Nations and Nationalism 2 (3), 1996, 453460. ASEN 1996

Review Article Russia: territory and identity crises*

Tuomas Forsberg (ed.) Contested Territory: Border Disputes at the Edge of the Former Soviet Empire. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995. f45.00.

Lena Jonson and Clive Archer (eds.), Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in Eurasia. Boulder: Westview, 1996. f41 SO.

ERIK RINGMAR Government Dept., London School of Economics and Political Science

Houghton St, London, WC2A 2AE

The relationship between a country’s territory and its identity is in many ways similar to the relationship between an individual’s identity and his or her body. Our individual or collective selves are not the same as the bodies or territories we inhabit, yet there is a clear and undeniable connection between the two. There can be no persons without bodies, and no states without territories. If there is a link between identity and physical matter, but if the one cannot be reduced to the other, we may ask what the nature of the link is. In philosophy this is known as the ‘mind-body problem’ and in political science we could perhaps talk about it as the ‘identity-territory problem’. In neither instantiation is the problem particularly easy to solve. What seems obvious, however, is that an important aspect of the connection concerns power. The power of our faculties in the case of an individual, and the power of natural and other resources in the case of a state. Hence if there is a sudden shift in power - if we suddenly become very much stronger or weaker - it seems we must reconsider our identities as a result.

A country which has experienced a number of identity crises of precisely this kind is Russia. The country’s borders - particularly to the west - have been difficult to define in the absence of any major rivers, seas or mountain ranges, and this fact has made territorial questions into perennial issues in the domestic Russian debate (J. Iivonen in Forsberg: 76; R. Allison in Jonson and Archer: 33). This century is no exception: the temtory held by the Bolsheviks at the nadir of their power during the civil war was only a little larger than the ancient principality of Moscovy; during the heyday of communism Soviet troops were stationed in the

I am grateful to the Swedith Institute of International Affairs for institutional and financial support.

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heart of Europe and scattered throughout the globe; once communism fell the empire disintegrated. With every change in size the Russians have thought of themselves - and been thought of by others - in a different fashion. Is Russia mainly a European power? Is it primarily a world power? Or is it a ‘Eurasian’ power in a class of its own?

The books under review discuss - albeit in somewhat different terms - two of these transformations. The volume edited by Tuomas Forsberg deals with the eight territories that the Soviet Union occupied as a result of the Second World War. The Jonsson and Archer volume deals with a consequence of the break-up of the Soviet empire: the sudden eruptions of civil wars in the newly independent republics and the continued Russian presence in what today has become known as the ‘near abroad.’

Reinforcing the empire

As a result of the Second World War eight new territories were incorporated into the Soviet Union. Eastern Poland was the largest such area, the Kurile islands is the one still most talked about in the news, but there were six others: Karelia was taken from Finland, the Kiinigsberg region was taken from Germany, and parts of Romania and Hungary were annexed which now are parts of Ukraine. In addition, small eastern parts of Estonia and Latvia were transferred into Russian control. It is the fate of these areas which Forsberg and his co-authors discuss. They investigate their treatment by the Russian authorities and what happened to the people who lived there; what their status is today; and what the prospects are for a return of these territories to their pre-Second World War owners.

Given that the study is supported by the Finnish Institute of Interna- tional Affairs it is not difficult to read the subtext: the status and future of Karelia (Forsberg: 202-3). Karelia was occupied as a result of Stalin’s attempt to gain a more secure position for his country in the north-west. The previous border had passed only 32 kilometres from Leningrad, and Stalin, who obviously did not trust the Finnish neutrality policy, feared an attack from that direction. Karelia contained what at the time was Finland’s second largest city, Vyborg, and some 410,000 people had to be repatriated as a result of the annexation (p. 209). After the Second World War, which Finland had fought on the German side, the question of Karelia was a taboo subject in discussions with the Soviet leaders. Somewhat surprisingly perhaps, Finnish politicians have remained silent even after the break-up of the Soviet Union, and officially they still make no difference between Russian and former Finnish lands. They do not, for example, object to the Russian military installation in Salla in what used to be Finnish Karelia (p. 212). It is only unofficially that the issue is discussed. According to opinion polls, one in four of all Finns supports negotiations with Russia regarding a return of Karelia (p. 214). Given this

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background perhaps Contested Territory can be understood as an attempt to explore the issue on an academic - and thus far less politically sensitive - level. If the other areas occupied by the Soviet Union after the war are similar to the Karelian case, and if there is a possibility that these areas could be returned. then perhaps the issue of Karelia could be raised officially also. Alternatively, if there are no such similarities between the cases then official Finland would have a good reason to continue its silence.

As it turns out the differences between the cases are in fact quite pronounced. The question of the Kurile islands is still, for example, very much alive in Japanese domestic debates (T. Ishiwatari in Forsberg). The Kuriles were occupied as late as September 1945 when all the inhabitants were expelled to Japan. Ever since, the demand that the islands be returned has been a rallying point for Japanese right-wing groups, and the Japanese government has also maintained that the occupation is illegal. Soviet leaders, for their part, categorically refused to discuss the issue until Mikhail Gorbachev suddenly changed course in 1987 (pp. 233- 5). Hoping that Japan would provide economic support for his perestroika reforms, Gorbachev seemed ready for some kind of a deal. The Japanese government offered $2.5 billion on condition that the issue be resolved to its satisfaction, but due to the subsequent political turmoil in Moscow the contribution was never made. When Yeltsin visited Japan in 1993 the situation was quite different. He acknowledged that the Kurile islands still constituted a problem, yet he expressed no particular eagerness to solve it.

Lost lands have been rallying points also for Estonian and Latvian nationalist groups since independence (B. Dauksts and A. Puga and I. Jaats in Forsberg). In both cases the areas were assigned to the Baltic republics in treaties concluded with the young Soviet state in 1920, at a time when the Bolsheviks still were looking forward to the World Revolution which forever would abolish state borders. In the case of Latvia, however, the issue today is one of fairly low priority. The official demand is that the Russians acknowledge their annexation to have taken place illegally, but once this step is taken everyone seems to agree that some form of a compromise must be reached. The area is now predominantly populated by Russians, and to incorporate more Russians into Latvia - which already has a very precarious Russian/Latvian mix - might not be such a good idea. The former Estonian areas too are predominantly inhabited by Russians - in fact this was the case already when'the territories belonged to Estonia - but Estonian politicians, for their part, are unanimous in demanding a return of their lost lands. The issue fills an important function in the Estonian nation-building project and it is quite clearly a convenient question to bring up whenever the Russians start complaining about Estonia's treatment of its Russian minority.

East Prussia, further south along the Baltic coast, was divided between

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Poland, Russia and Lithuania after the war (P. Wiirster in Forsberg). German-speaking peoples had lived here since the days of the Teutonic Order and it was obviously important for Stalin to get a piece of genuine German soil as a symbol of the humiliation of his enemy. All the Germans were expelled - and although the Potsdam agreement stipulated that this be done in a humane fashion - many died as a result. Kaliningrad, as Kiinigsberg was renamed, became an important warm-water base for the Soviet navy. The area was turned into one gigantic military installation with a Russian population of 78.3 per cent but with 58 other nationalities represented (p. 165). For a long time after the war German politicians maintained that the occupation was illegal, but with Ostpolitik in 1960 there was a change of heart. The issue of Kiinigsberg was never mentioned in any of the & fact0 peace treaties which the Brandt government concluded with its Eastern neighbours. Some German nationalists and associations of former inhabitants have tried to keep the issue alive, but their influence is and remains limited. Germany has found new, and less explicit, ways of guaranteeing itself a presence in Eastern Europe. As far as the territories lost by Poland, Hungary and Romania are

concerned the issue seems equally closed (W. Materski, I. Chiper and I. Madi in Forsberg). Poland suffered the heaviest loss, but was recom- pensed at Germany’s expense. The areas that Romania lost to the Soviet Union would today have to be reclaimed by Moldova from Ukraine. None of the regions is ethnically homogeneous and any territorial restitution would create endless new problems. Perhaps the best solution is instead to find ways of increasing the autonomy of these areas within existing state boundaries and to improve the protection guaranteed the minorities who live there. A solution along these lines has been obtained by the Hungarian minority in western Ukraine. This is clearly to the satisfaction of the Hungarian government, and apart from some nationalistic fringe groups no one any longer raises the issue (Madi: 13840).

The official Russian position is basically the same as that of the old Soviet authorities: no borders will be changed (Forsberg: 245-6). During the last years of Gorbachev and in the period immediately following the coup of August 1991 there was an opportunity to discuss aspects of these issues, but since then much has happened. Russian politicians have stopped courting the West and the loss of territory has come to symbolise the humiliation of the country in the eyes of the world. To reconquer territory has consequently come to be seen by neo-fascists and neo-communists as a quick fu for the image problem, but also much more moderate politicians, afraid of appearing to give in to Western demands, refuse to discuss the topic. Barring some new cataclysmic event in Russia - a total disintegration of the country, for example - none of these territories will be returned (Forsberg: 2524). The only possible exception concerns the Kurile islands, but in today’s political climate a Russian compromise seems unlikely even here.

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The empire breaks apart

During the last years of the Gorbachev regime the Soviet Union disposed of its sphere of interest in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union was to become a ‘normal’ country; a regular inhabitant of ‘the Common House of Europe’. That this self-description remained contested was obvious in August 1991 when a group of Communist Party stalwarts intervened in order to stop any further dissolution. Ironically enough the coup attempt only speeded up the process it was designed to circumvent. Yeltsin and the pro-Western reformers who came to power sought to turn Russia into a democratic, capitalist country. From now on Russia would only be Russia; the former Soviet republics were separate political entities, recognised as such by the international community; and Russia had no business meddling in them. Besides, it would cost too much for the poor Russian state to continue subsidising any further imperial ambitions.

The break-up did, however, result in a number of conflicts breaking out in former Soviet temtories. Many of the borders between republics were highly artificial, constructed by Stalin in order to divide and weaken the republics on the periphery. With the Red Army gone, power struggles broke out, often caused by local politicians who fanned the flames of ethnic antagonisms. The volume edited by Lena Jonson and Clive Archer discusses four of these cases: Nagorno-Karabakh, Tajikistan, Transdniestr and Abkhazia. In all four areas Moscow eventually restored order through peacekeeping forces operated either directly under Russian command or under the auspices of the CIS. The question which many observers in the West have asked - and the question which the book tries to answer - is what the status and role of these troops are. Is this a way of continuing the Soviet Union by other means, or are the Russian forces simply trying to bring peace to troubled neighbouring regions?

As Alexander Pikayev points out in his chapter, the Westernising policy of the immediate post-coup days was abandoned for the simple reason that it failed (in Jonson and Archer). The policy of non-interference was widely regarded as responsible for the increase in ethnic tension and thus as detrimental to Russia’s interests. In addition, the Western countries continued to maintain a very sceptical attitude toward Russia’s foreign policy and showed no particular interest in peacekeeping operations in the area. In this situation Moscow had little choice but to act on its own. The result was the new military doctrine of November 1993 which stipulated that Russia had a special responsibility for peace and order throughout the space of the former USSR (Allison in Jonson and Archer). Pikayev talks about a new consensus on foreign policy which was attained by mid-1994 (in Jonson and Archer: 59-60; see also P. K. Baev in Forsberg: 98-9). Today most politicians would agree that Russia has a vital interest in the ‘near abroad‘, but that it would be counterproductive to seek to reconstitute old borders. More cooperation through the CIS is a priority, and so is

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increased integration with Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, but these processes must be controlled by Moscow and take place on its terms. All attempts by the ‘far abroad’ to interfere with developments in the ‘near abroad‘ must be prevented (cf. Jonson and Archer: 9-12).

It is often argued that the break-up of the Soviet Union has plunged Europe into an endless series of ethnic conflicts. There are reportedly 168 ethnic disputes over territory in the former USSR - 73 of which directly involve Russia - and only two of the twenty-three inter-state borders are not disputed (Baev in Forsberg: 92; cf. Iivonen: 79 who gives the number of 176 ethnic conflicts). As the case studies in Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in Eurasia make clear, however, this is not an entirely accurate description. There are ethnic components to all four conflicts, but ethnicity alone does not explain them (In none of the conflicts is the status of Russian minorities an issue. See Allison: 41). Take the war in Transdniestr, which often is analysed as a conflict between Russians and Moldovans. As Jeff Chinn makes clear in his chapter, however, the majority of the population in Transdniestr is Moldovan, not Russian, and the conflict should best be described in political terms as a show-down between old apparatchniks and new democrats (pp. 103-19). Similarly, the conflict in Tajikistan, as Iver Neumann and Sergei Solodovnik explain, is more regional and clan-based than ethnic. The Russians have for various reasons decided to support the traditional ruling elite - in the West known as the ‘communists’ - against rival clans - in the West alternatively known as ‘democrats’ or ‘Islamists’, but there is nothing ethnic about this confronta- tion: the ethnic dimension to the Abkhaz conflict is admittedly more pronounced. The Abkhaz were given various privileges during the commu- nist era, privileges they were afraid of losing in an independent Georgia (C. Dale). Their military struggle against the Georgian regime - and its spectacular success - has less to do with ‘national liberation,’ however, than with Russian attempts to undermine and control the independent-minded Georgians (pp. 124-9). Similarly it is clear that the Armenians in Nagorno- Karabakh are engaged in an ethnic conflict with the Azeri which at its root has the deep-seated Armenian fear of the Turks (the Azeris are a Turkish- speaking people) (D. Furman and C. J. Asenius). At the same time a more direct cause of the conflict is to be found in Stalin’s arbitrary drawing of the borders between the two republics in the 1930s.

The last third of the volume is devoted to the role played by international organisations in settling these conflicts. The Western reaction has generally been a very cautious one. The CSCO is interested in helping out - responsible as it is for matters of security and cooperation in Europe - but has so far done little beyond dispatching groups of observers and trying to organise ‘preventive diplomacy’ (P. Switalski and I. Tersman). Nato is of course keenly interested in developments in the former Soviet Union, but is also careful not to upset its former antagonist (N. Drew). The United Nations is already overextended and there is a clear lack of self-confidence

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as a result of the (relative) debacles in Cambodia, Somalia and Bosnia (P. Taylor and K. Smith). The Russians have instead focused on enlisting CIS support for their actions, but the response from the former Soviet republics has been far less than enthusiastic and the vast majority of deployed troops have in all cases been Russian (A. Kreikemeyer and A. V. Zagorski).

It would be incorrect to ascribe altruistic motives to the Russian policy towards the ‘near abroad’ since the Russians clearly are seeking to influence the development of these republics, and also to have a presence in the forms of military bases and troops on the CIS border. It would be equally misplaced, however, to explain the policy in terms of expansionism. The democratic forces in Russian politics do not want to recreate the empire, and even the not-so-democratic forces are likely to pay lip-service to internationally sanctioned notions of sovereignty. In addition, empires tend to be very expensive to maintain these days and can be afforded only by a few rich countries in the West, and then only in an informal, and mainly cultural, form. It would be too costly for the Russians to rebuild the explicit empire and too costly to maintain it. This does not mean, of course, that Moscow will stop trying to influence events in the former Soviet republics or that the economic and political integration between Russia, on the one hand, and Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, on the other, will not continue.

Interests and identities

In conclusion it is worth pointing out how little sense many of these policies make from a rationalistic point of view (cf. T. Forsberg: 3&1, 250-2 in Forsberg (ed.)). The Russians would no doubt benefit from a deal with Japan over the Kuriles and they could no doubt get help from the Germans - suitably dressed up as European Union officials - in rebuilding the Kaliningrad area. In a similar fashion, a clearer non-interventionist policy vis-h-vis the ‘near abroad’ would surely be economically advantageous and in addition build confidence in the West. What is at stake in all cases discussed in these two books, however, are not primarily matters of national interest, but instead matters of national identity (I develop this point in Erik Ringmar, Identity, Interest and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden’s Intervention in the Thirty Year’s War (Cambridge University Press, 1996) esp. 66-91.). The question of territory’is not a matter of what Russia wants to have, but rather of what Russia wants to be. The Russians see themselves as having been thoroughly humiliated in the eyes of the world and to make any further concessions on territorial issues would perpetuate the country’s inferior status - even if the concessions themselves were to Russia’s benefit.

At least two conclusions follow from this. The first conclusion is that the West must take matters of national identity into account when analysing

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Russian foreign policy. Russia is likely to act much more unpredictably than the West is likely to feel comfortable with, not because its leaders are inherently ‘irrational’, but simply because matters of ‘rationality’ and ‘irrationality’ can be concerns only to those who already have solidly established identities. It is only as some-one that we can have an interest in some-thing, and to the extent that this ‘some-one’ remains to be defined rational actions are not possible. If identities matter in international politics . - and this is the second conclusion - then we need a better understanding of how they are formed. The scholars best suited to provide such analyses are scholars of nationalism. The study of nationalism is to a large extent the study of identities not the study of interests. We need to bring our knowledge of nationalism to bear on problems of world affairs.