclaimstorepresentthepopular

will.Leadersuseacomplex

bureaucracy,mediaandeducation

systemtocarryoutcontrolofpolitical,

economic,andsocialaspects.

Expectedtoparticipatein

vanguardparty.Economic

controlmaybeinhands

ofpublicsector.

Pluralistic

(Democracy)

Publicactingthrough

politicalparties.

Numerouspoliticalstructures

establishedwithinandoutsideof

government.Externalgroupsact

autonomously.Limitsplacedon

powersofleaders.lacethepolitical

systeminfavorofindividualfreedom

andliberty

Publicactively

participatesinespousing

valuesoffreedom,liberty

andcompromise

Iraqi Domestic System: Present DayNocleanending+developmentalregression

=challengingrebuilding.The fact that theendof

theconventionalpartofOperationIraqiFreedom

didnothaveacleanendinggaverisetocadresof

Baath loyalistsaswellasotheropponentsof the

U.S.ledcoalition.Infact,itisnowsuspectedthat

many of the insurgent threats operating in Iraq

are from otherArab countries like Syria,Jordan

and Saudi Arabia fighting to endwhat is now

clearly seen as an occupation.16

Given this

continuedinsurgentthreatchallengingIraqslongtransition to democracy, it is clear that the

conventionalmilitaryvictorydidnot transpire to

politicalvictoryorgrandstrategyvictoryassome

leaders had expected. Anthony Cordesman,

correctly points out that military victory was

always a prelude to a much more important

struggle:winningthepeace.17

Unlike the formal surrenders of previous

conventional wars, like those of Germany and

Japan, where defeated armies stopped fighting,thewar in Iraq did not) produce a formal and

open surrender from any senior official in the

formerregime.This lackof formalsurrenderhas

contributed to this unclean ending as former

Saddam loyalists, who are unhappy that they

havelostcontrol,influence,andsocialstatus,and

continue to fight the American occupation.

Although it isdifficulttomeasure towhatextent

a formal surrender could have deterred the

formerregimeloyalistfromcontinuingtofight,it

isarguable

that

even

asmall

reduction

of

insurgent fighters (attained through a formal

surrender)couldhavesignificantly improved the

domestic setting by reducing the number of

insurgents deeply committed at conducting

terrorist acts. It iswith this understanding that

Ambassador Barbara Bodine stated, We tried

mightily to find some, any senior Iraqi officers



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who would surrender prior to April 9th.

18

Terrorist acts play a huge role in affecting the

psyche of the masses and legitimacy of the

government. Therefore, this notion of reducing

the number of insurgents becomes even more

significantwhen

placed

in

the

context

of

not

only

transforming a repressive autocratic government

into a newdemocracybut also in attempting to

rebuild the national infrastructure while

simultaneouslyfightinganinsurgency.

Dr. ONeill addresses two fundamental

challengesthatconfrontnationsintheirtransition

to independence: lackofnational integrationand

economicunderdevelopment.19

Societaldivisions

along one ormore linesracial, ethnic, linguistic,

or religiousand an absence of political tradition

thattranscends

parochial

loyalties

are

plaguing

post conflict Iraq. Since the forceful removal of

Saddam Hussein, the absence of the hardline

Baathist regime can no longer demand the

citizensloyaltiesthroughterrorandintimidation.

Asrivalgroupsnowviefortheirshareofpower,

they foster intergroup antagonism and distrust,

whichmay give rise to evenmore insurrections

directed at the provisional government if it is

dominated by rival groups, or perceived to be

illegitimate.RetiredMarineCorpsGeneralZinni

has even gone as far as stating that theUnited

Statesmustprepare itself forapossiblecivilwar

inIraq.20

Obstacles to economic development that

have hampered or continue to hamper Iraq

includesanctions,alongandcostlywarwithIran,

war reparations for the invasion of Kuwait,

corruptionofgovernmentofficials,poorlytrained

or inefficientbureaucracies, the lack of adequate

communications and transportation

infrastructure, an uncompetitive economic

position, and amisuse of foreign assistance that

was misdirected in favor of its military

establishment.Accordingtoastudyconductedby

AnthonyCordesman, the Iraqiannualper capita

income dropped from approximately $8,200 in

1978to$1,435in1990,to$723in1991andcurrent

figuresnowshow$150in2003.21

Iraq has experienced a huge economic

decline. Therefore, the lack of a hardline

centralist control of diverse and competing

groups, the lackof thecleanending topostIraqi

war hostilities, and the cluster of significant

societal and economic factors have led to the

emergenceofnewdissatisfiedgroupsandtherise

to the insurgents and terrorists threats that

previously held a disdain towards the United

States.

International Domestic Interplay

Aspreviouslyaddressed,theterroristattacks

ontheUnitedStatesinitiallyhadaunifyingeffect

on the international communitybut the lack of

broader internationalsupport forOperation Iraqi

Freedomisproofthatinthelongterm,ithadthe

oppositeeffect.Atthedomesticlevel,thelackofa

clear ending coupled with the economic

underdevelopment and lack of national

integrationeventuallygavebirthtothe insurgent

threat. David Reiff points out that when the

administrator to the Coalition Provisional

AuthorityPaulBremer, announced the complete

disbanding of the Iraqi Army, some 400,000

strong, and the lustration of 50,000members of

theBaathParty,oneU.S.officialremarked, That

was theweekwemade 450,000 enemies on the

ground in Iraq.22

This statement is evenmorealarming when on realizes that these 450,000

newly minted enemies also have family

members;sothenumberofdisaffectedIraqiscan

easilyexceed1million.Thus,thecurrentsituation

in Iraq, shaped by the international context of

ambivalent support and the domestic context of

dissatisfiedgroups isnowabreedingground for

notonly the localIraqi insurgents,butalso those

international terrorists that desire to drive a

wedge in the international community by

attackingthe

U.S.

in

Iraq

as

well

as

those

that

align with it. With this understanding the

attention will now turn to analyzing the

insurgency in Iraq by looking at the types of

insurgents, their strategy, goals and means, as

well as todetermine thedemands theyplaceon

differentactors.



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23

RecentdatasupportsthattheIraqiinsurgent

threat is composed of dissatisfied Iraqis of the

former Baathist regime, international terrorists

such

as

Ansar

al

Islam

&

Jaish

Ansar

al

Islam,

and

tribal militias (known as the Fawq).24

Upon

examination of their goals and/or actions that

support specific goals, these threemain groups

can be classified as preservationists, anarchists,

and traditionalists, respectively one must be

cautious when attempting to classify the

insurgents, and keep in mind the following

challengestocategorization:

Insurgentsabilitytotransformtheirgoals.

Numerous insurgent groups may have

different

and

mutually

exclusive

goals.

They may mask their goals or convey

misleadingrhetoric.

Goal ambiguity, as evidencedby two or

more aims of which neither of them

predominates.25

The latter challenge has indeed posed

problems inanalyzing someof the insurgents in

Iraq.According toanarticlewrittenbyPatrickJ.

McDonnell and Sebastian Rotella, many of the

suicidebombersinIraqappeartobenatives.This

is in contrast to the statements from the

DepartmentofDefensebriefings,whichstatethat

suicideattacksareprimarilytheworksofforeign

jihadists like Abu Musab Zarqawi, a Jordanian

connectedtoAnsaralIslamandaffiliatedwithal

Qaeda.As evidence, they point to thedefinitive

identification of an Iraqi suicide bomber that

struckonDecember9th2003aswellasstatements

from Lt.Col.KenDevan, an intelligence officer

for theArmys 1stCavalry Division in Baghdad

that stated, Overall, the facts say that the

majorityoffolkswearefightingareIraqis.26

Yet

despite this assessment, U.S. and Iraqi officials

have repeatedly stated that Iraqisareunlikely to

engage in such suicidemissionsbecause theydo

nothaveahistoryofviolentreligiousextremism.

ONeillalsodescribesfourstrategiesthatcan

be employed by insurgents. These are:

conspiratorial,protractedwar,militaryfocus,and

urbanwarfare strategies.27

These strategiesvary

as to the importance theyplaceon the following

variables: the environment, popular support,

organization, cohesion,external support,and the

governmentsresponse.

A

summary

of

each

strategyfollows:

Conspiratorial Strategy: In this strategy a

small group conspires to remove a ruling

authority through limited but swift force. This

strategy normally requires a wellorganized

group and does not necessarily rely on external

support.This strategy is typical of coups ledby

militaryofficers.

Protracted War Strategy: This strategy

seeks to prolong the fight against the ruling

government because insurgents realize the

governmenthas a conventional force advantage.

They adapt asymmetricmeans to attack selected

targets inorder todiscredit thegovernment and

causedisenfranchisement among thepopulation.

This strategy is the most widely used and is

normally associated with Maos guerrilla

movement, which encompassed three stages:

political organization and lowlevel violence

which focused on recruitment and the

infrastructure, guerrilla warfare, which

encompassed violent military directed at the

rulinggovernment,andmobileconventionalwar,whichencompassed largeconventionalattacksas

well as psychological and political means to

collapse the government. Mao also emphasized

flexibility in these phases allowing leaders to

reverttopreviousstagesifnecessary.

MilitaryFocusStrategy:Thisstrategygives

primacy to military action and subordinates

political action. It places little emphasis on the

political aspectbecause it assumes that there is

sufficient popular support or it will be a by

productof

military

victory.

It

focuses

on

catalyzingtheinsurgencythroughmilitaryefforts.

Urban Warfare Strategy: This strategy

employsterrorismasakeyfactorindestabilizing

thesocietyanditsgovernment.Thepurposeisto

createhavocandinsecurity,whichwilleventually

producealossofconfidenceinthegovernment.It

employstacticssuchasassassinations,bombings,



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kidnappings,armedpropaganda,ambushes,and

assaults on fixed targets in an effort to sabotage

economicassets.

Table 1.3 is a simplifiedmatrixof the three

major insurgent threats in Iraq depicting the

insurgency and type, strategy,means employed,

and primary region(s) of operation. Although

therearenodistinctlinesthatclearlydifferentiate

oneinsurgentgroupfromanother,itisimportant

tonotethateachinsurgencyembracesadifferent

strategy, and operates in specific regions. The

insurgents do share the goal of expelling the

coalitionforcesfromIraq,however,theFawqare

morewilling toworkwith theCoalition inorder

topreserveorenhancetheirregionalinfluence.28

Table 1.3

TypesofIraqiinsurgents,theirstrategy,means,andregionallocation

Insurgency/

Type

Strategy Means Region

Foreign

Terrorist

/Anarchist

UrbanWarfareStrategy transform

politicalcrisisintoarmedconflictby

conductingterroristactsthatwillforcethe

governmentintomilitaryaction.The

purposeistocreatehavocandinsecurity,

whichwilleventuallyproducealossof

confidenceinthegovernment.

SuicideBombings,29

Carbombings,Rocket

attacks,Assassinations,

Ambushes,

KidnappingsPropaganda

blamingtheCoalition

Centraland

NorthernIraq

Baathist

Regime

/

Preservationist

Protractedpopularwarstrategy prolong

thefightagainstthetransitioning

government.Employasymmetricmeansto

attackselectedtargetstodiscreditthe

governmentandcausedisenfranchisement

amongthepopulation.

Bombings(IEDs),Car

bombings,Rocketattacks,

Mortarattacks,SAMat

helos,Assassinations,

Ambushes,

Kidnappings,Propaganda

blamingtheCoalition,

Infiltration.30

Baghdad,

Tikrit,SWBasra,

andother

predominant

Sunnicities

TribalMilitia

(Fawq)

/

Traditionalist

Toemplaceavillageorcommunitybased

forcesupportingsacredprimordialvalues

rootedinancestraltiesandreligion.

Willingtoworkwithcoalitionifposition

ofinfluenceisrespected.(Flirtingw/

MilitaryStrategy)

Ambushes,Sniperfire,RPG

fires,Carjackings,

Smuggling

SouthernIraq,

Basra,AlFaw,

UmmQsar

31

Problems to Actors

The problems posedby the three insurgent

groupsareprimarilyofasecuritynaturetoallthe

actorsoperating

in

Iraq

but

there

are

other

problemsthatmanifestthemselvesdifferentlyand

indiffering intensities towardspecificactors.For

example, the Coalition also faces the politicized

challenges of dealing with the international

community and can see its influence fluctuate

based the policies and means it employs in

counteringtheinsurgencythreats.Additionally,a

nongovernmental organization or a private

organizationcanbedissuadedfromcontinuingits

participationin

the

rebuilding

because

the

monetaryorpersonalsecuritycostsare toohigh.

Seetable1.4

Table 1.4

ActorsinIraq,problemsencountered,andrequirementsplacedonactors.



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Actor ProblemEncounteredbyInsurgency RequirementsPlacedonActor

U.S.ledCoalition Securityoflocalpopulation,

SecurityofIraqiGoverningCouncil,

SecurityofNGOsandPrivateGroups

Forceprotection,

CredibilityandReputation,Abilitytoinfluenceinternational community,

Financialcosts

IncreaseForcesSeennegatively

Increaseforceprotectionmeasures

Imposerestrictivemeasures

Combatnegativepropaganda

Increaseexpenditures

IraqiGoverning

Council

PersonalSecurityHighvaluetargets

Credibility SeenaspuppetGovt

Inabilitytoaccommodatefactionalized

groups

Groupscanbepoliticizedbyattacks

Restrictpersonalmobilitytosecureareas

Overcomefactionalization

Combatnegativepropaganda

Providereputableservices/policies

amenabletopublicatlarge

IraqiSecurity

Forces

PersonalSecurity Seenastraitors

Overwhelmingtasktosecurelocal

environment

LimitedResources

LimitedTraining

Fear,leadingtoinaction

Combatnegativepropagandathrough

reputablesecurityposture

Patrolthestreetsenforcinglawandorder

Improvetraininglevels

Earntrustofpublicthroughfair,just,and

valiantlawenforcement

NGOsand

PrivateSector

PersonalSecurity SeenasCollaborators

Fear Attackswilldissuaderebuildingefforts

CostsforSecurityAnAdditional10%32

Attacksoninfrastructureincreasesproject

workload

Increasepersonalsecuritymeasures

Assessfeasibilityofcontinuingrebuilding

effortsorrelocatingtomoresecure

environment

Spendmoreonsecuritywhichmeansless

moneyforprojects

Conclusion

By using Dr. ONeills framework foranalysis, it was shown that Iraqs insurgency

is not composed of one insurgent faction butrather various factions that possess their own

(as well as shared) goals and utilize various

tactics and means of support. These

insurgents pose common as well as uniqueproblems to different actors, which in turncall for specific measures to counter such

problems. Identifying the insurgent threat by

type, region(s) of operation as well as having

an understanding the domestic andinternational setting are also valuable in

successfully developing effective tactics,

strategies and policies. Therefore, it is with

this understanding of the insurgency in Iraqthat one can better contemplate the uses of the

economic, diplomatic and military

instruments as they apply to this currentchallenge in Iraq.The views and opinions expressed in articles arestrictly the authors own, and do not necessarilyrepresent those of Al Nakhlah, its Advisory andEditorial Boards, or the Program on SouthwestAsiaand Islamic Civilization (SWAIC) at The FletcherSchool.

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ONeill,BardE.InsurgencyandTerrorism.Washington:Brasseys,1990.

RAND.AmericasRoleinNationBuilding:FromGermanytoIraq.2003.AccessedJanuary9,2004.

Availablefromhttp://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1753/.

Rieff,David.BlueprintforaMess,NewYorkTimes,November2,2003.

Russia,Germany,FranceCriticizeUnitedStatesOnIraq.Accessed21February2004.Availableat

http://www.dwworld.de/english/0,3367,7489_A_812501_1_A,00.html

TheTheoryandPracticeofInsurgencyandCounterinsurgency.AccessedFebruary19,2004.Available

fromhttp://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/1998/winter/art5w98.htm#author.

UnitedNations.LetterFromtheUSRepresentativetotheUN.October7,2001.AccessedJanuary19,2004.

Availablefrom

http://www.un.int/usa/s

2001

946.htm

.

UnitedNations.LetterFromtheUSRepresentativetotheUN.March20,2003.AccessedJanuary19,2004.

Availablefromhttp://www.un.int/usa/s2003_351.pdf.

UnitedNations.SecurityCouncilResolution1373.4385thMeeting.September28,2001.AccessedJanuary

19,2004.Availablefromhttp://odsdds

ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/N0155743.pdf?OpenElement.

UnitedNations.SecurityCouncilResolution1378.4415thMeeting.November14,2001.AccessedJanuary

19,2004.Availablefromhttp://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm.

UnitedNations.SecurityCouncilResolution1441.4644thMeeting.November8,2002.AccessedJanuary

19,2004.Availablefromhttp://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2002/sc2002.htm.

1

BardE.ONeill,InsurgencyandTerrorism,(Washington:Brasseys,1990),12.2

CentralIntelligenceAgency,GuidetotheAnalysisofInsurgency,Washington,D.C.:Central

IntelligenceAgency,n.d.2.3

UnitedNations,SecurityCouncilResolution1373,4385thMeeting.,September28,2001,(accessed

January19,2004);availablefromhttp://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm.



11/12


4

Ibid5

UnitedNations,LetterFromtheUSRepresentativetotheUN,October7,2001,(accessedJanuary19,

2004);availablefromhttp://www.un.int/usa/s2001946.htm.6

UnitedNations,SecurityCouncilResolution1378,4415thMeeting,November14,2001,(accessed

January19,2004);availablefromhttp://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm.7UnitedNations,SecurityCouncilResolution1441,4644

thMeeting,November8,2002.(accessedJanuary

19,2004);availablefromhttp://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2002/sc2002.htm.8

Ibid9

UnitedNations,LetterFromtheUSRepresentativetotheUN,March20,2003,(accessedJanuary19,

2004);availablefromhttp://www.un.int/usa/s2003_351.pdf.10

DeutscheWelle:Russia,Germany,FranceCriticizeUnitedStatesOnIraq,19March2003.(accessed

21February2004);availableathttp://www.dw

world.de/english/0,3367,7489_A_812501_1_A,00.html11

HelgaHaftendorn,TheSecurityPuzzle:TheTheoryBuildingandDisciplineBuildinginInternational

Security,InternationalStudiesQuarterly35(March1991):317.Inthisarticle,Haftendorn

arguesthatthereisnouniversalsecuritydefinitionthatappliestoallsituations.Nationalandinternationalsecurityenvironmentscanbeinterpreteddifferentlyandarecasespecific.

12

RAND,AmericasRoleinNationBuilding:FromGermanytoIraq,2003(accessedJanuary9,2004);

availablefromhttp://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1753/.13

Ibid.,186.14

StevenMetz,InsurgencyandCounterinsurgencyinIraq,TheWashingtonQuarterly,(Winter2003

2004):27.15

BardE.ONeill,1316.16

RaymondBonner,ExpertsWarnRegionalGroupsPoseGrowingThreat,NewYorkTimes,February

8,2004,I1.17

AnthonyCordesman,TheLessonsoftheIraqWar:MainReport,(WashingtonD.C.:CenterforStrategicandInternationalStudies,2003)122.

18

BarbaraBodine,U.S.StateDepartment,ResponsetoPersonalEmail,March21,2004.19

BardE.ONeill,3.20

AGeneralsView,(accessed5March,2004);availablefrom

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/julydec03/zinni_0930.html21

AnthonyH.Cordesman,MilitaryBalanceintheMiddleEast,(WashingtonD.C.:CenterforStrategic

andInternationalStudies,1998)12.22

DavidRieff,BlueprintforaMess,NewYorkTimes,November2,2003.23

BardE.ONeill,27.24

TimRipley,JTICBriefing:TheInsurgencyThreatinSouthernIraq,JanesTerrorismandInsurgencyCentre,(accessedon24Feb2004);availableathttp//jtic.janes.com/suscribe/jtic/doc_view/.

25

BardE.ONeill,21.26

PatrickJ.McDonnellandSebastianRotella,IraqSuicideBombersAppeartobeNatives,TheSeattle

Times,March1,2004.27

BardE.ONeill,31.28

TimRipley.



12/12

Al Nakhlah12

29

AccordingtoaMarch1st2004SeattleTimesarticlewrittenbyPatrickJ.McDonnellandSebastian

Rotella,manyofthesuicidebombersinIraqappeartobenatives.Thishoweverisincontrastto

thestatementsfromtheDoDbriefings,whichstatethatsuicideattacksareprimarilytheworksof

foreignjihadistslikeAbuMusabZarqawi,aJordanianconnectedtoAnsaralIslamandaffiliated

withalQaeda.U.S.andIraqiofficialshavesaidrepeatedlythatIraqisareunlikelytoengagein

suchmissions

because

they

do

not

have

ahistory

of

violent

religious

extremism.

30

JohnBurns,2AmericanCiviliansKilledbyFakeIraqiPolicemen,NewYorkTimes,March11,2004.31

BardE.ONeill,49.32

MaryPatFlaherty,InIraq,ContractorsSecurityCostsRise,WashingtonPost,February18,2004,

A01.


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