RUSI Spring2012
Transcript of RUSI Spring2012
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For international defence professionals
Royal United Services Institute Spring 2012 Vol 14 No 3
Air Commodore Russell La ForteThe former head of the RAF Regiment
discusses Force Protection in Afghanistan
Guarding high-value assetsChief Inspector Kenneth Pennington (PSNI)
on the importance of protecting people
UK AFV and PPV procurementHow the UOR system rushed protected
patrol vehicles to the front line
Force Protection– saving liveson operations
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RUSI DEFENCE SYSTE MS
Editor-in-chief Colette Doyle
Managing editor Barry Davies
Sub-editors Matthew Andrews
Erica Moss
Art editors Jean-Philippe Stanway
James White
Designer Kylie Alder
Production and Malcolm Greendistribution manager
Sales director Martin Cousens
Sales manager Peter Barron
Managing director Andrew Howard
Chief executive Alan Spence
Chairman Paul Duffen
Published by Newsdesk Communications Ltd
5th Floor, 130 City Road, London EC1V 2NW
Tel: +44 (0)20 7650 1600
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© 2012. The entire contents of this publication are protected by copyright. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any
form or by any means: electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. The views and opinions expressed by independent authors
and contributors in this publication are provided in the writers’ personal capacities and are their sole responsibility. Their publication does not imply that they represent the views or opinions
of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) or Newsdesk Communications Ltd and must neither be regarded as constituting advice on any matter whatsoever, nor be interpreted as such. The
reproduction of advertisements in this publication does not in any way imply endorsement by RUSI or Newsdesk Communications Ltd of products or services referred to therein.
Editor Simon Michell
Editorial director Michael Codner
Royal United Services Institute, Whitehall, London SW1A 2ET
Tel: +44 (0)20 7747 2600
Fax: +44 (0)20 7839 1090
Email: [email protected]
www.rusi.org
For international defence professionals
Royal United Services Institute Spring 2012 Vol 14 No 3
Air Commodore Russell La ForteThe former head of the RAF Regiment
discusses Force Protection in Afghanistan
Guarding high-value assetsChief Inspector Kenneth Pennington (PSNI)
on the importance of protecting people
UK AFV and PPV procurementHow the UOR system rushed protected
patrol vehicles to the front line
Force Protection– saving liveson operations
Newsdesk Communications Ltd publishes a wide range of business
and customer publications. For further information please contact
Alan Spence, chief executive, or Paul Duffen, chairman.
Pictures: Crown copyright, Press Association, Reuters
Printed by Buxton Press
ISBN: 978-1-906940-52-2
Cover image supplied by Ministry of Defence Crown copyright
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CONTENTS
25 The Defence Enterprise is More Than
Just a Supermarket Chain
Patrick Beautement, from The abaci Partnership LLP, explains
why the UK defence enterprise should not be seen as a single
homogenous activity, similar to a supermarket chain
34 LPPV – Lessons for Defence Procurement
Chris Maughan, managing consultant at Decision Analysis
Services Ltd, examines the two key procurement processes
employed by the Ministry of Defence and highlights lessons
to be learned from the success of the LPPV rapid procurement
DEFENCE INDUSTRY
38 Bandits and T hieves – Sovereign Wealth Recovery
as a Critical Defence Capability
RUSI’s Dr John Louth makes the case that returning stolen
assets to sovereign nations is a vital element of stability
building and should receive greater government support
40 German Defence Exports in Perspective
Dr Henrik Heidenkamp assesses recent developments in
German defence exports and examines how they impact on
the country’s foreign, security and defence policies
DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES – LAND
44 Whatever Happened to Medium-Weight Forces?
Colonel Peter Flach MBE (Retd) explains why air-
transportable, medium-weight armoured vehicles havebecome such a vital component in current operations
46 UK AFV and PPV Procurement Using Urgent
Operational Requirements
Peter D Antill, Jeremy CD Smith and David M Moore explain
how the Ministry of Defence devised urgent solutions to give
better protection to personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan
51 Protected Mobility and Vehicle Modernisation:
Keeping up with Evolving T hreats
Serge Buchakjian of Oshkosh Defense highlights the role
that the company’s vehicle technology is playing in helping
to protect troops travelling on the ground
55 T he Talisman System-of-Systems Approach to Route
Proving and Clearance
Amyas Godfrey and Paul Wathen review the Thales Talisman
counter-improvised explosive device suite of systems
58 People Protection
Chief Inspector Kenneth Pennington, from the Police Service
of Northern Ireland, explains why people and their safety are
an important part of the Critical National Infrastructure debate
61 Bowman Comes of Age
Giles Ebbutt explores the history of the Bowman tactical C4I
system, its positive impact on British military capability and
the root causes for some of the criticism that it has received
EDITOR’S LETTER
11 Protect and survive
By Simon Michell
DEFENCE CONTENTION
12 Defence Exports Need More T han a Minister’s Goodwill
Professor David Kirkpatrick argues that the economic
downturn has made defence exports more important to the
United Kingdom’s financial well-being
DEFENCE ACQUISITION
14 Acquisition Focus Group and the Defence White Paper
The RUSI Acquisition Focus Group analyses the British
government’s February 2012 Defence White Paper,
National Security through Technology
18 Defence Reform – a Precision Attack?
Bob Barton, former managing director of Niteworks,
explains why implementing change at an institution such as
the Ministry of Defence is proving to be so challenging
22 Labour’s Defence Procurement Report and
Shadow Defence Review Launch
Michael Codner, senior research fellow and director
of Military Sciences at RUSI, commends the UK’s Labour
shadow government for its recent report focusing on
defence procurement
46
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CONTENTS
DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES – AIR
64 T he RAF Regiment – More T han the Sum of its Parts
The Royal Air Force Regiment provides much more
than its unique perimeter-patrolling capability for NATOand coalition partners, also offering vital capabilities to
UK Defence and the civilian authorities
68 Securing the Fifth Environment: the RAF and the
Importance of Cyber
RUSI’s Elizabeth Quintana examines the development of
cyber-capabilities within the Royal Air Force and looks at
some of the high-tech threats that the service may face
70 UAVs and the Counter-IED Campaign
Avnish Patel, military sciences project manager at RUSI,
assesses a selection of the latest unmanned aerial vehicle
counter-improvised explosive device technology
DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES – SEA
72 Danger from Below
Dr Lee Willett, RUSI’s head of maritime studies, considers
whether the Royal Navy is in danger of relinquishing its
global leadership status in the art of Anti-Submarine Warfare
74 T he ‘Baggers’ – Royal Navy Sea King Mk 7 Airborne
Surveillance and Control (SKASaC) helicopters
Simon Michell reveals the utility of the Sea King Mk 7
helicopter and highlights the crucial contribution that ithas made in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya
76 RUSI Leads the Way on Ballistic Missile Defence
Captain George V Galdorisi, USN (Retd) reviews RUSI’s
1 2th annual Missile Defence Conference and highlights some
of the most pressing international ballistic missile threats
78 Better Submarine In-Service Support
Martin Burns, submarine engineering support manager
at Babcock, looks at the latest developments in the joint
Ministry of Defence/industry approach to submarine support
DEFENCE R&T
80 Electric Dragons – Airborne Electronic Warfare
Capabilities in China
Robert Hewson reveals some of the results of the vast
resources dedicated to military electronics in China
82 IBCS – Integrating Air and Missile Defence Systems
How Northrop Grumman met the challenge of developing a
common battle command system to enhance the US Army’s
integrated air and missile defence capability
85 Delivering Sustainable Air Power
Group Captain Maurice Dixon, from the Royal Air Force,
explains the steps being taken to ensure that the service is
playing its part in achieving a smaller carbon footprint
89 Cyber Security Conference Update
A review of last November’s RUSI event, which brought
together leaders in cyber-crime prevention
INTERVIEW
92 Leading the guardians of the Royal Air Force’s
military soulSimon Michell talks to the former Commandant General
of the Royal Air Force Regiment, Air Commodore Russell
La Forte CBE, to discover the nature of the corps’ work
94 Index of advertisers
82
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EDITOR’S LET TER
Protect and survive
The eagerly awaited coalition government Defence White Paper,
National Security through Technology, was published in February
2012 to mixed reviews. On the one hand, the stated ambition
of publishing a 10-year equipment programme is a very welcome move
as it will help the defence systems industry to plan ahead with more
certainty. However, the somewhat circular arguments as to when
national sovereignty issues dictate that equipment should be sourcedfrom a UK contractor or bought off the shelf overseas have left many
people confused. Others are waiting for more information about the
proposed Ministerial Working Group that will endeavour to translate
the published words into practice.
To help guide readers through the main thrust of the White Paper, RUSI’s
Acquisition Focus Group has gone over it line by line and published its
own conclusions in this issue. Furthermore, and in the light of the White
Paper, Mike Codner takes a look at the Labour Party’s own report on
defence procurement to see how the two perspectives differ. And, for
context, Patrick Beautement from The abaci Partnership adds his thoughts
as to why the overall defence enterprise can’t be regarded as a single
homogenous entity in a similar vein as a supermarket chain when procur-
ing and delivering equipment and undertaking operations.
Force Protection
The spring issue of RUSI Defence Systems takes a closer look at Force
Protection in the air, on the ground and at sea. The role that the Royal
Air Force plays in this arena is often overlooked, and so we highlight the
RAF Regiment to show just how crucial this organisation is to UK defence,
and how wide-ranging its skills and capabilities are, from airfield defence
to forward air control and CBRN response. To add further weight to this
argument, we feature an interview with former Commander of the RAF
Regiment, Air Commodore Russell La Forte, weeks before he moved posts.
The RAF’s cyber-security capabilities are also examined, along with a review
of the RUSI Cyber Security Conference, which took place in November 2011.
On the land side, Peter Anthill and colleagues give a fascinating round-
up of how the Ministry of Defence went about bolstering troop protection
through a series of Urgent Operational Requirements that both upgraded
By Simon Michell, editor, RUSI Defence Systems
the existing fleet of wheeled and tracked vehicles and acquired new
bespoke vehicles for use in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Any examination of Force Protection naturally needs to consider the
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threat that has wreaked so much havoc
over the past decade. Accordingly, Thales offers an insight into the progress
of its Talisman programme for the British Army and explains how a suite
of robots, engineering/command vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles(UAVs) has been put together to create an integrated counter-IED solution
(C-IED). We also review a more general C-IED contribution made by UAVs
by highlighting the work of the American Task Force ODIN in Afghanistan
and their use of the AGM-114 Hellfire-armed Sky Warrior.
Force Protection from the sea is covered with a report by George Galdorisi,
from the US Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center Pacific, on the RUSI
Ballistic Missile Defence conference that took place last June. Captain
Galdorisi (Retd) reviews the international flavour of the conference and
the excellent work it does for the BMD community. He also highlights the
ballistic threats from China, Iran and North Korea.
Research and technology
Rob Hewson, editor of Jane’s Air-launched Weapons, takes a look at how
the Chinese are developing a formidable array of tactical and strategic
airborne electronic systems to rival those of the West. The tried-and-tested
technique of procure, dismantle, examine and then produce is bearing fruit
for the burgeoning Chinese defence electronics industry.
I hope that there is something of interest for all our readers in this issue,
and may I take this opportunity to alert you that the summer issue of RUSI
Defence Systems will focus on the ‘Kinetic Effect’. Please do not hesitate to
contact me if you would like to make a contribution.
Simon Michell
Editor, RUSI Defence Systems
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DEFENCE CONTENTION
In the Autumn/Winter 2011 issue of RUSI Defence Systems , Gerald
Howarth MP outlined1 how the Ministry of Defence (MoD) was promot-
ing UK defence exports in order to both enhance national economic
growth, and to reduce the cost of MoD acquisition projects (via economies
of scale). Both of these effects would, in principle, help to reduce the
UK’s public-sector deficit, which is, at present, the paramount priority of
the coalition government. His paper explained how the MoD is promot-
ing defence exports by considering exportability in the early phases of
its acquisition projects and by demonstrating the capabilities of equip-
ment already in service with British forces, as well as how its activities are
coordinated with those of other government departments (Department
for Business, Innovation and Skills, and the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office). However, he did not discuss the scale of the economic costs or the
benefits associated with defence exports, nor how these costs and benefits
are shared between the private and public sectors.
Putting defence exports in perspective
Defence exports attract particular attention as they are often controversial,
raising a variety of political and ethical issues, but it is important to put
them in their proper macroeconomic perspective. Defence exports consti-
tute only a small fraction – no more than three per cent in recent years – of
total UK exports; their value is similar to that of alcoholic beverages, much
Defence Exports Need More
T han a Minister’s GoodwillProfessor David Kirkpatrick argues that the economic downturn has made defence exports more
important to the United Kingdom’s financial well-being, but asks the government to produce
some detailed analysis on the true nature of their net benefits to the Exchequer
smaller than medicines, and significantly smaller than financial services.
Furthermore, the marketing of defence exports incurs substantial costs to
the government, as well as the costs incurred by UK defence contractors.
The government pays for the relevant military and civil service staff (in the
UK and in embassies overseas), and for export credits, service demonstra-
tions, ministerial visits and so on. In the past, some critics have alleged that
there were additional costs from the distortion of both MoD procurement
decisions and of UK foreign-aid programmes.
In 2002, a study of UK defence exports concluded2 that the net economic
effect on the UK government’s budget of a 50 per cent reduction in defence
exports would be an annual loss of about £70 million (equivalent to 0.3 per
cent of the current defence budget), excluding short-term adjustment costs.
A successful export drive needs
an array of complementary
and consistent policies
The Eurofighter Typhoon
has been exported
beyond the consortium
members to Austria
and Saudi Arabia
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DEFENCE CONTENTION
This suggests that even a substantial increase in UK defence exports would
not considerably improve the public-sector deficit.
However, much has changed since 2002. Firstly, the UK now has low
economic growth and unemployment well above its natural rate; in this
parlous situation, increased exports from any sector of the economy couldyield a greater benefit to public finances. Secondly, the government is
considering a Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS), proposed by its predeces-
sor3, that would sustain some chosen technological and industrial defence
capabilities within the UK; the cost of this Strategy would be substantially
reduced if exports kept the relevant UK industries above critical mass and
thus avoided the need for special subsidies.
Reassessment may be necessary
Accordingly, if the present economic difficulties are expected to persist for
several years, and if the government does eventually decide to support an
onshore defence industrial base, the MoD should reassess the net costs
and benefits of defence exports. If it has already conducted a reassessment
as part of its work on the DIS, the methodology and results should be pub-
lished to meet the House of Commons Defence Committee’s 19994 demand
for transparency and accountability in this politically sensitive area.
In a campaign to increase UK defence exports, a new Whitehall commit-
tee may be necessary, but it is certainly not sufficient. The campaign needs,
above all, a range of cost-effective UK-made products, and this demands
adequate preceding investment in defence research and development by
government and industry. MoD funding for defence-related research has
been cut drastically since the end of the Cold War and may need to be
addressed5. The MoD must also be prepared to contribute to the develop-
ment of UK-made equipment, modifying where necessary its current inten-
tion6 to procure more off-the-shelf equipment from foreign suppliers.
The UK defence industry must combine technical, analytical and man-agement competences to produce competitive products that achieve their
performance, timescale and cost targets, and must provide well-tailored
marketing, punctual deliveries and good after-sales services to its customer
nations7. A successful export drive – in defence as in other sectors of indus-
try – needs an array of complementary and consistent policies, as well as a
minister’s energy and eloquence.
In designing a campaign to increase UK defence exports, it is important
to be realistic – financial constraints can often dampen initial optimism, as
was witnessed by the Greek Typhoon procurement that has been put on the
back burner8. Furthermore, such exports will inevitably be limited by the
inability of small, poor nations to afford much expensive equipment,
by the preference of large, rich nations to produce equipment to meet their
own needs as far as is practicable, and by the UK’s need to avoid sales ofmilitary equipment to unstable or tyrannical regimes that could use the
equipment to invade their neighbours or to oppress their own people.
In recent decades, ill-judged sales to such regimes have yielded short-
term profits for contractors, but have had adverse consequences for the UK
in the longer term. For all of these reasons, nations with onshore defence
industries generally export less than half – often much less – of the value
of their own budgets for equipment procurement9.
Defence exports can also be regarded as a useful element of foreign policy.
They have the potential to strengthen the UK’s alliances, enhance mutual
understanding between the UK and its customer nations, and contribute to
regional stability. If sufficient relevant evidence could be assembled, then
government support for defence exports might be justified on these non-
economic criteria, even without a particularly strong economic case.
Perhaps, after the MoD’s decision on its defence industrial strategy has
been announced, Mr Howarth or one of his colleagues will contribute
another, more extensive paper on the net benefits of defence exports. ■
The Type 26 Global Combat
Ship is being designed with
export potential in mind
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DEFENCE ACQUISITION
In many ways, the White Paper could be viewed as the best that indus-
try might have hoped for. In government – but outside the Ministry
of Defence (MoD) – there are those with a doctrinaire opposition to
any kind of industrial policy, and it is easy to understand that a defence
ministry that is absolutely strapped for cash wants minimal restrictions
on its freedom of action. The White Paper delivers all the flexibility that
the MoD could hope for, while offering British industry a number of
words of support and appreciation. The reiteration of the commitment
to publish the 10-year Equipment Plan to help industry make appropri-
ate preparations is also welcome, as will be delivery on the promise.
However, as a policy statement to guide the recommendations and deci-
sions of officials and ministers, the paper is fundamentally flawed, not least
because of the circular nature of the lines of argument that it advances at
the highest level of procurement strategy. It bequeaths to the future a situ-
ation in which almost any procurement choice will be justifiable by at least
one part of the document. Moreover, at a time of difficulty in the national
economy, it has little concern with the contribution that defence could
make to wider economic success.
The paper offers little incentive for national or foreign defence businesses
to invest in the UK. It offers the prospect that UK forces will be equipped
only with systems that are freely available to others and the potential for
national freedom of action will evaporate. It represents a lost opportunity
to rethink the place of industry and the supply chain in defence.
Stage one: buy on the world market
The headline statement from the White Paper is that the UK’s core position
will be to buy on the basis of competition on the world market.
Acquisition Focus Group and
the Defence White PaperRUSI’s Acquisition Focus Group1 highlights the undoubted weaknesses in the UK Government’s
February 2012 Defence White Paper, National Security through Technology, and laments the lost
opportunity to deliver much-needed direction and genuine industrial policy
‘… we will use competition as our default position... we will look at the
domestic and global defence and security market for products that are
proven, that are reliable, and that meet our current needs.’
‘... applying the principle of open procurement will result in the greatest
possible value for money for our defence forces and security agencies.’
Words similar to these are used at several points in the document and
formed what the MoD presumably wanted to be the lead statement: the
Financial Times, after its interview with procurement minister Peter Luff,
observed ‘MoD will no longer favour British companies’.2
We note that, rather than insisting on UK understanding of how a
system works being a condition of purchase, the MoD appears content
to rely on assurances from a contractor about the performance of the
elements within the system (paragraph 61).
Stage two: take account of national security needs
The paper goes on to recognise that procurement in the defence and secu-
rity area is different from other areas of government purchasing, and notes
‘the need to take action to protect our technological advantage where
essential for national security’. Thus section 3.1 of the White Paper reads:
‘We will take action to protect the UK’s operational advantages and free-
dom of action, but only where this is essential for national security.’
What is essential for national security is a matter of judgement, not
objective fact, and therefore a subject on which honest and informed indi-
viduals can disagree, although in the paper national security is presented
as being concerned with two things: ‘operational advantages’ and ‘freedom
of action’. It is the latter that may have the more significant implications for
defence acquisition.
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DEFENCE ACQUISITION
What it means is set out in paragraphs 53 and 54 and its significance is
that it is defined as central to national sovereignty.
53. Freedom of action is the ability to determine our internal and exter-
nal affairs and act in the country’s interests free from intervention by other
states or entities, in accordance with our legal obligations. This freedom isthe essence of national sovereignty. It is also essential to be able to use a
capability effectively…
54. For national security capabilities in general, freedom of action rests on
the assurance that we will be able to use them – or continue to use them –
whenever we need to; and that when we do so, they will perform as we require.
In the field of defence, freedom of action includes being able to conduct combat
operations at a time and place of our choosing.
The paper seeks to assert an argument that not all equipment is central
to UK security, a point that is certainly valid with regard to, say, socks.
It speaks of ‘four general cases’ in which ‘action is likely to be needed in
the interests of national security’ (para 56). These are of potentially great
importance and so should be reported in full.
First, where the capability we require is by its nature fundamental to
our freedom of action as a nation. The leading example of this is secure
information and communications transfer at national level. This covers the
ability of the government to conduct its business securely at the highest
level, including communications with posts overseas and commanders
of deployed forces.
High-grade cryptography remains strategically vital across government.
The need to protect our most sensitive information, wherever it is in the
world, creates a sovereign requirement to control those aspects of crypto-
graphic production, deployment, and support that are critical to the integ-
rity of the product and therefore to our national security.
58. Secondly, where the fulfilment of our requirement, or the operation of
the resulting capability, is heavily dependant upon a supplier having access tohighly classified intelligence information or technologies. In these circumstances
we will only be able to consider suppliers of equipment and support services
that meet the highest standards of trust. The leading example of this is the UK’s
nuclear deterrent, as regards both weapons and propulsion systems.
59. Thirdly, where operational circumstances mandate changes to an in-
service capability that can only be met by having an assured ability to respond
– particularly in terms of technical expertise and knowledge – at the highest
levels of speed and agility. A leading example of this is electronic warfare and
associated defensive aids, where the ability to update deployed capability in
the light of intelligence is essential to survivability. Responding to cyber security
threats is another area where speed of response is critical.
60. Fourthly, where the nature of the UK’s potential operational advantagewhen using a particular capability means we need the highest possible confi-
dence in one or more aspects of its performance.
The paper is not clear as to whether all the major platforms and systems
in the UK’s forces are central to the country’s freedom of action and, thus,
sovereignty. However, there is overarching language that argues that oper-
ational advantage is seen to require that the UK deeply understands most,
if not all the technology that it is using, so that it can exploit the systems
concerned to their limits:
61. A key issue is our ability to assure the operation of critical sub-systems,
which will often include the design and operation of complex electronic hard-
ware and the associated controlling software. This may require us to request
assurances relating to processes and components used in the manufacture of such sub-systems, as well as their subsequent operation and support through
life. Without these assurances we would be unable to judge the level of opera-
tional risk or take appropriate action to mitigate certain threats.
This implies that, without such assurances and knowledge transfer, the
UK should not buy from an external supplier, and is similar to the think-
ing in the 2005 Defence Industrial Strategy that the UK ought to be able
to sustain and modify the equipment that it owns. (It is questionable
whether “assurances” are a sufficient substitute for certain knowledge
about such matters as operational performance and safety.) But the
paper then goes on to add a further qualification, which takes things
back to the beginning.
Stage three: if the route indicated by national security consider-
ations appears too expensive or risky, go back to the buy-from-the-
global-market approach (ie Stage 1)
In the White Paper, even national security considerations do not enjoy any
absolute dominance, perhaps because that would have been a significant
constraint on future action. Thus the paper observes:
“The extent to which we choose to protect our operational advantages
and freedom of action always involves a balance of risk and opportunity
cost. As with all acquisition choices, this is also subject to affordability
and value for money. The decision whether to take action depends on
other factors, particularly the balance of risk, affordability, and value for
money.”3 (para 62)
In plain language, the paper recognises that ‘beggars can’t be choosers’.
Our interpretation of the essentially circular nature of the MoD’s argu-
ment is represented in Figure 1, a contrast with the outwardly linear dia-
gram offered in the White Paper itself.
The paper is fundamentallyflawed, not least because of
the circular nature of the lines
of argument that it advances
The circular logic of the White Paper
Figure 1
Unless national securitydemands are too
expensive or risky
Relegate nationalsecurity factors
Review therequirement
Unless national security(freedom of action andoperational advantage)
implies otherwise
In which case
Buy from theglobal market
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DEFENCE ACQUISITION
The role and impact of competition
Significantly, the document contains an argument meant to square the cir-
cle when it asserts that the UK government, by exposing defence and secu-
rity companies to global competition, will stimulate them to become lean,
efficient and successful. This was an emphasis prominent from the 1980swhen, as now, the government fear was that if UK companies felt they were
in a privileged position, they would lose their edge. In a press interview, the
procurement minister Peter Luff used words that reflected the mindset of
Mrs Thatcher and Lord Levene when he was Chief of Defence Procurement:
“One of the drivers of international success for British companies must be
their competitiveness and if you shield them from international competi-
tion you actually undermine their ability to compete.” This is tough love,
being cruel to be kind, and so on.
This argument should only reinforce the reputation of politicians for
a focus only on the short term. The paper fails to consider the medium-
and long-term effects of competition in the high-technology sectors of
defence. The defence market has some well-known attributes. There areonly a small number of customers for highly advanced equipment and it
is almost impossible to secure export orders without an endorsement in
the form of purchase by a firm’s home government. In several sectors,
including combat aircraft and medium-range missiles, governments
place orders only rarely.
A national company bidding in a competition can be under significant
pressure to make a highly optimistic bid in order to win the only contract
that matters. Unsuccessful companies in a competition tend to leave the
sector, ie, sell or abandon their capabilities, rather than pay for them until
the next competition comes along. Finally, in the most demanding areas
of defence, including aerospace systems, the financial, technological and
intellectual barriers to entry for new companies are huge.
The paper does not take account of the fact that the sustained use of
competitive tendering in important defence sectors where there is a need
for a huge intellectual inventory for development and production leads to
the number of companies being reduced to one. The UK has advocated
competition as the central aspect of its procurement policy since the mid
1980s when Peter Levene was appointed Chief of Defence Procurement,
and thus its impact can be assessed over a significant period of time.
We would emphasise that BAE Systems’ centrality in the UK defence
market must be ascribed mainly to others’ desire to abandon defence
and the unavailability of other investors other than US companies: the
cases of Alvis (armoured vehicles) and GEC (shipbuilding and electron-
ics) are central in this regard.
First, many high-tech defence businesses have left the sector. The firms
in Figure 2 were among the MoD’s top suppliers in 1998 and are no longer
active in defence. Many have been taken over by other firms, either BAES
or foreign businesses from the US and Europe, but none was subject to a
hostile takeover; they left of their own accord. Arguably, the British aero-
space and defence electronics sector has been kept afloat by the readiness
of Finmeccanica, Thales, Lockheed-Martin and others to invest in the UK.
Second, the remaining British defence firms have expended large amounts
of resource, not in research and technology to support UK defence, but ininvestments across the Atlantic, where the market is larger and less risky.
Rolls-Royce and BAE Systems have major US subsidiaries from which they
can extract profit but not technology because of US export controls, but
Cobham, QinetiQ and Chemring are important second-tier contractors that
have adopted a similar approach.
If the UK has discovered a remarkable policy approach, we might
expect it to be imitated by others. Looking forward, a policy of buying
off the shelf followed by the rest of Europe, plus the global tendency
of the highest-end capabilities to become vested in a single firm (con-
sider the concentration of defence capabilities within the US) will lead
inexorably to UK dependence on American suppliers, with many other
countries finding themselves in the same position. This would be fine
as long as UK politicians were to abandon explicitly their ambitions that
the UK should be capable of independent military action: see paragraphs
53 and 54 of the White Paper.
We believe that these arguments are well understood in the MoD, even
at the political level, but that there are influential ministers outside whose
ideological commitment to competition is such that they are incapable and/
or unwilling of seeing its negative aspects in the specific defence sector.
We suggest that the MoD takes on board that competitive tendering is
appropriate and viable long-term only for products with a modest intellec-
tual content and where the need for prior capital investment is modest.
Acquisition covers a broad spectrum from simple purchasing (repetitive/
physical) through to complex procurement (non-repetitive/highly intellec-
tual): Figure 3 illustrates the breadth and helps to describe why one size, orone approach does not fit all circumstances.
The paper fails to consider themedium- and long-term effects
of competition in the high-
technology sectors of defence
UK-based contractors paid more than £50 million by the UK
MoD in 1986-87 (Statement on Defence Estimates 1988 Vol2, p15)
No longer independent defence businesses
GEC■
Plessey■
Vickers■
Ferranti■
Hunting■
Racal■
Royal Ordnance■
Thorn-EMI■
STC■
Westland■
Dowty■
Lucas■
Pilkington■
Philips (was Dutch-owned)■
Shorts■
Yarrow■
No longer a defence player
Swan Hunter■ General Motors■
Defence survivors
BAE Systems■
British Telecom■
British Railways Board■
(reorganised for non-
defence reasons)
Rolls-Royce■
Shell■
Esso■
Figure 2
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The four quadrants in Figure 3 demand tailored approaches and the
top-right quadrant characterises why competitive dogma, simply applied,
will not produce effective results. Here, acquisition solutions must be
drawn from a limited but highly skilled source, and while a competitive
approach works well for repetitive products, with a choice of solutions from
a wide number of sources, it fails to operate effectively where the solution
is unique or non-repetitive.It is this fact that differentiates complex Defence procurements and
destroys the argument for universally simple (‘commercial’) competitive
practice. Non-repetitive procurement depends on a supply base which has
invested in a ‘body of knowledge’, and specialist skills, something that can
only be acquired over an extended period working cooperatively with the
acquiring organisation.
The White Paper and the future of DE&S
The context of the White Paper is not just the resource pressures on the
MoD but also the review of the Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S) cur-
rently under way in government. The White Paper surely provides a very
shaky foundation for any effort to establish DE&S with more independence
from ministers, and even government.
The paper as it stands would almost give an empowered DE&S carte
blanche to make the choices it wanted on short-term affordability
considerations or on risks focused on initial cost, time and performance
factors. Academics drafting examination regulations frequently make
use of the term ‘normally’ to ensure that a specific rule can be bypassed:
the White Paper has, as did the Green Paper before it, enough qualifica-
tions in its directions to ensure that a wide range of practices can be
compatible with it.
Conclusion
The paper appears to have been written so that it pins the MoD down to
few firm courses of action that involve significant resources, and almost
any behaviour and decision could be justified by reference to its language.
It might also be seen to incentivise industry to strive harder for efficiency
and effectiveness, although it could also lead more firms to the conclusion
that defence and security is not the sector to inhabit. Certainly the high-
level message of the White Paper gives little reason to foreign firms to
invest in the UK, and it is difficult to imagine that company boards across
Britain will read the document and conclude they should put more of their
shareholders’ money into defence.Inspired by one individual, our group is fond of reflecting that for
every multidimensional and challenging problem there is a clear simple
answer, which is wrong (clarification needed here). The long-awaited
National Security through Technology White Paper released by the MoD
on 1 February reflects both parts of this statement. There is a clear
and simple answer to the challenges of defence procurement, to buy
through open competition on the global market, albeit a response that
is accompanied by qualifying material explaining that may not always
be the sound thing to do.
In the interests of brevity and offering a focused argument, this paper
has not reviewed some important aspects of the White Paper, notably
those sections on SMEs, on R&T spending and the MoD’s need to restore/
preserve/strengthen its status as an intelligent customer. While the support
for SMEs is notable, such firms do not have muscle to lead the defence
export effort in which the government affects interest.
Moreover, the paper has nothing to say on the need for large businesses
with the technology and integration skills to develop large systems and
the financial base to take on significant risk. Nor does it consider the need for,
or shape of, a national technology base that needs to be preserved in the
country as a whole for security reasons.
It can be stated with confidence that the procurement sections of the
White Paper will be implemented, simply because virtually any procure-
ment choice will be able to be associated with some words somewhere
in the document.
Our group has reacted strongly to this paper, using adjectives including
‘dangerous’, ‘useless’, ‘contradictory’, ‘directionless’, and ‘poorly focused’.
The Levene Report made much of the need for more accountability in
defence but we wonder if, in five years’ time as the consequences of this
policy become apparent, the ministers who gave shape to it will be ready
to take responsibility for its results. ■
While the support for SMEs
is notable, such firms do
not have muscle to lead thedefence export effort
The competitive environment
Figure 3
Acquisition covers a range of “products” or “deliverables”.
The approach needs to reflect the nature of thedeliverable – the wrong approach either trivialises
the difficulty or complicates it
OTS procurements are in the bottom left quadrant
Complex systems and platforms are top right
Repetitive
Physicalinventory
Intellectualinventory
New productintroduction
Make tocontract
Mass or standardproduction
Non-repetitive
C o m p
e t i t i
o n s i m p
l e r
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Managing change in complex environments is tough: managing
change in a complex environment where external influence
(not external market factors) is intrusive and significant, is
even tougher. When the environment in which you are trying to manage
change is constantly ‘disturbed’ by government impatience, government
departments and political imperatives, however, you have a recipe for
failure. This is the world of the Ministry of Defence (MoD).
As the MoD turns its attention squarely to implementing defence reform
in the latest in a long line of radical programmes to put right ‘its poor
performance’, the barriers to success are already apparent and, make no
mistake, are legion. Some of these obstacles were discussed in my previ-
ous paper (RUSI Defence Systems , Spring 2011), but the interim period has
served only to demonstrate the fragility of defence reform and the strength
of the barriers in resisting change. Breaking through these will take a criti-
cal mass, well aimed and strongly directed but, conversely, well distributed;
a precision attack with a difference. At this juncture in the process, it may
be time to reflect on what lies ahead and, consequently, examine what
can be done to break through the barriers preventing change.
Defence Reform – a Precision Attack?Bob Barton, former managing director of Niteworks, explains why implementing change
at an institution such as the Ministry of Defence is proving to be such a challenging task
It is easy to criticise the MoD for the obvious problems arising in defence
acquisition, and yet the environment in which the MoD has to operate – its
‘external environment’ – is almost certainly the primary problem to fix. The
constraints placed on the MoD from outside have a dramatic and debilitat-
ing effect on its ability to perform effectively, and this appears to be getting
worse, not better. Any organisation, if it is to perform well, needs to utilise
every ounce of ability and brain power that it can muster. The external
environment in which the MoD operates has undoubtedly caused a dete-
riorating capability in the acquisition process, and this has led to a level of
dysfunctional behaviour that threatens to defeat any successful change.
The Levene Report does not bring a holistic or sufficiently fresh approach
to the problem. While it highlights a number of critical deficiencies and
identifies a number of solid recommendations on what needs to be fixed,
it is strong on structure and weak on implementation, and this is the really
hard part. It is heavily laced with structural changes (without any idea of
the adverse consequences) and some recycled ideas that seem focused on
symptoms rather than root causes – one such example would be responsi-
bility and accountability. Of course, these need to be aligned, but the key
behaviour change is from government downwards. Government interven-
tion sets the tone: for example, in terms of defence appetite (often too
big), directed solutions (often unaffordable) and competition as the only
means of delivering value (what evidence?). Balance of Investment (BoI)
“For every complex problem, there is a simple solution
– and it is wrong.” Henry Louis Mencken
Reforming the MoD remains a
government priority
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is not something that happens inside the MoD. The government has to
dictate a defence policy that is affordable at the outset – something it has
consistently failed to do. The result is an unaffordable programme that no
amount of massaging through MoD departments will disguise or mitigate.
There seems to be a resurgence of the notion that industry should begiven prescriptive specifications and should be contracted to undertake
fixed-price development (for example, of bespoke solutions). Fixed-price
development is a contradiction in terms: as a mechanism to encourage
helpful behaviours, it is about as useful as Corporal Jones from Dad’s Army
crying “Don’t panic!” The one area in which the Levene Report could have
really set out some constructive direction – namely industrial strategy,
and the breaking down of barriers that cause inappropriate MoD/industry
behaviours – it has avoided completely.
We now see the emergence of a number of acquisition doctrinal ‘solu-
tions’ that are remedies given to the MoD as if they were obvious. In reality,
there is little or no evidence that they will be effective. It is easy to come up
with simple solutions when objectivity is neglected.
Some of the ideas for fixing the MoD’s problems
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) can lead exports: SMEs
are vitally important; they are the lifeblood of the future industrial land-
scape and help to transition larger companies. But to lead exports? They
simply do not have the infrastructure to do so.
OTS (off the shelf) is the answer: OTS can be a very good solution, but
the blind pursuance of OTS as a panacea belies the problems that come
in equal measure. It is a classic example of a ‘simple’ solution to a com-
plex problem. OTS is just as likely to result in cost growth as reduction, it
certainly fails to deliver any control, and it also leads to a reduction in
capacity and ‘body of knowledge’ (on which defence depends on heavily
in times of adversity) in the UK.Most OTS will be foreign, so how much control will we have over it, its
cost and its supply? Will foreign companies help when we most need it
(for example, with urgent operational requirements)? What happens if the
exchange rate fluctuates out of control?
Partnering is a bad thing: This appears to be against all commercial logic,
and presumably stems from the perception of competition as being the
be-all and end-all, and that industry cannot be trusted. The problem is that
this becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy. As one observer put it: “The oil and
gas industry accepts collaboration and partnering as essential. Why does
defence think it is different?”
More certainty in specification: There are no certainties. Conflicts are
not a certainty, nor is what you find when you get there. The military have
to live with this, and yet acquisition is meant to be a certainty. What is
worse is that, through the MoD process, it is a long gestation – a slow dis-
tillation to a certainty. Pace in acquisition does not happen: surely, time is
the important parameter. It certainly is in industry.
More controls are needed: The greater the controls, the less the respon-
sibility is properly exercised in a thoughtful and intelligent way. Controls
heap complication on complication and remove the ability to veer and haul
and, more importantly, trade. Trading is vital at every stage of the process.
Unlike most industrial situations, where the external environment is
a given, the government can effect a real change if it wishes to, but the
degree of distrust has reached such a level that this is unlikely. However,
an analysis of the key external factors clearly points to this as being an
essential starting point for changing the way that the MoD operates.
Public accountability means that no one wants to be seen to be mak-
ing the wrong decision, so most decisions are put off. This has led to the
endless cycle of option generation, spreadsheet analysis, salami-slicing
and delay. The effect is cost growth, not reduction: it wastes huge amounts
of resources. Industry has to make decisions, even if it gets some wrong;
but decisions must be made.
Changes are now being proposed to the central capability manage-
ment area, to give more responsibility to the front lines for this function.This, in theory, sounds the right thing to do, and for some aspects it
undoubtedly is, but balancing it will be very hard. Will it result in simpli-
fication, fewer parochial decisions, better BoI, more constructive trad-
ing? The historical data would not support this: indeed, this model has
been tried before and changed for precisely the reasons that it biased
or drove single-service priorities. Of course, this time around, the ‘fix’
is the joint area – yet more interfaces and more divergence of views to
manage and resolve?
Why has the central model seemingly failed? Has anyone looked at the
externally imposed constraints under which it operates? The failure to
achieve the difficult decisions at the highest level – to stop the unafford-
able, early – means its operating practices dissolve into endless rework-
ing. Those who have led the Joint Capabilities Board have stated that it
has never really grasped its role effectively. Maybe it operates at too low
a level, but it has never benefited from the high-level (BoI) decisions that
would give it clear space and degrees of freedom in which to operate effec-
tively. This, and the undoubted pressure from individual services, renders a
cohesive approach impossible.
Now, the proposal is to replace this single joint body with three single
service bodies, plus a separate joint one, and retain a central strategic one
(the MilCap area). This feels like a structural focus when the underlying
problems will all remain, and the process will just become more compli-
cated, which is the last thing it needs.
Let us look at the nature of the organisation. The MoD is probably the
most complex government department and undertakes some of the most
challenging, technically difficult and, a fact that is often overlooked, interde-
pendent projects. Ironically, the level of overspend on many large Defence
projects is considerably less than in civil construction and other areas of
government, and often considerably less than that of our US counterparts,
and that despite an artificially suppressed cost basis contrived through the
vagaries of the bidding process. A recent example of comparative over-
spend is Edinburgh’s new tram system which, at £1 billion, is three times
over budget. When was there last a Defence project that ‘overspent’ by
anything like as much?
Complexity is a hallmark of the MoD by nature of what it does, and
the sheer number of stakeholders and interested parties
Complex environments cannot be controlled – either give up the
complexity or drop the control: This first point often leads to suboptimal
change initiatives in an attempt to drive change. Senior MoD heads look
It is easy to come up with
simple solutions for the Ministry
of Defence’s problems when
objectivity is neglected
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to their own areas and formulate specific changes without account or the
use of the overall context in which outcomes are generated. Furthermore,
they often start by prescribing control mechanisms that serve to constrain
and reduce available thinking power to a minimum. The controls end up
driving the wrong behaviours and destroying effective contributions. The
most obvious example of these are:
Over-detailed specifications■
Over-restrictive budgets (‘P9 line’ approach, preventing trading)■
Annualisation■
Scrutiny■
The dilemma for any government department is to be seen to be exer-
cising adequate control in the public interest (to meet the demands of
public accountability), while not stifling the ability, creativity and problem-
solving mentality that must be harnessed within any successful organi-
sation. We should ask why so many government departments appear to
underperform – are they all bad, or is there something systemic in their
environments that causes poor performance? The control mechanisms,
therefore, need to be thought through at the highest level, in terms of
both positive and adverse consequences, and not allowed to become the
province of individual functions.
Leading the change
Always drive change through the most senior coordinating spon-
sorship body: The tribal nature of the MoD inherently gives rise to inde-
pendent solutions. The absence of a single, coherent change programme
(very senior and full-time) leader who is directing major themes, via a
powerful senior change board, leads to conflict, poor outcome focus (at
the Defence level) and a divisive, turbulent and, ultimately, failing change
process. Every MoD change programme has started with a sworn intent
and ministerial drive to achieve a major shake-up; each has singularly
failed to achieve this.
Too often, the change itself has been delegated to three-star or below,
and this immediately condemns the process to failure. Without singularity
of sponsorship, each functional area or department will try to set about
suboptimal changes in their own areas. While this is well-meaning, it almost
always leads to conflicting agendas, confusion and unnecessary work.
The use of external assistance
Always use an experienced team of very senior external agents or
consultants: This aspect is always problematic, as the pressure not to
use external assistance (EA) is severe. In the past, there have been mixed
If change is to stick in the
Ministry of Defence, it has to be
relentlessly driven from the top
– nothing is more important
Pushing through Defence reform requires
a precision attack with a difference
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results from the use of consultants, and this further colours the situation.
Too often, however, the instinct to cut costs with EA has led to the engaged
party being forced to use junior or lightweight consultants. These have
little or no content knowledge and, worse, lack the stature and experience
to stand up to resisting players, particularly senior sponsors.
There are such profound cultural and behavioural problems to be
addressed that only the very best consultants can arguably effect any
change and, even then, their resolve must be very strong. Government
has lost confidence in the MoD, leading to excessive scrutiny of its actions.
This is a downward spiral, as it leads to less decision-making and worsen-
ing performance. This spiral can only be addressed by highly competent
exterior support, whose actions cannot be held against them unfairly when
senior behaviour is confronted. Only senior consultants can adequately
challenge the status quo, point out the consequences of inappropriate
senior behaviour and break the damaging cycle of regression.
Perverse incentives
There are only two reasons why people behave ineffectively: either they
are stupid or their environment causes them to do so. The list of perverse
incentives under which MoD staff operate is legion. To name but a few:
Commit as much funding as you can: If you do not commit it, you lose it,
so commit to things that enable fund retention, even if it is unsupportable.
Reward and recognition: The lack of any realistic performance differen-
tial means it is best not to make any decisions. You cannot be wrong that
way, and why take the risk?
Promotion: No one in a single service was ever promoted for offering up
cuts in their own area.
Avoid scrutiny for as long as possible: Helpful challenge is vital – at the
right time. Too much, and at the wrong time, stops creativity. So scrutiny
ends up coming too late.
Do not innovate: This leads to risk, so it is best avoided.
Do not use collaboration: No prizes for fighting for this one, so it is mucheasier to fall into a competition than to argue why not.
Delay = saving: A widely held belief. Delay gives the illusion of saving – in
reality, it always leads to increased cost.
Ignore integration: The cost of adopting a systems approach early is
never identified, because it would mean going over budget and, hence,
cause approval problems. Better, therefore, to ignore it. Someone else can
deal with it later, at a much increased cost.
Over specify: Without understanding the impact on cost and time, it is
easy to overdo it. But it feels safer.
Do not make trades with other areas: This is hard anyway, and the bud-
get lines make it harder, but why offer bigger savings elsewhere when you
have to spend more (but less overall) to do it?
Process is more important than outcomes: Process is now, outcomes
are later. So stick to the process, even if it is clearly not working.
Do not worry if you get it wrong: Almost certainly, the impact will be
felt by your successors, so no need to worry.
In summary, if change is to really stick in the MoD, it has to be relentlessly
and consistently driven from the top – nothing is more important. While
it is right and proper to ensure that the MoD operating model, its culture
and behaviours all change as part of Defence reform, the impact of the
external environment needs to be addressed first and a more informed set
of government demands drawn up as a result.
If the culture is to change, the aforementioned perverse incentives that
abound need to be stripped away and more degrees of freedom given, withmore positive and negative consequences being articulated to encourage
people to use them wisely.
After all this time, it is surely obvious that there is something systemically
wrong with the way MoD operates. Maybe concentrating on the systemic
issues would deliver better results – if those causing them to be sustained
would wake up to the fact. Change starts with your own behaviour.■
The author
Bob Barton, has spent 40 years in Defence and the past 15 years
working very closely with and within the Ministry of Defence
(MoD). He has run several very successful change programmes
and he speaks with practical experience of how change should be
conducted and what makes it stick. His most recent appointment
was as managing director of Niteworks,
an MoD set-up that is charged with
spotting problems early, and helping to
deliver more joined-up, cost-effective
solutions. Three years ago, Niteworks
nearly folded: after a very successful
and rapid change programme
it stands today as a strong and
proven vehicle ready to help the
MoD through a difficult period,
and is in comprehensive use
right across the MoD space.
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On 23 February 2012, Jim Murphy MP, the UK Shadow Secretary
of State for Defence, announced that the Labour Party was
embarking on a ‘Shadow Defence Review’1. The UK is some
three years from the next Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR),
which are now to be held every five years. It should therefore come
straight after the next general election, unless events were to intervene
and force an earlier one. Hence, it is a good time for the major opposi-
tion party to present its own strategic vision for the future.
This initiative, and the opportunity to lead rather than follow the debate, is
timely. Let us hope that there is some real substance to the outcome and that
Labour comes up with some clear strategy and policy proposals that allow
for a challenging debate. Issues about which a clear ‘side’ is needed include:
the replacement of Trident; the European context; America’s uncertain com-
mitment to the transatlantic partnership and its ‘special’ relationship with
the UK; a realistic take on the value of defence in contributing to global
influence and the premium for this paid by the taxpayer. There is also the
priority to be given to government’s inalienable defence obligations (domes-
tic security and defence of the UK, overseas territories, access for trade
and protection of nationals abroad) over interventions of choice whether
morally motivated, for honour in the global arena, or in support of the
argument that asymmetric wars are better fought abroad than at home.
Labour’s Defence Procurement Report
and Shadow Defence Review Launch Michael Codner , senior research fellow and director of Military Sciences at RUSI, commends the UK’s
Labour shadow government for its recent report focusing on defence procurement, and hopes that
the party’s resultant Shadow Defence Review will bring something genuinely new to the table
The consultation paper2 that accompanied this announcement does to
some extent ‘eat its own sandwiches’ in the discussion; for instance, the
commitment in the 2006 White Paper to replace Trident is reinforced. One
might conclude the outcome will be a continuation of the Blair strategy of
the last government with all the costs, risks of embroilment, and indeed
direct threats to the UK that this vision invited. Fortunately, the questions at
the end of each section challenge these presumptions to some extent. Let
us hope that the outcome answers the question, “Why is Britain the fourth
biggest spender on defence in the world yet the ninth largest in terms of
Gross Domestic Product3 (2011 estimated)?” If not, it should make a strong
argument for more parity in this ratio as one might expect a Labour Party
without the trammels of legacy to do.
Procurement
In this regard, it might be considered a particularly noble effort for Labour
to have put its head above the parapet with its Ideas for Future UK Defence
Procurement: A report for the Shadow Defence Team4, commissioned by
Shadow Defence Ministers Jim Murphy and Michael Dugher and executed
by Admiral Lord West, Bill Thomas and Tony Roulstone. The previous
government devoted extraordinary effort to the reform of defence acquisi-
tion policy and practice from ‘Smart Acquisition’, launched with the 1998
Jim Murphy MP, Shadow Secretary of State
for Defence, commissioned the independent
defence procurement report with his
colleague, Michael Dugher MP
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Strategic Defence Review5. This initiative was widely accepted as innova-
tive and relevant to the issues of equipment overspend that have dogged
the UK and most other serious spenders on defence for years. In particu-
lar, it redressed the problem of the adversarial relationship between the
government customer and supplier that had emerged from the necessarycompetition-led reforms of Peter Levene as Chief of Defence Procurement
from 1985 to 1991 under the Conservative government.
Smart Acquisition established clear lines of responsibility and it tried to
address the matter of Through Life Capability Management (TLCM) and its
significance for realistic long-term funding of major projects. Outcomes rele-
vant today were that the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) was established
as a ‘Next Steps’ executive agency of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in 1998 in
lavish new premises at Abbey Wood and that the new Equipment Capability
Department in the MoD Central Staff would take control of the defence
equipment budget as the customer to DPA, the supplier. This relationship
was the outcome of the institution of commercial accounting methods
in the MoD with the adoption of Resource Accounting and Budgeting.
However, the reputation of Smart Acquisition fell foul of problems with
legacy programmes and lack of cultural change in management.
The Labour government pursued the matter of the significance of
the UK’s defence and related industries to the economy and to Britain’s
military independence – something the Conservatives had shunned – with
its Defence Industrial Policy7 of 2002 and, more importantly, its Defence
Industrial Strategy8 (DIS) of 2005. The second of these, initiated and driven
by Lord Drayson, was once again perceived widely as a very good thing.
But the much trumpeted follow-on, DIS2, which was to address funding
implications, among other things, never happened. Once again, the prob-
lem presented itself as one of reluctance to change management cultures
in the MoD. Paul Drayson stormed off to pursue other interests. However,
2006 saw Enabling Acquisition Change9, an MoD study led by Tom McKane,
which took forward the conclusion that the DPA should be merged with
the Defence Logistics Organisation into a single entity, Defence Equipment
and Support (DE&S) – no longer an agency with the intended freedoms of
action but rather, once again, a department of the MoD in all but name.
Then, in 2009, the then Secretary of State for Defence, John Hutton,
commissioned Bernard Gray, former City boy, journalist, and government
special adviser, to produce a very comprehensive and detailed report10.
Its focus was much to do with achieving affordability, sorting out the
Head Office functions of the MoD and building structures for clear direc-
tion and accountability – particularly important, because it is the disper-
sion of responsibility that hinders cultural change in management, as of
course does lack of clear vision and authority from the very top. And now,
Bernard Gray is Chief of Defence Materiel. He is expected soon to launch
his Defence Materiel Strategy for the future of DE&S. Something of an
irony here because, while he is poacher turned gamekeeper when it comes
Three years from the next SDSR,
it is a good time for the majoropposition party to present its
strategic vision for the future
to the problems of defence acquisition, Lord Levene, the grandfather of
competition in the UK defence sector, was the poacher who led the 2010
government study of the organisation of the MoD, once again bashing
Head Office and recommending a radical restructuring of the ‘require-
ments customer’ end of the acquisition chain.
Labour ideas for procurement
As John Louth from RUSI has noted, the Labour Party report on procure-
ment contains “a mix of new ideas for the future, along with old concepts
from the past”11. It preceded by some months the long-awaited government
White Paper on technology, equipment and support, on which there is
commentary in this edition of RUSI Defence Systems by the RUSI Acquisition
Focus team12 (see page 14).
Labour’s report contains a number of areas of recommendation:
Balancing the Defence Equipment and Support Budgets: The MoD as
a whole should commit to a 10-year rolling budget. At present, there is a
10-year budget for equipment procurement but other aspects of defence
spending are covered in a five-year plan. Accordingly, there is a resulting
mismatch between the funding of systems procurement and their support
and manning, which compromises TLCM. Also, if under the Levene reforms
the services are to have more control of the allocation of spending across
capabilities in the widest sense, a single budgetary process will allow these
decisions to be more considered and consistent.
The downside for government and the MoD is less flexibility to muddle
through. However, 10 years extends way beyond the life of any particular
government and the typical political perspective. There is also the compli-
cating factor of five-yearly defence and comprehensive spending reviews.
But defence – uncomfortably for the British system of government –
requires a vision that extends to 20 years and beyond. The defence indus-
tries would also welcome greater transparency over the 10-year budgetand longer-term plans to support their own longer-term vision.
Over-Ambition: In the same section the report recommends that capa-
bilities should not exceed ambition and that the premium for perfection
should be avoided – a problem that is well understood in the community.
The solution is not easy, however. On the one hand, there is the need to
adapt culture and processes. On the other, warfare is a matter of prevailing
in competition, and the best capabilities are an essential means to that.
‘Make-Buy’ Decisions: This question is also central to another set of
recommendations. Most capabilities can be bought off the shelf; there are
only a few that need to be developed onshore for particular British needs.
The White Paper also addresses this matter in similar fashion. The question
of appropriate sovereignty was central to the 2005 DIS and there is general
agreement that ‘off the shelf’ purchasing is a route to reducing defence
budgets. Unfortunately, it is not easy to define sovereign capabilities with
any certainty, and the White Paper acknowledges the need for compro-
mises. So much depends on a grand strategic commitment to autono-
mous action in certain circumstances and the scope and scale of these
commitments. A preference for ‘off the shelf’ purchasing from international
suppliers is also not comfortable for the UK defence industry and does not
favour British defence exports with the jobs and return to taxpayers that
government hopes that this will bring.
Firmer and Fairer Contracts with Industry: The White Paper has a very
strong emphasis on competition. The Labour report is somewhat more
realistic about the availability of sufficient numbers of competitors, recom-
mending a minimum of three. Where there is not sufficient competition,
‘fixed price’ contracts must be fair and attractive to industry. They must
also be carefully costed to factor in adaptability but avoid monopoly exploi-
tation. These issues were agonised over even before Smart Acquisition.
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DEFENCE ACQUISITION
Procurement Process and Efficiency: The recommendations include
shorter three- to five-year projects with ‘reasonable objectives and
successive phases for incremental capability improvement’. Once again,
there is not much new here; incremental or ‘spiral’ acquisition has beenpart of the agreed way ahead for years. The problem is in operationalising
the concept. Capability-specific acquisition processes and cycles is another
recommendation that harks back to Smart Acquisition as does ‘alliance or
partnering approaches’ and the empowerment of Integrated Project Team
Leaders (IPTL). The report raises the serious issue of the actual role and
responsibilities of the Senior Responsible Owner in relation to the IPTL and
other functionaries. The proposal to review and shut down over-expensive
projects lies very much in the comfort zone of the present government, but
it becomes politically uncomfortable if that government cannot pass the
blame for the failed project to its predecessor and has to account for the
waste of money. Finally, passing more responsibility for project manage-
ment to industry is very much part of Bernard Gray’s recommendations.
But the challenge is retaining and building intelligent customer capacity
without huge costs, and avoiding exploitation and mistakes by industry13.
Professional Procurement and Programme Organisation: The report
recommends that DE&S should become an executive Non-Departmental
Public Body (NDPB) rather than the Government Owned Commercially
Operated (GoCo) entity which was Bernard Gray’s preferred recommen-
dation – and was assumed to be the outcome of his present reforms as
CDM. The argument is one of accountability to government for the scale
of expenditure. That said, Gray’s report limits the budget contracted to the
private sector to the running costs of DE&S. This, of course, leaves acres
of ultimate responsibility within the MoD and the burden of intelligent
customer that this entails. In either the NDPB or GoCo model there is a vast
range of possibilities. As ever, a problem for the UK government is the lack
of models within the peculiarly unique defence procurement sector. One
cannot easily translate lessons from the private sector or other government
models in the UK or abroad to the UK’s future acquisition system.
Conclusion
So once again the UK will be an anxious leader in acquisition reform,
observed with great interest by other governments but sneered at for its
failures by them and its own population. The Labour Party has made a
brave move in putting its own thoughts together up front. Setting asideNDPB/GoCo there is a lot of overlap and potential consensus between this
report, Bernard Gray’s earlier report, and the White Paper. Acquisition is
one area of defence in which a combative debate is probably not helpful
after such a long period of testing and agonising. The key test will be in
enforcing cultural change and that will be for the government in power.
On the wider issue of the Shadow Defence Review, an outcome that pres-
ents a clear and distinctive Labour view would be helpful to the nation.
Some polarity will make for a rich debate in the build-up to the 2015 SDSR
– something that never happened in the run-up to the 2010 review. That
is not to say that consensus is not achievable, but it must be one that is
properly informed and not dogged by legacy decisions by any of the main
parties. A five-year policy and strategy cycle with the sort of general accep-
tance that was achieved in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review would be a
very good thing, provided it is properly costed to 10 years across the board
and builds and implements a strategic vision to 25 years – and all in the
wider context of national security. In that regard, the problem for defence
is that its vision and timelines are necessarily far longer than most other
arms of government and that it will find itself as the reluctant leader.■
Michael Dugher MP, Shadow Minister for
Defence Equipment, Support and Technology,
on the terrace of the Houses of Parliament
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Would it be a good idea if the whole of the defence enterprise
were organised with repeatable, ‘identikit’ structures, with
standardised barcodes and metadata, and harmonised and
optimised processes from end to end? Surely, this would be a good thing
for efficiency, similar to a supermarket chain? But what about opera-
tional effectiveness? Would there be any unintended consequences
arising from such uniformity and homogeneity? The evidence is that
enterprise-wide adoption of a supermarket chain-like approach would
be damaging to the UK’s ability to carry out operations – especially of
the kind that the nation was involved in during 2011. An alternative
‘agile enterprise’ approach is far more applicable to defence and this
article uses a systematic approach to indicate why.
Characterising enterprises
To characterise enterprises in general, a simple ‘enterprise framework’ will
be used (shown in its most basic form in Figure 1). The framework1 indicates
that there are five interdependent aspects to any enterprise, as follows:
The Defence Enterprise is More
Than Just a Supermarket ChainPatrick Beautement, from The abaci Partnership LLP, explains why the UK defence enterprise should
not be seen as a single homogenous activity, in the same way that a supermarket chain is regarded
Governance hub:■ There is an enterprise ‘governance hub’ that is
responsible for overall strategy, direction, coordination and over-
sight of trade-offs between the other aspects;
‘Customer-facing’ operations:■ The quadrant 1 (Q1) aspect oper-
ates in the real world, and adapts and reconfigures what it is doing
concurrently with changing circumstances;
Policy and vision:■ The quadrant 2 (Q2) aspect is concerned
with policy and vision, and provides design guidance that is
cognizant of the wider external context beyond that of the
immediate enterprise;
Capability acquisition:■ This quadrant 3 (Q3) aspect arranges for
appropriate capability to be researched, designed, built and tested
and delivered to the enterprises’ users;
Development and experimentation:■ This quadrant 4 (Q4)
aspect is where users bring together the available capabilities and
engage in development and integration, including establishing
ways of working, as part of pre-adaptation before deployment.
There is ample evidence to suggest
that adopting a supermarket chain-
like approach across defence would
prove detrimental to the ability of
UK forces to conduct operations
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DEFENCE ACQUISITION
The supermarket chain
Let us now consider the characteristics of the supermarket chain. Figure 2
uses the framework to illustrate that supermarkets are largely structured as
homogenous enterprises, as follows:
Front-office activities, customer services, and shop floor ‘shelf-stack-■
ing’ and presentation are part of Q1, which is largely where brand
projection and engagement with customers occurs;
In Q2, market trends and public opinion are monitored, as are policy,■
legislation, the regulatory environment, and the wider activities of
commerce and competitors, as part of strategy development;
Q3 sources the commodities for sale, deals with suppliers, and sets■
up and maintains the back-office services that the whole enterprise
relies upon, eg, logistics and human resources (HR);
Q4 is where staff training is undertaken and where new■
procedures and processes are evaluated before they are rolled out
across the enterprise;
The head office functions direct the overall operations to ensure■
that there is the optimised end-to-end coherence of performance
required for accountability and brand predictability.
It makes sense for this enterprise to be homogeneous, ie self-similar in all
its parts. Every shop has the same look and feel, after all, they are cloned
in line with the brand. Information systems are standardised – from the
barcoded tags on the cows’ ears and on commodities, to customer loy-
alty cards – and strive for a ‘single view of the truth’. Techniques such
as demand-flow technology3 are employed to reduce cost and eliminate
waste, yet be flexible within an envelope of predictable performance.
The defence enterprise
One difference that is immediately obvious between supermarketchains and defence is that defence deploys operational parts that are
semi-independent, stand-alone organisations that must be able to make
sense of their local context, and engage with and shape it .
These deployable parts vary in ways that reflect the military tasks.
The parts can range from, for instance, an adviser team with a satellite
Although this model is very straightforward, it captures all of the essen-
tial elements and relationships needed to characterise different types
of enterprises. Of course, these five aspects do not operate in isolation
– there is continual dialogue between them (omitted from Figure 1 for
simplicity). Therefore, Figure 1 should not be thought of as an anticlockwisesequential cycle.
Instead, each quadrant has its own ‘internal’ patterns of activity
(design principles, organisational structures and ways of working, etc)
and operates semi-autonomously, yet concurrently with the others. The
quadrants are, in reality, semi-independent organisations working within
a ‘federation’. It is the responsibility of all of the parts of the enterprise
to engage in the pan-enterprise interactions that are required for overall
success. The degree of coupling between the quadrants and the extent
of the standardisation imposed determines whether or not the whole
behaves either as a homogenous, single entity (directly under the con-
trol of the ‘governance hub’) or alternatively, more adaptively, as sets of
Communities of Interest (CoIs).
It is simply a design issue to determine where along this continuum
of behaviours it is desired that the enterprise will be positioned at ‘run
time’. For example, a clamped-down organisation will have quadrants
that communicate with each other in stereotyped ways, providing pre-
dictability, but proving to be brittle should the unexpected happen.
In contrast, if agility is required, then this can be realised by facilitat-
ing more flexible interactions within and between the various aspects.
Indeed, the overall behaviour of the enterprise can be ‘tuned’, by chang-
ing the degree and nature of the collaboration.
This tuning can be carried out top-down (for instance, through policy
or by altering permissions, authorities and responsibilities), or bottom-
up (by individuals being innovative and taking the initiative) or through
self-regulation/self-organisation that propagates through various socialstructures (such as via ‘meetings at the water cooler’, ad hoc interest
groups and so on). All of these basic patterns of behaviour, their under-
lying mechanisms and the dynamics of the phenomena that result are
largely understood and have been articulated for use by operators, man-
agers and practitioners2.
Enterprise Framework
Q2 Q1
Q4Q3
Sponsor User
Capability management
Challenges Real-world focus
Technical focusSolutions
Capability employment
Enterprise
‘governance hub’
(Federation
trade-offs)
Policy and vision
(Concepts, guidance,
relevance and utility)
Operate and adapt
(Configuring, doing
and sustaining)
Develop and experiment
(Service integration,
training and exercises)
Capability acquisition
(Research, design,
build and test)
Figure 1 A simple ‘Enterprise Framework’
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DEFENCE ACQUISITION
briefcase (as in Sierra Leone) to large deployments, such as those sent to
Iraq for the first Gulf War.
This means that defence has to be able to operate at least two types of
enterprise, with very different characteristics and capability needs, con-
currently. The first is the ‘standing enterprise’, based around the Ministryof Defence (MoD) in Whitehall and at the home bases, that administers
defence capability, in line with national priorities. The second type is the
‘deployed enterprise’ (DE), of which there may be more than one, that
carries out operations under a political mandate in dynamically chang-
ing and uncertain situations.
Why aren’t these two types homogenous? The simple reason is that
they operate within different contexts that are driven by entirely dif-
ferent imperatives. This means that for each type to operate effectively,
they cannot be the same. As can be seen from Figure 3, the DE(s) sit
within Q1 – each of them having their own version of the enterprise
framework configured to suit the situation into which they have been
deployed. Note that the standing enterprise is constituted largely of the
other three quadrants. Let us examine them first .
Characteristics of the standing enterprise
Other than in Q1 (operations), the characteristics of supermarket chains
and the standing enterprise are remarkably consistent. Starting with:
Standing enterprise ‘management hub’: This management hub,
where the senior responsible officers (SROs) are based, is driven by the
need to have a coherent view of the overall defence enterprise, as shown
in Figure 3. The main challenge for the hub is adopting approaches that
accept the necessary diversity of the ways in which the deployed enter-
prises function and in which their activities are valued. The relationship
between the hub and quadrants is a two-way street of reciprocal engage-ment – for example, in establishing the principles, behaviours and engi-
neering necessary to achieve operational agility. The hub’s focus ranges
from days to years, and its activities are driven by the need to be able to
provision, deploy, sustain and support effective operational capabilities
(into Q1) consistent with national aims.
Policy, vision and strategy – Q2: The activities within this quadrant
are shaped by politics, finance, foreign policy, defence priorities and
public opinion. Its focus is on providing long-term direction based on a
‘rational’ assessment of risk/need, looking ahead from years to decades.
The quadrant is driven by the requirement that it should be account-able to a number of stakeholders – especially external ones, such as the
Treasury, and the scrutineers and their metrics – and to the notions of
value they employ that reflect their particular sensitivities.
Capability management, acquisition and manufacture – Q3:
This quadrant’s activities are shaped by concerns over timelines, cost,
quality, technical principles (precision, repeatability), and its focus is on
providing ‘raw’ capability tested against engineered requirements and
valued in those terms. The time horizon for these activities can shift
from weeks to years and is driven largely by financial, engineering and
programmatic considerations, which are informed by innovative research.
Experimentation, integration and exercises – Q4: This quadrant is
shaped by the need to test and evaluate capability against current and
perceived, future operational needs – not simply against technical speci-
fications. The outputs from these activities are not just assessments of the
ability of integrated capability to meet programme needs, but also provide
opportunities for military forces to learn how to adapt and employ the
capability creatively to cope with the unexpected. The time frame of these
activities can range from the immediate to a matter of months, against
Defence has to be able to operate
at least two types of enterprise,
with different characteristics and
capability needs, concurrently
Enterprise Model of a Supermarket Chain
Q2 Q1
Q4Q3
Market User
Capability aquisition
Opportunities Customer focus
Service focusSolutions
Capability employment
Figure 2 Enterprise framework applied to a supermarket chain
Brand projection
C u s t o m
e r s
Technical services
S u p p l i e r s
( e g f a r m e r s )
Policy/legislation
Fashion/trends
Focus groups
Public opinion
Staff training
Process development
Head
office
DirectionStrategy
Criteria
(competence)
Service
agreements
Front office
Customer serviceShop floor
Back office
Product preparation
Packaging
Logistics/HR/finance Optimised end-to-end
coherence, predictability ( e g e a r t a g s o n c o w s )
( e g l o y a l t y
c a r d s )
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the background of a variety of inevitably ‘contradictory’, real-world,
operational performance criteria.
Despite the similarities with supermarkets, the main difference for
defence is the theme that the operational environment is always an
unknown. Supermarket chains do not usually have to deploy, at shortnotice, to a new country or cope with their shops being blown up.
Characteristics of deployed enterprises – Q1
This quadrant is where the real-world realities come into play and where
the activities of the DEs are shaped by the context, the expectations
on the ground, the dynamics of the current situation and the nature of
possible futures4. Commanders must be able to make sense of this as
it happens. It cannot be fully appreciated and delivered in advance as
activities in this space must lead to self-sustaining change that meets the
outcomes required by politicians, the people and the media etc. There
are many drivers and demands in tension, not least the changing ‘complex
operational realities’ and the mix of perceptions and intentions of the
actors involved, many of whom influence matters behind the scenes.
There are two mutually supporting sides to DEs: the ‘informal’ side –
that is to say, the command and intelligence ‘brain’ that makes sense of
the changing context – and the ‘formal’ one – namely, the control and
administration machine-like ‘nervous system’. There is no dispute about
the fact that these two sides exist. The DSTO-inspired chart5 at Figure
4 has been used at front-line operator and intelligence workshops over
12 years, involving personnel from three-star generals to corporals, and
across NATO to outside defence without there ever being any dissent
about its validity. The issue is that its wider implications have not, in my
experience, been articulated clearly enough in capability terms to gain
traction and to be taken forward into acquisition. The two sides of DEs are
complementary – both are required – and the function of each is as follows:
The informal side, built around the command-intelligence partner-■
ship, provides intent and purposeful leadership drive to controland Intelligence functions. Its activities vary with changes in oper-
ational imperatives, contexts and degree of dominance, that we,
and the forces and communities that we work with, have in any
specific situation. In capability terms, it is more outward looking,
proving perception and sense-making ‘services’ based on human
judgement. These support our own forces and, often in commu-
nities of interest and federations, those of coalition partners and
agencies/other government departments (OGDs) outside defence.
Without this brain, the formal side is a ‘blind machine’.
The formal side, largely managed by staffs, ensures on-going■
accountability of control and administrative functions, such as
issuing of orders, monitoring and reporting, security, logistics,
personnel/finance, medical and office automation, including sig-
nals, messaging, transfer of data, etc. It uses standard operating
procedures (SOPs) and changes little during operations. In capa-
bility terms, it is more inward-looking, providing the kind of stan-
dardised, end-to-end services (very similar to those in supermarket
chains) required for the reliable execution of missions.
Implications for operational effectiveness and acquisition
The spring 2011 edition of RUSI Defence Systems contained articles
concerning acquisition reform, coherence, information superiority,
enterprise architectures and system thinking. A single, largely unspoken,
The Two Defence Enterprises
Q2 Q1
Q4Q3
Sponsor User
Capability acquisition
Challenges Operational focus
Service focusSolutions
Capability employment
Figure 3 Enterprise framework applied to defence showing the deployed enterprise(s) required for operations
Research and development
D e f e n c e i n d u s t r y
Defence policy/doctrine
Vision and guidance
Public opinion
Blueprints for behaviours
Intergration and
experimentation
Direction
I n n o v a t i o n
Strategy
Criteria
(performance)
Contracts
AgreementsAcquisition
Design
Development and test
Exercises and trials
(Simulated operational
environment)
Missions/
Initiative/
Adapt
Deployed Defence Enterprise(s)
CJO
eg COMISAF
Command/
Intelligence/
Intent
Op-Orders/
Rehearsal
Forces Assigned/
Logistics/
Personnel
Challenges Execution
Solutions Preparation
Strategic Operational/tactical
Provision Employment
Real operational environment
SROs
(Standing enterprise)
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assumption underpins these papers – that defence can be thought of as
a coherent enterprise, in effect, as a ‘single’, unified System of Systems
(SOS), rather like a supermarket chain.
Yet, as already indicated in operational terms, this cannot be so. The UK’s
defence forces usually operate in coalitions with tens or even hundreds of
partners and many of these are ‘come as you are’ elements that may drop
in or out at short notice. This means being able to engage in the kind of
flexible, federated, collaborative working across governments, agencies
and non-governmental organisations that is needed for success.
This diversity and agility is required to cope with the various values,
timescales, drivers and complexities of the situations/actors involved,
which cannot be predicted exactly in advance due to the inevitable
uncertainty. In these situations, one can ask a number of questions, such
as: where are the boundaries of the defence enterprise? What makes
information ‘right’ in a particular time and place that you do not yet
know? What is the extent of the SOS?
It would be a struggle to find the definitive answer if we were to try to
specify a formal supermarket chain-like enterprise. It is apparent that if
UK defence acquired only the capability necessary to support the formal
parts of the enterprise, then it would not be possible for the command
and intelligence partnership to function. For example, how could spe-cial forces, psychological operations and deceptions, agents and double
agents be run if a supermarket chain-like ‘single view of the truth’ were
mandated across defence?
However, Figure 3 shows that, because operational DEs have different
needs to the ‘peacetime’ parts of the defence enterprise, the capabilities
that acquisition must provide for DEs are radically different from those
for the standing enterprise. Furthermore, ignoring this diversity and
treating the defence enterprise as a single homogenous unit has, is, and
will adversely affect the UK’s ability to apply military capabilities effec-
tively – especially in the key areas of command and intelligence.
These realities mean that the assumptions underpinning the ‘defence
as a supermarket chain’ analogy are wrong. There are two distinct, yet
interrelated, types of enterprise at work here, each with specific char-
acteristics (as listed in the table overleaf) and with different implica-
tions for policy, acquisition, experimentation and training, as well as for
operational effectiveness itself. So what are the consequences?
A model for service-based agile acquisition
The starting point for an alternative model of acquisition is the accep-
tance that we cannot fully know the threats we might face and therefore
need to be agile and robust in the face of the unexpected. This implies
the need for a service-based, agile acquisition approach that can be
influenced to continually evolve along capability pathways over time.
We cannot fully know the
threats we might face and needto be agile and robust in the
face of the unexpected
The Deployed Enterprise (DE)
Command-intelligence (Informal)
Conceive futuresSense-make
Control/Direct
‘The Brain’(Context-driven)
‘The Nervous System’(Process-driven)
Control-Admin (Formal)
Command
IntentCOMMANDER CONTROLLER
Mind games with opponents
Competing alternative hypotheses
Espionage, agents, tradecraft
Deception/countermeasures
Cross-agency cooperation
Comprehensive approach with NGOs
Deliberate plans and schedules
Op orders, directives, warnings
SoPs, rules, laydowns
Logistics, admin and personnel
Reporting, alerting, cueing
Coordinate ongoing missions
Authorities
‘Ops’/ISR Team
‘7 Questions’
Dynamic intentShape futures I n t e l l i g
e n c e
C o l l a t e/A n a l
y s e
Information/Status Tasking/Orders
Responsibilities
Execution monitoring
Coordination
Events/Effects in the World
Action/TasksCollectI n f o r m
Information reporting Mission prep
Operate, Sustain, Protect
D i s s e m i n a t e : V K B – C 4 I S T A R s e r v i c e s
P e r c e i v e : V K B – H u m a n j u d g e m e n t
Figure 4 The two complementary sides of deployed defence enterprises
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DEFENCE ACQUISITION
Criteria Command and Intelligence Control and Administration
Function Provides leadership, unity of purpose, intent andappreciation of possible futures to deployed enterprises
Provides accountable, assured, secure and reliableperformance of the deployed enterprises’ ‘machines’
Governance
Always working in coalition/federation/CoIs with allies,
OGDs to fulfil its functions. Ownership/leadership more
from operational axis of DE (CJO/JtCap)
Working as a coherent unit, largely standardised inter-
nally with clear ‘technical’ interfaces to allies. Ownership/
leadership from technical axis of DE (info officer)
Scope UK defence and external users/enablers Largely within UK defence
Operational/
risk
Invoked for operations and national security issues;
activities depend on circumstance. Takes risks in the face
of uncertainty – accepts that there is no ‘right’ answer
Largely ongoing. Procedures vary little from operation to
operation. Risk averse, emphasis on certainty and ‘facts’.
Unlikely to act without the ‘right’ information
Capability characteristics
User-configurable tools and services that can be adapted to
current imperatives and possibilities – which enable com-
mand agility/do not constrain option space/wiggle room
Pre-defined, tightly specified systems, repeatable pro-
cesses that ensure an underpinning of certainty to the DE
Ways of working (WsoW)
People work as active problem-solvers, determining the
lines of enquiry based on circumstance supported by
so-called ‘human-machine teaming6, 7
People work as components within systems following
largely predefined processes
TrainingIn leadership, command, tradecraft and the ability to be
cunning, insightful and unpredictable as context requires
In process, procedures, ‘buttonology’ and ensure that the
‘right thing’ is done as trained
Equipment/
‘Processes’
Supports informal ‘sense-making’, collaborative problem
solving as part of exploration/discovery/assessment of
competing hypotheses
Structured process following, via office automation, con-
trol systems, databases push, communications systems
PersonnelLeaders: flexible, adaptable, imaginative and wily,
challenging, devious, insightful
Followers: dependable, reliable, resourceful, precise
Intelligence/
information/
Virtual knowledge base
(VKB)
Access to user-determined indicators/significant evidence
that might exist/be required to support or refute
hypotheses. Contradictory by intent, supported by
morphable ontologies with multiple meanings
Delivery of facts and fact-like information, categorised,
tagged with standardised metadata, supported by
normalised (no duplications) data structures, for example,
a ‘single view of the truth’
Doctrine and concepts Command, Inform, Operate and Collect Operate, Collect, Sustain, Protect
OrganisationAs established by the commander, plus informal and
ad-hoc CoIs, usually with OGDs/NGOs outside defence
Institutional, enduring and largely pre-defined roles and
responsibilities
InfrastructureFlexible, adaptable, ‘come-as-you-are’
plug-and-play components
Pre-defined, based on IERs
Logistics On demand Scheduled
InteroperabilityAdapted as appropriate by circumstance/expediency Largely per-agreed (eg through NATO’s
Standardization Agreements)
AcquisitionNeeds to provide service-based, modular capability that
can be adapted at point of use, people drive it (think
iPhone and Apps)
Needs to provide pre-integrated systems displaying
repeatability, eg, the supermarket chain
Architecture
Collaborative open federations (of SoSs) with no single
owner (think of providing devices and apps into the
global mobile phone market)
SoSs with predefinable boundaries and interfaces. Largely
a ‘closed’ architecture
System engineering
Provide services which can be adapted/configured, at
short notice at ‘run time’. Use dynamic, resource-aware
discovery. Average performance OK. Embrace ‘complexity’to generate novelty, options/exploit degrees of freedom
Provide engineered systems that, as far as possible,
individually and collectively perform in a known way.
Eradicate ‘complexity’, embrace certainty. Predictable,therefore more vulnerable and brittle to change
The differences in approach between the two parts of defence enterprises, and the types of Information and Intelligence (i2) required, are highlighted above. These characteristics
have been widely critiqued both inside and outside defence, and have been found to be sound.
The Two Complementary Sides of Deployed Enterprises: Informal v Formal
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DEFENCE ACQUISITION
A mindset change is also required away from, for example, the idea of
building a house (and then paying off the builders) to the idea of the con-
tinual development of a city (where there is an ongoing partnership with
the construction community). As a result, the way in which we do things
would need to change and examples of what needs to be done differentlyare shown in Figure 5 and discussed below.
Governance: For a service-based, agile acquisition approach to work8,
the federation of stakeholders and organisations must be governed and
managed by management hubs that have the authority and oversight to
deal with trade-offs across the enterprise. These hubs (where the SROs
sit) will also need to be responsible for providing common approaches
and enterprise services, while supporting the important differences
between the complementary ways of working in the quadrants.
These hubs are currently absent, as Lord Levene’s Defence Reform
Report published in June 2011 has indicated9 and the mismatch between
the roles, authorities and responsibilities of the various chiefs means that
UK defence is not making the best use of what it has, let alone acquir-
ing what it needs. If appropriate governance is to be provided, which is
focused on delivering ‘plug and play’ services, it needs to facilitate the
cross-domain interdependencies and shape the collaborative dynamic
across the enterprise to achieve operational agility in Q1. To this end,
programmatic certainty may need to be traded for flexibility – especially,
for example, for the flexibility required by commanders of DEs.Required operational behaviours: Strategic defence and security
reviews and pan-government thinking would need to move away from
defining requirements to indicating appropriate behaviours. This means
that only the long-term, aspirational outcomes are specified in Q2 as
blueprints of performance indicators for the range of behaviours that
military forces and capabilities are required to be able to display in Q1.
These include the types of services that need to be made available to
support those behaviours and the interwoven properties of the services
that enable them to be employed in a flexible manner in Q1.
Plug-and-play service acquisition: Programmes initiated in Q3 deliver
a range of tested, robust interoperable services – including core and
enduring common services, such as those specified in the Concept Report
for the ISTAR Virtual Knowledge Base (VKB)10, in the kind of agile man-
ner described in the VKB Implementation Report11. These services are not
The Agile Defence Enterprise
Q2 Q1
Q4Q3
Sponsor User
Capability management
Challenges Real-world focus
Technical focusSolutions
Capability employment
Figure 5 A model of agile acquisition
‘UORs’SDSRs
Agility
trade-offs
Industry
insights
Missions/
Initiative/
Adapt
Deployed Defence Enterprise(s)
CJO
eg COMISAF
Command/
Intelligence/
Intent
Op-orders/
Rehearsal
Forces Assigned/
Logistics/PersonnelOperational adaptation
Challenges Execution
Solutions Preparation
Strategic Operational/Tactical
Provision Employment
Governance, capability
management, common
services, scrutiny etc
Operational lessons
and possible contexts
Employ
Coalition
contributionOperational contexts
(largely unknown)
Plug-and-play
for deployment
Command-led development,integration and exercises
Pools of services
Integration
at ‘point
of use’
Incremental
evolutionary delivery
of robust services
Test interoperability
Application
‘plug-ins’
Information
services
Interface,
infrastructure and
comms services
Provision of
interoperable services
Services and
‘composability’
specifications
Capabilities andoutcomes ‘blueprint’
OGDs and defence policy
Learning by
exploring
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DEFENCE ACQUISITION
pre-integrated into fixed capability packages, as is done at present, but
are delivered as a ‘pool of services’, ready to be employed and adapted
by military personnel, in order to meet changing operational needs.
Integration at the point of use: From this pool of services, in Q4,
command-led integration, development and integration (informed bothby new concepts and by ‘learning by doing’) tries out options for ‘integra-
tion at the point of use’ (as the iPhone already enables with the ‘apps’
metaphor) as part of the training and experimentation process.
These are driven in two opposing directions – by an operational prag-
matism to make the best of what is available and a technical correctness
towards repeatability. Feedback enables evolutionary improvement,
update and delivery of service ‘plug-ins’ without dislocating overall
capability. Industry and research are closely involved in offering options
concerning the state of the art and the art of the possible.
Operational agility realised: For operations, in Q1, an appropriate
range of services are selected from the pools based on their suitability to
be deployed/employed in those contexts. If they are service-based, coali-
tion contributions can easily be accommodated and integrated quickly 12.
When, during operations, the inevitable mismatch between the expected
and reality occurs, it can be dealt with ‘in the field’ because the ability to
adapt ‘on the fly’ to the changing operational imperatives has been built
in. This leads to greater force effectiveness, flexibility and a reduction in
urgent operational requirements.
Agile acquisition approaches are also applicable to other domains that
spawn DEs, for instance, for critical national infrastructure, or for events
such as the London 2012 Olympics. Indeed, they would be required for
the kind of cross-government and coalition operations needed if so-called
‘comprehensive approaches’ are to work effectively.
Conclusions
Much has been written about acquisition over the past few decades. There
have been many initiatives launched, such as Smart Acquisition, alterna-
tive methods employed, such as Through Life Capability Management,
and techniques such as Managing Successful Programmes introduced.
Reports have been written concerning the need for agile acquisition 13
and technical strategies expressed14, yet how many of them have, in
enterprise terms, fully articulated that defence in its entirety cannot be a
single, unified ‘system-of-systems’ like a supermarket chain? How many
have managed to acknowledge and articulate the need for the deployed
parts of defence to be necessarily different in ways that cannot always be
fully specified in advance? Which of our system-engineering techniques
can deal effectively with this kind of inevitable openendedness?
This article is a step along the path to express the issues that need to
be addressed if we are to avoid the scenario whereby defence has been
turned into an enterprise as inflexible as a call centre. ■
When, during operations, the
inevitable mismatch between the
expected and reality occurs, it
can be dealt with ‘in the field’
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DEFENCE ACQUISITION
The UK Armed Forces may be tasked to deploy at short notice
anywhere in the world and, on arrival, to undertake many dif-
ferent types of operation. Their ability to succeed in the missions
assigned to them by government is ultimately driven by the quality of
the individual combatants, how they are led and the equipment with
which they are provided.
Budget constraints mean that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) does not
have the money to buy the full range of equipment that may be needed to
cater for all types of operations. Therefore, it currently procures equipment
based on capability priorities, recognising that there will be some capabil-
ity gaps when the capability is deployed. There are a number of different
approaches that the MoD adopts to procure equipment, with the selected
approach being dependent on, among other factors, the urgency of need.
The purpose of this article is to identify whether there any lessons to be
learned with respect to the particular processes that the MoD applies to
procuring equipment. Recognising these lessons, and adopting the neces-
sary changes, is a key factor in the success of future procurements.
How does the MoD procure equipment?
CADMID: There are a number of alternative procurement routes available
to the MoD for the acquisition of capital equipment. The selection of any
particular route is largely driven by whether the equipment can be consid-
ered to be part of normal defence re-equipping or whether it is demanded
by an urgent operational requirement.
LPPV – Lessons for
Defence Procurement Chris Maughan, managing consultant at Decision Analysis Services Ltd, examines the two key
procurement processes currently employed by the Ministry of Defence and highlights the lessons
that should be learned from the success of the LPPV rapid procurement
The conventional acquisition cycle for equipments is defined by the
CADMID cycle (concept, assessment, demonstration, manufacture, in-
service and disposal), which was introduced in 1999 as part of the Smart
Procurement Initiative. Each of the six stages involves executing the plan
agreed in the previous stage, reviewing the outcome and planning for the
remaining stages.
The acquisition cycle is actually relatively simple in concept, but in prac-
tice turns out to be highly process-driven and labour intensive. Significant
plans, analyses and documentation are produced at each stage, with, in
some assessments, insufficient emphasis placed on the relative value that
each truly produces to the eventual output (ie the delivered equipment).
A number of external reviews and audits of actual MoD acquisition
performance over recent years have consistently indicated the poor per-
formance of some high-profile projects, demonstrated through schedule
delays and acquisition cost increases. This all indicates that the conven-
tional acquisition approach, as outlined by the CADMID cycle, is no longer
functioning as intended.
Despite this, it could be said that the various stages defined in the
CADMID cycle are, in principle, sound. After all, the acquisition of any
equipment (from buying a new car to a space shuttle) follows the same
basic steps: establishing a need, defining a requirement, determining how
to acquire an affordable solution to that requirement, placing a contract
and finally, confirming that what has been received is exactly the product
that was requested.
Force Protection Europe’s
Foxhound LLPV will allow troops
to carry out a wide range of tasks
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DEFENCE ACQUISITION
Commercial organisations (such as oil companies and cruise-ship opera-
tors, to pick just two of numerous examples) are able to operate such a
procurement process successfully. This would indicate that any failure in
defence acquisition more properly resides in the execution of the process,
rather than the process itself.
UOR: An alternative to the conventional CADMID procurement cycle has
been developed by the MoD as a response to the need for rapid acquisi-
tion of equipment in support of current or imminent operational commit-
ments. This is the Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) process.
The MoD claims that the UOR procurement activities can be achieved
within a timescale that cannot be met by the CADMID acquisition cycle.
UOR projects, driven by the timescale imperative, necessarily focus
on delivery of the 80-per-cent solution, balancing pan-Defence Lines
of Development residual risk (such as long-term supportability issues)
against the need to urgently satisfy the operational capability gap. Given
the inevitable time constraints, in the majority of cases, the purchase
under UOR arrangements have been off the shelf (OTS) or made use of
OTS components. There has also, in many cases, been a requirement for
some integration development.
It has been the expressed view of Front Line Commands1, and widely
reported in the national press, that the UOR process has been successful
in delivering capability more effectively than the conventional acquisition
process. So it must be recognised that there are lessons to be learned from
the UOR process that can be applied longer term, in order to markedly
improve the MoD’s routine acquisition of equipment.
The LPPV acquisition
A third approach to equipment acquisition, in effect a hybrid of CADMID
and UOR, was adopted by the MoD for the procurement of the LightProtected Patrol Vehicle (LPPV). The requirement originated with a public
notice in February 2009 in respect of a potential future requirement for
the supply of up to 400 LPPVs. The notice sought information from indus-
try as to current products available now or under development that could
potentially meet the requirement.
The notice also gave broad capability requirements for the LPPV and
indicated that, following expressions of interest from industry and an
initial down-select activity by the MoD, a pre-qualification questionnaire
(PQQ) with a draft requirements document would be made available in
order to inform industry in more detail of the capability sought.
Following some 30 expressions of interest, 16 PQQs were returned,
evaluated and down-selected. In the event, the technical requirements
issued were so demanding that no in-production vehicle was able to
meet them. The result of this scenario was that all contenders were
developed specifically for the LPPV requirement.
Rather than conduct a protracted paper assessment, the project team
invited industry to provide systems for trial, first of protection levels and
then of performance and reliability. A date and place for the performance
trials was set, and vehicles that were not made available were excluded
from the competition. In this way, Technology Readiness and System
Readiness Levels as well as time became selection criteria, with industry,
in effect, conducting its own initial self-assessment.
In the event, two of the three contenders that had been presented
for initial blast trials were presented for what the project team termed
the Competitive Evaluation Phase (CEP): Supacat’s SPV400 and Force
Protection Europe’s (FPE) Ocelot. The CEP was designed to establish
whether a viable solution to the LPPV requirement could be developed
and procured within the desired timescales. It included the conduct of:
physical trials and reliability evaluations of prototype vehicles■
conducted during a number of Battlefield Missions (BFMs);
further blast and ballistic trials to demonstrate actual performance■
of each vehicle against defined threats and the ability to achieve
the required levels of protection;a risk assessment;■
a supportability assessment;■
an independent analysis of the production capability and capacity■
available to the two potential LPPV suppliers, using experts.
The last of these included analysis of the manufacturing capacity and
readiness of the two potential suppliers, in the event that, should the
project move into a production phase and they were successful in being
awarded a contract for LPPV volume manufacture, production rates
would meet the requirement for delivery. The analysis used a bespoke
Manufacturing Readiness Assessment framework, as well as the US
Department of Defense’s Production Readiness Review criteria to assess
the readiness of both suppliers to meet the MoD’s requirements.
The final outcome of the CEP and the parallel invitation to tender, sub-
mission and assessment of tenders (both apparently close-fought) was
that FPE was selected as the preferred bidder and, following the final
negotiations, was awarded the LPPV contract in November 2010, with the
delivered vehicle to be known in British Army service as the Foxhound.
Deliveries are expected to be completed by early 2012, some three years
after the first advertisement.
Lessons learned from LPPV
The LPPV acquisition could be considered a success in that it has resulted
in the relatively rapid development, procurement, delivery and introduc-
tion into service of a new capability. However, as is the case in any success
story, there are lessons that need to be recognised and adopted, where
appropriate, in terms of future projects and acquisitions. For the various
organisations that are involved in the procurement process, these lessons,
which are not intended to be overtly critical, fall under three categories and
are judged to be as follows:
MoD lessons
Senior MoD officials and approving authorities need to recognise■
that moving as quickly as was achieved in the LPPV project is not
without increased risk. The project team requires ‘management
top cover’, not only because of the risk of failure, but also in order
to avoid the potential destabilisations brought about by lobbying
and internal and external naysayers, eager to criticise and under-
mine the approach;
The LPPV acquisition could be
considered a success. However,
lessons need to be recognised
and adopted in terms of future
projects and acquisitions
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DEFENCE ACQUISITION
The MoD needs to recognise that it cannot delegate all work to con-■
sultants and still remain in full control of the evaluation process. Key
management expertise will be needed for success;
There is a need for a clear procurement strategy to be defined at the■
outset, and that includes the down-select assessment criteria;Recognition by the MoD that the UOR approach is not a ‘silver bul-■
let’. It works best for OTS or MOTS (Modified Off-The-Shelf) equip-
ment, where lots of real data and maturity already exists on which to
base rapid decisions. For products that are intrinsically developmen-
tal, this will be more difficult and risky. However, this risk, properly
managed and taken incrementally where possible, may be justified
in achieving acquisition more rapidly;
In conducting the assessment with multiple evaluations going on in■
parallel, the MoD needs to ensure the avoidance of overlap, other-
wise industry is severely inconvenienced by being asked the same
thing under several different guises;
The MoD needs to remain an intelligent-enough customer to under-■
stand what it is being told and the implications for the procurement,
production and support in service;
The MoD needs the ability to be able to check the commercial readi-■
ness of companies to proceed to contract and to have available a
suitable ‘mechanisation readiness’ check metric;
The MoD must include sufficient time in the evaluation process for■
themselves and industry to plan and prepare for assessments, and
to avoid wasted efforts due to poor data and a subsequent need to
revisit areas later.
MoD agents (SMEs/consultants)
SMEs require a depth of understanding, as well as practical experi-■
ence, to be able to understand what they are being shown and tobe able to see beyond the industry ‘sales pitch’. They must have a
breadth of real practical experience of manufacturing and defence
projects, and hence the ability to command respect and be taken
seriously by industry;
They require the ability to identify and focus on key issues, allowing■
industry to present its case without being led to the correct answer
and thus losing any discriminators between competitors;
A clear questioning and assessment structure must be deployed that■
is consistent, objective and fair to all;
The assessment and evaluation of manufacturers needs to include■
the ability to ‘deep dive’ down the sub-contractor supply chain if
specific risks are identified.
Industry
The competitors need to understand the process that the MoD is■
following and how they are expected to deal with it;
Industry must ensure that it fields the correct senior people and■
appreciate the fact that the evaluation process will be time-consum-
ing and perhaps frustrating;
If the evaluation is in all practical purposes a competitive bid in other■
clothes, then industry should form a bid team and prepare properly.
The process adopted for the procurement of LPPV enabled the MoD to
move reasonably quickly from identification of the initial requirement
through trials, down-selection and contract awarding, thus ensuring
the early delivery of capability. There was room for improvement in the
process in several areas, without drifting into the full, conventional,
CADMID procurement route.
The MoD appears to be generally reluctant to adopt alternative acquisi-
tion techniques (such as spiral development or incremental acquisition),
which have the potential to mitigate the consequences of high technical
risk and requirement uncertainty. There is an established and recognised
way to benchmark the technology and system integration risk for any par-ticular project, utilising Technology and System Readiness Levels (TRLs and
SRLs). The MoD should make greater use of readiness reviews, as there is
evidence of the links between TRL at the approval gates and eventual proj-
ect out-turn schedule and cost performance. However, when time is para-
mount, down-selection by deadline has also been shown to be effective.
Smart acquisition was intended to lead to improvements in new equip-
ment delivery performance. This has not materialised, and the practical
application of CADMID by the MoD has been to create an ‘industry’ of sup-
porting processes and management information, which is, arguably, largely
a product of insecurity among decision-makers and their staff. The result
is to direct the focus of teams, perhaps inadvertently, towards feeding the
process and not delivering the product (the equipment to be acquired).
Others have reported that more effective change is required in the MoD,
but any change introduced must result in genuinely different ways of work-
ing and the avoidance of low-value, wasteful or repetitive activities. The
LPPV acquisition has been a success story, drawing on key strengths from
MoD staff and selected technical subject-matter experts.
Despite this success, the major lesson to be learned from UOR acquisi-
tion, and particularly the LPPV, should be that of identifying the minimum
acceptable level of activity to deliver a product. This is the basis of under-
standing the behaviours that cause problems and seeking to change these.
Two quotes from Albert Einstein seem to fit the situation in which the MoD
now finds itself, with the latter particularly appropriate: “Insanity is doing
the same thing over and over again and expecting different results,” and
“Any intelligent fool can make things bigger and more complex... It takes atouch of genius, and a lot of courage, to move in the opposite direction.” ■
Decision Analysis Services Ltd would like to acknowledge the assistance of
the Defence Equipment and Support Combat Wheels Group with this article
The Supacat SPV400 made
it to the LPPV Competitive
Evaluation Phase
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DEFENCE INDUSTRY
It is often quite helpful to conceive of defence as a confluence of three
elements – government policy, the development of defence capabili-
ties presumably to promote that policy, and forces on operations to
deploy those capabilities – thereby meeting a country’s policy ambition.
These three elements are rooted in:
The political body that debates and decides upon defence policies;■
The military component that advises on future capability require-■
ments and deploys those provided, often to lethal effect;
Industry and commerce providing equipment, services and■
know-how; and
Wider society that enables and ‘permits’ defence activity, as■
well as providing actual recruits for military forces and the defence
industrial base.
Bandits and Thieves – Sovereign
Wealth Recovery as a CriticalDefence Capability Dr John Louth, deputy director for the Defence, Industries and Society Programme at RUSI, makes
the case that returning stolen assets to sovereign nations is a vital element of stability building
and should therefore be supported by more robust government policy
Defence policies, the development of capabilities and military opera-
tions are subjects that are widely reviewed and studied, but one key, niche
ingredient that has been ignored is the stolen-asset recovery actor’s role in
defence; in other words, the contribution made by the specialist accoun-
tant, lawyer and investigator, and the companies that employ them, in
tracking and returning purloined sovereign wealth to a particular state.
Why is this activity significant and what conceivable role can sovereign
wealth recovery professionals contribute towards notions of defence? First,
state-owned assets enable a government to provide core services such as
security, education, healthcare, infrastructure and law and order. A coun-
try’s sovereign wealth is required to pay for these functions. If elements
of a country’s government have raided the national treasury and hidden
funds offshore, state functions are, potentially, severely compromised.
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DEFENCE INDUSTRY
Today, this issue is significant, post conflict, in countries such as
Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia and Tunisia. If these states, for example,
are to fully develop a civil society, alleviate poverty and generate a favour-
able climate for continued international investment and economic growth,
then the sovereign wealth misappropriated by corrupt politicians and
officials needs to be recovered to the state as a defence and international
security imperative.
Second, at a global level, the cross-border flow of proceeds from cor-
ruption and crime are estimated by the World Bank at being close to
$1.6 trillion per annum. Corrupt officials and politicians in developing and
transition countries account for approximately $40 billion of this amount
each year. Clearly, the return of these monies to respective national coffers,
the prevention of them leaving a country in the first place, or the inter-
diction of sums of money before they fall into corrupt or criminal hands,
would enable more resources to be available for legitimate, and often criti-
cal, national investment.
Third, there is a correlation between state corruption and international,
organised criminal activity. The National Strategy Information Center in theUS, following extensive multinational research conducted at the turn of the
century, conceptualised a political-criminal nexus, which enabled the con-
centration, fusion and perpetuation of political and professional criminal
power. The argument is that this nexus builds upon political, economic and
cultural conditions within a specific country – especially those in conflict
or post conflict – to generate a permanently corrupt state and an outward
flow of national wealth to offshore safe havens and major international
crime syndicates to fund illicit activities. This, in turn, has the potential to
lead to yet more conflict as tensions rise between the economically dispos-
sessed and the beneficiaries of corruption.
A threat to stability
Fourth, NATO views corruption and the misappropriation of a nation’s
sovereign wealth as a significant threat to stabilisation and reconstruction.
Its 2011 political guidance to members, published following a meeting of
defence ministers in June 2010, emphasised the importance of the transi-
tion of stabilisation and reconstruction activities to a recovering state, with
the judicious return of stolen assets perceived as a critical enabling factor
for operational success.
At any level of analysis, therefore, the practice of sovereign wealth recov-
ery and the battle against this insidiously corrupt political-criminal nexus
present a significant international security issue and defence imperative
for the UK. This does not appear, however, to be widely understood within
the defence community. No guidance can be found within UK national
defence doctrine that highlights the significance of this issue to com-
manders and planners.
Moreover, the professionals working in the area of sovereign wealth
recovery – accountants, lawyers, private investigators and forces of law and
NATO views corruption and the
misappropriation of a nation’ssovereign wealth as a significant
threat to stabilisation
order – while often appearing on the front line in areas of conflict – appear
to work in silos, ignorant of defence policymakers and military practitio-
ners. Also, it is fair to suggest that sovereign wealth recovery specialists are
motivated by different factors: national statute, international law, money,
intellectual curiosity and altruism, to suggest a few.What is needed, then, is a coherent coalition to combat the threat posed
by corrupt political elites and international crime: a coalition involving
international and national courts, law-enforcement agencies, international
financial regulators, professional bodies, practitioners, the military and,
critically, national governments, in partnership with each other. Policy
frameworks need to be developed that clearly identify the threat of corrup-
tion and sovereign wealth theft as major international security, stabilisation
and reconstruction issues. This is critical in 2012, given the nation-building
that is required in countries such as Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Libya and
Tunisia. It is also critical for the future, as the fragile states of tomorrow
emerge in desperate need of immediate and long-term support from the
international community.
In an era that heralded the Arab Spring and the Western contribution to
the uprising in Libya, understanding state-building post conflict and the
importance of the return of misappropriated sovereign assets and monies
has never been more significant or timely. Efforts must be conceptualised
and promoted as an important international stability and national defence
effort. In this way the accountant, lawyer and investigator working in
sovereign wealth recovery will be rightly seen as valuable components of
national security, and policies developed to further integrate their compe-
tencies into the wider UK defence effort. ■
RUSI Defence, Industries
and Society Programme:Sovereign Wealth RecoveryResearch ProjectRUSI has initiated a Thought Leadership Project on Stolen
Asset Recovery, sponsored by Grant Thornton UK LLP,
with an initial workshop that was held in Whitehall on
6 October 2011. For fragile states and young democracies
alike, the recovery of sovereign wealth and assets is a major
security and development issue, especially post conflict.
The emergence of an independent body of knowledge to
explore the issues around this topic represents an important
contribution to notions of international stability and security.
The interactions and interdependencies between state and
corporate actors, played out within both international and
national jurisdictions, are at the heart of this research,
benefitting from the critique of the academic and analyst,
as well as the expertise of the practitioner.
Two detailed studies are being undertaken. One, a case
study, will address the recovery of sovereign wealth in
Sierra Leone, following the conflict there in 2000. The
second will conceptualise and explore the competencies,
relationships and structures required in the 21st century
to successfully manage a programme of sovereign wealth
recovery, involving many state and corporate professionals,
as part of a broader international security and stability effort.
Findings are due towards the end of 2012.
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DEFENCE INDUSTRY
A
ssessing the scope of German defence exports is not an easy
task, as comprehensive figures are not available either from
official or non-governmental sources1. This lack of data reflects
the general opacity regarding German defence exports. Added to that, the
German government also insists on its right to conceal its motivation
for issuing an export licence. Furthermore, it regularly refers to legal
regulations prohibiting the disclosure of corporate information in the
course of licensing procedures2. This situation not only poses a problem
for analysts, but also hampers the political and societal discourse on the
pros and cons of defence exports.
The German government’s annual Defence Exports Report presents the
annual value of individual and collective export licences for ‘Weapons
of War (WoW) and other military equipment’. However, licences do not
necessarily reflect already realised exports in a given year and can be
valid for a couple of years. Therefore, it is difficult to distinguish between
the order, delivery and conclusion of defence export deals. The report
accounts only for the actual annual value of exported ‘weapons of war’,
but fails to gather the same relevant information for the far larger sector
of ‘other defence exports’3.
German Defence Exports
in PerspectiveDr Henrik Heidenkamp assesses recent developments in German defence exports and examines how they
impact on the country’s foreign, security and defence policies
Data aggregated by other institutions, such as the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the US-Congressional
Research Service (CRS), also suffers from this problem. Consequently,
figures on German defence exports should be treated with caution.
Current state and trends in German defence exports
As the table opposite indicates, according to the latest annual Defence
Exports Report the total value of export licences fell by about 22 per
cent (€1,548 million) between 2009 and 2010. With a share of almost
87 per cent in 2010, individual export licences represented the bulk
of the total. Whereas these dropped slightly by around six per cent
(€289 million) compared to 2009, collective export licences decreased
sharply by 63 per cent (€1,259 million) in the same period.
According to the report, this decline was mainly the result of technical
reasons. Therefore, the report goes on to suggest that the value of collec-
tive export licences is likely to rise again. Of the total individual export
licences awarded in 2010, some €1.5 billion was allotted to individual
WoW licences (€1.1 billion in 2009), and €3.3 billion was awarded to
individual licences for other military equipment (€3.9 billion in 2009).
Germany’s potentially lucrative export
of Leopard 2 tanks to Saudi Arabia is
proving politically challenging
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DEFENCE INDUSTRY
The value of WoW exports rose between 2009 and 2010 by about
60 per cent (€780 million). However, this was mainly because of sub-
marine exports to two of Germany’s NATO allies – Portugal (one U-boat
Kl 209PN) and Greece (one U-boat Kl 214). If one discounts their value,
WoW exports actually decreased by 30 per cent, compared to 20095.
Key ticket items in Germany’s 2010 defence exports efforts (issued
licences and actual exports) were high-value armaments such as sub-
marines, warships and tanks. Some 71 per cent of the individual export
licences related to exports were designated for European Union (EU),
NATO and NATO-equivalent countries, 29 per cent for third countries
(non-members), including India, Pakistan, Saudi-Arabia, Singapore
and the United Arab Emirates. In terms of value, 77 per cent of all
weapon exports in 2010 were designated for EU, NATO and NATO-
equivalent countries, and 23 per cent were delivered to third countries.
Developing countries received German weapons with a total value of€108.5 million (5.1 per cent of all German weapon exports in 2010, com-
pared to 3.9 per cent in 2009).
Limited economic contribution
SIPRI figures for the period 2006-10 show Germany as the world’s third
largest defence exporter after the US (30 per cent) and Russia (23 per
cent), with a global market share of 11 per cent, followed by France (seven
per cent) and the UK (four per cent)6. However, it would be misleading to
conclude that defence exports present a significant share of Germany’s
economic performance. In 2010, the share of WoW exports in all German
exports was around 0.2 per cent. Even when the total value of export
licences is compared with the value of all German exports – which is
problematic as the latter figure represents actual exports and the former
does not – the share is still only 0.6 per cent. These figures suggest that
the economic relevance of defence exports is almost negligible.
The real relevance of defence exports must be identified within the
broader framework of Germany’s foreign, security and defence policy.
With high pressures on domestic demand due to a shrinking defence
budget, exports become a central element of many defence companies’
commercial viability. This is reflected by their elevated interest in stron-
ger governmental sponsorship for potential armament exports as part of
a compensation for cutting orders7.
In this sense, exports help to sustain domestic defence industrial
capabilities, which are a core component of Germany’s national defence
effort, as well as reducing dependence on external suppliers and offer-
ing the ability to influence behaviours of external customers.
Exports can also reduce the costs of programmes to Germany – a polit-
ical and fiscal imperative in an age of austerity. Export customers can
Figures for the period 2006-10
show Germany as the world’s
third largest defence exporter
after the US and Russia
help to spread the costs of fixed assets needed for long-term support
and allow the German government to recoup some of its investments
through levies. If export deals can be secured early in the develop-
ment phase of a project, the often very large non-recurring unit costs
of research and development can be spread over increased productionruns, thereby reducing the unit costs. Moreover, it could be argued that
a healthy German defence industrial base will increase Germany’s influ-
ence within the restructuring of the European defence industry and with
regard to the development of strategic technologies. Germany can only
proactively participate in multinational developments projects if it can
contribute cutting-edge defence technologies.
In addition, defence exports represent an opportunity to advance dip-
lomatic and economic relationships with the recipient country8. When a
government buys a major piece of equipment from an external source,
a long-term high-level relationship may be created between the two
governments because a continuous supply of parts, information and,
sometimes, support services is normally needed.
The explosive nature of defence exports
Despite these aspects, German defence exports are frequently a cause
for concern in the political and societal discourse for the destabilising
impact on international security they may produce. Controversial inci-
dents connected to defence exports have shocked the very foundations
of political parties (Schreiber scandal), almost wrecked government
coalitions (red-green coalition dispute over tank exports to Turkey) and
threatened international cooperation (discussion on additional exports
to finance the A400M military transport aircraft) in the past9.
The most recent occurrence of this political and societal scepticism
towards defence exports relates to the discovery in August 2011 of
German-made Heckler & Koch G36 assault rifles in Libya, which was
under a United Nations weapons embargo at that time. According to
the company, the guns were part of a batch of 608 rifles and 500,000
rounds of ammunition that was licensed by the German government in
2003 for delivery to the Egyptian Ministry of Defence. As yet it is not
known how the weapons made their way to Libya. Heckler & Koch is still
under investigation by the German Public Prosecutor’s office in Stuttgart
for a possible violation of German defence export laws10.
The potential export of up to 270 Leopard 2A7+ Main Battle Tanks to
Saudi Arabia is even more controversial11. Although the actual export has
so far not taken place, the decision by the Federal Security Council to
issue an export licence is highly contested, even within the government.
Critics argue that it breaks with the established policy not to export WoW
to crisis regions and marks a paradigm shift in German foreign policy.
To paraphrase the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, it’s gener-
ally not enough to send other countries and organisations words of
German defence exports4 (€millions)
2009 2010
Total value of export licences
of which:
7,039 5,491
Individual export licences 5,043 4,754
Collective export licences 1,996 737
Total value of exported WoW
of which:
1,339 2,119
Bundeswehr exports 132 43
Commercial exports 1,207 2,076
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DEFENCE INDUSTRY
encouragement if Germany shies away from military intervention.
Instead, she suggests that Germany must also provide the necessary
means to those nations that are prepared to get involved. Specifically,
she emphasised that this includes arms exports12. However, as this viewfaces opposition across major parts of the political spectrum and within
broader German society, the Federal Security Council will take up the
tank issue again – only this time the Chancellor will face a more funda-
mental debate13.
A new approach to German defence export policy
Whether the licence remains valid or is withdrawn, the proceedings
around the tank deal highlight the need for Germany to adopt a new
approach. Such an approach has to balance the relevance of exports
for a healthy German defence industrial base and as an instrument of
German foreign, security and defence policy with their country’s interest
for sustaining peace and stability in the international system.
This is already a challenge at the national level, but even more so in
a multinational framework. However, the globalisation of defence com-
panies’ way to market, as well as the future integration of the European
defence market, demands that German policymakers – together with
their NATO and EU partners – advance a common defence exports policy.
This would, without doubt, require a more transparent German policy
that reflects the changing strategic environment for the country’s for-
eign, security and defence policy without sacrificing its political prin-
cipals. The lack of transparency surrounding defence exports and the
tensions they produce no longer seems sustainable. ■
Germany’s Chancellor, Angela Merkel,
has demonstrated increasing support
for defence exports
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VBCI
VBCI
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The term ‘medium-weight forces’ came to prominence in the late
1990s when the UK and US identified the need for an armoured
capability that was light enough to be deployed easily by air, but
had the lethality of ‘heavy’ armour.
The US was the first to articulate this requirement. General (Gen) Eric
Shinseki, who was appointed Chief of Staff of the United States Army in
June 1999, had been tasked with transforming the US Army from its Cold
War posture, and in the October of that year, he launched his vision of
‘Getting to the Fight Faster’, with the goal of deploying a full division with
15,000 troops within five days, and five full Divisions within a month.
This required armoured forces that could be deployed by air, and in the
next round of the US Budget process, known as the Program Objective
Memorandum, a raft of ‘legacy’ programmes had their funding cut and the
monies diverted to the Future Combat System (FCS) – a range of platforms
that would be C-130 deployable.
At the same time as Gen Shinseki was announcing his vision statement,
the British Army found itself embroiled in a hostage rescue operation in
Sierra Leone. After that operation, Gen Sir Mike Jackson expressed his
frustration at not having the right equipment to deploy. He pointed out that
his heavy forces were survivable and lethal, but not deployable – except by
Whatever Happened to
Medium-Weight Forces?Colonel Peter Flach MBE (Retd) explains why air-transportable, medium-weight armoured
vehicles have become such a vital component in the make-up of current operations
sea – while his light ‘deployable’ forces lacked the necessary survivability
and lethality until heavier forces could arrive.
He explained that he wanted a ‘golf bag’ of capabilities, so that in future
he would have usable armoured forces that could be deployed by air; so it
was that the Future Rapid Effect System (FRES) was launched. FRES, like
the FCS programme, had C-130 deployability at its heart and adopted on its
logo the strapline: ‘Go First, Go Fast, Go Home’.
As we now know, the FCS and FRES programmes, as originally conceived,
failed. Inevitably, there were various reasons for that failure, but a major
factor was undoubtedly the difficulty of providing adequate protection
within the C-130 portable envelope of around 18 tonnes. It had been
thought that advances in defensive aids systems would provide adequate
protection against direct fire, as well as allowing for a reduction in armour
and, hence, weight.
A new threat emerges
However, it soon became clear that not only were defensive aids systems
unlikely to provide protection across the range of direct-fire threats, but a
new threat was emerging that they could not deal with – the improvised
explosive device (IED). The British Army had considerable experience of
44 RUSI DEFENCE SYSTEMS SPRING 2012
DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES LAND
The Scout SV, winner of
the FRES SV competition,
is just one example of a
medium-weight AFV
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IEDs from Northern Ireland, but had not anticipated their widespread use
in other asymmetric conflicts and had certainly underestimated their effec-
tiveness against relatively well-armoured platforms.
As FCS and FRES fell out of favour, so too did the use of the term ‘medium
forces’. Nevertheless, it is recognised that deployable forces with high
levels of survivability and lethality remain a vital component of a modern
army with aspirations to engage in the full spectrum of operations. This is
because there will always be a requirement for protected mobility on the
battlefield to transport men and equipment; and it may well be necessary
to deploy that capability rapidly by air and to operate over terrain and
infrastructure that cannot take heavy armour.
While the current focus in Afghanistan is on dismounted operations, there
remains a requirement to transport troops and equipment to where they are
needed, while protecting them in transit. There is also a range of battlefield
functions that requires utility vehicles capable of carrying equipment and
their crews, including manned reconnaissance, direct and indirect fire,
mobility support, repair and recovery, and casualty evacuation.
This is why the UK and the US have spent billions procuring mine-
protected patrol vehicles, of which the Mastiff, which is derived from the
US Cougar, is a prime example. Typically, these vehicles are wheeled andhave heavily armoured, V-shaped hulls and, while they have excellent mine
protection capabilities, they have limited mobility because of their high
ground pressure and rigid axles, which restricts their selection of routes.
However, a modern force needs more than protected mobility; it needs
a protected manoeuvre capability, so that it can avoid being restricted to
roads where it is vulnerable to ambush and IEDs, and is able to conduct
operations across terrain, and at a tempo, that the enemy cannot match.
What is required, therefore, is a high level of mine protection, coupled with
excellent terrain accessibility and manoeuvrability.
A changing battlefield
A new capability requirement has also emerged. Given how the battlefield
is changing under the scrutiny of persistent Intelligence, Surveillance,
Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR), the massing of land com-
bat power against a modern, matched enemy carries the risk of annihila-
tion by the very act of concentration. Under such conditions, the enemy’s
combat power will be destroyed by stand-off attack from indirect systems,
as Colonel Gaddafi’s forces found outside Benghazi in Libya. However, the
recent engagements have shown how important it is to cue those systems
accurately, from protected manoeuvre land platforms that act both with
eyes on the enemy and as ISTAR hubs, as well as from aerial platforms.
Fortunately, there are utility vehicles in the 25-30-tonne region that have
high levels of mine protection, as well as excellent mobility and the capacity
to act as ISTAR nodes. Examples of such vehicles are the contenders for the
wheeled FRES UV programme: Boxer, VBCI and the winning vehicle, the
General Dynamics Piranha V. There are also tracked examples, such as the
winner of the FRES SV programme – the General Dynamics Scout SV. While
the lower end of the weight limit for a medium utility vehicle is driven by
the requirement of protection, the upper end tends to be driven by the
twin requirements of air deployability and terrain accessibility.
Although few countries are capable of transporting large numbers
of armoured vehicles by air, such deployability still features in most
requirements as a constraint and, for the UK, A400M deployability ishighly desirable. An A400M has a payload of approximately 30 tonnes,
which would allow a medium-weight vehicle to fly light and fight heavy.
Reducing the weight of armoured vehicles also helps to reduce the logistic
footprint, which is particularly important during deployed operations when
airlift is at a premium.
There is another, less obvious, reason to reduce weight, and that is the
requirement to operate in developing countries with limited infrastructure.
Deployed forces will never win the hearts and minds of local populations
by deploying 65-tonne battle tanks and destroying the roads, bridges,
water supply and drains of the locals. While there is no absolute defined
weight limit, it is worth noting that the current UK road limit for heavy
goods vehicles1 is 44 tonnes.
The choice of wheels and tracks is usually contentious and can be highly
dependent on terrain and weather conditions. Ideally, an army would have
a mix of wheels and tracks because each has its advantages. However, at
weights far in excess of 30 tonnes, the limitations of tyre technology and
the increasing ground pressure begin to favour tracks; and in straitened
economic times when a nation cannot afford both, tracks have the critical
advantage of better terrain accessibility.
It is perhaps no coincidence, therefore, that the UK Ministry of Defence
(MoD) has selected the Scout SV, a tracked vehicle in the 30-40-tonne
range, to form the core of its future armoured force, and it is no surprise
that other armies are watching the progress of the SV programme with
interest. It would seem that ‘medium forces’, or whatever we choose to call
them in the future, are here to stay. ■
45
DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES LAND
The author
Colonel Peter Flach MBE (Retd) served as a Royal Armoured Corps
Officer for 32 years. His acquisition appointments included: OC
RAC sales team at the Armoured Trials and Development Unit,
LSOR1 desk officer for the Challenger 2 Requirement, deputy
project manager MRAV and IPT Leader Tactical Reconnaissance
and Counter-Concealment Enabled Radar (TRACER).
He attended the Long Armour Infantry Course and the Army
Staff Course, and also served on the staff at the Royal Military
College of Science as DS CAFS and DS Armour 1. His last MoD
posting was to the Defence Exports Services Organisation, run-
ning the regional desk responsible for defence exports to the US,
Canada, France, Germany, Benelux, the UN and NATO. He joined
General Dynamics United Kingdom (GD UK) in 2004, working on
vehicle programmes, including FRES. In 2009, he joined Cranfield
University as BD Director in the Department of Engineering
Systems and Management, before rejoining GD UK in 2011 as mili-
tary liaison director, Advanced Programmes and Technology.
Ideally, an army would have a
mix of wheels and tracks becauseeach has its advantages
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DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES LAND
UK AFV and PPV Procurement Using
Urgent Operational Requirements1
Peter D Antill, Jeremy CD Smith and David M Moore explain how the Ministry of Defence rushed through
a set of urgent solutions to provide better protection for deployed personnel travelling in Armoured
Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) and Protected Patrol Vehicles (PPVs) in Iraq and Afghanistan
During the recent conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the
problems of providing protected mobility to troops on the
ground, especially in view of the limited availability of Chinook
helicopters, has received attention from the media, from coroners and in
Parliament. The equipment in service at the time provided certain capa-
bilities but was either fast and agile, but lacking protection against mines
and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), or was much better protected,
but slow and with relatively high operating costs. These included:
‘Snatch’ Land Rovers – an up-armoured version of the Land Rover■
Defender 110, they were widely used in Northern Ireland and
on peacekeeping missions where the threat environment was
considered low2. Their use in Iraq and Afghanistan has been criti-
cised, because despite being armoured against small arms fire, the
vehicles have proven susceptible to IEDs, and more than 37 casual-
ties have been attributed to the vehicle’s lack of protection 3. Such
was the disillusionment, that armed forces personnel started calling
it the ‘mobile coffin’4.
Warrior – an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) that grew out of the 1970s■
MCV-80 project. Some 789 vehicles were produced by GKN Defence,
the Warrior entering service in 1987 with the 1st Battalion, Grenadier
Guards. Comparatively well armed and armoured (having a 30mm
Rarden cannon and 7.62mm chain gun), they are more than 20 years
old, with increasing maintenance costs, and in need of upgrading5.
FV432 – replaced by the Warrior IFV, the FV432 was built by GKN■
Sankey up until 1971, when more than 3,000 had been produced.
It had a welded, steel hull that provided protection against small
arms fire and shell splinters and came in a number of variants,
including troop carrier, ambulance and command vehicle6.
In addition, it was considered that tracked vehicles are viewed as more
aggressive, while wheeled vehicles are less intimidating, have a greater
range, higher top speed and lower maintenance burden. Pressure was on to
get something done, from the Prime Minister, through Lord Drayson, down
to Sir Peter Spencer of the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA)7 and General
Sir Kevin O’Donoghue of the Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO)8.
A Ridgeback armoured vehicle undergoes
rigorous testing at the hands of the CSS
Trials Development Unit at Aldershot
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DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES LAND
Time is of the essence
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) had three options available to it to fill
what it perceived to be a capability gap – go through the standard acqui-
sition cycle, upgrade any existing capability, or acquire capability using
the Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) process. Using the standardacquisition cycle was not really practical, as time and again, the MoD
had been criticised for the delays (and cost overruns) to projects as they
move through the Concept, Assessment, Development, Manufacturing,
In-Service, Disposal (CADMID) cycle9. The second option has been imple-
mented, in so far as the ‘Snatch’ Land Rover, Warrior IFV and FV432 have
been concerned, with:
Snatch Vixen – deployment started in 2008 with vehicles being■
upgraded by Ricardo Specialist Vehicles and NP Aerospace (NPA)
as the original design authority, the programme being run by the
Specialist & Utility Vehicles Project Team. The main improvements
centre on an improved armour package, with underbody and wheel
arch blast deflectors, as well as an enhanced engine and drive-train
package, essential given that the vehicle now weighs 4.1 tonnes10.
Warrior – has both the Theatre Entry Standard (Herrick) (TES(H)■
and Capability Sustainment Programme (WCSP), covering both the
short- and long-term upgrading of the vehicle. The TES(H) so far has
resulted in around 70 upgraded vehicles that had been deployed
to Afghanistan by mid 2011. This upgrade features a further 30
modifications, done at the Defence Support Group (DSG) facility
at Donnington, and builds on the 70 modifications already under-
taken by BAE Systems under UOR funding. It has additional modular
armour protection, a passive noise-reduction system, enhanced
engine, suspension, brakes and drive train (it is now around 40
tonnes in weight) and two electronic systems to detect IEDs. The
£1 billion WCSP programme was, subject to final contract nego-tiations, been awarded by the MoD to Lockheed Martin UK. The
upgrade was originally to be applied to 643 vehicles, and includes
additional electronics and communications gear along with a new
appliqué armour package, with 449 of these also receiving a remod-
elled turret with a CTAI 40mm Cased Telescoped Cannon. Those
numbers are, however, in some doubt11.
FV432 Mk. 3 Bulldog – in November 2005, the DLO awarded BAE■
Systems an £80m contract (with an additional £15m for support in
early 2006) to upgrade 500 FV432 APCs to a standard that included
an Explosive Reactive Armour (ERA) package, advanced passive
armour, air conditioning, thermal blanket, protected commander’s
position and an IED detection system. A follow-on contract worth
£70 million for an additional 400 vehicles was signed in May 2007,
with final deliveries taking place in early 201112.
But, given both the operational and political urgency (for example, a
ministerial target was set to get Mastiff into Iraq by 31 December 2006)13,
upgrading vehicles currently in service would, while being faster than the
normal acquisition cycle, still take time. It was decided that the require-
ment would be met by a Military-Off-The-Shelf (MOTS) purchase. After a
review by subject-matter experts and capability managers of what was
available, a list of 10 key user requirements was produced. While these
have been applied to the Mastiff acquisition, the MoD has, in fact, bought a
wide range of vehicles in significant numbers to fill the capability gap.
In the market
The first Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles appeared in
Iraq as Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and combat engineer vehicles.
The original designs were based on experience of both the South African
and Rhodesian bush wars and generally feature a V-shaped or curved
lower hull that deflects the blast from a land mine or IED around and
away from the vehicle. They also tend to be fully enclosed, a hint as to
their origin as EOD vehicles, with heavy ballistic glass fitted to windscreens
and viewing ports.As the IED threat increased in both Iraq and Afghanistan, MRAP vehicles
were seen as the safest method by which armed forces personnel could
move around in hostile terrain, given that the IED threat was killing hun-
dreds of personnel each year. The early MRAP vehicles, although far better
protected than Humvees or ‘Snatch’ Land Rovers, were not designed as
troop transports, and so were regarded as being a bit too heavy, too tall,
and too bulky for either the urban environment of Iraq or the mountain-
ous regions of Afghanistan. New designs appeared that took into account
the tactical needs of the users and the operating conditions in theatre.
However, some criticism has been voiced as to their effect on the counter-
insurgency effort, encouraging troops to ride in these vehicles rather than
patrolling outside and interacting with the local population14. To cater for
the needs of the British Army with regard to protected mobility, the MoD
has bought Mastiff, Wolfhound and Ridgeback.
Protected mobility UORs
The MoD initially ordered 108 Force Protection Industries Incorporated
(FPII) Cougar MRAP vehicles (known in British service as the Mastiff)15.
The MoD was given a deadline of 23 weeks to have Mastiff in theatre, and
so the basic vehicles16 were upgraded to UK specifications by Coventry-
based NPA at the UK base in Akrotiri, Cyprus, where some REME and
RLC personnel were given training as well. The initial batch of 10 vehicles
was then flown to Iraq to meet the deadline, a classic UOR procurement
where urgency outweighed cost or an extended assurance process.
This initially rushed procurement was followed by the purchase of addi-
tional ‘upgraded’ versions of Mastiff 1, as well as 174 Mastiff 2, a growing
number of Mastiff 317 and 30 ex-USMC vehicles (which entered service in
2009) as training vehicles18. The total number of Mastiff vehicles will even-
tually reach about 470. On top of that, approximately 180 Ridgeback (4x4)19
and about 125 Wolfhound (6x6)20 have been ordered, meaning that the
entire Cougar-based fleet will rise to about 780 vehicles during 2012, mak-
ing a vital contribution to protected mobility and overall force protection.
There had been doubts as to whether something quite so large and
lumbering could fulfil the UOR and in the broader context, not increase
pressure in the equipment programme on the FRES UV project. However,
Mastiff has proven to be an operational success, but there have been other
factors that have complicated things, including:
The commercial environment – NPA took on the task at a signifi-■
cant commercial risk pending the award of an MoD contract. At that
time, the Specialist & Utility Vehicles Integrated Project Team (SUV
As the IED threat increased,
MRAP vehicles were seen as the
safest method by which forces
personnel could move around
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DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES LAND
IPT) was the design authority but with Mastiff 2, the role passed to
NPA and has since moved to Integrated Survivability Technologies
Ltd (a joint venture between FPII and NPA).
Procurement strategy – Given the timescale, the strategy was to■
look for a MOTS solution, with the key issues being the choice of thebase vehicle, developing enhanced protection and systems integra-
tion. The urgency of the requirement was underlined by a number
of people, including the SUV IPT Leader and Lord Drayson, the then
Minister for Defence Procurement21. The Defence Vehicle Dynamics
Trade Show was useful in showing a number of different contend-
ers, with information also coming from the Defence Science and
Technology Laboratory.
Innovative support – Given the speed at which this procurement■
was undertaken, there was little time to consider innovative support
arrangements, such as ‘contracting for availability’ or ‘contracting
for capability’, although some $4 million of spares were ordered
with the vehicles, based on the only usage model then available, the
USMC, itself based on the understanding that UORs have a one-year
life (later amended to three).
International context – the procurement was also influenced by the■
international nature of the operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan,
with a number of Coalition partners having deployed Cougar-based
vehicles22. While this might have led to opportunities for shared sup-
port and learning lessons regarding interoperability, it actually led
to some unhelpful competition over priorities and resources. At the
time, NP Aerospace was not allowed to source alternative suppliers
of spare parts and had to use US manufacturers, who themselves
were required by US law to satisfy the demands of the USMC first,
with the MoD finding that significant quantities of spare parts
originally intended for the UK were diverted23. While Mastiff andRidgeback were conducted as Foreign Military Sales, Wolfhound was
a Direct Commercial Sale, allowing the UK to have a little more say.
In UK service, the Mastiff family of vehicles includes24:
Mastiff 1 and 1.5: Contract awarded in August 2006; deployed■
– December 2006; first operational use – March 2007. Variants –
troop carrier, battlefield ambulance.
Mastiff 2: Entered service – late 2008; deployed operationally –■
March 2009. Enhancements – improved lights and upgraded brakes.
Variants – troop carrier, battlefield ambulance and enhanced com-
munications vehicle.
Mastiff 3: Entered service – early 2011. Enhancements – increase in■
internal room and integrated communications equipment.
Ridgeback (4x4): Ordered – February 2008; arrived in UK – August■
2008; deployed – May 2009. Variants – troop carrier, battlefield
ambulance, command post vehicle25.
Wolfhound (6x6): Ordered – April 2009; entered service – late 2010.■
Variants – logistics vehicle.
There was some initial resistance to Mastiff, which led to criticism of
some of its capability shortcomings. One area of concern is safety, and this
is being looked at by the Protected Mobility Team and Headquarters, Land
Forces. It is considered a priority, with issues including the vehicle’s ability
to deal with water hazards (canals are common in Helmand) and crew egress
in an emergency. But if allowances are made, it actually fulfils the capability
requirements very well. Indeed, Mastiff has, overall, received a good press,
for example: “The procurement of Mastiff has largely been a real success
story for the MoD and, in particular, for Minister of Defence Equipment and
Support, Lord Drayson”26, warranted by good performance in theatre27.
Vector: The MoD ordered 180 UK-built Pinzgauer Vector alongside the
Mastiffs28. The Vector, originally designed by Steyr-Daimler-Puch of Austria,
was developed and placed in quantity production in less than nine months,
being based on the Pinzgauer (6x6) chassis, with a new armoured body
designed by BAE Systems. It also incorporated power-assisted steering, an
anti-skid braking system, electronic traction control, run-flat tyres, an air-
conditioning system, the Bowman communications system and electronic
counter-measures devices. While better than the Snatch Land Rover, it has
There was some initial
resistance to Mastiff, whichled to criticism of some of
its capability shortcomings
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DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES LAND
been found that the Vector does not provide the sort of protection against
mines and IEDs that other vehicles do and so has been relegated to use in
lower threat areas. All 180 vehicles had been delivered by the end of 200729.
Foxhound: The Ocelot PPV has been in development by Force Protection
Europe (FPE – a subsidiary of FPII) since early 2009 (with Ricardo SpecialistVehicles) to meet the requirements of the British Army for a light PPV with
a high degree of protection and good mobility. After undergoing trials, the
Ocelot was selected as the preferred bidder in September 2010, over that
of the Supacat SPV400. In November 2010, FPE was awarded a £180 mil-
lion contract covering the supply of 200 Ocelot LPPV (to be known as the
Foxhound in British Army service), plus an initial purchase of spare parts
with deliveries to run from 2011 through to mid 201230.
Panther: The BAE Systems Panther, based on the Iveco Defence Vehicles
LMV (4x4), was chosen to fulfil the British Army’s Future Command and
Liaison Vehicle requirement, with 400 vehicles being ordered, although it
wasn’t accepted for service until mid 2008. Of the 400, a number have
been upgraded to TES with additional ECM equipment, a third roof hatch,
rear-view camera, additional armour and a redesigned engine air intake31.
Warthog: Ordered in late 2008 to replace its direct predecessor the Viking,
the new vehicle includes spall liners, appliqué armour, a mine protection
kit, Bowman communications equipment, devices to counter IEDs, wire
cutters, grenade launchers and a Platt roof-mounted weapon system32.
With an urgent need to counter the growing threat of IEDs in both Iraq and
Afghanistan, and political pressure building due to adverse press coverage
and coroners’ reports, the MoD has successfully filled a specific operationalrequirement in a relatively short period of time, in terms of both upgrading
current capability and acquiring new capability, by utilising the UOR pro-
cess. This is important, as the MoD has recently stated that there will be an
increasing emphasis on buying MOTS solutions where appropriate33. Taking
the Mastiff as an example there have, however, been problems, particularly
in relation to: first, the lack of any real examination of the issues surround-
ing the generation of a ‘through-life capability management’ plan, effec-
tively leaving that to after the signing of the post-design services contract;
second, maintenance and repair, which have been exacerbated by the lack
of visibility of, and difficulties in, the management of spares.
All this, and the lack of an overall fleet management system, means that
there will be a shortage of available information when it comes around
to deciding whether to take these vehicles into the MoD’s core capability
area, a decision that is yet to be taken34, but could swing either way in this
age of austerity. ■
Mastiff 2 is capable of
carrying a total of eight
passengers and two crew
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Air Assault Brigade test-drives
the Wolfhound at Camp
Bastion in Afghanistan
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DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES LAND
The date 7 October 2011 marked 10 years since coalition forces
went to war in Afghanistan. Since then, more than 2,800 coali-
tion military personnel have lost their lives. The number-one
threat facing these forces remains the hidden and extremely dangerous
improvised explosive device (IED).
Outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, IEDs increasingly became the weapon
of choice for global insurgents and terrorists in 2010, with more than 260
IED incidents recorded per month, worldwide. Device effectiveness and
lethality has increased around the world, and counter-insurgencies are
urgently seeking increasingly sophisticated mobility and protection solu-
tions to protect their troops.
Protected Mobility and Vehicle
Modernisation: Keepingup with Evolving T hreats Serge Buchakjian, senior vice-president and general manager of international programmes for Oshkosh
Defense, leads the development, production and sustainment for all the company’s international
programmes and has more than 25 years of worldwide defence industry experience. In this article, he
highlights the role that Oshkosh vehicle technology is playing in helping to protect troops travelling on
the ground, either with enhanced protection, improved suspension or by removing the need for a driver
NATO forces are responding by modernising their fleets to give troops
improved levels of protection and mobility, and an overall edge to combat
the ever-evolving threats that they face in theatre. As engineers refine
and develop new vehicle protection solutions, they aim to keep vehicles
as light as possible, while reducing weight per square foot to give the
armoured vehicles optimal mobility on the battlefield.
Lighter vehicles can traverse more rigorous terrain with improved agil-
ity, allowing troops to operate off-road extensively and deviate from the
predictable, road-based travel routes that they are otherwise limited to
travelling in heavier vehicles. This dramatically reduces the chances of
vehicles encountering IEDs, because enemies can no longer anticipate
Light armoured vehicles, such as
the Oshkosh M-ATV, can cross rough
terrain and avoid roadside bombs
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DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES LAND
M-ATV uses the TAK-4 system in order to achieve 16 inches of indepen-
dent wheel travel, more than 13 inches of ground clearance and a 70 per
cent off-road profile capability.
These are vital features on a vehicle that needs to drive extensively
across uneven and obstacle-strewn terrain. The TAK-4 system also allows
the vehicle to maintain its full payload capacity, while accepting addi-
tional add-on armour for greater protection against evolving threats.
The M-ATV uses a bolt-on design to accept the latest armour technolo-
gies and meet changing threat levels. Most recently, Oshkosh worked
with the US military to develop and install under-body protection kits
for the M-ATV to further enhance the vehicle’s protection against IEDs
or other explosive threats.
The TAK-4 suspension system’s success on the M-ATV and other
Oshkosh vehicles in Afghanistan led to it being incorporated onto legacy
MRAP vehicles to optimise their manoeuvrability in Afghanistan as well.
To date, Oshkosh has delivered nearly 3,400 TAK-4 suspension kits for
legacy MRAP vehicles, including the RG33, RG31A3 and Cougar MRAPs.
Oshkosh also expanded the M-ATV into a family of vehicles to meet a
wide range of mission profiles, such as an ambulance variant. Oshkosh
is using the TAK-4 system on its Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle (TAPV)
submission for Canadian Forces.
when and where trucks will confront these hidden explosives. The
Oshkosh Defense Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) All-Terrain
Vehicle (M-ATV) redefines standards for mobility and IED protection.
The earlier generation of heavily armoured MRAP vehicles, prior to the
M-ATV, was designed to protect troops against roadside bombs in Iraq.
The vehicles succeeded in Iraq, but they were frequently too heavy to
safely navigate the terrain that troops encountered in Afghanistan, which
lacks paved roads and modern infrastructure.
Weight from the additional armour, combined with straight-axle sus-
pension, restricted the MRAP vehicles’ mobility, forcing convoys to travel
predictable, more easily navigable roads – where enemies were more
likely to plant lethal explosive devices. To fulfil the urgent need for a
heavily protected vehicle that could navigate Afghanistan’s treacherous
cross-country terrain, Oshkosh Defense engineers developed the M-ATV.
New vehicle, proven lineage
The M-ATV incorporates technologies developed for other Oshkosh
Defense vehicle fleets to deliver a calculated balance of mobility, perfor-
mance and protection for operations in Afghanistan. One key component
is the Oshkosh Defense TAK-4 independent suspension system, which
has now been used on more than 20,000 military-class vehicles. The
The Oshkosh M-ATV Multi-Mission Vehicle
(MMV) equipped with Raytheon TOW missiles
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DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES LAND
Oshkosh Defense engineers continue to examine and develop ways to
improve ride quality by studying military trucks in action and calculating
what is required for optimal manoeuvrability on harsh terrain. Leveraging
their field observations after 10 years of operational experience in the-
atre, Oshkosh engineers developed the next-generation TAK-4 system,known as the TAK-4i intelligent independent suspension, with very low
spring rates and long travel measurements. The TAK-4i system delivers
20 inches of independent wheel travel, which is 25 per cent more than
other vehicles fielded in the US military.
Critical advantage
Testing has verified that vehicles equipped with this advanced
suspension system achieve higher speeds and greater ride quality on
rougher terrain than existing vehicles, providing a critical mobility advan-
tage on extremely challenging battlefields. To date, the TAK-4i system
has completed more than 50,000 test miles. This included completing
the Baja 1000 – a 1,061-mile off-road race through the gruelling Mexican
desert. As with its predecessor, the TAK-4i system is scalable for use on
light, medium and heavy tactical wheeled vehicles.
As militaries strive to redefine mobility and protection standards, auton-
omous operability has emerged as another key modernisation capability.
Front lines on the modern battlefield have blurred, with troops participat-
ing in logistics missions exposed to threats previously contained in active
battle zones. Autonomous vehicle technology increases a driver’s situ-
ational awareness and can even remove a driver from a vehicle entirely,
reducing exposure to IEDs or other lethal attacks.
Most of the unmanned ground vehicles (UGV) used on the battlefield
today are small robots used to detect and detonate explosives. The
Oshkosh TerraMax UGV system, however, integrates high-power military
computers, intelligent drive-by-wire technology and innovative sensing
systems into already fielded vehicles, allowing them to operate with-
out a driver and with minimal supervision. The TerraMax UGV system
allows supervised autonomous navigation in either a lead or follow con-
voy role, or it can be commanded to semi-autonomously follow a lead
command-and-control vehicle.
The TerraMax system also supports remote control and teleoperation of
the UGV, allowing an operator to utilise those modes for recovery if com-
ponents of the autonomy system are rendered inoperable. In the event of
subsystem degradation or failure, the TerraMax system’s extensive health
monitoring ensures early detection and notifies operators of any poten-
tial maintenance issues.
TerraMax technology uses a multi-sensor system, employing intel-
ligently fused radar, LIDAR and camera systems to compensate for the
weaknesses in one sensing modality with the strengths of another. The
system is enhanced by GPS, inertial and vehicle-to-vehicle data, but does
not depend on any of these data sources. In fact, Oshkosh has success-
fully navigated TerraMax-equipped vehicles on stretches of more than six
miles with the GPS antenna disconnected. The system’s computing solu-
tion provides ruggedised, configurable computing in a compact, conduc-
tion-cooled chassis. It is scalable for use on heavy to light vehicles, andhas proven reliable through hundreds of hours of on-vehicle operation.
Each TerraMax-equipped vehicle is able to navigate to its destination
independently, allowing convoys of TerraMax-equipped vehicles to travel
in tight formation, while remaining flexible to respond to traffic condi-
tions, road blockages or other unique mission needs with short-range
radars that provide 360-degree, close-proximity obstacle detection and
avoidance. The system is designed to retain a vehicle’s original payload
and performance capabilities so that nothing is sacrificed, in order for the
vehicle to achieve autonomy. Designed as a kit, the TerraMax UGV tech-
nology can be integrated on existing military vehicles, including those
made by other manufacturers.
Performance proven
The TerraMax technology recently completed its first limited technical
assessment for the US Marine Corps’ Cargo UGV initiative. The Cargo
UGV programme uses an Oshkosh Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement
(MTVR), equipped with the TerraMax UGV technology, and is sponsored
by the US Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory and the Joint Ground
Robotics Enterprise Robotics Technology Consortium. The technical
assessment included numerous tests and produced successful results,
including obstacle avoidance, leader-follower behaviour, water crossings
and navigation without the use of a GPS.
The Cargo UGV initiative’s goal of determining the feasibility of reducing
the exposure of troops to lethal attacks, by replacing some of the manned
vehicles in logistics convoys with unmanned vehicles, is already reachingfruition. After a successful testing phase, Oshkosh began training Marines
to independently conduct autonomous convoy missions for evaluation,
taking yet another step toward increased vehicle modernisation.
While military units are looking to enhance their fleets with well-pro-
tected, highly mobile vehicles, budget limitations prevent forces from
purchasing entirely new vehicles. Solutions such as the TAK-4, TAK-4 i and
TerraMax technologies allow units to upgrade or recapitalise their fleets
in an affordable manner.
Regardless of the manner in which it is carried out, vehicle moderni-
sation is bringing state-of-the-art protection, improved mobility, and
autonomous driving and operating capabilities, to provide troops around
the world with an edge in protected mobility against ever-evolving IEDs
and other threats in theatre. ■
To date, the TAK-4i system has
completed more than 50,000test miles, displaying consistently
exceptional reliability
The TerraMax UGV integrates
drive-by-wire technology into
existing vehicles
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LAND WARFARECONFERENCE 20127-8 June 2012Church House
Westminster, SW1P 3NZ
Find out more and register at
www.rusi.org/landwarfare
Supported by:
General Sir Peter Wall KCB CBE ADC Gen
General Raymond T Odierno
DEFENCE, INDUSTRIES AND SOCIETY CONFERENCE 2012
28-29 June 2012
The Defence Industrial Base – A Critical Component ofMilitary Capability
www.rusi.org/DIandSconference
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DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES LAND
Maintaining freedom of manoeuvre for security forces operat-
ing in asymmetric environments is key to creating and pre-
serving safety and security, not least for local populations. An
effective Route Proving and Clearance (RP&C) capability can help forces
to expand their influence by eliminating ‘no-go’ areas. It will enable
forces to maintain momentum, keep roads clear for civilians and military
alike, and detect and deal with the prevalent threat posed by roadside
bombs and devices effectively.
Beyond recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, the ability to clear
concealed threats remains essential for forces conducting either expedi-
tionary operations abroad or dealing with domestic issues. The necessity
for maintaining freedom of manoeuvre applies to all types and phases
of warfare, from full-scale combat to counter-insurgency and even to
peacekeeping operations. In recent years, improvised explosive devices
(IEDs) have become one of the most common and lethal threats on the
battlefield and are likely to remain a weapon of choice for insurgents
in future conflicts, due to the significant strategic benefits that can be
gained for relatively little effort and with limited resources. IEDs severely
constrain the ability of land forces to manoeuvre at will, especially if
insufficient specialist Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) resources are
available to deal with large numbers of concealed devices. IEDs can dis-
rupt momentum, choke supply lines and isolate communities, allowing
the insurgent to gain the initiative.
The Talisman System-of-Systems
Approach to Route Provingand ClearanceT-Hawk, Buffalo, Mastiff and a JCB – all are constituent parts of the Thales Talisman counter-improvised
explosive device suite of systems. RUSI’s Amyas Godfrey and Paul Wathen, from Thales UK, review this
important programme and explain the nature of its capabilities
Detect, destroy and avoid
Over the past 10 years, NATO forces operating in Afghanistan have devel-
oped a range of combat engineer ‘detect, destroy and avoid’ capabilities
in order to deliver and maintain the required effect on their manoeu-
vres. This freedom of manoeuvre can only be maintained by having an
effective RP&C capability, which, in military terms, has been described
as the ability to make safe and passable routes that have been subjected
to attack through the use of IEDs or conventional mines. In Afghanistan,
where troops are highly dispersed, this is considered key to the ability to
resupply Forward Operating Bases (FOBs).
Looking across the spectrum of NATO International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) deployments, the core capabilities of a generic RP&C system
would seem to be the ability to detect the hidden threat, perform ‘imme-
diate investigation’ and then disrupt or neutralise the suspected device,
without the need to call out specialist support. Associated with this are a
number of supporting capabilities, including command and control (C2),
observation, protection and mobility support. The emphasis of C2 in this
context is on the management of the entire system from ‘under armour’,
while remaining in contact with other units and systems: a necessary pre-
caution against potential ambushes or more complex IED emplacements,
such as ‘daisy chains’ or separated trigger and explosive devices.
The requirement for observation from under armour of the immediate
area surrounding the RP&C system – in order to predict ‘come-ons’ and
A line-up of Talisman vehicles
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DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES LAND
ambushes – is also a lesson learned from experience, as is the more
obvious requirement for protection from the direct effects of the threat
and the ability to provide effective fire when necessary.
Furthermore, in this environment the ability to repair any road or track
damaged by the effects of the device, or even to create new routes ifrequired, are crucial capabilities for maintaining momentum and mobil-
ity support. RP&C systems can also address the need to avoid areas of
danger, for example, by using lane-marking systems, remotely operated
mission systems, and protected-mobility systems to bypass threats.
Taken together, all of the above capabilities address the core require-
ments for a complete RP&C system. Whereas each requirement can be
addressed in different ways – depending on national doctrine and the
environment in which they are operating – each requirement must be
addressed in some way in order to deliver a significant RP&C system.
The Thales Talisman solution
In the late 2000s, an Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) for an
enhanced RP&C capability emerged during British Army operations inAfghanistan, resulting in the launch of the Talisman programme. The UK
Ministry of Defence (MoD) addressed this requirement broadly through a
system-of-systems approach, with key complementary capabilities deliv-
ered by industry to make up the system. The vision was that of several
platforms operating together to provide the capability enhancement.
In July 2009, Thales UK was appointed by the MoD as the Mission
System Design Authority (MSDA) for the Talisman system. This program-
matic approach acknowledged a situation whereby a diverse set of equip-
ment, vehicles, sensors, effectors, communications and capabilities were
being combined to work as a single system, mirroring the operational
merging of capabilities on the ground as envisaged for this requirement.
To this end, the MSDA role included the management of the design,
procurement, installation, test and acceptance of Talisman-specific
equipment into Mastiff and Buffalo vehicles that were provided as
government-furnished equipment by the MoD. The installed equipment
consisted of complex mission systems, interconnected within an elec-
tronic architecture, bringing together the sensors, weapon stations and
a suite of UK theatre-entry protection and communications equipment.
Conscious of the requirements of the realities on the ground, the Mastiff
vehicle in the Talisman system was fitted with a mast-mounted camera,
remote weapon station, local situational awareness system, communica-
tion system and countermeasures. Its investigation capability, based on
a highly protected Buffalo vehicle platform, includes a long-reach rum-
mage arm that provides the ability to probe and unearth suspect buried
devices. The mast-mounted camera, in conjunction with image analysis
techniques, provides a stand-off, close-inspection capability that can
be used to examine suspicious areas and irregularities. Suspect devices
can be destroyed by direct fire from the remote weapon station, all
Thales continues to support
the MoD with upgrades and
enhancements to Talisman as
lessons are learned in theatre
controlled from within the armoured safety of the vehicle. The Talisman
system also includes two types of remotely operated capabilities built
around the T-Hawk micro air vehicle and a Talon remote ground vehicle.
The T-Hawk includes a camera and data link and is used to provide close-
up images of areas of interest, utilising its ability to hover.Talon, a tracked robotic system more commonly associated with spe-
cialist EOD teams, also includes a camera for close-up inspection, and
can be used for charge laying or minor physical probing of suspect
devices. The Talisman system-of-systems is completed by a JCB High-
Mobility Engineering Excavator (HMEE), which is used to reinstate
routes damaged by IEDs, for example, during disposal operations.
Within a year of the MSDA contract award, Talisman entered service
in Afghanistan, following extensive trials and exercises. It is operated
by the Royal Engineers and has proved very effective in enhancing the
safety of convoys travelling though dangerous areas. The MSDA’s role
during the current in-service phase is to ensure maximum availability
and readiness of all the installed mission systems and equipment.
Simulated training
Preparations for using Talisman have been supported by a new collec-
tive synthetic training system based on standard PCs and screens. This
runs a simulation based on the VBS2 gaming engine, within a synthetic
wrap derived from Thales’s open Generic Vehicle Architecture and video-
over-ethernet developments. The training system represents an entire
Talisman Troop, including representative vehicle bays with ‘out-of-the
window’ views and control systems, operator work stations, communi-
cations systems and after-action review facilities. It can simulate events
and entities that would not be possible in live training – such as incom-
ing fire, combined arms actions, weather, day/night operations and local
population movements – thereby significantly enhancing readiness forfinal pre-deployment field training.
Using the new training system, ‘what if?’ situations are played out and
later analysed to help improve operational effectiveness. By simulating
different scenarios, introducing new threats and testing responses, the
crew members rapidly become familiar with operating as a team, while
the command team acquires a better understanding of the interaction
between the platforms and the strengths of team members. The result is
a much higher state of readiness for operations prior to deployment.
Thales continues to support the MoD with upgrades and enhancements
to the Talisman capability, building on the lessons that are being learned
from its employment in theatre. This helps to ensure that UK forces are
able to maintain freedom of manoeuvre so that they can extend their
influence, and that of the Afghan government, to wherever they – and
not the insurgents – choose. ■
T-Hawk UAV
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Always in its element.
Iveco S.p.A. Defence VehiclesI-39100 Bolzano - via Volta, 6+390471905111 - [email protected]
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and in the water, and airportability in a C130, SUPERAV provides anoptimum blend of tactical, operational and strategic mobility.
SUPERAV has an under armour volume of 14m3 and can carry acrew of up to 13 in a highly protected compartment. Designed foroperations worldwide, SUPERAV truly is always in its element.
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and Logistic Trucks and Armoured Fighting Vehicles, which togethercover the full spectrum of on- and off-road military requirements.
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DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES LAND
The debate about what constitutes critical infrastructure existed
well before – but was accelerated by – the events of the 9/11 ter-
rorist attacks on New York in 2001. Nevertheless, there has been
some adjustment to what exactly is considered ‘infrastructure’ and what
is deemed ‘critical’. The focus on critical infrastructure has traditionally
been on ‘hard’ assets, key functions and, more recently, ‘cyber’ assets
and ‘icons’. These are generally described as follows:
Hard assets:■ The tangible machinery of the state, transportation,
power plants, food, information systems, water and waste, and the
defence and industrial base;
Key functions:■ The instruments of state that facilitate its function
and control, including education, prisons, emergency services,
and the government;
People ProtectionChief Inspector Kenneth Pennington, from the Police Service of Northern Ireland, explains why people
are an important element of the Critical National Infrastructure debate, as are the measures being
carried out to protect them and the nature of the equipment being used to secure their safety
Cyber assets:■ The secure and continued use of the internet and
IT assets;
Icons:■ Symbolic features and locations, which could represent a
‘signal’ event for that society if attacked.
What is missing from most, but not all, of the debate around critical
infrastructure is the concept of key people as assets. This seems strange
given the predominance given to interdicting high-value targets dur-
ing counter insurgency operations. One person’s high-value target is
another’s high-value asset.
To quote Andrew Staniforth in Blackstone’s Counter-Terrorism
Handbook (second edition): “A successful assassination of a lead-
ing public and political figure allows terrorists an opportunity to draw
A security presence escorts
UK business secretary
Vince Cable (left) during
a demonstration
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DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES LAND
attention to their cause and to celebrate a momentary victory. It also
serves to raise the fear of terrorism amongst members of the public and
may force governments to react and respond to an embarrassing lapse
in security measures. No such opportunity should be afforded to ter-
rorists, and the security of all in authority is paramount to deliveringeffective counter-terrorism methods.”
The protection of key people therefore, needs to consider both military
targeting models, such as ‘CARVER’, and the various models utilised by
the US’ Department of Homeland Security to identify and prioritise the
protection of key assets. Consideration of how the military selects targets
is effectively ‘red team’ thinking, which represents an attempt to regard
target significance and selection from the aggressor’s perspective.
The adoption of the Homeland Security ‘matrix’ of risks represents
‘blue team’ thinking, with the emphasis on considering risk and conse-
quence from the protector’s perspective. While these approaches may
lead to broadly similar outcomes, they can differ. For example, a lack
of intelligence on the part of the aggressor may mean that they believe
there to be little consequence to the loss of an individual, while the pro-
tector understands that the individual is in fact vital.
What might the aggressor be considering prior to
assassination (using CARVER as a framework)?
Criticality: How critical is this person to the political or economic inter-
ests of the state (enemy)? This may be time specific.
Accessibility: How easy are they to access in terms of their role or fre-
quented locations, do they set patterns, and how easy is an escape?
Recuperability: Can they be easily replaced in their role or function?
Vulnerability: What protection do they receive to their person, transit
or key locations? Do they employ active counter-surveillance?Effect: What are the wider consequences? Can this cause an overreac-
tion by the state?
Recognisability: How high is the individual’s profile? Will that have a
greater potential impact on the populace?
What might the protector consider when determining what
level of protection is proportionate?
Capability: To what equipment does the aggressor have access? What is
the competence of their teams and their intellectual capital? In short, do
they know how to do this?
Intention: Do they want to carry out attacks at this time or on this type
of target? For example, they may be in negotiations with the state and,
depending on the nature of the ideology or ethos of the group, they
might not target certain types of individuals.
Vulnerability: How proximate is the principal to recent attacks? Do they
set patterns? What protection are they afforded? Any test of vulnerability
needs to consider the terrorists’ (or criminals’) attack cycle. An example
of this is described in CJM Drake’s Terrorists’ Target Selection (1998):
Setting up a logistical network;1.
Selecting potential targets;2.
Gathering information on potential targets;3.
Planning of operation;4.
Insertion of weapons into area of operations;5.
Execution of operation;6.
Withdrawal of the operational team;7.
Issue of communiqués.8.
The protection of people needs
to consider military targetingmodels and the various models
used by US Homeland Security
By consequence, interrupting or preventing stages two through to
seven can reduce vulnerability. Is the potential target publicly known/
identifiable? To a lesser extent are they known to the aggressor group
and identifiable by them? For example, a key prosecutor might be largely
unknown to the wider public, but well known to terrorist or criminal
personnel. In terms of impact, what are the political and economic con-
sequences of the principal’s loss? Having considered the level of threat
and the proportionate level of protection required, there needs to be
careful consideration of equipment needs. In broad terms, this covers:
Vehicles: In the protection world, vehicles typically fall into two cat-
egories: ‘hard-skin’ (armoured) and ‘soft-skin’ (unarmoured). Given
the expense of armoured vehicles and the way in which this tends to
increase exponentially towards the top end of the spectrum, the armour
package should be based upon an assessment of the aggressor’s cur-
rent capability, coupled with what operational activity can be taken to
mitigate the risk of attack.
Soft-skin, unarmoured vehicles are not always the poor man’s choice.
When simply in transit, there is a lot of merit in ‘not standing out in acrowd of one’. This covert, low-key approach makes it difficult for the
aggressor to select the target. Intermediate armour systems are also
available that can increase the ballistic protection within the vehicle,
while not compromising the vehicle’s performance.
In any event, the provision of appropriate training to the driver is criti-
cal. He or she must be able to evade hazards and escape an ambush in
the selected vehicle type. Moreover, the vehicle type can significantly
affect the choice of tactics employed. Many will not ram without airbag
deployment and fuel cut-off. Some vehicle types (such as 4x4s) will not
execute violent high-speed turns, while saloon cars remove the ‘off-road’
option. Anyone purchasing vehicles should therefore explore the provi-
sion of training as part of the contract. Equally, do not buy an entire fleet
of one type. This is questionable from both an operational and a practi-
cal perspective. Operationally, changes in vehicles can counter hostile
surveillance. Practically, when your motor transport manager tells you
that the manufacturer has found a fault and wants to recall, you do not
lose your entire fleet. Depending on the operating environment, vehicles
may require countermeasures to prevent the activation of improvised
explosive devices (IEDs).
Air support: This can be employed as a means of transit by itself (pro-
vided ground teams are available to respond). However, air support is
more often employed as ‘top cover’. It can advise the protection package
of hazards ahead and, with the right suite of cameras, can work across
the spectrum to scan for threats. In addition, air support is a very vis-
ible deterrent to those terrorists who are interested in escaping after the
attack. When purchasing air assets it is critical that the platform chosen
can carry the crew and a principal plus a protection officer, as it may be
the only means of removing the principal to a place of safety.
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Communications: In principle, communications need to be encrypted,
or else you are not secure and, therefore, vulnerable in terms of infor-
mation and location. The communication can be police- or military-style
radios or increasingly encrypted smartphones with an ‘app’ that allows
‘push to talk’. This use of smartphones is particularly appropriate when
there is a need to keep the protection package low-profile. This also
raises the issue regarding the security of any communications equip-
ment carried by the principal and crews. This needs to be closely moni-
tored and all parties briefed regarding potential security risks.
Site security: High-profile, pre-planned visits require a different secu-
rity regime to impromptu and/or low-profile operations. Where advance
notice is provided then route and site security become issues. For this
type of operation, it is necessary to create secure areas through con-
trolled access points. Scanners and explosive/firearms detection equip-
ment will be essential. Portable CCTV systems can assist with this. It is
also essential to know what other CCTV systems and/or webcams are in
operation on the premises and from where they can be viewed.
Firearms and less-lethal technologies: Protection ‘details’ can be
faced with all types of threats – from the disgruntled, the emotionally
or mentally distressed, right through to a determined terrorist attacker.
The ‘detail’ must be equipped to deal with the range of threats that
they might encounter. The decision as to what is carried is a command
decision based on a strategic assessment of the threat to ensure that
the protection package is proportionate. Given the range of threat sce-
narios, firearms providers will see either a requirement to escalate or
de-escalate the potential lethality of systems. Fully automatic weapons
will be suitable for some areas of operations and not for others.
Equally, the provision of appropriate, less-lethal alternatives helps to
ensure that any use of lethal force is ‘absolutely necessary’. To be profi-
cient in selecting the appropriate response during high-threat scenarios,
personnel need to be exposed to more than just range training. They
need ‘judgemental’ training, exposing them to realistic real-time dilem-
mas, which are video- or scenario-based. This training requires effective
training environments, coupled with simulations and/or Simunitions™.
Protection begins as an assessment of the aggressor, coupled with
an assessment of the principal. This then informs the debate regard-
ing both the level of protection, and the equipment required. The key
word is ‘proportionate’, both in terms of the assets deployed and the
cost incurred. Proportionality is, of course, a subjective and elusive test,
however, that has to be constantly reviewed. Those reviews will drive
the need for equipment changes, so suppliers need to be capable of
meeting the needs of this continuum. ■
The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the PSNI
The key word
in protection is‘proportionate’,
both in terms
of the assets
deployed and
the cost incurred
The Olympic Stadium, Stratford. The 2012
Games in London will provide a logistical
challenge for UK security forces to overcome
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The early history of the Bowman programme was an unhappy one.
In the 1990s, a series of consortia – initially Yeoman and Crossbow
and, subsequently, Archer – failed to convince the UK Ministry
of Defence (MoD) of their ability to deliver a sufficiently robust solution
to what had originally been envisaged as a replacement for the Clansman
combat net radio system.
By 2000, with original in-service dates long past, the MoD initiated
a new competition, which was won by a team led by CDC Systems UK
(subsequently General Dynamics UK – GDUK) in 2001. The GDUK solu-
tion aimed to capitalise on the similar, though smaller, Iris programme it
had run for the Canadian Department of National Defence.
The initial contract was to provide the new tactical communications
system, which included secure high-frequency and very-high-frequency
Bowman Comes of AgeThe Bowman tactical C4I system has been one of the most significant programmes for the UK’s armed
forces over the past decade. Its impact on British military capability, particularly in the land environment,
has been considerable and mostly positive. Giles Ebbutt traces the history of this complex project to
highlight its undoubted value and uncover the root causes for some of the criticism that it has received
(VHF) voice and data radios, plus an ultra-high-frequency, high-capacity
data backbone network. In 2002, it was followed by the awarding of
the contract to provide the Bowman C2 capability, including software,
hardware and interfaces for systems in armoured fighting vehicles.
This consists of the Common Battlefield Application Toolset (ComBAT),
Infrastructure (I) and armoured Platform Battlefield Information System
Application (P-BISA), collectively known as CIP.
It is known in its entirety as Bowman CIP or BCIP and is intended to
provide a mobile, battlefield-wide ‘tactical internet’, capable of provid-
ing a high-capacity data network, automated positional information and
secure voice communications for mounted and dismounted users.
ITT and Harris, the principal subcontractors providing the communi-
cations equipment, established major manufacturing facilities in the
A soldier from 24 Commando Engineer Regiment
uses the ‘Makefast’ engineering tool that is
supplied with the Bowman suite of applications
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DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES LAND
UK to produce the radios, and embarked on the considerable produc-
tion runs required. This also had to be matched to a vehicle-conversion
programme organised by GDUK, which was running at more than 100
vehicles per week at its peak.
The conversion programme was a major evolution for the military, par-ticularly the Army, and was considered to have the equivalent impact of
a medium-scale operation in its own right, in terms of the effect it would
have on the Army’s operational commitments’ plot and unit availabil-
ity. The programme included: the training/familiarisation of more than
74,000 personnel; the conversion of more than 15,000 vehicles, both
‘core’ and Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR)-funded; and installa-
tions in 120 maritime platforms and 60 helicopters. More than 50,000
radios were supplied, together with more than 22,000 computer termi-
nals. It has been, by any reckoning, a huge undertaking that has had
considerable unsung success, as well as more high-profile criticism.
What was not expected in the planning for conversion was Operation
TELIC (second Gulf War) and subsequently HERRICK (Afghanistan
campaign), which meant that at the peak of the conversion period
the Army’s operational programme had to absorb the effects of three
medium-scale operations. According to Brigadier (Brig) Ivan Hooper, the
current Bowman and Tactical Communications and Information Systems
Delivery Team (BATCIS DT) leader, it was “an immense G3 [Operations
Staff] challenge: really painful.”
Field trials took place during 2003 and 2004, and despite a number
of shortfalls in performance, the decision was taken that 12 Mechanised
Brigade (12 Mech Bde) would deploy to Iraq in early 2005, equipped
with key elements of BCIP, principally using voice, but also with some
limited data capability. This represented a significant milestone, but at
the time there was a wide range of criticism of the equipment’s perfor-
mance, weight and ergonomics. Some of this was well-founded, somebased on hearsay and some on unfulfilled, overambitious expectations.
Nonetheless, as Brig Hooper observes: “It is very easy to forget that
when 12 Bde brought up its formation and battlegroup secure voice nets
in Basra, it was a huge step up in capability.”
A mixed response to the system
The successors of 12 Mech Bde’s 7 Armoured Brigade (Armd Bde), deployed
as the first fully ‘Bowmanised’ Brigade, with what was known as BCIP4F
(Fielded). This provided secure voice and a limited tactical internet, but
still fell short of offering all the capabilities that were expected. Among
continuing negative publicity there were some positive testimonials from
armed forces personnel, such as: “It took me 15 minutes to issue orders
that would have taken two hours with Clansman”, and “the battle group
is impressed and happy with Bowman”. However, there is no doubt that,
at that time, the system was suffering from a poor reputation.
The fielding of BCIP4F continued, and by late 2007 some 10,000 vehi-
cles had been converted. Further spiral development of the system was
in progress, including a number of iterations that were never fielded,
partly because of the impact of operational commitments on the forma-
tion cycle. Eventually, the operational field trial of BCIP5 took place in
the UK and Germany, towards the end of that year.
Following the acceptance of an interim version (5.2.1) in 2008, BCIP
5.4 was contracted in mid 2009. Fielding began in 2010 and the system
was deployed to Afghanistan in mid 2011. Brig Hooper notes that this
“probably saw the realisation of what most people intended or expected
it to be at the outset” and that, overall, it was a rapid implementation.
BCIP 5.4 now provides the following: robust tactical internet that was
needed to make data communications a reality; improved situational
The conversion period was
considered to have the
equivalent impact of a medium-
scale operation in its own right
awareness; better hardware; more flexible and usable software; better
batteries; and the ability to host the engineer, fire-support and air-defence
BISAs. Brig Ed Davis Royal Marines, the outgoing Commander of Task
Force Helmand, commented in August 2011: “This… will not only enable
a step change in positional situational awareness for the battle group/company commander/staff, but will also provide automatic updates on
tactical ground reporting. All in all, a substantial enhancement in capabil-
ity that is already helping to tip the balance our way in the campaign.”
So what caused the earlier problems? A major difficulty was one of
expectation management. The programme cut across all three environ-
ments. It included all three frontline commands and covered everything
from the dismounted soldier through to vehicles, warships and aircraft,
as well as fixed headquarters. Furthermore, the programme had a
smaller budget, but still carried unchanged expectations in the minds
of most customers.
According to Brig Rick Bounsall, previously head of DEC CCII (Director
of Equipment Capability for Command and Control Information
Infrastructure) and then BATCIS DT leader during the key period: “Thiswas the biggest problem I had to overcome. If this had been a commer-
cial programme, we would have rebranded it.”
Brig Hooper notes that: “Although there was recognition within the
programme that the full CIP capability would follow the initial fielding,
this was not widely understood throughout the field army. We could
have managed expectations better. Your particular view of Bowman
depended on where you met it; therefore, we had to get it all right. Get
one bit wrong and it coloured the entire perception. Some elements
weren’t what was expected, particularly for the dismounted user: that
was 40 per cent of the user population.”
Furthermore, users were used to seeing similar-looking technology
being introduced rapidly and successfully in the commercial world while,
with Bowman, they were apparently being denied capabilities that they
already had on their mobile telephones.
In Brig Bounsall’s view: “In retrospect, many of the problems were not
as significant as they appeared at the time.” Some were original design
faults that needed revision, but others, such as the weight and the power
requirement, were as much caused by the requirement for secure voice
and integrated GPS as anything else.
Much of the equipment represented the technical solutions that were
available in 2001, and some suffered in comparison to commercial or
competing military solutions only four years later, such is the speed of
technological development.
The programme required an incremental development approach
incorporating a series of spiral developments to arrive at the desired
capability, as opposed to the linear one with a process of design, experi-
ment, test, trial, accept, field – which is the accepted model. However,
at that stage, the understanding within the MoD of how to manage an
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DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES LAND
incremental programme was still immature, with limited appreciation of
the phasing of design, experimentation and trials that is required. Partly
due to GDUK’s work as systems integrator, there is now much greater
use of simulation and low-level experimentation prior to BCIP trials,
which themselves are far more tightly prepared and controlled.
More complex than anticipated
Significantly, the MoD lacked an accurate appreciation of the immensity
of the impact across all of the Defence Lines of Development, includ-
ing training, equipment accounting and logistics. This resulted in the
constant need to adjust the training programme to account for skills
fade and personnel availability, which turned out to be far less predict-
able and controllable than expected. That said, the support solution has
matured rapidly, partly driven by the demands of current operations.
In addition, the vehicle conversion programme was significantly more
complex than had been anticipated. Ultimately, more than 15,000 vehi-
cles of 114 different types, each with sub-variants, have been converted.
Not surprisingly, every type or variant presented a new problem. The
vehicles also included a number of UOR platforms, such as the MRAPs
that were not planned within the contract.
Vehicle presentation standards also differed considerably from those
expected, with vehicles appearing in unexpected configurations, and
availability for conversion soon departed from the programme. These
difficulties were overcome by the MoD and GDUK, essentially by aban-
doning the strict letter of the contract and working in partnership to
conduct the conversion in the most effective way possible.
There was also an issue with ‘installation versus integration’, as the
process of vehicle conversion involved more than just putting kit into
vehicles. Moreover, there was an inadequate understanding of the
impact on the BCIP installation of adding more subsystems to a platformor changing its configuration.
For example, the poor performance of VHF in one type of vehicle was
eventually traced to the fact that Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC)
profiling had been conducted by the MoD on the first example of the
vehicle to arrive in the UK, for which a suitable installation was designed,
but subsequent vehicles had a different windscreen-wiper motor withdifferent characteristics, thus changing the EMC profile.
On the basis of the subsequent contract to take over the integration
of the vehicles, GDUK could claim to have become the leading vehicle
integrator in the UK, having so far successfully delivered 15,000 inte-
grated vehicles.
As for BCIP, it is more than just a new radio system; it is a new digitisa-
tion regime, and there was a widespread lack of appreciation, particu-
larly across the Army, where the bulk of the impact was felt, of what it
was they were taking on. Several years of use, mostly on operations,
have been instructive in maturing the land forces’ view of what they
have got and where they want to go.
Doctrine is now maturing, and formation commanders understand the
capability and what it offers them, and this continues to be developed
through improved Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, drawing on the
experience gained from current operations.
As far as the future is concerned, “I don’t think we’d ever do a ‘Big
Bang’ approach again, even if it were affordable,” says Brig Hooper. BCIP
is now part of a suite of systems that includes some core programmes,
some UOR and some others; this will need to be developed into an
effective Tactical CIS capability.
Commercial and military systems that are available will address the
capability requirements beyond 2012, some of the obsolescence from
2016 onwards, and the needs of the Army’s Future Force 2020, and
Bowman will be a part of this. The challenge will be to keep this pro-
gramme aligned with other land environment programmes, such asScout SV and Dismounted Situational Awareness. ■
Some 15,000 vehicles, including the
recently acquired Warthog (pictured),
have been equipped with Bowman
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DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES AIR
On 21 January 1920, a dozen RAF de Havilland DH9A biplanes
began a three-week bombing campaign in British Somaliland
that devastated numerous Dervish insurgent bases in British
Somaliland, effectively ending the 20-year uprising masterminded by
Muhammad Abdul Hassan – the notorious “Mad Mullah”.
An unintended consequence of this campaign, which was dubbed the
“cheapest war in history” by Leo Amery, the colonial under-secretary,
was the decision by Winston Churchill, the secretary of state for war
and air, to extend this new doctrine of Air Control and put the vast
swathes of new British protectorates in the Middle East under the steward-
ship of the RAF. It is this decision that led to the formation of the RAF’s
Armoured Car Companies around 90 years ago, and to the start of a
tradition of soldiering within the Air Force.
T he RAF Regiment – More
T han the Sum of its PartsThe Royal Air Force Regiment provides a unique capability to NATO and coalition partners in the force
protection of airfields. It is, however, far more than just a perimeter-patrolling organisation, providing
a raft of vital capabilities to UK Defence and the civilian authorities. Simon Michell explains
Fast forward to May 1941 and the German invasion of Crete. The Germans
had concluded that the operational centre of gravity on the island was,
in fact, the RAF airfield at Máleme. They correctly surmised that once
this fell, the defence of the rest of the island would inevitably crumble.
Consequently, the Germans launched an airborne invasion which, although
extremely costly, managed to take the airfield and, with it, the island.
This invasion was the catalyst for the formation, once again at
Churchill’s behest just over 70 years ago on 1 February 1942, of an organic,
integrated force that would take sole responsibility for the defence of
airfields – the RAF Regiment, into which the Armoured Car Companies
were subsumed. From that moment on, the RAF would have the means
to maintain a permanent Force Protection (FP) posture inside and
outside its deployed air bases.
Protecting a base as large as Camp Bastionin Afghanistan requires dedicated C2 and
systematic patrolling outside the wire
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DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES AIR
Six Corps capabilities
In its core function, today’s RAF Regiment provides FP Command and
Control (C2) alongside air operations and under command of the base
commander, to integrate the entire range of security tasks inside a base, on
its perimeter, and in the Ground Defence Area (GDA) outside the base.RAF Regiment field squadrons operate within this GDA (typically up to
500 sq km around an airfield) to prevent stand-off attack against the air-
field and the aircraft flying in and out.
As a fully integrated, air-minded element of the RAF, the Regiment’s
tactics and doctrine evolve within the framework of the RAF’s three-
dimensional operating environment. In order to defend airfields (and the
aircraft flying in and out of them), air operations cannot be separated from
the FP operations that facilitate them – the two must occur in seamless
harmony, requiring an intrinsic understanding termed ‘air-mindedness’,
across the operational spectrum. Not only does the RAF Regiment under-
stand what is going on in and around airfields from an air operations point
of view, but the air operations component also understands exactly what
the Regiment is capable of and how it operates. This understanding has
implications beyond FP C2 and ground combat – important as that is.
It links to air power doctrine, aircraft tactics and equipment procurement.
For example, aircraft defensive-aids procurement decisions are made in
the knowledge of what elements of the required suite of consolidated FP
measures need to be delivered from the air in terms of systems such as
chaff, flare and electronic countermeasures, but also what can be delivered
from the ground by the RAF Regiment. Furthermore, if a threat is identified
in the proximity of an airfield, it has to be neutralised as quickly as possible
in such a way that the safety of aircraft is not put at risk. The tasking of a
mortar team to take out an insurgent aiming a handheld missile at an air-
craft, for example, needs to take into account that a mortar bomb flying at
10,000 feet across a runway approach is capable of downing a helicopter
or fixed-wing aircraft. In addition, if GDA patrols uncover a threat to the air-
field, they need to communicate with those directing aircraft movements
and directly with aircrew to give them early warning, and vice versa.
The RAF Regiment currently provides six distinct functions.
Force Protection C2 and Integration: Control of the air has to be won
both in the air and on the ground. Therefore, the Force Protection C2 inte-
gration forms the link between air operations, security within the base and
the field squadrons patrolling outside the wire. This is done by co-locating
one of the Corps’ eight FP Wing Headquarters with air operations under
overall command of the airfield commander.
Ground Combat: This is provided by the RAF Regiment’s eight Field
Squadrons, each of which has its own C2, logistics and fire support. The 174
Gunners of the Squadron are responsible for dominating the GDA around
the base through a combination of patrolling, observation and joint fires.
Threats can come in the form of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), small
arms and rocket fire, mortars and man-portable anti-aircraft missiles, as
well as suicide bombers who might try and penetrate the camp.
Another key ground combat role is providing protection for the
Chinook helicopters that ferry the Medical Emergency Response Teams
(MERTS) to evacuate casualties on the ground. Beyond this, the RAFRegiment provides tactical air-control party (TACP) and ground combat
elements in support of Special Forces.
Air-Land Integration: The job of finding targets and directing aircraft
to them is routinely carried out by a Forward Air Controller (FAC). This
arduous and dangerous task requires an understanding of soldiering and
aircraft, and so naturally the RAF Regiment is a breeding ground for these
troops. The Regiment provides around 50 per cent of UK TACPs, including
those for 16 Air Assault and 3 Commando Brigades. TACPs and FACs are
trained at RAF Leeming’s Joint Forward Air Control Training and Standards
Unit ( JFACTSU), under command of a RAF Regiment squadron leader.
CBRN Defence: Airfields are prime targets for attack using Weapons
of Mass Destruction (WMD). Consequently, since the outset of the Cold
War, the RAF has had to invest huge amounts of time and effort in work-
ing out how best to survive an attack and then return to operations as
quickly as possible. This resulted in 1999 in the RAF becoming the Lead
Service for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) defence.
Hence, when the Joint NBC Regiment (subsequently renamed the Joint
Kandahar Airfield – an FP model
Before the RAF Regiment deployed there in 2005, Kandahar
Airfield (KAF) in Afghanistan was perceived as a garrison
that just happened to have an airfield on it. Although it came
under the overall command of the US forces, it was somewhatschizophrenic, with a US Army Colonel in charge of the
garrison and a US Air Force Colonel in charge of the airfield.
Initially, the area outside the wire was occasionally
patrolled by NATO forces. But after losing men to improvised
explosive device (IED) strikes, their governments took a
political decision to withdraw the external patrols. The
result was that the base came under frequent attack from
the Taliban. After two RAF GR9 Harriers were irreparably
damaged by rocket fire, the decision was made to deploy
an RAF Regiment FP Wg HQ in 2005. On arrival, the small
team took over the command and control of around 750
people – 150 from the RAF and the rest from the multinational
force responsible for general security duties. The results
were immediate. For the first time, everything to do with
the protection of KAF was integrated into a single command
structure. This gave a much clearer situation awareness of
what was happening inside and outside the perimeter.
After reorganising the internal base security, the next
step was to bring in an RAF Field Squadron to create a
Ground Defence Area (GDA) measuing 500 sq km and to
reinstitute a thorough and systematic regimen of GDA
patrolling to deter stand-off attack by insurgents. Having
carried out this task for six years, the RAF Regiment undertook
a phased handover in February/March 2011. The US Army then
took on the responsibility, using the procedures and structures
put in place by the RAF Regiment, which now focuses its
efforts on the FP of Camp Bastion.
Air operations cannot be
separated from the FP operations
that facilitate them – the two
must occur in seamless harmony
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CBRN Regiment) was established in 1999, it came under RAF command.
It remained under RAF leadership until it was disbanded on 14 December
2011 as part of the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), and
replaced with the Defence CBRN Wing (20 Wing RAF Regiment), based at
RAF Honington and wholly manned by the RAF Regiment.
The Wing includes highly specialist detection, monitoring and decontami-
nation capabilities, including the Sampling and Identification of Biological
Chemical and Radiological Agents (SIBCRA) task. Small teams will go out
to an area where a WMD event has occurred or where it is suspected that
some sort of CBRN weapon is being developed. Once there, they take
samples and bring them back for testing at Porton Down. RAF Regiment
CBRN specialists also provide support to the civil authorities as part of the
UK Nuclear Event Response Organisation (NERO). A further example of the
support to the civil authorities was the RAF Regiment team that was sent
out to Tokyo last year after the Fukushima nuclear emergency in order to
monitor the atmosphere near the British embassy.
RAF FP Training: When new recruits join the RAF and are inducted
either at Cranwell (officers) or Halton (airmen and women), between
40 and 60 per cent of their Phase 1 training is in basic military skills
– weapons, fieldcraft, first aid, CBRN, drill and ceremonial and so on – all
of which is provided by RAF Regiment instructors. Furthermore, follow-
ing initial training, all RAF personnel have to maintain their militaryskills and are, therefore, regularly tested. For example, before airmen can
go on guard duty they have to refresh their weapons skills. Every year
they have to undergo Common Core Skills training when they requalify
their weapons skills, CBRN first aid and other capabilities. Again, this
continued training and testing is provided by the FP Training Flight,
which is located at every RAF station. Before deploying on operations,
all RAF personnel require thorough pre-deployment training; once again,
this is provided by FP training flights.
In all, around 42 per cent of RAF Regiment NCOs, and a large number of
its officers, are employed on FP training tasks – duties that are undertaken
after employment on Field Squadrons.
“Guardians of the Military Soul” of the RAF: Successive Chiefs of
the Air Staff have used this phrase to describe this key function of the
Corps. A lesson that the RAF learned very early on, and reinforced daily in
Afghanistan, is that the defence of an airfield and the response to an attack
are everyone’s business, irrespective of their branch and trade. Thus, the
instilling of a “warfighting spirit” is essential, and the Service looks to its
dismounted close combat specialists in the RAF Regiment to generate and
safeguard this ethos. This warfighting spirit is inculcated from the outset in
regular FP training for all personnel; the RAF Regiment is also tasked with
the RAF’s formal ceremonial tasks, including Public Duties – principally
through the Queen’s Colour Squadron (dual-roled as a field squadron).
The provision of all these tasks makes the RAF Regiment an indispensably
effective and efficient arm within the RAF and for Defence – confirmed
once again most recently by the SDSR. ■
For further details on the impact of the SDSR on the RAF Regiment, see
the RDS interview with Air Commodore Russell La Forte on page 92
The RAF learned early on thatthe defence of an airf ield is
everyone’s business, irrespective
of their branch and trade
An RAF Regiment gunner
provides force protection
to Army colleagues during
a casualty evacuation
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2012
RUSI,
futuremaritime operationsconference 2012
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Prestigious Sponsor Invitations
Chesney Gold
Medal
RUSI Medal for
Military Literature
RUSI Annual Essay
Prize
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DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES AIR
In the 20th century, air and then space power provided an asymmetric
edge over adversaries. In the 21st century, militaries face “uncertain
superiority in an age of information”1. The rise of mobile technology
and social media, coupled with the desire by nation states to undermine
Western military superiority through asymmetric means, has given cyber
an increasing importance.
The RAF was an ‘early adopter’ of cyber-capabilities, following in the foot-
steps of the United States Air Force. In 2010, ahead of the publication of
the UK’s Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), Air Chief Marshal
Sir Stephen Dalton made several speeches highlighting the RAF’s ability to
operate in air, space and cyberspace2. Some saw it as a land grab at a time
when cyber-security was becoming trendy within government (and when
cuts across defence were imminent). However, others recognised that the
RAF was already making a significant contribution in this area. Indeed, it
was one of the first services to war-game the effects of cyber on future
operations. Today, some 75 per cent of all manpower in Corsham, the
MoD’s Information Systems and Services hub, comes from the RAF, which
also maintains a team of cyber-experts in its Air Warfare Centre.
Securing the Fifth Environment: the
RAF and the Importance of CyberRUSI’s Elizabeth Quintana examines the development of cyber-capabilities within the Royal Air Force (RAF)
and looks at some of the high-tech threats that the service may face from adversaries in cyberspace
Since the publication of the SDSR, cyber has indeed become more of
a departmental effort. The new Joint Forces Command, which will stand
up in April, is likely to take ownership of both cyber and other C4ISTAR
capabilities across the department and will provide a cadre of information
specialists. Individual services will still use, and be affected by, cyberspace
in different ways.
Cyber-operations have an impact on every part of defence, with three
main applications:
Cyber-defence■ The requirement to protect all computers and
information systems from the effects of a direct cyber-attack, cyber-
espionage or malware that may have been intentionally or uninten-
tionally downloaded.
Cyber-situational awareness (intelligence or espionage)■ Using
the internet or other means to gain access to information stored
on computers, servers or other information storage devices. It
may also refer to the data mining and exploitation of information
that is already available on the internet, which may provide an
additional intelligence collection tool. The information can then be
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DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES AIR
verified against other information feeds. Finally, it may provide a
cost-effective and anonymous form of communication with locals or
informants in difficult parts of the world.
Cyber-attack■ The use of the internet or other communications net-
works to tamper with information stored on a device, interfere withthe device’s ability to function, or cause it to self-destruct. Stuxnet,
which was a virus designed to target the control systems of the
Iranian nuclear programme, is probably the most famous example.
The RAF was among the first services to ‘mainstream’ cyber, to ensure
its personnel was aware of the opportunities and the risks that cyberspace
posed. Taking these three areas in turn, we can examine what they might
mean for air forces and give some examples of how they have been used
by the RAF and other air forces in recent years.
Cyber-defence
Military organisations, like any other user of commercially available soft-
ware, can be affected by malware. In 2009, for example, the Conficker
worm was found across a number of military networks and temporarily
grounded French Navy aircraft. Militaries are also facing a growing num-
ber of direct attacks to their networks from hacktivists or state actors: in
2010, former deputy defense secretary William Lynn exposed a particularly
vicious attack against US military CIS systems that took place in 2008 at
the instigation of a foreign spy agency3, while in the UK the Ministry of
Defence (MoD) foiled more than 1,000 attacks from criminals and foreign
intelligence agencies in 2011. Many of these threats can be minimised by
educating personnel in ‘cyber-hygiene’, for example understanding how to
spot a suspicious email and minimising the amount of information freely
available on the web through Facebook or LinkedIn. The RAF has had a
training scheme in place for a number of years to raise awareness.
The RAF has always been a very information-rich service, producing,
analysing and disseminating large amounts of ISTAR data, so the require-
ment for cyber-defence spans all areas. Layered defence is important in
such a fast-moving environment and the RAF is exploiting a wide range of
expertise to solve the problem. The RAF Police has been asked to apply its
security expertise, and the RAF Regiment its understanding of force protec-
tion; intelligence officers know how to rapidly develop an understanding of
the threat, and CIS experts provide the technical expertise. The MoD is also
investigating the future role of the reserve force, and certainly this is an
area where sponsored reserves might provide valuable expertise.
Cyber-defence will also become important in new ways as the service
relies more on networked synthetic trainers, which could be a great source
of intelligence and an attractive target for those with malicious intent.
Remotely Piloted Aircraft are also likely to continue to rely on satellite
communications, given the public nervousness about fully autonomous
armed aircraft. The downing of the US Sentinel stealth UAV in Iran late last
year was a clear warning that such links represent vulnerabilities, regardless
The RAF was an ‘early adopter’
of cyber-capabilities, following in
the footsteps of the US Air Force
of whether the aircraft was lost through a technical fault or whether the
Iranians managed to hack into the link and redirect the aircraft down on to
Iranian soil, as they claim.
Cyber situational awarenessMilitary intelligence officers now look to exploit ‘all source intelligence’, rec-
ognising that some open-source information, such as the internet or news
media, can be as accurate as classified military intelligence. The publication
of Cyber Dawn: Libya, which aimed to gather all open source information
on Libya’s ICT structure and vulnerability to cyber-attack, is one example4.
Verifying the accuracy of the open-source material remains a challenge and
it is often only used if it can be backed up by a more credible source.
NATO’s Operation Unified Protector over Libya was perhaps the first
operation to exploit social media and was driven in some ways by the lack
of ground troops. Jordanian intelligence officers were monitoring social
media networks on behalf of NATO to gather strategic trends, while British
Intelligence Officers used social media to directly communicate with trusted
contacts in the country. Such information was fused with other sources of
intelligence to gain a richer picture of events as they unfolded. News media
and other material gathered online also enabled NATO to gain some basic
battle-damage assessment on targets that they had hit and provided some
feedback from locals about the effectiveness of the campaign.
Cyber-attack
This is perhaps the most controversial use of cyberspace by the military
and is where much of the government’s new MoD funding was focused.
While much of the focus is on ‘cyber-weapons’ delivered via the internet,
existing technologies also produce ‘cyber-effects’ and can be delivered by
air. Classic electronic warfare or high-power microwaves (directed energy
weapons) can disrupt or interfere with electronic equipment. The RAFalready has, or has signalled interest in obtaining, both technologies.
In 2007, Israeli aircraft attacked a Syrian facility that they claimed was
developing nuclear weapons. The Syrian Air Defences were allegedly fooled
by software the Israelis planted on the Syrian system and did not spot the
incursion. Given that many European nations (including the UK) have given
up SEAD capabilities, cyber has been suggested as an interim solution.
However, with all forms of cyber-attack capabilities, there is a need to
develop cyber-battle damage assessment in order to analyse the effective-
ness of the attack, and both the RAF and USAF are investigating different
ways to achieve this. Understanding the second-order effects of an attack
and being able to look for them will be key.
Cyber-security and cyber-operations will inevitably be a feature of the
future operating environment. While this capability will be developed
through a joint organisation, there are specific applications for each of
the services, and the RAF has established expertise in a number of fields.
This is, however, a relatively new capability and a layered, multidisciplinary
approach will be essential to maximise the benefits of both. ■
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The effectiveness of the Talisman counter-improvised explosive
device (C-IED) capability with UK Armed Forces serves to illustrate
the emergence of the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) component
of such systems, epitomised by the Honeywell T-Hawk UAV. The reliance
on drones, with their ability to provide rapid, actionable intelligence in
locating IEDs, is integral to operations in Afghanistan.
Task Force ODIN in Afghanistan
Airborne surveillance has been vital to US C-IED operations for some
years. It is exemplified by Task Force (TF) ODIN (Observe, Detect, Identify
and Neutralise), which has been the benchmark for the conduct of
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Targeting and Acquisition (RSTA) C-IED
operations since its inception in 2006. Initially set up to eliminate road-
side bombs in Iraq, ODIN was reconfigured for Afghanistan, where it
searches for IEDs by patrolling major roads and supply routes. Attached to
the 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade as part of Task Force Falcon, Task Force
ODIN-Afghanistan (TF ODIN-A) operates joint manned and unmanned
missions, and coordinates with ground forces to neutralise targets, as
well as provide warning of enemy activity, including the planting of IEDs.
Integral to TF ODIN-A is Sky Warrior (Predator/I-Gnat derivative)
– the extended-range, multipurpose UAV that is manufactured by
UAVs and the Counter-IED Campaign Avnish Patel, military sciences project manager at RUSI, assesses a selection of the latest unmanned
aerial vehicle counter-improvised explosive device technology
General Atomics. It provides a constant Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR) capability, via its electro-optical/infrared or syn-
thetic aperture radar payloads, and carries both laser range-finder desig-
nators and laser target markers.
While featuring an arsenal of up to four AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, its
main utility is to capture full-motion video to provide division command-
ers with instant, actionable intelligence, as well to as provide troops with
knowledge and an awareness of the terrain around them. Sky Warrior
can also engage the enemy with its Hellfire missiles.
The US is funding programmes to
develop both small, autonomous,runway-independent and rotary-
wing UAVs to detect IEDs
A rail-launched Bat UAV
prepares for launch
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The Sand Dragon programme
Building on the success of ODIN, the US is funding new programmes
to develop both small, autonomous, runway-independent and rotary-
wing UAVs to detect IEDs. Possessing high-definition, electro-optical
sensors and able to detect unintentional electromagnetic emissions, thisnew generation of UAVs is being designed as part of overall convoy and
route-patrol protection, flying in advance to monitor roads and tracks.
The Sand Dragon Tier II UAV for the Route Surveillance Programme is
a US Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) initiative to develop innova-
tive technologies and integrate new unmanned systems for operating
in an irregular warfare environment. In particular, there is a need for
a medium-altitude, long-endurance small tactical UAV that is runway
independent (rail-launched and net-recovered), equipped with a heavy
fuel engine ( JP-5/JP-8) with a minimum of 45lb/500W sensor payload,
and command and control via a ground station.
At the time of writing, the AFRL at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base had
awarded contracts totalling $44.74 million to ChandlerMay ($16.4 mil-
lion in 2010; $2.14 million in 2011) and Northrop Grumman Aerospace
Systems ($26.2 million in August 2011) to develop and deploy UAVs with
C-IED capabilities. ChandlerMay’s contribution is the Fury UAV, which is
capable of flying C-IED missions lasting up to 24 hours at a time, fitted
with a dual-band radar and electro-optical sensor.
It can also support missions during which radar, visual, infrared and
acoustic detection is to be avoided1. Northrop Grumman’s contribution
to the Sand Dragon Programme covers the fully autonomous Bat 12 UAV,
which can be configured with differently sized fuel tanks and sensor
payloads to conduct ISR operations, as well as target acquisition and
communications relay2.
Rotary-wing UAVsThe addition of rotary-wing UAVs with enhanced sensors and imaging sys-
tems into the C-IED inventory is a development that points towards future
trends. The Northrop Grumman-developed Airborne Surveillance, Target
Acquisition and Minefield Detection System (ASTAMIDS) demonstrated in
late 2010 that it could detect simulated IEDs in a US Army evaluation when
flown on an MQ-8B Fire Scout UAV3. The ASTAMIDS system is a lightweight,
multi-capability (multi-spectral, electro-optical and infrared imaging) sen-
sor that would provide reconnaissance, surveillance and target-acquisition
capabilities via laser-guided munitions.
Three remotely piloted Boeing A160 Hummingbird rotary-wing UAVs,
equipped with the Autonomous Real-Time Ground Ubiquitous Surveillance-
Imaging System (ARGUS-IS), are due to be deployed in Afghanistan in May
or June this year4. The Hummingbird has endurance in excess of 20 hours,
carrying a payload of more than 300lbs, and will fly at an estimated top
speed of 140 knots at a ceiling of 30,000 feet, as well as having unprec-
edented hovering capabilities5.
The BAE Systems’ designed ARGUS-IS was developed for the US DARPA
(Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) organisation for $18.5
million and the technology was based on a 1.8 gigapixel camera that can
provide real-time video streams at the rate of 10 frames a second – suf-
ficient to track people and vehicles from altitudes of more than 20,000
feet, across 65 square miles6.
Operators on the ground have access to 65 ‘Predator-class’ steerable
video streams that can be operated independently of the others, either
providing continuous imagery of a fixed area on the ground or being
designated to keep a specified target in the window automatically.
Additionally, these targets can be tracked even if they are all moving in
different directions7.
Future trends will see the development of capabilities such as texture-
recognition systems, with the ability to determine whether soil has been
recently turned in order to locate where IEDs may have been buried. There
is a continuing need to develop, procure and deploy new capabilities.
Certainly, the Joint IED Defeat Organisation ( JIEDDO), among others, wantsto tap into industry research and development, and harness innovative
C-IED capabilities that are able to counter the evolving IED threat and take
into account the latest technical and tactical trends in the field. ■
Boeing’s A160 Hummingbird
is expected to deploy to
Afghanistan during 2012
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Traditionally, the Royal Navy has been a global leader among
navies in Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW). From the North to the
South Atlantic, as well as much further afield, the operational
fruits of the Royal Navy’s decades of labour and investment in the ASW
skills, capability and ethos required to be, perhaps, the world’s state-of-
the-art ASW force, have been borne out clearly.
However, three trends highlight a potential growth in the gap between
the UK’s ASW requirement and the Royal Navy’s capability:
First, operational trends have required navies to broaden the roles under-
taken by their ships and submarines; in the case of ASW, the Royal Navy’s
fleet of nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarines (SSNs), which spent
the Cold War hunting Soviet submarines and surface ships in the North
Atlantic, now occupies a much greater proportion of its time inserting spe-
cial forces, gathering intelligence from the strategic to tactical levels and
firing Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles ashore.
Second, the demise of the Soviet (now Russian) Navy at the end of the
Cold War, coupled with – as yet – no other navy emerging to fill the gap as
a traditional maritime rival, meant that the requirement to conduct ASW
in its traditional sense was, for a while, much reduced. Third, as a direct
result of these first two trends, since the 1990s there has been a relatively
reduced level of financial investment in ASW as a capability.
Danger from Below Dr Lee Willett, RUSI’s head of maritime studies, considers whether the Royal Navy is in danger
of relinquishing its global leadership status in the complex art of Anti-Submarine Warfare
In both relative and absolute terms, the Royal Navy remains one of the
most capable ASW navies in the world. Today, its Type 23 Duke-class ASW
frigates, its EH-101 Merlin Mk 1 and Lynx Mark 8 surveillance helicopters,
and its Trafalgar- and Astute-class SSNs weave together to provide a lay-
ered ASW capability for the UK. At some point in the future, these layers
will be strengthened further when the Type 26 frigate arrives, replacing the
Type 23s and bringing a significant step up in ASW capability – and, it is
hoped, the same number of platforms. However, strategic, operational and
capability overstretch, when coupled with ongoing financial challenges,
Many countries are investing in
submarines, which help nationsto ‘jump the queue’ in both
naval and national power terms
Not only does the Royal Navy have some of
the world’s most powerful submarines – such
as HMS Astute – but, for the time being at
least, it is also expert at hunting them down
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DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES SEA
arguably have caused a lower level of investment and practice in ASW
capability. Moreover, with the withdrawal of the Nimrod airborne surveil-
lance capability under the October 2010 Strategic Defence and Security
Review (SDSR), the UK’s national ASW capability is arguably weaker overall,
as Nimrod provided the surveillance glue that bound other layers together.More broadly, the unstable international balance mandates the
enduring global need for major navies to maintain presence, conduct
engagement and capacity-building, and carry out a range of operations
in support of international stability, as and where required. The forward-
deploying of such navies requires sea control, access and logistics
support, as well as the ability to keep open critical sea lines of communi-
cation and choke points through which the world’s maritime trade flows.
Conversely, such control, access and support can be put at risk by the
possible presence of a submarine.
Growth in global submarine capability
Submarines remain a fundamental tool for increasing both naval and
national power. Large numbers of countries around the world are investing
in both conventional and nuclear-powered submarines, which help nations
to ‘jump the queue’ in both naval and national power terms, to use the
words of Dr Andrew Davies.
This advantage applies to both navies with emerging submarine capa-
bilities and also to traditionally more powerful navies. In the Kosovo crisis,
Western naval forces in the Adriatic kept a close eye on the single Serb
Sava-class diesel-electric (SSK) submarine – even though it never left
port. Moreover, during the United Nations-led intervention in East Timor,
‘aggressive probing’ from Indonesian submarines presented a significant
operational challenge. More recently, Iran’s decision to move its main
submarine base from Bandar Abbas to Jask, at the mouth of the Straits of
Hormuz, underlines the strategic utility of submarines to threaten Westernassumptions of superiority in sea control and access.
In the case of more established navies, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin built what can be seen as a minor renaissance of Russian global
military power around his navy and, in particular, its submarine force. The
US is increasingly focused on China’s military expansion, and the security
questions this raises for the West. Yet, rather than any potential US-China
hostilities emerging over issues in the Western Pacific – risks that have
prompted the Chinese Navy to begin to develop significant anti-access
capabilities – perhaps more immediate risk can be found in the increasing
Chinese presence elsewhere around the world today. One of China’s earliest
deployments into the Indian Ocean to support the international counter-
piracy operation, in 2009, saw reports of its task group being followed into
the Gulf of Aden by an Indian Kilo-class submarine. It should be noted, too,
that each of the ‘BRIC Bloc’ navies – Brazil, Russia, India and China – either
have already, or aspire to operate, nuclear-powered submarine fleets, with
India aspiring also to join Russia and China in basing a proportion of its
nuclear deterrent on its submarines.
Future technological developments that can augment, optimise and
maximise the contribution of underwater battlespace to defence and
security operations include improvements in propulsion for SSKs, the
use of unmanned systems – including offboard capabilities – for both
SSKs and SSNs, sound quieting, the enduring relevance of subsurface
land-attack and covert force-insertion requirements, the use of flexible
payload options, and the increasing importance and capabilities of
submarines themselves.
Nuclear power continues to be both an aspiration and an option for some
submarine forces, not just because of the political and military power
offered by the ability to remain submerged indefinitely, but also because
of the need to overcome the tyranny of distance as many navies seek to
operate more widely around the world.
However, perhaps the key issues are the overall strategic importance
that submarines continue to offer many nations – especially given the
unique flexibility, capability and operational output they can generate –and the risks to which navies expose themselves if ASW becomes a lost
art. In addition, it is worth noting that as the US now faces strategic and
budgetary challenges of its own and may look for other navies to carry
a greater share of the international maritime security burden, there may
be a risk that a reduction in Royal Navy ASW capability – often a
particular niche provided to coalition operations by the UK – will see
the UK’s overall operational influence decline. ■
HMS Monmouth , one of the
Royal Navy’s 13 Duke-class
Type 23 frigates, is at the
forefront of Anti-Submarine
Warfare capabilities
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T he ‘Baggers’ – Royal Navy Sea King
Mk 7 Airborne Surveillance andControl (SKASaC) helicoptersThe Sea King Mk 7 has already proved its worth during the course of three campaigns and has
introduced new capabilities to UK Defence. Simon Michell reveals the utility of the helicopter
and highlights the crucial contribution that it has made in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya
A Royal Navy Sea King
Mk 7 on the flight
line at Camp Bastion,
Afghanistan, with an RAF
Chinook (CH-47) flying
past in the background
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Licence-built by AgustaWestland in Yeovil, the Sea King is based on
the ubiquitous Sikorsky S-61 helicopter. The current Royal Navy fleet
of Sea Kings comprises three variants – each with a specific role. The
green Mk 4s, known as ‘Junglies’, are primarily troop-transport helicopters;
the red and grey Mk 5s are used for search and rescue and, until 2003, thegrey Mk 7 Airborne Surveillance and Control helicopters’ main task was to
defend ships from low-flying aircraft and missiles by detecting them and
then directing additional assets to destroy them.
The Mk 7 ‘Baggers’ – aptly named to describe the large, grey bucket
radome that hangs off the right-hand side, in which the Thales Searchwater
2000 radar system is housed – were converted from the Airborne Early
Warning Mk 2 variant by AgustaWestland (then GKN Westland) with Racal
Radar Defence Systems (now part of Thales UK) as prime contractor at an
original contract value of $155 million under the Cerberus Mission System
Update1. The first Mk 7 conversions were delivered in 2002, with a further
eight completed by 2004. Once the upgraded aircraft re-entered service,
they introduced a step change in terms of Royal Navy ISTAR (Intelligence
Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) capability.
In essence, the Mk 7 became the first advanced surveillance and control
helicopter in the world, able to undertake missions that, prior to its intro-
duction, had usually been assigned to much larger, fixed-wing aircraft. The
combination of the mission system computer, the pulse-Doppler radar,
the Rockwell Collins Joint Tactical Information Distribution Systems Link
16 ( JTIDS Link 16) terminal, secure voice communications and inertial/
GPS navigation systems enabled the helicopter to transform itself from a
‘one-trick pony’ (airborne early warning) to a multi-functional ISTAR asset
capable of tracking ground targets through the use of its Ground Moving
Target Indicator capability and then linking these data feeds to other assets
either on the ground, at sea or in the air.
Their first operational use took place in the run up to 3 Commando
Brigade’s amphibious assault on the Al Faw peninsula during the second
Gulf War. For three weeks prior to the assault, the Mk 7s flew missions off
HMS Ark Royal around the area, in order to gain a ‘pattern of life’ picture
on the ground. During the actual attack, they then went on to identify and
locate threats on the ground and link the data directly to the Royal Marines2.
The successful employment of the Mk 7s in Iraq effectively resulted in a
new line of business for the Royal Navy’s 849 Squadron, which was subse-
quently split into 854 and 857 Naval Air Squadrons in 2006.
After Iraq, the Mk 7s were deployed to landlocked Afghanistan in May
2009 with NAS 854 and 857, where they are still operating out of Camp
Bastion, having completed their 1,000th mission in July 2011. Since arriving
in theatre, they have played a key role in the campaign against improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) and drug runners, once again by creating a ‘pattern
of life’ picture and looking for the abnormal – people and vehicles avoiding
normal tracks and roads, moving at night or diverting around checkpoints.
Since arriving in theatre, the
MK 7s have played a key role in
the campaign against improvised
explosive devices and drugs
With a typical mission lasting up to three-and-a-half hours, and with
crews often flying twice a day, the radar is switched on within five minutes
of being airborne and it remains in operation until touchdown. Everything
within its range is recorded for later analysis back at base. A particular
benefit of having a trained data analyst on board the helicopter as anobserver is that the mission system and radar can be re-tasked in the air at
a moment’s notice, delivering significant flexibility3.
In 2011, yet another operational role was found for the ‘Baggers’: this
time the support of five British Army Air Corps’ Apache attack helicopters
based on HMS Ocean, off Libya. During Operation ELLAMY, the British ele-
ment of the UN-mandated Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, Mk 7s were
used not only to supply ISTAR situational awareness and force protection
to the multinational ships off the coast of Libya, but also to prepare ingress
and egress routes for the Apaches to enable them to safely engage targets
ashore. This could perhaps be seen as the introduction of a new capability
to UK Defence – that of attack-helicopter strike from the sea.
With all of the Sea Kings nearing the end of their service lives, and with
the acceptance in the Strategic Defence and Security Review that the
Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers will be completed and at least one
of them routinely operated, there has never been a greater need for the
Mk 7 capability. The Maritime Airborne Surveillance and Control require-
ment remains as clear as ever. Although not all of this will necessarily
be delivered by manned aircraft, there remains a robust case for a Mk 7
replacement, via the Merlin helicopter.
In July 2010, AgustaWestland and Thales showcased an enhanced ASaC
capability at Royal Naval Air Station Yeovilton, during the Fleet Air Arm’s
annual Air Day. The two companies unveiled a potential successor that
deploys a palletised Searchwater radar through the rear ramp aperture,
which can then be stowed in the cabin when it is not in use. According to
Nick Whitney, senior vice-president of the UK Government Business Unitat AgustaWestland, the replacement system represents a “cost-effective
and low-risk capability” that builds on the substantial investment that
has already been made in the system. ■
The Royal Navy ASAC Sea King
Mk 7 helicopters are playing
a vital role in the ongoing
campaign against IEDs
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As one of the world’s premier think tanks, RUSI has within its
ranks informed policymakers, strategists, military personnel,
academicians, industry representatives and the informed pub-
lic, all of whom can turn their attention to issues of importance – not
just to the UK, but also to Europe and the world at large. Now, fully 180
years after the Duke of Wellington founded RUSI in 1831, the institution
continues to drive the focus on cutting-edge issues through its publica-
tions, as well as through its diverse series of professional conferences.
Nowhere is this more telling than in RUSI’s Missile Defence Conference
series. There are many reasons for this. Firstly, because RUSI identified mis-
sile defence as a critical issue over a decade ago and made the decision to
convene an ongoing series of conferences to maintain focus on this issue
– not as a one-time event, but as an annual gathering that has built up a
critical mass of informed discussion.
Secondly, as missile defence – and especially Ballistic Missile Defence
(BMD) – has become such an enormous challenge for Europe, and the
world, RUSI has gathered prominent experts in this field to highlight the
issue, and to begin to search for multilateral solutions upon which nations
and militaries can agree. By gathering those at the very top of numerous
communities of interest to challenge conference participants to open up
their individual apertures, it becomes possible to look for collective solu-
tions to bedevilling challenges.
RUSI Leads the Way on
Ballistic Missile DefenceCaptain George V Galdorisi, USN (Retd), director of the Corporate Strategy Group at the US Space and
Naval Warfare Systems Center Pacific, reviews RUSI’s 12th annual Missile Defence Conference, while
drawing attention to some of the most pressing international ballistic missile threats
The 12th RUSI Missile Defence Conference, held in June 2011, was, argu-
ably, a classic in its field and placed an emphasis not only on the impor-
tance of missile defence, but also on the extent to which this singular
issue has the attention of top political, military, industry and other leaders.
The bar has been set high. Leading the discussion were, among others,
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO secretary general; Lieutenant General
Patrick O’Reilly, director, United States Missile Defense Agency; Ambassador
Dmitry Rogozin, permanent representative of Russia to NATO and special
envoy of the president of Russia for interaction with NATO on missile
defence; Dr James Miller, principal deputy under secretary of defense for
policy, US Department of Defense; Roberto Zadra, deputy head, WMD Non-
Proliferation Centre, NATO Headquarters; and Ellen Tauscher, the under
secretary for arms control and international security, US Department of State.
Diverse views on addressing the challenges
At some conferences there is ‘group think’ and a certain amount of ‘preach-
ing to the converted’. However, the diverse group of individuals brought
together for this event, while all generally agreeing that missile defence,
and BMD in particular, was essential, differed – sometimes dramatically –
in the solutions that they proposed to these challenges. Nowhere was this
more apparent than in the panels that convened to deal with subsets of
the missile defence conundrum.
NATO secretary general
Anders Fogh Rasmussen
was among the speakers
at the 12th RUSI Missile
Defence Conference
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DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES SEA
These panels focused specifically on the following areas:
Setting the Agenda;■
Tectonic Shifts in the Middle East and North Africa – Implications for■
Missile Defence;
European Contributions to NATO Territorial Defence;■
NATO’s New Strategic Concept and Missile Defence Cooperation■
with Russia;
Capabilities and Operational Developments;■
Integrating United States PAA Systems with NATO ALTBMD for■
Territorial Defence;
Missile Defence, New START for Arms Control■
While a one-line panel title cannot begin to capture the essence of the
discussion of the senior panel participants, they do, nevertheless, help to
define the depth and breadth of the issues surrounding missile defence.
The lively – and often heated – discussions during each panel spoke vol-
umes about the importance of the issue of missile defence.
Emerging threats from BMD
While not the sole theme of the conference, BMD was the core topic. This
was exemplified in NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s key-
note address. Rasmussen defined the challenge in a compelling fashion.
The need for effective BMD has increased in the 21st century; in 2012, more
than 30 countries have deployed ballistic missiles, compared with only
nine in 1972. Potential enemies possess ballistic missiles and Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMD), and today’s rogue leaders view WMD as weap-
ons of choice, not of last resort. In the last year for which complete records
are available, potential adversaries launched 120 ballistic missiles in tests
and demonstrations. These ballistic missile launchings, especially in the
short- to intermediate-range category, were particularly pronounced in thePeople’s Republic of China, North Korea and Iran.
The broadened ballistic missile threat, moreover, crosses the strategic-,
operational- and tactical-level boundaries. Since their inception in the late
1980s, the main driver of current BMD systems has been the threat posed
by rogue nations, such as Iran and North Korea. Today, it is Iran’s organic
missile development that poses perhaps the most immediate, technically
developed threat to NATO and European interests. Iranian firings have con-
tinued, with several mid-range ballistic missiles launched during the past
several years. In 2011, Tehran launched numerous ballistic missiles during
its ‘Great Prophet’ exercise. As Rasmussen pointed out, some of these mis-
siles were capable of striking European nations.
The threat from Iran’s ballistic missile development takes on a new
urgency when juxtaposed with that nation’s WMD programme. Leon
Panetta warned in 2010, when he was director of the CIA, that in a
mere two years, Iran would be able to threaten other nation states with
nuclear warheads mounted on ballistic missiles. Likewise, the US Defense
Intelligence Agency has reported that by 2015, Iran could field a WMD-
armed Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capable of reaching the US1.
Coupled with its determination to acquire WMD, Iran’s missiles pose the
gravest immediate threat to Europe2.
Ballistic missile threat planning at both the regional and strategic level
must also take into account North Korea, which has already conducted
a nuclear weapon test. North Korea possesses a growing ballistic missile
force that includes the short-range Scud C, medium-range No Dong and
intermediate-range Taepo Dong 1 missiles, some of which have also been
transferred to other nations. South Korean defence minister, Kim Kwan-
jin, told his country’s parliament in June 2011 that North Korea may have
already developed nuclear warheads small enough for ballistic missile
RUSI will continue to lead in
focusing international attentionon the challenges of BMD
payloads. Also in 2011, former US defense secretary Robert Gates said
that North Korea’s missiles and nuclear weapons will pose a threat to the
United States within five years3. Far from being a ‘distant threat’ to Europe,
North Korea’s practice of exporting military technology could readily place
its technologies in the hands of other rogue nations or terrorist groups.
C2 interoperability is the goal
As the delegates to the 12th RUSI Missile Defence conference were often
reminded, at the end of the day, sovereign interdependence and interop-
erability will remain core attributes of any collective BMD enterprise.
Indeed, many speakers noted, the Aegis BMD system will form the basis
of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to ballistic missile
defence, and long-term integration with NATO’s Active Layered Theatre
Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programme is the ultimate goal. To
this end, the NATO ALTBMD has been tested to demonstrate Shared
Situational Awareness with the US Command, Control, Battle Management
and Communications (C2BMC) system, with the ultimate goal of true C2
interoperability. The 28 NATO allies are in the process of deciding whether
to connect the European/NATO short- and medium-range theatre missile
defence systems to the US long-range missile defence system. According toAllied officials, this move would only cost €200 million ($260 million)4.
RUSI will continue to lead the way in focusing international attention on
the challenges of ballistic missile defence and, in so doing, will ensure that
this compelling issue continues to receive the focused attention it so richly
deserves. To do anything less is not in RUSI’s character or charter.■
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Better Submarine In-Service Support Martin Burns, submarine engineering support manager at Babcock, looks at the latest developments
in the joint Ministry of Defence/industry approach to submarine support under the Submarine
Engineering Support Contract, to ensure alignment with the wider maritime change programme
When the Submarine Engineering Support Contract (SESC)
was awarded to Babcock in 2009, it heralded a shift in
culture in the complex field of submarine support, moving
from the traditional, rigidly defined scope and distinct customer/supplier
relationship, to one of partnering at a new level, with an integrated joint
Ministry of Defence (MoD)/industry team approach. Now, two years into
the 10-year contract, fresh advances have been made in establishing and
implementing a development strategy to improve joint effectiveness in
the delivery of submarine in-service support over the next two years.
SESC is performance-based, rather than volume-driven, and provides
support for in-service design and engineering technical services to the
entire Royal Naval submarine flotilla, through Babcock’s Submarine
Support Management Group (SSMG). This group is an industry team with
Babcock as prime contractor, supported by the BMT Group and SEA, and
working with the MoD’s In-Service Submarines project team (ISM PT).
SESC has always been seen as an enabler to driving cost reduction and
efficiencies within the submarine support enterprise. Furthermore, it was
always recognised that SESC would need to evolve across its 10-year dura-
tion to meet the challenges of the evolving submarine enterprise. This is
now being achieved. Over the first two years of the contract, some impor-
tant steps forward have been seen in implementing the vision of co-located
joint team working, enabling the move from transactional to relational,
including developing joint team members’ relationships along partnering
lines. In a further important step forward, plans are in place and are being
implemented to take SESC to the next stage.
A team has been established to drive this, via a change-management
programme, to effect the transition to the next stage. Importantly, given
the potential size of the programme and the limited resources available, the
SESC joint steering group has established controls to manage the change
programme, allowing the available resources to be prioritised, in order
to support the most strategically important and beneficial changes, while
maintaining the day-to-day output in supporting the submarine flotilla.
The overriding vision is to establish clear links between the work that
is undertaken and the results achieved, to ensure value for money and
correct prioritisation. Equally, it is about delivering integrated planning
and streamlined processes to drive efficiencies, and marshalling scarce
submarine Suitably Qualified and Experienced Personnel (SQEP) to sustain
the delivery of safe, capable and available platforms. Further, the vision
includes supporting implementation of Flotilla Output Management (FOM);
the initiative to develop improved, collaborative in-service submarine
support, for greater assurance of safety-approved submarine availability, at
reduced cost, on a sustainable and performance-driven basis.
Plans to achieve this have been put in place across a number of areas
or work streams, each with identified goals and priority issues and actions
HMS Trenchant , a hunter-
killer submarine, receives
attention as part of the
Submarine Engineering
Support Contract
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DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES SE A
Though there is work to do with regard to defining information-manage-
ment requirements at the enterprise level and wider initiatives across
DE&S, which will provide both opportunities and constraints, there is
a need to define the in-service model within that. It is the intention,
therefore, to create the information-management framework needed forthe effective delivery of day-to-day, in-service support, while setting the
requirement to pull information from future submarines into the in-service
environment. This will include a platform systems design record, joint team
use of a shared working environment, and process workflows providing
a common, single source of project information and records. In turn, this
will enable more effective use of enterprise information, more informed
decision-making, and enhanced safety across the submarine flotilla.
Relationship development is a further key area in terms of taking SESC
forward. With the Submarine Enterprise Performance Programme (SEPP)
(an MoD–industry collaboration with Babcock, BAE Systems and Rolls-
Royce), Babcock’s Terms of Business Agreement (ToBA) with the MoD
(a long-term strategic agreement confirming Babcock as the MoD’s key
support partner in the maritime sector), and FOM all influencing the envi-
ronment in which the joint team operates, there is a need to define a clear
end-state objective; with relationship development and measurement
being key activities. The goal is to build on the joint team shared values
to establish and implement an ongoing process for the development of
joint team roles and working relationships, in accordance with the strategic
direction set by the joint SESC Steering Group.
Linking outputs to costs
Over the first two years of SESC, by working as an integrated joint team,
SSMG and ISM staff have gained a better understanding of each other’s
perspectives, and the joint team now has a better understanding of the
detail of the changes to take forward. The identified initiatives across the
eight work streams, led by the change team, are set to deliver a number of
benefits over the next two years. Many of these, such as delivery of proj-
ects and programmes to agreed milestones, enhanced allocation of joint
SQEP resource, more effective use of enterprise information, and reduced
platform, system and equipment downtime, are in direct correlation to the
FOM programme and blueprint.
Importantly, as the various work streams implement their plans, agreed
process change will become fully embedded to deliver identified benefits.
These include a clear linkage between input costs and submarine outputs
(ensuring that SESC continues to deliver value for money), and robust proj-
ect planning to deliver the right products at the right time. There will also
be a marshalling of the scarce SQEP across the submarine enterprise to
sustain the delivery of safe, capable and available submarines, while also
supporting the implementation of FOM, coherent with wider maritime
change. Building on a successful first two years, SESC is set to improve joint
effectiveness in the delivery of submarine in-service support. ■
to be undertaken. These encompass: a joint In-Service Submarines (ISM)
engineering plan; submarine support process improvement; availability,
reliability and maintainability (AR&M) service improvement; resource man-
agement; governance and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs); joint work-
force planning; relationship development; and information management.
Submarine engineering plan
The joint ISM engineering plan, for instance, aims to develop and imple-
ment processes for the management of an ISM engineering programme
to capture, plan and define resource requirements to deliver the agreed
submarine requirements or outputs. This will facilitate enhanced allocation
of SQEP resources and more informed prioritisation of work, and help to
deliver projects and programmes to schedule.
The submarine support process review will look at ISM processes with
the aim of having effective, coherent and truly end-to-end ISM business
processes in place by 2013. The objective is to integrate and align these with
the processes of other key submarine support stakeholders, with clear MoD
ownership and process-management responsibilities placed with industry
(SSMG). This review also aims to achieve commonality of processes across
submarine support in their interfaces with ISM, as an enabler to enacting
the developing FOM construct for future submarine support arrangements.
This process integration and alignment is expected to result in the more
effective use of SQEP resource with less duplication of effort, improved
end-to-end coherence and standardisation, better use of enterprise infor-
mation, enhanced safety assurance across the flotilla, and an improvement
in the quality of service, in terms of output and timeliness.
Improvements are also being targeted in the AR&M service. The vision
here is to deliver an AR&M service capable of accurately identifying key
cost and availability drivers, analysing the causes and impacts of those
drivers, and providing justified recommendations for their resolution(also enabling transfer of in-service experience into the design and build
programmes). This will clearly be beneficial in enabling informed prioritisa-
tion of equipment improvement, underpinned by a better understanding
of the wider impacts and benefits of addressing individual problems.
Another area being explored is resource management, with a view to
defining and implementing processes for the planning and allocation of
the resource to support joint team delivery of ISM platform engineering
programme requirements. This will involve developing resource allocation
and planning tools, and the development of processes and procedures to
manage the interface between the different resources. It will be led by
a pilot project looking at the Platform Systems Group (PSG) engineering
resource support to ISM. Key benefits will again include the improved
allocation of SQEP resource, the projects and programme delivering to key
milestones, and informed prioritisation of work. As a pilot project, this may
be applied to other submarine project teams, where relevant.
In reviewing governance and KPIs, the goal is to ensure joint team KPIs,
aligned with MoD Joint Business Agreements that balance improvement
projects, sustainability of support and the need to deliver availability and
capability today. This should improve end-to-end coherence and reduce
duplication, enhance safety assurance across the flotilla, and ensure joint
team governance, focused on delivery of safe submarine outputs. A further
area under review is the management of submarine SQEP, with a view to
establishing a singular approach. A joint team would be able to plan best
use of submarine SQEP to meet specific requirements, with the flexibility to
deploy SQEP to cover unplanned shortfalls. This would contribute to ensur-
ing a sustainable SQEP resource to support the submarine programme.
Information management is another important area. While there is
already some common data storage, there is room for further development.
Fresh advances have been made
in establishing and implementinga development strategy to
improve joint effectiveness
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As an element of China’s current air-power capabilities, elec-
tronic warfare (EW) assets appear to be less advanced than
other key People’s Liberation Army (PLA) air-combat systems,
such as weapons and radars. However, the huge resources that have
been devoted to military electronics in China are bearing fruit. Outside
observers can now see two distinct EW competencies emerging within
the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) – with the fielding of ‘tactical’ and ‘strategic’
frontline systems. China also has immense confidence in the domestic
industry it has established to produce and develop the highly sophis-
ticated hardware and software components that modern EW demands.
However, one question remains unanswered: does all of this produce a
combat capability that actually works?
The vast China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC) and its
many associated research institutes and manufacturing entities is at the
Electric Dragons – Airborne Electronic Warfare Capabilities in China
China’s airborne electronic warfare (EW) skills development has followed the same path as the rest of its
formidable defence aerospace industry. Starting from a low experience base, Chinese technicians have
bought equipment from overseas, used it, studied it, copied it and then built a version of their own.
Robert Hewson reveals some of the results of this evolutionary capability
core of China’s EW industry. Conversations with CETC officials over the
years have shown that they have a surprisingly deep understanding of
Western EW systems – and how to counter them. China has also gained
immense benefit from its extensive access to Russia’s EW designers and
manufacturers, whose business was sustained by Chinese orders over
the long period when funding from Moscow dried up. Elsewhere, strong
links are maintained with EW specialists in Ukraine – a country that
plays an important part as a supplier of niche military technology, such
as missile-seekers, to China.
China’s modern era of airborne EW systems began with the acquisition
of Sukhoi Su-27SK fighters from Russia in the early 1990s, along with
their associated L-203 Gardenia wing-tip countermeasures pods. Later,
the more advanced L-005 Sorbtsiya jamming system was acquired and
carried by Su-30MKK strike fighters and late-model Su-27s ( J-11A in
The Y-8G, which first flew
in 2004, is believed to be
a heavyweight electronic
countermeasures platform.
It is one of several Chinese
EW and Elint platforms
based on the Y-8 airframe
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PLAAF service). China is now building a developed, indigenised version
of the Su-27 as the multi-role J-11B. These aircraft carry a podded EW sys-
tem that closely resembles the Russian designs, but with several notable
differences. An examination of the systems and subsystems that China
has exhibited publicly shows airborne jammers that may be less power-
ful than their Russian equivalents, but with more modern and modular
designs, based on the efficient integration of line-replaceable units. This
approach should make these systems rapidly adaptable and upgradable
– allowing them to better counter and defeat the threat systems that
China expects to face.
A second key platform in China’s tactical frontline force is the Xian JH-7
and JH-7A – the large, twin-engined strike fighter now emerging as the
PLAAF’s dedicated defence-suppression and electronic-attack aircraft.
JH-7s and upgraded JH-7As have been observed operating with a suite of
large, underwing jamming pods. Judging from their size and configura-
tion, each pod is dedicated to a different frequency range, indicating
that the JH-7A could operate as an escort jammer (with a strike package)
or a stand-alone electronic attack system.The JH-7A has been integrated with a range of dedicated defence sup-
pression weapons, including the YJ-91, China’s version of the Russian
Kh-31P (AS-17 ‘Krypton’) high-speed, anti-radiation missile. A mix of
armed and ‘podded’ JH-7As would make an effective US missile-seeking
aircraft or ‘Wild Weasel’ defence-suppression team.
Strong links are maintained with
specialists in Ukraine – a countrythat plays an important part as
a supplier of niche technology
China’s airborne EW systems will take another step forward once the
enhanced Chengdu J-10B enters service. This much-improved version
of the baseline J-10A will introduce the PLAAF’s first electronic fighter
radar (although it remains unclear whether it is a passive or active array
design). This lays the groundwork for the potential use of such a largeantenna system as an EW emitter. The J-10B also appears to have an
integral EW system unlike any other found on a Chinese fighter, with a
pair of jammers built into underwing hardpoints.
To feed this ‘tactical’ force of EW combat assets, the PLAAF has a modest,
but active, fleet of ‘strategic’ electronic surveillance aircraft, the task of
which is to collect the raw data needed to programme China’s EW-threat
libraries. These aircraft, known as Y-8JB, have been sighted on missions
off the Japanese coast. A wide array of special-missions platforms has
been developed from the venerable Shaanxi Y-8 four-engined turbo-
prop. This includes a number of large, specialist EW platforms, such as
the Y-8CB, Y-8G and others. Unlike the electronic intelligence-gathering
Y-8JBs, these aircraft have a full-spectrum active EW mission and are
part of China’s expanding electronic-attack forces. The modernised and
improved Y-9 platform will soon enter service and will provide a signifi-
cant performance boost for future special-missions platforms.
China’s military planners are well versed in concepts such as net-
enabled and asymmetric warfare. At public events, the PLA had shown
future combat scenarios that demonstrate a tight integration between
its air, land and sea forces, using UAVs, guided weapons and electronic
systems. The EW aspect of these plans is every bit as important as
the kinetic aspect, which has been China’s priority thus far. China has
striven to reach an acceptable (near-peer) level of conventional military
capability with land, sea and air platforms (eg tanks, ships and planes).
Confident that this scenario has been achieved, China’s military planners
will focus on unconventional assets and improved combat support capa-bilities, all of which will call for the further expansion of an offensive EW
force that is already on a solid foundation. ■
Robert Hewson is the editor of Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons and has studied
the Chinese aerospace scene over three decades
The Xian JH-7 strike fighter
is a key PLA electronic
warfare asset and has
taken on a dedicated
electronic attack role with
this jamming pod fit
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Northrop Grumman’s approach to integrating the existing sensors,
weapons and Command and Control (C2) tools is transforma-
tional, and comes from decades of battle management, C2 and
system-of-systems integration expertise. The intention was to put into
practice lessons learned from past conflicts, taking advantage of technol-ogy advancements and industry best practices. With the new approach,
the Integrated Air and Missile Defence Battle Command System (IBCS)
will also make C2 – or battle command – a powerful weapon system
that vastly improves the cost-effectiveness of integrated air and missile
defence (IAMD), as well as its capability for delivering situational under-
standing and flexibility for adapting to the spectrum of operations.
Converting lessons observed into lessons learned
The experiences gained from Operation DESERT STORM, Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM are merely lessons
observed until solutions are made available to address them.
The issues observed from recent conflicts include:
Fewer than one-in-four aircraft have■ proper identification on all
C2 systems;
Unrecognised cruise missiles;■
Spurious attacks;■
Airspace fratricides;■
No ability for collaborative planning.■
The integration of sensors and shooters would have improved these situ-
ations significantly.
Today, our IAMD systems have unique C2 tools that do not communicate
well with each other. Warfighters require an integrated approach to C2, so
they are not inundated with so many tools that there is insufficient time for
effective usage, especially in a highly dynamic threat environment. IAMD is
joined up by its very nature. The tools must allow for collaborative planning
and execution, otherwise significant combat power is lost and the risk of
fratricide or failure to protect friendly forces increases.
IBCS – Integrating
Air and MissileDefence SystemsIn December 2009, the US Army awarded
Northrop Grumman its Integrated Air and Missile
Defence Battle Command System contract to
address myriad Command and Control problems
encountered in recent wars. The programme
objective was to develop a common battlecommand system for various sensors and weapons
to enhance the US Army’s integrated air and
missile defence capability. The company explains
how it met the challenge
Integrating sensors will help create situational understanding that can
mean the difference between life and death. This understanding should
come from all C2 systems having a common understanding of the air
situation – seeing the same ‘truth’ of a Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP).
The SIAP is the product of fused, common, continuous, unambiguous
tracks of all airborne objects in the surveillance area, so that joint military
operations share a single graphical representation of the battlespace. Each
object, whether friendly or a threat, should be represented by a single
symbol on the screen and associated with a single identification. There
should not be a picture for ballistic missiles and a separate picture for
air-breathing airborne objects, and certainly not multiple symbology repre-
senting the same airborne object.
Situational understanding goes beyond situational awareness by
adding the warfighter’s cognitive understanding of the environment.
Unprecedented connectivity and value-added information has to be in the
right form to enable warfighters to take effective and timely action. Making
sure that the system capabilities are intuitively useable for the soldier is
absolutely critical when split-second, life-saving decisions have to be made.
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Design philosophies that ignore the warfighter will result in system limita-
tions that force warfighters to create inefficient workarounds.
In addition, the warfighter needs tailorable decision aides. Decision aides
that are hard-coded into the software during system design and develop-
ment often do not meet the needs of specific situations. The system has
to be scalable and adaptable to the changing threat environment, and the
range of operations from tactical through strategic.
Making use of technology advances and industry best practices
The IAMD components are a mix of newly fielded systems fighting along-
side weapons fielded decades ago. For example, the Patriot missile was
first fielded by NATO during the mid 1980s and is expected to be around
for at least the next 20 years. This creates an integration challenge, since
technology, especially information technology, changes faster than our
procurement systems can keep up with.
One way to integrate two components is to define the interface between
them for sharing data. However, if a third component is added, there is
no guarantee that the three components will share all the same data. In
addition, whenever one of the components changes, the interface is
broken and costly to re-establish. Similarly, sensors and shooters that are
tightly coupled with their own C2 components are a hindrance to complete
integration and achieving full combat power.
The military is not alone in this integration challenge. With no tolerance
for approaches that cannot keep up with competition, the commercial world
concluded the environment in which our tools will operate is always likely to
be heterogeneous. Thus, it uses an open-systems approach embracing this.
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DEFENCE R&T
The system has to be scalable
and adaptable to the changing
threat environment
The Integrated Air and Missile Defence Battle Command
System (IBCS) produces a distributed Single Integrated
Air Picture (SIAP) among sensors and shooters
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Assuming that military operations will also be conducted in a heteroge-
neous environment, the non-proprietary Northrop Grumman approach for
IBCS uses a Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA)-based enterprise
architecture. This is not the software architecture of the components – the
enterprise architecture determines how the heterogeneous componentsinteract. Therefore, the enterprise can persist while individual components
can come and go. In this manner, the Northrop Grumman solution will
have the flexibility to allow for evolving missions, and the technologies for
achieving optimal information access, high performance and affordability
over the system’s life cycle.
While threats evolve and technologies change, the one constant is the
warfighter. Given advancements in technology, the IBCS programme is also
using extraordinary means to ensure that system capabilities are intuitively
usable for time-critical IAMD decisions. The Northrop Grumman IBCS
development team includes a human-computer interaction group of infor-
mation architects, communication scientists, cognitive and experimental
psychologists and graphics developers. IBCS features the user-centred
design philosophy that focuses on the needs, wants and limitations of the
warfighter. It involves prototyping concepts prior to development and vali-
dation testing of the design concepts with actual users.
Making battle command a more affordable, powerful weapon system
With the user-centred design philosophy that validates concepts with
warfighters before the software is built, the IBCS programme significantly
reduces its development costs. IBCS will deliver a more affordable battle
command capability by embracing the principles of modular open systems
to allow competition that drives down costs. In addition, IBCS will lower
system life-cycle costs by streamlining the training required for and main-
tenance of multiple, disparate systems.
By integrating the stovepiped systems in an open systems enterprise
architecture, the IBCS will provide major benefits in terms of performance
and operational flexibility. The IBCS creates a common C2 battle commandframework so warfighters can share the best information from all of the
sensors on the network for the same view of the integrated battlespace.
The system creates standard interfaces to ensure that current and future
systems can be easily incorporated, allowing warfighters to take advantage
of expanded sensor and weapon-system combinations.
In September 2011, IBCS played a key role in the Composite Track Network
Bridging Capability Demonstration that connected sensors and systems
from the US Army and other services for unprecedented real-time data
exchange to form a SIAP. Northrop Grumman’s IBCS track manager mod-
ules passed associated measurement reports from diverse sensors ‘over
the air’, which allowed participating service nodes to create the SIAP.
“This was a remarkable event to establish the foundation for real-time
sharing of extremely accurate information between ships, aircraft and
land-based air defence units for more effective engagement,” said Kelley
Zelickson, Northrop Grumman’s vice-president of air and missile defence
systems. “Northrop Grumman products clearly demonstrated the ability to
allow modular interoperability among disparate systems and networks.”
Northrop Grumman’s innovative approach to IBCS will allow the modu-
larity, scalability and adaptability required for collaborative missions and
dynamic battle execution in an integrated environment. The IBCS not only
maximises the power of existing assets, it is robust and flexible enough to
address emerging threats and the needs of tomorrow. ■
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DEFENCE R&T
The US Government’s view of MOSA
Open System
A system that employs modular design, uses widely supported and consensus-based standards for its key interfaces and has been subjected
to successful validation and verification tests to ensure the openness of its key interfaces.
Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA)
MOSA is an
integral part of all
acquisition strategies
to achieve affordable,
evolutionary and
joint combat
capability
Establish enabling environment Ease of change
Reduced total ownership cost
Reduced cycle time
Enabling joint integratedarchitecture and interoperability
Risk mitigation
Employ modular design
Designate key interfaces
Select open standards
Certify conformance
Vision Principles Benefits
Business TechnicalIndicators
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A
ir superiority enables Intelligence, Surveillance, Target
Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR), logistics and person-
nel battlespace mobility freedom, and the ability to deliver
weaponry in a rapid manner to any part of the battlefield. Air Vice-
Marshal (then Air Commodore) Stuart Atha, Air Officer Commanding
No 1 Group, Air Command, stated: “We set the condition for success, and
air power has an important role to play. We’re not going to win the will
of the Afghan people through air power alone, but through our actions
and the way we conduct those actions, we can win their support, and
thus make progress.”1 The use of air power in past conflicts set the same
conditions for success, most recently in Libya, in 2011.
Modern air platforms require large logistical footprints (airbases, per-
sonnel, weapons, consumables, operating and technical support) at high
fixed and variable costs, especially of energy. A recent study revealed that
military fuel usage has increased from 0.1 gallons/day/soldier during the
Second World War to 22 gallons/day/soldier in Afghanistan. When con-
sidering the associated supply chain, logistics, casualties and security,
the fully burdened cost of energy at the battlefield point of use can be
greater than the original purchase cost. Energy security, peak oil, fuel
Delivering Sustainable Air PowerGroup Captain Maurice Dixon, from the Royal Air Force, outlines the reasons why air power sustainability
is important and explains the steps being taken by the RAF to ensure that its bases, aircraft, equipment
and personnel are all playing their part in helping to achieve a smaller carbon footprint
shortage from the lack of availability, conflict (such as the current tensions
with Iran) and cost concerns in coming decades have focused militaries on
reducing their dependency on fossil fuels. The US Department of Defense
(DoD) has been advised to become independent of petroleum fuels for
all of its systems by 2040.
Unsustainable approach
Shrinking military budgets, increasing environmental legislation and
greater scarcity of critical resources make modern air power’s current
approach unsustainable. In 2010-11, RAF stations consumed more than one
billion kWh of energy, costing £51 million and emitting more than 345,000
tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2). They used three million litres of water and
produced 36,500 tonnes of waste. UK military aviation2 consumed 792 mil-
lion litres of fuel – costing £370 million and producing two million tonnes
of CO2 – as well as using some 64 per cent of the 1.2 billion litres of Ministry
of Defence (MoD) operational fuel consumed in 2010-11. RAF flying activity
uses 82 per cent of military aviation fuel and accounts for an increasing
percentage of the RAF budget, even more so as fuel prices rise. The wider
application of ‘green’ taxation and government ‘sustainable development’
An RAF Typhoon on a mission
over Libya adds to the UK
military’s aircraft fuel costs of
£370 million in 2011
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DEFENCE R&T
targets further drive the consideration of more sustainable options to
provide aviation training and force readiness, logistics support and the
delivery of operational effect on the battlefield.
It is increasingly important to address the future sustainability of deliv-
ering air power, be it logistical, operational or environmental. This article
focuses on environmental sustainability, but will also highlight the military
benefits that this delivers. A recent study conducted by the RAF addressed
six elements of delivering sustainable air power: external factors, decision-
making, airspace, infrastructure, air platforms and people behaviours.
External factors include UK political aspirations for global leadership
in sustainability, the introduction of European Union-wide legislation to
include aviation in carbon-trading schemes, increasing climate change and
the pressure on scarce resources to consume less. The MoD’s proactive
approach to sustainability has already influenced policymakers, enabling
it to fulfil its roles and obligations. Positive engagement with the UK
Government’s sustainability agenda has resulted in recognition of climate
change as a security threat multiplier in national security strategies, has
delivered wind farm-resilient radars, and initiated many energy efficiency
and clean energy projects, saving the MoD millions of pounds. Continued
forward-thinking, innovative sustainability engagement and leadership will
bring further MoD and UK benefits, with low-carbon and lean-resource
sustainable military solutions.
Strategy, force structure and procurement decision-making can deliver
direct and tangible benefits in whole-life cost, as well as in wider sustain-
ability. Procuring energy- and resource-efficient equipment and infrastruc-
ture, lean maintenance support services and training can generate more
effective capability with reduced costs and less impact on the environment.
The myth that ‘going green costs money’ has been countered many times
in the commercial world, and the ‘triple bottom line’ benefits (people,
planet, profits) apply just as much in the military context.
Savings through greater sustainability
However, sustainability investment decisions require a greater understand-
ing of likely whole-life consumables, fuel, disposal and other cost drivers.
Designing equipment to use less material and energy, fewer consumables,
and be reusable or recyclable, while delivering the specified output,
requires a refocus of procurement specifications. As already proven by
innovative Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S) organisation project
teams, whole-life sustainability approaches deliver substantial savings
through imaginative contracting. A more flexible MoD financial structure
would further encourage greater sustainable decision-making, particularly
if Resource Department Expenditure Limits (RDEL) and Capital Department
Expenditure Limits (CDEL) could be better coordinated across the budget
boundaries of capability providers and users.
Current air traffic management procedures and the limitations of older
military radars to deal with complex clutter (such as wind farms), result
in suboptimal airspace usage. This leads to extended flight times, reduced
aircraft handling capacity, increased aviation fuel use and cost, and higher
emissions and environmental impact. The MoD is fully engaged with civil
aviation authorities to share airspace use when not required for military
operations. The MoD is also in the vanguard for finding mitigation/adapta-
tion options to radar interference from wind farms, upgrading navigation
UAVs, such as the MQ-9 Reaper,
have a role to play in reducing
the military’s carbon footprint
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DEFENCE R&T
and reduced costs and environmental impact: the military triple-bottom-line benefits to people, profit/projected power, and planet.
UASs are routinely used today to deliver munitions and ISTAR on opera-
tions, and remotely piloted helicopters deliver logistics to US Marines in
Afghanistan. Undeniably, many UAS challenges remain, such as the desen-
sitisation of warfare through remote targeting, communications band-
width and lost communications procedures, and civil airspace operations.
Fortunately, UAS developments are rapidly addressing these issues. The
removal of piloted vehicle constraints will no doubt take air power doctrine,
tactics and operational effectiveness to a new level, improving all three sus-
tainable air power requirements (operational, logistical, environmental).
New principles must be embraced
Defence personnel attitude and behaviour is critical to delivering opera-
tionally essential, sustainable air power. The most sustainably defined,
designed and delivered equipment and airbase can be undermined by the
way they are operated. The MoD needs all personnel to understand and
embrace new principles to deliver the benefits of a sustainable military
capability. Every pound wasted in perpetuating the unsustainable procure-
ment, use and disposal of capability deprives the front line of thousands of
pounds cumulatively, and exacerbates future risks.
Delivering coherent, sustainable air power requires multinational
cooperation and coordination to ensure military interoperability. The RAF
is sponsoring Defence Science & Technology Laboratory research and
development programmes that collaborate with commercial sustainable
aviation, the DoD and other military sustainable aviation programmes. The
RAF and USAF are also collaborating on how to reduce fuel and energy use.
Fossil fuels, while the lifeblood and enabler of air power, are also its
Achilles’ heel. A sustainable approach generates the benefits of significant
reputational advantages, energy independence from fossil fuels, opera-tional resilience and business continuity. Energy, water and waste-efficient
airbases will reduce environmental impact, through-life costs, and site
energy vulnerability, especially by exploiting the potential of on-site
clean energy. Collaborating and maintaining low-carbon energy interop-
erability with allies will increase operational effectiveness, flexibility
and sustainability. Lighter, agile, mission-adaptable and fuel-efficient
UASs will take air power to a new level, evolving RAF doctrine beyond
the current limitations of manned aircraft.
The MoD increasingly understands its growing supply chain, logistics,
energy, operational and environmental vulnerability to delivering future air
power. Becoming more resource and fuel efficient significantly reduces the
burden on the logistics chain, minimises the impact on the environment,
lowers costs and increases operational endurance and resilience, especially
when deployed. The RAF and DE&S have proactive and successful pro-
grammes under way, addressing many sustainability risks, especially the
certification of all aircraft on a 50:50 synthetic/fossil fuel blend by 2013.
The move to fully integrate sustainable air power is already delivering
substantial environmental, logistical, cost and operational benefits to the
RAF. Sustainable air power is efficient, effective, resilient and future-proof
air power. The RAF recognises it as both fundamental and mission critical
to its future operational effectiveness. ■
The RAF will certify all of its
aircraft to use 50:50 synthetic/
fossil fuel blends by 2013
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DEFENCE R&T
On 15 and 16 November 2011, RUSI’s Cyber Security Conference
looked at the challenges facing national security from a range
of cyber-threats. Over the two days, speakers from government,
industry, academia and law enforcement presented some frightening
statistics as to the extent of national vulnerabilities in cyberspace. In
short, unless comprehensive and rigorous measures are taken to secure
data, almost nothing is safe. Even the scoreboard at 2011’s Wimbledon
tennis championship was attacked no fewer than 80,000 times, accord-
ing to IBM’s Chris Nott.
The conference speakers highlighted the complexity of the issues and
reinforced the message that crime on the web covers a multitude of dif-
ferent activities, from child abuse to the theft of intellectual property and
Cyber Security Conference UpdateLast November’s RUSI Cyber Security Conference brought together leaders in cyber-crime prevention
and underlined the need for everybody to tighten their security procedures. Simon Michell reports
classified government information, as well as threats to critical national
infrastructure. Some of it is state-funded, while some other aspects are
perpetrated by organised crime. Political activists are using the web to
influence and/or coerce government organisations and commercial com-
panies to take notice of their views, as witnessed by the Wikileaks saga.
Some of it is just vandalism. Moreover, even petty thieves are monitor-
ing social networks to see, for example, when homes are empty so that
they can be burgled – a lesson to us all not to announce to the world
that we will soon be taking a short break in the sun.
The cyber dimension is now so pervasive that any effective defence
has to involve almost everybody, whether they own a computer, smart-
phone, PDA, tablet or not. This presents governments with a massive
RUSI’s two-day Cyber Security
Conference got under way on
15 November 2011
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DEFENCE R&T
problem as, according to Andrea Rigoni, director general of the Global
Cyber Security Center, almost 78 per cent of the internet is in private
hands. However, promoting the secure use of the internet and sharing
best practice are tasks that have to be taken on by governments, but are
not those that they can easily enforce.
A strong conference theme was the need for information sharing.
Despite the natural propensity for organisations to try and hide their
vulnerabilities and security lapses, delegates were told that they should
now think in terms of needing to share information in order to keep
pace with the cyber threat. But this should be done in a tactical way.
But, according to the head of KPMG’s UK Cyber Response Team, Martin
Jordan: “You have to carefully decide what information you need to
share and why. It is important to steer clear of information overload.”
Information sharing
Genuine signs that a ‘dare to share’ attitude is becoming more wide-
spread do exist. There are, for example, already groups within commerce,
banking, pharmaceuticals and retail that have become competent at this.
This message was reinforced by Ronald E Plesco Jr, president and CEO of
the US-based National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance, which spe-cialises in real-time sharing of intelligence to quickly neutralise cyber-
threats. Plesco revealed how the UK’s Serious Organised Crime Agency
had expressed an interest in joining his organisation.
Police forces worldwide have also introduced a successful information-
sharing infrastructure and ethos that sees them regularly handing over
significant data with international partners over the internet.
But before this can be done in a systematic and productive manner,
trust must be built. “Sharing information is regulated by trust, but there
is no trust without understanding of cultural differences,” explained
Delegates were told that they
should now think in terms ofneeding to share information
Interpol’s Kris D’Hoore, before emphasising the need for effective pro-
tection of that information exchange to further enhance that trust.
The conference took place two weeks before the publication of the
UK Government’s cyber-security strategy, ‘Protecting and Promoting the UK
in a Digital World’, in which Government Communications Headquarters(GCHQ) is given a pivotal role. Jonathan Hoyle, director general for
Government and Industry Cyber Security, used the conference to under-
line that GCHQ is fast becoming the central hub for UK cyber-security.
This is alongside numerous newly created UK organisations, not least
the Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance (OCSIA), the
Metropolitan Police Service’s Central e-Crime Unit, as well as three key
Cyber-Emergency Response Teams – the UK Government Computer
Emergency Response Team (GovCert UK), MoD Computer Emergency
Response Teams and the Combined Security Incident Response
Team (CSIRTUK).
The proceeds of cyber-crime
Hoyle recounted how GCHQ shares information with industry in a number
of ways, in some cases by ‘shock and awe’ visits in which a GCHQ team
reveals to a company the full extent to which they have been penetrated.
During a fascinating question-and-answer session, industry delegates
revealed a certain amount of frustration, however, with what they and
their colleagues perceived as a one-way street in information shar-
ing with the UK Government. Part of their frustration concerned the
bureaucratic nature of the system in which information supplied to a
UK Government organisation found itself being classified and then
not available to others. A possible solution to this problem, in terms
of defence-industry contractors, might be the establishment of the UK
Niteworks partnership as an information-sharing hub.
The presence of the Metropolitan Police Service at the conference,headed by Detective Superintendent Charlie McMurdie, provided a
salient lesson for the overall debate. True, the loss of intellectual property
and state secrets must be prevented, but the other side of cyber-crime is
what happens to the vast sums that are stolen over the internet.
Much of this money is reinvested in even more criminal activity, includ-
ing a black market in cyber-tools in which the loan of the Zeus Trojan
used for stealing banking information was valued at £5,000. Alarmingly,
an enterprising hacker managed to reproduce the virus and has put it on
sale at a greatly reduced rate. ■
The Cyber Security Conference
panels were kept busy with a
barrage of questions
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RUSI/Cranfield Defence
Acquisition Reform23 May 2012Defence Capability Centre, Shrivenham
Following the Chicago Summit, this will be
30-31 May 2012
www.rusi.org/events
Missile Defence Conference 2012
structural reform within the Ministry of Defence
www.rusi.org/defenceacquisition2012
www.rusi.org/missiledefence
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RDS INTERVIEW
What exactly is the RAF Regiment?
The RAF Regiment was formed by a royal warrant awarded by George VI
on 1 February 1942 to protect RAF airfields from attack. As a distinct Corps
that is totally integrated within the RAF, we are unique within UK Defence.
While our raison d’être remains the specialist defence of airfields, in all
we provide six core functions that are vital for the RAF, UK Defence and
the civil authorities. In short, these are: Force Protection (FP); Command
and Control (C2) and integration; ground combat; FP training; Chemical,
Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) defence; and air-land integra-
tion. We also embed the warfighting spirit throughout the entire RAF as
the so-called ‘Guardians of the Military Soul of the RAF’. Our main task,
however, is to defend airfields.
Why can’t the Army do that?
In its core function, the RAF Regiment provides FP C2 to integrate the
entire range of security tasks inside a base, on its perimeter, and in the
Ground Defence Area (GDA) outside the base. RAF Regiment field squad-
rons operate within this GDA (typically up to 500 sq km around an airfield)
to prevent stand-off attack against the airfield and the aircraft flying in and
out. In theory of course, the Army could reconfigure to defend RAF air-
fields, just as the RAF Regiment could reconfigure to perform a number of
Army functions, but in both cases neither as effectively nor efficiently.
The reason we are so effective is because we are a fully integrated air-
minded element of the RAF. The simple fact is that in order to defend air-
fields (and the aircraft flying in and out of them) you cannot separate air
operations from the FP operations that facilitate them – the two require
an intrinsic understanding that we term ‘air-mindedness’ across the opera-
tional spectrum. Not only does the RAF Regiment understand what is going
on in and around airfields from an air operations point of view, but the
air operations component also understands exactly what we are capable
of and how we operate. This has implications beyond FP C2 and ground
combat – important as that is. It links to air-power doctrine, aircraft tactics
and equipment procurement, and it embeds the Regiment into the ethos
of the RAF right from the day that a man or woman joins the RAF.
The reason why the RAF Regiment is so efficient is the value for money
it offers by providing a number of related capabilities in addition to FP C2
and air-minded ground combat. More than 40 per cent of our NCOs are
responsible for the FP training of RAF airmen and women throughout their
careers in core military skills. We also have a vital contribution to air-land
integration through the command of Forward Air Control (FAC) training for
Leading the guardians
of the Royal Air Force’smilitary soul Simon Michell talks to the former Commandant General of the Royal Air
Force Regiment, Air Commodore Russell La Forte CBE, to discover the
nature of the work carried out by the corps and outline the impact of
the latest Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR)
UK Defence and the provision of around 50 per cent of the UK’s Tactical
Air Control Parties (TACPs) – including for 3 Commando Brigade and 16 Air
Assault Brigade. With the RAF as lead service for CBRN, the Regiment also
provides all of the UK’s specialist counter-CBRN capabilities.
So a better question would be: could the Army fulfil all of the RAF
Regiment’s capabilities in as effective and cost-efficient manner? As con-
firmed once again in the SDSR, the answer is no.
Why do airfields need to be defended?
Control of the air is essential to success in any military endeavour, and air
power requires secure airfields from which to deliver it. Airfields are invari-
ably the centre of gravity of military operations – they are logistic, as well astactical, hubs. They are a magnet for all sorts of other units and capabilities,
and they contain some very expensive assets in the form of fast jets, trans-
porters as well as ISTAR (Intelligence Surveillance, Target Acquisition and
Reconnaissance) platforms – all of which are vulnerable on the ground.
Afghanistan is a classic example of the need to defend airfields. Air power
is NATO’s asymmetric advantage over the Taliban, and the Taliban know it.
The Soviets failed to secure control of the air from the ground when the
Mujahadeen acquired MANPADs (man-portable air-defence systems) – and
after losing more than 450 aircraft over a 10-year campaign, suffered stra-
tegic failure as a result. When NATO forces stopped patrolling outside the
wire of Kandahar Airfield (KAF), the Taliban was able to attack it almost at
will. They regularly sent in rockets and launched suicide attacks on the base.
It was only after RAF Regiment FP C2 integrated base security and pro-
vided GDA patrolling that the threat level to KAF receded to acceptable lev-
els. Now, if the dismounted close combat forces defending KAF were not
tied to that role under Air Component command, there would be pressure
to redeploy them to other duties.
What has the RAF Regiment been doing recently?
Our main deployments have been in Afghanistan and Iraq. Indeed, we were
the last UK ground-holding troops to leave Iraq when we vacated Basra
Airport in 2009. Since then, our primary effort has been in Afghanistan.
For a short while we were in Kabul as part of ISAF 1, but from 2005 to 2011
we were FP lead at KAF. During part of that time we were in both KAF and
Camp Bastion, but now we are centred on Bastion, where we work along-
side the US Marine Corps (USMC), which is co-located at Bastion in Camp
Leatherneck. The UK is the Airfield Operating Authority at Bastion, and the
Regiment provides the FP C2 and a squadron for GDA patrolling. While
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RDS INTERVIEW
we work for the airbase Commander (an RAF Group Captain), off base we
work through the USMC HQ Group at Camp Leatherneck. This works very
well. The USMC is a highly professional organisation, with which we have
an excellent relationship.
We do have units elsewhere providing discrete capabilities for other UKagencies, and we have 16 men mentoring the Afghan police. We also have
people at constant readiness to support the civil authorities and we contrib-
ute people to the Joint Counter Terrorism Training Advisory Team (JCTTAT)
that helps with counter-terrorism capacity-building in certain countries.
Sadly, there is a cost to this high tempo. Over the past four years we have
lost 11 men killed in action, as well as a larger number seriously wounded.
What was the impact of SDSR on the Corps?
Currently, the RAF Regiment field force is organised into eight FP Wing
Headquarters (FP Wg HQs) responsible for integrated C2 and eight field
squadrons that undertake GDA patrolling. There are also two CBRN and
eight RAuxAF (Reservist) Squadrons – one of which is CBRN.
As part of SDSR, by 2015 (until which time we are fully committed to
Afghanistan) we will lose two of these FP Wg HQs and two field squadrons
– in sum, 25 per cent of our field force, about 350-400 men.
The second outcome will be a commensurate reduction of our Reserves,
which may take place before 2015. The exact number will be determined
as part of a wider review of RAF Reserves, but will entail the re-roling (not
disbandment) of some RAuxAF FP squadrons.
The third outcome concerns CBRN. Following an MoD decision to dis-
pense with certain CBRN capabilities, provided by the Army element of
the Joint CBRN Regiment, the unit was disbanded on 14 December 2011
and replaced with the Defence CBRN Wing (20 Wg RAF Regiment), wholly
manned by the RAF Regiment.
What are the RAF Regiment equipment priorities?
If I had a shopping list of things I need, most of it would be ISTAR equip-
ment. This would include a range of base ISTAR assets, and so, naturally,
we are an interested party in Project Outpost, which is attempting to
draw in some of the base ISTAR procured under the Urgent Operational
Requirement (UOR) system into the overall Equipment Programme (EP).
Some of this work is ongoing as part of the work that the Cortez Team
is undertaking on an integrated suite of measures – everything from bal-loons/aerostats to cameras, ground sensors and radar for FOBs and larger
hubs. But, what I would really like is good, persistent, tactical ISTAR cover-
age across the GDA. This could include aerostats such as the one deployed
north of KAF GDA at FOB Luke, or perhaps UAVs. As airborne assets near
an airfield, they would need to be employed under a FP Wg HQ to ensure
safe integration with air operations.
As far as vehicles on operations in Afghanistan are concerned, we draw
what we need from the existing pooled system. This covers a suite of
vehicles from Jackals, WMIKs (stripped-down Land Rovers with Weapons
Mounted Installation Kit) and Ridgebacks. What we need are relatively
small, fast all-terrain vehicles that allow us to get off the main tracks and
paths where most of the IEDs (improvised explosive devices) are set. Like
the ISTAR equipment, there is an aspiration to draw these into the EP
as permanent assets. We have identified what we need for a contingent
operation – not specifically Afghanistan.
Of course we are not doing this in isolation from the rest of the dis-
mounted close combat community. The Army and Royal Marines will be
identifying their requirements as well. For us though, it is important to be
fast and agile and not to be enclosed within an armoured box. The GDA is
our real estate, complete with local inhabitants. They do not like what they
perceive as big tanks tearing through their villages ripping up their roads
and scaring the children. This creates resentment. Having an open-topped
vehicle allows us to get eye contact with the locals – form a relationship
with them, listen to the mood music in the villages. This is extremely
important for insurgency operations – it’s a ‘hearts and minds’ thing. ■
For further details on the RAF Regiment’s history and roles, see ‘The RAF
Regiment – More Than the Sum of Its Parts’ on page 64
RAF Regiment gunners keep watch
during a meeting with a local shopkeeper
in Helmand province, Afghanistan
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INDEX OF ADVERTISERS
Babcock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
BMT Defence Services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
CAE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
Finmeccanica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .96
Green Hills Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Iveco Defence Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
L3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Nexter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Objectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54, 67, 91
Saab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Steria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
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YOUR MISSION-CRITICAL DATA...
DELIVERED
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