Russia Development Index 2012–2013 (Valdai Index)

RUSSIA DEVELOPMENT INDEX 2012–2013

Expert Opinion Poll of the Valdai

Discussion Club

Moscow, October 2013

valdaiclub.com

Russia Development Index 2012—2013

3ExpErt opinion poll of thE Valdai discussion club

The Valdai Discussion Club has held its fourth expert survey and has calculated the Russia Development Index for 2012/2013 (also known as the Valdai Index).

The aggregate index derived from the survey results produced a value of 0.0. On the one hand, it looks like the negative value of the Valdai Index of the past two years has been reversed. On the other hand, this is in fact an indication that Russia’s eco-nomic, political, cultural and civilizational development is being restrained by a variety of trends that reflect the existing contradic-tions in Russia’s state administration sys-tem, its economy and its society.

The negative trend persists in the Rus-sian Political System module, one of the anchor elements of the index, with the results on last year’s level at –0.3 (–0.4

in 2011 and –0.5 in 2010). As in the previ-ous survey, the assessment of the efficiency of Russian political institutions and the pub-lic's trust in them remained the lowest. According to the 2013 survey, 70.1% of respondents believed there had been a drop in the effectiveness of the work of the prime minister, 50.6% said the same of the govern-ment, 40.1% of the president, 39.0% of the State Duma, and 32.1% of respondents of general jurisdiction courts and the Supreme Court. A total of 79.3% said public trust in the prime minister has decreased, 59.8% said the same about the government, 59.7% about the president, 56.3% about courts, and 55.1% about the State Duma.

The party with the parliamentary major-ity (the ruling party) has shown critically low results for the second year running; although there is some improvement on last year’s results: 55.1% of experts assessed its effectiveness as low (as compared to 78.1% result of last year survey) and 70.0% believe that public trust in the party has decreased (as compared to 84.9% result of last year survey).

Commenting on changes in Russia’s domes-tic policy, the Valdai Club experts said Rus-sia had not seen any truly landmark events over the last year, while noting the grow-ing “social polarization and radicalization,” which is becoming ever more perceptible. Many expressed concerns over weak non-parliamentary opposition. An increase in the influence of non-parliamentary opposition was mentioned by only 40.2% of respon-dents (71.2% in 2012 survey), and only 39%

0,2 -0,1

-0,2

0,0

0,2

0,1

0,0

-0,1

-0,2

Russia Development Index

2010 20132011 2012

Executive Summary


4 Moscow, october 2013

pointed to growing public confidence in it (68.5% in 2012 survey). Moreover, 41.3% of experts believe that the non-parliamentary opposition has shown itself to be less effec-tive than during the “explosive year of 2012,” while only 22.9% mentioned an increase in its effectiveness. More experts describe the non-parliamentary opposition as “disorga-nized” and “fragmented.”

The parliamentary opposition has also lost some points, according to the experts, with 42.4% of respondents saying that its influ-ence has decreased; 43.7% noted a drop in the effectiveness of the opposition’s work, while 44.7% thought public confidence in the parliamentary opposition had declined.

The assessment of standards of civil rights and freedoms has indicated some improvement since last year, despite the recent controver-sial laws adopted by the Duma (the NGO Law and the Law banning propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations among minors). As many as 50.6% of respondents said that stan-dards of civil rights and freedoms had declined (63.0% in 2012 survey) and 55.2% pointed to reduced freedom of the press (63.0% in 2012 survey). The extent to which citizens’ interests are reflected during elections has remained almost unchanged – although last year 57.6% of experts noted a decrease.

Importantly, the survey results suggested that the right and the freedom to elect and

be elected have improved amid a general negative trend in domestic politics. In par-ticular, higher appraisal was given of impor-tant issues such as the extent to which the authorities observe people’s rights and free-doms (during the election process) and the freedom of campaigning, including unim-peded access to the media.

The conclusion that the role of NGOs in Rus-sia’s political system has weakened seems quite logical under the circumstances: 66.6% of respondents agreed with this, while 58.6% also mentioned a decrease in these organiza-tions’ effectiveness.

The survey has again showed that the roles of the Federation Council, the Constitutional Court and the Public Chamber in the Rus-sian political system have remained at the same level as last year. It is worth noting that the experts have given a higher appraisal of the regional executive branch development. This assessment was probably driven by the authorities’ recent successful initiatives car-ried out in specific regions aiming to create new points of growth, as well as to get “some new blood” in local elites. However, many experts refrained from giving their assess-ment of regional governments because they vary greatly from region to region.

The economy was given a negative score of –0.3. This result was largely due to poor assessment of Russia’s macroeconomic indi-cators: 69.0% of respondents mentioned a declining trend in most economic perfor-mance indicators including GDP growth, industrial production, investment inflow, and labor productivity).

The experts pointed to the corrupt context in which Russia’s economy is stagnating, as well as to the fact that the continued eco-nomic crisis has weakened Russia’s Europe-an partners. They have also flagged some of the government’s controversial moves with regard to a range of political threats. Harsh policies can scare away investors and make Russia a less attractive investment destina-tion, they said.

Negative assessments prevailed in the discussion of some specific industries.

-0,5 -0,4-0,3

-0,3

1,5

1,0

0,5

0,0

-0,5

-1,0

-1,5

The Russian political system

2010 20132011 2012



The only exception was the financial sector, which showed a slight increase in positive assessments of its development.

The state of manufacturing industries raised the greatest concerns: 44.8% of respondents said the state of this sector has deteriorated. The modernization policy has not yet led to any tangible results. All figures regarding the progress of economic modernization (including economic diversification) were assessed negatively by most experts. This is probably the reason for the change in the assessment of innovative industries from positive last year to negative this year.

The figures related to the investment climate suggest there has not been any significant change. The Investment Attractiveness for Direct Investment, Investment Attractive-ness for Portfolio Investment and Business Climate indicators showed a negative trend. Foreign investor uncertainty is probably linked to political developments. On the other hand, the Level of Integration in the Global Economy, showed improvement – probably as a result of Russia’s accession to the WTO, as did the Russian Market’s Open-ness (for the same reason). The Tax Legisla-tion Development Level remains in the same condition as last year.

Amid these largely negative indicators, it is especially important to focus on some positive economic development. Commen-

tators emphasize Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization (foreign ones for the most part), the economic amnesty announced in summer 2013, the introduc-tion of the business ombudsman office and the successful holding of the APEC Leaders’ Week in Vladivostok (although the latter took place during the work on the 2011-2012 Russia Development Index).

The respondents’ assessment of the Russian Human Dimension revealed stagnation at 0.0. This has in fact reversed the negative trend of the past two years when this module’s score showed deteriora-tion at –0.3.

Environmental changes and public health were appraised positively. According to respondents, people’s welfare has improved and poverty is now a less acute problem. Opinions were divided equally on people’s safety/security.

Interestingly, the change in the general level of education in society was assessed negative-ly, while the level of professional/vocation-al education was judged to have improved slightly. As far as education is concerned, the planned reform of the Russian Academy of Sciences and how effective it will be raised the most questions with the experts.

In the Ideology and Politics group of indica-tors, experts noted an increase in the level

0,1 -0,3

-0,3 0,0

0,50

0,25

0,00

-0,25

-0,50

The Russian human dimension

2010 20132011 2012-0,1 0,0 -0,1

-0,3

0,50

0,25

0,00

-0,25

-0,50

The Russian economy

2010 20132011 2012



of patriotism and stable levels of compas-sion and culture in Russian society, while at the same time pointing to a decrease in feelings of freedom and mutual trust, as well as a critical decline in tolerance – 71.2% of respondents stated that there was a dete-rioration in the general level of tolerance, including more than a quarter of respon-dents who noted a “substantial deteriora-tion.” The growing feelings of intolerance towards immigrants (mostly labor immi-grants from Central Asia) and the LGBT community have predictably raised the greatest concerns.

The expert assessment of the Human Dimension indicators shows an even greater ambiguity. While most international experts observed some unacceptable trends in Rus-sian society, Forbes contributor Mark Ado-manis, for example, announced a humani-tarian triumph based on the past few years’ positive demographic changes (referring to the reduction in alcoholism, suicide and murder rates).

The Science and Innovative Develop-ment module was assessed at 0.0 for the third time out of four.

Parity of opinions emerged on most of the indicators comprising this assessment mod-ule (or slight deviations toward positive or negative values).

It appears that the “brain drain” is wors-ening: a decline since the previous period was noted by 44.8% of respondents. The assessment of the extent to which R&D results are applied in the economy caused a certain amount of skepticism among the experts: around one-fourth of respondents said the situation has deteriorated, while 40.2% have not noticed any changes at all and 20.7% said they didn’t know. At the same time, 47.1% were confident that the government had increased funding for sci-entific research.

It is worth noting that the percentage of ‘don't knows’ was rather high on a number of issues. For example, up to 25% of respon-dents failed to assess the creative potential

of engineering personnel or the level of ven-ture investment in R&D.

The final score of zero in Science may describe the medium-term development of the nation-al science and innovation system for the period of 2009–2013. According to one of the experts who spoke on condition of anonym-ity, “Russia appears to be losing, rather than gaining ground in reaching a take-off point for innovation. Efforts like Skolkovo appear to be far too little or misconceived. The gov-ernment has not begun to figure out how to solve the basic challenge of getting the results of R&D to the commercial market.”

Russia in the System of National, Regional and Global Security has shown the highest score of all the categories, assessed at 0.3 for the second time.

The experts positively assessed most of the indicators in this group: an improvement in the level to which the Russian Armed Forces are equipped with modern weapons was noted by 68.9% of respondents; the ability to respond quickly to a threat from abroad by 55.1%; the level of advanced mili-tary R&D projects by 50.6%; the ability to conduct operations in Russia by 49.4%; the ability to conduct operations outside Russia by 42.4%; military cooperation with foreign countries and organizations by 40.2%; the ability to combat terrorism threats by 39.7%; and external border security by 35.6%.

0,0

-0,1

0,0

0,0

0,2

0,1

0,0

-0,1

-0,2

Russian science and the country’s innovative development

2010 20132011 2012



Many experts have noted a cumulative effect of the efforts to modernize the Russian army, probably being impressed, among other things, by the increased number and scale of military exercises. Some experts have mentioned Russia’s positive role in the Syrian peace process, which contrib-utes to lasting peace and security in the Middle East and supports a multi-polar world. One of the respondents said Russia’s growing influence in the system of global security especially stands out against the United States’ inconsistent moves in vari-ous regions, including the Middle East. The expert also praised Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s diplomatic proficiency.

It is only natural that indicator for “Rus-sia as a guarantor of international security (including peacekeeping missions)” showed weak growth in this context.

In addition, the recent public scandal involving former Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and his entourage has serious-ly marred the Russian army’s image. The experts also noted the growing anti-U.S. sentiment as a risk factor.

The score for Russian Diplomatic Activ-ity in the International Scene has grown to 0.1 this year.

Russia’s unyielding stance on Syria was assessed varyingly, resulting in a parity

of opinion on the role of Russia’s media-tor efforts in resolving international con-flicts. At the same time, Russia’s growing global influence was mentioned by 56.2% of respondents. Nearly half of respondents said there have been improvements in Rus-sia’s diplomatic initiatives.

However, the international perception of Russia has continued to deteriorate, although the figures are not as discouraging as last year – the proportion of the experts who said Russia’s image had deteriorated shrank to 58.6% in 2013 from 75.4% last year.

Russia has remained a “supplier” of high-profile events that are always subject to controversial interpretation and assessment; this cannot but affect the perception of the Russian diplomacy in the world. This year, Russia’s conflicts with human rights groups and the growing anti-U.S. sentiment both in the public and in high diplomatic circles, have certainly affected the indicator, leading to a negative value.

According to the experts, the dramatic dete-rioration of Russia’s relations with the for-mer Soviet republics, mainly Ukraine, is a serious problem.

The experts also noted Russia’s active involvement in international organizations and its ability to maintain constructive dia-logue with them. Nearly all of the indicators

0,8-0,20,2 0,1

1,0

0,5

0,0

-0,5

-1,0

Russian diplomatic activityon the international scene

2010 20132011 2012

1,0 0,10,00,31,5

1,0

0,5

0,0

-0,5

-1,0

-1,5

Russia in the system of national, regional and global security

2010 20132011 2012



related to international organizations have shown growth. It is also natural that Rus-sia’s activity in APEC and the G20, hosted by Russia this year, has earned it the high-est score – improvement was mentioned by 60.8% and 58.6% of respondents, respec-tively.

As before, Russia’s actions in some organi-zations earned higher scores than in oth-ers, with 41.3% of respondents noting its improved role in the SCO, 37.9% mentioned the CIS and 37.8% in the CSTO. Neutral scores prevailed with regard to the OECD, OSCE and UN. Unexpectedly, Russia’s coop-eration with the Council of Europe was given a negative assessment, with 39.0% of respondents observing deterioration.

Experts pointed to a minimum posi-tive trend in Russia’s Openness to the World (0.1), with 53.9% of respondents mentioning an improvement in the level of Russians’ freedom of international trav-el (compared with 46.6% last year), and 43.6% noting more freedom in foreigners’ movement around Russia (39.7% the year before). Russian’s attitude toward foreign-ers showed a slightly negative trend, as just above one-third of respondents said it had deteriorated. The same holds true for foreigners’ attitude to Russians. According to Forbes’ Mark Adomanis, “Russia is mov-ing in an increasingly socially conservative direction at the exact time that Western countries are becoming ever-more toler-ant and liberal. Unfortunately, if this trend persists, it is difficult to expect the atti-tude toward Russians to improve.” Another respondent, who preferred to remain anon-ymous, was more optimistic: “The growing presence of Russian tourists around the world is slowly changing stereotypes about Russians, as understanding grows about the emerging middle class in Russia. Young Russian tourists are often a pleasant sur-prise to foreigners.”

The strongest downward trend was shown by foreign perception of Russia as an open country, with 65.4% of respondents report-ing deterioration for this indicator. Accord-ing to the experts, “foreigners still see Russia as a closed country, which it is not easy to

travel to. They are very poorly informed of its diversity, its cultural and natural riches.” Some noted the negative influence of contro-versial policies on Russia’s image, including the US Magnitsky Act and Russian legisla-tive initiatives – the Dima Yakovlev Law, the NGO law and the Law banning propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations among minors – as well as the continued mandatory registration system for foreigners and repri-sals against the opposition. One of respon-dents said that “the Russian government has spent enormous sums of money on present-ing Russia to the world, but some of what is presented does more harm to Russia’s image than good.”

The openness and accessibility of federal and regional executive bodies for foreigners generally remain at the same level of last year, although a large proportion of experts could not assess this indicator.

The accessibility of information on Russia to foreign citizens was assessed rather posi-tively.

Russia’s Soft Power index achieved a positive result for the first time in four years, with a value of 0.1.

The attractiveness of Russia’s cultural and civilizational models produced a parity of opinions, which is nevertheless much better than the year before. Some experts pointed

0,2

-0,10,1 0,10,3

0,2

0,1

0,0

-0,1

-0,2

-0,3

Russia’s openness to the world

2010 20132011 2012



to the successes of Russia’s cultural diplo-macy, while others again emphasized the rise in traditionalist values – a lower level of tolerance toward immigrants and the LGBT community, which prevents citizens of developed nations from seeing Russia as an attractive country to live in.

Other indicators showed weak or moderate upward trends, including the extent to which Russia’s political values are reflected in its foreign policy, a national idea (predominat-ing general values across the country), the global role of the Russian language, the glob-al popularity of Russian culture, and foreign perception of Russian emigrants.

0,0

-0,2-0,2

0,1

0,4

0,2

0,0

-0,2

-0,4

Soft Power

2010 20132011 2012

An analysis of the surveys over the past four years has led to the conclu-sion that Russia has strengthened its foothold as one of the major players in the global multi-polar world. The country’s geopolitical weight and consistency in upholding its interests on the international stage is highly appreciated by the expert community.

However, Russia’s domestic policy and some aspects of Russian society cause the biggest concerns for the fourth year running, along with the economy, which is unlikely to provide new points of growth based on the commercializing of R&D projects any time soon, but will likely to continue to rely heavily on exploiting the country’s natural resources. The negative trend in scientific research (more precisely, the absence of growth for four years, which comes to the same thing) also confirms the experts’ concerns.

However, it is important to note the first positive value of the Soft Power score over the period surveyed. There is also room for improvement in the area of human capital. Achievements in this sphere should greatly improve the perception of Russia as a good country to live in and do business. They could also help to create an environment for popularizing Russia’s cultural accom-plishments, and develop an image of a major power which puts a high value on people’s rights, freedoms and opportunities.



0,0

3,4

25,3

17,2

19,5

20,7

12,6

1,1

3,4

10,3

26,4

20,7

20,7

16,1

1,1

1,1

5,7

13,8

40,2

11,5

18,4

8,0

2,3

0,0

Influence withinthe political system

%

Efficiency of policy development and implementation

%

Public trust

%

Very substantial deterioration

Substantial deterioration

Slight deterioration

No change

Slight improvement

Substantial improvement

Very substantial improvement

Don’t know/ Can’t assess

% %%

1.1. The President

11,5

36,8

24,1

20,7

3,4

2,3

1,1

0,0

6,9

26,4

36,8

19,5

9,2

0,0

1,1

0,0

11,5

27,6

40,2

11,5

5,7

1,1

1,1

1,1


%


%

Public trust

%




No change

Slight improvement




% %%

1.2. The executive branch 1.2.1. The Prime Minister

1. The Russian Political System



2,3

14,9

39,1

27,6

13,8

0,0

1,1

1,1

2,3

16,1

32,2

31,0

13,8

1,1

1,1

2,3

4,6

18,4

36,8

29,9

5,7

2,3

1,1

1,1


%


%

Public trust

%




No change

Slight improvement




% %%

1.2.2. The Russian Government

0,0

3,4

20,7

39,1

26,4

1,1

0,0

9,2

1,1

3,4

17,2

50,6

14,9

2,3

0,0

10,3

1,1

9,2

18,4

44,8

16,1

1,1

0,0

9,2


%


%

Public trust

%




No change

Slight improvement




% %%

1.2.3. The regional executive branch (Plenipotentiary Representatives, Governors, Mayors)

4,6

5,7

21,8

41,4

20,7

2,3

1,1

2,3

5,7

14,9

18,4

43,7

10,3

2,3

2,3

2,3

8,0

19,5

27,6

32,2

9,2

0,0

1,1

2,3


%


%

Public trust

%




No change

Slight improvement




% %%

1.3. The legislative branch 1.3.1. The State Duma



3,4

3,4

8,0

67,8

11,5

0,0

0,0

5,7

2,3

4,6

13,8

69,0

4,6

0,0

0,0

5,7

3,4

8,0

10,3

70,1

3,4

0,0

0,0

4,6


%


%

Public trust

%




No change

Slight improvement




% %%

1.3.2. The Federation Council

4,6

11,5

13,8

43,7

14,9

3,4

1,1

6,9

5,7

11,5

14,9

39,1

18,4

1,1

1,1

8,0

9,2

16,1

31,0

24,1

11,5

1,1

1,1

5,7


%


%

Public trust

%




No change

Slight improvement




% %%

1.4. The judicial system 1.4.1. The courts of general jurisdiction, the Supreme Court

0,0

4,6

9,2

65,5

8,0

1,1

0,0

11,5

0,0

3,4

10,3

64,4

9,2

1,1

0,0

11,5

1,1

3,4

14,9

59,8

8,0

0,0

0,0

12,6


%


%

Public trust

%




No change

Slight improvement




% %%

1.4.2. The Constitutional Court



0,0

1,1

13,8

44,8

10,3

1,1

0,0

28,7

0,0

2,3

11,5

43,7

12,6

1,1

0,0

28,7

1,1

0,0

12,6

46,0

10,3

0,0

0,0

29,9


%


%

Public trust

%




No change

Slight improvement




% %%

1.4.3. Arbitration tribunals, the Supreme Arbitration Court

5,7

16,1

32,2

23,0

14,9

4,6

2,3

1,1

5,7

18,4

31,0

26,4

10,3

5,7

1,1

1,1

10,3

28,7

31,0

19,5

5,7

2,3

0,0

2,3


%


%

Public trust

%




No change

Slight improvement




% %%

1.5. Political parties and the political system 1.5.1. The ruling party

3,4

14,9

24,1

40,2

13,8

1,1

0,0

2,3

4,6

13,8

25,3

43,7

8,0

1,1

0,0

3,4

3,4

17,2

24,1

36,8

12,6

2,3

0,0

3,4


%


%

Public trust

%




No change

Slight improvement




% %%

1.5.2. Parliamentary opposition



5,7

13,8

17,2

19,5

33,3

6,9

0,0

3,4

8,0

11,5

21,8

29,9

18,4

3,4

1,1

5,7

2,3

9,2

21,8

24,1

33,3

4,6

1,1

3,4


%


%

Public trust

%




No change

Slight improvement




% %%

1.5.3. Extra-parliamentary opposition

6,9

25,3

18,4

23,0

21,8

3,4

1,1

0,0

4,6

23,0

27,6

24,1

14,9

3,4

1,1

1,1

4,6

13,8

18,4

27,6

28,7

4,6

1,1

1,1

The extent to which the rightsand freedoms of citizens

are observed by the government

%

Degree of freedomof press and expression

%

The extent to which citizens interests are reflected during elections

%




No change

Slight improvement




% %%

1.6. The role of civil society 1.6.1. Civil society development level

3,4

12,6

18,4

31,0

26,4

3,4

3,4

1,1

5,7

11,5

14,9

40,2

18,4

6,9

1,1

1,1

0,0

6,9

12,6

48,3

19,5

5,7

3,4

3,4

The extent to which the rights and freedoms to elect and be electedare observed by the government

%

Freedom of campaigning, including access to the media

%

The degree of predictabilityof the electoral process

%




No change

Slight improvement




% %%

1.6.2. The electoral process



11,5

26,4

28,7

14,9

14,9

1,1

0,0

2,3

9,2

24,1

25,3

24,1

12,6

1,1

0,0

3,4

2,3

14,9

24,1

29,9

23,0

2,3

0,0

3,4


%


%

Public trust

%




No change

Slight improvement




% %%

1.6.3. The role of non-governmental organizations

2,3

4,6

16,1

43,7

16,1

0,0

0,0

17,2

3,4

5,7

14,9

47,1

10,3

0,0

0,0

18,4

4,6

5,7

11,5

48,3

12,6

0,0

0,0

17,2


Efficiency of decision-makingand implementation

Public trust




No change

Slight improvement




% %%

1.6.4. The role of the Russian Public Chamber



0,0

11,5

57,5

8,0

12,6

3,4

2,3

4,6

Macroeconomicparameters




No change

Slight improvement




%

2.1. Macroeconomic parameters (GDP trends, external debts, the trade balance and inflation)

0,0

2,3

21,8

27,6

32,2

2,3

0,0

13,8

0,0

12,6

27,6

20,7

25,3

1,1

0,0

12,6

0,0

8,0

36,8

21,8

13,8

4,6

0,0

14,9

0,0

1,1

36,8

23,0

18,4

5,7

1,1

13,8

Financialservices

Innovationindustries

Producing and Processing industries

Extractionindustries

%%%%

2.2. Development of economic sectors

2. The Russian Economy



0,0

10,3

27,6

32,2

24,1

0,0

1,1

4,6

1,1

16,1

26,4

25,3

25,3

0,0

2,3

3,4

2,3

3,4

36,8

24,1

18,4

1,1

2,3

11,5

Level of diversificationof the economy

The efficiency of measures taken to modernize the economy

Russia’s balanceof payments forecast




No change

Slight improvement




% %%

2.3. Economic modernization

0,0

5,7

16,1

34,5

29,9

5,7

1,1

6,9

0,0

2,3

19,5

37,9

27,6

4,6

0,0

8,0

1,1

10,3

33,3

18,4

24,1

3,4

0,0

9,2

Level of Russia’s integrationin the global economy

The Russianmarket’s openness

Investment attractiveness(direct investment)




No change

Slight improvement




% %%

2.4. The Russian investment climate

1,1

13,8

26,4

21,8

20,7

3,4

0,0

12,6

0,0

5,7

12,6

47,1

18,4

2,3

0,0

13,8

0,0

12,6

33,3

25,3

16,1

3,4

0,0

9,2

Investment attractiveness(portfolio investment)

Tax legislationdevelopment level

Businessclimate




No change

Slight improvement




% %%



0,0

0,0

16,1

47,1

31,0

1,1

0,0

4,6

0,0

2,3

18,4

35,6

33,3

3,4

0,0

6,9

0,0

8,0

21,8

34,5

27,6

1,1

2,3

4,6

Environment Publichealth

Feeling of safety/security




No change

Slight improvement




% %%

3.1. Living standards

0,0

4,6

16,1

35,6

35,6

3,4

1,1

3,4

0,0

2,3

14,9

35,6

37,9

4,6

1,1

3,4

Povertylevel

Prosperitylevel




No change

Slight improvement




% %

3. The Russian Human Dimension



1,1

5,7

20,7

44,8

18,4

2,3

1,1

5,7

1,1

4,6

14,9

41,4

26,4

1,1

1,1

9,2

General educationstandards

Professional/vocationaleducation standards




No change

Slight improvement




% %

3.2. Education standards

0,0

0,0

12,6

16,1

51,7

12,6

4,6

2,3

4,6

10,3

41,4

32,2

9,2

1,1

1,1

0,0

1,1

10,3

37,9

33,3

13,8

1,1

1,1

1,1

Level of nationalpride, patriotism

Senseof freedom

Levelof mutual trust




No change

Slight improvement




% %%

3.3. Ideology and politics

1,1

5,7

14,9

48,3

20,7

3,4

1,1

4,6

6,9

26,4

37,9

17,2

4,6

2,3

1,1

3,4

1,1

6,9

11,5

49,4

25,3

1,1

1,1

3,4

Level of good will, supportto compatriots, compassion

Tolerancelevel

Cultural levelof the population




No change

Slight improvement




% %%



1,1

6,9

25,3

29,9

26,4

3,4

0,0

6,9

1,1

1,1

20,7

42,5

24,1

1,1

2,3

6,9

1,1

1,1

13,8

39,1

17,2

1,1

2,3

24,1

Competitiveness of Russianhigher education, post-graduate

and doctorate courses

The creative potentialof academics/scientists

The creative potentialof engineers




No change

Slight improvement




% %%

1,1

2,3

26,4

21,8

31,0

3,4

1,1

12,6

1,1

1,1

16,1

34,5

23,0

3,4

1,1

19,5

1,1

4,6

20,7

32,2

20,7

2,3

0,0

18,4

Infrastructure incentivesfor innovation

Tax incentivesfor innovation

The business community’s willingness to be involved in venture investment




No change

Slight improvement




% %%

4. Russian Science and the country’s Innovative Development



1,1

3,4

20,7

27,6

19,5

3,4

0,0

24,1

3,4

13,8

27,6

24,1

18,4

4,6

0,0

8,0

0,0

1,1

18,4

24,1

43,7

3,4

0,0

9,2

Venture investmentin R&D projects

The “brain drain” The level of statefinancing for science




No change

Slight improvement




% %%

1,1

2,3

19,5

33,3

25,3

1,1

0,0

17,2

1,1

4,6

18,4

40,2

10,3

4,6

0,0

20,7

The existence of competitive innovation projects

The extent to which R&D results are applied in the economy/mechanisms governing the commercialization of scientific innovations




No change

Slight improvement




% %



0,0

1,1

11,5

49,4

28,7

4,6

2,3

2,3

0,0

1,1

5,7

18,4

58,6

8,0

2,3

5,7

0,0

2,3

4,6

25,3

43,7

4,6

2,3

17,2

External bordersecurity

Level to which the RussianArmed Forces is equipped

with modern weapons

Level of advancedmilitary R&D projects




No change

Slight improvement




% %%

0,0

1,1

8,0

41,4

29,9

1,1

1,1

17,2

0,0

1,1

6,9

48,3

23,0

1,1

1,1

18,4

0,0

1,1

4,6

26,4

43,7

8,0

3,4

12,6

Professional qualitiesof officers and commanders

Professional qualitiesof Russian soldiers

Ability to quickly respondto a threat from abroad




No change

Slight improvement




% %%

5. Russia in the System of national, Regional and global Security



0,0

1,1

5,7

29,9

39,1

9,2

1,1

13,8

0,0

2,3

8,0

32,2

35,6

5,7

1,1

14,9

0,0

1,1

10,3

34,5

34,5

4,6

4,6

10,3

Ability to respond to a threatwhich arises within Russia

Ability to conductoperations outside Russia

Ability to combatthe terror threat




No change

Slight improvement




% %%

1,1

2,3

18,4

33,3

29,9

5,7

4,6

4,6

0,0

3,4

21,8

39,1

21,8

8,0

3,4

2,3

1,1

4,6

9,2

69,0

6,9

3,4

1,1

4,6

0,0

4,6

16,1

37,9

19,5

3,4

2,3

16,1

Military cooperationwith foreign countries

and organizations

Russia as a guarantorof international security, including

peacekeeping missions

Russia as a potentialthreat to peace

Ability to conducta global war

%%%%



6. Russian Diplomatic activity

0,0

5,7

21,8

16,1

44,8

8,0

3,4

0,0

1,1

4,6

26,4

32,2

26,4

4,6

2,3

2,3

0,0

3,4

10,3

47,1

26,4

8,0

1,1

3,4

Russia’s internationalinfluence

Mediation work to resolve international conflicts

Involvement in internationalaid efforts




No change

Slight improvement




% %%

6.1. General assessment of the Russian foreign policy

2,3

24,1

32,2

12,6

21,8

4,6

1,1

1,1

0,0

4,6

20,7

23,0

39,1

6,9

2,3

3,4

Perceptionof Russia abroad

Russia’s diplomaticinitiatives




No change

Slight improvement




% %



0,0

2,3

14,9

51,7

25,3

1,1

2,3

2,3

0,0

0,0

5,7

33,3

41,4

11,5

5,7

2,3

0,0

0,0

6,9

67,8

18,4

0,0

2,3

4,6

Participationin the G8

Participationin the G20

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)




No change

Slight improvement




% %%

6.2. Russia's participation in international organizations

0,0

1,1

8,0

42,5

31,0

8,0

2,3

6,9

0,0

1,1

3,4

29,9

44,8

14,9

1,1

4,6

0,0

2,3

16,1

40,2

25,3

9,2

3,4

3,4

The Shanghai CooperationOrganization (SCO)

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)

The Commonwealthof Independent States (CIS)




No change

Slight improvement




% %%

1,1

8,0

29,9

42,5

10,3

2,3

1,1

4,6

0,0

0,0

10,3

42,5

28,7

5,7

3,4

9,2

0,0

4,6

27,6

44,8

9,2

4,6

1,1

8,0

0,0

3,4

13,8

52,9

21,8

2,3

2,3

3,4

The Councilof Europe

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)

Participation in Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) activities

Participationin UN activities

%%%%



7. Russia’s openness to the world

0,0

0,0

8,0

34,5

28,7

17,2

8,0

3,4

1,1

1,1

11,5

39,1

27,6

10,3

5,7

3,4

0,0

4,6

29,9

36,8

19,5

4,6

2,3

2,3

Degree to which Russian citizensare free to travel internationally

Degree to which foreign citizens are free to travel within Russia

The Russian population’s attitude toward foreign citizens




No change

Slight improvement




% %%

1,1

3,4

28,7

40,2

20,7

2,3

2,3

1,1

3,4

19,5

42,5

17,2

11,5

2,3

2,3

1,1

0,0

3,4

12,6

49,4

21,8

5,7

2,3

4,6

Foreign perceptionof Russian citizens

Foreign perceptionof Russia as an open country

Accessibility of informationon Russia to foreign citizens




No change

Slight improvement




% %%



0,0

8,0

11,5

46,0

16,1

3,4

1,1

13,8

0,0

4,6

10,3

46,0

17,2

2,3

1,1

18,4

Openness and accessibilityof representatives of federal

government bodies to foreign citizens

Openness and accessibilityof representatives of regional

government bodies to foreign citizens




No change

Slight improvement




% %



8. Soft Power

3,4

10,3

21,8

26,4

28,7

5,7

1,1

2,3

1,1

2,3

4,6

39,1

37,9

9,2

2,3

3,4

0,0

3,4

11,5

36,8

26,4

6,9

2,3

12,6

The attractiveness of Russia’scultural and civilizational models

The extent to which Russia’s political values are reflected

in its foreign policy

The national idea (valuesthat predominate nationwide)




No change

Slight improvement




% %%

0,0

2,3

11,5

49,4

24,1

0,0

2,3

10,3

1,1

18,4

26,4

26,4

18,4

2,3

1,1

5,7

0,0

5,7

13,8

39,1

31,0

3,4

2,3

4,6

0,0

5,7

14,9

39,1

31,0

2,3

1,1

5,7

Foreign perceptionof Russian emigrants

Russia’s attractivenessas a place of permanent

residence

The global popularityof Russian culture

The global roleof the Russian language

%%%%



About the project:

The Russia Development Index (Valdai Index) reflects the combined opinion of the world's leading experts on Russia as regards Russia’s political, economic, social, cultural and international performance. The poll is conducted annually in August-September and aims to study the changes that have occurred in Russia’s develop-ment over the course of a year. Indeed, respondents assess changes, rather than the current situation.

The first Valdai Index survey was conducted at the seventh annual conference of the Valdai Discussion Club in 2010. A group of 25 leading experts on Russia from the United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, China, Poland, Canada and Japan were asked to answer nine questions and to give marks on a 10-point scale, ranging from –5 (significant deterioration) to 5 (significant improvement).

In 2011, the Valdai Index structure was changed quite substantially. The questionnaire modules were expanded, each containing a number of categories that specify and define more accurately the changes that happened in Russia over the year. The respondents were asked to choose one mark on a seven-point scale for each category in eight modules that best describes the current trend. The marks ranged from “–3” (significant deterioration) to “+3” (significant improvement). The new format was approved as the basis for the project.

The focus group for the Russia Development Index 2012–2013 included 323 participants of the Valdai Club conferences, and 87 respondents from 26 countries participated in the survey: Austria, Armenia, Great Britain, Hungary, Germany, Israel, India, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Canada, China, Mexico, Norway, Russia, Poland, Slovakia, USA, Turkey, Ukraine, Finland, France, Switzerland, Estonia, South Korea and Japan. Foreign experts accounted for 76% of the respondents.

valdaiclub.com

Russia Development Index 2012–2013 (Valdai Index)

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Transcript of Russia Development Index 2012–2013 (Valdai Index)