Russian assessment of missile threat

9
Missile Threat Assessment Russia’s MOD View

description

Presentation of the Russian Ministry of Defence assessing the challenges of missile technology proliferation

Transcript of Russian assessment of missile threat

Page 1: Russian assessment of missile threat

Missile Threat Assessment Russia’s MOD View

Page 2: Russian assessment of missile threat

Nation’s missile capabilities

Слайд 2Слайд 2Missile threats and challenges 2222

Missile challenge

Missile threats

Using rocket technologies to make missiles

Military and political intentions of a nation to deliver a missile

strike

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Слайд 2Strategic BM arsenals reduction 3333

Strategic nuclear warheads reduction

Shorter and intermediate range missile reduction

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Слайд 3 Activities required to build ICBMs 4444

- having all necessary resources available at the national level while establishing adequate R&D, production and testing capacity

- carrying out a number of comprehensive tests of each individual system and the product as a whole

-manufacturing key high-tech ICBM components and integrating them into a single operational product

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Слайд 4 Activities required to produce ICBMs based on space launch vehicles 5555

- developing a new missile flight control system that would guarantee delivery of a high-precision warhead to intended surface targets by ballistic trajectory;

- ensuring conditions for high operational readiness;

- providing long-term warranty period operation;

- ensuring HDBT conditions for ICBMs; - securing ICBMs from unauthorized launch.

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Слайд 5 Proliferation of liquid-propellant missile technologies to south-east 6666

Game-changing designs are not visibleObsolete missiles are upscaled and upgraded

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- war potential of these nations significantly yields to that of states and nation coalitions, which they may view as potential adversaries;

- relatively low level of economic self-sufficiency and capacity to hold on under economic sanctions in case missile challenges turn into a missile threat;

- self-reliance in national security, often times in the conditions of relative international isolation;

- inevitability of “retaliation strike” in case of self-started missile attack;

- lack of sufficient resource base enabling them to withstand a “retaliation strike”;

- participation in key WMD non-proliferation regimes (NPT Treaty, Convention on Prohibition of Chemical and Biological weapons etc).

Слайд 6 Factors impacting military and political intentions of south-east nations 7777

Incentives for a self-started missile attack on the territory of Europe are absent

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1. At present it is shorter-range and tactical missiles that are mostly spread around the world.

2. For some countries missile systems primarily mean assets to win international recognition or to achieve supremacy over neighbors.

3. A direct missile attack threat to leading states of the world including NATO member-states look very insignificant.

4. At this stage the problem of missile proliferation can and should be addressed not solely by the use of force and not through building expensive BMD assets, that are not always adequate to existing missile threats, but by engaging preventive diplomacy and strengthening arms control and non-proliferation regimes as well as reducing weapon systems.

Слайд 6Summary of comprehensive assessment of present missile threats 8888

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Слайд 6Elimination of potential missile threats 9999

Priority – to employ political and diplomatic methods