Russian Influence in Post-Communist Romania

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From Spheres of Influence to Energy Wars: Russian Influence in Post-Communist RomaniaTheodor Tudoroiu

Online Publication Date: 01 September 2008

To cite this Article Tudoroiu, Theodor(2008)'From Spheres of Influence to Energy Wars: Russian Influence in Post-CommunistRomania',Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics,24:3,386 414

To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/13523270802267922URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523270802267922

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From Spheres of Influence to Energy Wars:Russian Influence in Post-Communist

Romania

T H E O D O R T U D O R O I U

Since the fall of communism and its replacement with a pro-Moscow neo-communistregime in December 1989 the question of Russian influence has been a sensitive matterfor most Romanians. Accession to NATO (2004) and the European Union (2007)seemed to distance Romania from the Russian sphere of influence. However, thebitter dispute between President Traian Basescu and Prime Minister Calin Popescu-Tariceanu that led to the breakdown in 2007 of Romanias ruling coalition is in parta direct consequence of Russias new energy-based offensive in Europe. The import-ance of individual politicians choices in determining foreign policy remains a keyfactor in Romanias relations with Russia and with the West, and the Kremlins newapproach likewise has an important impact.

Introduction

In December 1989, a group of second-rank communist officials headed by a

former university colleague of Gorbachevs took power in Bucharest. As they

promoted a pro-Moscow foreign policy, the question of Russian influence

soon became a sensitive matter for most Romanians. The countrys accession

to NATO in 2004 and the European Union in 2007 apparently put an end to

the possibility of becoming part of a Russian sphere of influence in south-

eastern Europe. However, the bitter dispute between President Traian Basescuand Prime Minister Calin Popescu-Tariceanu that led to the 2007 breakdown

of the Romanian ruling coalition is more than a personality conflict or a domestic

struggle between opposing interest groups. At least in part, it is a direct

consequence of Russias new, energy-based offensive in Europe. Nevertheless,

while we are now witnessing a fundamentally new Russian approach, many of

the facilitating elements were put in place during the period 199096. Conse-

quently, this article analyses Moscows present involvement in Romania in the

context of the two countries post-1989 bilateral relations.

Theodor Tudoroiu, PhD, is a Postdoctoral Researcher in the Institute for European StudiesUniversite de MontrealMcGill University, Montreal, Canada.

Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.24, No.3, September 2008, pp.386 414ISSN 1352-3279 print/1743-9116 onlineDOI: 10.1080/13523270802267922# 2008 Taylor & Francis


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From a methodological point of view, two cautionary remarks deserve

mention in relation to available sources of information. First, official

secrecy, party political bias and press speculation frequently result in unreli-

able data. Because this article is based mostly on press reports, caution was

exercised in selecting unbiased information, to cross-check media sources,

and to eliminate unsupported exaggerations and conspiracy theories: every

mention of a rumour is clearly identified as such. Second, the subject has

always been sensitive for Romanians while being of marginal importance to

Russian public opinion; for this reason, information is abundant in the

Romanian media but scarce in Russia. Consequently, the article uses mostly

Romanian and Western sources.

The main goal of this article is to provide a clear picture of Moscows

present influence in Romania and to assess perspectives on the bilateralrelationship. This is by no means a question of purely Romanian interest;

rather, it is a case study of the Kremlins foreign policy directed towards

Central and Eastern Europe. Consequently, it illuminates Russias general atti-

tude towards that region. In this context, the term influence has a special

signification. Of course, it has nothing in common with the USSRs total

control over its external empire in the 1950s. Nevertheless, it goes far

beyond the normal promotion of a countrys political and economic national

interest. MoscowBucharest relations are highly asymmetrical, connecting a

great regional power and its medium-sized neighbour. There is a huge imbal-ance in political influence, military strength, economic weight and regional

status. In fact, the Kremlins post-1989 actions first aimed at Romanias

inclusion in a Soviet and then Russian sphere of influence. The fall of Iliescus

regime in 1996 and the subsequent NATO and EU enlargements constrained

Moscows ambitions. None the less, the Romanian episode of Russias present

energy-based offensive suggests that it will actively use economic incentives

to attract and support local political forces that promote a friendly foreign

policy. The Kremlins influence, therefore, preserves its hegemonic flavour.

The following section depicts the pro-Soviet beginnings of post-communistRomania; this is followed by three sections that analyse the evolution of Russian

influence during Iliescus regime (199096), the 1997 2000 democratic

intermezzo, and Iliescus return to power in 20014. The following section

portrays the present power struggle in Bucharest in relation to Russias new,

energy-related offensive in Europe. The conclusion further analyses recent

developments and summarizes the articles main findings.

The Pro-Soviet Beginnings of Romanian Post-Communism

In December 1989, a series of bloody events led to the replacement of the

Romanian Stalinist dictator, Nicolae Ceausescu, by a group of second-rank

R U S S I A N I N F L U E N C E I N P O S T - C O M M U N I S T R O M A N I A 387


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communist officials headed by Ion Iliescu, a former minister and ex-university

colleague of Gorbachevs.1 Ceausescus sultanistic rule was replaced by a

soft authoritarian regime that lasted until 1996. Iliescu was not a brutal,

fully-fledged dictator: he imposed a limited authoritarianism that sought to

uphold the appearance of formal democracy. But his regime did not refrain

from using brutal force to suppress protest movements (in 199091 repeated

violent marches on Bucharest by secret-police-led miners became known

internationally under the name of mineriades). The mass media, and

especially state television and radio, were under strict control; there was no

truly independent legal system. No fewer than nine secret services in fact,

unreformed former departments of Ceausescus infamous Securitate were

used to spy on, infiltrate and control opposition groups and political parties.

Blackmail and intimidation of politicians and journalists were common.National minorities were persecuted.2 The ruling party successively

called the National Salvation Front, the Democratic National Salvation

Front, the Party of Social Democracy in Romania and the Social Democratic

Party3 was in fact the unreformed Romanian Communist Party. It was mod-

estly reformed only in 2000, followed by a more credible conversion to social

democracy after Iliescus marginalization, following the 2004 electoral defeat.

A good description of the 199096 regime was made by Emil Constantinescu,

Romanias president between 1996 and 2000, in an article published by

Le Monde on 22 February 1997:

We are not talking about classical communism . . . but rather of a form

that is both old since it awakens latent nationalism and new because of

its goal, which is to preserve all that can be preserved, both in men and

structures, of the old regime: as many as possible of the large enter-

prises, as many monopolies as possible, especially in the areas of

energy and agriculture, as many of the political and economic leaders

as possible, and as much as possible of an isolationist and anti-

Western mythology, ready to halt all openings towards Europe andthe rest of the world.4

In this context, it is not surprising that Moscow was seen as a natural ally and

protector. In 1998 91 the unconditional support of a neighbouring superpower

was helpful in strengthening Iliescus control over the country. It also legiti-

mized his ideological preference for neo-communism. In terms of international

security it could provide protection against ethnic wars erupting in the area.

And it was a relationship supported by the personal convictions of Romanian

leaders. Soviet-educated Iliescu and most of his associates held the sincere

belief that Romanias (neo-communist) future could not be separated from

that of Moscow. This might be denied by Iliescu himself5 but is substantiated

by the 1996 episode of the Romanian Russian Friendship Treaty (see below).

388 JOUR NAL OF C OM M UNIST STUDIES AND TR ANSITION POLITIC S


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At that moment, the attempt to improve relations with Moscow was unpopular

and implied high electoral costs. Russia had ceased to be a superpower and its

capacity for legitimizing or protecting the regime in Bucharest had completely

disappeared. A rational-choice decision would have kept Iliescu away from

any negotiation with the Kremlin. The only explanation of his highly counter-

productive action is that he simply acted in accordance with his intimate

convictions. Furthermore, in June 1995 a journalist from the Romanian news-

paperZiua interviewed a former KGB colonel in Ukraine, who claimed to have

recruited Iliescu as a KGB agent. Ironically, the credibility of this allegation

was increased by the fact that members of Romanian secret services were

identified while spying on the author of the revealing article.6 While there

are no hard facts to prove Iliescus link with the KGB, his obsession with a

pro-Moscow foreign policy makes it quite plausible.However, in 1991 few political analysts were prepared for the shock of the

RomanianSoviet Friendship Treaty. This was the first (and only) such treaty

between the USSR and a former satellite state. It was based on the Kvitsinsky

Doctrine, adopted by Moscow on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union.

A clause prohibited both parties from joining any military alliance that was

perceived as hostile by the other side.7 Consequently, critics of the treaty,

inside and outside of Romania, viewed it as an infringement of the indepen-

dence and national sovereignty of the country, which if implemented, could

have resulted in its Finlandization.8

The new treaty made Romanias accession to NATO impossible. In fact,

Soviet control over the country was becoming stronger than during Ceausescus

reign.9 Other facts point in the same direction. Bucharest had been last in asking

for the official dismantling of the Warsaw Pact, in early 1991.10 On 19 December

1991 the Romanian minister of defence, Lieutenant-General Nicolae Spiroiu,

and his Soviet counterpart, Marshal Yevgeni Shaposhnikov, signed a military

co-operation agreement in Moscow.11

However, some days later Iliescu was faced with unforeseen changes. The

Soviet Unions collapse put him in an extremely vulnerable position, bothinternally and internationally. Fortunately, it soon became clear that the

new Russia considered itself the USSRs rightful heir in the Balkans. Still,

Romanian neo-communists had a more difficult mission. They were uncondi-

tional supporters of the Kremlin, be it Soviet or Russian, but the country they

ruled did not share this view. Relieved of the fears of a Soviet empire on its

border, Romanian society started to express open hostility towards Moscow.

In the words of Tom Gallagher, for most Romanians Russia remains a

pole of repulsion.12 Three historical reasons can account for this attitude.

The first subject of dispute concerns assets transported to Moscow during

the First World War, before Bucharest was occupied by German forces;

they include Romanias gold reserve, the crown jewels and other valuable



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items, of which the Bolsheviks took possession in 1917. Both the Soviet Union

and post-Soviet Russia have constantly refused their restitution (for the 2003

RomanianRussian treatys provision on this subject, see below). The second

is the brutal Stalinization of the country imposed by the Soviet regime. In the

two decades following the Second World War, hundreds of thousand of

Romanians were put in forced-labour camps and prisons. Some died as a

result of the brutal treatment and detention conditions, while the survivors

continued to be systematically persecuted even after their release. Romanias

sophisticated, highly Westernized political and intellectual elite was almost

completely destroyed.13 The third is related to the Romanian province of

Bessarabia, most of which is at present part of the Republic of Moldova.

After the first Russian occupation of 1812, all or part of this territory changed

hands in 1856, 1878, 1918, 1940, 1941 and 1944. In order to reduce the ratioof Romanians to Slavs, the Soviet authorities deported local populations, colo-

nized the territory with Russian-speakers, and arbitrarily modified the border

with Soviet Ukraine; they equally imposed a brutal process of Russification.14

After the fall of the USSR, there were clear moves to reunite the former

Soviet Republic of Moldova with Romania. However, the secession of Trans-

nistria and the ensuing war of 1992 ignited and instrumentalized by

Moscow halted the process.15 In Romania, this was perceived as a new

Russian aggression and stimulated general hostility toward the Kremlin.

In this context, Iliescus position was extremely delicate. He was deeplyconvinced that his countrys future was intertwined with Moscow, but he

could not state this openly, for fear of losing all electoral support. Hence his

politics of ambiguity.16

199096: The Politics of Ambiguity

The fall of the Soviet Union seriously shattered the Bucharest regimes confi-

dence in its own capacity to maintain and develop an anti-Western orientation.

The new Russia could not provide strong political or economic support. Anemerging Romanian civil society represented an increasingly serious obstacle.

Furthermore, the end of the centralized economic system, opposition to econ-

omic reform Iliescu insisted on having a strong state-controlled economic

sector and constantly opposed large-scale privatization and corruption gen-

erated a structural economic crisis.17 The country, already one of the poorest

in Europe, became dependent on external financial aid. Fortunately, the West

started to perceive Romania as an oasis of stability between the former Soviet

Union and Yugoslavia, torn by civil war. To prevent further instability, both

Americans and West Europeans were increasingly willing to support Iliescus

regime, provided it showed some signs of good-will. Having no alternative,

the Bucharest government responded by progressively declaring itself in



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favour of democratization, market-oriented reform, and pro-Western foreign

policy. The apparent change was sufficient to bring European and American

economic support, while in fact very little was done.

This ambiguity is exemplified by Bucharests attitude towards NATO.

Iliescu had never manifested open hostility, even when he was negotiating

an anti-NATO treaty with the Soviet Union. Romania willingly became a

member of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council, but in July 1993 the

head of the Romanian military, General Dumitru Cioflina, stated that

Romania was not going to enjoy closer relations with NATO than the ones

it already had with Russia.18 In January 1994, Bucharest was the first to

sign NATOs Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework agreement,19 a move

that was widely publicized by the state-controlled media in Romania.

However, this apparently pro-American move was only a consequence ofthe fact that the PfP included no security guarantees. Iliescu had decided to

use it as an alternative to NATO membership and not as a first step towards

accession. In 1996, one year before the Madrid summit that would decide

the limits of NATOs first eastward enlargement, General Cioflina stated

that, if Russian Communists win the June presidential elections, a regional

extra-NATO alliance could be discussed. [This military pact could

reunite] countries of the former Warsaw Pact as well as former Soviet repub-

lics.20 On one occasion, Ziua published a list of 20 contradictory official

statements made between 1991 and 2000 by Iliescu and his close associates.In the list, each pro-Western declaration was followed by a diametrically

opposed one. The article was appropriately entitled The Duplicitous

Foreign Policy of Iliescus Regime.21

Economics followed the same course. On the one hand, Romania was

dependent on aid coming from the International Monetary Fund, the European

Union and Western states; on the other, the government did everything in its

power to increase trade with Russia. During a visit to Moscow in July 1995,

Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu declared that he was ready to realign the

Romanian economy with that of Russia because Western economic supporthad been so disappointing.22 The purely political reason for such a reorienta-

tion is revealed by the fact that, unlike other Central and East European

(CEE) countries, Romania followed Moscow in not abandoning the former

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) project in the steel-

production city of Krivoi Rog (Kryvy Rih) (Ukraine), despite enormous

costs and lack of profit.23 An important effort was made to encourage bilateral

trade. Romania depends on Russia for energy, including 40 per cent of its

natural gas supply.24 In order to ease this dependence, Ceausescu had initiated

the construction of a nuclear plant located in Cernavoda, assisted by Canada.

In 1989, five reactors were under construction, with 85 per cent of the first

actually completed. At full capacity, the plant would have allowed the



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replacement of Russian gas with cheap electrical power, thereby eliminating

energy dependence on Moscow. However, one of Iliescus first measures

was to stop work at Cernavoda. It was only some years later, and under the

pressure of financial difficulties, that he finally decided to restart work on

the first reactor. The goal was to reduce costly oil imports required by oil-

based electrical plants, not to diminish gas consumption. The first Cernavoda

nuclear reactor finally became operational in 1996. The last three are still

uncompleted, perpetuating the need for massive gas imports from Russia.25

The former communists were satisfied with this situation since it allowed

them to justify maintaining friendly relations with the unpopular Kremlin.

However, they were disappointed by the sharp fall of Romanian exports to

Russia. This had a very clear cause: Russian companies systematically did

not pay for goods that had already been imported. As Russias courts arefamously inefficient and mafia-style practices widespread, it is not surprising

that Romanian companies preferred to ignore such a dangerous market.26

In order to increase exports at any cost, Iliescus regime put in place a

credit and insurance scheme based on the Romanian export credit agency,

Eximbank.27 Simply put, exporters losses were to be compensated from the

state budget. To avoid negative publicity, the alarming levels of past losses

were kept secret, except for medium- and long-term credits prior to 1989.

Paradoxically, this mechanism came to maturity after the fall of Iliescu, so

it will be detailed in the following section. In any case, pro-Russian economicmeasures were costly. In order to maintain or even create mutual dependence,

the former communists in Romania had to buy expensive gas instead of pro-

ducing cheap atomic electrical power, and they spent large amounts of money

to subsidize non-performing exports. At a time when the country depended on

Western financial aid, this was a burden with immediate consequences for the

general economic situation. The crisis deepened, making Iliescus regime less

and less popular; and, as the 1996 elections showed, friendship with Russia

came at a very high political cost.

Another element that contributed greatly to the weakening of Iliescuselectoral position was his obsession with the achievement of a Romanian

Russian Friendship Treaty. Five years earlier, he had proved ready to sacrifice

his countrys sovereignty if this could ensure good relations with Moscow. But

in the meantime, Romanian society had become highly vocal on key points

which the Kremlin wanted to uphold in the treaty. Recklessly, Iliescu decided

to ignore Romanian public opinion and accept Russian terms; the new bilateral

treaty was scheduled to be signed on 27 April 1996. One of the main points of

dispute, the condemnation of the 1939 MolotovRibbentrop pact (which

allowed the Soviet annexation of what is now the Republic of Moldova), was

not placed in the main treaty, but in a separate annex. Furthermore, the question

of the Romanian treasure confiscated by the Bolsheviks in 1918 was ignored.



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This raised a storm of protest from the parliamentary opposition and public

opinion.28 Iliescus spokesman organized a press conference in order to reassure

everyone that the state of rumour, agitation and tension and the frenetic alarm

signals are unjustified.29 Still, at the last minute, the signing of the treaty was

postponed.

Six months later, Iliescu paid the price of over-confidence. By 1996,

Romanian society was no longer dominated by the political apathy that pre-

vailed in 1990 92. A vibrant civil society that shared democratic values

had developed, and mass mobilization led to the electoral victory of resolutely

pro-democratic and pro-Western political forces.30 As the neo-communist

regime came to an end, its successors openly repudiated Iliescus eastern

commitments.

19972000: Manoeuvres in the Dark

The relationship between Iliescus regime and Moscow, and its limits, are well

captured by Tom Gallagher, a leading Western expert on post-communist

Romanian politics:

Anti-reformers . . . demonstrated their ascendancy by blocking econ-

omic reform between 1989 and 1996. But their advance has been con-

tained by the fact that the main proponent of authoritarian politics in

the region remains Russia. Russia appears keen to involve Romania in

a series of economic agreements that would make the Romanian

economy depend on its cheap energy supplies in return for political

compliance. This would suit the powerful lobby of managers of the

state-led Romanian energy sector who are hostile to genuine reform.

But for most Romanians Russia remains a pole of repulsion owing

to long-term Russian bids to stifle Romanian independence. So it is dif-

ficult for Romanian interests hostile to the Western democratic project to

take measures which are seen as analogous to ones being promoted byredbrown forces in Russia itself. (Similarly, the surprising weakness

of Russian-influenced organized crime in Romania can probably be

ascribed to the fact that even for local criminal forces Russia remains

an anti-model.)31

Consequently, the victors in 1996 had no reason to preserve the neo-communist

leaning towards Moscow. Official statements started to reflect a more

critical attitude, their concerns reflected by Weiner:

Russia has engaged in a series of actions which have been interpreted by

some as threatening to the national security and interests of Romania.

These include the adoption of a Resolution by the Russian Duma in

1995 calling for the reconstitution of the Soviet Union, the designation



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by the Russian Parliament of Transnistria as an area of strategic interest,

and the union of Belarus and Russia, which threatens the security of

Ukraine, a state which shares a border with Romania.32

With a friendly Iliescu in power, the Kremlin could be sure that such moves

would never generate any tension. But the new pro-Western government in

Bucharest took them very seriously, and one of the immediate consequences

was its request for NATO membership.

In fact, it is precisely at this moment that Russia initiated an active policy

toward Romania. Until then, it could afford a passive attitude as Romanian

neo-communists were making all necessary efforts to ensure a harmonious

relationship. With their loss of power, Moscow saw its influence in the

country threatened. Resolute action was needed. The first and most visiblestep was related to the economy. Russian investors started to target Romanian

companies in what were clearly politically-motivated moves. One of the best-

publicized cases concerns the purchase of the Petrotel refinery, one of the

largest consortiums in Romania: During early and mid-1998, when Russian

firm Lukoil bought controlling interest in the Romanian company oil Petrotel,

amidst sharp Russian statements against NATO enlargement, the Russian

ambassador in Bucharest was often the focus of attention and some

innuendo.33 In all, more than 200 Russian companies became involved in

the Romanian economy during the 1990s, and their investments reachedmore than $400 million.34 Frequently, their goals and practices were judged

suspect:

In his 19992000 and 2001 reports to parliament, the director of

Romanian Security Intelligence, Alexandru-Radu Timofte, claimed that

foreign interest groups posed a danger to the countrys economy,

including threats under the guise of strategic investments. . . .

Timofte mentioned the collapsed National Investment Fund, which

was manipulated from abroad; there is little doubt that he was referringto Russian business groups. . . . He implied that foreign agents could also

be involved in the process to gain favors from government officials.35

Besides investments, increasing bilateral trade became a Russian obses-

sion. In fact, what the Kremlin was now advocating was Iliescus old plan

of creating mutual economic dependence.

When Ion Diaconescu, the chairman of the National PeasantChristian

Democratic Party [PNTCD] visited Moscow in September 1997,

Russian Foreign Minister Evgenii Primakov complained about Roma-

nias neglect of the Russian market and stressed the need for the two

countries to improve their trade relations.36



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Diaconescu, who had spent part of his life in Stalinist prisons, was a strong

advocate of Romanias accession to NATO. He had no reason to encourage

trade relations with a non-democratic and increasingly anti-Western Russia.

But Primakovs demand was better received by certain Romanian structures

created under Iliescus regime.

The most vocal was the National Association of Exporters and Importers

of Romania (NAEIR) and more specifically its chairman, Mihai Ionescu.

Pointing to unbalanced bilateral trade with Russia, he did not mention the

possible completion of the Cernavoda nuclear plant in order to eliminate

Russian gas imports. Instead, he started a crusade to reconquer lost markets

in the East by increasing Romanian exports to former Soviet Union republics

and especially Russia.37 As shown above, Russian markets were plagued by

dubious business ethics, mafia-type methods and an inefficient legal system,which discouraged Romanian exporters. NAEIR asked for the development

of the existing credit insurance mechanism, which transferred exporters

losses to the national budget. But Eximbank of Romania, the state export

credit agency, did not have the appropriate financial resources. A new

scheme was created: Eximbank would only insure export credits generously

offered by Bancorex, the state-owned and most important Romanian bank.38

I remember personally witnessing a 1999 conversation during which a high-

ranking official related to the above-mentioned banks was trying to convince

the head of a Romanian state company to start exporting to Russia. The poten-tial exporter was puzzled, as similar previous experiences had produced disas-

trous results. He was reminded that, within the new framework, his company

would first receive a Bancorex credit covering all production costs. Then he

need not worry about Russian payments for exported goods: Eximbank

would compensate Bancorex for any possible loss. It is very difficult to under-

stand how this Iliescu-style scheme could have developed. Its goal was to

increase dependence upon Russia at a time when the Romanian government

shared genuine pro-Western convictions. Furthermore, it was clearly costly,

as it would implicitly transfer money from Romanias budget to dubiousRussian companies.

There are two possible explanations. On the one hand, communist-era state

companies would receive large credits allowing them to avoid bankruptcy

despite their uncompetitive products; this could have positive electoral

effects in view of the 2000 elections. On the other hand, under Iliescus

regime, all Romanian state structures were headed by members of the

former communist elite. Many of them survived the 1996 election, defecting

to the new ruling parties. But their true allegiance can be questioned given

certain pro-Russian moves. In any case, the new scheme was inefficient and

short-lived. At the time of its creation, the effects of the 1998 Russian financial

crisis were still felt and were hampering bilateral trade. Furthermore, between



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1990 and 1996 Bancorex had lent huge sums on a discretionary basis to failing

state companies and clients of the Iliescu regime, which then pumped enor-

mous amounts of taxpayers money back into it.39 When, in July 1999, it

was disclosed that Bancorex had issued $1.2 billion in non-performing

loans, it was decided to close it down.40 The export-credit scheme had to be

dramatically scaled down to fit Eximbanks modest financial capabilities.

However, other more ambitious projects were prepared in the Kremlin.

In November 1998, soon after the Russian financial crisis, Moscows ambas-

sador in Bucharest stated that Primakov wanted to improve economic relations

with Romania to reach the pre-crisis level and even a higher one.41 It seemed

a simple enough diplomatic statement, but one year later, in November 1999,

the Romanian prime minister, Radu Vasile, member of the Christian Democrat

Peasant National Party, made an important visit to Moscow. The Romanianambassador in Russia stated that the goal of the visit was the unblocking of

bilateral trade relations. He mentioned gas and oil, Romanian involvement

in the Russian construction sector, and other projects of trade co-operation.

Prime Ministers Vasile and Putin would find solutions including govern-

ment guarantees countering the difficulty of our companies to find

Russian partners willing to pay for goods imported from Romania or to guar-

antee the payments. However, the same day, sources of the Russian ministry

of foreign affairs stated that boosting trade relations would not be agreed by

Moscow as long as Romania intended to join NATO.42

The warning did notworry Radu Vasile. On 25 November 1999 he went to Moscow stating that

he would increase the exports of a large number of goods, facilitate the partici-

pation of Romanian companies in the exploitation of Russian oil and gas

deposits, and create a joint venture meant to support Romanian exports to

Russia and to attract Russian investments in Romania. He even wanted to

expand co-operation between local administrations in the two countries.43

The visit proved to be surprisingly cordial. The two prime ministers had a

very confidential one-hour tete-a-tete during which even translators were

sent away.44 In statements made in Moscow and Bucharest, Vasile assertedthat we have to understand Russia. Boosting trade relations was seen as

imperative and Romania had to sign the Friendship Treaty as soon as possible,

leaving to the historians the questions of the 1918 treasure and the Molotov

Ribbentrop pact. Finally, in a Kremlin statement he claimed that Romanias

European road passes through Moscow.45 This was too much for his Christian

Democrat colleagues. The partys chairman, Ion Diaconescu, immediately

remarked that we have a more direct road to Europe, through Paris, for

example. He equally stated that there could be no political commitment to

return to the past situation.46 The titles of Romanian newspaper articles

even spoke of dangerous treason.47 Three weeks after his memorable visit

Vasile was sacked.



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Undoubtedly, this was the most ambitious Russian attempt to recover

Iliescu-era influence after the fall of the neo-communist regime. Rapid

failure did not diminish its remarkable audacity. Since 1989, Romanian

Christian Democrats had been the most resolute opponents of Iliescus pro-

Russian attitude, a fact of which Vasile could not have been unaware. If he

took the daring step of an openly pro-Kremlin stance, there seems to be

only one explanation: he was not alone. He probably believed that members

of his party and perhaps a larger sector of the ruling coalition would

join his new orientation. This hypothesis might be supported by the fact

that, during the Moscow visit, a Romanian economic journalist, Eugen

Ovidiu Chirovici, published an article entitled The Russian Trump Card.

It explains the advantages of a real economic partnership with Russia,

claiming that, if we receive a preferential treatment in economic relationswith Russia, we will have an important trump card in future relations with

the European Union and with Central European states, a trump card which

could be used in function of our interests.48 An interesting detail was

added. At that time, Putin was only the last in a series of Yeltsin-appointed

ephemeral prime ministers, yet Chirovici here predicted that Putin would in

fact be the future president. He equally notes that obtaining the sympathy of

the Russian president-to-be can bring favourable wind into the sail of Radu

Vasiles [political] career.49 The article had only limited impact. However,

its author is not unknown. In November 2000January 2001 his name was fre-quently quoted in the context of the difficult merger of two leading Romanian

Freemason lodges. The merger ceremony was attended by Freemasons from

eight countries, including Russia.50 This is not to suggest a Masonic plot or

other such absurdities, but simply to show that Chirovici was well connected

with Russian circles and probably had inside information on Yeltsins inten-

tion to nominate Putin as his successor. Apparently, Vasile had the same infor-

mation and decided to exploit the opportunity. This decision, however, shows

that the prime minister genuinely believed that influential members of his

party had been converted to Chirovicis point of view by Russian sympathi-zers. A second and complementary hypothesis can be formulated. In April

2006, Romanias 19962000 president, Emil Constantinescu, claimed that

he had evidence proving that Radu Vasile had been an informer of Ceauses-

cus Securitate.51 This is, for the time being, an unconfirmed allegation, but

if it were true, Vasile could have been extremely vulnerable to blackmail by

those aware of his past. Also, Iliescu was famous for using the services of

Virgil Magureanu, head of the Romanian intelligence service, to systemati-

cally manipulate Securitate files that were or had been in its possession. The

possibility that Radu Vasiles move had in fact been the combined result of

Romanian neo-communist blackmail and Russian promises cannot be dis-

counted. In any case, the prime minister was not the only target of Russian



14/30

manoeuvres. Information is of course scarce, but the Romanian press alleged

that in 1999 the then anonymous Cosmin Gusa developed close relations with

so-called Russian agents. He later became involved in Russian investments

in Romania, while publicly stating that Russia is my second homeland.52

When, after the 2000 elections, Iliescus party returned to power, Gusa

became secretary general of the governing party.

Besides the conversion of Romanian politicians and businessmen, Russia

apparently made use of less subtle methods. It was during the Kosovo crisis

that Romanian Russian relations became openly antagonistic. While

Moscow expressed its support for Milosevic, the Romanian government

declared itself on NATOs side and even forbade the flight of Russian

planes over its territory, preventing them from reaching Yugoslavia.53 In fact,

the strongest pro-NATO statements from Romanian officials came in thewake of the April 16 vote in the Russian Duma endorsing the call for a

union between Russia, Belarus and Serbia. Official anxiety and that of

much of the public opinion derived from the belief that Romanian security

and possibly independence might be threatened if a historic adversary

like Russia were to establish itself as a regional power in the Balkans.54

Romanian press reports suggest that, at that time, Russia went so far as to

organize certain small scale undercover actions directed at destabilizing

Romania. A good opportunity was provided by a new mineriada (the marchon Bucharest of miners who, on Iliescus orders, had previously crushed the

anti-communist movement of 1990 and brought down the Petre Roman gov-

ernment in 1991): When the fifth mineriada occurred in January 1999, public

speculation by a variety of politicians and journalists about Russian involve-

ment allegedly to create a crisis in Romania and thereby divert Western

attention from Serbia gained currency.55

Vasile Alexe, a regular columnist in Romania Libera, speculated that

unnamed foreign interests wishing to destabilize the entire Balkanswere behind the revolt. The view was supported by Ion Diaconescu,

the elderly leader of the PNTCD, who demanded in its aftermath that

all those acting in the interests of foreign powers should be eliminated

from the ministry of the interior. The SRI [the Romanian Intelligence

Service] reports from districts affected by the unrest backed up views

persistently expressed in the print media of suspicious activities on

the part of Russian embassy officials at the height of the unrest.56

It was reported that Russian embassy vehicles were seen at Costesti and

Ramnicu Valcea, recording on videotape the movements of Romanian secur-

ity forces and probably relaying all information to the marching miners.57 It is

not surprising that the Romanian publics image of Russia grew even darker:



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Moscows behind-the-scenes role is suspect in Bucharest. Senior Russian

officials are probed at almost every occasion about such matters, with a

subtext of suspicion not far from the surface.58 Fortunately for the

Kremlin, economic crisis and government corruption eroded the electoral

support of Romanian democratic political forces. Following the November

December 2000 elections, Iliescus partly reformed party returned to power.

20014: Back in Power, With a Difference

For the Kremlin, the change was a triumph. The Moscow-friendly Cosmin

Gusa was appointed general secretary of the governing party; Ioan Mircea

Pascu, who had stated during the Kosovo campaign that the NATO interven-

tion was illegitimate,

59

was now defence minister; Eugen Ovidiu Chiroviciwould soon become the prime ministers adviser on economic matters.60

Since the re-election victory of President Iliescu in November

2000, Moscow has made various overtures toward Bucharest. In particu-

lar, the Russians were eager to develop closer economic ties in the

energy and transport sectors. Some analysts speculated that Iliescu

maintained secret ties with the Russian political establishment

and there were rumors of the supposed existence of a telephone

hotline to the Russian president, which Iliescu strenuously denied.

The Kremlin believed that a social democratic president and govern-

ment in Bucharest would be more accommodating than a center-right

administration on the Moldovan question and this would play to

Moscows advantage.61

Iliescu was finally able to accomplish his old obsession, the conclusion of

the Friendship Treaty. Negotiations started in Moscow in October 2001,

between the Romanian foreign minister, Mircea Geoana, and his Russian

counterpart, Igor Ivanov:

The Romanians displayed a new pragmatism in their position by not

insisting that the MolotovRibbentrop Pact be renounced or that the

Romanian treasure be addressed. . . . On 8 November 2001, President

Iliescu stated that the issue of the MolotovRibbentrop Pact was no

longer relevant, and the issue of the treasure could be dealt with in an

annex to the treaty.62

Despite the opposition of certain Romanian political forces, the treaty of

friendship and co-operation was finally signed in July 2003, during a visit

by Iliescu to Moscow. The issue of the repatriation of Romanian gold and

cultural items kept by the Soviet Union after the First World War was

addressed only in a declaration. The two parties agreed to set up a joint



16/30

commission of experts to resolve the issue. The same declaration condemned

the MolotovRibbentrop Pact but also Romanias participation in the Second

World War, directed at recovering the territory occupied by Stalin on the basis

of that pact.63

Predictably, economic co-operation received a new boost. The Romanian

prime minister, Adrian Nastase, visited Moscow in February 2002 and met the

Russian prime minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, in an effort to improve trade

relations between the two countries.64 Iliescu, assisted by Foreign Minister

Mircea Geoana (his protege at that time) was present at the opening of the

first Russian bank in Bucharest.65 In March 2003, Eximbank of Romania

opened a credit line of $10 million to the Russian Vneshtorgbank in order

to encourage exports to Russia. It was in Moscow that Eximbank opened, in

June 2004, its only foreign branch, intended to intensify traditional bilateraltrade relations with this market66 (however, this venture was short-lived as

the Moscow branch soon had to be closed down). Other projects also were

envisaged. During his 2003 visit to Moscow,

Iliescu met with representatives of Gazprom and other Russian gas com-

panies regarding the possibility of establishing a joint consortium to

transport gas from Russia to Romania. They also discussed the

possibility of building a pipeline from Russia to the Romanian port of

Constanta. . . . A steel complex, based in the town of Targoviste, was

purchased in August of 2002 by the Conares Trading company,

controlled by Russian business. This complex is now called little

Russia. Russias prime minister stated in Bucharest that the Russian

government will continue to support our companies in the process of

privatization in Romania. They were expected to participate in the

privatization of several large enterprises, including Distrigaz, Carom,

and Petrotub.67

Russia even expressed an interest in supplying technology for the construction

of a new unit at the Cernavoda nuclear plant.68

At first view, this seemed like nothing more than a renewal of the 199096

foreign policy orientation. In reality, things were quite different. Iliescu and

his ministers did everything to prove their friendship and sympathy towards

Russia. At the same time and to the Kremlins horror they made

genuine efforts to secure Romanias accession to NATO. There are two comp-

lementary explanations for this. On the one hand, Romanian neo-communists

had learned the lesson of 1996. They understood they could not impose an

authoritarian, pro-Russian regime upon the newly-developed Romanian civil

society. Western democratic values had profoundly modified the populations

way of thinking. Accession to NATO and to the European Union was

considered the natural trajectory of European Romania. Iliescu and his



17/30

associates realized that, in order to stay in power, they had to follow this

direction. Avoiding the openly authoritarian practices of 1990 96, they

tried to improve their public image by vocally redefining themselves as

European social democrats. On the other hand, the 2000 neo-communists

social democrats had lost their pre-1996 unity. The party was no longer

under Iliescus absolute control. A new anti-Iliescu wing, led by Prime Min-

ister Adrian Nastase, was now very influential. It reunited about half of the

Bucharest party leaders and it was supported by the local barons, the

partys regional strongmen. It would be wrong to believe they shared

genuine democratic or pro-Western convictions. But unlike Iliescu

most, if not all, were extremely corrupt (Tom Gallagher even entitled a

chapter Looters of the State by Appointment of Brussels: Return of the

Social Democrats, 20012003;

69

Nastase himself went on trial in February2006 on multiple corruption charges and was subsequently forced to resign

as party leader). Their main goal seemed to be to become rich, and neo-com-

munism could not be of much help. Accepting bribes linked to large procure-

ment contracts with Western companies was. To give only one of many

examples, in June 2006, the British police and Serious Fraud Office disclosed

that the Romanian purchase in 2003 of two old British frigates was

accompanied by a bribe of approximately 7 million paid by BAE, Britains

biggest arms company, to an undisclosed Romanian official.70 So far, the offi-

cial has not been identified, and whether or to whom the money has been redis-tributed is unclear. This case highlights the incentives that convert former

KGB agents into passionate pro-Westerners.

When the September 2001 terrorists attacks, in the words of Nelson,

created an unexpected opening for stronger ties with Washington, a con-

certed and obvious effort was mounted by the government of President Ion

Iliescu and Prime Minister Adrian Nastase to position Bucharest as close as

possible to George W. Bushs global war on terrorism.71 Even the signing

of the Friendship Treaty with Russia was falsely presented by Iliescu as a

necessary step to prove that there would be no tension with neighbouringstates, and hence no regional obstacle to joining NATO.72 Romania finally

became a NATO member in 2004. In the same year, Iliescus party lost elec-

tions and entered a period of internal crisis, with the anti-Iliescu wing appar-

ently having the upper hand (the younger Mircea Geoana even became the

leader of the party). Foreign policy choices were now limited to President

Traian Basescus project of a Bucharest London Washington axis and

Prime Minister Calin Popescu-Tariceanus more pro-European orientation.73

Russia seemed to have completely lost its influence in Romania and had to

accept the new situation since more pressing issues were coming to the fore

in the aftermath of coloured Revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia, and

Kyrgyzstan.



18/30

2007: A New Beginning

Basescus presidential tenure has not been free of hesitations and ambiguities.

His adversaries constantly criticized his alleged appetite for power and his

temperamental behaviour. It is suggested that his work during the communistperiod unavoidably put him in close relations with Ceausescus Securitate.

Indeed, in 198789 he was the head of the Romanian River Navigation

Company Navroms branch in Antwerp, and it is widely believed that pos-

itions of this rank were reserved to agents of the secret service. Basescu is

also frequently accused of corruption. He was under inquiry for his alleged

role in the fraudulent sale of 16 ships during his tenure as undersecretary of

state for naval transportation and minister of transport in 1991 92.74 As

mayor of Bucharest (20002004) he was accused of illegal activities favour-

ing the interest group of Dorin Cocos, whose wife Elena Udrea was one ofBasescus closest (and most controversial) advisers.75

Nevertheless, Basescu contributed significantly to the break with the neo-

communist past that allowed Romanias accession to the EU on 1 January

2007. Despite some hesitation, he addressed the declassification of most

Securitate files, officially condemned the communist dictatorship in Romania

and, more importantly, actively supported the fight against high-level corrup-

tion. In fact, he was the only constant supporter of Monica Macovei, the remark-

ably efficient minister of justice. A former NGO activist, Mrs Macovei launched

an anti-corruption crusade targeting important members of both the opposition

and the governing coalition. Her resolute actions were soon perceived as a lethal

threat by many corrupt politicians. In February 2007, 81 senators (out of a total

of 137) voted for a motion demanding her resignation.76 One of the most pro-

minent figures under investigation was Dinu Patriciu, a very close associate

of Prime Minister Popescu-Tariceanu. Patriciu owned Rompetrol, which in

2006 became the most important Romanian oil firm, operating in 13 countries,

including France and Spain.77 In May 2005, prosecutors detained Patriciu after

an 18-hour marathon interrogation, although he was released the next daybecause of legal irregularities.78 However, scandal broke out when it was dis-

closed that the prime minister had asked Prosecutor-General Ilie Botos and Pre-

sident Basescu to help Patriciu.79 The president had little sympathy for this

liberal who had financially contributed to Iliescus electoral campaign of

200480 and did not intervene in his support. This appeared to be the first

unfriendly action which triggered the increasingly bitter dispute culminating

in 2007 in the break-up of Romanias ruling coalition.

By September 2006, it was observed that a blizzard of scandals, rows and

resignations [had] hit the centre-right ruling coalition.81

Basescu supported awing of the National Liberal Party led by Theodor Stolojan and Valeriu Stoica

that finally broke away and created a pro-Basescu Liberal Democratic Party



19/30

(PLD).82 Tensions further escalated in January 2007, when the president and

the prime minister had a brutal exchange of mutual incriminations on live tele-

vision.83 The governing coalition collapsed in March, with Popescu-Tariceanu

forming a minority government informally supported by the social democrats.

To the relief of many politicians, Justice Minister Monica Macovei was

replaced. Ironically, the government of Macedonia asked her to become an

adviser in its own campaign against corruption.84

One of the first actions undertaken by the new minister of justice, Tudor

Chiuariu, was to order the replacement of the chief prosecutor conducting cor-

ruption investigations, including that against Patriciu.85 Going one step

further, Tariceanu and the Social Democrats, led by Mircea Geoana, forced

a parliamentary vote to suspend the president from office, which they won

by 322 votes to 108,

86

a showing not matched by that of the electorate. Suc-cessfully presenting himself as victim to the oligarchs plot, Basescu received

huge popular support and triumphantly returned to power after winning the

referendum of 19 May 2007 with a spectacular 74.48 per cent of the vote.87

While both the Liberals and the Social Democrats were greatly delegitimized,

the president reinforced his public image as a lone fighter against the corrupt

oligarchy. There is, however, no apparent end to the present stalemate as all

parties (except that of Basescu) fear early elections. Most probably, the presi-

dent and his opponents will continue their daily disputes until the end of 2008.

This tortuous episode seems exclusively related to Romanian domesticpolitics. Still, in an interview with Romania Libera on 4 May 2007 Basescu

claimed that his recent suspension from office was in fact the result of exter-

nal structures interested in destabilizing Romania, suggesting that the

structures mentioned are Russian. Media owned by his adversaries that is,

most Romanian private media immediately ridiculed the statement. Never-

theless, details progressively emerged in support of this allegation. First of all,

it should be remembered that Basescu was the first Romanian head of state to

promote an openly pro-American foreign policy, best illustrated by his efforts

to create a Bucharest London Washington axis. He actively supportedRomanias military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq. He advocated the pre-

sence of American military bases in Romania. Furthermore, President

Basescu asked for the active involvement of NATO and the United States in

the Black Sea region. In a speech delivered in March 2005 at the Council

on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC, he hailed the pro-Western (and

anti-Russian) democratic revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia and asked for

the formulation of a common Euro-Atlantic strategy for the Black Sea

region in order to promote freedom, democracy, prosperity and stability

leading to the creation of a new identity for the Black Sea region. The

engine of the change would be the RomanianAmerican strategic partnership;

its immediate goal would be finding lasting solutions for the frozen



20/30

conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh

[which] threaten the security of Europe by spilling over organized crime,

human and arms trafficking, and transnational terrorism. More specifically,

he asked for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria and

Georgia.88 He tried to win President Bushs support for this plan during two

visits to the White House, in March 2005 and July 2006.89 In September

2005, in a speech delivered at Stanford University, he proposed the creation

of a USEU military task force in the region, as the Russian Federation

does not accept the internationalization of the Black Sea. He insisted that

it is time for the Black Sea to cease being a Russian lake.90 Romanias

National Security Strategy, adopted in April 2006, reflects the same ideas.91

Another dimension of Basescus provocative statements concerns Russian

energy exports. Only 60 per cent of Romanias total gas consumption is domes-tically produced, the rest being imported from Russia on the basis of contracts

between Gazprom, Wintershall Erdgas Handelshaus, and Romanian companies.

In December 2005 the price was $252 per thousand cubic metres. There was a

planned increase to $280 in January 2006, but for the rest of that year the price

was expected to be kept below $285.92 In fact, it reached $310, higher than in

any other CEE country. Basescu accused Russia of artificially increasing it for

political reasons.93 He went so far as to compare Gazprom with the Soviet Red

Army.94 In order to resolve this situation, he asked the European Union and the

United States to accelerate the building of alternative routes of transit forCaspian Sea gas that would eliminate the Russian monopoly. Since Moscow

was using frozen conflicts in the Black Sea area to hamper such projects, he

stated, active Western involvement in the region was needed. While saying

that Romania had already started to reorient its energy policy towards alterna-

tive sources such as coal, hydroelectricity and atomic plants, Basescu called for

an EU energy policy, reducing dependence on Russia. Finding an alternative to

Russian gas has to be the European Unions No.1 priority, he claimed.95

These and other anti-Russian statements including comments on

Russias democratic deficit96 were predictably met with hostility inMoscow. The Kremlins successive ambassadors in Bucharest formulated

rather polite criticism, but the Romanian foreign affairs ministry concluded

that Russia had initiated a concerted diplomatic offensive against

Romania.97 Indeed, in November 2006, Moscow reproached the European

Union for not having consulted it on Romanias membership.98 The protest

was not turned down. On the contrary, in April 2007, EU officials agreed

on a common declaration responding to Moscows economic demands:

The Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, the EU Commissioner forForeign Affairs Benita Ferrero-Waldner and the German foreign minister

Frank-Walter Steinmeier signed a common declaration in Luxembourg



21/30

last Monday, recognizing Russias economic interests in Romania. . . .

In the document there is a special clause on the export of Russias

traditional agriculture products to Romania not to be influenced by the

new structural dialogue on EU agriculture. . . . According to the protocol,

the EU commits to initiate consulting before applying measures that may

harm the way such products are sold at present. . . . The EU is to respect the

needs of two syderurgy [metallurgical] plants in Romania, given the

Russian investments there. There is also mentioned the EUs awareness

of Russias concern about the use of European anti-dumping measures

that would do harm to Russias export to Bulgaria and Romania. In case

of such anti-dumping measures harming Russian export, the EU promises

to proceed to revision.99

Apparently, Moscow approached the White House in a similar fashion. In

April 2007, President Putin expressed his concern over the presence of

American bases in Romania in a conversation with the US defence secretary,

Robert Gates.100 However, this was associated with Russias rejection of the

American missile defence system in Eastern Europe and had little chance of

influencing US military plans. Simultaneously, there were Russian reactions

directed at the Romanian government itself. The Russian foreign affairs

minister, Sergei Lavrov, told his counterpart in Bucharest, Mihai-Razvan

Ungureanu, that Russia was concerned about President Basescus statements.The press agency ITAR-TASS likewise reproduced Lavrovs criticism of the

unfriendly attitude illustrated by allegations on the Russian gas monopoly

being used as a political instrument. In response, Basescu bluntly stated he

would never ask Moscow what he is allowed to say.101

In general, Russias relations with Romania were becoming increasingly

hostile in a way similar to the cases of Poland and the Baltic States. Neverthe-

less, there is an important difference. The anti-Russian stance is almost exclu-

sively due to Basescus personal foreign policy decisions, which were

frequently criticized by his adversaries (and by media under theircontrol).102 Prime Minister Tariceanu held a different position. At first,

stating that the European Union is the most important strategic axis,103 he

moderately opposed the presidents pro-American attitude. Tensions with

Basescu made him more aggressive. In June 2006, Tariceanu and the

defence minister, Teodor Atanasiu, publicly announced the withdrawal of

Romanian troops from Iraq without even consulting Romanias president or

the United States; the former was in fact able to stop this initiative.104 The

Liberal minister of foreign affairs, Mihai-Razvan Ungureanu, who supported

Basescus position, was forced by the prime minister to resign his ministry in

February 2007. Tariceanu gave the job to one of his suppporters, Adrian

Cioroianu, whose nomination was in turn repeatedly rejected by the president.



22/30

Visibly interested in having a say in Romanias external relations, the prime

minister went as far as temporarily taking over the functions of foreign

affairs minister.105 It is true that the Romanian semi-presidential and

French-inspired system makes the president the leading foreign policy

authority. Disputes with the prime minister, however, limited Basescus

international credibility. The Social Democrat leader, Mircea Geoana, even

claimed that Romanias foreign policy was completely incoherent.106

From Moscows point of view, the BasescuTariceanu duel was an unex-

pected opportunity to end Romanias hostile attitude. The president was

clearly pro-American and anti-Russian, but the prime minister seemed

neutral, while Geoana strongly rejected historical anti-Russian attitudes.107

It would have been perfectly logical to encourage and support an alliance

between the latter two to sideline Basescu. It is within this context thatTariceanu met a person well connected with the Kremlin, and this only

one week before the vote on the presidents suspension. The president

mentioned the prime ministers meeting with a very important gentleman,

Kondyakov in his interview with Romania Libera. Aleksandr Kondyakov,

a former employee of the Soviet TASS press agency and adviser to the chair-

man of the USSR committee of youth organizations, had then become the

head of Novocom, a consulting firm whose clients include the Russian pre-

sidential administration and the Russian government. He had also organized

a number of regional governor electoral campaigns in Russia, and is also anadviser to the Moldovan president.108 On 12 April 2007 Kondyakov visited

Tariceanu in his prime ministerial office. The Liberal senator Radu Stroe,

who was present at the meeting, later stated that Kondyakov offered to

lobby for the National Liberal Party in advance of the 2008 parliamentary

elections.109 Tariceanu denied that such an offer existed, while Kondyakov

himself claimed they discussed matters related to making possible new

economic projects between Romania and Russia and between interested

companies in the two countries.110 Speaking on the same subject, the

prime minister made a rather ambiguous statement: Since I entered politics,I have affirmed without any hesitation my Western option. But this does not

necessarily mean that Romania has to have a tense relationship with

Russia.111 Of course, this is far from Radu Vasiles pro-Russian profession

de foi of 1999; but a further statement made by Dinu Patriciu makes things

clearer (see below). Tariceanu was not the only host of Kondyakov during

the latters short visit to Bucharest: the Russian consultant also met the

1999 advocate of Vasiles pro-Moscow turn, Eugen Ovidiu Chirovici,112

and the self-proclaimed friend of Russia, Cosmin Gusa. Furthermore, Gusa

claimed Kondyakovs next visitor was Ion Iliescu himself, while other

sources mentioned an appointment with Geoana (both Social Democrats

strongly deny any such reunion).113 Commenting on these meetings, Ioan



23/30

Talpes a former national security adviser to Iliescu and former head of the

Romanian intelligence service spoke of a Bucharest Moscow ring that

does not favour the state interest of Romania and Russia but its own interest,

against Romania.114

These confusing and often contradictory statements became more coherent

on 25 May 2007. On that day, at the Sofia meeting of the European Energy

Forum, Dinu Patriciu presented his views on the European Unions (and

Romanias) future relations with Russia in the field of energy. Comparing

Russia with a bear, he stated that as long as you have to share the same cage

with the bear you also have to co-operate with it. More specifically, you

have to invest in the side of the cage where the bear is and the bear has to be

convinced and allowed to invest in energy projects in Europe.115 This was

no simple statement. In August 2007 Patriciu sold for $2.7 billion 75 per centof Rompetrol to the Kazakh state-owned company KazMunaiGaz, while

preserving his position of president and general manager.116 Kazakhstans

authoritarian ruler, Nursultan Nazarbayev, is a close ally of the Kremlin.

Furthermore, KazMunaiGaz (which controls a third of the Kazakh oil pro-

duction) had set up joint ventures with Gazprom in 2002117 and with Lukoil

and Gazprom in 2003.118 On 1 June 2007 it concluded with Gazprom a new

series of agreements that President Vladimir Putin welcomed.119 Apparently,

Gazprom itself had tried to buy Rompetrol but Patriciu turned down the offer

for political reasons.120

He gave preference to the more discreet KazMunaiGazto avoid public criticism. Nevertheless, this is a move bringing Rompetrol closer

to Russian control. In the words of the political analyst, Traian Ungureanu:

Romania becomes a lane for promoting Russias agenda through a decision

that places the state in a position of inferiority; politically strengthens an

amoral oligarchy; and prepares future instability.121

This sheds new light on the new economic projects between Romania and

Russia and between interested companies in the two countries that Kondyakov

had discussed with Tariceanu. At that point, the latter became less of a prime

minister and more of a representative to Patricius Rompetrol-centred interestgroup. It is widely known that the two Liberals are close associates of long

standing. After the secession of the StoicaStolojan wing, they had gained

full control of the National Liberal Party. However, they were unable to influ-

ence Basescus anti-Russian foreign policy, which was threatening Patricius

energy plans; nor could they obtain the presidents support in order to block

anti-corruption investigations targeting Patriciu himself. Their interest in bring-

ing down Basescu was therefore matching Moscows. Kondyakovs visit and

the possible deal he might have negotiated are the logical consequences of

this match.

This is to say that Romanian domestic causes of President Basescus sus-

pension from office must be complemented with external ones, linked to



24/30

Russias energy policy in Central and Eastern Europe. The phenomenon

sometimes naively described as a personality conflict between the president

and the prime minister is in fact a fragment of a much wider strategic game.

As elsewhere in the region, Russia associates itself with local energy interest

groups in order to influence the foreign policy agenda of their respective

states. In a way, Tariceanu is not unlike the former German chancellor

Gerhard Schroder as the latter became an advocate of Russian energy interests

in Germany and Europe. The difference lies in the consequences: Tariceanus

dramatic actions, if successful, would have eliminated one of the most vocal

East European critics of Moscow. On the other hand, however, it should be

noted that the situation is now fundamentally different from that in the

1990s. With or without Basescu in power, Romania is a NATO and EU

member. Tariceanu and even Geoana cannot change this and do not intendto do so. There is no question of becoming part of a pre-1996-style Russian

sphere of influence. The Kremlins renewed political control over the

country cannot be imagined. Rather, the battle is now fought over soft

mainly economic influence in a state that unequivocally belongs to the

Western security community.

Conclusion

The beginnings of post-communist Romania were closely associated with apro-Soviet foreign policy orientation that culminated in the signing of the

1991 treaty of friendship, forbidding Romanias accession to NATO. The dis-

mantling of the USSR forced the regime of Ion Iliescu to adopt the so-called

politics of ambiguity, which balanced Western and Russian influence.

However, unpopular links with Russia finally contributed to the fall of

Iliescu after the 1996 elections. The new democratic government adopted a

clearly pro-Western foreign policy. In 1999, Moscow did succeed in persuad-

ing the Romanian prime minister, Radu Vasile, to become its outspoken sup-

porter, but this victory was short-lived. Back in power after the 2000 elections,Iliescu partly reformed the party, showing that it had learned the lesson of

1996. It avoided both openly authoritarian trends and a special relationship

with the Kremlin. It even secured Bucharests accession to NATO in 2004.

Combined with the December 2004 electoral victory of democratic parties,

this seemed to mark the end of Russias influence in Romania. Furthermore,

President Basescus resolutely pro-American stance and his vociferous

advocacy of NATOs involvement in the Black Sea area led to unprecedented

hostility between Bucharest and Moscow.

Nevertheless, the presidents support for an effective anti-corruption cam-

paign led to an increasingly bitter conflict with Prime Minister Tariceanu,

whose close associate Dinu Patriciu was under investigation. As Patriciu



25/30

headed Romanias most important oil company and promoted energy relations

with Russia, a natural convergence of interests was created between the

Kremlin and Basescus domestic opponents. It should not be forgotten that,

besides Patriciu, a large number of Romanian politicians are threatened by

the anti-corruption campaign. The Kondyakov episode suggested that Tari-

ceanu met a Russian envoy (who might have equally contacted Iliescu and

Geoana) one week before the suspension of the president by the Liberal

Social Democrat coalition. Unsurprisingly, one month later Patriciu publicly

advocated the European Unions (and Romanias) improved energy relations

with Russia.

This is in fact the local reflection of a wider regional strategic game. On the

one hand, a pro-American Poland and the Baltic States take advantage of the

deteriorating relations between the US and Moscow in order to rejectRussian influence openly, while on the other hand, energy interest groups in

many West European states promote projects that clearly increase European

dependence upon Russian resources. Despite its undemocratic course, the

Kremlin is thus acquiring a long-term capacity to influence European affairs

which Polish, Baltic or Romanian democrats assess against a background of

historical adversity.

An obvious (and frustrating) flaw in this article is related to the difficulty of

assessing the internal Russian mechanisms for conceiving, executing and

supervising actions directed towards Romania. The Kremlin or Russiaboth seem to be absurdly monolithic entities engineering perfectly coherent

strategies. This is because there is no inside information, while available

public statements, mostly from Foreign Minister Lavrov, are scarce and of

little relevance. For example, nobody can say who are Kondyakovs real con-

tacts in the Kremlin, or whether he represents Russias government, Russian

interest groups (as Ioan Talpes seems to suggest), or both. It is clear that the

chaotic foreign policy of the Yeltsin era has been replaced by an efficient,

highly coherent, and secretive mechanism not unlike that of the Soviet

Union. The uncontested authority of President Putin in his second term leftlittle space for other decision makers, and it is too early to discern the real

power of his successor, President Dmitrii Medvedev. Still, this does not

exclude the existence of autonomous Russian interest groups supporting

(and taking advantage of) economic involvement in Romania. The visible

part of the iceberg is represented, as elsewhere in Europe, by Gazprom, not

inappropriately compared by President Basescu to the Soviet Red Army.

While linked to certain Russian energy interest groups, Gazprom is directly

subordinated to the Kremlin and has closely followed Putins foreign policy

moves; it is not inappropriate to note that Medvedev served as chairman of

Gazprom from 2002. The situation of Russian companies operating on the

Romanian market Lukoil, equally involved in energy supply, is a good



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example is less clear. Unlike Gazprom, they benefit from substantial

autonomy and have created their own networks of influence involving

Romanian politicians and businessmen. But it is difficult to know to what

extent such companies use their networks to support the Kremlins strategic

goals beyond their own simple, profit-oriented interests. Added to the com-

plete lack of transparency in Moscows foreign policy decision-making

process, this makes the assessment of the Russian side of the Russian

Romanian relation extremely difficult.

It is nevertheless obvious that Romanias case is different from those of

Poland or the Baltic States because of the above-mentioned post-1989 pro-

Russian episodes. The existence of three categories of potential Moscow allies

can be identified as consequences of these episodes. First, most politicians,

top civil servants and businessmen that helped establish the special relationswith the Kremlin from 1990 to 1996 still hold important positions. All of

them (or, at least, their families) had belonged to the communist nomenklatura.

For purely electoral reasons, they now have to display pro-Western and

pro-democratic convictions. But they remain genuinely pro-Russian and are

ready to improve relations with their former protector. A second category is

illustrated by former Christian Democrat prime minister, Radu Vasile, and his

conversion in 1999. Moscow is able to use political and perhaps economic

incentives efficiently to attract support from Romanian politicians who had

nothing in common with Iliescus regime. Tactically, this can be extremelyuseful precisely because nobody can foresee (and thereby prevent) such

sudden changes. The final and perhaps most important category is represented

by Patriciu-type interest groups that engage in energy business with Russia or

intend to do so. This is an important sector, as it includes a large network of

gas and oil importing, processing and distribution companies. There are many

petrochemical works built during the communist period, and most Romanian

city houses use natural gas for heating. Energy supply is therefore paramount.

Consequently, Prime Minister Popescu-Tariceanu is not alone in his struggle

against anti-Russian Basescu. Despite Romanians general lack of sympathyfor Moscow, a significant number of politicians and businessmen implicitly

support Russian interests.

However, the nature of this support is fundamentally different from that of the

1990s. There is no Romanian parliamentary party challenging the countrys pro-

Western orientation. This is a forced decision: the spectacular economic growth

is overwhelmingly attributed to EU accession and is contrasted with the econ-

omic and financial crises that prevailed during the pro-Russian period. Roma-

nians historical hostility toward the Eastern neighbour and the progressive

Europeanization of society are equally important. Consequently, political

forces openly demanding a radical foreign policy shift towards Moscow would

simply be faced with electoral suicide. For this reason, the countrys inclusion



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in a pre-1996-style Russian sphere of influence has become highly unlikely.

Ironically, this is an important advantage for energy interest groups. Precisely

because the countrys independence is in no way menaced, they suggest, good

economic relations with Russia should not be rejected. The Kremlins soft,

energy-based influence in Europe is presented not as a new imperial strategy

but rather as a normal, mutually beneficial economic process. The profitable

agreements between Germany or Italy and Gazprom are contrasted with

Poland and the Baltic States counterproductive anti-Russian policies. The

next logical step is to ask the replacement of the anti-Russian, Polish-style

special relationship between Bucharest and Washington with a pro-European

orientation of the type embraced by the former German chancellor, Gerhard

Schroder. This corresponds to Prime Minister Popescu-Tariceanus proposal.

For the time being, President Basescu remains in control and has no intentionof changing Romanias foreign policy preferences. However, one should be

reminded that these are mostly due to his personal choices and might not

survive his presidential tenure. The energy lobby, by contrast, has long-term

interests that may one day impose a different foreign policy orientation.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to Stefanie Von Hlatky-Udvarhelyi (Groupe detude et de recherche sur la securiteinternationale) and to two anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions. Research for thisarticle was made possible by a fellowship from the Social Sciences and Humanities ResearchCouncil of Canada.

NOTES

1. Peter Siani-Davies, The Romanian Revolution of December 1989 (Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press, 2005); Catherine Durandin, Geopolitique de lEurope centrale et orientale.La Roumanie de 1989 a 2002. 1ere partie: La revolution de 1989, available at ,http://

www.diploweb.com., accessed 17 Nov. 2007; Jose Javier Chavero Pozo, La revolucionrumana de 1989, Papeles del Este. Transiciones Poscomunistas, No.2 (2001), availableat ,http://www.ucm.es/BUCM/cee/papeles/02/16.doc., accessed 17 Nov. 2007.

2. Janusz Bugajski, Political Parties of Eastern Europe: A Guide to Politics in the Post-Communist Era (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 2002); Vladimir Tismaneanu, Romanian Excep-tionalism? Democracy, Ethnocracy, and Uncertain Pluralism in post-Ceausescu Romania,in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (eds.), The Consolidation of Democracy in EastCentral Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Cornel Ivanciuc,Manipularea prin transparenta, paper presented at the debate Transparency of the Security

Security of the Transparency, Feb. 1996, available at ,http://tactic.kappa.ro/programs/proceedings/ivanciuc.html., accessed 15 Jan. 2001.

3. See Bugajski, Political Parties of Eastern Europe, pp.8457.4. Quoted by Tom Gallagher, Building Democracy in Romania: Internal Shortcomings and

External Neglect, in Jan Zielonka and Alex Pravda (eds.), Democratic Consolidation inEastern Europe. Vol.2: International and Transnational Factors (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 2001), pp.383412 (p.392).



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5. See Iliescus own books, or the more recent interviews conducted by Vladimir Tismaneanuand published as Ion Iliescu, Communism, Post-Communism and Democracy: The GreatShock at the End of a Short Century (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 2006).

6. Ziua, 2228 June 1995.7. Janusz Bugajski, Cold Peace: Russias New Imperialism (Westport, CT: Praeger, in

co-operation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC,2004), p.216.

8. Robert Weiner, Romanian Bilateral Relations with Russia and Hungary: 1989 2002, inHenry F. Carey (ed.), Romania since 1989: Politics, Economics, and Society (Lanham,MD: Lexington Books, 2004), pp.485503 (p.486).

9. Gallagher, Building Democracy in Romania, p.392.10. Alfred A. Reisch, Central and Eastern Europes Quest for NATO Membership, RFE/RL

Research Report, Vol.2, No.28 (9 July 1993), p.39.11. RFE/RL Research Report, 10 Jan. 1992, p.49.12. Gallagher, Building Democracy in Romania, p.411.13. See Dennis Deletant, Communist Terror in Romania: Gheorghiu-Dej and the Police State,

194865 (New York: St. Martins, 1999).14. Georges Castellan, Histoire des Balkans. XIVeXXe siecle (Paris: Fayard, 1991); Catherine

Durandin, Histoire des Roumains (Paris: Fayard, 1995); Charles King, Moldovan Identityand the Politics of Pan-Romanianism, Slavic Review, Vol.53, No.2 (1994), pp.34568;Charles King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture (Stanford,CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2001); William Crowther, The Politics of Ethno-NationalMobilization: Nationalism and Reform in Soviet Moldavia, Russian Review, No.50(April 1991), pp.183202.

15. Robert Cutler, Moldova/Transdnistria, Self-Determination Regional Conflict Profile, avail-able at ,http://www.irc-online.org/selfdetermine/conflicts/moldova_body.html., accessed17 Nov. 2007; Stuart J. Kaufman, Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Mas

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